@oculum/scanner 1.0.9 → 1.0.11

package/dist/layer2/dangerous-functions.js

@@ -1,1701 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-/**
- * Layer 2: Dangerous Function Call Analysis
- * Detects usage of dangerous functions that can lead to security vulnerabilities
- */
-Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.detectDangerousFunctions = detectDangerousFunctions;
-const context_helpers_1 = require("../utils/context-helpers");
-/**
- * Check if exec() call is from child_process (dangerous) vs RegExp.exec (safe)
- * Returns true if this is a child_process exec call that should be flagged
- */
-function isChildProcessExec(content, lineContent) {
-    // Check for child_process import
-    const hasChildProcessImport = /require\s*\(\s*['"]child_process['"]\s*\)/.test(content) ||
-        /from\s+['"]child_process['"]/.test(content) ||
-        /import\s+.*child_process/.test(content) ||
-        /require\s*\(\s*['"]node:child_process['"]\s*\)/.test(content) ||
-        /from\s+['"]node:child_process['"]/.test(content);
-    // If no child_process import, this is likely RegExp.exec or similar
-    if (!hasChildProcessImport) {
-        return false;
-    }
-    // Check if this specific line is RegExp.exec pattern
-    // RegExp.exec is called as: regex.exec(string) or /pattern/.exec(string)
-    const isRegExpExec = /\.\s*exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) && // Method call on an object
-        !/\bexec\s*\(/.test(lineContent.replace(/\.\s*exec\s*\(/, '')); // Not a standalone exec()
-    // Also check for common RegExp patterns
-    const isRegExpPattern = /\/[^/]+\/[gimsuy]*\.exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) || // /pattern/.exec()
-        /new\s+RegExp\s*\([^)]+\)\.exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) || // new RegExp().exec()
-        /regex\.exec\s*\(/i.test(lineContent) || // regex.exec()
-        /pattern\.exec\s*\(/i.test(lineContent) || // pattern.exec()
-        /match\.exec\s*\(/i.test(lineContent) || // match.exec()
-        /re\.exec\s*\(/i.test(lineContent); // re.exec()
-    if (isRegExpExec || isRegExpPattern) {
-        return false;
-    }
-    // Check if exec is imported/destructured from child_process
-    const execImported = /\{\s*[^}]*\bexec\b[^}]*\}\s*=\s*require\s*\(\s*['"]child_process['"]/.test(content) ||
-        /\{\s*[^}]*\bexec\b[^}]*\}\s*=\s*require\s*\(\s*['"]node:child_process['"]/.test(content) ||
-        /import\s+\{\s*[^}]*\bexec\b[^}]*\}\s+from\s+['"]child_process['"]/.test(content) ||
-        /import\s+\{\s*[^}]*\bexec\b[^}]*\}\s+from\s+['"]node:child_process['"]/.test(content);
-    // If exec is directly imported from child_process, standalone exec() is dangerous
-    if (execImported && /\bexec\s*\(/.test(lineContent)) {
-        return true;
-    }
-    // Check for child_process.exec() pattern
-    if (/child_process\.exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) ||
-        /cp\.exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) ||
-        /childProcess\.exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent)) {
-        return true;
-    }
-    // If we have child_process import but can't determine usage, be conservative
-    // Only flag if it looks like a standalone exec() call
-    return /\bexec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) && !/\.\s*exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent);
-}
-/**
- * Check if schema validation is applied near a JSON.parse call
- * Looks for zod, yup, joi, or similar validation patterns
- */
-function hasSchemaValidationNearby(content, lineNumber) {
-    const lines = content.split('\n');
-    const start = Math.max(0, lineNumber - 5);
-    const end = Math.min(lines.length, lineNumber + 10);
-    const context = lines.slice(start, end).join('\n');
-    const schemaValidationPatterns = [
-        // Zod patterns
-        /z\.(object|string|number|array|boolean)\s*\(/i,
-        /\.parse\s*\(/i,
-        /\.safeParse\s*\(/i,
-        /schema\.parse/i,
-        /Schema\.parse/i,
-        // Yup patterns
-        /yup\.(object|string|number|array|boolean)\s*\(/i,
-        /\.validate\s*\(/i,
-        /\.validateSync\s*\(/i,
-        // Joi patterns
-        /Joi\.(object|string|number|array|boolean)\s*\(/i,
-        /\.validateAsync\s*\(/i,
-        // Valibot patterns
-        /v\.(object|string|number|array|boolean)\s*\(/i,
-        // AJV patterns
-        /ajv\.compile/i,
-        /validate\s*\(\s*schema/i,
-        // TypeBox patterns
-        /Type\.(Object|String|Number|Array|Boolean)\s*\(/i,
-        // Generic validation patterns
-        /validateSchema/i,
-        /schemaValidator/i,
-        /parseAndValidate/i,
-    ];
-    return schemaValidationPatterns.some(p => p.test(context));
-}
-/**
- * Check if path traversal protection is in place
- * Looks for common sanitization patterns that prevent directory traversal attacks
- */
-function hasPathTraversalProtection(context, lineContent) {
-    const protectionPatterns = [
-        // Path normalization with base directory check
-        /path\.resolve\s*\([^)]+\).*\.startsWith\s*\(/i,
-        /\.startsWith\s*\([^)]*(?:baseDir|basePath|rootDir|uploadDir|allowedDir)/i,
-        // Explicit ".." rejection
-        /\.includes\s*\(\s*['"`]\.\.['"`]\s*\)/i,
-        /\.indexOf\s*\(\s*['"`]\.\.['"`]\s*\)/i,
-        /['"`]\.\.['"`].*(?:throw|reject|return|error)/i,
-        // Path sanitization libraries
-        /sanitizePath|sanitizeFilename|sanitize-filename/i,
-        /path-sanitizer|secure-path/i,
-        // Explicit path validation
-        /validatePath|isValidPath|checkPath|verifyPath/i,
-        /isPathAllowed|isAllowedPath|pathIsAllowed/i,
-        // Normalize and check pattern
-        /path\.normalize\s*\([^)]+\).*(?:startsWith|includes|indexOf)/i,
-        // Regex validation for safe characters only
-        /\/\^?\[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.\\\/\]\+\$?\//, // Only alphanumeric, dash, underscore, dot
-        // Allowlist/whitelist patterns
-        /allowedExtensions|allowedTypes|whitelist/i,
-        /\.endsWith\s*\(\s*['"`]\.\w+['"`]\s*\)/i, // Extension check
-        // Path.basename to strip directory
-        /path\.basename\s*\(/i,
-        // Zod/validation for filename patterns
-        /z\.string\s*\(\s*\)\.regex\s*\(/i,
-    ];
-    return protectionPatterns.some(p => p.test(context) || p.test(lineContent));
-}
-/**
- * Check if spawn/execFile/execSync is from child_process
- */
-function isChildProcessSpawn(content, lineContent) {
-    // Check for child_process import
-    const hasChildProcessImport = /require\s*\(\s*['"]child_process['"]\s*\)/.test(content) ||
-        /from\s+['"]child_process['"]/.test(content) ||
-        /require\s*\(\s*['"]node:child_process['"]\s*\)/.test(content) ||
-        /from\s+['"]node:child_process['"]/.test(content);
-    if (!hasChildProcessImport) {
-        return false;
-    }
-    // These functions are always from child_process when that module is imported
-    return /\b(spawn|spawnSync|execSync|execFile|execFileSync)\s*\(/.test(lineContent);
-}
-/**
- * Check if a line is inside a try-catch block
- * Looks for enclosing try { ... } catch pattern
- */
-function isInsideTryCatch(content, lineNumber) {
-    const lines = content.split('\n');
-    // Track brace depth and whether we're in a try block
-    let tryDepth = 0;
-    let inTryBlock = false;
-    let braceStack = [];
-    // Scan from start to the target line
-    for (let i = 0; i < lineNumber && i < lines.length; i++) {
-        const line = lines[i];
-        // Check for try keyword (not in a comment)
-        if (/\btry\s*\{/.test(line) && !(0, context_helpers_1.isComment)(line)) {
-            inTryBlock = true;
-            tryDepth++;
-            // Count opening braces on this line
-            const openBraces = (line.match(/\{/g) || []).length;
-            const closeBraces = (line.match(/\}/g) || []).length;
-            for (let j = 0; j < openBraces - closeBraces; j++) {
-                braceStack.push('try');
-            }
-        }
-        else if (/\bcatch\s*\(/.test(line) && !(0, context_helpers_1.isComment)(line)) {
-            // Entering catch block - still protected
-            // Don't decrement tryDepth yet
-        }
-        else if (/\bfinally\s*\{/.test(line) && !(0, context_helpers_1.isComment)(line)) {
-            // Entering finally block - still protected
-        }
-        else {
-            // Track regular braces
-            const openBraces = (line.match(/\{/g) || []).length;
-            const closeBraces = (line.match(/\}/g) || []).length;
-            for (let j = 0; j < openBraces; j++) {
-                braceStack.push(inTryBlock && tryDepth > 0 ? 'try' : 'other');
-            }
-            for (let j = 0; j < closeBraces; j++) {
-                const popped = braceStack.pop();
-                if (popped === 'try') {
-                    tryDepth--;
-                    if (tryDepth === 0) {
-                        inTryBlock = false;
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    return tryDepth > 0;
-}
-/**
- * Simpler heuristic: check if there's a try-catch in the same function scope
- * Looks for try { before the line and } catch after, within reasonable bounds
- */
-function hasTryCatchNearby(content, lineNumber, windowSize = 20) {
-    const lines = content.split('\n');
-    const startLine = Math.max(0, lineNumber - windowSize);
-    const endLine = Math.min(lines.length, lineNumber + windowSize);
-    // Look backward for 'try {'
-    let foundTry = false;
-    for (let i = lineNumber - 1; i >= startLine; i--) {
-        const line = lines[i];
-        if (/\btry\s*\{/.test(line) && !(0, context_helpers_1.isComment)(line)) {
-            foundTry = true;
-            break;
-        }
-        // Stop if we hit a function boundary
-        if (/\b(function|async function|=>|class)\b/.test(line) && /\{/.test(line)) {
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-    if (!foundTry)
-        return false;
-    // Look forward for '} catch'
-    for (let i = lineNumber; i < endLine; i++) {
-        const line = lines[i];
-        if (/\}\s*catch\s*\(/.test(line) && !(0, context_helpers_1.isComment)(line)) {
-            return true;
-        }
-        // Stop if we hit another function boundary
-        if (i > lineNumber && /\b(function|async function|class)\b/.test(line) && /\{/.test(line)) {
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-    return false;
-}
-/**
- * Check if file path indicates a low-risk context for JSON.parse
- */
-function isLowRiskJSONParseFile(filePath) {
-    // Test/mock files - skip or info only
