@oculum/scanner 1.0.12 → 1.0.13

package/dist/detect/structural/auth-patterns.js

@@ -0,0 +1,533 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Layer 2: Authentication Anti-Pattern Detection
+ * Identifies weak or missing authentication/authorization patterns
+ *
+ * Key improvements:
+ * - Respects global middleware protection (caps severity at info)
+ * - Detects throwing auth helpers and suppresses redundant null checks
+ * - Properly classifies public endpoints
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.detectAuthAntipatterns = detectAuthAntipatterns;
+const middleware_detector_1 = require("../../model/middleware-detector");
+const auth_helper_detector_1 = require("../../model/auth-helper-detector");
+const file_classifier_1 = require("../../parse/file-classifier");
+const route_hierarchy_1 = require("../../model/route-hierarchy");
+const schema_semantics_1 = require("../../shared/schema-semantics");
+const intent_detector_1 = require("../../shared/intent-detector");
+const BASE_CONFIDENCE = 0.40;
+const AUTH_ANTIPATTERNS = [
+    // Missing auth checks
+    {
+        name: 'Unprotected API route',
+        pattern: /export\s+(async\s+)?function\s+(GET|POST|PUT|DELETE|PATCH)\s*\(/gi,
+        severity: 'medium',
+        description: 'API route handler may lack authentication - verify auth is checked',
+        suggestedFix: 'Add authentication middleware or check session at the start of the handler',
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'Express route without auth middleware',
+        pattern: /\.(get|post|put|delete|patch)\s*\(\s*['"][^'"]+['"]\s*,\s*(async\s*)?\(\s*(req|request)/gi,
+        severity: 'medium',
+        description: 'Express route may lack authentication middleware',
+        suggestedFix: 'Add authentication middleware before the route handler',
+    },
+    // Weak authentication patterns
+    {
+        name: 'Hardcoded credentials check',
+        pattern: /if\s*\(\s*(username|user|email)\s*===?\s*['"][^'"]+['"]\s*&&\s*(password|pass|pwd)\s*===?\s*['"][^'"]+['"]/gi,
+        severity: 'critical',
+        description: 'Hardcoded credentials in authentication logic',
+        suggestedFix: 'Use a proper user database with hashed passwords',
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'Password in plain text comparison',
+        pattern: /password\s*===?\s*user\.password|user\.password\s*===?\s*password/gi,
+        severity: 'high',
+        description: 'Plain text password comparison detected',
+        suggestedFix: 'Use bcrypt.compare() or similar for password verification',
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'JWT without verification',
+        pattern: /jwt\.decode\s*\([^)]+\)(?!.*verify)/gi,
+        severity: 'high',
+        description: 'JWT decoded without signature verification',
+        suggestedFix: 'Use jwt.verify() instead of jwt.decode() for authentication',
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'Weak JWT secret',
+        pattern: /jwt\.sign\s*\([^)]+,\s*['"][^'"]{1,20}['"]/gi,
+        severity: 'high',
+        description: 'JWT signed with a short/weak secret',
+        suggestedFix: 'Use a strong, random secret of at least 256 bits from environment variables',
+    },
+    // Session issues
+    {
+        name: 'Session without secure flag',
+        pattern: /session\s*\(\s*\{[^}]*(?!secure\s*:\s*true)[^}]*\}/gi,
+        severity: 'medium',
+        description: 'Session configuration may lack secure flag',
+        suggestedFix: 'Set secure: true for cookies in production',
+    },
+    // NOTE: Cookie httpOnly detection removed - causes false positives
+    // Client-side code (document.cookie) cannot set httpOnly - it's a server-only flag
+    // Server-side cookie libraries have proper defaults
+    // The pattern was triggering on client-side cookie access which is conceptually wrong
+    // Authorization issues
+    // NOTE: We intentionally do NOT flag "if (!user)" or "if (!userId)" patterns as issues
+    // when throwing auth helpers are in use. Those helpers guarantee the user exists.
+    // This pattern is now much more targeted.
