@oked/sdk 0.1.7 → 0.2.0

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Files changed (2) hide show
  1. package/dist/classify.js +314 -124
  2. package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/classify.js CHANGED
@@ -2,10 +2,25 @@ import path from "path";
2
2
  import os from "os";
3
3
  import { findSqlInCommand } from "./describe.js";
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  import { TIER_ORDER } from "./degraded.js";
5
- // Tier 1 - safe: auto-allow, no notification (Read, Glob, ls, git status, etc.)
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- // Tier 2 - warning: terminal log only, no push (Write/Edit inside project dir)
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- // Tier 3 - review: push notification required (Write/Edit outside project, unknown bash)
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- // Tier 4 - high_stakes: push + number matching (rm -rf, git push, DROP TABLE, etc.)
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+ // Classification is EFFECT-BASED, not command-name-based. We don't keep an
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+ // allowlist of "safe commands"; instead we detect the few categories of effect
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+ // that warrant a human in the loop, and DEFAULT TO NO PROMPT for everything
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+ // else. Running a command, reading, copying a file, a DB SELECT, or deleting a
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+ // /tmp scratch file must never prompt — only destructive, irreversible, or
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+ // outward-facing operations do.
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+ //
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+ // Tier 1 - safe: auto-allow, silent. No detected side effect (reads, queries,
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+ // and any command we don't recognize as mutating — the default).
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+ // Tier 2 - warning: terminal log only, no push. A reversible LOCAL mutation
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+ // (file create/copy/move, /tmp delete, local git, install,
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+ // code-exec, SQL INSERT/CREATE).
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+ // Tier 3 - review: push notification, tap to approve. Prompt-worthy but not
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+ // catastrophic: sensitive-path writes (~/.ssh, shell rc, system
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+ // dirs, OKed's own config), sudo, outward message/email sends.
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+ // Tier 4 - high_stakes: push + number matching. Destructive / irreversible /
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+ // external: rm of non-temp data, DROP/TRUNCATE/DELETE FROM,
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+ // git push / reset --hard / branch -D, mkfs / dd-to-device /
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+ // shutdown, curl POST/DELETE, ssh/scp, npm publish, kill.
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  // Tools that are always safe (read-only, no side effects)
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  const SAFE_TOOLS = new Set([
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  "Read",
@@ -40,77 +55,26 @@ const SAFE_TOOL_ALIASES = new Set([
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  const REVIEW_TOOLS = new Set([]);
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  // Tools that are always high stakes
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  const HIGH_STAKES_TOOLS = new Set([]);
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- // Bash commands classified as safe (read-only, informational)
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- const SAFE_COMMANDS = [
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- /^ls\b/,
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- /^pwd$/,
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- /^echo\b/,
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- /^cat\b/,
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- /^head\b/,
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- /^tail\b/,
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- /^wc\b/,
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- /^date$/,
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- /^whoami$/,
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- /^which\b/,
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- /^type\b/,
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- /^file\b/,
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- /^stat\b/,
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- /^du\b/,
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- /^df\b/,
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- /^uname\b/,
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- /^env$/,
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- /^printenv\b/,
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- /^node\s+(-v|--version)/,
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- /^npm\s+(list|ls|--version|-v|view|info|outdated|audit)\b/,
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- /^npx\s+-v/,
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- /^git\s+(status|log|diff|branch|remote|show|tag|stash\s+list|ls-files|ls-tree|ls-remote|check-ignore|check-attr|rev-parse|rev-list|describe|cat-file|blame|shortlog|reflog|name-rev|whatchanged|for-each-ref|symbolic-ref|merge-base|var|grep|count-objects|show-ref|cherry|verify-commit|fsck)\b/,
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- /^git\s+config\s+(--get|--get-all|--get-regexp|--list|-l)\b/,
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- /^docker\s+(ps|images|inspect|logs)\b/,
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- /^docker\s+compose\s+(ps|logs)\b/,
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- /^tree\b/,
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- /^find\b/,
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- /^grep\b/,
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- /^rg\b/,
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- /^fd\b/,
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- /^jq\b/,
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- /^curl\s+-s.*\|\s*(jq|python|node)/, // curl piped to parser (usually read-only)
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- /^curl\b/, // curl without -X defaults to GET (high-stakes patterns checked first)
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- // himalaya (email CLI) read-only ops. Listing/reading mail or folder state
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- // never mutates anything remotely. Only `message send|reply|forward` and
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- // `message delete` / `folder delete|expunge|purge` matter; those land in
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- // the review/high-stakes paths.