-    if ((0, context_helpers_1.isTestOrMockFile)(filePath)) {
-        return 'test_fixture';
-    }
-    // Settings/preferences components - internal UI state
-    if (/\/(components|pages)\/(settings|preferences|config)/i.test(filePath)) {
-        return 'ui_state';
-    }
-    // Provider/context files - typically storing state in localStorage
-    if (/Provider\.(ts|tsx|js|jsx)$/i.test(filePath)) {
-        return 'ui_state';
-    }
-    // Modal/Dialog components - typically internal state
-    if (/(Modal|Dialog|Settings|Preferences)\.(ts|tsx|js|jsx)$/i.test(filePath)) {
-        return 'ui_state';
-    }
-    // __mocks__ directory
-    if (/__mocks__/i.test(filePath)) {
-        return 'test_fixture';
-    }
-    // fixtures directory
-    if (/\/(fixtures?|stubs?|mocks?)\//i.test(filePath)) {
-        return 'test_fixture';
-    }
-    // scripts/tools directories (internal tooling)
-    if (/\/(scripts?|tools?|cli)\//i.test(filePath)) {
-        return 'internal';
-    }
-    // Migration files
-    if (/migration/i.test(filePath)) {
-        return 'migration';
-    }
-    // Config files
-    if (/\/(config|settings|constants)\.(ts|js)/i.test(filePath)) {
-        return 'config';
-    }
-    return null;
-}
-/**
- * Check if JSON.parse is parsing a trusted SDK response
- * These are well-defined responses from known APIs and are safe to parse
- */
-function isTrustedSDKResponse(lineContent, content) {
-    const trustedPatterns = [
-        // OpenAI SDK responses
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(?:response|completion|result|message)\.(?:content|text|data)/i,
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(?:openai|anthropic|client)\./i,
-        // Fetch response.json() result (already parsed by fetch)
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*await\s+.*\.json\s*\(\s*\)\s*\)/i,
-        // SDK method results
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(?:result|response)\.(?:choices|content|data|body)\[/i,
-        // AI SDK streaming results
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(?:chunk|delta|part)\.(?:content|text)/i,
-    ];
-    if (trustedPatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent))) {
-        return true;
-    }
-    // Check surrounding context for SDK usage
-    const sdkContextPatterns = [
-        /openai\..*\.create/i,
-        /anthropic\..*\.create/i,
-        /\.chat\.completions/i,
-        /\.messages\.create/i,
-    ];
-    return sdkContextPatterns.some(p => p.test(content));
-}
-function classifyJSONParseSource(lineContent, filePath) {
-    // First check file path for low-risk contexts
-    const fileBasedSource = isLowRiskJSONParseFile(filePath);
-    if (fileBasedSource) {
-        return fileBasedSource;
-    }
-    // User input - potentially dangerous
-    const userInputPatterns = [
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(req|request)\.(body|query|params)/i,
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*event\.(body|queryStringParameters)/i, // AWS Lambda
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*ctx\.(request|body|query)/i, // Koa
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(input|userInput|rawInput|payload)/i,
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*body\b/i, // Generic 'body' often means request body
-    ];
-    if (userInputPatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent))) {
-        return 'user_input';
-    }
-    // localStorage/sessionStorage - client-side storage
-    const storagePatterns = [
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*localStorage\.getItem/i,
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*sessionStorage\.getItem/i,
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*window\.localStorage/i,
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*storage\.get/i,
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*saved\b/i, // Common pattern: const saved = localStorage.getItem(...); JSON.parse(saved)
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*stored\b/i,
-    ];
-    if (storagePatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent))) {
-        return 'local_storage';
-    }
-    // Database results - internal data
-    const databasePatterns = [
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(row|result|record|doc|document)\./i,
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*\w+\.(data|json|metadata|embedding)\)/i,
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*\w+\[['"]?\w+['"]?\]\.(data|json|embedding)/i,
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*item\.\w+\)/i, // ORM iteration: items.map(item => JSON.parse(item.field))
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*\w+\.content\)/i, // Parsing content field from DB
-    ];
-    if (databasePatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent))) {
-        return 'database';
-    }
-    // Editor state, internal caches, UI state
-    const internalPatterns = [
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(state|cache|stored|saved|cached)/i,
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*this\.(state|cache|data)/i,
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*\w+State\)/i,
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*editorState/i,
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*parsed\b/i, // JSON.parse(parsed) - likely already validated
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*settings\b/i, // Settings data
-        /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*preferences\b/i,
-    ];
-    if (internalPatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent))) {
-        return 'internal';
-    }
-    // Node content in editor apps (e.g., noda-os nodes have JSON content)
-    if (/JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(node|note|document|entry)\.(content|body|data)\)/i.test(lineContent)) {
-        return 'database';
-    }
-    return 'unknown';
-}
-const DANGEROUS_FUNCTIONS = [
-    // Code execution
-    {
-        name: 'eval() usage',
-        pattern: /\beval\s*\(/gi,
-        severity: 'critical',
-        description: 'eval() executes arbitrary code and is a major security risk',
-        suggestedFix: 'Use JSON.parse() for JSON data, or refactor to avoid dynamic code execution',
-    },
-    {
-        name: 'Function constructor',
-        pattern: /new\s+Function\s*\(/gi,
-        severity: 'critical',
-        description: 'Function constructor can execute arbitrary code like eval()',
-        suggestedFix: 'Refactor to use static functions or safe alternatives',
-    },
-    {
-        name: 'setTimeout/setInterval with string',
-        pattern: /set(Timeout|Interval)\s*\(\s*['"`]/gi,
-        severity: 'high',
-        description: 'setTimeout/setInterval with string argument acts like eval()',
-        suggestedFix: 'Pass a function reference instead of a string',
-    },
-    // Command injection
-    {
-        name: 'child_process exec',
-        pattern: /\b(exec|execSync|spawn|spawnSync|execFile)\s*\(/gi,
-        severity: 'high',
-        description: 'Shell command execution can lead to command injection',
-        suggestedFix: 'Validate and sanitize all inputs, prefer execFile over exec',
-    },
-    {
-        name: 'os.system/subprocess (Python)',
-        pattern: /\b(os\.system|subprocess\.(call|run|Popen|check_output))\s*\(/gi,
-        severity: 'high',
-        description: 'Shell command execution can lead to command injection',
-        suggestedFix: 'Use subprocess with shell=False and pass arguments as a list',
-        languages: ['py'],
-    },
-    // SQL injection risks
-    {
-        name: 'Raw SQL query construction',
-        pattern: /\.(query|execute|raw)\s*\(\s*[`'"].*\$\{|\.query\s*\(\s*['"].*\+/gi,
-        severity: 'critical',
-        description: 'String concatenation in SQL queries can lead to SQL injection',
-        suggestedFix: 'Use parameterized queries or prepared statements',
-    },
-    {
-        name: 'SQL template literal',
-        pattern: /`SELECT.*FROM.*WHERE.*\$\{|`INSERT.*INTO.*VALUES.*\$\{|`UPDATE.*SET.*\$\{|`DELETE.*FROM.*WHERE.*\$\{/gi,
-        severity: 'critical',
-        description: 'Template literals in SQL queries can lead to SQL injection',
-        suggestedFix: 'Use parameterized queries with placeholders (?, $1, etc.)',
-    },
-    // XSS risks
-    {
-        name: 'innerHTML assignment',
-        pattern: /\.innerHTML\s*=|\.outerHTML\s*=/gi,
-        severity: 'high',
-        description: 'Direct innerHTML assignment can lead to XSS vulnerabilities',
-        suggestedFix: 'Use textContent for text, or sanitize HTML with DOMPurify',
-    },
-    {
-        name: 'document.write',
-        pattern: /document\.write\s*\(/gi,
-        severity: 'high',
-        description: 'document.write can introduce XSS vulnerabilities',
-        suggestedFix: 'Use DOM manipulation methods instead',
-    },
-    {
-        name: 'dangerouslySetInnerHTML',
-        pattern: /dangerouslySetInnerHTML\s*=\s*\{\s*\{\s*__html\s*:/gi,
-        severity: 'high',
-        description: 'dangerouslySetInnerHTML can lead to XSS if content is not sanitized',
-        suggestedFix: 'Sanitize HTML content with DOMPurify before rendering',
-    },
-    // Deserialization
-    {
-        name: 'Unsafe deserialization',
-        pattern: /\b(pickle\.loads?|yaml\.load\s*\((?!.*Loader)|unserialize|Marshal\.load)\s*\(/gi,
-        severity: 'critical',
-        description: 'Unsafe deserialization can lead to remote code execution',
-        suggestedFix: 'Use safe loaders (yaml.safe_load) or validate input before deserializing',
-    },
-    // Note: JSON.parse is handled specially with source-aware severity - see below
-    // Note: request.json() is NOT a dangerous function - see schema validation rules
-    // File system risks
-    {
-        name: 'Dynamic file path',
-        pattern: /\b(readFile|writeFile|readFileSync|writeFileSync|createReadStream|createWriteStream)\s*\(\s*[^'"]/gi,
-        severity: 'medium',
-        description: 'Dynamic file paths can lead to path traversal attacks',
-        suggestedFix: 'Validate and sanitize file paths, use path.resolve with a base directory',
-    },
-    {
-        name: 'Path traversal risk',
-        pattern: /path\.(join|resolve)\s*\([^)]*req\.(params|query|body)/gi,
-        severity: 'high',
-        description: 'User input in file paths can lead to path traversal attacks',
-        suggestedFix: 'Validate paths and ensure they stay within allowed directories',
-    },
-    // Crypto weaknesses
-    {
-        name: 'Math.random for security',
-        pattern: /Math\.random\s*\(\s*\)/gi,
-        severity: 'medium',
