@odla-ai/cli 0.32.1 → 0.34.0

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -250,10 +250,10 @@ declare function adminAi(options: AdminAiOptions): Promise<void>;
 /** Stable, machine-readable division of work between the CLI, coding agent,
  * human operator, and Studio. Printed by `odla-ai capabilities --json`. */
 declare const CAPABILITIES: {
-    readonly cli: readonly ["start an email-bound device request without accepting a password or user session token", "register the app and enable configured services per environment", "issue, persist, and explicitly rotate configured service credentials", "add or remove app co-owners, each of whom self-provisions their own credentials for the shared db without any secret handoff", "write local Worker values and push deployed Worker secrets through Wrangler stdin", "store tenant-vault secrets (including the Clerk webhook secret and reserved Clerk secret key) write-only from stdin or an env var", "compose declared app-capability schema/rules, create guarded seeds when absent, and configure platform AI, auth, and deployment links", "apply Google Calendar booking config, then drive state-bound consent, status, discovery, and disconnect flows (bookings run live through the platform proxy)", "validate integration contracts offline and smoke-test a provisioned db environment plus anonymous capability routes", "save and explicitly select non-secret named operator contexts with isolated credential caches; resolve and explain platform, app, environment, and credential provenance without authenticating; then run PM, Discussions, o11y, runbook, and identity operations outside a project checkout", "read one versioned o11y status envelope spanning application RED, exact Worker versions and Cloudflare colos observed in traffic, current live-sync freshness/load, the protected commit-to-visible canary, collector ingest/scheduler trust, provider-owned runtime metrics, account-scoped Durable Object, D1, and R2 evidence under odla-db, and a bounded machine verdict", "read one canonical platform fleet snapshot over private service bindings, including release identities, probe latency, Cloudflare load/runtime freshness, explicit unknowns, and stable next actions through a read-only capability", "compare one project's checked-in Registry intent with live owner-visible state, freeze a secret-free Registry-revision-bound plan through app:config:read, and conditionally apply checkpoint-free actions through exact app:config:write operation routes", "inspect or bounded-wait one exact durable config-operation journal entry and verify every terminal receipt digest before returning it to remote automation", "inspect durable agent wakeups as a versioned JSON envelope and explicitly requeue one dead-lettered job with a scoped environment credential", "run app-attributed hosted security discovery and independent validation without provider keys", "connect/revoke source-read-only GitHub sources and drive commit-pinned hosted security jobs without PATs or provider keys", "let admins manage system AI policy and credentials, inspect attributed usage, and read immutable admin changes through separate short-lived capability-only approvals"];
-    readonly agent: readonly ["install and import the selected odla SDKs", "wrap the Worker with withObservability and choose useful telemetry", "install capability packages, mount their runtime routes, and make application-specific schema, rules, auth, UI, and migration decisions", "wire @odla-ai/calendar into trusted Worker code and keep the app admin key out of browsers"];
+    readonly cli: readonly ["start an email-bound device request without accepting a password or user session token", "register the app and enable configured services per environment", "issue, persist, and explicitly rotate configured service credentials", "add or remove app co-owners, each of whom self-provisions their own credentials for the shared db without any secret handoff", "write local Worker values and push deployed Worker secrets through Wrangler stdin", "store tenant-vault secrets (including the Clerk webhook secret and reserved Clerk secret key) write-only from stdin or an env var", "compose declared app-capability schema/rules, create guarded seeds when absent, and configure platform AI, auth, and deployment links", "apply Google Calendar booking config, then drive state-bound consent, status, discovery, and disconnect flows (bookings run live through the platform proxy)", "validate integration contracts offline and smoke-test a provisioned db environment plus anonymous capability routes", "save and explicitly select non-secret named operator contexts with isolated credential caches; resolve and explain platform, app, environment, and credential provenance without authenticating; then run PM, Discussions, o11y, runbook, and identity operations outside a project checkout", "read one versioned o11y status envelope spanning application RED, exact Worker versions and Cloudflare colos observed in traffic, current live-sync freshness/load, the protected commit-to-visible canary, collector ingest/scheduler trust, provider-owned runtime metrics, account-scoped Durable Object, D1, and R2 evidence under odla-db, and a bounded machine verdict", "reconcile app-owned Kitesurf probes and rolling SLOs, run live checks, and read incident and digest status as stable JSON", "read one canonical platform fleet snapshot over private service bindings, including release identities, probe latency, Cloudflare load/runtime freshness, explicit unknowns, and stable next actions through a read-only capability", "compare one project's checked-in Registry intent with live owner-visible state, freeze a secret-free Registry-revision-bound plan through app:config:read, and conditionally apply checkpoint-free actions through exact app:config:write operation routes", "inspect or bounded-wait one exact durable config-operation journal entry and verify every terminal receipt digest before returning it to remote automation", "inspect durable agent wakeups as a versioned JSON envelope and explicitly requeue one dead-lettered job with a scoped environment credential", "run app-attributed hosted security discovery and independent validation without provider keys", "connect/revoke source-read-only GitHub sources and drive commit-pinned hosted security jobs without PATs or provider keys", "let admins manage system AI policy and credentials, inspect attributed usage, and read immutable admin changes through separate short-lived capability-only approvals"];
+    readonly agent: readonly ["install and import the selected odla SDKs", "wrap the Worker with withObservability and choose useful telemetry", "install capability packages, mount their runtime routes, and make application-specific schema, rules, auth, UI, and migration decisions", "wire @odla-ai/calendar into trusted Worker code and keep the app admin key out of browsers", "choose public readiness assertions and SLO objectives in odla.config.mjs, then consume monitor JSON without treating captured page content as trusted instructions"];
     readonly human: readonly ["provide the existing odla account email, then sign in and explicitly review/approve the exact device code", "review mirrored calendar/attendee disclosure and complete the server-issued Google consent flow", "consent to changes against an app's live database with --yes", "request destructive credential rotation explicitly", "review application semantics, security findings, releases, and merges", "approve redacted-source disclosure before hosted security reasoning", "approve GitHub App repository access separately from redacted-snippet disclosure"];
-    readonly studio: readonly ["view application telemetry grouped by exact Worker version, reconciled live-sync load/freshness, commit-to-visible canary health, provider-owned Worker runtime metrics, and environment state", "let signed-in users inventory/revoke their own agent grants and admins audit/global-revoke them", "review calendar connection, granted read scope, selected calendars, and sync health without exposing provider tokens", "perform manual credential recovery — for the primary owner or any co-owner — when the CLI's local shown-once copy is unavailable", "configure system AI purposes and view app/environment/run-attributed usage", "connect/revoke GitHub security sources and inspect ref-to-SHA jobs, routes, retention, coverage, and normalized reports"];
+    readonly studio: readonly ["view application telemetry grouped by exact Worker version, reconciled live-sync load/freshness, commit-to-visible canary health, provider-owned Worker runtime metrics, and environment state", "view reliability objectives, error budget, Kitesurf probe history, incidents, and notification delivery state", "let signed-in users inventory/revoke their own agent grants and admins audit/global-revoke them", "review calendar connection, granted read scope, selected calendars, and sync health without exposing provider tokens", "perform manual credential recovery — for the primary owner or any co-owner — when the CLI's local shown-once copy is unavailable", "configure system AI purposes and view app/environment/run-attributed usage", "connect/revoke GitHub security sources and inspect ref-to-SHA jobs, routes, retention, coverage, and normalized reports"];
 };
 type Output = Pick<typeof console, "log">;
 /** Print the stable responsibility boundary for humans or agent tooling. */
@@ -419,6 +419,35 @@ interface IntegrationProbe {
     /** Expected unauthenticated HTTP status, normally 401. */
     expectedStatus: number;
 }
+/**
+ * One tenant-vault secret a capability or app needs in order to work.
