@objectstack/plugin-auth 11.0.0 → 11.2.0

package/dist/index.mjs

@@ -522,7 +522,13 @@ var AUTH_SSO_PROVIDER_SCHEMA = {
     oidcConfig: "oidc_config",
     samlConfig: "saml_config",
     userId: "user_id",
-    organizationId: "organization_id"
+    organizationId: "organization_id",
+    // DNS domain-ownership proof (ADR-0024 ②). @better-auth/sso writes
+    // `domainVerified` on its `ssoProvider` model when domain verification is
+    // enabled; map it so the env can surface a verified/unverified badge. The
+    // one-time `domainVerificationToken` is NOT a provider column — it lives in
+    // the verification table and is returned only from request-domain-verification.
+    domainVerified: "domain_verified"
   }
 };
 var AUTH_SCIM_PROVIDER_SCHEMA = {
@@ -601,9 +607,36 @@ function readDisableSignUpEnv() {
 function readSsoOnlyEnv() {
   return readBooleanEnv("OS_AUTH_SSO_ONLY");
 }
+function ipv4ToInt(ip) {
+  const m = /^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/.exec(ip.trim());
+  if (!m) return null;
+  const p = [Number(m[1]), Number(m[2]), Number(m[3]), Number(m[4])];
+  if (p.some((n) => n > 255)) return null;
+  return (p[0] << 24 >>> 0) + (p[1] << 16) + (p[2] << 8) + p[3] >>> 0;
+}
+function ipMatchesRange(ip, range) {
+  const r = (range || "").trim();
+  if (!r) return false;
+  if (r.includes("/")) {
+    const [base, bitsStr] = r.split("/");
+    const bits = Number(bitsStr);
+    const ipInt = ipv4ToInt(ip);
+    const baseInt = ipv4ToInt(base);
+    if (ipInt === null || baseInt === null || !(bits >= 0 && bits <= 32)) {
+      return ip.trim() === base.trim();
+    }
+    const mask = bits === 0 ? 0 : ~0 << 32 - bits >>> 0;
+    return (ipInt & mask) >>> 0 === (baseInt & mask) >>> 0;
+  }
+  return ip.trim() === r;
+}
 var AuthManager = class {
   constructor(config) {
     this.auth = null;
+    // ADR-0069 — cached "does any org require MFA" flag (per-org tightening).
+    // Refreshed lazily with a TTL so isAuthGateActive() stays synchronous + cheap.
+    this._orgMfaCache = { value: false, at: 0 };
+    this._orgMfaRefreshing = false;
     this.config = config;
     installWebContainerRequestStatePolyfill();
     if (config.authInstance) {
@@ -808,6 +841,7 @@ var AuthManager = class {
             if (candidate && (ctx?.path === "/reset-password" || ctx?.path === "/change-password")) {
               const userId = await this.resolvePasswordChangeUserId(ctx).catch(() => void 0);
               if (userId) {
+                ctx.context.__osPwChangeUserId = userId;
                 const pw = ctx?.context?.password;
                 const verify = typeof pw?.verify === "function" ? pw.verify.bind(pw) : void 0;
                 const oldHash = await this.assertPasswordNotReused(userId, candidate, verify);
@@ -947,25 +981,43 @@ var AuthManager = class {
                 succeeded = !(ctx?.context?.returned instanceof Error);
               }
               await this.recordSignInOutcome(email, succeeded);
+              if (succeeded) {
+                const uid = ctx?.context?.returned?.user?.id;
+                if (typeof uid === "string") await this.enforceConcurrentCap(uid);
+              }
             }
             return;
           }
           if (ctx?.path === "/change-password" || ctx?.path === "/reset-password") {
-            const stash = ctx?.context?.__osPwHistory;
-            if (stash?.userId) {
-              let succeeded = true;
-              try {
-                const { isAPIError } = await import("better-auth/api");
-                succeeded = !isAPIError(ctx?.context?.returned);
-              } catch {
-                succeeded = !(ctx?.context?.returned instanceof Error);
-              }
-              if (succeeded) await this.recordPasswordHistory(stash.userId, stash.oldHash);
-              delete ctx.context.__osPwHistory;
+            let succeeded;
+            try {
+              const { isAPIError } = await import("better-auth/api");
+              succeeded = !isAPIError(ctx?.context?.returned);