+    {
+        name: 'Missing role check for admin operation',
+        pattern: /\b(admin|superuser|moderator|owner)\b.*(?:delete|remove|update|modify|grant|revoke)/gi,
+        severity: 'low',
+        description: 'Potentially privileged operation - verify role/permission checks are in place',
+        suggestedFix: 'Add role-based access control for sensitive operations',
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'Client-side only auth check',
+        pattern: /if\s*\(\s*!?\s*(isAuthenticated|isLoggedIn|user)\s*\)\s*\{?\s*(router\.push|navigate|redirect|window\.location)/gi,
+        severity: 'medium',
+        description: 'Client-side only authentication redirect detected',
+        suggestedFix: 'Implement server-side authentication checks as well',
+    },
+    // Insecure token handling
+    {
+        name: 'Token in URL',
+        pattern: /\?.*token=|&token=|\?.*api_key=|&api_key=/gi,
+        severity: 'high',
+        description: 'Sensitive token passed in URL query parameter',
+        suggestedFix: 'Pass tokens in Authorization header or request body',
+    },
+    {
+        name: 'Token in localStorage',
+        pattern: /localStorage\.(setItem|getItem)\s*\(\s*['"](token|jwt|auth|session|apiKey)/gi,
+        severity: 'medium',
+        description: 'Sensitive token stored in localStorage (XSS vulnerable)',
+        suggestedFix: 'Use httpOnly cookies for token storage',
+    },
+    // OAuth/Social auth issues
+    // NOTE: OAuth detection narrowed significantly to reduce false positives.
+    // Previously matched any line containing "oauth" which flagged variable names, imports, etc.
+    // Now only matches actual OAuth authorization URL construction.
+    {
+        name: 'OAuth state parameter missing',
+        // Only match actual OAuth authorization URL construction without state parameter
+        // Must have: authorize endpoint + client_id/redirect_uri but missing state
+        pattern: /['"`]https?:\/\/[^'"]*\/(?:oauth|authorize|auth)[^'"]*client_id=[^'"]*(?!.*state=)/gi,
+        severity: 'medium',
+        description: 'OAuth authorization URL may lack state parameter for CSRF protection',
+        suggestedFix: 'Include a random state parameter in OAuth authorization requests',
+    },
+    // Password handling issues
+    {
+        name: 'Password logged',
+        pattern: /console\.(log|info|debug|warn|error)\s*\([^)]*password/gi,
+        severity: 'critical',
+        description: 'Password may be logged to console',
+        suggestedFix: 'Never log passwords or sensitive credentials',
+    },
+    // NOTE: 'Password in error message' pattern now uses smart intent detection
+    // Error CODES like 'SAME_PASSWORD' are not flagged (they're codes, not values)
+    // Only actual password values concatenated into errors are flagged
+    // This is handled specially in detectAuthAntipatterns() below
+    // Rate limiting
+    {
+        name: 'Login without rate limiting',
+        pattern: /\/(login|signin|auth|authenticate)\s*['"],\s*(async\s*)?\(/gi,
+        severity: 'medium',
+        description: 'Login endpoint may lack rate limiting',
+        suggestedFix: 'Add rate limiting to prevent brute force attacks',
+    },
+    // 2FA bypass
+    {
+        name: 'Potential 2FA bypass',
+        pattern: /skip2fa|bypass2fa|disable2fa|twoFactor\s*[=:]\s*false/gi,
+        severity: 'high',
+        description: 'Two-factor authentication bypass detected',
+        suggestedFix: 'Remove 2FA bypass options in production',
+    },
+];
+// Check if line is a comment
+function isComment(line) {
+    const trimmed = line.trim();
+    return (trimmed.startsWith('//') ||
+        trimmed.startsWith('#') ||
+        trimmed.startsWith('*') ||
+        trimmed.startsWith('/*'));
+}
+// Check if file is likely an auth-related file
+function isAuthRelatedFile(filePath) {
+    const authKeywords = ['auth', 'login', 'session', 'user', 'account', 'credential', 'password', 'token', 'jwt', 'oauth'];
+    const lowerPath = filePath.toLowerCase();
+    return authKeywords.some(keyword => lowerPath.includes(keyword));
+}
+/**
+ * Check if file is an auth implementation/library file
+ * These files ARE the auth system - flagging them for "missing auth" is wrong
+ *
+ * Examples:
+ * - packages/auth/src/handlers.ts