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- /^himalaya\s+(account|folder|envelope|message\s+(?:read|export|search|copy|move)|attachment\s+(?:download|list)|template|search)\b/,
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- // cd just changes directory — no side effect of its own. Any dangerous
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- // command chained after it (`cd x && rm -rf`) is caught per-stage.
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- /^cd\b/,
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- // sed without -i / --in-place only prints to stdout (read-only). In-place
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- // edits are detected as a write op (below) before this is reached.
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- /^sed\b/,
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- // gh read-only subcommands — listing/viewing PRs, issues, runs, etc.
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- /^gh\s+(pr|issue|repo|run|workflow|release|api)\s+(list|view|status|diff|checks)\b/,
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- // Test runners — running the project's own tests is part of the dev loop.
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- // (Arbitrary node/npx/python execution is `warning`, see WARNING_COMMANDS.)
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- /^npm\s+(test|t)\b/,
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- /^npx\s+(tsx|ts-node|jest|vitest|mocha|ava|cypress|playwright|tsc)\b/,
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- /^(jest|vitest|mocha|pytest|ava)\b/,
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- /^python3?\s+-m\s+pytest\b/,
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- // Shell control-flow keywords. A compound like `for f in *; do cmd; done`
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- // is split on `;` into stages; these keyword stages carry no risk of their
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- // own, and any real command in the body is classified per-stage. Dangerous
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- // commands hidden in a $(...) on a keyword line are still caught by the
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- // high-stakes scan, which runs on the full command first.
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- /^(for|while|until|do|done|then|else|elif|fi|case|esac|if|select)\b/,
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- /^(done|fi|esac|\}|\{|:|true|false)\s*$/,
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- ];
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- // Bash commands classified as high stakes (destructive, irreversible, external)
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- const HIGH_STAKES_COMMANDS = [
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+ // NOTE: there is intentionally NO "safe commands" allowlist. Under the
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+ // effect-based model, anything we don't detect as a mutation or a prompt-worthy
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+ // effect IS safe by default (reads, queries, `ls`, `grep`, `jq`, `awk`, `sort`,
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+ // unknown commands, …). We only enumerate the things that DO warrant a log
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+ // (WARNING_*) or a prompt (REVIEW_*, HIGH_STAKES_*).
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+ // File deletion (rm/rmdir/trash). Checked PER-STAGE (not on the full command)
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+ // so the ephemeral-temp downgrade can run first: `something; rm /tmp/x` must be
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+ // warning, but `rm /tmp/x` mixed with a non-temp delete in another stage stays
66
+ // high_stakes. Matching the bare word also catches it inside a loop body or a
67
+ // $(...) substitution stage.
68
+ const DELETE_PATTERNS = [
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  /\brm\b/,
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- /\brm\b\s+(?:-[^\s]*[rf][^\s]*\s+)*-[^\s]*[rf][^\s]*\b/,
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- /\brm\s+--recursive\b/,
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- /\brm\b.*\s+\//, // rm with absolute path
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  /\brmdir\b/,
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  /\btrash\b/,
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  /\btrash-put\b/,
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+ ];
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+ // Bash commands classified as high stakes (destructive, irreversible, external).
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+ // Scanned on the FULL command (some patterns, e.g. download|shell, span a pipe).
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+ // File deletion lives in DELETE_PATTERNS (per-stage) instead, see above.
77
+ const HIGH_STAKES_COMMANDS = [
114
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  /\bgit\s+push\b/,
115
79
  /\bgit\s+reset\s+--hard\b/,
116
80
  /\bgit\s+clean\s+-f/,
@@ -123,10 +87,6 @@ const HIGH_STAKES_COMMANDS = [
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87
  // -c/-e, interpreter -e/-c bodies, heredocs), then classifySqlSeverity.