+            } catch {
+              succeeded = !(ctx?.context?.returned instanceof Error);
             }
+            if (succeeded) {
+              const stampId = ctx?.context?.__osPwChangeUserId;
+              if (stampId) await this.stampPasswordChangedAt(stampId);
+              const stash = ctx?.context?.__osPwHistory;
+              if (stash?.userId) await this.recordPasswordHistory(stash.userId, stash.oldHash);
+            }
+            delete ctx.context.__osPwChangeUserId;
+            delete ctx.context.__osPwHistory;
             return;
           }
           if (ctx?.path !== "/sign-up/email") return;
+          {
+            const newUserId = ctx?.context?.returned?.user?.id;
+            let signupOk;
+            try {
+              const { isAPIError } = await import("better-auth/api");
+              signupOk = !isAPIError(ctx?.context?.returned);
+            } catch {
+              signupOk = !(ctx?.context?.returned instanceof Error);
+            }
+            if (signupOk && typeof newUserId === "string") await this.stampPasswordChangedAt(newUserId);
+          }
           const ep = ctx?.context?.options?.emailAndPassword;
           if (ep && ctx.context.__osDisableSignUpOrig !== void 0) {
             ep.disableSignUp = ctx.context.__osDisableSignUpOrig;
@@ -977,7 +1029,7 @@ var AuthManager = class {
       // Auto-includes origins from OS_CORS_ORIGIN env var so CORS and CSRF stay in sync.
       ...(() => {
         const origins = [...this.config.trustedOrigins || []];
-        const corsOrigin = readEnvWithDeprecation("OS_CORS_ORIGIN", "CORS_ORIGIN");
+        const corsOrigin = readEnvWithDeprecation("OS_CORS_ORIGIN", "CORS_ORIGIN", { silent: true });
         if (corsOrigin && corsOrigin !== "*") {
           corsOrigin.split(",").map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean).forEach((o) => {
             if (!origins.includes(o)) origins.push(o);
@@ -1077,12 +1129,10 @@ var AuthManager = class {
   async buildPluginList() {
     const pluginConfig = this.config.plugins ?? {};
     const plugins = [];
-    const oidcEnv = globalThis?.process?.env?.OS_OIDC_PROVIDER_ENABLED;
-    const oidcFromEnv = oidcEnv != null ? String(oidcEnv).toLowerCase() === "true" : void 0;
-    const ssoEnv = globalThis?.process?.env?.OS_SSO_ENABLED;
-    const ssoFromEnv = ssoEnv != null ? String(ssoEnv).toLowerCase() === "true" : void 0;
-    const scimEnv = globalThis?.process?.env?.OS_SCIM_ENABLED;
-    const scimFromEnv = scimEnv != null ? String(scimEnv).toLowerCase() === "true" : void 0;
+    const oidcFromEnv = readBooleanEnv("OS_OIDC_PROVIDER_ENABLED");
+    const ssoFromEnv = readBooleanEnv("OS_SSO_ENABLED");
+    const scimFromEnv = readBooleanEnv("OS_SCIM_ENABLED");
+    const ssoDomainVerifyFromEnv = readBooleanEnv("OS_SSO_DOMAIN_VERIFICATION");
     const scimEffective = scimFromEnv ?? pluginConfig.scim ?? false;
     const twoFactorFromEnv = readBooleanEnv("OS_AUTH_TWO_FACTOR");
     const hibpFromEnv = readBooleanEnv("OS_AUTH_PASSWORD_REJECT_BREACHED");
@@ -1096,6 +1146,7 @@ var AuthManager = class {
       deviceAuthorization: pluginConfig.deviceAuthorization ?? false,
       admin: pluginConfig.admin ?? scimEffective,
       sso: ssoFromEnv ?? pluginConfig.sso ?? false,
+      ssoDomainVerification: ssoDomainVerifyFromEnv ?? pluginConfig.ssoDomainVerification ?? false,
       scim: scimEffective
     };
     const { bearer } = await import("better-auth/plugins/bearer");
@@ -1179,9 +1230,8 @@ var AuthManager = class {
           // The plugin itself is always installed (so list/update/invite endpoints
           // keep responding); only the `create` operation is denied when the
           // deployment is provisioned in single-org mode. Resolution order:
-          // 1. explicit `OS_MULTI_ORG_ENABLED` (wins for backwards compat),
-          // 2. else `OS_MULTI_TENANT` (multi-tenant deployments are always
-          //    multi-org), default `'false'` → single-org / per-env runtime.