+ * - lib/auth/middleware.ts
+ * - services/authentication/index.ts
+ */
+function isAuthImplementationFile(filePath) {
+    const authImplPatterns = [
+        /\/packages\/auth\//i,
+        /\/lib\/auth\//i,
+        /\/utils\/auth\//i,
+        /\/services\/auth/i,
+        /\/authentication\//i,
+        /\/auth-provider/i,
+        /\/auth-helpers/i,
+        /\/auth-utils/i,
+        /\/passport-/i, // Passport.js strategy files
+        /\/next-auth\//i, // NextAuth config
+        /\/lucia\//i, // Lucia auth
+        /\/better-auth\//i, // Better Auth
+        /\/supabase\/auth/i, // Supabase auth
+        /\/clerk\//i, // Clerk auth
+        /\/auth0\//i, // Auth0
+        /\/keycloak\//i, // Keycloak
+    ];
+    return authImplPatterns.some(p => p.test(filePath));
+}
+// Check if endpoint is a known public endpoint (health checks, webhooks, cron)
+function isKnownPublicEndpoint(lineContent, filePath) {
+    const PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS = [
+        // Health checks
+        /\/health\b/i,
+        /\/healthz\b/i,
+        /\/ready\b/i,
+        /\/live\b/i,
+        /\/ping\b/i,
+        /\/status\b/i,
+        /\/_health/i,
+        // Webhooks (receive external calls)
+        /\/webhook\b/i,
+        /\/webhooks\//i,
+        /\/callback\b/i,
+        /\/stripe\/webhook/i,
+        /\/clerk\/webhook/i,
+        /\/svix\//i,
+        // Cron/scheduled tasks
+        /\/cron\//i,
+        /\/scheduled\//i,
+        /\/tasks\//i,
+        /\/jobs?\//i,
+        // Public APIs - intentionally unauthenticated
+        /\/public\//i,
+        /\/openpage/i, // OpenPage API pattern (intentionally public)
+        /\/open-api\//i,
+        /\/api\/public\//i,
+        /\/api\/v\d+\/public\//i,
+        /\bGET\b.*\/api\/\w+\/\[id\]/i, // Public resource reads with ID param
+        // Auth endpoints (must be public for users to authenticate)
+        /\/api\/auth\//i,
+        /\/auth\//i,
+        /\/login\b/i,
+        /\/signup\b/i,
+        /\/register\b/i,
+        /\/forgot-password/i,
+        /\/reset-password/i,
+        /\/verify-email/i,
+        /\/magic-link/i,
+        /\/oauth\//i,
+        // RSS/Atom feeds (typically public)
+        /\/feed\b/i,
+        /\/rss\b/i,
+        /\/atom\b/i,
+        // Sitemap/robots (always public)
+        /\/sitemap/i,
+        /\/robots/i,
+        // OpenGraph/meta endpoints
+        /\/og\//i,
+        /\/opengraph/i,
+        /\/meta\//i,
+        // Share/embed endpoints
+        /\/share\//i,
+        /\/embed\//i,
+        /\/widget\//i,
+    ];
+    return PUBLIC_ENDPOINTS.some(pattern => pattern.test(lineContent) || pattern.test(filePath));
+}
+// Check if there are auth indicators in nearby lines (within 15 lines)
+function hasAuthCheckNearby(lines, lineIndex) {
+    const startLine = Math.max(0, lineIndex);
+    const endLine = Math.min(lines.length, lineIndex + 15);
+    const searchWindow = lines.slice(startLine, endLine);
+    const authIndicators = [
+        /authorization/i,
+        /bearer\s+token/i,
+        /req\.user/,
+        /request\.user/,
+        /isAuthenticated/,
+        /requireAuth/,
+        /verifyToken/,
+        /checkPermission/,
+        /getServerSession/,
+        /auth\(\)/,
+        /middleware.*auth/i,
+        /session\s*\.\s*user/,
+        // Internal secret checks (network-level auth)
+        /internal.?secret/i,
+        /INTERNAL_SECRET/,
+        /x-internal-secret/i,
+        /admin.?secret/i,
+        /service.?token/i,
+        // BYOK patterns - user provides their own API key (implicit auth)
+        /userApiKey|user_api_key|clientApiKey/i,
+        /req\.body\.(?:apiKey|api_key|openaiKey|anthropicKey)/i,
+        /headers\[['"`]x-(?:openai|api|anthropic)-key['"`]\]/i,
+        // Next.js / React auth patterns (expanded)
+        /const\s+session\s*=\s*await\s+auth\s*\(\)/, // const session = await auth()
+        /const\s+\{\s*session\s*\}\s*=\s*await\s+auth\s*\(\)/, // const { session } = await auth()
+        /if\s*\(\s*!session\?\.user/, // if (!session?.user)
+        /if\s*\(\s*!session\s*\)/, // if (!session)
+        /session\s*\?\.\s*user/, // session?.user
+        /getServerSession\s*\(\s*authOptions/, // getServerSession(authOptions)
+        /getServerSession\s*\(\s*req\s*,\s*res/, // getServerSession(req, res, ...)