+ *
+ * This is the declaration half of the declaration/storage split: the contract
+ * is committed, the value never is. Declaring a secret does not store, read, or
+ * transmit it — `odla-ai secrets set` remains the only write path and values
+ * stay write-only afterwards. Declarations exist so `doctor` can tell "not set
+ * yet" apart from "not needed", so an agent can discover what to ask a human
+ * for instead of learning it from prose, and so `check:secrets` can prove the
+ * declared name is the name the runtime actually reads.
+ */
+interface IntegrationSecret {
+    /** Vault name, byte-identical to what `odla-ai secrets set <name>` writes and
+     * what the runtime passes to `getSecret`. Reserved slots keep their `$`. */
+    name: string;
+    /** What the secret is for, and what breaks without it. */
+    description: string;
+    /** Expected value prefix, e.g. `whsec_`. Advisory: never matched against a
+     * stored value (the CLI cannot read one back), only against a value on its
+     * way in. */
+    pattern?: string;
+    /** Platform-managed `$`-prefixed slot. Reserved secrets are never readable by
+     * an app key and are written by a dedicated command, not `secrets set`. */
+    reserved?: boolean;
+    /** Whether the capability is broken without it. Defaults to `true`; set
+     * `false` for secrets only some configurations need, so `doctor` reports them
+     * as available rather than missing. */
+    required?: boolean;
+}
 /** Structural, data-only capability descriptor consumed from
  * `odla.config.mjs`. Capability packages do not depend on the CLI; their
  * descriptors only need to conform to this shape. */
@@ -440,6 +469,8 @@ interface OdlaIntegration {
     seeds?: IntegrationSeed[];
     /** Read-only unauthenticated checks run against `links.<env>`. */
     probes?: IntegrationProbe[];
+    /** Tenant-vault secrets this capability reads. Names only — never values. */
+    secrets?: IntegrationSecret[];
 }
 interface ClerkAuthConfig {
     publishableKey?: string;
@@ -464,6 +495,96 @@ interface GoogleCalendarConfig {
 interface CalendarConfig {
     google: GoogleCalendarConfig;
 }
+/** One deterministic, anonymous Kitesurf journey against an environment link.
+ * Routes are always relative to `links.<env>`; arbitrary origins and executable
+ * JavaScript are deliberately outside the monitoring contract. */
+interface MonitoringProbeConfig {
+    /** Stable id used by SLO indicators and retained run history. */
+    id: string;
+    /** Absolute path beneath the configured environment link. */
+    route: string;
+    /** Environments in which this probe is active. Defaults to every configured env. */
+    envs?: OdlaEnvName[];
+    /** Fixed cadence. The collector's one-minute scheduler executes due probes. */
+    every: "1m" | "2m" | "5m" | "10m" | "15m" | "30m" | "1h";
+    /** Navigation timeout in milliseconds, from 1,000 through 60,000. */
+    timeout?: number;
+    /** Optional DOM readiness signal passed to the Kitesurf snapshot action. */
+    ready?: {
+        selector: string;
+    };
+    /** Declarative assertions; monitoring config cannot inject arbitrary scripts. */
+    expect: {
+        status: number;
+        titleIncludes?: string;
+        textIncludes?: string[];
+        accessibility?: Array<{
+            role: string;
+            name: string;
+        }>;
+    };
+    enabled?: boolean;
+}
+/** The probe or existing-o11y signal whose scheduled observations determine one SLO's good, bad, or unknown events. */
+type MonitoringIndicatorConfig = {
+    type: "probe-success";
+    probes: string[];
+} | {
+    /** A bounded observation of an existing o11y performance signal. Each
+     * scheduled observation is one exact SLO event, including no-data as an
+     * unknown monitoring event rather than a successful application event. */
+    type: "o11y-metric";
+    metric: "error_rate" | "latency_p95" | "synthetic_success" | "synthetic_publish_to_visible";
+    comparator: "gt" | "gte" | "lt" | "lte";
+    threshold: number;
+    every: "1m" | "2m" | "5m" | "10m" | "15m" | "30m" | "1h";
+    observationWindow: "1m" | "2m" | "5m" | "10m" | "15m" | "30m" | "1h";
+    route?: string;
+};
+/** One rolling objective over exact scheduled Kitesurf or existing-o11y outcomes. */
+interface MonitoringSloConfig {
+    id: string;
+    name?: string;
+    indicator: MonitoringIndicatorConfig;
+    /** Good-event objective as a fraction, for example 0.999. */
+    target: number;
+    window: "7d" | "28d" | "30d";
+    alerts?: {
+        /** Immediate outage detector. Defaults to two bad checks among the last three. */
+        spike?: {
+            badChecks?: number;
+            withinChecks?: number;
+            recoverAfter?: number;
+        };
+        /** Multi-window error-budget detector for sustained degradation. */
+        trend?: {
+            burnRate?: number;
+            shortWindow?: "30m" | "1h" | "6h" | "12h" | "1d";
+            longWindow?: "1d" | "3d" | "7d";
+            minBadChecks?: number;
+        };
+    };
+    enabled?: boolean;
+}
+/** Email subscriptions for one app environment. Immediate incident mail is
+ * always enabled when recipients are present; digests are independently
+ * scheduled in the named IANA timezone. */
+interface MonitoringNotificationConfig {
+    email: string[];
+    timezone: string;
+    daily?: string | false;
+    weekly?: {
+        day: "monday" | "tuesday" | "wednesday" | "thursday" | "friday" | "saturday" | "sunday";
+        at: string;
+    } | false;
+}
+/** Repository-owned probes, SLO policies, and per-environment reliability notification schedules. */
+interface MonitoringConfig {
+    /** Optional when every SLO consumes an existing o11y metric. */
+    probes?: MonitoringProbeConfig[];
+    slos: MonitoringSloConfig[];
+    notifications?: Record<OdlaEnvName, MonitoringNotificationConfig>;
+}
 /** Canonical, environment-specific config sent to the calendar controller. */
 interface CalendarServiceConfig extends Record<string, unknown> {
     provider: "google";
@@ -486,6 +607,9 @@ interface OdlaProjectConfig {
     /** App capabilities composed into schema/rules/seeds. Integrations are npm
      * modules, not hosted platform services, so they do not belong in services. */
     integrations?: OdlaIntegration[];
+    /** Vault secrets this app needs beyond the ones its capabilities declare.