+          // `OS_MULTI_ORG_ENABLED` (default `'false'` → single-org /
+          // per-env runtime).
           beforeCreateOrganization: async () => {
             if (!resolveMultiOrgEnabled()) {
               const { APIError } = await import("better-auth/api");
@@ -1362,7 +1412,8 @@ var AuthManager = class {
     if (enabled.sso) {
       const { sso } = await import("@better-auth/sso");
       plugins.push(sso({
-        organizationProvisioning: { defaultRole: "member" }
+        organizationProvisioning: { defaultRole: "member" },
+        ...enabled.ssoDomainVerification ? { domainVerification: { enabled: true } } : {}
       }));
     }
     if (enabled.scim) {
@@ -1434,7 +1485,16 @@ var AuthManager = class {
           ...orgRoles,
           ...platformAdmin ? [BUILTIN_ROLE_PLATFORM_ADMIN] : []
         ]));
-        return { user: { ...user, roles, isPlatformAdmin: platformAdmin }, session };
+        await this.enforceSessionControls(session?.id, session?.createdAt);
+        const authGate = await this.computeAuthGate(
+          user.id,
+          session?.activeOrganizationId,
+          user?.twoFactorEnabled === true
+        );
+        return {
+          user: { ...user, roles, isPlatformAdmin: platformAdmin, ...authGate ? { authGate } : {} },
+          session
+        };
       }));
     }
     return plugins;
@@ -1464,7 +1524,7 @@ var AuthManager = class {
    * Generate a secure secret if not provided
    */
   generateSecret() {
-    const envSecret = readEnvWithDeprecation("OS_AUTH_SECRET", ["AUTH_SECRET", "BETTER_AUTH_SECRET"]);
+    const envSecret = readEnvWithDeprecation("OS_AUTH_SECRET", ["AUTH_SECRET", "BETTER_AUTH_SECRET"], { silent: true });
     if (envSecret) return envSecret;
     if (process.env.NODE_ENV === "production") {
       throw new Error(
@@ -1739,12 +1799,28 @@ var AuthManager = class {
    * in `buildPlugins()` (`ssoFromEnv ?? pluginConfig.sso ?? false`) so the
    * advertised capability can never disagree with the actual `/sign-in/sso`
    * route. `OS_SSO_ENABLED` (when set) wins over the config-file setting.
+   * Public so `AuthPlugin` can gate the Setup-nav "SSO Providers" entry on it
+   * (captures both self-host `OS_SSO_ENABLED` and the cloud per-env
+   * `planAllowsSso` config, since that arrives via `plugins.sso`).
    */
   isSsoWired() {
-    const ssoEnv = globalThis?.process?.env?.OS_SSO_ENABLED;
-    const ssoFromEnv = ssoEnv != null ? String(ssoEnv).toLowerCase() === "true" : void 0;
+    const ssoFromEnv = readBooleanEnv("OS_SSO_ENABLED");
     return ssoFromEnv ?? this.config.plugins?.sso ?? false;
   }
+  /**
+   * Whether opt-in DNS domain-verification (ADR-0024 ②) is wired — i.e. the
+   * `/sso/request-domain-verification` + `/sso/verify-domain` endpoints are
+   * mounted (and the hard "domain must be verified to log in" gate is active).
+   * Resolved with the EXACT logic `buildPluginList` uses for the `sso()`
+   * `domainVerification.enabled` option, so the bridge can return a clear
+   * "not enabled for this environment" instead of a bare 404 when off.
+   * Implies `isSsoWired()` (the sso plugin must be loaded to honor it).
+   */
+  isSsoDomainVerificationEnabled() {
+    if (!this.isSsoWired()) return false;
+    const fromEnv = readBooleanEnv("OS_SSO_DOMAIN_VERIFICATION");
+    return fromEnv ?? this.config.plugins?.ssoDomainVerification ?? false;
+  }
   /**
    * Whether enterprise SSO is actually *usable*, not merely wired: the plugin
    * is on AND at least one `sys_sso_provider` row exists. Per-email domain→IdP
@@ -2004,6 +2080,119 @@ var AuthManager = class {
       });
     }
   }
+  /**
+   * ADR-0069 — is any authentication-policy gate enabled? Cheap, synchronous;
+   * lets the transport seams skip session lookups entirely when off (the
+   * default), keeping the gate zero-overhead until an admin opts in.