124
88
  /\bdocker\s+(rm|rmi|system\s+prune)\b/,
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  /\bdocker\s+compose\s+down\b/,
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- /\bkill\b/,
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- /\bpkill\b/,
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- /\bkillall\b/,
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- /\bchmod\s+777\b/,
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90
  /\bcurl\s+.*-X\s*(DELETE|PUT|POST|PATCH)\b/i,
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91
  /\bcurl\s+.*--request\s*(DELETE|PUT|POST|PATCH)\b/i,
132
92
  // curl flags that send a request body (POST/PUT/PATCH) without an explicit -X
@@ -152,36 +112,73 @@ const HIGH_STAKES_COMMANDS = [
152
112
  /\bhimalaya\s+message\s+delete\b/,
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113
  /\bhimalaya\s+folder\s+(delete|expunge|purge)\b/,
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  /\bhimalaya\s+account\s+delete\b/,
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+ // Overwriting a raw block device (`> /dev/sda`, `… > /dev/nvme0n1`) destroys a
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+ // disk irreversibly. (dd to a device is in HIGH_STAKES_STAGE.)
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+ />\s*\/dev\/(sd|nvme|hd|disk|mmcblk|vd)\w*/,
155
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  ];
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- // Commands that auto-allow without a phone prompt but are logged (warning):
157
- // reversible/local actions where an audit line is enough.
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+ // Destructive / irreversible commands matched PER-STAGE at the start of a stage
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+ // (after stripping a leading `sudo `), so the destructive WORD can't be hit
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+ // inside an argument or a commit message (`git commit -m "kill the flaky test"`
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+ // must not be high_stakes). These don't span pipes, so per-stage `^`-anchoring
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+ // is both safe and precise.
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+ const HIGH_STAKES_STAGE = [
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+ // Filesystem / disk destruction.
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+ /^mkfs(\.\w+)?\b/,
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+ /^mkswap\b/,
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+ /^(fdisk|parted|gparted)\b/,
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+ /^dd\b.*\bof=\/dev\//,
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+ /^shred\b/,
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+ /^truncate\b/, // `truncate -s 0 file` wipes contents
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+ /^find\b.*\s-delete\b/, // `find … -delete` removes matches
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+ // Power / system state.
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+ /^(shutdown|reboot|halt|poweroff)\b/,
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+ // Remote/outward file transfer (almost always a remote target).
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+ /^scp\b/,
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+ /^rsync\b.*(--delete|\s\S+:)/, // rsync --delete, or to a host:path target
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+ // Local git history/work destruction (force branch delete, tag delete,
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+ // dropping/clearing stashed work). Reversible local git (add/commit/stash) is
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+ // a WARNING marker below.
141
+ /^git\s+branch\s+(?:-D|--delete)\b/,
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+ /^git\s+tag\s+(?:-d|--delete)\b/,
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+ /^git\s+stash\s+(?:drop|clear)\b/,
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+ // Process termination.
145
+ /^kill\b/,
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+ /^pkill\b/,
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+ /^killall\b/,
148
+ // Wide-open permissions.
149
+ /^chmod\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*777\b/,
150
+ ];
151
+ // Outward-but-recoverable commands → review (prompt, simple approve). Sending
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+ // mail/messages can't be unsent, but it isn't destructive to local state, so it
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+ // sits below high_stakes. Matched per-stage. (Destructive himalaya verbs —
154
+ // message delete, folder purge — are high_stakes in the full scan above.)
155
+ const REVIEW_COMMANDS = [
156
+ /^himalaya\s+message\s+(send|reply|forward)\b/,
157
+ ];
158
+ // Local-mutation MARKERS for DETECTED side effects. These never gate a prompt —
159
+ // under the effect-based model anything not flagged destructive/outward/sensitive
160
+ // already auto-allows. They exist only to pick the `warning` (logged) vs `safe`
161
+ // (silent) label, and cover the local mutations we can recognize by shape but
162
+ // that aren't a plain file write (those are handled by extractShellWriteOps).
163
+ //
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+ // Opaque code execution (node/npx/python/claude/test runners) is intentionally
165
+ // NOT here: we can't tell whether it mutated anything, and a destructive effect
166
+ // buried inside `node -e …` would slip through regardless of the label — so
167
+ // logging it adds terminal noise without buying safety. It stays `safe`, just
168
+ // like any other unrecognized command. A real file write it performs is a
169
+ // separate Bash/Write call that gets classified on its own.
158
170
  const WARNING_COMMANDS = [
159
- // Local, reversible git ops — branch/stage/commit/stash/switch. They touch
160
- // only the local repo and can be undone (amend, reset, checkout).
161
- // Destructive/remote git (push, reset --hard, clean, checkout -- .) is matched
162
- // by HIGH_STAKES_COMMANDS above and wins first. `git stash drop|clear` is
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- // excluded — those discard stashed work — so it stays `review`.
