@oculum/scanner 1.0.0

package/src/layer2/dangerous-functions.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,1563 @@
+/**
+ * Layer 2: Dangerous Function Call Analysis
+ * Detects usage of dangerous functions that can lead to security vulnerabilities
+ */
+
+import type { Vulnerability, VulnerabilitySeverity } from '../types'
+import {
+  isComment,
+  isTestOrMockFile,
+  isScannerOrFixtureFile,
+} from '../utils/context-helpers'
+
+/**
+ * Check if exec() call is from child_process (dangerous) vs RegExp.exec (safe)
+ * Returns true if this is a child_process exec call that should be flagged
+ */
+function isChildProcessExec(content: string, lineContent: string): boolean {
+  // Check for child_process import
+  const hasChildProcessImport = 
+    /require\s*\(\s*['"]child_process['"]\s*\)/.test(content) ||
+    /from\s+['"]child_process['"]/.test(content) ||
+    /import\s+.*child_process/.test(content) ||
+    /require\s*\(\s*['"]node:child_process['"]\s*\)/.test(content) ||
+    /from\s+['"]node:child_process['"]/.test(content)
+
+  // If no child_process import, this is likely RegExp.exec or similar
+  if (!hasChildProcessImport) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  // Check if this specific line is RegExp.exec pattern
+  // RegExp.exec is called as: regex.exec(string) or /pattern/.exec(string)
+  const isRegExpExec = 
+    /\.\s*exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) &&  // Method call on an object
+    !/\bexec\s*\(/.test(lineContent.replace(/\.\s*exec\s*\(/, '')) // Not a standalone exec()
+
+  // Also check for common RegExp patterns
+  const isRegExpPattern = 
+    /\/[^/]+\/[gimsuy]*\.exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) ||  // /pattern/.exec()
+    /new\s+RegExp\s*\([^)]+\)\.exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) ||  // new RegExp().exec()
+    /regex\.exec\s*\(/i.test(lineContent) ||  // regex.exec()
+    /pattern\.exec\s*\(/i.test(lineContent) ||  // pattern.exec()
+    /match\.exec\s*\(/i.test(lineContent) ||  // match.exec()
+    /re\.exec\s*\(/i.test(lineContent)  // re.exec()
+
+  if (isRegExpExec || isRegExpPattern) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  // Check if exec is imported/destructured from child_process
+  const execImported = 
+    /\{\s*[^}]*\bexec\b[^}]*\}\s*=\s*require\s*\(\s*['"]child_process['"]/.test(content) ||
+    /\{\s*[^}]*\bexec\b[^}]*\}\s*=\s*require\s*\(\s*['"]node:child_process['"]/.test(content) ||
+    /import\s+\{\s*[^}]*\bexec\b[^}]*\}\s+from\s+['"]child_process['"]/.test(content) ||
+    /import\s+\{\s*[^}]*\bexec\b[^}]*\}\s+from\s+['"]node:child_process['"]/.test(content)
+
+  // If exec is directly imported from child_process, standalone exec() is dangerous
+  if (execImported && /\bexec\s*\(/.test(lineContent)) {
+    return true
+  }
+
+  // Check for child_process.exec() pattern
+  if (/child_process\.exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) || 
+      /cp\.exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) ||
+      /childProcess\.exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent)) {
+    return true
+  }
+
+  // If we have child_process import but can't determine usage, be conservative
+  // Only flag if it looks like a standalone exec() call
+  return /\bexec\s*\(/.test(lineContent) && !/\.\s*exec\s*\(/.test(lineContent)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if schema validation is applied near a JSON.parse call
+ * Looks for zod, yup, joi, or similar validation patterns
+ */
+function hasSchemaValidationNearby(content: string, lineNumber: number): boolean {
+  const lines = content.split('\n')
+  const start = Math.max(0, lineNumber - 5)
+  const end = Math.min(lines.length, lineNumber + 10)
+  const context = lines.slice(start, end).join('\n')
+
+  const schemaValidationPatterns = [
+    // Zod patterns
+    /z\.(object|string|number|array|boolean)\s*\(/i,
+    /\.parse\s*\(/i,
+    /\.safeParse\s*\(/i,
+    /schema\.parse/i,
+    /Schema\.parse/i,
+    // Yup patterns
+    /yup\.(object|string|number|array|boolean)\s*\(/i,
+    /\.validate\s*\(/i,
+    /\.validateSync\s*\(/i,
+    // Joi patterns
+    /Joi\.(object|string|number|array|boolean)\s*\(/i,
+    /\.validateAsync\s*\(/i,
+    // Valibot patterns
+    /v\.(object|string|number|array|boolean)\s*\(/i,
+    // AJV patterns
+    /ajv\.compile/i,
+    /validate\s*\(\s*schema/i,
+    // TypeBox patterns
+    /Type\.(Object|String|Number|Array|Boolean)\s*\(/i,
+    // Generic validation patterns
+    /validateSchema/i,
+    /schemaValidator/i,
+    /parseAndValidate/i,
+  ]
+
+  return schemaValidationPatterns.some(p => p.test(context))
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if path traversal protection is in place
+ * Looks for common sanitization patterns that prevent directory traversal attacks
+ */
+function hasPathTraversalProtection(context: string, lineContent: string): boolean {
+  const protectionPatterns = [
+    // Path normalization with base directory check
+    /path\.resolve\s*\([^)]+\).*\.startsWith\s*\(/i,
+    /\.startsWith\s*\([^)]*(?:baseDir|basePath|rootDir|uploadDir|allowedDir)/i,
+    // Explicit ".." rejection
+    /\.includes\s*\(\s*['"`]\.\.['"`]\s*\)/i,
+    /\.indexOf\s*\(\s*['"`]\.\.['"`]\s*\)/i,
+    /['"`]\.\.['"`].*(?:throw|reject|return|error)/i,
+    // Path sanitization libraries
+    /sanitizePath|sanitizeFilename|sanitize-filename/i,
+    /path-sanitizer|secure-path/i,
+    // Explicit path validation
+    /validatePath|isValidPath|checkPath|verifyPath/i,
+    /isPathAllowed|isAllowedPath|pathIsAllowed/i,
+    // Normalize and check pattern
+    /path\.normalize\s*\([^)]+\).*(?:startsWith|includes|indexOf)/i,
+    // Regex validation for safe characters only
+    /\/\^?\[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.\\\/\]\+\$?\//,  // Only alphanumeric, dash, underscore, dot
+    // Allowlist/whitelist patterns
+    /allowedExtensions|allowedTypes|whitelist/i,
+    /\.endsWith\s*\(\s*['"`]\.\w+['"`]\s*\)/i,  // Extension check
+    // Path.basename to strip directory
+    /path\.basename\s*\(/i,
+    // Zod/validation for filename patterns
+    /z\.string\s*\(\s*\)\.regex\s*\(/i,
+  ]
+
+  return protectionPatterns.some(p => p.test(context) || p.test(lineContent))
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if spawn/execFile/execSync is from child_process
+ */
+function isChildProcessSpawn(content: string, lineContent: string): boolean {
+  // Check for child_process import
+  const hasChildProcessImport = 
+    /require\s*\(\s*['"]child_process['"]\s*\)/.test(content) ||
+    /from\s+['"]child_process['"]/.test(content) ||
+    /require\s*\(\s*['"]node:child_process['"]\s*\)/.test(content) ||
+    /from\s+['"]node:child_process['"]/.test(content)
+
+  if (!hasChildProcessImport) {
+    return false
+  }
+
+  // These functions are always from child_process when that module is imported
+  return /\b(spawn|spawnSync|execSync|execFile|execFileSync)\s*\(/.test(lineContent)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if a line is inside a try-catch block
+ * Looks for enclosing try { ... } catch pattern
+ */
+function isInsideTryCatch(content: string, lineNumber: number): boolean {
+  const lines = content.split('\n')
+
+  // Track brace depth and whether we're in a try block
+  let tryDepth = 0
+  let inTryBlock = false
+  let braceStack: Array<'try' | 'other'> = []
+
+  // Scan from start to the target line
+  for (let i = 0; i < lineNumber && i < lines.length; i++) {
+    const line = lines[i]
+
+    // Check for try keyword (not in a comment)
+    if (/\btry\s*\{/.test(line) && !isComment(line)) {
+      inTryBlock = true
+      tryDepth++
+      // Count opening braces on this line
+      const openBraces = (line.match(/\{/g) || []).length
+      const closeBraces = (line.match(/\}/g) || []).length
+      for (let j = 0; j < openBraces - closeBraces; j++) {
+        braceStack.push('try')
+      }
+    } else if (/\bcatch\s*\(/.test(line) && !isComment(line)) {
+      // Entering catch block - still protected
+      // Don't decrement tryDepth yet