+   */
+  isAuthGateActive() {
+    this.refreshOrgMfaCacheIfStale();
+    return Math.floor(Number(this.config.passwordExpiryDays) || 0) > 0 || this.config.mfaRequired === true || this._orgMfaCache.value;
+  }
+  /**
+   * ADR-0069 — refresh the "any org requires MFA" cache in the background when
+   * stale (60s TTL). Fire-and-forget: a brand-new per-org requirement activates
+   * the gate on the next request, never blocking this one. No-op when global MFA
+   * is already on (the gate is active regardless).
+   */
+  refreshOrgMfaCacheIfStale() {
+    if (this.config.mfaRequired === true) return;
+    if (this._orgMfaRefreshing) return;
+    if (Date.now() - this._orgMfaCache.at < 6e4) return;
+    const engine = this.getDataEngine();
+    if (!engine) return;
+    this._orgMfaRefreshing = true;
+    void (async () => {
+      try {
+        const SYSTEM_CTX = { isSystem: true, roles: [], permissions: [] };
+        const n = await engine.count("sys_organization", {
+          where: { require_mfa: true },
+          context: SYSTEM_CTX
+        });
+        this._orgMfaCache = { value: typeof n === "number" && n > 0, at: Date.now() };
+      } catch {
+      } finally {
+        this._orgMfaRefreshing = false;
+      }
+    })();
+  }
+  /**
+   * ADR-0069 — compute the auth-policy gate posture for a session. Returns an
+   * `{ code, message }` when the user is currently blocked (e.g. password
+   * expired), else undefined. No-op (and no DB read) when no gate feature is
+   * enabled. Fails OPEN on any lookup error — a transient hiccup must never lock
+   * a compliant user out.
+   */
+  async computeAuthGate(userId, _activeOrgId, _twoFactorEnabledHint) {
+    const expiryDays = Math.floor(Number(this.config.passwordExpiryDays) || 0);
+    const mfaGlobal = this.config.mfaRequired === true;
+    const orgMaybeRequires = !mfaGlobal && !!_activeOrgId && this._orgMfaCache.value;
+    if (expiryDays <= 0 && !mfaGlobal && !orgMaybeRequires) return void 0;
+    const engine = this.getDataEngine();
+    if (!engine || !userId) return void 0;
+    try {
+      const SYSTEM_CTX = { isSystem: true, roles: [], permissions: [] };
+      const u = await engine.findOne("sys_user", {
+        where: { id: userId },
+        fields: ["password_changed_at", "two_factor_enabled", "mfa_required_at"],
+        context: SYSTEM_CTX
+      });
+      let mfaRequired = mfaGlobal;
+      if (!mfaRequired && orgMaybeRequires) {
+        const org = await engine.findOne("sys_organization", {
+          where: { id: _activeOrgId },
+          fields: ["require_mfa"],
+          context: SYSTEM_CTX
+        });
+        mfaRequired = org?.require_mfa === true || org?.require_mfa === 1;
+      }
+      if (expiryDays > 0) {
+        const changed = u?.password_changed_at;
+        if (changed && Date.now() - new Date(changed).getTime() > expiryDays * 864e5) {
+          return {
+            code: "PASSWORD_EXPIRED",
+            message: "Your password has expired. Please change it to continue."
+          };
+        }
+      }
+      if (mfaRequired && !(u?.two_factor_enabled === true || u?.two_factor_enabled === 1)) {
+        const graceDays = Math.max(0, Math.floor(Number(this.config.mfaGracePeriodDays ?? 7)));
+        let requiredAt = u?.mfa_required_at;
+        if (!requiredAt) {
+          requiredAt = /* @__PURE__ */ new Date();
+          engine.update("sys_user", { id: userId, mfa_required_at: requiredAt }, { context: SYSTEM_CTX }).catch(() => void 0);
+        }
+        const elapsedMs = Date.now() - new Date(requiredAt).getTime();
+        if (elapsedMs > graceDays * 864e5) {
+          return {
+            code: "MFA_REQUIRED",
+            message: "Multi-factor authentication is required. Please set up an authenticator app to continue."