171
+ // Local, reversible git writes — stage/commit/switch/stash. They mutate the
172
+ // local repo but can be undone (amend, reset, checkout). Destructive git
173
+ // (push, reset --hard, branch -D, stash drop/clear) is caught above and wins.
164
174
  /^git\s+add\b/,
165
175
  /^git\s+commit\b/,
166
176
  /^git\s+checkout\s+-b\b/,
167
177
  /^git\s+switch\b/,
168
178
  /^git\s+stash\b(?!\s+(?:drop|clear))/,
169
- // PR creation is reversible (a PR can be closed); the underlying branch push
170
- // is separately high_stakes.
171
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  /^gh\s+pr\s+create\b/,
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- // Arbitrary code execution (node/npx/python/npm run/bun/deno). The spawned
173
- // process can do anything and its syscalls don't pass back through OKed, so
174
- // we don't prompt but keep a local trail. Known test runners and read-only
175
- // version flags are handled as `safe` (SAFE_COMMANDS) before reaching here.
176
- /^node\b/,
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- /^npx\b/,
178
- /^python3?\b/,
179
- /^npm\s+run\b/,
180
- /^bun\b/,
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- /^deno\b/,
182
- // Package installs run dependency postinstall scripts (code execution), so
183
- // they're not "safe" — but they're a constant part of the dev loop, so log
184
- // (warning) rather than prompt.
180
+ // Package installs always mutate node_modules and run dependency postinstall
181
+ // scripts — a known local mutation worth an audit line.
185
182
  /^npm\s+(install|ci|i|update|upgrade|rebuild|prune|dedupe)\b/,
186
183
  /^(pnpm|yarn)\s+(install|add|ci|up|upgrade)\b/,
187
184
  ];
@@ -209,14 +206,21 @@ function isEphemeralPath(filePath) {
209
206
  function isSensitiveWritePath(filePath) {
210
207
  if (!filePath)
211
208
  return true; // unknown target → err toward review
209
+ const home = os.homedir();
210
+ // Expand a leading `~` / `$HOME` / `${HOME}` to the real home dir BEFORE
211
+ // resolving. In a shell `echo x > ~/.zshrc` the tilde IS the home dir, but
212
+ // path.resolve treats `~` as a literal segment under cwd, which would miss
213
+ // sensitive home targets (shell rc, ~/.ssh, …) and silently downgrade them.
214
+ const expanded = filePath
215
+ .replace(/^~(?=\/|$)/, home)
216
+ .replace(/^\$\{?HOME\}?(?=\/|$)/, home);
212
217
  let resolved;
213
218
  try {
214
- resolved = path.resolve(filePath);
219
+ resolved = path.resolve(expanded);
215
220
  }
216
221
  catch {
217
222
  return true;
218
223
  }
219
- const home = os.homedir();
220
224
  const underHome = (rel) => {
221
225
  const base = path.join(home, rel);
222
226
  return resolved === base || resolved.startsWith(base + path.sep);
@@ -310,6 +314,7 @@ function splitTopLevel(cmd) {
310
314
  const out = [];
311
315
  let cur = "";
312
316
  let quote = null;
317
+ let subDepth = 0; // depth inside $( ... ) / `...` command substitutions
313
318
  let i = 0;
314
319
  while (i < cmd.length) {
315
320
  const ch = cmd[i];
@@ -326,6 +331,31 @@ function splitTopLevel(cmd) {
326
331
  i++;
327
332
  continue;
328
333
  }
334
+ // Command substitution: keep `$( ... )` / backticks intact so a pipe or `;`
335
+ // inside (e.g. `V=$(curl … | sed …)`) isn't treated as a top-level operator.
336
+ if (ch === "$" && cmd[i + 1] === "(") {
337
+ subDepth++;
338
+ cur += "$(";
339
+ i += 2;
340
+ continue;
341
+ }
342
+ if (subDepth > 0 && ch === "(") {
343
+ subDepth++;
344
+ cur += ch;
345
+ i++;
346
+ continue;
347
+ }
348
+ if (subDepth > 0 && ch === ")") {
349
+ subDepth--;
350
+ cur += ch;
351
+ i++;
352
+ continue;
353
+ }
354
+ if (subDepth > 0) {
355
+ cur += ch;
356
+ i++;
357
+ continue;
358
+ }
329
359
  // Heredoc: consume the opener and the entire body (up to the closing
330
360
  // delimiter line) as part of the current segment, so operators inside a
331
361
  // heredoc fed to an interpreter (psql/node/…) aren't treated as separators.