+     * Names and descriptions only; values are never authored here. */
+    secrets?: IntegrationSecret[];
     db?: {
         /** Inline SerializedSchema, JSON file, or JS module path exporting default/schema. */
         schema?: unknown;
@@ -514,6 +638,8 @@ interface OdlaProjectConfig {
         endpoint?: string;
         /** Release tag stamped on emitted signals. */
         version?: string;
+        /** Repository-owned live probes, rolling SLOs, and email subscriptions. */
+        monitoring?: MonitoringConfig;
     };
     auth?: {
         clerk?: Record<OdlaEnvName, ClerkAuthConfig | string | null | undefined>;
@@ -624,13 +750,22 @@ interface SmokeOptions {
     stdout?: Pick<typeof console, "log" | "error">;
 }
 
-/** The Google OAuth scope that authorizes booking writes (events read/write). */
-declare const GOOGLE_CALENDAR_EVENTS_SCOPE = "https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar.events";
+/**
+ * The calendar half of `odla.config.mjs`: resolving the checked-in Google
+ * booking block into a controller payload, and validating it.
+ *
+ * Split out of config.ts because calendar validation and its four value
+ * guards are used by nothing else in config loading — the guards were private
+ * to this one validator already.
+ */
 /** Resolve the checked-in calendar block into one controller-safe env payload. */
 declare function calendarServiceConfig(cfg: LoadedProjectConfig, env: string): CalendarServiceConfig;
 /** Public Appointment Schedule URL to apply separately from connector config. */
 declare function calendarBookingPageUrl(cfg: LoadedProjectConfig, env: string): string | null | undefined;
 
+/** The Google OAuth scope that authorizes booking writes (events read/write). */
+declare const GOOGLE_CALENDAR_EVENTS_SCOPE = "https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar.events";
+
 /** Canonical SHA-256 identifier for normalized configuration or a frozen plan. */
 type ConfigDigest = `sha256:${string}`;
 /** Overall relationship between repository-managed intent and observed state. */
@@ -1261,4 +1396,81 @@ declare function installSkill(options?: SkillInstallOptions): SkillInstallResult
  */
 declare function smoke(options: SmokeOptions): Promise<void>;
 
-export { AGENT_HARNESSES, type AdminAiOptions, type AgentHarness, type AgentHarnessSelector, type AiModelsOptions, type AvailableGoogleCalendar, CAPABILITIES, CODE_BUILD_RECIPES, COMMAND_SURFACE, type CalendarConfig, type CalendarConnectionState, type CalendarLifecycleOptions, type CalendarServiceConfig, type CalendarStatus, type CliDependencies, type CodeBuildRule, type CodeConnectOptions, type CodeContainerEngine, type CodeHostCapabilities, type CodeLocalSourceDescriptor, type CodeRuntimeInput, type ConfigApplyOptions, type ConfigCoverage, type ConfigDiffDocument, type ConfigDifference, type ConfigDigest, type ConfigDrift, type ConfigInspectOptions, ConfigOperationCommandError, type ConfigOperationInspectOptions, type ConfigOperationResult, type ConfigPlanAction, type ConfigPlanDocument, type ConfigReconciliation, type ConfigRisk, type ConfigSource, type ConnectGitHubSecuritySourceOptions, type DesiredRegistryState, type DisconnectGitHubSecuritySourceOptions, type FollowHostedSecurityJobOptions, GOOGLE_CALENDAR_EVENTS_SCOPE, type GetHostedSecurityIntentOptions, type GetHostedSecurityJobOptions, type GoogleCalendarConfig, type HarnessInstallResult, type HostedSecurityProfile, type HostedSecurityResult, type HostedSecurityTokenRequest, type IntegrationProbe, type IntegrationSeed, type InvocationProblem, type ListGitHubSecuritySourcesOptions, type ListHostedSecurityJobsOptions, type LoadedProjectConfig, type LocalCredentials, type OdlaIntegration, type OdlaProjectConfig, type ProvisionOptions, type ProvisionPlan, type ReconciliationInput, type RunHostedSecurityOptions, SYSTEM_AI_PURPOSES, type ScopedPlatformTokenOptions, type SecretsPushOptions, type SecretsSetOptions, type SkillInstallOptions, type SkillInstallResult, type SmokeOptions, type StartHostedSecurityJobOptions, type SurfaceNode, type SystemAiPurpose, acceptedAfter, adminAi, aiModels, calendarBookingPageUrl, calendarCalendars, calendarConnect, calendarDisconnect, calendarServiceConfig, calendarStatus, codeConnect, configApply, configDiff, configOperationGet, configOperationWait, configPlan, connectGitHubSecuritySource, describeProblem, desiredRegistryState, disconnectGitHubSecuritySource, doctor, exitCodeFor, followHostedSecurityJob, getHostedSecurityIntent, getHostedSecurityJob, getHostedSecurityPlan, getHostedSecurityReport, getScopedPlatformToken, inferGitHubRepository, initProject, installSkill, invocationPath, isTerminalHostedSecurityStatus, listGitHubSecuritySources, listHostedSecurityJobs, printCapabilities, provision, reconcileConfig, redactSecrets, repositoryFromGitRemote, runCli, runCodeRuntime, runHostedSecurity, secretsPush, secretsSet, secretsSetClerkKey, smoke, startHostedSecurityJob, surfacePaths, validateInvocation };
+type OptionValue = string | boolean | string[];
+interface ParsedArgv {
+    positionals: string[];
+    options: Record<string, OptionValue>;
+}
+
+/** Repository-controlled Kitesurf probe/SLO operations. Read actions accept
+ * projectless operator context; plan/apply require odla.config.mjs because it
+ * remains the desired-state authority. */
+declare function monitorCommand(parsed: ParsedArgv, deps?: CliDependencies): Promise<void>;
+
+/** Normalized, revision-addressed monitoring policy sent from the CLI to the o11y collector for one environment. */
+interface MonitoringWireConfig {
+    revision: `sha256:${string}`;
+    environment: string;
+    baseUrl: string;
+    probes: Array<{
+        id: string;
+        route: string;
+        cadenceMinutes: number;
+        timeoutMs: number;
+        readySelector?: string;
+        expect: {
+            status: number;
+            titleIncludes?: string;
+            textIncludes: string[];
+            accessibility: Array<{
+                role: string;
+                name: string;
+            }>;
+        };
+        enabled: boolean;
+    }>;
+    slos: Array<{
+        id: string;
+        name: string;
+        indicator: {
+            type: "probe-success";
+            probes: string[];
+        } | {
+            type: "o11y-metric";
+            metric: "error_rate" | "latency_p95" | "synthetic_success" | "synthetic_publish_to_visible";
+            comparator: "gt" | "gte" | "lt" | "lte";
+            threshold: number;
+            cadenceMinutes: number;
+            observationWindowMinutes: number;
+            route?: string;
+        };
+        target: number;
+        windowMinutes: number;
+        spike: {