+          };
+        }
+      }
+    } catch {
+      return void 0;
+    }
+    return void 0;
+  }
+  /**
+   * ADR-0069 D1 — stamp `sys_user.password_changed_at = now` after a password is
+   * set (sign-up / change / reset). Best-effort; never throws. Written as a Date
+   * (never epoch-ms) per ADR-0074.
+   */
+  async stampPasswordChangedAt(userId) {
+    const engine = this.getDataEngine();
+    if (!engine || !userId) return;
+    try {
+      const SYSTEM_CTX = { isSystem: true, roles: [], permissions: [] };
+      await engine.update(
+        "sys_user",
+        { id: userId, password_changed_at: /* @__PURE__ */ new Date() },
+        { context: SYSTEM_CTX }
+      );
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
   /**
    * ADR-0069 D1 — parse the bounded `previous_password_hashes` JSON column into
    * a string[] of hashes, tolerating null / malformed values.
@@ -2220,6 +2409,96 @@ var AuthManager = class {
     );
     return true;
   }
+  /**
+   * ADR-0069 D4 — idle / absolute session enforcement, run per request from
+   * `customSession`. No-op when both are off. Revokes (expires in place +
+   * stamps revoked_at/revoke_reason) when a limit is exceeded so better-auth
+   * returns no session on the NEXT request; otherwise touches `last_activity_at`
+   * (throttled to once a minute). Best-effort — never throws.
+   */
+  async enforceSessionControls(sessionId, createdAtHint) {
+    const idleMin = Math.floor(Number(this.config.sessionIdleTimeoutMinutes) || 0);
+    const absHrs = Math.floor(Number(this.config.sessionAbsoluteMaxHours) || 0);
+    if (idleMin <= 0 && absHrs <= 0) return;
+    const engine = this.getDataEngine();
+    if (!engine || !sessionId) return;
+    try {
+      const SYSTEM_CTX = { isSystem: true, roles: [], permissions: [] };
+      const srow = await engine.findOne("sys_session", {
+        where: { id: sessionId },
+        fields: ["id", "created_at", "last_activity_at", "revoked_at"],
+        context: SYSTEM_CTX
+      });
+      if (!srow?.id || srow.revoked_at) return;
+      const now = Date.now();
+      let reason;
+      if (absHrs > 0) {
+        const created = srow.created_at ?? createdAtHint;
+        if (created && now - new Date(created).getTime() > absHrs * 36e5) reason = "absolute_max";
+      }
+      if (!reason && idleMin > 0) {
+        const last = srow.last_activity_at ?? srow.created_at ?? createdAtHint;
+        if (last && now - new Date(last).getTime() > idleMin * 6e4) reason = "idle_timeout";
+      }
+      if (reason) {
+        await engine.update(
+          "sys_session",
+          { id: sessionId, expires_at: new Date(now - 1e3), revoked_at: new Date(now), revoke_reason: reason },
+          { context: SYSTEM_CTX }
+        ).catch(() => void 0);
+        return;
+      }
+      if (idleMin > 0) {
+        const la = srow.last_activity_at ? new Date(srow.last_activity_at).getTime() : 0;
+        if (now - la > 6e4) {
+          await engine.update("sys_session", { id: sessionId, last_activity_at: new Date(now) }, { context: SYSTEM_CTX }).catch(() => void 0);
+        }
+      }
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
+  /**
+   * ADR-0069 D4 — concurrent-session cap, run from the sign-in after-hook.
+   * Keeps the newest `maxConcurrentSessions` live sessions for the user and
+   * revokes the rest (oldest first). No-op when off. Best-effort.
