@odla-ai/cli 0.25.2 → 0.25.6

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -246,10 +246,10 @@ declare function adminAi(options: AdminAiOptions): Promise<void>;
 /** Stable, machine-readable division of work between the CLI, coding agent,
  * human operator, and Studio. Printed by `odla-ai capabilities --json`. */
 declare const CAPABILITIES: {
-    readonly cli: readonly ["start an email-bound device request without accepting a password or user session token", "register the app and enable configured services per environment", "issue, persist, and explicitly rotate configured service credentials", "add or remove app co-owners, each of whom self-provisions their own credentials for the shared db without any secret handoff", "write local Worker values and push deployed Worker secrets through Wrangler stdin", "store tenant-vault secrets (including the Clerk webhook secret and reserved Clerk secret key) write-only from stdin or an env var", "compose declared app-capability schema/rules, create guarded seeds when absent, and configure platform AI, auth, and deployment links", "apply Google Calendar booking config, then drive state-bound consent, status, discovery, and disconnect flows (bookings run live through the platform proxy)", "validate integration contracts offline and smoke-test a provisioned db environment plus anonymous capability routes", "run app-attributed hosted security discovery and independent validation without provider keys", "connect/revoke source-read-only GitHub sources and drive commit-pinned hosted security jobs without PATs or provider keys", "let admins manage system AI policy and credentials, inspect attributed usage, and read immutable admin changes through separate short-lived capability-only approvals"];
+    readonly cli: readonly ["start an email-bound device request without accepting a password or user session token", "register the app and enable configured services per environment", "issue, persist, and explicitly rotate configured service credentials", "add or remove app co-owners, each of whom self-provisions their own credentials for the shared db without any secret handoff", "write local Worker values and push deployed Worker secrets through Wrangler stdin", "store tenant-vault secrets (including the Clerk webhook secret and reserved Clerk secret key) write-only from stdin or an env var", "compose declared app-capability schema/rules, create guarded seeds when absent, and configure platform AI, auth, and deployment links", "apply Google Calendar booking config, then drive state-bound consent, status, discovery, and disconnect flows (bookings run live through the platform proxy)", "validate integration contracts offline and smoke-test a provisioned db environment plus anonymous capability routes", "read one versioned o11y status envelope spanning application RED, current live-sync freshness/load, the protected commit-to-visible canary, collector ingest/scheduler trust, provider-owned runtime metrics, and a bounded machine verdict", "run app-attributed hosted security discovery and independent validation without provider keys", "connect/revoke source-read-only GitHub sources and drive commit-pinned hosted security jobs without PATs or provider keys", "let admins manage system AI policy and credentials, inspect attributed usage, and read immutable admin changes through separate short-lived capability-only approvals"];
     readonly agent: readonly ["install and import the selected odla SDKs", "wrap the Worker with withObservability and choose useful telemetry", "install capability packages, mount their runtime routes, and make application-specific schema, rules, auth, UI, and migration decisions", "wire @odla-ai/calendar into trusted Worker code and keep the app admin key out of browsers"];
     readonly human: readonly ["provide the existing odla account email, then sign in and explicitly review/approve the exact device code", "review mirrored calendar/attendee disclosure and complete the server-issued Google consent flow", "consent to changes against an app's live database with --yes", "request destructive credential rotation explicitly", "review application semantics, security findings, releases, and merges", "approve redacted-source disclosure before hosted security reasoning", "approve GitHub App repository access separately from redacted-snippet disclosure"];
-    readonly studio: readonly ["view telemetry and environment state", "let signed-in users inventory/revoke their own agent grants and admins audit/global-revoke them", "review calendar connection, granted read scope, selected calendars, and sync health without exposing provider tokens", "perform manual credential recovery — for the primary owner or any co-owner — when the CLI's local shown-once copy is unavailable", "configure system AI purposes and view app/environment/run-attributed usage", "connect/revoke GitHub security sources and inspect ref-to-SHA jobs, routes, retention, coverage, and normalized reports"];
+    readonly studio: readonly ["view application telemetry, reconciled live-sync load/freshness, commit-to-visible canary health, provider-owned Worker runtime metrics, and environment state", "let signed-in users inventory/revoke their own agent grants and admins audit/global-revoke them", "review calendar connection, granted read scope, selected calendars, and sync health without exposing provider tokens", "perform manual credential recovery — for the primary owner or any co-owner — when the CLI's local shown-once copy is unavailable", "configure system AI purposes and view app/environment/run-attributed usage", "connect/revoke GitHub security sources and inspect ref-to-SHA jobs, routes, retention, coverage, and normalized reports"];
 };
 type Output = Pick<typeof console, "log">;
 /** Print the stable responsibility boundary for humans or agent tooling. */
@@ -1032,15 +1032,16 @@ declare function installSkill(options?: SkillInstallOptions): SkillInstallResult
  * Verify a live, already-provisioned environment end-to-end. Resolves the target
  * env (`options.env`, else `dev`, else the first declared env) and requires it to
  * be declared in the config. Reads the local credentials file and checks that it
- * belongs to this app and holds a `tenantId` + `dbKey` for the env — otherwise it
- * throws pointing the user at `odla-ai provision --write-dev-vars`.