-        description: 'Math.random() is not cryptographically secure',
-        suggestedFix: 'Use crypto.randomBytes() or crypto.getRandomValues() for security-sensitive operations',
-    },
-    // Regex DoS
-    {
-        name: 'Potentially unsafe regex',
-        pattern: /new\s+RegExp\s*\(\s*[^'"]/gi,
-        severity: 'medium',
-        description: 'Dynamic regex construction can lead to ReDoS attacks',
-        suggestedFix: 'Validate regex patterns and consider using safe-regex library',
-    },
-    // Prototype pollution
-    {
-        name: 'Object.assign with user input',
-        pattern: /Object\.assign\s*\(\s*\{\s*\}\s*,\s*(req\.|request\.|body|params|query)/gi,
-        severity: 'high',
-        description: 'Object.assign with user input can lead to prototype pollution',
-        suggestedFix: 'Validate and sanitize input, or use a safe merge function',
-    },
-    {
-        name: 'Spread operator with user input',
-        pattern: /\{\s*\.\.\.req\.(body|params|query)|\.\.\.request\.(body|params|query)/gi,
-        severity: 'medium',
-        description: 'Spreading user input can lead to mass assignment vulnerabilities',
-        suggestedFix: 'Explicitly pick allowed properties instead of spreading all input',
-    },
-];
-// Check if file matches language filter
-function matchesLanguage(filePath, languages) {
-    if (!languages || languages.length === 0)
-        return true;
-    const ext = filePath.split('.').pop()?.toLowerCase() || '';
-    return languages.some(lang => {
-        if (lang === 'py')
-            return ext === 'py';
-        if (lang === 'js')
-            return ['js', 'jsx', 'mjs', 'cjs'].includes(ext);
-        if (lang === 'ts')
-            return ['ts', 'tsx'].includes(ext);
-        return ext === lang;
-    });
-}
-// Check if innerHTML/dangerouslySetInnerHTML uses static content only
-function isStaticHTMLContent(lineContent, content, lineNumber) {
-    const lines = content.split('\n');
-    // Get surrounding context (5 lines before and after)
-    const contextStart = Math.max(0, lineNumber - 6);
-    const contextEnd = Math.min(lines.length, lineNumber + 5);
-    const context = lines.slice(contextStart, contextEnd).join('\n');
-    // Static HTML indicators - string literals only
-    const staticIndicators = [
-        /innerHTML\s*=\s*['"`][^'"`]*['"`]/, // innerHTML = "static string"
-        /innerHTML\s*=\s*`[^$]*`/, // innerHTML = `static template without ${}`
-        /dangerouslySetInnerHTML\s*=\s*\{\s*\{\s*__html:\s*['"`]/, // React static string
-    ];
-    // Dynamic content indicators (red flags)
-    const dynamicIndicators = [
-        /\$\{[^}]+\}/, // Template interpolation ${...}
-        /innerHTML\s*=.*\+/, // String concatenation with +
-        /innerHTML\s*\+=\s*/, // Append operation
-        /\breq\.|\.params|\.query|\.body/, // User input (req.params, req.query, req.body)
-        /\bprops\./, // Component props
-        /\bstate\./, // Component state
-        /\.value\b/, // Input value
-        /dangerouslySetInnerHTML\s*=\s*\{\s*\{\s*__html:\s*[^'"`]/, // React dynamic
-    ];
-    const isStatic = staticIndicators.some(p => p.test(lineContent));
-    const isDynamic = dynamicIndicators.some(p => p.test(context));
-    return isStatic && !isDynamic;
-}
-/**
- * Check if eval/exec/Function has only static literal inputs (no user data)
- * Static inputs like eval('({ mode: "production" })') are low risk
- */
-function hasOnlyStaticInputs(lineContent, content, lineNumber) {
-    const lines = content.split('\n');
-    // Check if the argument to eval/exec/Function is a string literal only
-    const staticPatterns = [
-        /eval\s*\(\s*['"`][^'"`$]*['"`]\s*\)/, // eval('static string')
-        /eval\s*\(\s*`[^$`]*`\s*\)/, // eval(`static template without ${}`)
-        /new\s+Function\s*\(\s*['"`][^'"`$]*['"`]\s*\)/, // new Function('static')
-        /execSync\s*\(\s*['"`][^'"`$]*['"`]\s*\)/, // execSync('static command')
-        /exec\s*\(\s*['"`][^'"`$]*['"`]/, // exec('static command'
-    ];
-    if (staticPatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent))) {
-        return true;
-    }
-    // Check surrounding context for user input flowing in
-    const userInputIndicators = [
-        /\$\{/, // Template interpolation
-        /\+\s*\w+/, // String concatenation with variable
-        /req\.|request\.|body\.|params\.|query\./i, // Request data
-        /user[Ii]nput|userCode|userCommand/, // User input variables
-        /args\[|argv\[/, // Command line args
-    ];
-    const contextStart = Math.max(0, lineNumber - 3);
-    const contextEnd = Math.min(lines.length, lineNumber + 1);
-    const context = lines.slice(contextStart, contextEnd).join('\n');
-    // If no user input indicators found, likely static
-    return !userInputIndicators.some(p => p.test(context));
-}
-/**
- * Check if SQL query uses whitelist validation pattern
- * e.g., columns validated against allowedColumns array before use
- */
-function hasSQLWhitelistValidation(content, lineNumber) {
-    const lines = content.split('\n');
-    const contextStart = Math.max(0, lineNumber - 15);
-    const contextEnd = Math.min(lines.length, lineNumber + 5);
-    const context = lines.slice(contextStart, contextEnd).join('\n');
-    // Whitelist/allowlist validation patterns
-    const whitelistPatterns = [
-        /allowed\w*\s*=\s*\[/i, // allowedColumns = [...]
-        /whitelist\w*\s*=\s*\[/i, // whitelistFields = [...]
-        /valid\w*\s*=\s*\[/i, // validColumns = [...]
-        /\.filter\s*\([^)]*\.includes\s*\(/i, // .filter(c => allowed.includes(c))
-        /\.includes\s*\([^)]*\)/i, // allowedColumns.includes(col)
-        /\.every\s*\([^)]*\.includes/i, // columns.every(c => allowed.includes(c))
-        /if\s*\(\s*!.*\.includes/i, // if (!allowed.includes(...))
-    ];
-    return whitelistPatterns.some(p => p.test(context));
-}
-/**
- * Check if dangerouslySetInnerHTML is used with DOMPurify sanitization
- */
-function hasDOMPurifySanitization(lineContent, content, lineNumber) {
-    const lines = content.split('\n');
-    const contextStart = Math.max(0, lineNumber - 10);
-    const contextEnd = Math.min(lines.length, lineNumber + 5);
-    const context = lines.slice(contextStart, contextEnd).join('\n');
-    // DOMPurify sanitization patterns
-    const sanitizationPatterns = [
-        /DOMPurify\.sanitize/i,
-        /sanitize\s*\(/i,
-        /purify\s*\(/i,
-        /xss\s*\(/i,
-        /clean\s*\(/i,
-        /sanitizeHtml/i,
-        /escapeHtml/i,
-        /sanitized/i,
-        /purified/i,
-    ];
-    return sanitizationPatterns.some(p => p.test(context));
-}
-/**
- * Check if data flows to an LLM prompt rather than a DOM sink
- * LLM prompts are NOT XSS - they're prompt injection (different risk profile)
- */
-function isLLMPromptContext(lineContent, content, filePath) {
-    // File path indicators of AI/LLM code
-    const aiFilePatterns = [
-        /\/(ai|llm|chat|openai|anthropic|gpt|claude)\//i,
-        /\/(assistants?|agents?|prompts?)\//i,
-        /(chat|ai|llm|prompt|assistant).*\.(ts|js|tsx|jsx)$/i,
-    ];
-    if (aiFilePatterns.some(p => p.test(filePath))) {
-        return true;
-    }
-    // Content patterns suggesting LLM API usage
-    const llmApiPatterns = [
-        /\.create\s*\(\s*\{[^}]*messages\s*:/i, // OpenAI/Anthropic SDK
-        /openai|anthropic|claude|gpt-4|gpt-3/i, // AI service mentions
-        /\bprompt\s*[=:+]/i, // prompt assignment
-        /\bsystemPrompt|userPrompt|assistantPrompt/i, // Prompt variables
-        /completion|chat\.create|messages\.create/i, // API calls
-        /\bmessages\s*:\s*\[/i, // Messages array
-        /role:\s*['"`](user|assistant|system)['"`]/i, // Message roles
-    ];
-    // Check the line and surrounding context
-    const lines = content.split('\n');
-    const lineIndex = lines.findIndex(l => l === lineContent || l.includes(lineContent.trim()));
-    const startLine = Math.max(0, lineIndex - 10);
-    const endLine = Math.min(lines.length, lineIndex + 10);
-    const context = lines.slice(startLine, endLine).join('\n');
-    return llmApiPatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent) || p.test(context));
-}
-/**
- * Check if this is a static bootstrap script (e.g., localStorage theme reader)
- * These are very low risk even with dangerouslySetInnerHTML
- */
-function isStaticBootstrapScript(_lineContent, content, lineNumber) {
-    const lines = content.split('\n');
-    const contextStart = Math.max(0, lineNumber - 10);
-    const contextEnd = Math.min(lines.length, lineNumber + 5);
-    const context = lines.slice(contextStart, contextEnd).join('\n');
-    // Bootstrap script indicators (reading from localStorage, setting attributes)
-    const bootstrapPatterns = [
-        /localStorage\.getItem/i,
-        /document\.documentElement\.setAttribute/i,
-        /data-(theme|font|mode)/i,
-        /classList\.(add|remove|toggle)/i,
-        /\.dataset\./i,
-    ];
-    // Dangerous patterns that disqualify as safe bootstrap
-    const dangerousPatterns = [
-        /\$\{.*\}/, // Template interpolation
-        /\+\s*[a-zA-Z]/, // String concatenation with variable
-        /innerHTML\s*=\s*[a-zA-Z]/, // innerHTML set to variable directly
-        /fetch\s*\(/, // Network requests
-        /\.(query|params|body)/, // User input
-        /location\.(search|hash)/, // URL parameters
-        /document\.cookie/, // Cookie access
-    ];
-    const hasBootstrapPatterns = bootstrapPatterns.some(p => p.test(context));
-    const hasDangerousPatterns = dangerousPatterns.some(p => p.test(context));
-    return hasBootstrapPatterns && !hasDangerousPatterns;
-}
-/**
- * Check if Math.random() is used for cosmetic/UI purposes (not security)
- * Cosmetic uses: CSS values, animations, UI variations, demo data
- * Security uses: tokens, IDs, cryptographic operations, session management
- */
-function isCosmeticMathRandom(lineContent, content, lineNumber) {
-    const lines = content.split('\n');
-    // Check the line itself for cosmetic indicators
-    const cosmeticLinePatterns = [
-        // CSS/style values
-        /['"`]\s*\$\{.*Math\.random.*\}\s*%['"`]/, // `${Math.random() * 40 + 50}%`
-        /Math\.random.*\s*\+\s*['"`]%['"`]/, // Math.random() * 40 + '%'
-        /Math\.random.*\)\s*\*\s*\d+\s*\+\s*\d+\s*\}\s*%/, // }) * 40 + 50}%
-        /return\s+`.*Math\.random.*%`/, // return `${...}%`
-        /width:\s*['"`].*Math\.random/i, // width: `${Math.random()...}%`
-        /height:\s*['"`].*Math\.random/i, // height: `${Math.random()...}%`
-        /opacity:\s*['"`]?.*Math\.random/i, // opacity: Math.random()
-        /transform:\s*['"`]?.*Math\.random/i, // transform: translate(...)