+   */
+  async enforceConcurrentCap(userId) {
+    const cap = Math.floor(Number(this.config.maxConcurrentSessions) || 0);
+    if (cap <= 0 || !userId) return;
+    const engine = this.getDataEngine();
+    if (!engine) return;
+    try {
+      const SYSTEM_CTX = { isSystem: true, roles: [], permissions: [] };
+      const rows = await engine.find("sys_session", {
+        where: { user_id: userId },
+        fields: ["id", "created_at", "expires_at", "revoked_at"],
+        limit: 200,
+        context: SYSTEM_CTX
+      });
+      const now = Date.now();
+      const live = (Array.isArray(rows) ? rows : []).filter((sn) => !sn.revoked_at && (!sn.expires_at || new Date(sn.expires_at).getTime() > now)).sort((a, b) => new Date(b.created_at ?? 0).getTime() - new Date(a.created_at ?? 0).getTime());
+      for (const sn of live.slice(cap)) {
+        await engine.update(
+          "sys_session",
+          { id: sn.id, expires_at: new Date(now - 1e3), revoked_at: new Date(now), revoke_reason: "concurrent_cap" },
+          { context: SYSTEM_CTX }
+        ).catch(() => void 0);
+      }
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
+  /**
+   * ADR-0069 D5 — is `ip` within the configured allow-list? True (allow) when no
+   * ranges are configured, OR when the IP can't be determined (fail-open so a
+   * misconfigured proxy never locks everyone out — an admin enabling this must
+   * ensure forwarded headers are trusted). Supports IPv4 CIDR + exact IPv4/IPv6.
+   */
+  isClientIpAllowed(ip) {
+    const ranges = this.config.allowedIpRanges;
+    if (!ranges || ranges.length === 0) return true;
+    if (!ip) return true;
+    return ranges.some((r) => ipMatchesRange(ip, r));
+  }
   /**
    * Returns the data engine wired into this auth manager. Used by route
    * handlers (e.g. bootstrap-status) that need to query identity tables
@@ -2261,6 +2540,283 @@ function mapSetPasswordError(error) {
   return { status, body: { success: false, error: { code, message } } };
 }
 
+// src/register-sso-provider.ts
+async function resolveActiveOrganizationId(handle, registerUrl, headers) {
+  try {
+    const sessionUrl = registerUrl.replace(/\/sso\/register$/, "/get-session");
+    if (sessionUrl === registerUrl) return void 0;
+    const h = new Headers({ accept: "application/json" });
+    const cookie = headers.get("cookie");
+    if (cookie) h.set("cookie", cookie);
+    const authz = headers.get("authorization");
+    if (authz) h.set("authorization", authz);
+    const resp = await handle(new Request(sessionUrl, { method: "GET", headers: h }));
+    if (!resp.ok) return void 0;
+    const data = await resp.json().catch(() => null);
+    const org = data?.session?.activeOrganizationId ?? data?.activeOrganizationId;
+    return typeof org === "string" && org.length > 0 ? org : void 0;
+  } catch {
+    return void 0;
+  }
+}
+async function runRegisterSsoProviderFromForm(handle, request) {
+  let body;
+  try {
+    body = await request.json();
+  } catch {
+    body = {};
+  }
+  const str = (v) => typeof v === "string" ? v.trim() : "";
+  const providerId = str(body?.providerId);
+  const issuer = str(body?.issuer);
+  const domain = str(body?.domain);
+  const clientId = str(body?.clientId);
+  const clientSecret = str(body?.clientSecret);
+  const discoveryEndpoint = str(body?.discoveryEndpoint);
+  const scopesRaw = str(body?.scopes);
+  const missing = [
+    ["providerId", providerId],
+    ["issuer", issuer],
+    ["domain", domain],
+    ["clientId", clientId],
+    ["clientSecret", clientSecret]
+  ].filter(([, v]) => !v).map(([k]) => k);
+  if (missing.length) {
+    return {
+      status: 400,