+        /useSession\s*\(\)/, // useSession()
+        /signIn\s*\(/, // signIn()
+        /signOut\s*\(/, // signOut()
+        // Clerk auth patterns
+        /currentUser\s*\(\)/, // currentUser()
+        /auth\s*\(\)\s*\.\s*protect/, // auth().protect
+        /auth\s*\(\)\s*\.\s*userId/, // auth().userId
+        /clerkClient/i,
+        /getAuth\s*\(/,
+        /ClerkProvider/,
+        // Supabase auth patterns
+        /supabase\s*\.\s*auth\s*\.\s*getUser/, // supabase.auth.getUser()
+        /supabase\s*\.\s*auth\s*\.\s*getSession/, // supabase.auth.getSession()
+        /createServerClient/, // Supabase server client
+        /createRouteHandlerClient/,
+        // Lucia auth patterns
+        /lucia\s*\.\s*validateSession/,
+        /validateRequest/,
+        // Better Auth patterns
+        /betterAuth/,
+        /auth\.api\./,
+        // Throwing auth helpers (if these are called, route is authenticated)
+        /throw\s+new\s+Error\s*\(\s*['"]unauthorized/i,
+        /throw\s+new\s+Error\s*\(\s*['"]unauthenticated/i,
+        /ChatSDKError\s*\(\s*['"]unauthorized/i,
+        /return\s+new\s+Response\s*\(\s*.*401/,
+        /return\s+NextResponse\s*\.\s*json\s*\(\s*.*401/,
+    ];
+    return searchWindow.some(line => authIndicators.some(pattern => pattern.test(line)));
+}
+function detectAuthAntipatterns(content, filePath, options = {}) {
+    const { middlewareConfig, authHelpers, fileAuthImports, parsed } = options;
+    const vulnerabilities = [];
+    // Skip scanner/fixture files to avoid self-detection
+    if ((0, file_classifier_1.isScannerOrFixtureFile)(filePath))
+        return vulnerabilities;
+    const lines = parsed?.lines ?? content.split('\n');
+    const isAuthFile = isAuthRelatedFile(filePath);
+    const isAuthImpl = isAuthImplementationFile(filePath);
+    // Check framework route hierarchy protection (Remix, Next.js route groups)
+    const routeHierarchy = (0, route_hierarchy_1.getRouteProtectionContext)(filePath);
+    // Check if this route is protected by global middleware
+    const routePath = (0, middleware_detector_1.getRoutePathFromFile)(filePath);
+    const middlewareProtection = routePath && middlewareConfig
+        ? (0, middleware_detector_1.isRouteProtectedByMiddleware)(routePath, middlewareConfig)
+        : { isProtected: false, reason: '' };
+    // Check if file uses imported auth middleware/helpers
+    const importedAuthProtection = fileAuthImports?.get(filePath);
+    const usesImportedAuth = importedAuthProtection?.usesImportedAuth ?? false;
+    // Check if file uses throwing auth helpers
+    const helpersList = authHelpers?.helpers || [];
+    // Check if this is a component only used in authenticated contexts
+    const isAuthOnlyComponent = (0, route_hierarchy_1.isAuthenticatedOnlyComponent)(filePath);
+    lines.forEach((line, index) => {
+        // Skip comment lines
+        if (isComment(line))
+            return;
+        for (const pattern of AUTH_ANTIPATTERNS) {
+            const regex = new RegExp(pattern.pattern.source, pattern.pattern.flags);
+            if (regex.test(line)) {
+                // Special handling for unprotected route patterns
+                if (pattern.name === 'Unprotected API route' ||
+                    pattern.name === 'Express route without auth middleware') {
+                    // PRIORITY -1: Skip auth implementation files entirely
+                    // These files ARE the auth system - flagging them for "missing auth" is conceptually wrong
+                    if (isAuthImpl) {
+                        break; // Skip this pattern
+                    }
+                    // PRIORITY 0: Check if this is actually a route file
+                    // In Next.js, routes must be in `route.ts/js` files. Files like `handlers.ts`,
+                    // `safe-handlers.ts`, `utils.ts` etc. are NOT actual API routes even if they
+                    // export GET/POST functions.