-        /rotate\(.*Math\.random/i, // rotate(Math.random() * 360)
-        /translate\(.*Math\.random/i, // translate(Math.random() * 100)
-        /scale\(.*Math\.random/i, // scale(Math.random() * 2)
-        // Color/animation values
-        /rgba?\(.*Math\.random/i, // rgb(Math.random() * 255, ...)
-        /hsl\(.*Math\.random/i, // hsl(Math.random() * 360, ...)
-        /Math\.random.*\*\s*360/, // Math.random() * 360 (degrees/hue)
-        /Math\.random.*\*\s*255/, // Math.random() * 255 (RGB values)
-        // Array/list randomization for UI
-        /Math\.floor\(Math\.random.*\.length\)/, // Math.floor(Math.random() * array.length)
-        /\[Math\.floor\(Math\.random/, // array[Math.floor(Math.random()...)]
-        // Demo/placeholder data
-        /Math\.random.*\*\s*\d+\s*\+\s*\d+.*\bpx\b/i, // Math.random() * 100 + 50 + 'px'
-        /Math\.random.*\*\s*\d+\s*\+\s*\d+.*\bms\b/i, // Math.random() * 1000 + 500 + 'ms'
-        /Math\.random.*\*\s*\d+\s*\+\s*\d+.*\bs\b/i, // Math.random() * 5 + 2 + 's'
-        // NOTE: toString patterns removed - now handled by analyzeToStringPattern()
-        // which provides more granular severity classification (info/low/medium/high)
-        // based on truncation length and context
-    ];
-    if (cosmeticLinePatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent))) {
-        return true;
-    }
-    // Check surrounding context (5 lines before and after)
-    const contextStart = Math.max(0, lineNumber - 5);
-    const contextEnd = Math.min(lines.length, lineNumber + 5);
-    const context = lines.slice(contextStart, contextEnd).join('\n');
-    // Context indicators of cosmetic use
-    const cosmeticContextPatterns = [
-        // UI component files - REMOVED, let severity classification handle these
-        // Style-related variables/functions
-        /\b(style|styles|css|className|animation|transition)/i,
-        /\b(width|height|opacity|color|transform|rotate|scale|translate)/i,
-        // Demo/example data
-        /\b(demo|example|placeholder|mock|fake|sample|test)Data/i,
-        /\b(random|shuffle|pick|choose).*\b(color|item|element|option)/i,
-        // Animation/timing
-        /setTimeout.*Math\.random/i,
-        /setInterval.*Math\.random/i,
-        /delay.*Math\.random/i,
-        /duration.*Math\.random/i,
-        // UI state variations
-        /\b(variant|theme|layout|position).*Math\.random/i,
-        // NOTE: Removed UI identifier patterns (key, id, tempId, etc.) - these should be
-        // classified with info/low severity by the severity classification logic, not skipped entirely
-    ];
-    if (cosmeticContextPatterns.some(p => p.test(context))) {
-        return true;
-    }
-    // Security-sensitive patterns that override cosmetic detection
-    const securityPatterns = [
-        /\b(token|secret|key|password|credential|signature)/i,
-        /\b(auth|crypto|encrypt|decrypt|hash)/i,
-        /\b(session|nonce|salt)\b/i,
-        /Math\.random.*\*\s*1e\d+/, // Math.random() * 1e16 (large numbers for IDs)
-    ];
-    if (securityPatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent) || p.test(context))) {
-        return false; // Not cosmetic - this is security-sensitive
-    }
-    // Check for .toString(36) WITHOUT substring/slice/substr (security token pattern)
-    // If it has substring/slice/substr, it's already caught by cosmeticLinePatterns above
-    const hasToString36WithoutTruncation = /Math\.random\(\)\.toString\(36\)/.test(lineContent) &&
-        !/\.(substring|substr|slice)\(/.test(lineContent);
-    const hasToString16WithoutTruncation = /Math\.random\(\)\.toString\(16\)/.test(lineContent) &&
-        !/\.(substring|substr|slice)\(/.test(lineContent);
-    if (hasToString36WithoutTruncation || hasToString16WithoutTruncation) {
-        return false; // Full-length toString() without truncation - likely security token
-    }
-    return false; // Default to flagging if unclear
-}
-/**
- * Extract function context where Math.random() is being called
- * Looks backwards from the current line to find enclosing function name
- * Returns lowercase function name or null if not found
- */
-function extractFunctionContext(content, lineNumber) {
-    const lines = content.split('\n');
-    const start = Math.max(0, lineNumber - 20); // Increased from 10 to 20 for nested callbacks
-    // Look backwards for function declaration
-    for (let i = lineNumber; i >= start; i--) {
-        const line = lines[i];
-        // Skip anonymous arrow functions in callbacks (e.g., .map((x) => ...), .replace(/x/g, (c) => ...))
-        // These are not the function context we're looking for
-        // Look for pattern: .methodName(..., (param) => or .methodName(...(param) =>
-        const hasMethodCallWithArrowCallback = /\.\w+\(.*\([^)]*\)\s*=>/.test(line);
-        if (hasMethodCallWithArrowCallback) {
-            continue; // Skip this line and keep looking
-        }
-        // Match various function declaration patterns
-        // 1. function functionName
-        // 2. export function functionName
-        // 3. const/let functionName = function
-        // 4. const/let functionName = (arrow function)
-        // 5. export const functionName =
-        // Traditional function declaration (handles TypeScript type annotations)
-        // Matches: function name(...), export function name(...), function name<T>(...), etc.
-        const funcDeclMatch = line.match(/(?:export\s+)?(?:async\s+)?function\s+(\w+)/i);
-        if (funcDeclMatch) {
-            return funcDeclMatch[1].toLowerCase();
-        }
-        // Function expression assignment (const foo = function...)