+    } else if (/\bfinally\s*\{/.test(line) && !isComment(line)) {
+      // Entering finally block - still protected
+    } else {
+      // Track regular braces
+      const openBraces = (line.match(/\{/g) || []).length
+      const closeBraces = (line.match(/\}/g) || []).length
+
+      for (let j = 0; j < openBraces; j++) {
+        braceStack.push(inTryBlock && tryDepth > 0 ? 'try' : 'other')
+      }
+
+      for (let j = 0; j < closeBraces; j++) {
+        const popped = braceStack.pop()
+        if (popped === 'try') {
+          tryDepth--
+          if (tryDepth === 0) {
+            inTryBlock = false
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return tryDepth > 0
+}
+
+/**
+ * Simpler heuristic: check if there's a try-catch in the same function scope
+ * Looks for try { before the line and } catch after, within reasonable bounds
+ */
+function hasTryCatchNearby(content: string, lineNumber: number, windowSize: number = 20): boolean {
+  const lines = content.split('\n')
+  const startLine = Math.max(0, lineNumber - windowSize)
+  const endLine = Math.min(lines.length, lineNumber + windowSize)
+
+  // Look backward for 'try {'
+  let foundTry = false
+  for (let i = lineNumber - 1; i >= startLine; i--) {
+    const line = lines[i]
+    if (/\btry\s*\{/.test(line) && !isComment(line)) {
+      foundTry = true
+      break
+    }
+    // Stop if we hit a function boundary
+    if (/\b(function|async function|=>|class)\b/.test(line) && /\{/.test(line)) {
+      break
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!foundTry) return false
+
+  // Look forward for '} catch'
+  for (let i = lineNumber; i < endLine; i++) {
+    const line = lines[i]
+    if (/\}\s*catch\s*\(/.test(line) && !isComment(line)) {
+      return true
+    }
+    // Stop if we hit another function boundary
+    if (i > lineNumber && /\b(function|async function|class)\b/.test(line) && /\{/.test(line)) {
+      break
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false
+}
+
+/**
+ * JSON.parse source classification
+ * Determines if the input is user-controlled or internal data
+ */
+type JSONParseSource = 'user_input' | 'local_storage' | 'database' | 'config' | 'migration' | 'internal' | 'test_fixture' | 'ui_state' | 'unknown'
+
+/**
+ * Check if file path indicates a low-risk context for JSON.parse
+ */
+function isLowRiskJSONParseFile(filePath: string): JSONParseSource | null {
+  // Test/mock files - skip or info only
+  if (isTestOrMockFile(filePath)) {
+    return 'test_fixture'
+  }
+
+  // Settings/preferences components - internal UI state
+  if (/\/(components|pages)\/(settings|preferences|config)/i.test(filePath)) {
+    return 'ui_state'
+  }
+
+  // Provider/context files - typically storing state in localStorage
+  if (/Provider\.(ts|tsx|js|jsx)$/i.test(filePath)) {
+    return 'ui_state'
+  }
+
+  // Modal/Dialog components - typically internal state
+  if (/(Modal|Dialog|Settings|Preferences)\.(ts|tsx|js|jsx)$/i.test(filePath)) {
+    return 'ui_state'
+  }
+
+  // __mocks__ directory
+  if (/__mocks__/i.test(filePath)) {
+    return 'test_fixture'
+  }
+
+  // fixtures directory
+  if (/\/(fixtures?|stubs?|mocks?)\//i.test(filePath)) {
+    return 'test_fixture'
+  }
+
+  // scripts/tools directories (internal tooling)
+  if (/\/(scripts?|tools?|cli)\//i.test(filePath)) {
+    return 'internal'
+  }
+
+  // Migration files
+  if (/migration/i.test(filePath)) {
+    return 'migration'
+  }
+
+  // Config files
+  if (/\/(config|settings|constants)\.(ts|js)/i.test(filePath)) {
+    return 'config'
+  }
+
+  return null
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if JSON.parse is parsing a trusted SDK response
+ * These are well-defined responses from known APIs and are safe to parse
+ */
+function isTrustedSDKResponse(lineContent: string, content: string): boolean {
+  const trustedPatterns = [
+    // OpenAI SDK responses
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(?:response|completion|result|message)\.(?:content|text|data)/i,
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(?:openai|anthropic|client)\./i,
+    // Fetch response.json() result (already parsed by fetch)
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*await\s+.*\.json\s*\(\s*\)\s*\)/i,
+    // SDK method results
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(?:result|response)\.(?:choices|content|data|body)\[/i,
+    // AI SDK streaming results
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(?:chunk|delta|part)\.(?:content|text)/i,
+  ]
+  
+  if (trustedPatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent))) {
+    return true
+  }
+  
+  // Check surrounding context for SDK usage
+  const sdkContextPatterns = [
+    /openai\..*\.create/i,
+    /anthropic\..*\.create/i,
+    /\.chat\.completions/i,
+    /\.messages\.create/i,
+  ]
+  
+  return sdkContextPatterns.some(p => p.test(content))
+}
+
+function classifyJSONParseSource(lineContent: string, filePath: string): JSONParseSource {
+  // First check file path for low-risk contexts
+  const fileBasedSource = isLowRiskJSONParseFile(filePath)
+  if (fileBasedSource) {
+    return fileBasedSource
+  }
+
+  // User input - potentially dangerous
+  const userInputPatterns = [
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(req|request)\.(body|query|params)/i,
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*event\.(body|queryStringParameters)/i,  // AWS Lambda
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*ctx\.(request|body|query)/i,            // Koa
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(input|userInput|rawInput|payload)/i,
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*body\b/i,  // Generic 'body' often means request body
+  ]
+  if (userInputPatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent))) {
+    return 'user_input'
+  }
+
+  // localStorage/sessionStorage - client-side storage
+  const storagePatterns = [
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*localStorage\.getItem/i,
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*sessionStorage\.getItem/i,
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*window\.localStorage/i,
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*storage\.get/i,
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*saved\b/i,  // Common pattern: const saved = localStorage.getItem(...); JSON.parse(saved)
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*stored\b/i,
+  ]
+  if (storagePatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent))) {
+    return 'local_storage'
+  }
+
+  // Database results - internal data
+  const databasePatterns = [
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(row|result|record|doc|document)\./i,
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*\w+\.(data|json|metadata|embedding)\)/i,
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*\w+\[['"]?\w+['"]?\]\.(data|json|embedding)/i,
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*item\.\w+\)/i,  // ORM iteration: items.map(item => JSON.parse(item.field))
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*\w+\.content\)/i,  // Parsing content field from DB
+  ]
+  if (databasePatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent))) {
+    return 'database'
+  }
+
+  // Editor state, internal caches, UI state
+  const internalPatterns = [
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(state|cache|stored|saved|cached)/i,
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*this\.(state|cache|data)/i,
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*\w+State\)/i,
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*editorState/i,
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*parsed\b/i,  // JSON.parse(parsed) - likely already validated
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*settings\b/i,  // Settings data
+    /JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*preferences\b/i,
+  ]
+  if (internalPatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent))) {
+    return 'internal'
+  }
+
+  // Node content in editor apps (e.g., noda-os nodes have JSON content)
