@odla-ai/cli 0.25.7 → 0.25.9

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -164,7 +164,8 @@ declare function runCodeRuntime(input: CodeRuntimeInput): Promise<void>;
 /** Map a CLI failure to its process exit code: 75 (EX_TEMPFAIL) marks work that
  * has not failed but has not finished — a handshake still awaiting human
  * approval (the pending state is persisted, so rerunning resumes it), or a
- * `discuss watch` that timed out before anyone replied. Everything else is 1. */
+ * `discuss watch` that timed out before anyone replied. A stale checkpoint is
+ * a consistency failure (3); an exhausted remote retry is retryable (6). */
 declare function exitCodeFor(err: unknown): number;
 /** Injectable side-effect boundaries used to run and test the command dispatcher. */
 interface CliDependencies {
@@ -246,7 +247,7 @@ declare function adminAi(options: AdminAiOptions): Promise<void>;
 /** Stable, machine-readable division of work between the CLI, coding agent,
  * human operator, and Studio. Printed by `odla-ai capabilities --json`. */
 declare const CAPABILITIES: {
-    readonly cli: readonly ["start an email-bound device request without accepting a password or user session token", "register the app and enable configured services per environment", "issue, persist, and explicitly rotate configured service credentials", "add or remove app co-owners, each of whom self-provisions their own credentials for the shared db without any secret handoff", "write local Worker values and push deployed Worker secrets through Wrangler stdin", "store tenant-vault secrets (including the Clerk webhook secret and reserved Clerk secret key) write-only from stdin or an env var", "compose declared app-capability schema/rules, create guarded seeds when absent, and configure platform AI, auth, and deployment links", "apply Google Calendar booking config, then drive state-bound consent, status, discovery, and disconnect flows (bookings run live through the platform proxy)", "validate integration contracts offline and smoke-test a provisioned db environment plus anonymous capability routes", "read one versioned o11y status envelope spanning application RED, current live-sync freshness/load, the protected commit-to-visible canary, collector ingest/scheduler trust, provider-owned runtime metrics, and a bounded machine verdict", "run app-attributed hosted security discovery and independent validation without provider keys", "connect/revoke source-read-only GitHub sources and drive commit-pinned hosted security jobs without PATs or provider keys", "let admins manage system AI policy and credentials, inspect attributed usage, and read immutable admin changes through separate short-lived capability-only approvals"];
+    readonly cli: readonly ["start an email-bound device request without accepting a password or user session token", "register the app and enable configured services per environment", "issue, persist, and explicitly rotate configured service credentials", "add or remove app co-owners, each of whom self-provisions their own credentials for the shared db without any secret handoff", "write local Worker values and push deployed Worker secrets through Wrangler stdin", "store tenant-vault secrets (including the Clerk webhook secret and reserved Clerk secret key) write-only from stdin or an env var", "compose declared app-capability schema/rules, create guarded seeds when absent, and configure platform AI, auth, and deployment links", "apply Google Calendar booking config, then drive state-bound consent, status, discovery, and disconnect flows (bookings run live through the platform proxy)", "validate integration contracts offline and smoke-test a provisioned db environment plus anonymous capability routes", "read one versioned o11y status envelope spanning application RED, current live-sync freshness/load, the protected commit-to-visible canary, collector ingest/scheduler trust, provider-owned runtime metrics, and a bounded machine verdict", "inspect durable agent wakeups as a versioned JSON envelope and explicitly requeue one dead-lettered job with a scoped environment credential", "run app-attributed hosted security discovery and independent validation without provider keys", "connect/revoke source-read-only GitHub sources and drive commit-pinned hosted security jobs without PATs or provider keys", "let admins manage system AI policy and credentials, inspect attributed usage, and read immutable admin changes through separate short-lived capability-only approvals"];
     readonly agent: readonly ["install and import the selected odla SDKs", "wrap the Worker with withObservability and choose useful telemetry", "install capability packages, mount their runtime routes, and make application-specific schema, rules, auth, UI, and migration decisions", "wire @odla-ai/calendar into trusted Worker code and keep the app admin key out of browsers"];
     readonly human: readonly ["provide the existing odla account email, then sign in and explicitly review/approve the exact device code", "review mirrored calendar/attendee disclosure and complete the server-issued Google consent flow", "consent to changes against an app's live database with --yes", "request destructive credential rotation explicitly", "review application semantics, security findings, releases, and merges", "approve redacted-source disclosure before hosted security reasoning", "approve GitHub App repository access separately from redacted-snippet disclosure"];
     readonly studio: readonly ["view application telemetry, reconciled live-sync load/freshness, commit-to-visible canary health, provider-owned Worker runtime metrics, and environment state", "let signed-in users inventory/revoke their own agent grants and admins audit/global-revoke them", "review calendar connection, granted read scope, selected calendars, and sync health without exposing provider tokens", "perform manual credential recovery — for the primary owner or any co-owner — when the CLI's local shown-once copy is unavailable", "configure system AI purposes and view app/environment/run-attributed usage", "connect/revoke GitHub security sources and inspect ref-to-SHA jobs, routes, retention, coverage, and normalized reports"];