-        const funcExprMatch = line.match(/(?:export\s+)?(?:const|let|var)\s+(\w+)\s*=\s*(?:async\s+)?function/i);
-        if (funcExprMatch) {
-            return funcExprMatch[1].toLowerCase();
-        }
-        // Arrow function assignment - require => to be present on the same line
-        // This prevents matching "const r = (Math.random()..." as an arrow function
-        if (line.includes('=>')) {
-            const arrowFuncMatch = line.match(/(?:export\s+)?(?:const|let|var)\s+(\w+)\s*=/i);
-            if (arrowFuncMatch) {
-                return arrowFuncMatch[1].toLowerCase();
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    return null;
-}
-/**
- * Classify function intent based on function name
- * Used to determine if Math.random() usage is legitimate
- */
-function classifyFunctionIntent(functionName) {
-    if (!functionName)
-        return 'unknown';
-    const lower = functionName.toLowerCase();
-    // UUID/ID generation (UI correlation, not security)
-    // Check for specific UUID patterns and generic ID generation functions
-    const uuidPatterns = ['uuid', 'guid', 'uniqueid', 'correlationid'];
-    const idGenerationPatterns = /^(generate|create|make|build)(id|identifier)$/i;
-    if (uuidPatterns.some(p => lower.includes(p)) || idGenerationPatterns.test(lower)) {
-        return 'uuid';
-    }
-    // CAPTCHA/puzzle generation (legitimate non-security)
-    const captchaPatterns = ['captcha', 'puzzle', 'mathproblem'];
-    // Also check for 'challenge' but only if not in security context
-    if (captchaPatterns.some(p => lower.includes(p)))
-        return 'captcha';
-    if (lower.includes('challenge') && !lower.includes('auth'))
-        return 'captcha';
-    // Demo/seed/fixture data
-    const demoPatterns = ['seed', 'fixture', 'demo', 'mock', 'fake'];
-    if (demoPatterns.some(p => lower.includes(p)))
-        return 'demo';
-    // Security-sensitive (check this after id generation to avoid false positives)
-    const securityPatterns = ['token', 'secret', 'key', 'password', 'credential', 'signature'];
-    // Also match generate/create + security term combinations
-    const securityFunctionPattern = /^(generate|create|make)(token|secret|key|session|password|credential)/i;
-    if (securityPatterns.some(p => lower.includes(p)) || securityFunctionPattern.test(lower)) {
-        return 'security';
-    }
-    return 'unknown';
-}
-/**
- * Analyze toString() pattern in Math.random() usage
- * Determines intent based on base and truncation length
- */
-function analyzeToStringPattern(lineContent) {
-    const toString36Match = lineContent.match(/Math\.random\(\)\.toString\(36\)/);
-    const toString16Match = lineContent.match(/Math\.random\(\)\.toString\(16\)/);
-    if (!toString36Match && !toString16Match) {
-        return { hasToString: false, base: null, isTruncated: false, truncationLength: null, intent: 'unknown' };
-    }
-    const base = toString36Match ? 36 : 16;
-    // Check for truncation methods
-    const substringMatch = lineContent.match(/\.substring\((\d+)(?:,\s*(\d+))?\)/);
-    const sliceMatch = lineContent.match(/\.slice\((\d+)(?:,\s*(\d+))?\)/);
-    const substrMatch = lineContent.match(/\.substr\((\d+)(?:,\s*(\d+))?\)/);
-    const truncMatch = substringMatch || sliceMatch || substrMatch;
-    if (!truncMatch) {
-        return { hasToString: true, base, isTruncated: false, truncationLength: null, intent: 'full-token' };
-    }
-    // Calculate truncation length
-    const start = parseInt(truncMatch[1]);
-    const end = truncMatch[2] ? parseInt(truncMatch[2]) : null;
-    const length = end ? (end - start) : null;
-    // Classify intent by length
-    // Short (2-9 chars): UI correlation IDs, React keys
-    // Medium (10-15 chars): Business IDs, order numbers
-    if (length && length <= 9) {
-        return { hasToString: true, base, isTruncated: true, truncationLength: length, intent: 'short-ui-id' };
-    }
-    else if (length && length <= 15) {
-        return { hasToString: true, base, isTruncated: true, truncationLength: length, intent: 'business-id' };
-    }
-    else {
-        return { hasToString: true, base, isTruncated: true, truncationLength: length, intent: 'business-id' };
-    }
-}
-/**
- * Extract variable name from Math.random() assignment
- * Examples:
- *   const token = Math.random() -> "token"
- *   const businessId = Math.random().toString(36) -> "businessId"
- *   return Math.random() -> null (no variable)
- */
-function extractMathRandomVariableName(lineContent) {
-    // const/let/var variableName = Math.random...
-    const assignmentMatch = lineContent.match(/(?:const|let|var)\s+(\w+)\s*=.*Math\.random/);
-    if (assignmentMatch)
-        return assignmentMatch[1];
-    // object.property = Math.random...
-    const propertyMatch = lineContent.match(/(\w+)\s*[:=]\s*Math\.random/);
-    if (propertyMatch)
-        return propertyMatch[1];
-    // function parameter default: functionName(param = Math.random())
-    const paramMatch = lineContent.match(/(\w+)\s*=\s*Math\.random/);
-    if (paramMatch)
-        return paramMatch[1];
-    return null; // No variable name found
-}
-/**
- * Classify variable name security risk based on naming patterns
- *
- * High risk: Security-sensitive names (token, secret, key, etc.)
- * Medium risk: Unclear context
- * Low risk: Non-security names (id, businessId, orderId, etc.)
- */
-function classifyVariableNameRisk(varName) {
-    if (!varName)
-        return 'medium'; // Unknown usage, moderate risk
-    const lower = varName.toLowerCase();
-    // High risk: security-sensitive variable names
-    const highRiskPatterns = [
-        'token', 'secret', 'key', 'password', 'credential',
-        'signature', 'salt', 'nonce', 'session', 'csrf',
-        'auth', 'apikey', 'accesstoken', 'refreshtoken',
-        'jwt', 'bearer', 'oauth', 'sessionid'
-    ];
-    if (highRiskPatterns.some(p => lower.includes(p))) {
-        return 'high';
-    }
-    // Low risk: clearly non-security contexts
-    const lowRiskPatterns = [
-        // Business identifiers
-        'id', 'uid', 'guid', 'business', 'order', 'invoice',
-        'customer', 'user', 'product', 'item', 'transaction',
-        'request', 'reference', 'tracking', 'confirmation',
-        // Test/demo data
-        'test', 'mock', 'demo', 'sample', 'example', 'fixture',
-        'random', 'temp', 'temporary', 'generated', 'dummy',
-        // UI identifiers
-        'toast', 'notification', 'element', 'component', 'widget',
-        'modal', 'dialog', 'popup', 'unique', 'react',
-        // Non-security randomness usage (backoff/sampling/experiments)
-        'jitter', 'retry', 'backoff', 'delay', 'timeout', 'latency',
-        'sample', 'sampling', 'probability', 'chance', 'rollout',
-        'experiment', 'abtest', 'cohort', 'bucket', 'variant'
-    ];
-    if (lowRiskPatterns.some(p => lower.includes(p))) {
-        return 'low';
-    }
-    return 'medium'; // Unclear context, moderate risk
-}
-/**
- * Analyze surrounding code context for security signals
- * Returns context type and description for severity classification
- */
-function analyzeMathRandomContext(content, filePath, lineNumber) {
-    const lines = content.split('\n');
-    const start = Math.max(0, lineNumber - 10);
-    const end = Math.min(lines.length, lineNumber + 5);
-    const context = lines.slice(start, end).join('\n');
-    // Security context indicators (functions, imports, comments)
-    const securityPatterns = [
-        /\b(generate|create)(Token|Secret|Key|Password|Nonce|Salt|Session|Signature)/i,
-        /\b(auth|crypto|encrypt|decrypt|hash|sign)\b/i,
-        /function\s+.*(?:token|secret|key|auth|crypto)/i,
-        /\bimport.*(?:crypto|jsonwebtoken|bcrypt|argon2|jose)/i,
-        /\/\*.*(?:security|authentication|cryptograph|authorization)/i,
-        /\/\/.*(?:security|auth|crypto|token|secret)/i,
-    ];
-    const inSecurityContext = securityPatterns.some(p => p.test(context));
-    // Test context
-    const testFilePatterns = /\.(test|spec)\.(ts|tsx|js|jsx)$/i;
-    const testContextPatterns = [
-        /\b(describe|it|test|expect|mock|jest|vitest|mocha|chai)\b/i,
-        /\b(beforeEach|afterEach|beforeAll|afterAll)\b/i,
-        /\b(fixture|stub|spy)\b/i,
-    ];
-    const inTestContext = testFilePatterns.test(filePath) ||
-        testContextPatterns.some(p => p.test(context));
-    // UI/cosmetic context (reuse existing logic)
-    const lineContent = lines[lineNumber];
-    const inUIContext = isCosmeticMathRandom(lineContent, content, lineNumber);
-    // Business logic context (non-security ID generation)
-    // Note: UUID/CAPTCHA patterns excluded - handled by functionIntent classification
-    const businessLogicPatterns = [
-        /\b(business|order|invoice|customer|product|transaction)Id\b/i,
-        /\b(reference|tracking|confirmation)Number\b/i,
-        /\b(backoff|retry|jitter|delay|timeout|latency)\b/i,
-        /\b(sample|sampling|probability|chance|rollout|experiment|abtest|cohort|bucket|variant)\b/i,
-    ];
-    const inBusinessLogicContext = businessLogicPatterns.some(p => p.test(context)) &&
-        !inSecurityContext;
-    // Determine context description
-    let contextDescription = 'unknown context';
-    if (inSecurityContext) {
-        contextDescription = 'security-sensitive function';
-    }
-    else if (inTestContext) {
-        contextDescription = 'test/mock data generation';
-    }
-    else if (inUIContext) {
-        contextDescription = 'UI/cosmetic usage';
-    }
-    else if (inBusinessLogicContext) {
-        contextDescription = 'non-security usage';
-    }
-    return {
-        inSecurityContext,
-        inTestContext,
-        inUIContext,
-        inBusinessLogicContext,
-        contextDescription,
-    };
-}
-function detectDangerousFunctions(content, filePath) {
-    const vulnerabilities = [];
-    // Skip scanner/fixture files to avoid self-detection
-    if ((0, context_helpers_1.isScannerOrFixtureFile)(filePath)) {
-        return vulnerabilities;
-    }
-    const lines = content.split('\n');
-    const isTestFile = (0, context_helpers_1.isTestOrMockFile)(filePath);
-    lines.forEach((line, index) => {
-        // Skip comment lines
-        if ((0, context_helpers_1.isComment)(line))
-            return;
-        for (const funcPattern of DANGEROUS_FUNCTIONS) {
-            // Check language filter
-            if (!matchesLanguage(filePath, funcPattern.languages))
-                continue;
-            const regex = new RegExp(funcPattern.pattern.source, funcPattern.pattern.flags);
-            if (regex.test(line)) {
-                // Special handling for innerHTML patterns
-                if (funcPattern.name === 'innerHTML assignment' ||
-                    funcPattern.name === 'dangerouslySetInnerHTML') {
-                    // Check if this uses static content only
-                    if (isStaticHTMLContent(line, content, index)) {
-                        vulnerabilities.push({
-                            id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
-                            filePath,
-                            lineNumber: index + 1,
-                            lineContent: line.trim(),
-                            severity: 'info',
-                            category: 'dangerous_function',
-                            title: funcPattern.name + ' (static content)',
-                            description: 'Static HTML assignment detected. Generally safe for hardcoded content, but consider using textContent for plain text or proper DOM methods for dynamic content.',
-                            suggestedFix: 'If this is plain text, use textContent instead. If HTML must be used, ensure it is static and does not come from user input.',
-                            confidence: 'low',
-                            layer: 2,
-                        });
-                        break; // Only report once per line
-                    }
-                    // Check if DOMPurify or similar sanitization is used
-                    if (hasDOMPurifySanitization(line, content, index)) {
-                        vulnerabilities.push({
-                            id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
-                            filePath,
-                            lineNumber: index + 1,
-                            lineContent: line.trim(),