+  if (/JSON\.parse\s*\(\s*(node|note|document|entry)\.(content|body|data)\)/i.test(lineContent)) {
+    return 'database'
+  }
+
+  return 'unknown'
+}
+
+interface DangerousFunctionPattern {
+  name: string
+  pattern: RegExp
+  severity: VulnerabilitySeverity
+  description: string
+  suggestedFix: string
+  languages?: string[] // Optional: restrict to specific languages
+}
+
+const DANGEROUS_FUNCTIONS: DangerousFunctionPattern[] = [
+  // Code execution
+  {
+    name: 'eval() usage',
+    pattern: /\beval\s*\(/gi,
+    severity: 'critical',
+    description: 'eval() executes arbitrary code and is a major security risk',
+    suggestedFix: 'Use JSON.parse() for JSON data, or refactor to avoid dynamic code execution',
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Function constructor',
+    pattern: /new\s+Function\s*\(/gi,
+    severity: 'critical',
+    description: 'Function constructor can execute arbitrary code like eval()',
+    suggestedFix: 'Refactor to use static functions or safe alternatives',
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'setTimeout/setInterval with string',
+    pattern: /set(Timeout|Interval)\s*\(\s*['"`]/gi,
+    severity: 'high',
+    description: 'setTimeout/setInterval with string argument acts like eval()',
+    suggestedFix: 'Pass a function reference instead of a string',
+  },
+  
+  // Command injection
+  {
+    name: 'child_process exec',
+    pattern: /\b(exec|execSync|spawn|spawnSync|execFile)\s*\(/gi,
+    severity: 'high',
+    description: 'Shell command execution can lead to command injection',
+    suggestedFix: 'Validate and sanitize all inputs, prefer execFile over exec',
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'os.system/subprocess (Python)',
+    pattern: /\b(os\.system|subprocess\.(call|run|Popen|check_output))\s*\(/gi,
+    severity: 'high',
+    description: 'Shell command execution can lead to command injection',
+    suggestedFix: 'Use subprocess with shell=False and pass arguments as a list',
+    languages: ['py'],
+  },
+  
+  // SQL injection risks
+  {
+    name: 'Raw SQL query construction',
+    pattern: /\.(query|execute|raw)\s*\(\s*[`'"].*\$\{|\.query\s*\(\s*['"].*\+/gi,
+    severity: 'critical',
+    description: 'String concatenation in SQL queries can lead to SQL injection',
+    suggestedFix: 'Use parameterized queries or prepared statements',
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'SQL template literal',
+    pattern: /`SELECT.*FROM.*WHERE.*\$\{|`INSERT.*INTO.*VALUES.*\$\{|`UPDATE.*SET.*\$\{|`DELETE.*FROM.*WHERE.*\$\{/gi,
+    severity: 'critical',
+    description: 'Template literals in SQL queries can lead to SQL injection',
+    suggestedFix: 'Use parameterized queries with placeholders (?, $1, etc.)',
+  },
+  
+  // XSS risks
+  {
+    name: 'innerHTML assignment',
+    pattern: /\.innerHTML\s*=|\.outerHTML\s*=/gi,
+    severity: 'high',
+    description: 'Direct innerHTML assignment can lead to XSS vulnerabilities',
+    suggestedFix: 'Use textContent for text, or sanitize HTML with DOMPurify',
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'document.write',
+    pattern: /document\.write\s*\(/gi,
+    severity: 'high',
+    description: 'document.write can introduce XSS vulnerabilities',
+    suggestedFix: 'Use DOM manipulation methods instead',
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'dangerouslySetInnerHTML',
+    pattern: /dangerouslySetInnerHTML\s*=\s*\{\s*\{\s*__html\s*:/gi,
+    severity: 'high',
+    description: 'dangerouslySetInnerHTML can lead to XSS if content is not sanitized',
+    suggestedFix: 'Sanitize HTML content with DOMPurify before rendering',
+  },
+  
+  // Deserialization
+  {
+    name: 'Unsafe deserialization',
+    pattern: /\b(pickle\.loads?|yaml\.load\s*\((?!.*Loader)|unserialize|Marshal\.load)\s*\(/gi,
+    severity: 'critical',
+    description: 'Unsafe deserialization can lead to remote code execution',
+    suggestedFix: 'Use safe loaders (yaml.safe_load) or validate input before deserializing',
+  },
+  // Note: JSON.parse is handled specially with source-aware severity - see below
+  // Note: request.json() is NOT a dangerous function - see schema validation rules
+  
+  // File system risks
+  {
+    name: 'Dynamic file path',
+    pattern: /\b(readFile|writeFile|readFileSync|writeFileSync|createReadStream|createWriteStream)\s*\(\s*[^'"]/gi,
+    severity: 'medium',
+    description: 'Dynamic file paths can lead to path traversal attacks',
+    suggestedFix: 'Validate and sanitize file paths, use path.resolve with a base directory',
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Path traversal risk',
+    pattern: /path\.(join|resolve)\s*\([^)]*req\.(params|query|body)/gi,
+    severity: 'high',
+    description: 'User input in file paths can lead to path traversal attacks',
+    suggestedFix: 'Validate paths and ensure they stay within allowed directories',
+  },
+  
+  // Crypto weaknesses
+  {
+    name: 'Math.random for security',
+    pattern: /Math\.random\s*\(\s*\)/gi,
+    severity: 'medium',
+    description: 'Math.random() is not cryptographically secure',
+    suggestedFix: 'Use crypto.randomBytes() or crypto.getRandomValues() for security-sensitive operations',
+  },
+  
+  // Regex DoS
+  {
+    name: 'Potentially unsafe regex',
+    pattern: /new\s+RegExp\s*\(\s*[^'"]/gi,
+    severity: 'medium',
+    description: 'Dynamic regex construction can lead to ReDoS attacks',
+    suggestedFix: 'Validate regex patterns and consider using safe-regex library',
+  },
+  
+  // Prototype pollution
+  {
+    name: 'Object.assign with user input',
+    pattern: /Object\.assign\s*\(\s*\{\s*\}\s*,\s*(req\.|request\.|body|params|query)/gi,
+    severity: 'high',
+    description: 'Object.assign with user input can lead to prototype pollution',
+    suggestedFix: 'Validate and sanitize input, or use a safe merge function',
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'Spread operator with user input',
+    pattern: /\{\s*\.\.\.req\.(body|params|query)|\.\.\.request\.(body|params|query)/gi,
+    severity: 'medium',
+    description: 'Spreading user input can lead to mass assignment vulnerabilities',
+    suggestedFix: 'Explicitly pick allowed properties instead of spreading all input',
+  },
+]
+
+// Check if file matches language filter
+function matchesLanguage(filePath: string, languages?: string[]): boolean {
+  if (!languages || languages.length === 0) return true
+
+  const ext = filePath.split('.').pop()?.toLowerCase() || ''
+  return languages.some(lang => {
+    if (lang === 'py') return ext === 'py'
+    if (lang === 'js') return ['js', 'jsx', 'mjs', 'cjs'].includes(ext)
+    if (lang === 'ts') return ['ts', 'tsx'].includes(ext)
+    return ext === lang
+  })
+}
+
+// Check if innerHTML/dangerouslySetInnerHTML uses static content only
+function isStaticHTMLContent(lineContent: string, content: string, lineNumber: number): boolean {
+  const lines = content.split('\n')
+
+  // Get surrounding context (5 lines before and after)
+  const contextStart = Math.max(0, lineNumber - 6)
+  const contextEnd = Math.min(lines.length, lineNumber + 5)
+  const context = lines.slice(contextStart, contextEnd).join('\n')
+
+  // Static HTML indicators - string literals only
+  const staticIndicators = [
+    /innerHTML\s*=\s*['"`][^'"`]*['"`]/,                    // innerHTML = "static string"
+    /innerHTML\s*=\s*`[^$]*`/,                              // innerHTML = `static template without ${}`
+    /dangerouslySetInnerHTML\s*=\s*\{\s*\{\s*__html:\s*['"`]/, // React static string
+  ]
+
+  // Dynamic content indicators (red flags)
+  const dynamicIndicators = [
+    /\$\{[^}]+\}/,           // Template interpolation ${...}
+    /innerHTML\s*=.*\+/,     // String concatenation with +
+    /innerHTML\s*\+=\s*/,    // Append operation
+    /\breq\.|\.params|\.query|\.body/,  // User input (req.params, req.query, req.body)
+    /\bprops\./,             // Component props
+    /\bstate\./,             // Component state
+    /\.value\b/,             // Input value
+    /dangerouslySetInnerHTML\s*=\s*\{\s*\{\s*__html:\s*[^'"`]/, // React dynamic
+  ]
+