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -164,7 +164,8 @@ declare function runCodeRuntime(input: CodeRuntimeInput): Promise<void>;
 /** Map a CLI failure to its process exit code: 75 (EX_TEMPFAIL) marks work that
  * has not failed but has not finished — a handshake still awaiting human
  * approval (the pending state is persisted, so rerunning resumes it), or a
- * `discuss watch` that timed out before anyone replied. Everything else is 1. */
+ * `discuss watch` that timed out before anyone replied. A stale checkpoint is
+ * a consistency failure (3); an exhausted remote retry is retryable (6). */
 declare function exitCodeFor(err: unknown): number;
 /** Injectable side-effect boundaries used to run and test the command dispatcher. */
 interface CliDependencies {
@@ -246,7 +247,7 @@ declare function adminAi(options: AdminAiOptions): Promise<void>;
 /** Stable, machine-readable division of work between the CLI, coding agent,
  * human operator, and Studio. Printed by `odla-ai capabilities --json`. */
 declare const CAPABILITIES: {
-    readonly cli: readonly ["start an email-bound device request without accepting a password or user session token", "register the app and enable configured services per environment", "issue, persist, and explicitly rotate configured service credentials", "add or remove app co-owners, each of whom self-provisions their own credentials for the shared db without any secret handoff", "write local Worker values and push deployed Worker secrets through Wrangler stdin", "store tenant-vault secrets (including the Clerk webhook secret and reserved Clerk secret key) write-only from stdin or an env var", "compose declared app-capability schema/rules, create guarded seeds when absent, and configure platform AI, auth, and deployment links", "apply Google Calendar booking config, then drive state-bound consent, status, discovery, and disconnect flows (bookings run live through the platform proxy)", "validate integration contracts offline and smoke-test a provisioned db environment plus anonymous capability routes", "read one versioned o11y status envelope spanning application RED, current live-sync freshness/load, the protected commit-to-visible canary, collector ingest/scheduler trust, provider-owned runtime metrics, and a bounded machine verdict", "run app-attributed hosted security discovery and independent validation without provider keys", "connect/revoke source-read-only GitHub sources and drive commit-pinned hosted security jobs without PATs or provider keys", "let admins manage system AI policy and credentials, inspect attributed usage, and read immutable admin changes through separate short-lived capability-only approvals"];
+    readonly cli: readonly ["start an email-bound device request without accepting a password or user session token", "register the app and enable configured services per environment", "issue, persist, and explicitly rotate configured service credentials", "add or remove app co-owners, each of whom self-provisions their own credentials for the shared db without any secret handoff", "write local Worker values and push deployed Worker secrets through Wrangler stdin", "store tenant-vault secrets (including the Clerk webhook secret and reserved Clerk secret key) write-only from stdin or an env var", "compose declared app-capability schema/rules, create guarded seeds when absent, and configure platform AI, auth, and deployment links", "apply Google Calendar booking config, then drive state-bound consent, status, discovery, and disconnect flows (bookings run live through the platform proxy)", "validate integration contracts offline and smoke-test a provisioned db environment plus anonymous capability routes", "read one versioned o11y status envelope spanning application RED, current live-sync freshness/load, the protected commit-to-visible canary, collector ingest/scheduler trust, provider-owned runtime metrics, and a bounded machine verdict", "inspect durable agent wakeups as a versioned JSON envelope and explicitly requeue one dead-lettered job with a scoped environment credential", "run app-attributed hosted security discovery and independent validation without provider keys", "connect/revoke source-read-only GitHub sources and drive commit-pinned hosted security jobs without PATs or provider keys", "let admins manage system AI policy and credentials, inspect attributed usage, and read immutable admin changes through separate short-lived capability-only approvals"];
     readonly agent: readonly ["install and import the selected odla SDKs", "wrap the Worker with withObservability and choose useful telemetry", "install capability packages, mount their runtime routes, and make application-specific schema, rules, auth, UI, and migration decisions", "wire @odla-ai/calendar into trusted Worker code and keep the app admin key out of browsers"];
     readonly human: readonly ["provide the existing odla account email, then sign in and explicitly review/approve the exact device code", "review mirrored calendar/attendee disclosure and complete the server-issued Google consent flow", "consent to changes against an app's live database with --yes", "request destructive credential rotation explicitly", "review application semantics, security findings, releases, and merges", "approve redacted-source disclosure before hosted security reasoning", "approve GitHub App repository access separately from redacted-snippet disclosure"];
     readonly studio: readonly ["view application telemetry, reconciled live-sync load/freshness, commit-to-visible canary health, provider-owned Worker runtime metrics, and environment state", "let signed-in users inventory/revoke their own agent grants and admins audit/global-revoke them", "review calendar connection, granted read scope, selected calendars, and sync health without exposing provider tokens", "perform manual credential recovery — for the primary owner or any co-owner — when the CLI's local shown-once copy is unavailable", "configure system AI purposes and view app/environment/run-attributed usage", "connect/revoke GitHub security sources and inspect ref-to-SHA jobs, routes, retention, coverage, and normalized reports"];

package/dist/index.js

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ import {
   startHostedSecurityJob,
   surfacePaths,
   validateInvocation
-} from "./chunk-5U3EXWCR.js";
+} from "./chunk-HXUVCUEM.js";
 export {
   AGENT_HARNESSES,
   CAPABILITIES,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@odla-ai/cli",
-  "version": "0.25.7",
+  "version": "0.25.9",
   "description": "Agent-operable CLI for odla provisioning, calendar consent and sync lifecycle, System AI administration, Worker secrets, security jobs, and smoke checks.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "homepage": "https://odla.ai/docs/packages/cli",

package/skills/odla/SKILL.md

@@ -120,6 +120,10 @@ guessing which platform/credential steps need manual work. Then:
    consent in a browser and the connection is immediately live — nothing
    syncs.
 4. **run** — `npx wrangler dev` (auto-loads `.dev.vars`); verify locally.
+   When an agent mention appears stuck, inspect the durable delivery ledger
+   with `npx odla-ai agent jobs --env <env> --json`. Requeue only an exact
+   dead-letter id with `npx odla-ai agent retry <job-id> --env <env> --json`;
+   pending/running/succeeded jobs are intentionally not replayable.
 5. **security** — run the passive `@odla-ai/security` odla profile; inspect
    every lead and keep critical candidate gating enabled. If the human approves
    redacted source disclosure, follow with