-                            severity: 'info',
-                            category: 'dangerous_function',
-                            title: funcPattern.name + ' (sanitized)',
-                            description: 'HTML is sanitized before rendering (DOMPurify or similar detected). This is the recommended pattern for rendering user-generated HTML.',
-                            suggestedFix: 'Ensure DOMPurify is configured correctly and kept up to date.',
-                            confidence: 'low',
-                            layer: 2,
-                        });
-                        break; // Only report once per line
-                    }
-                    // Check if this is a static bootstrap script (e.g., theme/font loader)
-                    if (isStaticBootstrapScript(line, content, index)) {
-                        vulnerabilities.push({
-                            id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
-                            filePath,
-                            lineNumber: index + 1,
-                            lineContent: line.trim(),
-                            severity: 'info',
-                            category: 'dangerous_function',
-                            title: funcPattern.name + ' (static bootstrap script)',
-                            description: 'This appears to be a static bootstrap script (e.g., reading localStorage for theme/font preferences). Low risk as no untrusted data is interpolated into the HTML/JS.',
-                            suggestedFix: 'Verify no user-controlled data is interpolated into the script content.',
-                            confidence: 'low',
-                            layer: 2,
-                        });
-                        break; // Only report once per line
-                    }
-                    // Check if this is in LLM prompt context (not XSS - it's prompt injection)
-                    if (isLLMPromptContext(line, content, filePath)) {
-                        vulnerabilities.push({
-                            id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-prompt-injection`,
-                            filePath,
-                            lineNumber: index + 1,
-                            lineContent: line.trim(),
-                            severity: 'info',
-                            category: 'ai_pattern',
-                            title: 'Potential prompt injection risk',
-                            description: 'User content is being used in an LLM prompt context. This is NOT XSS (the content goes to an AI, not a DOM). However, untrusted content in prompts may lead to prompt injection attacks.',
-                            suggestedFix: 'Consider input validation, content filtering, or structured prompts to limit prompt injection risk.',
-                            confidence: 'low',
-                            layer: 2,
-                        });
-                        break; // Only report once per line
-                    }
-                    // Dynamic content - full severity, needs AI validation
-                    let severity = funcPattern.severity;
-                    if (isTestFile) {
-                        severity = 'low';
-                    }
-                    vulnerabilities.push({
-                        id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
-                        filePath,
-                        lineNumber: index + 1,
-                        lineContent: line.trim(),
-                        severity,
-                        category: 'dangerous_function',
-                        title: funcPattern.name,
-                        description: funcPattern.description + ' This appears to use dynamic content which increases XSS risk.' + (isTestFile ? ' (in test file)' : ''),
-                        suggestedFix: funcPattern.suggestedFix,
-                        confidence: isTestFile ? 'low' : 'high',
-                        layer: 2,
-                        requiresAIValidation: true, // Dynamic HTML needs validation
-                    });
-                    break; // Only report once per line
-                }
-                // Note: JSON.parse is now handled by standalone detectJSONParseSafe() function
-                // which provides better source-aware severity classification
-                // Special handling for eval and Function constructor
-                if (funcPattern.name === 'eval() usage' || funcPattern.name === 'Function constructor') {
-                    // Suppress entirely in test files - test files legitimately test eval behavior
-                    if (isTestFile) {
-                        break; // Skip reporting entirely
-                    }
-                    // Check if eval is inside a test assertion (expect(), test(), it(), describe())
-                    const testAssertionPattern = /\b(expect|test|it|describe)\s*\(/;
-                    if (testAssertionPattern.test(line)) {
-                        break; // Skip reporting - this is testing eval behavior
-                    }
-                    // Check if inputs are static literals (low risk)
-                    if (hasOnlyStaticInputs(line, content, index)) {
-                        vulnerabilities.push({
-                            id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
-                            filePath,
-                            lineNumber: index + 1,
-                            lineContent: line.trim(),
-                            severity: 'info',
-                            category: 'dangerous_function',
-                            title: funcPattern.name + ' (static input)',
-                            description: 'eval/Function with static string literal input. Lower risk than dynamic input, but consider refactoring to avoid eval entirely.',
-                            suggestedFix: 'Consider using JSON.parse() for JSON data or refactoring to avoid eval.',
-                            confidence: 'low',
-                            layer: 2,
-                        });
-                        break;
-                    }
-                    vulnerabilities.push({
-                        id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
-                        filePath,
-                        lineNumber: index + 1,
-                        lineContent: line.trim(),
-                        severity: funcPattern.severity,
-                        category: 'dangerous_function',
-                        title: funcPattern.name,
-                        description: funcPattern.description,
-                        suggestedFix: funcPattern.suggestedFix,
-                        confidence: 'high',
-                        layer: 2,
-                        requiresAIValidation: true, // Code execution patterns need validation
-                    });
-                    break;
-                }
-                // Special handling for child_process exec - verify it's not RegExp.exec
-                if (funcPattern.name === 'child_process exec') {
-                    // First check if this is actually from child_process (not RegExp.exec)
-                    const isExecMatch = /\bexec\s*\(/.test(line);
-                    const isOtherMatch = /\b(execSync|spawn|spawnSync|execFile)\s*\(/.test(line);
-                    if (isExecMatch && !isOtherMatch) {
-                        // This matched 'exec(' - verify it's from child_process
-                        if (!isChildProcessExec(content, line)) {
-                            // This is RegExp.exec or similar - skip
-                            break;
-                        }
-                    }
-                    else if (isOtherMatch) {
-                        // This matched spawn/execSync/etc - verify child_process import
-                        if (!isChildProcessSpawn(content, line)) {
-                            // No child_process import - skip
-                            break;
-                        }
-                    }
-                    if (hasOnlyStaticInputs(line, content, index)) {
-                        vulnerabilities.push({
-                            id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
-                            filePath,
-                            lineNumber: index + 1,
-                            lineContent: line.trim(),
-                            severity: 'info',
-                            category: 'dangerous_function',
-                            title: funcPattern.name + ' (static command)',
-                            description: 'exec/execSync with hardcoded command. Lower risk than dynamic commands, but ensure command does not change based on user input.',
-                            suggestedFix: 'If command is truly static, this is generally acceptable. For dynamic commands, validate and sanitize inputs.',
-                            confidence: 'low',
-                            layer: 2,
-                        });
-                        break;
-                    }
-                }
-                // Special handling for SQL patterns - check for whitelist validation
-                if (funcPattern.name === 'Raw SQL query construction' || funcPattern.name === 'SQL template literal') {
-                    if (hasSQLWhitelistValidation(content, index)) {
-                        vulnerabilities.push({
-                            id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
-                            filePath,
-                            lineNumber: index + 1,
-                            lineContent: line.trim(),
-                            severity: 'info',
-                            category: 'dangerous_function',
-                            title: funcPattern.name + ' (whitelist validated)',
-                            description: 'SQL query with dynamic content, but whitelist/allowlist validation detected. This is a safer pattern that limits injection risk.',
-                            suggestedFix: 'Ensure the whitelist is comprehensive and cannot be bypassed. Consider using parameterized queries for additional safety.',
-                            confidence: 'low',
-                            layer: 2,
-                        });
-                        break;
-                    }
-                }
-                // Special handling for Dynamic file path - skip for utility files
-                // Utility functions designed to work with file paths are expected to take path parameters
-                if (funcPattern.name === 'Dynamic file path') {
-                    // Skip for utility/lib/helper files - these are internal functions, not API handlers
-                    const isUtilityFile = /\/(utils?|lib|helpers?|services?|modules?)\//i.test(filePath);
-                    // Skip if function name suggests it's designed for file operations
-                    const isFileOperationFunction = /\b(checksum|hash|digest|fingerprint|read|write|load|save|get|set|copy|move|delete)File/i.test(content.slice(Math.max(0, index - 200), index + 100));
-                    // Skip CLI command files - these take paths from command-line args (controlled inputs)
-                    const isCLIFile = /\/(cli|commands?|bin)\//i.test(filePath) ||
-                        /\/src\/(index|main|cli)\.(ts|js)$/i.test(filePath);
-                    // Skip GitHub Action files - these process repo files (controlled environment)
-                    const isGitHubAction = /github-action/i.test(filePath) ||
-                        /action\.(ts|js|yml|yaml)$/i.test(filePath);
-                    // Check for schema validation patterns in the surrounding context
-                    // Zod, Yup, Joi, or regex validation on the input
-                    const contextWindow = content.slice(Math.max(0, content.indexOf(line) - 500), content.indexOf(line) + line.length);
-                    const hasSchemaValidation = /z\.(string|object)\s*\(\s*\)\.regex\s*\(/i.test(contextWindow) ||
-                        /z\.enum\s*\(/i.test(contextWindow) ||
-                        /\.regex\s*\(\s*\/.*\/\s*\)/i.test(contextWindow) || // .regex(/.../)
-                        /\.match\s*\(\s*\/.*\/\s*\)/i.test(contextWindow) || // .match(/.../)
-                        /\.(schema|validate)\s*\(/i.test(contextWindow) ||