+      body: { success: false, error: { code: "invalid_request", message: `Missing required field(s): ${missing.join(", ")}` } }
+    };
+  }
+  const oidcConfig = { clientId, clientSecret };
+  if (discoveryEndpoint) oidcConfig.discoveryEndpoint = discoveryEndpoint;
+  oidcConfig.scopes = scopesRaw ? scopesRaw.split(/[\s,]+/).filter(Boolean) : ["openid", "email", "profile"];
+  oidcConfig.mapping = {
+    id: str(body?.mapId) || "sub",
+    email: str(body?.mapEmail) || "email",
+    name: str(body?.mapName) || "name"
+  };
+  let innerUrl;
+  let origin;
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(request.url);
+    origin = url.origin;
+    innerUrl = `${origin}${url.pathname.replace(/\/admin\/sso\/register$/, "/sso/register")}`;
+  } catch {
+    return { status: 400, body: { success: false, error: { code: "invalid_request", message: "Bad request URL" } } };
+  }
+  const headers = new Headers({ "content-type": "application/json" });
+  const cookie = request.headers.get("cookie");
+  if (cookie) headers.set("cookie", cookie);
+  const authz = request.headers.get("authorization");
+  if (authz) headers.set("authorization", authz);
+  headers.set("origin", request.headers.get("origin") || origin);
+  const organizationId = await resolveActiveOrganizationId(handle, innerUrl, headers);
+  const innerReq = new Request(innerUrl, {
+    method: "POST",
+    headers,
+    body: JSON.stringify({ providerId, issuer, domain, oidcConfig, ...organizationId ? { organizationId } : {} })
+  });
+  const resp = await handle(innerReq);
+  let parsed = {};
+  try {
+    const t = await resp.text();
+    parsed = t ? JSON.parse(t) : {};
+  } catch {
+    parsed = {};
+  }
+  if (!resp.ok) {
+    return {
+      status: resp.status,
+      body: { success: false, error: { code: "sso_register_failed", message: parsed?.message || "SSO provider registration failed" } }
+    };
+  }
+  return { status: 200, body: { success: true, data: { providerId: parsed?.providerId ?? providerId } } };
+}
+async function runRegisterSamlProviderFromForm(handle, request) {
+  let body;
+  try {
+    body = await request.json();
+  } catch {
+    body = {};
+  }
+  const str = (v) => typeof v === "string" ? v.trim() : "";
+  const providerId = str(body?.providerId);
+  const issuer = str(body?.issuer);
+  const domain = str(body?.domain);
+  const entryPoint = str(body?.entryPoint);
+  const cert = str(body?.cert);
+  const identifierFormat = str(body?.identifierFormat);
+  const missing = [
+    ["providerId", providerId],
+    ["issuer", issuer],
+    ["domain", domain],
+    ["entryPoint", entryPoint],
+    ["cert", cert]
+  ].filter(([, v]) => !v).map(([k]) => k);
+  if (missing.length) {
+    return { status: 400, body: { success: false, error: { code: "invalid_request", message: `Missing required field(s): ${missing.join(", ")}` } } };
+  }
+  let origin;
+  let prefix;
+  let innerUrl;
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(request.url);
+    origin = url.origin;
+    prefix = url.pathname.replace(/\/admin\/sso\/register-saml$/, "");
+    innerUrl = `${origin}${prefix}/sso/register`;
+  } catch {
+    return { status: 400, body: { success: false, error: { code: "invalid_request", message: "Bad request URL" } } };
+  }
+  const acsUrl = `${origin}${prefix}/sso/saml2/sp/acs/${encodeURIComponent(providerId)}`;
+  const spMetadataUrl = `${origin}${prefix}/sso/saml2/sp/metadata?providerId=${encodeURIComponent(providerId)}`;
+  const samlConfig = {
+    entryPoint,
+    cert,
+    callbackUrl: acsUrl,
+    // better-auth requires an SP descriptor (its inner fields are optional). Use
+    // the SP metadata URL as our EntityID — the value the IdP keys this SP on.
