@odla-ai/cli 0.25.23 → 0.26.1

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { HostedSecurityJob, GitHubConnectionStatus, GitHubSecuritySource, Hosted
 export { GitHubConnectionAttempt, GitHubConnectionStatus, GitHubSecuritySource, HostedSecurityCounts, HostedSecurityCoverage, HostedSecurityIntent, HostedSecurityIntentResponse, HostedSecurityJob, HostedSecurityJobStatus, HostedSecurityPlan, HostedSecurityPlanRoute, HostedSecurityReport, HostedSecurityReportFinding, HostedSecurityRoute } from '@odla-ai/security/hosted';
 
 /** One exact device-grant scope obtainable through the approval flow. */
-type ScopedPlatformScope = "platform:ai:policy:read" | "platform:ai:policy:write" | "platform:ai:credential:read" | "platform:ai:credential:write" | "platform:ai:usage:read" | "platform:ai:audit:read" | "platform:status:read" | "app:config:read" | "app:config:write" | "app:code:host:connect" | "platform:code:host:connect" | "platform:security:self" | "platform:runbook:write";
+type ScopedPlatformScope = "platform:ai:policy:read" | "platform:ai:policy:write" | "platform:ai:credential:read" | "platform:ai:credential:write" | "platform:ai:usage:read" | "platform:ai:audit:read" | "platform:status:read" | "platform:chat:credential:write" | "app:config:read" | "app:config:write" | "app:code:host:connect" | "platform:code:host:connect" | "platform:security:self" | "platform:runbook:write";
 /** Inputs for obtaining one short-lived, exact-scope device grant. */
 interface ScopedPlatformTokenOptions {
     platform: string;
@@ -162,6 +162,17 @@ declare function codeConnect(options: CodeConnectOptions): Promise<void>;
 /** Run outbound presence and fenced Pi commands without opening a listener. */
 declare function runCodeRuntime(input: CodeRuntimeInput): Promise<void>;
 
+interface RunResult {
+    code: number;
+    stdout: string;
+    stderr: string;
+}
+/** Subprocess seam: injectable in tests, `defaultRunner` in production. */
+type CommandRunner = (cmd: string, args: string[], opts?: {
+    input?: string;
+    cwd?: string;
+}) => Promise<RunResult>;
+
 /** Map a CLI failure to its process exit code: 75 (EX_TEMPFAIL) marks work that
  * has not failed but has not finished — a handshake still awaiting human
  * approval (the pending state is persisted, so rerunning resumes it), or a
@@ -186,6 +197,8 @@ interface CliDependencies {
     /** Runs git in the working directory; injected so `runbook impact` can be
      * driven over a fixed diff instead of whatever the checkout happens to be. */
     runGit?: (args: string[]) => string;
+    /** Runs Wrangler for one-purpose platform secret rotations. */
+    runner?: CommandRunner;
 }
 /**
  * Parse CLI arguments and dispatch the matching odla command.
@@ -380,17 +393,6 @@ declare function calendarConnect(options: CalendarLifecycleOptions): Promise<Cal
  * project grant is not revoked. */
 declare function calendarDisconnect(options: CalendarLifecycleOptions): Promise<CalendarStatus>;
 
-interface RunResult {
-    code: number;
-    stdout: string;
-    stderr: string;
-}
-/** Subprocess seam: injectable in tests, `defaultRunner` in production. */
-type CommandRunner = (cmd: string, args: string[], opts?: {
-    input?: string;
-    cwd?: string;
-}) => Promise<RunResult>;
-
 type OdlaEnvName = string;
 type AppRules = Record<string, {
     view?: string;

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { HostedSecurityJob, GitHubConnectionStatus, GitHubSecuritySource, Hosted
 export { GitHubConnectionAttempt, GitHubConnectionStatus, GitHubSecuritySource, HostedSecurityCounts, HostedSecurityCoverage, HostedSecurityIntent, HostedSecurityIntentResponse, HostedSecurityJob, HostedSecurityJobStatus, HostedSecurityPlan, HostedSecurityPlanRoute, HostedSecurityReport, HostedSecurityReportFinding, HostedSecurityRoute } from '@odla-ai/security/hosted';
 