-                        /joi\./i.test(contextWindow) ||
-                        /yup\./i.test(contextWindow);
-                    // Check for path sanitization patterns
-                    const hasPathSanitization = hasPathTraversalProtection(contextWindow, line);
-                    if (isUtilityFile || isFileOperationFunction || isTestFile || isCLIFile || isGitHubAction || hasSchemaValidation || hasPathSanitization) {
-                        // Skip entirely for utility functions or when schema validation is present
-                        break;
-                    }
-                }
-                // Special handling for Path traversal risk - check for sanitization
-                if (funcPattern.name === 'Path traversal risk') {
-                    const contextWindow = content.slice(Math.max(0, content.indexOf(line) - 500), content.indexOf(line) + line.length + 200);
-                    // Check for path sanitization patterns
-                    if (hasPathTraversalProtection(contextWindow, line)) {
-                        vulnerabilities.push({
-                            id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
-                            filePath,
-                            lineNumber: index + 1,
-                            lineContent: line.trim(),
-                            severity: 'info',
-                            category: 'dangerous_function',
-                            title: funcPattern.name + ' (sanitized)',
-                            description: 'User input in file path, but path traversal protection detected. Verify sanitization is comprehensive.',
-                            suggestedFix: 'Ensure path.resolve() result is checked against base directory and ".." sequences are rejected.',
-                            confidence: 'low',
-                            layer: 2,
-                        });
-                        break;
-                    }
-                }
-                // Special handling for Math.random() - enhanced context-aware severity classification
-                if (funcPattern.name === 'Math.random for security') {
-                    // Phase 1: File-level exclusions (skip entirely)
-                    if ((0, context_helpers_1.isSeedOrDataGenFile)(filePath)) {
-                        break; // Skip seed/data generation files entirely
-                    }
-                    if ((0, context_helpers_1.isEducationalVulnerabilityFile)(filePath)) {
-                        break; // Skip intentional vulnerability examples
-                    }
-                    // Phase 2: Context analysis
-                    const varName = extractMathRandomVariableName(line);
-                    const nameRisk = classifyVariableNameRisk(varName);
-                    const context = analyzeMathRandomContext(content, filePath, index);
-                    const functionName = extractFunctionContext(content, index);
-                    const functionIntent = classifyFunctionIntent(functionName);
-                    const toStringPattern = analyzeToStringPattern(line);
-                    // Phase 3: Skip cosmetic/UI uses
-                    if (context.inUIContext) {
-                        break; // Already working
-                    }
-                    // Phase 4: Skip UUID/CAPTCHA generation functions
-                    if (functionIntent === 'uuid' || functionIntent === 'captcha') {
-                        break; // Legitimate non-security uses
-                    }
-                    // Phase 5: Determine severity
-                    let severity = 'medium';
-                    let confidence = 'medium';
-                    let explanation = '';
-                    let description = funcPattern.description;
-                    let suggestedFix = funcPattern.suggestedFix;
-                    // Test context - INFO
-                    if (context.inTestContext) {
-                        severity = 'info';
-                        confidence = 'low';
-                        explanation = ' (test data generation)';
-                        description = 'Math.random() used in test context for generating mock data. Not security-critical, but consider crypto.randomUUID() for better uniqueness in tests.';
-                        suggestedFix = 'Consider crypto.randomUUID() for test data uniqueness, though Math.random() is acceptable in tests';
-                    }
-                    // Seed/demo function context - INFO
-                    else if (functionIntent === 'demo') {
-                        severity = 'info';
-                        confidence = 'low';
-                        explanation = ' (seed/demo data generation)';
-                        description = 'Math.random() used for generating fixture/seed data. Not security-critical in development contexts.';
-                        suggestedFix = 'Acceptable for seed data. Use crypto.randomUUID() if uniqueness guarantees needed.';
-                    }
-                    // Short UI ID pattern - INFO (check before variable name to avoid false positives)
-                    // e.g., "const key = Math.random().toString(36).substring(2, 9)" is a UI ID, not a security key
-                    else if (toStringPattern.intent === 'short-ui-id') {
-                        severity = 'info';
-                        confidence = 'low';
-                        explanation = ' (UI correlation ID)';
-                        description = 'Math.random() used for short UI correlation IDs. Not security-critical, but collisions possible in high-volume scenarios.';
-                        suggestedFix = 'For UI correlation, crypto.randomUUID() provides better uniqueness guarantees';
-                    }
-                    // Security context - HIGH
-                    else if (nameRisk === 'high' || context.inSecurityContext || functionIntent === 'security') {
-                        severity = 'high';
-                        confidence = 'high';
-                        explanation = ' (security-sensitive context)';
-                        description = 'Math.random() is NOT cryptographically secure and MUST NOT be used for tokens, keys, passwords, or session IDs. This can lead to predictable values that attackers can exploit.';
-                        suggestedFix = 'Replace with crypto.randomBytes() or crypto.randomUUID() for security-sensitive operations';
-                    }
-                    // Business/non-security pattern - LOW
-                    else if (nameRisk === 'low' || context.inBusinessLogicContext || toStringPattern.intent === 'business-id') {
-                        severity = 'low';
-                        confidence = 'low';
-                        explanation = ' (non-security usage)';
-                        description = 'Math.random() is being used for non-security purposes (business IDs, sampling, jitter/backoff, experiments). While not critical, Math.random() can produce collisions or bias in high-volume scenarios.';
-                        suggestedFix = 'Use crypto.randomUUID() for uniqueness-sensitive IDs. For sampling/backoff, consider a seeded PRNG if determinism is needed.';
-                    }
-                    // Unknown context - MEDIUM
-                    else {
-                        severity = 'medium';
-                        confidence = 'medium';
-                        explanation = ' (unclear context)';
-                        description = 'Math.random() is being used. Verify this is not for security-critical purposes like tokens, session IDs, or cryptographic operations.';
-                        suggestedFix = 'If used for security, replace with crypto.randomBytes(). For unique IDs, use crypto.randomUUID()';
-                    }
-                    // Update title with context
-                    const title = `Math.random() in ${context.contextDescription}${explanation}`;
-                    vulnerabilities.push({
-                        id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
-                        filePath,
-                        lineNumber: index + 1,
-                        lineContent: line.trim(),
-                        severity,
-                        category: 'dangerous_function',
-                        title,
-                        description,
-                        suggestedFix,
-                        confidence,
-                        layer: 2,
-                    });
-                    break; // Only report once per line
-                }
-                // Standard handling for all other patterns
-                let severity = funcPattern.severity;
-                let confidence = 'high';
-                if (isTestFile) {
-                    if (severity === 'critical') {
-                        severity = 'medium';
-                    }
-                    else if (severity === 'high') {
-                        severity = 'low';
-                    }
-                    else {
-                        severity = 'info';
-                    }
-                    confidence = 'low';
-                }
-                vulnerabilities.push({
-                    id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
-                    filePath,
-                    lineNumber: index + 1,
-                    lineContent: line.trim(),
-                    severity,
-                    category: 'dangerous_function',
-                    title: funcPattern.name,
-                    description: funcPattern.description + (isTestFile ? ' (in test file)' : ''),
-                    suggestedFix: funcPattern.suggestedFix,
-                    confidence,
-                    layer: 2,
-                });
-                break; // Only report once per line
-            }
-        }
-    });
-    // Additional standalone checks (not in DANGEROUS_FUNCTIONS array)
-    // JSON.parse source-aware detection
-    detectJSONParseSafe(content, filePath, isTestFile, vulnerabilities);
-    // request.json() / req.json() schema validation suggestion
-    detectRequestJsonValidation(content, filePath, isTestFile, vulnerabilities);
-    return vulnerabilities;
-}
-/**
- * Detect JSON.parse usage with source-aware severity
- * Much smarter than simple pattern matching - considers try/catch and data source
- */
-function detectJSONParseSafe(content, filePath, isTestFile, vulnerabilities) {
-    const lines = content.split('\n');
-    const jsonParsePattern = /JSON\.parse\s*\(/gi;
-    // Track instances per file to aggregate noisy patterns
-    const instances = [];
-    lines.forEach((line, index) => {
-        if ((0, context_helpers_1.isComment)(line))
-            return;
-        jsonParsePattern.lastIndex = 0;
-        if (!jsonParsePattern.test(line))
-            return;
-        const jsonSource = classifyJSONParseSource(line, filePath);
-        // Skip migration files entirely - they're internal tooling
-        if (jsonSource === 'migration')
-            return;
-        // Skip test fixtures entirely - they're intentionally parsing test data
-        if (jsonSource === 'test_fixture')
-            return;
-        // Skip trusted SDK responses - these are well-defined and safe to parse
-        if (isTrustedSDKResponse(line, content))
-            return;
-        // Check if JSON.parse is inside a try-catch block
-        const insideTryCatch = isInsideTryCatch(content, index) || hasTryCatchNearby(content, index);
-        // Check if schema validation is applied after JSON.parse
-        const hasSchemaValidation = hasSchemaValidationNearby(content, index);
-        // If inside try-catch with safe source, suppress entirely - this is perfectly fine
-        if (insideTryCatch && ['local_storage', 'database', 'config', 'internal', 'ui_state'].includes(jsonSource)) {
-            return;
-        }
-        // If schema validation is present, this is properly handled
-        if (hasSchemaValidation) {
-            return;
-        }
-        // UI state (settings, providers, modals) - very low risk, aggregate or skip
-        if (jsonSource === 'ui_state') {
-            // Only track for aggregation, don't report individually
-            instances.push({ lineNumber: index + 1, lineContent: line.trim(), source: jsonSource });
-            return;
-        }
-        // Determine severity based on source and error handling