+                    const isActualRouteFile = /\/(route|page)\.(ts|js|tsx|jsx)$/i.test(filePath) ||
+                        /\/(api|routes?)\/.*\/(index|route)\.(ts|js)$/i.test(filePath) ||
+                        // Express/Koa routes typically have 'routes' or 'router' in path
+                        /\/(routes?|router|controllers?)\.[tj]s$/i.test(filePath);
+                    // Files explicitly named as handlers, helpers, utils are not routes
+                    const isUtilityFile = /(handler|helper|util|mock|test|fixture|safe|example)/i.test(filePath);
+                    if (!isActualRouteFile || isUtilityFile) {
+                        // Not an actual route file - skip this finding
+                        break;
+                    }
+                    // PRIORITY 0.5: Check if route is in a protected route hierarchy
+                    // Framework route conventions (Remix _authenticated+, Next.js route groups)
+                    if (routeHierarchy.isInProtectedHierarchy) {
+                        // Route is in a protected hierarchy - cap severity at info
+                        vulnerabilities.push({
+                            id: `auth-antipattern-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${pattern.name}`,
+                            filePath,
+                            lineNumber: index + 1,
+                            lineContent: line.trim(),
+                            severity: 'info',
+                            category: 'missing_auth',
+                            title: pattern.name + ' (in protected route hierarchy)',
+                            description: `This route is within a protected route hierarchy (${routeHierarchy.protectionSource.join(', ')}). Authentication is likely handled by parent layout/middleware.`,
+                            suggestedFix: 'Verify parent layout enforces authentication. If not, add auth check here.',
+                            confidence: 'low',
+                            baseConfidence: BASE_CONFIDENCE,
+                            layer: 2,
+                            source: 'structural',
+                        });
+                        break; // Only report once per line
+                    }
+                    // PRIORITY 0.75: Check if this is a component only used in authenticated contexts
+                    if (isAuthOnlyComponent) {
+                        // Component is in admin/dashboard/etc - skip entirely
+                        break;
+                    }
+                    // PRIORITY 1: Check if route is protected by global middleware
+                    // This is the STRONGEST signal - if middleware protects the route, suppress entirely
+                    if (middlewareProtection.isProtected) {
+                        // Route is authenticated by middleware - no finding needed
+                        break; // Skip this pattern, route is protected
+                    }
+                    // PRIORITY 1.5: Check if file imports and uses auth middleware
+                    // e.g., import { authMiddleware } from '@/lib/auth' + wraps handlers
+                    if (usesImportedAuth) {
+                        // File imports auth middleware and uses it - no finding needed
+                        break; // Skip this pattern, route is protected via imported auth
+                    }
+                    // PRIORITY 2: Check if file uses throwing auth helpers
+                    // If getCurrentUserId() or similar is called, the route is authenticated
+                    const authHelperCall = (0, auth_helper_detector_1.hasAuthHelperCallBefore)(content, index, helpersList);
+                    if (authHelperCall.hasCall && authHelperCall.helper) {
+                        // Route uses a throwing auth helper - no finding needed
+                        // The auth helper guarantees authenticated context
+                        break; // Skip this pattern, route is protected
+                    }
+                    // PRIORITY 3: Check if this is a known public endpoint
+                    if (isKnownPublicEndpoint(line, filePath)) {
+                        vulnerabilities.push({
+                            id: `auth-antipattern-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${pattern.name}`,
+                            filePath,
+                            lineNumber: index + 1,
+                            lineContent: line.trim(),
+                            severity: 'info',
+                            category: 'missing_auth',
+                            title: pattern.name + ' (public endpoint)',
+                            description: 'This appears to be a public endpoint (health check, webhook, cron, etc.). Verify this is intentionally public and consider rate limiting if needed.',
+                            suggestedFix: 'If this is a webhook or cron endpoint, ensure it has appropriate authentication (API keys, signatures, etc.). Health checks typically do not need auth.',
+                            confidence: 'low',
+                            baseConfidence: BASE_CONFIDENCE,
+                            layer: 2,
+                            source: 'structural',
+                        });
+                        break; // Only report once per line