@@ -379,21 +409,149 @@ function isEphemeralOnlyDeletion(command) {
379
409
  return false;
380
410
  return targets.every((a) => isEphemeralPath(unquote(a)));
381
411
  }
412
+ /**
413
+ * Classifies a single stage that begins with one or more `NAME=value`
414
+ * assignments (a pure assignment like `TARGET=abc`, an env prefix like
415
+ * `FOO=bar cmd`, or a capture like `V=$(cmd)`). Strips the leading assignments,
416
+ * then takes the worst tier of: each command-substitution inner found in the
417
+ * values, plus any trailing command. A purely literal assignment is `safe`.
418
+ * Returns null if the stage is not assignment-prefixed.
419
+ */
420
+ function classifyAssignmentStage(stage) {
421
+ if (!/^\w+=/.test(stage))
422
+ return null;
423
+ const inners = [];
424
+ let i = 0;
425
+ while (i < stage.length) {
426
+ const m = stage.slice(i).match(/^(\w+)=/);
427
+ if (!m)
428
+ break; // next token isn't an assignment → it's the command
429
+ i += m[0].length;
430
+ let quote = null;
431
+ while (i < stage.length) {
432
+ const ch = stage[i];
433
+ if (quote) {
434
+ if (ch === quote)
435
+ quote = null;
436
+ i++;
437
+ continue;
438
+ }
439
+ if (ch === '"' || ch === "'") {
440
+ quote = ch;
441
+ i++;
442
+ continue;
443
+ }
444
+ if (ch === "$" && stage[i + 1] === "(") {
445
+ let d = 1, j = i + 2;
446
+ while (j < stage.length && d > 0) {
447
+ if (stage[j] === "(")
448
+ d++;
449
+ else if (stage[j] === ")")
450
+ d--;
451
+ j++;
452
+ }
453
+ inners.push(stage.slice(i + 2, j - 1));
454
+ i = j;
455
+ continue;
456
+ }
457
+ if (ch === "`") {
458
+ let j = i + 1;
459
+ while (j < stage.length && stage[j] !== "`")
460
+ j++;
461
+ inners.push(stage.slice(i + 1, j));
462
+ i = j + 1;
463
+ continue;
464
+ }
465
+ if (/\s/.test(ch))
466
+ break; // end of this value
467
+ i++;
468
+ }
469
+ while (i < stage.length && /\s/.test(stage[i]))
470
+ i++;
471
+ }
472
+ const rest = stage.slice(i).trim();
473
+ let tier = "safe";
474
+ for (const inner of inners)
475
+ tier = maxTier(tier, classifyBashCommand(inner));
476
+ if (rest)
477
+ tier = maxTier(tier, classifyBashCommand(rest));
478
+ return tier;
479
+ }
480
+ /**
481
+ * `env [OPTION]... [NAME=VALUE]... [COMMAND [ARG]...]` runs COMMAND with a
482
+ * modified environment (a wrapper like sudo / an assignment prefix). Strips
483
+ * env's own options (`-i`, `-u NAME`, `-C dir`, `-`, `--unset=NAME`, …) and any
484
+ * leading NAME=VALUE pairs, then classifies the inner COMMAND from its original
485
+ * (quote-preserving) offset. `env` with no command just prints the environment
486
+ * → safe. Returns null if the stage doesn't start with `env`.
487
+ */
488
+ function classifyEnvStage(stage) {
489
+ const lead = /^env\b[ \t]*/.exec(stage);
490
+ if (!lead)
491
+ return null;
492
+ // env options that consume a following argument token.
493
+ const argTaking = new Set(["-u", "--unset", "-C", "--chdir", "-P", "-S", "--split-string"]);
494
+ const readToken = (from) => {
495
+ let i = from;
496
+ let quote = null;
497
+ while (i < stage.length) {
498
+ const ch = stage[i];
499
+ if (quote) {
500
+ if (ch === quote)
501
+ quote = null;
502
+ i++;
503
+ continue;
504
+ }
505
+ if (ch === '"' || ch === "'") {
506
+ quote = ch;
507
+ i++;
508
+ continue;
509
+ }
510
+ if (/\s/.test(ch))
511
+ break;
512
+ i++;
513
+ }
514
+ return i;
515
+ };
516
+ let i = lead[0].length;
517
+ while (i < stage.length) {
518
+ while (i < stage.length && /\s/.test(stage[i]))
519
+ i++;
520
+ if (i >= stage.length)
521
+ break;
522
+ const start = i;
523
+ i = readToken(i);
524
+ const tok = stage.slice(start, i);
525
+ if (tok === "-")
526
+ continue; // ignore-environment marker
527
+ if (tok.startsWith("--") && tok.includes("="))
528
+ continue; // --unset=NAME etc.