 /** One exact device-grant scope obtainable through the approval flow. */
-type ScopedPlatformScope = "platform:ai:policy:read" | "platform:ai:policy:write" | "platform:ai:credential:read" | "platform:ai:credential:write" | "platform:ai:usage:read" | "platform:ai:audit:read" | "platform:status:read" | "app:config:read" | "app:config:write" | "app:code:host:connect" | "platform:code:host:connect" | "platform:security:self" | "platform:runbook:write";
+type ScopedPlatformScope = "platform:ai:policy:read" | "platform:ai:policy:write" | "platform:ai:credential:read" | "platform:ai:credential:write" | "platform:ai:usage:read" | "platform:ai:audit:read" | "platform:status:read" | "platform:chat:credential:write" | "app:config:read" | "app:config:write" | "app:code:host:connect" | "platform:code:host:connect" | "platform:security:self" | "platform:runbook:write";
 /** Inputs for obtaining one short-lived, exact-scope device grant. */
 interface ScopedPlatformTokenOptions {
     platform: string;
@@ -162,6 +162,17 @@ declare function codeConnect(options: CodeConnectOptions): Promise<void>;
 /** Run outbound presence and fenced Pi commands without opening a listener. */
 declare function runCodeRuntime(input: CodeRuntimeInput): Promise<void>;
 
+interface RunResult {
+    code: number;
+    stdout: string;
+    stderr: string;
+}
+/** Subprocess seam: injectable in tests, `defaultRunner` in production. */
+type CommandRunner = (cmd: string, args: string[], opts?: {
+    input?: string;
+    cwd?: string;
+}) => Promise<RunResult>;
+
 /** Map a CLI failure to its process exit code: 75 (EX_TEMPFAIL) marks work that
  * has not failed but has not finished — a handshake still awaiting human
  * approval (the pending state is persisted, so rerunning resumes it), or a
@@ -186,6 +197,8 @@ interface CliDependencies {
     /** Runs git in the working directory; injected so `runbook impact` can be
      * driven over a fixed diff instead of whatever the checkout happens to be. */
     runGit?: (args: string[]) => string;
+    /** Runs Wrangler for one-purpose platform secret rotations. */
+    runner?: CommandRunner;
 }
 /**
  * Parse CLI arguments and dispatch the matching odla command.
@@ -380,17 +393,6 @@ declare function calendarConnect(options: CalendarLifecycleOptions): Promise<Cal
  * project grant is not revoked. */
 declare function calendarDisconnect(options: CalendarLifecycleOptions): Promise<CalendarStatus>;
 
-interface RunResult {
-    code: number;
-    stdout: string;
-    stderr: string;
-}
-/** Subprocess seam: injectable in tests, `defaultRunner` in production. */
-type CommandRunner = (cmd: string, args: string[], opts?: {
-    input?: string;
-    cwd?: string;
-}) => Promise<RunResult>;
-
 type OdlaEnvName = string;
 type AppRules = Record<string, {
     view?: string;

package/dist/index.js

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ import {
   startHostedSecurityJob,
   surfacePaths,
   validateInvocation
-} from "./chunk-JJ42NV7X.js";
+} from "./chunk-ZAZBUURZ.js";
 export {
   AGENT_HARNESSES,
   CAPABILITIES,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@odla-ai/cli",
-  "version": "0.25.23",
+  "version": "0.26.1",
   "description": "Agent-operable CLI for odla provisioning, calendar consent and sync lifecycle, System AI administration, Worker secrets, security jobs, and smoke checks.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "homepage": "https://odla.ai/docs/packages/cli",