+ * belongs to this app and holds the credentials required by the enabled
+ * services — otherwise it throws pointing the user at
+ * `odla-ai provision --write-dev-vars`.
  *
- * It then makes real network calls: fetches the registry public-config (and, when
- * `ai.provider` is configured, asserts the live provider matches), fetches the
- * live db schema with the db key and asserts every entity from the composed app
- * plus integration schema is present, runs a `count` aggregate against the
- * first entity, and checks each integration's deployed route probe anonymously
- * against `links.<env>`. Progress lines are printed and it ends with `ok`.
+ * It then makes service-aware network calls: fetches the registry public-config
+ * (and, when `ai.provider` is configured, asserts the live provider matches);
+ * when db is enabled, fetches the live schema, checks composed entities, and
+ * runs a `count` aggregate; when calendar is enabled, checks its owner-visible
+ * booking health; and checks integration route probes anonymously against
+ * `links.<env>`. Progress lines are printed and it ends with `ok`.
  * Read-only — it writes nothing and throws on the first mismatch or failed
  * request.
  *

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -246,10 +246,10 @@ declare function adminAi(options: AdminAiOptions): Promise<void>;
 /** Stable, machine-readable division of work between the CLI, coding agent,
  * human operator, and Studio. Printed by `odla-ai capabilities --json`. */
 declare const CAPABILITIES: {
-    readonly cli: readonly ["start an email-bound device request without accepting a password or user session token", "register the app and enable configured services per environment", "issue, persist, and explicitly rotate configured service credentials", "add or remove app co-owners, each of whom self-provisions their own credentials for the shared db without any secret handoff", "write local Worker values and push deployed Worker secrets through Wrangler stdin", "store tenant-vault secrets (including the Clerk webhook secret and reserved Clerk secret key) write-only from stdin or an env var", "compose declared app-capability schema/rules, create guarded seeds when absent, and configure platform AI, auth, and deployment links", "apply Google Calendar booking config, then drive state-bound consent, status, discovery, and disconnect flows (bookings run live through the platform proxy)", "validate integration contracts offline and smoke-test a provisioned db environment plus anonymous capability routes", "run app-attributed hosted security discovery and independent validation without provider keys", "connect/revoke source-read-only GitHub sources and drive commit-pinned hosted security jobs without PATs or provider keys", "let admins manage system AI policy and credentials, inspect attributed usage, and read immutable admin changes through separate short-lived capability-only approvals"];
+    readonly cli: readonly ["start an email-bound device request without accepting a password or user session token", "register the app and enable configured services per environment", "issue, persist, and explicitly rotate configured service credentials", "add or remove app co-owners, each of whom self-provisions their own credentials for the shared db without any secret handoff", "write local Worker values and push deployed Worker secrets through Wrangler stdin", "store tenant-vault secrets (including the Clerk webhook secret and reserved Clerk secret key) write-only from stdin or an env var", "compose declared app-capability schema/rules, create guarded seeds when absent, and configure platform AI, auth, and deployment links", "apply Google Calendar booking config, then drive state-bound consent, status, discovery, and disconnect flows (bookings run live through the platform proxy)", "validate integration contracts offline and smoke-test a provisioned db environment plus anonymous capability routes", "read one versioned o11y status envelope spanning application RED, current live-sync freshness/load, the protected commit-to-visible canary, collector ingest/scheduler trust, provider-owned runtime metrics, and a bounded machine verdict", "run app-attributed hosted security discovery and independent validation without provider keys", "connect/revoke source-read-only GitHub sources and drive commit-pinned hosted security jobs without PATs or provider keys", "let admins manage system AI policy and credentials, inspect attributed usage, and read immutable admin changes through separate short-lived capability-only approvals"];
     readonly agent: readonly ["install and import the selected odla SDKs", "wrap the Worker with withObservability and choose useful telemetry", "install capability packages, mount their runtime routes, and make application-specific schema, rules, auth, UI, and migration decisions", "wire @odla-ai/calendar into trusted Worker code and keep the app admin key out of browsers"];