+            badChecks: number;
+            withinChecks: number;
+            recoverAfter: number;
+        };
+        trend: {
+            burnRate: number;
+            shortMinutes: number;
+            longMinutes: number;
+            minBadChecks: number;
+        };
+        enabled: boolean;
+    }>;
+    notifications?: {
+        email: string[];
+        timezone: string;
+        daily: string | false;
+        weekly: {
+            day: string;
+            at: string;
+        } | false;
+    };
+}
+/** Resolve repository monitoring intent for one environment into the bounded
+ * collector wire document. The digest covers the exact normalized payload. */
+declare function monitoringWireConfig(cfg: LoadedProjectConfig, env: string): MonitoringWireConfig;
+
+export { AGENT_HARNESSES, type AdminAiOptions, type AgentHarness, type AgentHarnessSelector, type AiModelsOptions, type AvailableGoogleCalendar, CAPABILITIES, CODE_BUILD_RECIPES, COMMAND_SURFACE, type CalendarConfig, type CalendarConnectionState, type CalendarLifecycleOptions, type CalendarServiceConfig, type CalendarStatus, type CliDependencies, type CodeBuildRule, type CodeConnectOptions, type CodeContainerEngine, type CodeHostCapabilities, type CodeLocalSourceDescriptor, type CodeRuntimeInput, type ConfigApplyOptions, type ConfigCoverage, type ConfigDiffDocument, type ConfigDifference, type ConfigDigest, type ConfigDrift, type ConfigInspectOptions, ConfigOperationCommandError, type ConfigOperationInspectOptions, type ConfigOperationResult, type ConfigPlanAction, type ConfigPlanDocument, type ConfigReconciliation, type ConfigRisk, type ConfigSource, type ConnectGitHubSecuritySourceOptions, type DesiredRegistryState, type DisconnectGitHubSecuritySourceOptions, type FollowHostedSecurityJobOptions, GOOGLE_CALENDAR_EVENTS_SCOPE, type GetHostedSecurityIntentOptions, type GetHostedSecurityJobOptions, type GoogleCalendarConfig, type HarnessInstallResult, type HostedSecurityProfile, type HostedSecurityResult, type HostedSecurityTokenRequest, type IntegrationProbe, type IntegrationSeed, type InvocationProblem, type ListGitHubSecuritySourcesOptions, type ListHostedSecurityJobsOptions, type LoadedProjectConfig, type LocalCredentials, type MonitoringConfig, type MonitoringIndicatorConfig, type MonitoringNotificationConfig, type MonitoringProbeConfig, type MonitoringSloConfig, type MonitoringWireConfig, type OdlaIntegration, type OdlaProjectConfig, type ProvisionOptions, type ProvisionPlan, type ReconciliationInput, type RunHostedSecurityOptions, SYSTEM_AI_PURPOSES, type ScopedPlatformTokenOptions, type SecretsPushOptions, type SecretsSetOptions, type SkillInstallOptions, type SkillInstallResult, type SmokeOptions, type StartHostedSecurityJobOptions, type SurfaceNode, type SystemAiPurpose, acceptedAfter, adminAi, aiModels, calendarBookingPageUrl, calendarCalendars, calendarConnect, calendarDisconnect, calendarServiceConfig, calendarStatus, codeConnect, configApply, configDiff, configOperationGet, configOperationWait, configPlan, connectGitHubSecuritySource, describeProblem, desiredRegistryState, disconnectGitHubSecuritySource, doctor, exitCodeFor, followHostedSecurityJob, getHostedSecurityIntent, getHostedSecurityJob, getHostedSecurityPlan, getHostedSecurityReport, getScopedPlatformToken, inferGitHubRepository, initProject, installSkill, invocationPath, isTerminalHostedSecurityStatus, listGitHubSecuritySources, listHostedSecurityJobs, monitorCommand, monitoringWireConfig, printCapabilities, provision, reconcileConfig, redactSecrets, repositoryFromGitRemote, runCli, runCodeRuntime, runHostedSecurity, secretsPush, secretsSet, secretsSetClerkKey, smoke, startHostedSecurityJob, surfacePaths, validateInvocation };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -250,10 +250,10 @@ declare function adminAi(options: AdminAiOptions): Promise<void>;
 /** Stable, machine-readable division of work between the CLI, coding agent,
  * human operator, and Studio. Printed by `odla-ai capabilities --json`. */
 declare const CAPABILITIES: {
-    readonly cli: readonly ["start an email-bound device request without accepting a password or user session token", "register the app and enable configured services per environment", "issue, persist, and explicitly rotate configured service credentials", "add or remove app co-owners, each of whom self-provisions their own credentials for the shared db without any secret handoff", "write local Worker values and push deployed Worker secrets through Wrangler stdin", "store tenant-vault secrets (including the Clerk webhook secret and reserved Clerk secret key) write-only from stdin or an env var", "compose declared app-capability schema/rules, create guarded seeds when absent, and configure platform AI, auth, and deployment links", "apply Google Calendar booking config, then drive state-bound consent, status, discovery, and disconnect flows (bookings run live through the platform proxy)", "validate integration contracts offline and smoke-test a provisioned db environment plus anonymous capability routes", "save and explicitly select non-secret named operator contexts with isolated credential caches; resolve and explain platform, app, environment, and credential provenance without authenticating; then run PM, Discussions, o11y, runbook, and identity operations outside a project checkout", "read one versioned o11y status envelope spanning application RED, exact Worker versions and Cloudflare colos observed in traffic, current live-sync freshness/load, the protected commit-to-visible canary, collector ingest/scheduler trust, provider-owned runtime metrics, account-scoped Durable Object, D1, and R2 evidence under odla-db, and a bounded machine verdict", "read one canonical platform fleet snapshot over private service bindings, including release identities, probe latency, Cloudflare load/runtime freshness, explicit unknowns, and stable next actions through a read-only capability", "compare one project's checked-in Registry intent with live owner-visible state, freeze a secret-free Registry-revision-bound plan through app:config:read, and conditionally apply checkpoint-free actions through exact app:config:write operation routes", "inspect or bounded-wait one exact durable config-operation journal entry and verify every terminal receipt digest before returning it to remote automation", "inspect durable agent wakeups as a versioned JSON envelope and explicitly requeue one dead-lettered job with a scoped environment credential", "run app-attributed hosted security discovery and independent validation without provider keys", "connect/revoke source-read-only GitHub sources and drive commit-pinned hosted security jobs without PATs or provider keys", "let admins manage system AI policy and credentials, inspect attributed usage, and read immutable admin changes through separate short-lived capability-only approvals"];
