@odla-ai/cli 0.16.7 → 0.17.0

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ declare function adminAi(options: AdminAiOptions): Promise<void>;
 declare const CAPABILITIES: {
     readonly cli: readonly ["start an email-bound device request without accepting a password or user session token", "register the app and enable configured services per environment", "issue, persist, and explicitly rotate configured service credentials", "add or remove app co-owners, each of whom self-provisions their own credentials for the shared db without any secret handoff", "write local Worker values and push deployed Worker secrets through Wrangler stdin", "store tenant-vault secrets (including the Clerk webhook secret and reserved Clerk secret key) write-only from stdin or an env var", "compose declared app-capability schema/rules, create guarded seeds when absent, and configure platform AI, auth, and deployment links", "apply Google Calendar booking config, then drive state-bound consent, status, discovery, and disconnect flows (bookings run live through the platform proxy)", "validate integration contracts offline and smoke-test a provisioned db environment plus anonymous capability routes", "run app-attributed hosted security discovery and independent validation without provider keys", "connect/revoke source-read-only GitHub sources and drive commit-pinned hosted security jobs without PATs or provider keys", "let admins manage system AI policy and credentials, inspect attributed usage, and read immutable admin changes through separate short-lived capability-only approvals"];
     readonly agent: readonly ["install and import the selected odla SDKs", "wrap the Worker with withObservability and choose useful telemetry", "install capability packages, mount their runtime routes, and make application-specific schema, rules, auth, UI, and migration decisions", "wire @odla-ai/calendar into trusted Worker code and keep the app admin key out of browsers"];
-    readonly human: readonly ["provide the existing odla account email, then sign in and explicitly review/approve the exact device code", "review mirrored calendar/attendee disclosure and complete the server-issued Google consent flow", "consent to production changes with --yes", "request destructive credential rotation explicitly", "review application semantics, security findings, releases, and merges", "approve redacted-source disclosure before hosted security reasoning", "approve GitHub App repository access separately from redacted-snippet disclosure"];
+    readonly human: readonly ["provide the existing odla account email, then sign in and explicitly review/approve the exact device code", "review mirrored calendar/attendee disclosure and complete the server-issued Google consent flow", "consent to changes against an app's live database with --yes", "request destructive credential rotation explicitly", "review application semantics, security findings, releases, and merges", "approve redacted-source disclosure before hosted security reasoning", "approve GitHub App repository access separately from redacted-snippet disclosure"];
     readonly studio: readonly ["view telemetry and environment state", "let signed-in users inventory/revoke their own agent grants and admins audit/global-revoke them", "review calendar connection, granted read scope, selected calendars, and sync health without exposing provider tokens", "perform manual credential recovery — for the primary owner or any co-owner — when the CLI's local shown-once copy is unavailable", "configure system AI purposes and view app/environment/run-attributed usage", "connect/revoke GitHub security sources and inspect ref-to-SHA jobs, routes, retention, coverage, and normalized reports"];
 };
 type Output = Pick<typeof console, "log">;