package/skills/odla/references/sdks.md

@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ block (`availabilityCalendars` per env, optional `bookingCalendar`). Normal
 provision opens a second, state-bound Google checkpoint issued by the
 platform; the human grants the booking scopes in a browser. Google tokens
 stay platform-side and never become app/CLI secrets. Google Calendar is the
-single source of truth — odla stores no calendar or attendee data, and
-nothing syncs.
+single source of truth — odla stores no event mirror, bounded exact-lifetime
+mutation receipts are purged with the app, and nothing syncs.
 
 ```ts
 // Trusted Worker only — the admin key must never enter browser code.
@@ -61,7 +61,9 @@ const { booking } = await cal.actions.create(
 ```
 
 Store the returned `eventId`/`meetUrl` on the app's own record;
-`actions.reschedule(eventId, …)` and `actions.cancel(eventId)` use it. A
+`actions.reschedule(eventId, { idempotencyKey, … })` and
+`actions.cancel(eventId, { idempotencyKey })` use it. Derive each key from the
+record and exact intended action; reuse it only for an exact retry. A
 taken slot rejects with non-retryable `calendar_slot_unavailable` — refetch
 slots, don't retry. Browser code never calls `initCalendar` or the platform
 calendar routes; it hits the app's own endpoints and may import pure helpers

package/skills/odla-migrate/references/phase-2b-calendar.md

@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
 Use this phase when the site should offer real scheduling: visitors pick a
 bookable slot and the app creates a live Google Calendar event — with a Meet
 link and an invitation email that Google itself sends. Google Calendar is the
-single source of truth; odla stores no calendar or attendee data. There is no
+single source of truth; odla stores no calendar mirror. Bounded exact-lifetime
+mutation receipts make retries safe and are removed on app purge. There is no
 sync, no mirror, and no `$bookings` namespace.
 
 Human obligations: complete the server-issued Google consent page in a
@@ -95,14 +96,17 @@ this app's own Worker endpoints and may import pure helpers from
    ```
 
    Store the returned `booking.eventId` and `booking.meetUrl` on the app's
-   own record (its odla-db row) — that record is the app's only persistence;
-   attendee data lives in Google. On `calendar_slot_unavailable` (409,
+   own record (its odla-db row) — that is the app's product record. Attendee
+   source data lives in Google; the platform may retain the bounded create
+   response in the exact app lifetime for replay. On `calendar_slot_unavailable` (409,
    non-retryable) return a "slot taken" response; the client refetches
    `/api/booking/slots` and re-picks. On retryable
    `calendar_booking_in_progress`, retry once after a short delay.
-6. Reschedule/cancel go through the stored id:
-   `cal.actions.reschedule(eventId, { startAt, endAt })` and
-   `cal.actions.cancel(eventId)` (idempotent) — expose them as app endpoints
+6. Reschedule/cancel go through the stored id and require stable exact-action
+   keys: `cal.actions.reschedule(eventId, { idempotencyKey:
+   \`booking:${applicationId}:move:${startAt}:${endAt}\`, startAt, endAt })`
+   and `cal.actions.cancel(eventId, { idempotencyKey:
+   \`booking:${applicationId}:cancel\` })` — expose them as app endpoints
    gated to the record's owner. Attendees can also act through Google's own
    invitation flows; treat Google as authoritative.
 7. Frontend. Two supported shapes:
@@ -125,7 +129,8 @@ UI creates the event on the booking calendar with a Meet link; the Google
 invitation email arrives in the test attendee's inbox; a repeat POST with the
 same idempotency key returns `duplicate: true` (no second event); a taken
 slot returns 409 and the UI refetches slots; reschedule and cancel work via
-the stored `eventId`; zero attendee data is persisted anywhere except the
-app's own tenant record; no Google credential exists in local files; and
+the stored `eventId`; no event mirror exists and retry receipts are purged
+with the app; attendee source data remains in Google and the app stores only
+its own product record; no Google credential exists in local files; and
 PM records the booking-flow decision and the active task comment links this
 evidence.