-    readonly agent: readonly ["install and import the selected odla SDKs", "wrap the Worker with withObservability and choose useful telemetry", "install capability packages, mount their runtime routes, and make application-specific schema, rules, auth, UI, and migration decisions", "wire @odla-ai/calendar into trusted Worker code and keep the app admin key out of browsers"];
+    readonly cli: readonly ["start an email-bound device request without accepting a password or user session token", "register the app and enable configured services per environment", "issue, persist, and explicitly rotate configured service credentials", "add or remove app co-owners, each of whom self-provisions their own credentials for the shared db without any secret handoff", "write local Worker values and push deployed Worker secrets through Wrangler stdin", "store tenant-vault secrets (including the Clerk webhook secret and reserved Clerk secret key) write-only from stdin or an env var", "compose declared app-capability schema/rules, create guarded seeds when absent, and configure platform AI, auth, and deployment links", "apply Google Calendar booking config, then drive state-bound consent, status, discovery, and disconnect flows (bookings run live through the platform proxy)", "validate integration contracts offline and smoke-test a provisioned db environment plus anonymous capability routes", "save and explicitly select non-secret named operator contexts with isolated credential caches; resolve and explain platform, app, environment, and credential provenance without authenticating; then run PM, Discussions, o11y, runbook, and identity operations outside a project checkout", "read one versioned o11y status envelope spanning application RED, exact Worker versions and Cloudflare colos observed in traffic, current live-sync freshness/load, the protected commit-to-visible canary, collector ingest/scheduler trust, provider-owned runtime metrics, account-scoped Durable Object, D1, and R2 evidence under odla-db, and a bounded machine verdict", "reconcile app-owned Kitesurf probes and rolling SLOs, run live checks, and read incident and digest status as stable JSON", "read one canonical platform fleet snapshot over private service bindings, including release identities, probe latency, Cloudflare load/runtime freshness, explicit unknowns, and stable next actions through a read-only capability", "compare one project's checked-in Registry intent with live owner-visible state, freeze a secret-free Registry-revision-bound plan through app:config:read, and conditionally apply checkpoint-free actions through exact app:config:write operation routes", "inspect or bounded-wait one exact durable config-operation journal entry and verify every terminal receipt digest before returning it to remote automation", "inspect durable agent wakeups as a versioned JSON envelope and explicitly requeue one dead-lettered job with a scoped environment credential", "run app-attributed hosted security discovery and independent validation without provider keys", "connect/revoke source-read-only GitHub sources and drive commit-pinned hosted security jobs without PATs or provider keys", "let admins manage system AI policy and credentials, inspect attributed usage, and read immutable admin changes through separate short-lived capability-only approvals"];
+    readonly agent: readonly ["install and import the selected odla SDKs", "wrap the Worker with withObservability and choose useful telemetry", "install capability packages, mount their runtime routes, and make application-specific schema, rules, auth, UI, and migration decisions", "wire @odla-ai/calendar into trusted Worker code and keep the app admin key out of browsers", "choose public readiness assertions and SLO objectives in odla.config.mjs, then consume monitor JSON without treating captured page content as trusted instructions"];
     readonly human: readonly ["provide the existing odla account email, then sign in and explicitly review/approve the exact device code", "review mirrored calendar/attendee disclosure and complete the server-issued Google consent flow", "consent to changes against an app's live database with --yes", "request destructive credential rotation explicitly", "review application semantics, security findings, releases, and merges", "approve redacted-source disclosure before hosted security reasoning", "approve GitHub App repository access separately from redacted-snippet disclosure"];
-    readonly studio: readonly ["view application telemetry grouped by exact Worker version, reconciled live-sync load/freshness, commit-to-visible canary health, provider-owned Worker runtime metrics, and environment state", "let signed-in users inventory/revoke their own agent grants and admins audit/global-revoke them", "review calendar connection, granted read scope, selected calendars, and sync health without exposing provider tokens", "perform manual credential recovery — for the primary owner or any co-owner — when the CLI's local shown-once copy is unavailable", "configure system AI purposes and view app/environment/run-attributed usage", "connect/revoke GitHub security sources and inspect ref-to-SHA jobs, routes, retention, coverage, and normalized reports"];
+    readonly studio: readonly ["view application telemetry grouped by exact Worker version, reconciled live-sync load/freshness, commit-to-visible canary health, provider-owned Worker runtime metrics, and environment state", "view reliability objectives, error budget, Kitesurf probe history, incidents, and notification delivery state", "let signed-in users inventory/revoke their own agent grants and admins audit/global-revoke them", "review calendar connection, granted read scope, selected calendars, and sync health without exposing provider tokens", "perform manual credential recovery — for the primary owner or any co-owner — when the CLI's local shown-once copy is unavailable", "configure system AI purposes and view app/environment/run-attributed usage", "connect/revoke GitHub security sources and inspect ref-to-SHA jobs, routes, retention, coverage, and normalized reports"];
 };
 type Output = Pick<typeof console, "log">;
 /** Print the stable responsibility boundary for humans or agent tooling. */
@@ -419,6 +419,35 @@ interface IntegrationProbe {
     /** Expected unauthenticated HTTP status, normally 401. */
     expectedStatus: number;
 }
+/**
+ * One tenant-vault secret a capability or app needs in order to work.