+  const isStatic = staticIndicators.some(p => p.test(lineContent))
+  const isDynamic = dynamicIndicators.some(p => p.test(context))
+
+  return isStatic && !isDynamic
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if eval/exec/Function has only static literal inputs (no user data)
+ * Static inputs like eval('({ mode: "production" })') are low risk
+ */
+function hasOnlyStaticInputs(lineContent: string, content: string, lineNumber: number): boolean {
+  const lines = content.split('\n')
+  
+  // Check if the argument to eval/exec/Function is a string literal only
+  const staticPatterns = [
+    /eval\s*\(\s*['"`][^'"`$]*['"`]\s*\)/,           // eval('static string')
+    /eval\s*\(\s*`[^$`]*`\s*\)/,                     // eval(`static template without ${}`)
+    /new\s+Function\s*\(\s*['"`][^'"`$]*['"`]\s*\)/, // new Function('static')
+    /execSync\s*\(\s*['"`][^'"`$]*['"`]\s*\)/,       // execSync('static command')
+    /exec\s*\(\s*['"`][^'"`$]*['"`]/,                // exec('static command'
+  ]
+  
+  if (staticPatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent))) {
+    return true
+  }
+  
+  // Check surrounding context for user input flowing in
+  const userInputIndicators = [
+    /\$\{/,                    // Template interpolation
+    /\+\s*\w+/,                // String concatenation with variable
+    /req\.|request\.|body\.|params\.|query\./i,  // Request data
+    /user[Ii]nput|userCode|userCommand/,         // User input variables
+    /args\[|argv\[/,           // Command line args
+  ]
+  
+  const contextStart = Math.max(0, lineNumber - 3)
+  const contextEnd = Math.min(lines.length, lineNumber + 1)
+  const context = lines.slice(contextStart, contextEnd).join('\n')
+  
+  // If no user input indicators found, likely static
+  return !userInputIndicators.some(p => p.test(context))
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if SQL query uses whitelist validation pattern
+ * e.g., columns validated against allowedColumns array before use
+ */
+function hasSQLWhitelistValidation(content: string, lineNumber: number): boolean {
+  const lines = content.split('\n')
+  const contextStart = Math.max(0, lineNumber - 15)
+  const contextEnd = Math.min(lines.length, lineNumber + 5)
+  const context = lines.slice(contextStart, contextEnd).join('\n')
+  
+  // Whitelist/allowlist validation patterns
+  const whitelistPatterns = [
+    /allowed\w*\s*=\s*\[/i,              // allowedColumns = [...]
+    /whitelist\w*\s*=\s*\[/i,            // whitelistFields = [...]
+    /valid\w*\s*=\s*\[/i,                // validColumns = [...]
+    /\.filter\s*\([^)]*\.includes\s*\(/i, // .filter(c => allowed.includes(c))
+    /\.includes\s*\([^)]*\)/i,           // allowedColumns.includes(col)
+    /\.every\s*\([^)]*\.includes/i,      // columns.every(c => allowed.includes(c))
+    /if\s*\(\s*!.*\.includes/i,          // if (!allowed.includes(...))
+  ]
+  
+  return whitelistPatterns.some(p => p.test(context))
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if dangerouslySetInnerHTML is used with DOMPurify sanitization
+ */
+function hasDOMPurifySanitization(lineContent: string, content: string, lineNumber: number): boolean {
+  const lines = content.split('\n')
+  const contextStart = Math.max(0, lineNumber - 10)
+  const contextEnd = Math.min(lines.length, lineNumber + 5)
+  const context = lines.slice(contextStart, contextEnd).join('\n')
+  
+  // DOMPurify sanitization patterns
+  const sanitizationPatterns = [
+    /DOMPurify\.sanitize/i,
+    /sanitize\s*\(/i,
+    /purify\s*\(/i,
+    /xss\s*\(/i,
+    /clean\s*\(/i,
+    /sanitizeHtml/i,
+    /escapeHtml/i,
+    /sanitized/i,
+    /purified/i,
+  ]
+  
+  return sanitizationPatterns.some(p => p.test(context))
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if data flows to an LLM prompt rather than a DOM sink
+ * LLM prompts are NOT XSS - they're prompt injection (different risk profile)
+ */
+function isLLMPromptContext(lineContent: string, content: string, filePath: string): boolean {
+  // File path indicators of AI/LLM code
+  const aiFilePatterns = [
+    /\/(ai|llm|chat|openai|anthropic|gpt|claude)\//i,
+    /\/(assistants?|agents?|prompts?)\//i,
+    /(chat|ai|llm|prompt|assistant).*\.(ts|js|tsx|jsx)$/i,
+  ]
+
+  if (aiFilePatterns.some(p => p.test(filePath))) {
+    return true
+  }
+
+  // Content patterns suggesting LLM API usage
+  const llmApiPatterns = [
+    /\.create\s*\(\s*\{[^}]*messages\s*:/i,          // OpenAI/Anthropic SDK
+    /openai|anthropic|claude|gpt-4|gpt-3/i,         // AI service mentions
+    /\bprompt\s*[=:+]/i,                             // prompt assignment
+    /\bsystemPrompt|userPrompt|assistantPrompt/i,    // Prompt variables
+    /completion|chat\.create|messages\.create/i,     // API calls
+    /\bmessages\s*:\s*\[/i,                          // Messages array
+    /role:\s*['"`](user|assistant|system)['"`]/i,    // Message roles
+  ]
+
+  // Check the line and surrounding context
+  const lines = content.split('\n')
+  const lineIndex = lines.findIndex(l => l === lineContent || l.includes(lineContent.trim()))
+  const startLine = Math.max(0, lineIndex - 10)
+  const endLine = Math.min(lines.length, lineIndex + 10)
+  const context = lines.slice(startLine, endLine).join('\n')
+
+  return llmApiPatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent) || p.test(context))
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if this is a static bootstrap script (e.g., localStorage theme reader)
+ * These are very low risk even with dangerouslySetInnerHTML
+ */
+function isStaticBootstrapScript(_lineContent: string, content: string, lineNumber: number): boolean {
+  const lines = content.split('\n')
+  const contextStart = Math.max(0, lineNumber - 10)
+  const contextEnd = Math.min(lines.length, lineNumber + 5)
+  const context = lines.slice(contextStart, contextEnd).join('\n')
+
+  // Bootstrap script indicators (reading from localStorage, setting attributes)
+  const bootstrapPatterns = [
+    /localStorage\.getItem/i,
+    /document\.documentElement\.setAttribute/i,
+    /data-(theme|font|mode)/i,
+    /classList\.(add|remove|toggle)/i,
+    /\.dataset\./i,
+  ]
+
+  // Dangerous patterns that disqualify as safe bootstrap
+  const dangerousPatterns = [
+    /\$\{.*\}/,                    // Template interpolation
+    /\+\s*[a-zA-Z]/,               // String concatenation with variable
+    /innerHTML\s*=\s*[a-zA-Z]/,    // innerHTML set to variable directly
+    /fetch\s*\(/,                  // Network requests
+    /\.(query|params|body)/,       // User input
+    /location\.(search|hash)/,     // URL parameters
+    /document\.cookie/,            // Cookie access
+  ]
+
+  const hasBootstrapPatterns = bootstrapPatterns.some(p => p.test(context))
+  const hasDangerousPatterns = dangerousPatterns.some(p => p.test(context))
+
+  return hasBootstrapPatterns && !hasDangerousPatterns
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if Math.random() is used for cosmetic/UI purposes (not security)
+ * Cosmetic uses: CSS values, animations, UI variations, demo data
+ * Security uses: tokens, IDs, cryptographic operations, session management
+ */
+function isCosmeticMathRandom(lineContent: string, content: string, lineNumber: number): boolean {
+  const lines = content.split('\n')
+  
+  // Check the line itself for cosmetic indicators
+  const cosmeticLinePatterns = [
+    // CSS/style values
+    /['"`]\s*\$\{.*Math\.random.*\}\s*%['"`]/,           // `${Math.random() * 40 + 50}%`
+    /Math\.random.*\s*\+\s*['"`]%['"`]/,                 // Math.random() * 40 + '%'
+    /Math\.random.*\)\s*\*\s*\d+\s*\+\s*\d+\s*\}\s*%/,   // }) * 40 + 50}%
+    /return\s+`.*Math\.random.*%`/,                      // return `${...}%`
+    /width:\s*['"`].*Math\.random/i,                     // width: `${Math.random()...}%`
+    /height:\s*['"`].*Math\.random/i,                    // height: `${Math.random()...}%`
+    /opacity:\s*['"`]?.*Math\.random/i,                  // opacity: Math.random()
+    /transform:\s*['"`]?.*Math\.random/i,                // transform: translate(...)