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ declare function adminAi(options: AdminAiOptions): Promise<void>;
 declare const CAPABILITIES: {
     readonly cli: readonly ["start an email-bound device request without accepting a password or user session token", "register the app and enable configured services per environment", "issue, persist, and explicitly rotate configured service credentials", "add or remove app co-owners, each of whom self-provisions their own credentials for the shared db without any secret handoff", "write local Worker values and push deployed Worker secrets through Wrangler stdin", "store tenant-vault secrets (including the Clerk webhook secret and reserved Clerk secret key) write-only from stdin or an env var", "compose declared app-capability schema/rules, create guarded seeds when absent, and configure platform AI, auth, and deployment links", "apply Google Calendar booking config, then drive state-bound consent, status, discovery, and disconnect flows (bookings run live through the platform proxy)", "validate integration contracts offline and smoke-test a provisioned db environment plus anonymous capability routes", "run app-attributed hosted security discovery and independent validation without provider keys", "connect/revoke source-read-only GitHub sources and drive commit-pinned hosted security jobs without PATs or provider keys", "let admins manage system AI policy and credentials, inspect attributed usage, and read immutable admin changes through separate short-lived capability-only approvals"];
     readonly agent: readonly ["install and import the selected odla SDKs", "wrap the Worker with withObservability and choose useful telemetry", "install capability packages, mount their runtime routes, and make application-specific schema, rules, auth, UI, and migration decisions", "wire @odla-ai/calendar into trusted Worker code and keep the app admin key out of browsers"];
-    readonly human: readonly ["provide the existing odla account email, then sign in and explicitly review/approve the exact device code", "review mirrored calendar/attendee disclosure and complete the server-issued Google consent flow", "consent to production changes with --yes", "request destructive credential rotation explicitly", "review application semantics, security findings, releases, and merges", "approve redacted-source disclosure before hosted security reasoning", "approve GitHub App repository access separately from redacted-snippet disclosure"];
+    readonly human: readonly ["provide the existing odla account email, then sign in and explicitly review/approve the exact device code", "review mirrored calendar/attendee disclosure and complete the server-issued Google consent flow", "consent to changes against an app's live database with --yes", "request destructive credential rotation explicitly", "review application semantics, security findings, releases, and merges", "approve redacted-source disclosure before hosted security reasoning", "approve GitHub App repository access separately from redacted-snippet disclosure"];
     readonly studio: readonly ["view telemetry and environment state", "let signed-in users inventory/revoke their own agent grants and admins audit/global-revoke them", "review calendar connection, granted read scope, selected calendars, and sync health without exposing provider tokens", "perform manual credential recovery — for the primary owner or any co-owner — when the CLI's local shown-once copy is unavailable", "configure system AI purposes and view app/environment/run-attributed usage", "connect/revoke GitHub security sources and inspect ref-to-SHA jobs, routes, retention, coverage, and normalized reports"];
 };
 type Output = Pick<typeof console, "log">;

package/dist/index.js

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ import {
   secretsSetClerkKey,
   smoke,
   startHostedSecurityJob
-} from "./chunk-X3HUN6S3.js";
+} from "./chunk-2UKO2NED.js";
 export {
   AGENT_HARNESSES,
   CAPABILITIES,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@odla-ai/cli",
-  "version": "0.16.7",
+  "version": "0.17.0",
   "description": "Agent-operable CLI for odla provisioning, calendar consent and sync lifecycle, System AI administration, Worker secrets, security jobs, and smoke checks.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "homepage": "https://odla.ai/docs/packages/cli",
@@ -57,10 +57,10 @@
     "prepublishOnly": "npm run build"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@odla-ai/ai": ">=0.5.0 <0.7.0",
-    "@odla-ai/apps": "^0.8.1",
+    "@odla-ai/ai": ">=0.5.0 <1.0.0",
+    "@odla-ai/apps": ">=0.8.1 <1.0.0",
     "@odla-ai/db": ">=0.6.4",
-    "@odla-ai/security": "^0.3.1"
+    "@odla-ai/security": ">=0.3.1 <1.0.0"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@odla-ai/harness": "*",

package/skills/odla/SKILL.md

@@ -41,11 +41,13 @@ State which path you're taking and what you'll build in one line; get a nod.
    A fresh odla device request also needs the existing account email via
    `--email` or `ODLA_USER_EMAIL`; email is a non-secret identifier. Never ask
    for an odla password, Clerk token, or browser session.
-2. **Dev before prod.** Keep `envs: ["dev"]` and verify the tenant
-   (`<appId>--dev`) before any write or deploy. Add `prod` only at the explicit
-   production checkpoint. The first prod
-   `provision --dry-run` review, `provision --yes --push-secrets`, and deploy
-   are human checkpoints.
+2. **Sandbox before live.** Every app has two databases on production odla.ai:
+   a sandbox (env `dev`, tenant `<appId>--dev`) and a live one (env `prod`,
+   tenant `<appId>`). "prod" names the app's live DATABASE, never a different
+   odla — there is only one odla.ai. Keep `envs: ["dev"]` and verify the tenant
+   before any write or deploy. Add `prod` only at the explicit go-live
+   checkpoint. That first live `provision --dry-run` review,
+   `provision --yes --push-secrets`, and deploy are human checkpoints.
 3. **Rules are default-deny.** A namespace with no rule is invisible; a write
    with no rule is rejected. Never widen a rule just to clear a 403 — edit
    `src/odla/rules.mjs` deliberately, and flag rule changes to the human.

package/skills/odla/references/sdks.md

@@ -155,6 +155,15 @@ injected isolated executor and never falls back to the host shell.
 