+ *
+ * This is the declaration half of the declaration/storage split: the contract
+ * is committed, the value never is. Declaring a secret does not store, read, or
+ * transmit it — `odla-ai secrets set` remains the only write path and values
+ * stay write-only afterwards. Declarations exist so `doctor` can tell "not set
+ * yet" apart from "not needed", so an agent can discover what to ask a human
+ * for instead of learning it from prose, and so `check:secrets` can prove the
+ * declared name is the name the runtime actually reads.
+ */
+interface IntegrationSecret {
+    /** Vault name, byte-identical to what `odla-ai secrets set <name>` writes and
+     * what the runtime passes to `getSecret`. Reserved slots keep their `$`. */
+    name: string;
+    /** What the secret is for, and what breaks without it. */
+    description: string;
+    /** Expected value prefix, e.g. `whsec_`. Advisory: never matched against a
+     * stored value (the CLI cannot read one back), only against a value on its
+     * way in. */
+    pattern?: string;
+    /** Platform-managed `$`-prefixed slot. Reserved secrets are never readable by
+     * an app key and are written by a dedicated command, not `secrets set`. */
+    reserved?: boolean;
+    /** Whether the capability is broken without it. Defaults to `true`; set
+     * `false` for secrets only some configurations need, so `doctor` reports them
+     * as available rather than missing. */
+    required?: boolean;
+}
 /** Structural, data-only capability descriptor consumed from
  * `odla.config.mjs`. Capability packages do not depend on the CLI; their
  * descriptors only need to conform to this shape. */
@@ -440,6 +469,8 @@ interface OdlaIntegration {
     seeds?: IntegrationSeed[];
     /** Read-only unauthenticated checks run against `links.<env>`. */
     probes?: IntegrationProbe[];
+    /** Tenant-vault secrets this capability reads. Names only — never values. */
+    secrets?: IntegrationSecret[];
 }
 interface ClerkAuthConfig {
     publishableKey?: string;
@@ -464,6 +495,96 @@ interface GoogleCalendarConfig {
 interface CalendarConfig {
     google: GoogleCalendarConfig;
 }
+/** One deterministic, anonymous Kitesurf journey against an environment link.
+ * Routes are always relative to `links.<env>`; arbitrary origins and executable
+ * JavaScript are deliberately outside the monitoring contract. */
+interface MonitoringProbeConfig {
+    /** Stable id used by SLO indicators and retained run history. */
+    id: string;
+    /** Absolute path beneath the configured environment link. */
+    route: string;
+    /** Environments in which this probe is active. Defaults to every configured env. */
+    envs?: OdlaEnvName[];
+    /** Fixed cadence. The collector's one-minute scheduler executes due probes. */
+    every: "1m" | "2m" | "5m" | "10m" | "15m" | "30m" | "1h";
+    /** Navigation timeout in milliseconds, from 1,000 through 60,000. */
+    timeout?: number;
+    /** Optional DOM readiness signal passed to the Kitesurf snapshot action. */
+    ready?: {
+        selector: string;
+    };
+    /** Declarative assertions; monitoring config cannot inject arbitrary scripts. */
+    expect: {
+        status: number;
+        titleIncludes?: string;
+        textIncludes?: string[];
+        accessibility?: Array<{
+            role: string;
+            name: string;
+        }>;
+    };
+    enabled?: boolean;
+}
+/** The probe or existing-o11y signal whose scheduled observations determine one SLO's good, bad, or unknown events. */
+type MonitoringIndicatorConfig = {
+    type: "probe-success";
+    probes: string[];
+} | {
+    /** A bounded observation of an existing o11y performance signal. Each
+     * scheduled observation is one exact SLO event, including no-data as an
+     * unknown monitoring event rather than a successful application event. */
+    type: "o11y-metric";
+    metric: "error_rate" | "latency_p95" | "synthetic_success" | "synthetic_publish_to_visible";
+    comparator: "gt" | "gte" | "lt" | "lte";
+    threshold: number;
+    every: "1m" | "2m" | "5m" | "10m" | "15m" | "30m" | "1h";
+    observationWindow: "1m" | "2m" | "5m" | "10m" | "15m" | "30m" | "1h";
+    route?: string;
+};
+/** One rolling objective over exact scheduled Kitesurf or existing-o11y outcomes. */
+interface MonitoringSloConfig {
+    id: string;
+    name?: string;
+    indicator: MonitoringIndicatorConfig;
+    /** Good-event objective as a fraction, for example 0.999. */
+    target: number;
+    window: "7d" | "28d" | "30d";
+    alerts?: {
+        /** Immediate outage detector. Defaults to two bad checks among the last three. */
+        spike?: {
+            badChecks?: number;
+            withinChecks?: number;
+            recoverAfter?: number;
+        };
+        /** Multi-window error-budget detector for sustained degradation. */
+        trend?: {
+            burnRate?: number;
+            shortWindow?: "30m" | "1h" | "6h" | "12h" | "1d";
+            longWindow?: "1d" | "3d" | "7d";
+            minBadChecks?: number;
+        };
+    };
+    enabled?: boolean;
+}
+/** Email subscriptions for one app environment. Immediate incident mail is
+ * always enabled when recipients are present; digests are independently
+ * scheduled in the named IANA timezone. */
+interface MonitoringNotificationConfig {
+    email: string[];
+    timezone: string;
+    daily?: string | false;
+    weekly?: {
+        day: "monday" | "tuesday" | "wednesday" | "thursday" | "friday" | "saturday" | "sunday";
+        at: string;
+    } | false;
+}
+/** Repository-owned probes, SLO policies, and per-environment reliability notification schedules. */
+interface MonitoringConfig {
+    /** Optional when every SLO consumes an existing o11y metric. */
+    probes?: MonitoringProbeConfig[];
+    slos: MonitoringSloConfig[];
+    notifications?: Record<OdlaEnvName, MonitoringNotificationConfig>;
+}
 /** Canonical, environment-specific config sent to the calendar controller. */
 interface CalendarServiceConfig extends Record<string, unknown> {
     provider: "google";
@@ -486,6 +607,9 @@ interface OdlaProjectConfig {
     /** App capabilities composed into schema/rules/seeds. Integrations are npm
      * modules, not hosted platform services, so they do not belong in services. */
     integrations?: OdlaIntegration[];
+    /** Vault secrets this app needs beyond the ones its capabilities declare.