+    /rotate\(.*Math\.random/i,                           // rotate(Math.random() * 360)
+    /translate\(.*Math\.random/i,                        // translate(Math.random() * 100)
+    /scale\(.*Math\.random/i,                            // scale(Math.random() * 2)
+    // Color/animation values
+    /rgba?\(.*Math\.random/i,                            // rgb(Math.random() * 255, ...)
+    /hsl\(.*Math\.random/i,                              // hsl(Math.random() * 360, ...)
+    /Math\.random.*\*\s*360/,                            // Math.random() * 360 (degrees/hue)
+    /Math\.random.*\*\s*255/,                            // Math.random() * 255 (RGB values)
+    // Array/list randomization for UI
+    /Math\.floor\(Math\.random.*\.length\)/,             // Math.floor(Math.random() * array.length)
+    /\[Math\.floor\(Math\.random/,                       // array[Math.floor(Math.random()...)]
+    // Demo/placeholder data
+    /Math\.random.*\*\s*\d+\s*\+\s*\d+.*\bpx\b/i,        // Math.random() * 100 + 50 + 'px'
+    /Math\.random.*\*\s*\d+\s*\+\s*\d+.*\bms\b/i,        // Math.random() * 1000 + 500 + 'ms'
+    /Math\.random.*\*\s*\d+\s*\+\s*\d+.*\bs\b/i,         // Math.random() * 5 + 2 + 's'
+    // UI identifier generation (short strings for element IDs, keys, etc.)
+    /Math\.random\(\)\.toString\(36\)\.substring\(/,     // .toString(36).substring(2, 9) - short UI IDs
+    /Math\.random\(\)\.toString\(36\)\.substr\(/,        // .substr() variant
+    /Math\.random\(\)\.toString\(36\)\.slice\(/,         // .slice() variant
+    /Math\.random\(\)\.toString\(16\)\.substring\(/,     // .toString(16).substring() - hex UI IDs
+    /Math\.random\(\)\.toString\(16\)\.slice\(/,         // hex slice variant
+  ]
+  
+  if (cosmeticLinePatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent))) {
+    return true
+  }
+  
+  // Check surrounding context (5 lines before and after)
+  const contextStart = Math.max(0, lineNumber - 5)
+  const contextEnd = Math.min(lines.length, lineNumber + 5)
+  const context = lines.slice(contextStart, contextEnd).join('\n')
+  
+  // Context indicators of cosmetic use
+  const cosmeticContextPatterns = [
+    // UI component files
+    /\/(components?|ui|widgets?|animations?|contexts?)\//i,
+    // Style-related variables/functions
+    /\b(style|styles|css|className|animation|transition)/i,
+    /\b(width|height|opacity|color|transform|rotate|scale|translate)/i,
+    // Demo/example data
+    /\b(demo|example|placeholder|mock|fake|sample|test)Data/i,
+    /\b(random|shuffle|pick|choose).*\b(color|item|element|option)/i,
+    // Animation/timing
+    /setTimeout.*Math\.random/i,
+    /setInterval.*Math\.random/i,
+    /delay.*Math\.random/i,
+    /duration.*Math\.random/i,
+    // UI state variations
+    /\b(variant|theme|layout|position).*Math\.random/i,
+    // UI identifier variable names (toast, notification, element, component IDs)
+    /\b(toast|notification|element|component|widget|modal|dialog|popup).*id\b/i,
+    /\bid\s*=.*Math\.random/i,
+    /\bkey\s*=.*Math\.random/i,  // React keys
+    /\btempId|temporaryId|uniqueId\b/i,
+  ]
+  
+  if (cosmeticContextPatterns.some(p => p.test(context))) {
+    return true
+  }
+  
+  // Security-sensitive patterns that override cosmetic detection
+  const securityPatterns = [
+    /\b(token|secret|key|password|credential|signature)/i,
+    /\b(auth|crypto|encrypt|decrypt|hash)/i,
+    /\b(session|nonce|salt)\b/i,
+    /Math\.random.*\*\s*1e\d+/,      // Math.random() * 1e16 (large numbers for IDs)
+  ]
+  
+  if (securityPatterns.some(p => p.test(lineContent) || p.test(context))) {
+    return false  // Not cosmetic - this is security-sensitive
+  }
+  
+  // Check for .toString(36) WITHOUT substring/slice/substr (security token pattern)
+  // If it has substring/slice/substr, it's already caught by cosmeticLinePatterns above
+  const hasToString36WithoutTruncation = /Math\.random\(\)\.toString\(36\)/.test(lineContent) &&
+    !/\.(substring|substr|slice)\(/.test(lineContent)
+  
+  const hasToString16WithoutTruncation = /Math\.random\(\)\.toString\(16\)/.test(lineContent) &&
+    !/\.(substring|substr|slice)\(/.test(lineContent)
+  
+  if (hasToString36WithoutTruncation || hasToString16WithoutTruncation) {
+    return false  // Full-length toString() without truncation - likely security token
+  }
+  
+  return false  // Default to flagging if unclear
+}
+
+export function detectDangerousFunctions(
+  content: string,
+  filePath: string
+): Vulnerability[] {
+  const vulnerabilities: Vulnerability[] = []
+
+  // Skip scanner/fixture files to avoid self-detection
+  if (isScannerOrFixtureFile(filePath)) {
+    return vulnerabilities
+  }
+
+  const lines = content.split('\n')
+  const isTestFile = isTestOrMockFile(filePath)
+
+  lines.forEach((line, index) => {
+    // Skip comment lines
+    if (isComment(line)) return
+
+    for (const funcPattern of DANGEROUS_FUNCTIONS) {
+      // Check language filter
+      if (!matchesLanguage(filePath, funcPattern.languages)) continue
+
+      const regex = new RegExp(funcPattern.pattern.source, funcPattern.pattern.flags)
+
+      if (regex.test(line)) {
+        // Special handling for innerHTML patterns
+        if (funcPattern.name === 'innerHTML assignment' ||
+            funcPattern.name === 'dangerouslySetInnerHTML') {
+
+          // Check if this uses static content only
+          if (isStaticHTMLContent(line, content, index)) {
+            vulnerabilities.push({
+              id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
+              filePath,
+              lineNumber: index + 1,
+              lineContent: line.trim(),
+              severity: 'info',
+              category: 'dangerous_function',
+              title: funcPattern.name + ' (static content)',
+              description: 'Static HTML assignment detected. Generally safe for hardcoded content, but consider using textContent for plain text or proper DOM methods for dynamic content.',
+              suggestedFix: 'If this is plain text, use textContent instead. If HTML must be used, ensure it is static and does not come from user input.',
+              confidence: 'low',
+              layer: 2,
+            })
+            break // Only report once per line
+          }
+          
+          // Check if DOMPurify or similar sanitization is used
+          if (hasDOMPurifySanitization(line, content, index)) {
+            vulnerabilities.push({
+              id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
+              filePath,
+              lineNumber: index + 1,
+              lineContent: line.trim(),
+              severity: 'info',
+              category: 'dangerous_function',
+              title: funcPattern.name + ' (sanitized)',
+              description: 'HTML is sanitized before rendering (DOMPurify or similar detected). This is the recommended pattern for rendering user-generated HTML.',
+              suggestedFix: 'Ensure DOMPurify is configured correctly and kept up to date.',
+              confidence: 'low',
+              layer: 2,
+            })
+            break // Only report once per line
+          }
+
+          // Check if this is a static bootstrap script (e.g., theme/font loader)
+          if (isStaticBootstrapScript(line, content, index)) {
+            vulnerabilities.push({
+              id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
+              filePath,
+              lineNumber: index + 1,
+              lineContent: line.trim(),
+              severity: 'info',
+              category: 'dangerous_function',
+              title: funcPattern.name + ' (static bootstrap script)',
+              description: 'This appears to be a static bootstrap script (e.g., reading localStorage for theme/font preferences). Low risk as no untrusted data is interpolated into the HTML/JS.',
+              suggestedFix: 'Verify no user-controlled data is interpolated into the script content.',
+              confidence: 'low',
+              layer: 2,
+            })
+            break // Only report once per line
+          }
+
+          // Check if this is in LLM prompt context (not XSS - it's prompt injection)
+          if (isLLMPromptContext(line, content, filePath)) {
+            vulnerabilities.push({
+              id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-prompt-injection`,
+              filePath,
+              lineNumber: index + 1,
+              lineContent: line.trim(),
+              severity: 'info',
+              category: 'ai_pattern',
+              title: 'Potential prompt injection risk',
+              description: 'User content is being used in an LLM prompt context. This is NOT XSS (the content goes to an AI, not a DOM). However, untrusted content in prompts may lead to prompt injection attacks.',
+              suggestedFix: 'Consider input validation, content filtering, or structured prompts to limit prompt injection risk.',
+              confidence: 'low',
+              layer: 2,
+            })
+            break // Only report once per line
+          }
+