 ## Others
 
+- **@odla-ai/chapter** — membership sites from one `defineChapter()` config:
+  generates the odla-db schema + deny-all rules + group seed + provisioning
+  integration, and ships the worker (join/apply, Stripe membership, Google
+  booking, member area, exactly-once lifecycle email, CRM projection) plus a UI
+  kit. Composable: `chapterWorker({ chapter, routes })` runs host routes before
+  the built-ins and shares its auth context, and `./ui/member` is react-only
+  (no Clerk SDK) while `./ui/admin` is the gated console. **If a migration target
+  is a membership site, start here instead of hand-authoring schema** — see
+  `odla-migrate/references/phase-2-chapter.md`.
 - **@odla-ai/ui** — design system: CSS tokens, five themes, component styles,
   chart helpers.
 - **@odla-ai/kg** — ontology-driven knowledge graph: source connectors, LLM

package/skills/odla-migrate/SKILL.md

@@ -33,8 +33,10 @@ installed skill at `../odla/SKILL.md` instead.
 
 1. The old site (GitHub Pages) stays live and untouched until Phase 5
    sign-off. Before that, rollback is always "do nothing."
-2. Dev only until Phase 5: `envs: ["dev"]` in odla.config.mjs; the dev
-   tenant is `<appId>--dev`. Verify the tenant before any write or deploy.
+2. Sandbox database only until Phase 5: `envs: ["dev"]` in odla.config.mjs; the
+   sandbox tenant is `<appId>--dev`, and the app's live database (env `prod`)
+   is the bare `<appId>`. Both sit on production odla.ai. Verify the tenant
+   before any write or deploy.
 3. Never print, paste, or commit a secret. Never `cat` .dev.vars,
    .odla/credentials.local.json, or .odla/dev-token.json. Read
    references/secrets-map.md BEFORE any command that touches a credential.