+     * Names and descriptions only; values are never authored here. */
+    secrets?: IntegrationSecret[];
     db?: {
         /** Inline SerializedSchema, JSON file, or JS module path exporting default/schema. */
         schema?: unknown;
@@ -514,6 +638,8 @@ interface OdlaProjectConfig {
         endpoint?: string;
         /** Release tag stamped on emitted signals. */
         version?: string;
+        /** Repository-owned live probes, rolling SLOs, and email subscriptions. */
+        monitoring?: MonitoringConfig;
     };
     auth?: {
         clerk?: Record<OdlaEnvName, ClerkAuthConfig | string | null | undefined>;
@@ -624,13 +750,22 @@ interface SmokeOptions {
     stdout?: Pick<typeof console, "log" | "error">;
 }
 
-/** The Google OAuth scope that authorizes booking writes (events read/write). */
-declare const GOOGLE_CALENDAR_EVENTS_SCOPE = "https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar.events";
+/**
+ * The calendar half of `odla.config.mjs`: resolving the checked-in Google
+ * booking block into a controller payload, and validating it.
+ *
+ * Split out of config.ts because calendar validation and its four value
+ * guards are used by nothing else in config loading — the guards were private
+ * to this one validator already.
+ */
 /** Resolve the checked-in calendar block into one controller-safe env payload. */
 declare function calendarServiceConfig(cfg: LoadedProjectConfig, env: string): CalendarServiceConfig;
 /** Public Appointment Schedule URL to apply separately from connector config. */
 declare function calendarBookingPageUrl(cfg: LoadedProjectConfig, env: string): string | null | undefined;
 
+/** The Google OAuth scope that authorizes booking writes (events read/write). */
+declare const GOOGLE_CALENDAR_EVENTS_SCOPE = "https://www.googleapis.com/auth/calendar.events";
+
 /** Canonical SHA-256 identifier for normalized configuration or a frozen plan. */
 type ConfigDigest = `sha256:${string}`;
 /** Overall relationship between repository-managed intent and observed state. */
@@ -1261,4 +1396,81 @@ declare function installSkill(options?: SkillInstallOptions): SkillInstallResult
  */
 declare function smoke(options: SmokeOptions): Promise<void>;
 
-export { AGENT_HARNESSES, type AdminAiOptions, type AgentHarness, type AgentHarnessSelector, type AiModelsOptions, type AvailableGoogleCalendar, CAPABILITIES, CODE_BUILD_RECIPES, COMMAND_SURFACE, type CalendarConfig, type CalendarConnectionState, type CalendarLifecycleOptions, type CalendarServiceConfig, type CalendarStatus, type CliDependencies, type CodeBuildRule, type CodeConnectOptions, type CodeContainerEngine, type CodeHostCapabilities, type CodeLocalSourceDescriptor, type CodeRuntimeInput, type ConfigApplyOptions, type ConfigCoverage, type ConfigDiffDocument, type ConfigDifference, type ConfigDigest, type ConfigDrift, type ConfigInspectOptions, ConfigOperationCommandError, type ConfigOperationInspectOptions, type ConfigOperationResult, type ConfigPlanAction, type ConfigPlanDocument, type ConfigReconciliation, type ConfigRisk, type ConfigSource, type ConnectGitHubSecuritySourceOptions, type DesiredRegistryState, type DisconnectGitHubSecuritySourceOptions, type FollowHostedSecurityJobOptions, GOOGLE_CALENDAR_EVENTS_SCOPE, type GetHostedSecurityIntentOptions, type GetHostedSecurityJobOptions, type GoogleCalendarConfig, type HarnessInstallResult, type HostedSecurityProfile, type HostedSecurityResult, type HostedSecurityTokenRequest, type IntegrationProbe, type IntegrationSeed, type InvocationProblem, type ListGitHubSecuritySourcesOptions, type ListHostedSecurityJobsOptions, type LoadedProjectConfig, type LocalCredentials, type OdlaIntegration, type OdlaProjectConfig, type ProvisionOptions, type ProvisionPlan, type ReconciliationInput, type RunHostedSecurityOptions, SYSTEM_AI_PURPOSES, type ScopedPlatformTokenOptions, type SecretsPushOptions, type SecretsSetOptions, type SkillInstallOptions, type SkillInstallResult, type SmokeOptions, type StartHostedSecurityJobOptions, type SurfaceNode, type SystemAiPurpose, acceptedAfter, adminAi, aiModels, calendarBookingPageUrl, calendarCalendars, calendarConnect, calendarDisconnect, calendarServiceConfig, calendarStatus, codeConnect, configApply, configDiff, configOperationGet, configOperationWait, configPlan, connectGitHubSecuritySource, describeProblem, desiredRegistryState, disconnectGitHubSecuritySource, doctor, exitCodeFor, followHostedSecurityJob, getHostedSecurityIntent, getHostedSecurityJob, getHostedSecurityPlan, getHostedSecurityReport, getScopedPlatformToken, inferGitHubRepository, initProject, installSkill, invocationPath, isTerminalHostedSecurityStatus, listGitHubSecuritySources, listHostedSecurityJobs, printCapabilities, provision, reconcileConfig, redactSecrets, repositoryFromGitRemote, runCli, runCodeRuntime, runHostedSecurity, secretsPush, secretsSet, secretsSetClerkKey, smoke, startHostedSecurityJob, surfacePaths, validateInvocation };
+type OptionValue = string | boolean | string[];
+interface ParsedArgv {
+    positionals: string[];
+    options: Record<string, OptionValue>;
+}
+
+/** Repository-controlled Kitesurf probe/SLO operations. Read actions accept
+ * projectless operator context; plan/apply require odla.config.mjs because it
+ * remains the desired-state authority. */
+declare function monitorCommand(parsed: ParsedArgv, deps?: CliDependencies): Promise<void>;
+
+/** Normalized, revision-addressed monitoring policy sent from the CLI to the o11y collector for one environment. */
+interface MonitoringWireConfig {
+    revision: `sha256:${string}`;
+    environment: string;
+    baseUrl: string;
+    probes: Array<{
+        id: string;
+        route: string;
+        cadenceMinutes: number;
+        timeoutMs: number;
+        readySelector?: string;
+        expect: {
+            status: number;
+            titleIncludes?: string;