+          // Dynamic content - full severity, needs AI validation
+          let severity = funcPattern.severity
+          if (isTestFile) {
+            severity = 'low'
+          }
+
+          vulnerabilities.push({
+            id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
+            filePath,
+            lineNumber: index + 1,
+            lineContent: line.trim(),
+            severity,
+            category: 'dangerous_function',
+            title: funcPattern.name,
+            description: funcPattern.description + ' This appears to use dynamic content which increases XSS risk.' + (isTestFile ? ' (in test file)' : ''),
+            suggestedFix: funcPattern.suggestedFix,
+            confidence: isTestFile ? 'low' : 'high',
+            layer: 2,
+            requiresAIValidation: true,  // Dynamic HTML needs validation
+          })
+          break // Only report once per line
+        }
+
+        // Note: JSON.parse is now handled by standalone detectJSONParseSafe() function
+        // which provides better source-aware severity classification
+
+        // Special handling for eval and Function constructor
+        if (funcPattern.name === 'eval() usage' || funcPattern.name === 'Function constructor') {
+          // Suppress entirely in test files - test files legitimately test eval behavior
+          if (isTestFile) {
+            break // Skip reporting entirely
+          }
+
+          // Check if eval is inside a test assertion (expect(), test(), it(), describe())
+          const testAssertionPattern = /\b(expect|test|it|describe)\s*\(/
+          if (testAssertionPattern.test(line)) {
+            break // Skip reporting - this is testing eval behavior
+          }
+
+          // Check if inputs are static literals (low risk)
+          if (hasOnlyStaticInputs(line, content, index)) {
+            vulnerabilities.push({
+              id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
+              filePath,
+              lineNumber: index + 1,
+              lineContent: line.trim(),
+              severity: 'info',
+              category: 'dangerous_function',
+              title: funcPattern.name + ' (static input)',
+              description: 'eval/Function with static string literal input. Lower risk than dynamic input, but consider refactoring to avoid eval entirely.',
+              suggestedFix: 'Consider using JSON.parse() for JSON data or refactoring to avoid eval.',
+              confidence: 'low',
+              layer: 2,
+            })
+            break
+          }
+
+          vulnerabilities.push({
+            id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
+            filePath,
+            lineNumber: index + 1,
+            lineContent: line.trim(),
+            severity: funcPattern.severity,
+            category: 'dangerous_function',
+            title: funcPattern.name,
+            description: funcPattern.description,
+            suggestedFix: funcPattern.suggestedFix,
+            confidence: 'high',
+            layer: 2,
+            requiresAIValidation: true,  // Code execution patterns need validation
+          })
+          break
+        }
+
+        // Special handling for child_process exec - verify it's not RegExp.exec
+        if (funcPattern.name === 'child_process exec') {
+          // First check if this is actually from child_process (not RegExp.exec)
+          const isExecMatch = /\bexec\s*\(/.test(line)
+          const isOtherMatch = /\b(execSync|spawn|spawnSync|execFile)\s*\(/.test(line)
+          
+          if (isExecMatch && !isOtherMatch) {
+            // This matched 'exec(' - verify it's from child_process
+            if (!isChildProcessExec(content, line)) {
+              // This is RegExp.exec or similar - skip
+              break
+            }
+          } else if (isOtherMatch) {
+            // This matched spawn/execSync/etc - verify child_process import
+            if (!isChildProcessSpawn(content, line)) {
+              // No child_process import - skip
+              break
+            }
+          }
+
+          if (hasOnlyStaticInputs(line, content, index)) {
+            vulnerabilities.push({
+              id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
+              filePath,
+              lineNumber: index + 1,
+              lineContent: line.trim(),
+              severity: 'info',
+              category: 'dangerous_function',
+              title: funcPattern.name + ' (static command)',
+              description: 'exec/execSync with hardcoded command. Lower risk than dynamic commands, but ensure command does not change based on user input.',
+              suggestedFix: 'If command is truly static, this is generally acceptable. For dynamic commands, validate and sanitize inputs.',
+              confidence: 'low',
+              layer: 2,
+            })
+            break
+          }
+        }
+        
+        // Special handling for SQL patterns - check for whitelist validation
+        if (funcPattern.name === 'Raw SQL query construction' || funcPattern.name === 'SQL template literal') {
+          if (hasSQLWhitelistValidation(content, index)) {
+            vulnerabilities.push({
+              id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
+              filePath,
+              lineNumber: index + 1,
+              lineContent: line.trim(),
+              severity: 'info',
+              category: 'dangerous_function',
+              title: funcPattern.name + ' (whitelist validated)',
+              description: 'SQL query with dynamic content, but whitelist/allowlist validation detected. This is a safer pattern that limits injection risk.',
+              suggestedFix: 'Ensure the whitelist is comprehensive and cannot be bypassed. Consider using parameterized queries for additional safety.',
+              confidence: 'low',
+              layer: 2,
+            })
+            break
+          }
+        }
+
+        // Special handling for Dynamic file path - skip for utility files
+        // Utility functions designed to work with file paths are expected to take path parameters
+        if (funcPattern.name === 'Dynamic file path') {
+          // Skip for utility/lib/helper files - these are internal functions, not API handlers
+          const isUtilityFile = /\/(utils?|lib|helpers?|services?|modules?)\//i.test(filePath)
+          // Skip if function name suggests it's designed for file operations
+          const isFileOperationFunction = /\b(checksum|hash|digest|fingerprint|read|write|load|save|get|set|copy|move|delete)File/i.test(content.slice(Math.max(0, index - 200), index + 100))
+          
+          // Skip CLI command files - these take paths from command-line args (controlled inputs)
+          const isCLIFile = /\/(cli|commands?|bin)\//i.test(filePath) || 
+                           /\/src\/(index|main|cli)\.(ts|js)$/i.test(filePath)
+          
+          // Skip GitHub Action files - these process repo files (controlled environment)
+          const isGitHubAction = /github-action/i.test(filePath) || 
+                                /action\.(ts|js|yml|yaml)$/i.test(filePath)
+
+          // Check for schema validation patterns in the surrounding context
+          // Zod, Yup, Joi, or regex validation on the input
+          const contextWindow = content.slice(Math.max(0, content.indexOf(line) - 500), content.indexOf(line) + line.length)
+          const hasSchemaValidation = /z\.(string|object)\s*\(\s*\)\.regex\s*\(/i.test(contextWindow) ||
+            /z\.enum\s*\(/i.test(contextWindow) ||
+            /\.regex\s*\(\s*\/.*\/\s*\)/i.test(contextWindow) ||  // .regex(/.../)
+            /\.match\s*\(\s*\/.*\/\s*\)/i.test(contextWindow) ||   // .match(/.../)
+            /\.(schema|validate)\s*\(/i.test(contextWindow) ||
+            /joi\./i.test(contextWindow) ||
+            /yup\./i.test(contextWindow)
+
+          // Check for path sanitization patterns
+          const hasPathSanitization = hasPathTraversalProtection(contextWindow, line)
+
+          if (isUtilityFile || isFileOperationFunction || isTestFile || isCLIFile || isGitHubAction || hasSchemaValidation || hasPathSanitization) {
+            // Skip entirely for utility functions or when schema validation is present
+            break
+          }
+        }
+
+        // Special handling for Path traversal risk - check for sanitization
+        if (funcPattern.name === 'Path traversal risk') {
+          const contextWindow = content.slice(Math.max(0, content.indexOf(line) - 500), content.indexOf(line) + line.length + 200)
+          
+          // Check for path sanitization patterns
+          if (hasPathTraversalProtection(contextWindow, line)) {
+            vulnerabilities.push({
+              id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
+              filePath,
+              lineNumber: index + 1,
+              lineContent: line.trim(),
+              severity: 'info',
+              category: 'dangerous_function',
+              title: funcPattern.name + ' (sanitized)',