package/skills/odla-migrate/references/phase-2-chapter.md

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+# Phase 2 (chapter): membership sites start from `defineChapter()`
+
+**Use this instead of hand-authoring `src/odla/schema.mjs` when the site is a
+membership site** — applications/join, paid membership, booked intro calls, a
+member area, an admin console, a people CRM. `@odla-ai/chapter` generates all of
+that. A real conversion deleted ~2,500 lines: a 2,094-line worker became 6, and
+four hand-maintained files (schema, rules, group seed, provisioner) became one
+`defineChapter()` call.
+
+If the app is NOT a membership site, stay on `phase-2-db.md`. If it is a
+membership site with a few extra entities, use chapter for what it models and
+hand-author only the namespaces it does not.
+
+## The sequence (do not reorder)
+
+1. **Write the config and assert parity BEFORE deleting anything.**
+   ```js
+   export const chapter = defineChapter({
+     id: "example-chapter", name: "Example", mode: "chapter",
+     prices: { standardCents: 90000 },
+     emails: { notificationEmail: "owner@example.com" },
+   });
+   ```
+   Then diff `chapter.schema` against the site's existing schema **in a test** and
+   require equality. That single assertion is what makes the deletion safe rather
+   than hopeful.
+2. **Freeze the old schema as a fixture, don't just delete it.** Move it to
+   `test/fixtures/legacy-schema.mjs` and keep asserting against it, so an upstream
+   default change fails a test instead of a live `provision`. It costs nothing and
+   is the only durable guard against drift in a generated schema.
+3. **Swap provisioning** — `createChapterIntegration(chapter)` in
+   `odla.config.mjs` `integrations: [...]`. Inert until the next provision run. It
+   supplies schema + rules + seeds, so the `db` block goes away entirely.
+4. **Then the worker**, keeping every bespoke route as a host route:
+   `chapterWorker({ chapter, routes })` runs host routes BEFORE the built-ins and
+   hands each the same context (`ctx.verifyUser`, `ctx.makeDb`, `ctx.roleFor`,
+   `ctx.isAdmin`), so you never verify a JWT twice. Do NOT hand routes over to
+   chapter in the same change as the framework swap.
+5. **Override rather than inherit wherever local behavior was a decision.**
+6. `npx @odla-ai/cli doctor` → `provision --dry-run` (show the human) → provision.
+
+The same parity-before-deletion pattern works for UI: render the packaged
+component beside yours, assert byte-identical markup, then delete yours and keep
+the test as an integration guard — the CSS class contract is the site's, not the
+package's.
+
+## Behavior deltas to audit
+
+These bite silently; no smoke test catches them.
+
+- **Per-field caps.** `application.defaultMaxLen` is 2000. A join form accepting a
+  5000-char message starts rejecting input. Pass `maxLen` explicitly.
+- **`services` default** is `["db","calendar","o11y"]`; `smoke` compares config
+  against the platform, so set it explicitly if you don't run the o11y collector.
+- **Which email fires from which route.** `adminNotification` fires on
+  `POST /api/applications` by default; `prepEmail` from `/api/schedule/book`;
+  `paymentConfirmation` from the Stripe webhook. Set
+  `sends: { adminNotification: "payment" | "submit" | "never" }` if the site's
+  policy differs — and re-check this on every chapter upgrade, since wiring a
+  send changes outbound mail with no local diff.
+- **Account creation model.** `account: "invite"` (default) mints a Clerk
+  invitation; `"create"` makes the account server-side; `"none"` skips. Swapping
+  in chapter's route while expecting server-side create loses it silently — the
+  applicant finds out when they cannot sign in.
+- **CRM projection points.** chapter projects on application submit, not on
+  booking or webhook status change. Mirroring pipeline stage into the CRM means
+  keeping those routes.
+- **Route names.** chapter serves `/api/config`, `/api/join-config`. Alias legacy
+  names in ~4 lines as host routes rather than rewriting pages.
+
+## Install notes
+
+- **A worker-only adoption does not need `@odla-ai/auth-clerk`.** The worker
+  verifies Clerk JWTs with `jose` via `ctx.verifyUser`. Install auth-clerk only
+  for `@odla-ai/chapter/ui/admin` (the Clerk-gated console) or the themed sign-in
+  components; `@odla-ai/chapter/ui/member` needs nothing but react.
+- **`--legacy-peer-deps` is a diagnostic, not a setting.** It suppresses exactly
+  the peer error that tells you a pair is unsupported. If an install errors, read
+  it. A site that left the flag on ran an unsupported ui/crm pair for a day with
+  no signal.
+
+## Verify the surface from the types
+
+Docs lag at this release cadence. **Read `dist/*.d.ts` and grep the built bundle
+for route strings; treat prose as intent.** When verifying live routes, note that
+Clerk session tokens expire in ~60s — a script that mints a JWT then runs a batch
+of curls must re-mint per batch (`clerk api /sessions`, then
+`/sessions/<id>/tokens`).

package/skills/odla-migrate/references/phase-2-db.md

@@ -27,7 +27,16 @@ opens the review page in interactive terminals; loading it alone is inert.
    re-project on read), lists need explicit `order`, uniques are
    single-attr (derive composite keys), ON CONFLICT maps to `mutationId`
    dedupe.
-4. Write `src/odla/schema.mjs` for the app's entities. KEEP the
+4. **Membership site? Go to `phase-2-chapter.md` before writing any
+   schema.** If the app has applications/join, paid membership, booked
+   intro calls, a member area, an admin console or a people CRM, then
+   `defineChapter()` from `@odla-ai/chapter` GENERATES the schema, the
+   deny-all rules, the seed row and the provisioning integration. Hand-
+   authoring them here is exactly the work that package exists to delete
+   (a real conversion cut ~2,500 lines). Use chapter for what it models;
+   hand-author only the namespaces it does not.
+
+   Otherwise, write `src/odla/schema.mjs` for the app's entities. KEEP the
    generated deny-all `src/odla/rules.mjs`: the worker mediates all
    access with its app key (which bypasses rules); browsers get nothing
    directly. Loosening a rule is a human checkpoint.