-        let severity;
-        let description;
-        let suggestedFix;
-        let confidence = 'medium';
-        if (insideTryCatch) {
-            // Already has error handling
-            switch (jsonSource) {
-                case 'user_input':
-                    severity = 'low';
-                    description = 'JSON.parse on user input is wrapped in try-catch. Consider adding schema validation (zod/yup) to validate the parsed structure.';
-                    suggestedFix = 'Add schema validation after parsing: const validated = schema.parse(JSON.parse(input))';
-                    confidence = 'low';
-                    break;
-                default:
-                    // With try-catch and non-user source, this is fine - don't report
-                    return;
-            }
-        }
-        else {
-            // No try-catch
-            switch (jsonSource) {
-                case 'user_input':
-                    severity = 'medium';
-                    description = 'JSON.parse on user input without schema validation. Malformed input will crash; malicious input may have unexpected shape.';
-                    suggestedFix = 'Use a schema validation library (zod, yup, joi): try { const data = schema.parse(JSON.parse(body)) } catch (e) { return 400 }';
-                    confidence = 'high';
-                    break;
-                case 'local_storage':
-                    severity = 'info';
-                    description = 'JSON.parse on localStorage data. Consider adding try-catch for robustness against corrupted data.';
-                    suggestedFix = 'Wrap in try-catch to handle corrupted localStorage gracefully.';
-                    confidence = 'low';
-                    break;
-                case 'database':
-                    // Database content parsing is very common and low-risk
-                    instances.push({ lineNumber: index + 1, lineContent: line.trim(), source: jsonSource });
-                    return; // Will be aggregated below
-                case 'config':
-                case 'internal':
-                    severity = 'info';
-                    description = `JSON.parse on ${jsonSource.replace('_', ' ')} data without error handling. Low risk but consider defensive coding.`;
-                    suggestedFix = 'Consider adding try-catch for robustness.';
-                    confidence = 'low';
-                    break;
-                default:
-                    // Unknown source - track for potential aggregation
-                    instances.push({ lineNumber: index + 1, lineContent: line.trim(), source: jsonSource });
-                    return; // Will be evaluated below based on aggregation
-            }
-        }
-        // Downgrade test files
-        if (isTestFile) {
-            severity = 'info';
-            confidence = 'low';
-            description += ' (in test file)';
-        }
-        vulnerabilities.push({
-            id: `json-parse-${filePath}-${index + 1}`,
-            filePath,
-            lineNumber: index + 1,
-            lineContent: line.trim(),
-            severity,
-            category: 'dangerous_function',
-            title: 'JSON.parse usage',
-            description,
-            suggestedFix,
-            confidence,
-            layer: 2,
-        });
-    });
-    // Aggregate low-risk JSON.parse instances if there are many
-    if (instances.length >= 3) {
-        // Create single aggregated finding instead of N individual findings
-        const lineNumbers = instances.map(i => i.lineNumber).slice(0, 5);
-        const moreText = instances.length > 5 ? `... (${instances.length} total)` : '';
-        vulnerabilities.push({
-            id: `json-parse-aggregated-${filePath}`,
-            filePath,
-            lineNumber: instances[0].lineNumber,
-            lineContent: `${instances.length} instances across this file`,
-            severity: 'info',
-            category: 'dangerous_function',
-            title: `JSON.parse usage (${instances.length} instances)`,
-            description: `JSON.parse detected. Consider adding error handling and schema validation if parsing user input.${isTestFile ? ' (in test file)' : ''}\n\nFound ${instances.length} occurrences at lines: ${lineNumbers.join(', ')}${moreText}`,
-            suggestedFix: 'Add try-catch for error handling. If parsing user input, add schema validation.',
-            confidence: 'low',
-            layer: 2,
-        });
-    }
-    else if (instances.length > 0 && instances.length < 3) {
-        // Report individually for small counts
-        for (const instance of instances) {
-            vulnerabilities.push({
-                id: `json-parse-${filePath}-${instance.lineNumber}`,
-                filePath,
-                lineNumber: instance.lineNumber,
-                lineContent: instance.lineContent,
-                severity: 'info',
-                category: 'dangerous_function',
-                title: 'JSON.parse usage',
-                description: `JSON.parse on ${instance.source.replace('_', ' ')} data without error handling. Low risk but consider defensive coding.${isTestFile ? ' (in test file)' : ''}`,
-                suggestedFix: 'Consider adding try-catch for robustness.',
-                confidence: 'low',
-                layer: 2,
-            });
-        }
-    }
-}
-/**
- * Check if this file appears to have form/input validation elsewhere
- * (manual checks on body fields, type guards, etc.)
- */
-function hasManualValidation(content) {
-    const manualValidationPatterns = [
-        // Type checking / type guards
-        /typeof\s+\w+\s*[!=]==?\s*['"](?:string|number|boolean|object)['"]|Array\.isArray\s*\(/i,
-        // Field existence checks followed by throws/returns
-        /if\s*\(\s*!(?:body|data|input)\.\w+\s*\)\s*\{?\s*(throw|return)/i,
-        // Property access with type assertion comments or inline validation
-        /\b(body|data|input)\s*as\s+\w+/i, // Type assertion
-        // Manual validation with error handling
-        /if\s*\(\s*![\w.]+\s*\|\|\s*typeof\s+[\w.]+/i,
-        // Using type predicates
-        /is\w+\s*\([\w.]+\)/i, // isFoo(bar) pattern
-    ];
-    return manualValidationPatterns.some(p => p.test(content));
-}
-/**
- * Check if route has throwing auth helper (getCurrentUserId, requireAuth, etc.)
- * Routes with throwing auth helpers are already protected
- */
-function hasThrowingAuthHelper(content) {
-    const throwingAuthPatterns = [
-        /\bgetCurrentUserId\s*\(/i,
-        /\brequireAuth\s*\(/i,
-        /\bensureAuth\s*\(/i,
-        /\bauth\s*\(\s*\)\s*\.protect\s*\(/i, // Clerk: auth().protect()
-        /\bcurrentUser\s*\(\s*\)/i, // Clerk: currentUser()
-        /\bgetServerSession\s*\([^)]*\)/i, // NextAuth
-        /\bauth\s*\(\s*\)/i, // Generic auth() call
-        /\bcheckAuth\s*\(/i,
-        /\bverifyAuth\s*\(/i,
-        /\bvalidateAuth\s*\(/i,
-        /\bassertAuth\s*\(/i,
-        /\bgetAuth\s*\(/i,
-        /\brequireUser\s*\(/i,
-        /\bgetUser\s*\(\s*\)/i, // supabase.auth.getUser()
-        /const\s+\{\s*user\s*\}\s*=\s*await/i, // Destructuring pattern
-    ];
-    return throwingAuthPatterns.some(p => p.test(content));
-}
-/**
- * Detect request.json() / req.json() and suggest schema validation
- * This is NOT a dangerous function - it's a prompt for best practices
- */
-function detectRequestJsonValidation(content, filePath, isTestFile, vulnerabilities) {
-    // Only check API route files
-    if (!/\/(api|routes?|handlers?|controllers?)\//i.test(filePath) &&
-        !/route\.(ts|js)$/i.test(filePath)) {
-        return;
-    }
-    // Skip if route has throwing auth helper - these are already protected routes
-    // and the schema validation suggestion is lower priority
-    if (hasThrowingAuthHelper(content)) {
-        return;
-    }
-    const lines = content.split('\n');
-    // Matches: request.json(), req.json(), await request.json(), etc.
-    const requestJsonPattern = /\b(request|req)\.json\s*\(\s*\)/gi;
-    // Check if file has schema validation (library-based)
-    const hasSchemaLibrary = /\b(zod|yup|joi|ajv|superstruct|valibot|typebox)\b/i.test(content) ||
-        /\.parse\s*\(|\.validate\s*\(|\.safeParse\s*\(/i.test(content);
-    // If file has schema library validation, don't report
-    if (hasSchemaLibrary)
-        return;
-    // Check for manual validation patterns (less robust but still indicates intent)
-    const hasManualCheck = hasManualValidation(content);
-    // Track instances for potential aggregation
-    const instances = [];
-    lines.forEach((line, index) => {
-        if ((0, context_helpers_1.isComment)(line))
-            return;
-        requestJsonPattern.lastIndex = 0;
-        if (!requestJsonPattern.test(line))
-            return;
-        // Check if there's validation nearby (within 10 lines after)
-        const startCheck = index;
-        const endCheck = Math.min(lines.length, index + 10);
-        const nearbyContent = lines.slice(startCheck, endCheck).join('\n');
-        // If there's validation in the nearby lines, skip
-        if (/\.parse\s*\(|\.validate\s*\(|\.safeParse\s*\(|schema\./i.test(nearbyContent)) {
-            return;
-        }
-        // If manual validation is present, skip individual reporting but track for aggregate
-        if (hasManualCheck) {
-            instances.push({ lineNumber: index + 1, lineContent: line.trim() });
-            return;
-        }
-        if (isTestFile) {
-            return; // Don't report in test files
-        }
-        instances.push({ lineNumber: index + 1, lineContent: line.trim() });
-    });
-    // Don't report if no instances found
-    if (instances.length === 0)
-        return;
-    // If manual validation exists, create a single info-level note
-    if (hasManualCheck && instances.length > 0) {
-        vulnerabilities.push({
-            id: `request-json-manual-${filePath}`,
-            filePath,
-            lineNumber: instances[0].lineNumber,
-            lineContent: instances[0].lineContent,
-            severity: 'info',
-            category: 'dangerous_function',
-            title: 'Request body with manual validation',
-            description: `API endpoint parses request body with manual validation patterns detected. Consider using a schema library (zod, yup) for more robust type-safe validation.`,
-            suggestedFix: 'While manual validation works, schema libraries provide better TypeScript integration and error messages.',
-            confidence: 'low',
-            layer: 2,
-        });
-        return;
-    }
-    // Aggregate if multiple instances without validation
-    if (instances.length >= 2) {
-        const lineNumbers = instances.map(i => i.lineNumber).slice(0, 5);
-        vulnerabilities.push({
-            id: `request-json-aggregated-${filePath}`,
-            filePath,
-            lineNumber: instances[0].lineNumber,
-            lineContent: `${instances.length} instances`,
-            severity: 'info',
-            category: 'dangerous_function',
-            title: `Request body without schema validation (${instances.length} instances)`,
-            description: `API endpoint parses request body without visible schema validation at lines: ${lineNumbers.join(', ')}. Consider validating the shape of incoming data.`,
-            suggestedFix: 'Add schema validation (e.g., zod): const body = await request.json(); const data = schema.parse(body);',
-            confidence: 'low',
-            layer: 2,
-        });
-    }
-    else {
-        // Single instance
-        vulnerabilities.push({
-            id: `request-json-${filePath}-${instances[0].lineNumber}`,
-            filePath,
-            lineNumber: instances[0].lineNumber,
-            lineContent: instances[0].lineContent,
-            severity: 'info',
-            category: 'dangerous_function',
-            title: 'Request body without schema validation',
-            description: 'API endpoint parses request body without visible schema validation. Consider validating the shape of incoming data.',
-            suggestedFix: 'Add schema validation (e.g., zod): const body = await request.json(); const data = schema.parse(body);',
-            confidence: 'low',
-            layer: 2,
-        });
-    }
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=dangerous-functions.js.map