     readonly human: readonly ["provide the existing odla account email, then sign in and explicitly review/approve the exact device code", "review mirrored calendar/attendee disclosure and complete the server-issued Google consent flow", "consent to changes against an app's live database with --yes", "request destructive credential rotation explicitly", "review application semantics, security findings, releases, and merges", "approve redacted-source disclosure before hosted security reasoning", "approve GitHub App repository access separately from redacted-snippet disclosure"];
-    readonly studio: readonly ["view telemetry and environment state", "let signed-in users inventory/revoke their own agent grants and admins audit/global-revoke them", "review calendar connection, granted read scope, selected calendars, and sync health without exposing provider tokens", "perform manual credential recovery — for the primary owner or any co-owner — when the CLI's local shown-once copy is unavailable", "configure system AI purposes and view app/environment/run-attributed usage", "connect/revoke GitHub security sources and inspect ref-to-SHA jobs, routes, retention, coverage, and normalized reports"];
+    readonly studio: readonly ["view application telemetry, reconciled live-sync load/freshness, commit-to-visible canary health, provider-owned Worker runtime metrics, and environment state", "let signed-in users inventory/revoke their own agent grants and admins audit/global-revoke them", "review calendar connection, granted read scope, selected calendars, and sync health without exposing provider tokens", "perform manual credential recovery — for the primary owner or any co-owner — when the CLI's local shown-once copy is unavailable", "configure system AI purposes and view app/environment/run-attributed usage", "connect/revoke GitHub security sources and inspect ref-to-SHA jobs, routes, retention, coverage, and normalized reports"];
 };
 type Output = Pick<typeof console, "log">;
 /** Print the stable responsibility boundary for humans or agent tooling. */
@@ -1032,15 +1032,16 @@ declare function installSkill(options?: SkillInstallOptions): SkillInstallResult
  * Verify a live, already-provisioned environment end-to-end. Resolves the target
  * env (`options.env`, else `dev`, else the first declared env) and requires it to
  * be declared in the config. Reads the local credentials file and checks that it
- * belongs to this app and holds a `tenantId` + `dbKey` for the env — otherwise it
- * throws pointing the user at `odla-ai provision --write-dev-vars`.
+ * belongs to this app and holds the credentials required by the enabled
+ * services — otherwise it throws pointing the user at
+ * `odla-ai provision --write-dev-vars`.
  *
- * It then makes real network calls: fetches the registry public-config (and, when
- * `ai.provider` is configured, asserts the live provider matches), fetches the
- * live db schema with the db key and asserts every entity from the composed app
- * plus integration schema is present, runs a `count` aggregate against the
- * first entity, and checks each integration's deployed route probe anonymously
- * against `links.<env>`. Progress lines are printed and it ends with `ok`.
+ * It then makes service-aware network calls: fetches the registry public-config
+ * (and, when `ai.provider` is configured, asserts the live provider matches);
+ * when db is enabled, fetches the live schema, checks composed entities, and
+ * runs a `count` aggregate; when calendar is enabled, checks its owner-visible
+ * booking health; and checks integration route probes anonymously against
+ * `links.<env>`. Progress lines are printed and it ends with `ok`.
  * Read-only — it writes nothing and throws on the first mismatch or failed
  * request.
  *

package/dist/index.js

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ import {
   startHostedSecurityJob,
   surfacePaths,
   validateInvocation
-} from "./chunk-MX6FSJUN.js";
+} from "./chunk-MWLZO2EZ.js";
 export {
   AGENT_HARNESSES,
   CAPABILITIES,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@odla-ai/cli",
-  "version": "0.25.2",
+  "version": "0.25.6",
   "description": "Agent-operable CLI for odla provisioning, calendar consent and sync lifecycle, System AI administration, Worker secrets, security jobs, and smoke checks.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "homepage": "https://odla.ai/docs/packages/cli",
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
   "dependencies": {
     "@odla-ai/ai": ">=0.5.0 <1.0.0",
     "@odla-ai/apps": ">=0.8.1 <1.0.0",
-    "@odla-ai/db": ">=0.6.4",
+    "@odla-ai/db": ">=0.6.7 <1.0.0",
     "@odla-ai/security": ">=0.3.1 <1.0.0"
   },
   "devDependencies": {