+            textIncludes: string[];
+            accessibility: Array<{
+                role: string;
+                name: string;
+            }>;
+        };
+        enabled: boolean;
+    }>;
+    slos: Array<{
+        id: string;
+        name: string;
+        indicator: {
+            type: "probe-success";
+            probes: string[];
+        } | {
+            type: "o11y-metric";
+            metric: "error_rate" | "latency_p95" | "synthetic_success" | "synthetic_publish_to_visible";
+            comparator: "gt" | "gte" | "lt" | "lte";
+            threshold: number;
+            cadenceMinutes: number;
+            observationWindowMinutes: number;
+            route?: string;
+        };
+        target: number;
+        windowMinutes: number;
+        spike: {
+            badChecks: number;
+            withinChecks: number;
+            recoverAfter: number;
+        };
+        trend: {
+            burnRate: number;
+            shortMinutes: number;
+            longMinutes: number;
+            minBadChecks: number;
+        };
+        enabled: boolean;
+    }>;
+    notifications?: {
+        email: string[];
+        timezone: string;
+        daily: string | false;
+        weekly: {
+            day: string;
+            at: string;
+        } | false;
+    };
+}
+/** Resolve repository monitoring intent for one environment into the bounded
+ * collector wire document. The digest covers the exact normalized payload. */
+declare function monitoringWireConfig(cfg: LoadedProjectConfig, env: string): MonitoringWireConfig;
+
+export { AGENT_HARNESSES, type AdminAiOptions, type AgentHarness, type AgentHarnessSelector, type AiModelsOptions, type AvailableGoogleCalendar, CAPABILITIES, CODE_BUILD_RECIPES, COMMAND_SURFACE, type CalendarConfig, type CalendarConnectionState, type CalendarLifecycleOptions, type CalendarServiceConfig, type CalendarStatus, type CliDependencies, type CodeBuildRule, type CodeConnectOptions, type CodeContainerEngine, type CodeHostCapabilities, type CodeLocalSourceDescriptor, type CodeRuntimeInput, type ConfigApplyOptions, type ConfigCoverage, type ConfigDiffDocument, type ConfigDifference, type ConfigDigest, type ConfigDrift, type ConfigInspectOptions, ConfigOperationCommandError, type ConfigOperationInspectOptions, type ConfigOperationResult, type ConfigPlanAction, type ConfigPlanDocument, type ConfigReconciliation, type ConfigRisk, type ConfigSource, type ConnectGitHubSecuritySourceOptions, type DesiredRegistryState, type DisconnectGitHubSecuritySourceOptions, type FollowHostedSecurityJobOptions, GOOGLE_CALENDAR_EVENTS_SCOPE, type GetHostedSecurityIntentOptions, type GetHostedSecurityJobOptions, type GoogleCalendarConfig, type HarnessInstallResult, type HostedSecurityProfile, type HostedSecurityResult, type HostedSecurityTokenRequest, type IntegrationProbe, type IntegrationSeed, type InvocationProblem, type ListGitHubSecuritySourcesOptions, type ListHostedSecurityJobsOptions, type LoadedProjectConfig, type LocalCredentials, type MonitoringConfig, type MonitoringIndicatorConfig, type MonitoringNotificationConfig, type MonitoringProbeConfig, type MonitoringSloConfig, type MonitoringWireConfig, type OdlaIntegration, type OdlaProjectConfig, type ProvisionOptions, type ProvisionPlan, type ReconciliationInput, type RunHostedSecurityOptions, SYSTEM_AI_PURPOSES, type ScopedPlatformTokenOptions, type SecretsPushOptions, type SecretsSetOptions, type SkillInstallOptions, type SkillInstallResult, type SmokeOptions, type StartHostedSecurityJobOptions, type SurfaceNode, type SystemAiPurpose, acceptedAfter, adminAi, aiModels, calendarBookingPageUrl, calendarCalendars, calendarConnect, calendarDisconnect, calendarServiceConfig, calendarStatus, codeConnect, configApply, configDiff, configOperationGet, configOperationWait, configPlan, connectGitHubSecuritySource, describeProblem, desiredRegistryState, disconnectGitHubSecuritySource, doctor, exitCodeFor, followHostedSecurityJob, getHostedSecurityIntent, getHostedSecurityJob, getHostedSecurityPlan, getHostedSecurityReport, getScopedPlatformToken, inferGitHubRepository, initProject, installSkill, invocationPath, isTerminalHostedSecurityStatus, listGitHubSecuritySources, listHostedSecurityJobs, monitorCommand, monitoringWireConfig, printCapabilities, provision, reconcileConfig, redactSecrets, repositoryFromGitRemote, runCli, runCodeRuntime, runHostedSecurity, secretsPush, secretsSet, secretsSetClerkKey, smoke, startHostedSecurityJob, surfacePaths, validateInvocation };

package/dist/index.js

@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ import {
   isTerminalHostedSecurityStatus,
   listGitHubSecuritySources,
   listHostedSecurityJobs,
+  monitorCommand,
+  monitoringWireConfig,
   printCapabilities,
   provision,
   reconcileConfig,
@@ -54,7 +56,7 @@ import {
   startHostedSecurityJob,
   surfacePaths,
   validateInvocation
-} from "./chunk-L6YTOTWU.js";
+} from "./chunk-LGNNX6AP.js";
 import {
   exitCodeFor,
   redactSecrets
@@ -101,6 +103,8 @@ export {
   isTerminalHostedSecurityStatus,
   listGitHubSecuritySources,
   listHostedSecurityJobs,
+  monitorCommand,
+  monitoringWireConfig,
   printCapabilities,
   provision,
   reconcileConfig,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@odla-ai/cli",
-  "version": "0.32.1",
+  "version": "0.34.0",
   "description": "Agent-operable CLI for odla provisioning, calendar consent and connection lifecycle, System AI administration, Worker secrets, security jobs, and smoke checks.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "homepage": "https://odla.ai/docs/packages/cli",
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@odla-ai/ai": "0.14.0",
-    "@odla-ai/apps": "0.10.5",
+    "@odla-ai/apps": "0.11.0",
     "@odla-ai/brand": "0.5.0",
     "@odla-ai/db": "0.10.3",
     "@odla-ai/security": "0.3.3"