+              description: 'User input in file path, but path traversal protection detected. Verify sanitization is comprehensive.',
+              suggestedFix: 'Ensure path.resolve() result is checked against base directory and ".." sequences are rejected.',
+              confidence: 'low',
+              layer: 2,
+            })
+            break
+          }
+        }
+
+        // Special handling for Math.random() - skip cosmetic/UI uses
+        if (funcPattern.name === 'Math.random for security') {
+          // Check if this is cosmetic use (CSS, animations, UI variations)
+          if (isCosmeticMathRandom(line, content, index)) {
+            // Skip entirely - this is not a security concern
+            break
+          }
+        }
+
+        // Standard handling for all other patterns
+        let severity = funcPattern.severity
+        let confidence: 'high' | 'medium' | 'low' = 'high'
+
+        if (isTestFile) {
+          if (severity === 'critical') {
+            severity = 'medium'
+          } else if (severity === 'high') {
+            severity = 'low'
+          } else {
+            severity = 'info'
+          }
+          confidence = 'low'
+        }
+
+        vulnerabilities.push({
+          id: `dangerous-func-${filePath}-${index + 1}-${funcPattern.name}`,
+          filePath,
+          lineNumber: index + 1,
+          lineContent: line.trim(),
+          severity,
+          category: 'dangerous_function',
+          title: funcPattern.name,
+          description: funcPattern.description + (isTestFile ? ' (in test file)' : ''),
+          suggestedFix: funcPattern.suggestedFix,
+          confidence,
+          layer: 2,
+        })
+        break // Only report once per line
+      }
+    }
+  })
+
+  // Additional standalone checks (not in DANGEROUS_FUNCTIONS array)
+  
+  // JSON.parse source-aware detection
+  detectJSONParseSafe(content, filePath, isTestFile, vulnerabilities)
+  
+  // request.json() / req.json() schema validation suggestion
+  detectRequestJsonValidation(content, filePath, isTestFile, vulnerabilities)
+
+  return vulnerabilities
+}
+
+/**
+ * Detect JSON.parse usage with source-aware severity
+ * Much smarter than simple pattern matching - considers try/catch and data source
+ */
+function detectJSONParseSafe(
+  content: string,
+  filePath: string,
+  isTestFile: boolean,
+  vulnerabilities: Vulnerability[]
+): void {
+  const lines = content.split('\n')
+  const jsonParsePattern = /JSON\.parse\s*\(/gi
+
+  // Track instances per file to aggregate noisy patterns
+  const instances: { lineNumber: number; lineContent: string; source: JSONParseSource }[] = []
+
+  lines.forEach((line, index) => {
+    if (isComment(line)) return
+
+    jsonParsePattern.lastIndex = 0
+    if (!jsonParsePattern.test(line)) return
+
+    const jsonSource = classifyJSONParseSource(line, filePath)
+
+    // Skip migration files entirely - they're internal tooling
+    if (jsonSource === 'migration') return
+
+    // Skip test fixtures entirely - they're intentionally parsing test data
+    if (jsonSource === 'test_fixture') return
+
+    // Skip trusted SDK responses - these are well-defined and safe to parse
+    if (isTrustedSDKResponse(line, content)) return
+
+    // Check if JSON.parse is inside a try-catch block
+    const insideTryCatch = isInsideTryCatch(content, index) || hasTryCatchNearby(content, index)
+
+    // Check if schema validation is applied after JSON.parse
+    const hasSchemaValidation = hasSchemaValidationNearby(content, index)
+
+    // If inside try-catch with safe source, suppress entirely - this is perfectly fine
+    if (insideTryCatch && ['local_storage', 'database', 'config', 'internal', 'ui_state'].includes(jsonSource)) {
+      return
+    }
+
+    // If schema validation is present, this is properly handled
+    if (hasSchemaValidation) {
+      return
+    }
+
+    // UI state (settings, providers, modals) - very low risk, aggregate or skip
+    if (jsonSource === 'ui_state') {
+      // Only track for aggregation, don't report individually
+      instances.push({ lineNumber: index + 1, lineContent: line.trim(), source: jsonSource })
+      return
+    }
+
+    // Determine severity based on source and error handling
+    let severity: VulnerabilitySeverity
+    let description: string
+    let suggestedFix: string
+    let confidence: 'high' | 'medium' | 'low' = 'medium'
+
+    if (insideTryCatch) {
+      // Already has error handling
+      switch (jsonSource) {
+        case 'user_input':
+          severity = 'low'
+          description = 'JSON.parse on user input is wrapped in try-catch. Consider adding schema validation (zod/yup) to validate the parsed structure.'
+          suggestedFix = 'Add schema validation after parsing: const validated = schema.parse(JSON.parse(input))'
+          confidence = 'low'
+          break
+        default:
+          // With try-catch and non-user source, this is fine - don't report
+          return
+      }
+    } else {
+      // No try-catch
+      switch (jsonSource) {
+        case 'user_input':
+          severity = 'medium'
+          description = 'JSON.parse on user input without schema validation. Malformed input will crash; malicious input may have unexpected shape.'
+          suggestedFix = 'Use a schema validation library (zod, yup, joi): try { const data = schema.parse(JSON.parse(body)) } catch (e) { return 400 }'
+          confidence = 'high'
+          break
+        case 'local_storage':
+          severity = 'info'
+          description = 'JSON.parse on localStorage data. Consider adding try-catch for robustness against corrupted data.'
+          suggestedFix = 'Wrap in try-catch to handle corrupted localStorage gracefully.'
+          confidence = 'low'
+          break
+        case 'database':
+          // Database content parsing is very common and low-risk
+          instances.push({ lineNumber: index + 1, lineContent: line.trim(), source: jsonSource })
+          return // Will be aggregated below
+        case 'config':
+        case 'internal':
+          severity = 'info'
+          description = `JSON.parse on ${jsonSource.replace('_', ' ')} data without error handling. Low risk but consider defensive coding.`
+          suggestedFix = 'Consider adding try-catch for robustness.'
+          confidence = 'low'
+          break
+        default:
+          // Unknown source - track for potential aggregation
+          instances.push({ lineNumber: index + 1, lineContent: line.trim(), source: jsonSource })
+          return // Will be evaluated below based on aggregation
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Downgrade test files
+    if (isTestFile) {
+      severity = 'info'
+      confidence = 'low'
+      description += ' (in test file)'
+    }
+
+    vulnerabilities.push({
+      id: `json-parse-${filePath}-${index + 1}`,
+      filePath,
+      lineNumber: index + 1,
+      lineContent: line.trim(),
+      severity,
+      category: 'dangerous_function',
+      title: 'JSON.parse usage',
+      description,
+      suggestedFix,
+      confidence,
+      layer: 2,
+    })
+  })
+
+  // Aggregate low-risk JSON.parse instances if there are many
+  if (instances.length >= 3) {
+    // Create single aggregated finding instead of N individual findings
+    const lineNumbers = instances.map(i => i.lineNumber).slice(0, 5)
+    const moreText = instances.length > 5 ? `... (${instances.length} total)` : ''
+
+    vulnerabilities.push({
+      id: `json-parse-aggregated-${filePath}`,
+      filePath,
+      lineNumber: instances[0].lineNumber,
+      lineContent: `${instances.length} instances across this file`,
+      severity: 'info',
+      category: 'dangerous_function',
+      title: `JSON.parse usage (${instances.length} instances)`,
+      description: `JSON.parse detected. Consider adding error handling and schema validation if parsing user input.${isTestFile ? ' (in test file)' : ''}\n\nFound ${instances.length} occurrences at lines: ${lineNumbers.join(', ')}${moreText}`,
+      suggestedFix: 'Add try-catch for error handling. If parsing user input, add schema validation.',
+      confidence: 'low',
+      layer: 2,
+    })
+  } else if (instances.length > 0 && instances.length < 3) {
+    // Report individually for small counts
+    for (const instance of instances) {
+      vulnerabilities.push({
+        id: `json-parse-${filePath}-${instance.lineNumber}`,
+        filePath,
+        lineNumber: instance.lineNumber,
+        lineContent: instance.lineContent,
+        severity: 'info',
+        category: 'dangerous_function',
+        title: 'JSON.parse usage',
+        description: `JSON.parse on ${instance.source.replace('_', ' ')} data without error handling. Low risk but consider defensive coding.${isTestFile ? ' (in test file)' : ''}`,
+        suggestedFix: 'Consider adding try-catch for robustness.',
+        confidence: 'low',
+        layer: 2,
+      })
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if this file appears to have form/input validation elsewhere
+ * (manual checks on body fields, type guards, etc.)