529
+ if (tok.startsWith("-")) {
530
+ if (argTaking.has(tok)) { // consume its argument token
531
+ while (i < stage.length && /\s/.test(stage[i]))
532
+ i++;
533
+ i = readToken(i);
534
+ }
535
+ continue;
536
+ }
537
+ if (/^\w+=/.test(tok))
538
+ continue; // NAME=VALUE
539
+ return classifyBashCommand(stage.slice(start).trim()); // first real word → the command
540
+ }
541
+ return "safe"; // `env` / `env -u X` with no command just prints the environment
542
+ }
382
543
  function classifyBashCommand(command) {
383
544
  if (!command)
384
545
  return "safe";
385
546
  // Strip heredoc bodies up front: their contents are literal data, not shell,
386
547
  // and must not be scanned for high-stakes tokens, operators, or redirects.
387
548
  const trimmed = stripHeredocBodies(command).trim();
388
- // rm/trash of only ephemeral temp files → warning (before the high-stakes
389
- // scan, which would otherwise match the bare `rm`).
390
- if (isEphemeralOnlyDeletion(trimmed))
391
- return "warning";
392
549
  // High-stakes scan on the FULL command, before any splitting. These patterns
393
550
  // use \b and several intentionally span an operator (e.g. `curl … | bash`,
394
551
  // `wget … | sh` — download-and-execute), so they have to be matched against
395
552
  // the whole string. Most-restrictive-wins: a high-stakes match anywhere in a
396
- // compound command takes the whole command to high_stakes.
553
+ // compound command takes the whole command to high_stakes. (File deletion is
554
+ // NOT here — it's per-stage below so the ephemeral-temp downgrade can run.)
397
555
  for (const pattern of HIGH_STAKES_COMMANDS) {
398
556
  if (pattern.test(trimmed))
399
557
  return "high_stakes";
@@ -407,6 +565,38 @@ function classifyBashCommand(command) {
407
565
  if (stages.length > 1) {
408
566
  return stages.reduce((worst, stage) => maxTier(worst, classifyBashCommand(stage)), "safe");
409
567
  }
568
+ // ---- single stage from here ----
569
+ // File deletion, per-stage so the ephemeral-temp carve-out can win: deleting
570
+ // only throwaway temp files (/tmp, $TMPDIR, /var/folders, …) → warning; any
571
+ // non-temp target (or the temp root itself) → high_stakes.
572
+ if (isEphemeralOnlyDeletion(trimmed))
573
+ return "warning";
574
+ for (const pattern of DELETE_PATTERNS) {
575
+ if (pattern.test(trimmed))
576
+ return "high_stakes";
577
+ }
578
+ // Destructive/irreversible single commands, matched at stage start with any
579
+ // leading `sudo ` stripped (so `sudo mkfs …` is still caught, but the word
580
+ // can't fire inside an argument). These don't span pipes, so `^`-anchoring is
581
+ // precise and avoids prose false-positives.
582
+ const bareStage = trimmed.replace(/^sudo\s+/, "");
583
+ for (const pattern of HIGH_STAKES_STAGE) {
584
+ if (pattern.test(bareStage))
585
+ return "high_stakes";
586
+ }
587
+ // Variable assignments: `NAME=value` (pure) or `NAME=$(cmd) rest` (env prefix
588
+ // / capture). Classify the command-substitution inners and any trailing
589
+ // command; a purely literal assignment is safe. Dangerous substitutions were
590
+ // already caught by the high-stakes/delete scans above.
591
+ const assignTier = classifyAssignmentStage(trimmed);
592
+ if (assignTier !== null)
593
+ return assignTier;
594
+ // `env [opts] [NAME=VAL]... cmd` runs cmd with a modified environment. Strip
595
+ // the env prefix and classify the inner command (a dangerous inner was already
596
+ // caught by the high-stakes full scan). Bare `env` just prints the env → safe.