+                    }
+                    // PRIORITY 4: Check if auth check exists nearby (inline check)
+                    if (hasAuthCheckNearby(lines, index)) {
+                        vulnerabilities.push({
+                            id: `auth-antipattern-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${pattern.name}`,
+                            filePath,
+                            lineNumber: index + 1,
+                            lineContent: line.trim(),
+                            severity: 'low',
+                            category: 'missing_auth',
+                            title: pattern.name,
+                            description: pattern.description + ' (auth check detected in nearby lines)',
+                            suggestedFix: pattern.suggestedFix,
+                            confidence: 'low',
+                            baseConfidence: BASE_CONFIDENCE,
+                            layer: 2,
+                            source: 'structural',
+                        });
+                        break; // Only report once per line
+                    }
+                }
+                // Standard handling for all patterns (or fallback for route patterns)
+                // Boost confidence for auth-related files
+                const confidence = isAuthFile ? 'high' : 'medium';
+                vulnerabilities.push({
+                    id: `auth-antipattern-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${pattern.name}`,
+                    filePath,
+                    lineNumber: index + 1,
+                    lineContent: line.trim(),
+                    severity: pattern.severity,
+                    category: 'missing_auth',
+                    title: pattern.name,
+                    description: pattern.description,
+                    suggestedFix: pattern.suggestedFix,
+                    confidence,
+                    baseConfidence: BASE_CONFIDENCE,
+                    layer: 2,
+                    source: 'structural',
+                });
+                break; // Only report once per line
+            }
+        }
+    });
+    // Special handling: Password in error message with smart intent detection
+    // Only flag actual password VALUES, not error CODES like 'SAME_PASSWORD'
+    const passwordErrorPattern = /throw\s+new\s+Error\s*\([^)]*password|Error\s*\([^)]*password/gi;
+    lines.forEach((line, index) => {
+        if (isComment(line))
+            return;
+        if (passwordErrorPattern.test(line)) {
+            // Reset regex state
+            passwordErrorPattern.lastIndex = 0;
+            // Skip if this is an error CODE, not a VALUE
+            if ((0, intent_detector_1.isPasswordErrorCode)(line)) {
+                return; // This is fine - 'SAME_PASSWORD' is a code, not a value
+            }
+            // Only flag if actual password value is in the error
+            if ((0, intent_detector_1.hasPasswordValueInError)(line)) {
+                vulnerabilities.push({
+                    id: `auth-antipattern-${filePath}-${index + 1}-password-in-error`,
+                    filePath,
+                    lineNumber: index + 1,
+                    lineContent: line.trim(),
+                    severity: 'high',
+                    category: 'missing_auth',
+                    title: 'Password value in error message',
+                    description: 'Actual password value may be included in error message, exposing sensitive data.',
+                    suggestedFix: 'Never include actual password values in error messages. Use error codes instead.',
+                    confidence: 'high',
+                    baseConfidence: BASE_CONFIDENCE,
+                    layer: 2,
+                    source: 'structural',
+                });
+            }
+        }
+    });
+    // Special handling: 2FA optional fields with OR validation
+    // Don't flag .optional() on 2FA fields if there's .refine() enforcing OR logic
+    const twoFAOptionalPattern = /\.(totp|otp|backupCode|recoveryCode|twoFactor|2fa|mfa).*\.optional\s*\(\)/gi;
+    lines.forEach((line, index) => {
+        if (isComment(line))
+            return;
+        if (twoFAOptionalPattern.test(line)) {
+            // Reset regex state
+            twoFAOptionalPattern.lastIndex = 0;
+            // Check if this is legitimate OR validation (either TOTP or backup code required)
+            if ((0, schema_semantics_1.is2FAOrValidation)(content, index)) {
+                // This is legitimate OR validation - skip or report as info
+                return;
+            }
+            // Only flag if this truly allows bypassing 2FA
+            // Most cases with .refine() are fine - this is handled by schema-semantics.ts
+        }
+    });
+    return vulnerabilities;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=auth-patterns.js.map

package/dist/detect/structural/auth-patterns.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/detect/structural/dangerous-functions/child-process.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/**
+ * Child Process Detection
+ *
+ * Detection logic for child_process functions (exec, spawn, execFile, etc.)
+ * that can lead to command injection vulnerabilities.