+ */
+function hasManualValidation(content: string): boolean {
+  const manualValidationPatterns = [
+    // Type checking / type guards
+    /typeof\s+\w+\s*[!=]==?\s*['"](?:string|number|boolean|object)['"]|Array\.isArray\s*\(/i,
+    // Field existence checks followed by throws/returns
+    /if\s*\(\s*!(?:body|data|input)\.\w+\s*\)\s*\{?\s*(throw|return)/i,
+    // Property access with type assertion comments or inline validation
+    /\b(body|data|input)\s*as\s+\w+/i,  // Type assertion
+    // Manual validation with error handling
+    /if\s*\(\s*![\w.]+\s*\|\|\s*typeof\s+[\w.]+/i,
+    // Using type predicates
+    /is\w+\s*\([\w.]+\)/i,  // isFoo(bar) pattern
+  ]
+
+  return manualValidationPatterns.some(p => p.test(content))
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if route has throwing auth helper (getCurrentUserId, requireAuth, etc.)
+ * Routes with throwing auth helpers are already protected
+ */
+function hasThrowingAuthHelper(content: string): boolean {
+  const throwingAuthPatterns = [
+    /\bgetCurrentUserId\s*\(/i,
+    /\brequireAuth\s*\(/i,
+    /\bensureAuth\s*\(/i,
+    /\bauth\s*\(\s*\)\s*\.protect\s*\(/i,  // Clerk: auth().protect()
+    /\bcurrentUser\s*\(\s*\)/i,  // Clerk: currentUser()
+    /\bgetServerSession\s*\([^)]*\)/i,  // NextAuth
+    /\bauth\s*\(\s*\)/i,  // Generic auth() call
+    /\bcheckAuth\s*\(/i,
+    /\bverifyAuth\s*\(/i,
+    /\bvalidateAuth\s*\(/i,
+    /\bassertAuth\s*\(/i,
+    /\bgetAuth\s*\(/i,
+    /\brequireUser\s*\(/i,
+    /\bgetUser\s*\(\s*\)/i,  // supabase.auth.getUser()
+    /const\s+\{\s*user\s*\}\s*=\s*await/i,  // Destructuring pattern
+  ]
+  return throwingAuthPatterns.some(p => p.test(content))
+}
+
+/**
+ * Detect request.json() / req.json() and suggest schema validation
+ * This is NOT a dangerous function - it's a prompt for best practices
+ */
+function detectRequestJsonValidation(
+  content: string,
+  filePath: string,
+  isTestFile: boolean,
+  vulnerabilities: Vulnerability[]
+): void {
+  // Only check API route files
+  if (!/\/(api|routes?|handlers?|controllers?)\//i.test(filePath) &&
+      !/route\.(ts|js)$/i.test(filePath)) {
+    return
+  }
+
+  // Skip if route has throwing auth helper - these are already protected routes
+  // and the schema validation suggestion is lower priority
+  if (hasThrowingAuthHelper(content)) {
+    return
+  }
+
+  const lines = content.split('\n')
+  // Matches: request.json(), req.json(), await request.json(), etc.
+  const requestJsonPattern = /\b(request|req)\.json\s*\(\s*\)/gi
+
+  // Check if file has schema validation (library-based)
+  const hasSchemaLibrary = /\b(zod|yup|joi|ajv|superstruct|valibot|typebox)\b/i.test(content) ||
+                           /\.parse\s*\(|\.validate\s*\(|\.safeParse\s*\(/i.test(content)
+
+  // If file has schema library validation, don't report
+  if (hasSchemaLibrary) return
+
+  // Check for manual validation patterns (less robust but still indicates intent)
+  const hasManualCheck = hasManualValidation(content)
+
+  // Track instances for potential aggregation
+  const instances: { lineNumber: number; lineContent: string }[] = []
+
+  lines.forEach((line, index) => {
+    if (isComment(line)) return
+
+    requestJsonPattern.lastIndex = 0
+    if (!requestJsonPattern.test(line)) return
+
+    // Check if there's validation nearby (within 10 lines after)
+    const startCheck = index
+    const endCheck = Math.min(lines.length, index + 10)
+    const nearbyContent = lines.slice(startCheck, endCheck).join('\n')
+
+    // If there's validation in the nearby lines, skip
+    if (/\.parse\s*\(|\.validate\s*\(|\.safeParse\s*\(|schema\./i.test(nearbyContent)) {
+      return
+    }
+
+    // If manual validation is present, skip individual reporting but track for aggregate
+    if (hasManualCheck) {
+      instances.push({ lineNumber: index + 1, lineContent: line.trim() })
+      return
+    }
+
+    if (isTestFile) {
+      return // Don't report in test files
+    }
+
+    instances.push({ lineNumber: index + 1, lineContent: line.trim() })
+  })
+
+  // Don't report if no instances found
+  if (instances.length === 0) return
+
+  // If manual validation exists, create a single info-level note
+  if (hasManualCheck && instances.length > 0) {
+    vulnerabilities.push({
+      id: `request-json-manual-${filePath}`,
+      filePath,
+      lineNumber: instances[0].lineNumber,
+      lineContent: instances[0].lineContent,
+      severity: 'info',
+      category: 'dangerous_function',
+      title: 'Request body with manual validation',
+      description: `API endpoint parses request body with manual validation patterns detected. Consider using a schema library (zod, yup) for more robust type-safe validation.`,
+      suggestedFix: 'While manual validation works, schema libraries provide better TypeScript integration and error messages.',
+      confidence: 'low',
+      layer: 2,
+    })
+    return
+  }
+
+  // Aggregate if multiple instances without validation
+  if (instances.length >= 2) {
+    const lineNumbers = instances.map(i => i.lineNumber).slice(0, 5)
+    vulnerabilities.push({
+      id: `request-json-aggregated-${filePath}`,
+      filePath,
+      lineNumber: instances[0].lineNumber,
+      lineContent: `${instances.length} instances`,
+      severity: 'info',
+      category: 'dangerous_function',
+      title: `Request body without schema validation (${instances.length} instances)`,
+      description: `API endpoint parses request body without visible schema validation at lines: ${lineNumbers.join(', ')}. Consider validating the shape of incoming data.`,
+      suggestedFix: 'Add schema validation (e.g., zod): const body = await request.json(); const data = schema.parse(body);',
+      confidence: 'low',
+      layer: 2,
+    })
+  } else {
+    // Single instance
+    vulnerabilities.push({
+      id: `request-json-${filePath}-${instances[0].lineNumber}`,
+      filePath,
+      lineNumber: instances[0].lineNumber,
+      lineContent: instances[0].lineContent,
+      severity: 'info',
+      category: 'dangerous_function',
+      title: 'Request body without schema validation',
+      description: 'API endpoint parses request body without visible schema validation. Consider validating the shape of incoming data.',
+      suggestedFix: 'Add schema validation (e.g., zod): const body = await request.json(); const data = schema.parse(body);',
+      confidence: 'low',
+      layer: 2,
+    })
+  }
+}