597
+ const envTier = classifyEnvStage(trimmed);
598
+ if (envTier !== null)
599
+ return envTier;
410
600
  // sudo: privilege escalation. A high-stakes inner command was already caught
411
601
  // by the full-string scan above (\b patterns match through the `sudo` prefix);
412
602
  // anything else still warrants review.
@@ -419,34 +609,31 @@ function classifyBashCommand(command) {
419
609
  const sql = findSqlInCommand(trimmed);
420
610
  if (sql)
421
611
  return classifySqlSeverity(sql);
422
- // File-mutating shell patterns. Content-creation idioms (echo > X, tee,
423
- // dd of=, touch, sed -i) are the bypass route from a denied Write, so they're
424
- // classified exactly like the Write/Edit tool: `warning` unless a target is a
425
- // sensitive path (system dir, secret store, shell rc, OKed config), which
426
- // stays `review`. cp/mv (which can clobber/relocate existing files) stay
427
- // review.
612
+ // File-mutating shell patterns (echo > X, tee, dd of=, touch, sed -i, cp, mv).
613
+ // A file write/copy/move is a reversible LOCAL mutation, classified like the
614
+ // Write/Edit tool: `warning` (logged) — UNLESS a target is a sensitive path
615
+ // (system dir, secret store, shell rc, OKed config), which stays `review`.
616
+ // (Overwriting a raw block device was already caught by the high-stakes scan.)
428
617
  const ops = extractShellWriteOps(trimmed);
429
618
  if (ops.length > 0) {
430
- const creates = ops.filter((o) => o.kind !== "copy" && o.kind !== "move");
431
- if (creates.length > 0) {
432
- return creates.some((o) => isSensitiveWritePath(o.target)) ? "review" : "warning";
433
- }
434
- return "review";
619
+ const targets = ops.map((o) => o.target);
620
+ return targets.some((t) => isSensitiveWritePath(t)) ? "review" : "warning";
435
621
  }
436
- // Check safe patterns
437
- for (const pattern of SAFE_COMMANDS) {
622
+ // Outward sends (email/message) → review.
623
+ for (const pattern of REVIEW_COMMANDS) {
438
624
  if (pattern.test(trimmed))
439
- return "safe";
625
+ return "review";
440
626
  }
441
- // Reversible/local commands (local git, gh pr create, code execution) →
442
- // warning: logged, no phone approval. Checked after SAFE so read-only git
443
- // (status/log/`stash list`) and known test runners stay fully silent.
627
+ // Local-mutation markers (local git, code execution, installs) → warning:
628
+ // logged, no prompt. Everything else is a read or an unrecognized command with
629
+ // no detected effect — and under the effect-based model that means `safe`.
444
630
  for (const pattern of WARNING_COMMANDS) {
445
631
  if (pattern.test(trimmed))
446
632
  return "warning";
447
633
  }
448
- // Default: review (require approval for unknown commands)
449
- return "review";
634
+ // Default: safe. No destructive/outward/sensitive effect was detected, so we
635
+ // do NOT put a human in the loop just for "running a command".
636
+ return "safe";
450
637
  }
451
638
  function classifySqlSeverity(sql) {
452
639
  if (/\bDROP\s+(TABLE|DATABASE|INDEX|VIEW)\b/i.test(sql))
@@ -466,7 +653,10 @@ function classifySqlSeverity(sql) {
466
653
  // SQLite dot-commands (.tables, .schema, .dump, etc.) — safe unless they mutate
467
654
  if (/^\s*\./.test(sql) && !/^\s*\.(import|read|restore)\b/i.test(sql))
468
655
  return "safe";
469
- return "review";
656
+ // INSERT/ALTER and other non-destructive DML: a reversible row/schema change,
657
+ // not a data wipe → warning (logged, no prompt). Destructive SQL (DROP /
658
+ // TRUNCATE / DELETE FROM / UPDATE-without-WHERE) returned high_stakes above.
659
+ return "warning";
470
660
  }
471
661
  /**
472
662
  * Detects shell idioms that mutate the filesystem. Used by classify (to
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@oked/sdk",
3
- "version": "0.1.7",
3
+ "version": "0.2.0",
4
4
  "description": "OKed SDK - human approval layer for AI agents",
5
5
  "type": "module",
6
6
  "main": "dist/index.js",