+ */
+/**
+ * Check if exec() call is from child_process (dangerous) vs RegExp.exec (safe)
+ * Returns true if this is a child_process exec call that should be flagged
+ */
+export declare function isChildProcessExec(content: string, lineContent: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * Check if spawn/execFile/execSync is from child_process
+ */
+export declare function isChildProcessSpawn(content: string, lineContent: string): boolean;
+//# sourceMappingURL=child-process.d.ts.map

package/dist/detect/structural/dangerous-functions/child-process.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"child-process.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/detect/structural/dangerous-functions/child-process.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;GAKG;AAEH;;;GAGG;AACH,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAiEhF;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,wBAAgB,mBAAmB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAgBjF"}

package/dist/detect/structural/dangerous-functions/child-process.js

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Child Process Detection
+ *
+ * Detection logic for child_process functions (exec, spawn, execFile, etc.)
+ * that can lead to command injection vulnerabilities.
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.isChildProcessExec = isChildProcessExec;
+exports.isChildProcessSpawn = isChildProcessSpawn;
+/**
+ * Check if exec() call is from child_process (dangerous) vs RegExp.exec (safe)
+ * Returns true if this is a child_process exec call that should be flagged
+ */
+function isChildProcessExec(content, lineContent) {
+    // Check for child_process import
+    const hasChildProcessImport = /require\s*\(\s*['"]child_process['"]\s*\)/.test(content) ||
+        /from\s+['"]child_process['"]/.test(content) ||
+        /import\s+.*child_process/.test(content) ||
+        /require\s*\(\s*['"]node:child_process['"]\s*\)/.test(content) ||
+        /from\s+['"]node:child_process['"]/.test(content);
+    // If no child_process import, this is likely RegExp.exec or similar
+    if (!hasChildProcessImport) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    // Check if this specific line is RegExp.exec pattern
+    // RegExp.exec is called as: regex.exec(string) or /pattern/.exec(string)
+    const isRegExpExec = /\.\s*exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) && // Method call on an object
+        !/\bexec\s*\(/.test(lineContent.replace(/\.\s*exec\s*\(/, '')); // Not a standalone exec()
+    // Also check for common RegExp patterns
+    const isRegExpPattern = /\/[^/]+\/[gimsuy]*\.exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) || // /pattern/.exec()
+        /new\s+RegExp\s*\([^)]+\)\.exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) || // new RegExp().exec()
+        /regex\.exec\s*\(/i.test(lineContent) || // regex.exec()
+        /pattern\.exec\s*\(/i.test(lineContent) || // pattern.exec()
+        /match\.exec\s*\(/i.test(lineContent) || // match.exec()
+        /re\.exec\s*\(/i.test(lineContent); // re.exec()
+    if (isRegExpExec || isRegExpPattern) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    // Check if exec is imported/destructured from child_process
+    const execImported = /\{\s*[^}]*\bexec\b[^}]*\}\s*=\s*require\s*\(\s*['"]child_process['"]/.test(content) ||
+        /\{\s*[^}]*\bexec\b[^}]*\}\s*=\s*require\s*\(\s*['"]node:child_process['"]/.test(content) ||
+        /import\s+\{\s*[^}]*\bexec\b[^}]*\}\s+from\s+['"]child_process['"]/.test(content) ||
+        /import\s+\{\s*[^}]*\bexec\b[^}]*\}\s+from\s+['"]node:child_process['"]/.test(content);
+    // If exec is directly imported from child_process, standalone exec() is dangerous
+    if (execImported && /\bexec\s*\(/.test(lineContent)) {
+        return true;
+    }
+    // Check for child_process.exec() pattern
+    if (/child_process\.exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) ||
+        /cp\.exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) ||
+        /childProcess\.exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent)) {
+        return true;
+    }
+    // If we have child_process import but can't determine usage, be conservative
+    // Only flag if it looks like a standalone exec() call
+    return /\bexec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) && !/\.\s*exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent);
+}
+/**
+ * Check if spawn/execFile/execSync is from child_process
+ */
+function isChildProcessSpawn(content, lineContent) {
+    // Check for child_process import
+    const hasChildProcessImport = /require\s*\(\s*['"]child_process['"]\s*\)/.test(content) ||
+        /from\s+['"]child_process['"]/.test(content) ||
+        /require\s*\(\s*['"]node:child_process['"]\s*\)/.test(content) ||
+        /from\s+['"]node:child_process['"]/.test(content);
+    if (!hasChildProcessImport) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    // These functions are always from child_process when that module is imported
+    return /\b(spawn|spawnSync|execSync|execFile|execFileSync)\s*\(/.test(lineContent);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=child-process.js.map