+    spMetadata: { entityID: spMetadataUrl }
+  };
+  if (identifierFormat) samlConfig.identifierFormat = identifierFormat;
+  const headers = new Headers({ "content-type": "application/json" });
+  const cookie = request.headers.get("cookie");
+  if (cookie) headers.set("cookie", cookie);
+  const authz = request.headers.get("authorization");
+  if (authz) headers.set("authorization", authz);
+  headers.set("origin", request.headers.get("origin") || origin);
+  const organizationId = await resolveActiveOrganizationId(handle, innerUrl, headers);
+  const innerReq = new Request(innerUrl, {
+    method: "POST",
+    headers,
+    body: JSON.stringify({ providerId, issuer, domain, samlConfig, ...organizationId ? { organizationId } : {} })
+  });
+  const resp = await handle(innerReq);
+  let parsed = {};
+  try {
+    const t = await resp.text();
+    parsed = t ? JSON.parse(t) : {};
+  } catch {
+    parsed = {};
+  }
+  if (!resp.ok) {
+    return { status: resp.status, body: { success: false, error: { code: "saml_register_failed", message: parsed?.message || "SAML provider registration failed" } } };
+  }
+  return { status: 200, body: { success: true, data: { providerId: parsed?.providerId ?? providerId }, acsUrl, spMetadataUrl } };
+}
+var SSO_DOMAIN_TOKEN_PREFIX = "better-auth-token";
+function bareHostname(domain) {
+  let d = domain.trim();
+  if (!d) return d;
+  const schemeIdx = d.indexOf("://");
+  if (schemeIdx !== -1) {
+    try {
+      return new URL(d).hostname;
+    } catch {
+      d = d.slice(schemeIdx + 3);
+    }
+  }
+  for (const sep of ["/", ":", "?", "#"]) {
+    const i = d.indexOf(sep);
+    if (i !== -1) d = d.slice(0, i);
+  }
+  return d;
+}
+function rewriteSsoAdminUrl(request, fromSuffix, toPath) {
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(request.url);
+    return { origin: url.origin, innerUrl: `${url.origin}${url.pathname.replace(fromSuffix, toPath)}` };
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+function forwardAuthHeaders(request, origin) {
+  const headers = new Headers({ "content-type": "application/json" });
+  const cookie = request.headers.get("cookie");
+  if (cookie) headers.set("cookie", cookie);
+  const authz = request.headers.get("authorization");
+  if (authz) headers.set("authorization", authz);
+  headers.set("origin", request.headers.get("origin") || origin);
+  return headers;
+}
+async function runRequestDomainVerification(handle, request) {
+  let body;
+  try {
+    body = await request.json();
+  } catch {
+    body = {};
+  }
+  const str = (v) => typeof v === "string" ? v.trim() : "";
+  const providerId = str(body?.providerId);
+  const domain = bareHostname(str(body?.domain));
+  if (!providerId) {
+    return { status: 400, body: { success: false, error: { code: "invalid_request", message: "Missing required field: providerId" } } };
+  }
+  const rw = rewriteSsoAdminUrl(request, /\/admin\/sso\/request-domain-verification$/, "/sso/request-domain-verification");
+  if (!rw) return { status: 400, body: { success: false, error: { code: "invalid_request", message: "Bad request URL" } } };
+  const headers = forwardAuthHeaders(request, rw.origin);
+  const resp = await handle(new Request(rw.innerUrl, { method: "POST", headers, body: JSON.stringify({ providerId }) }));
+  let parsed = {};
+  try {
+    const t = await resp.text();
+    parsed = t ? JSON.parse(t) : {};
+  } catch {
+    parsed = {};
+  }
+  if (!resp.ok) {
+    if (resp.status === 404 && !parsed?.code) {
+      return { status: 400, body: { success: false, error: { code: "domain_verification_disabled", message: "Domain verification is not enabled for this environment (set OS_SSO_DOMAIN_VERIFICATION)." } } };
+    }
+    return { status: resp.status, body: { success: false, error: { code: parsed?.code || "request_domain_verification_failed", message: parsed?.message || "Failed to request domain verification" } } };
+  }
+  const token = str(parsed?.domainVerificationToken);
+  const label = `_${SSO_DOMAIN_TOKEN_PREFIX}-${providerId}`;
+  const dnsRecordName = domain ? `${label}.${domain}` : label;
+  const dnsRecordValue = `${label}=${token}`;
+  return {
+    status: 200,
+    body: {
+      success: true,
+      data: { providerId, domain, token, dnsRecordType: "TXT", dnsRecordName, dnsRecordValue }
+    }
+  };
+}
+async function runVerifyDomain(handle, request) {
+  let body;
+  try {
+    body = await request.json();
+  } catch {
+    body = {};
+  }
+  const str = (v) => typeof v === "string" ? v.trim() : "";
+  const providerId = str(body?.providerId);
+  if (!providerId) {
+    return { status: 400, body: { success: false, error: { code: "invalid_request", message: "Missing required field: providerId" } } };
+  }
+  const rw = rewriteSsoAdminUrl(request, /\/admin\/sso\/verify-domain$/, "/sso/verify-domain");
+  if (!rw) return { status: 400, body: { success: false, error: { code: "invalid_request", message: "Bad request URL" } } };
+  const headers = forwardAuthHeaders(request, rw.origin);
+  const resp = await handle(new Request(rw.innerUrl, { method: "POST", headers, body: JSON.stringify({ providerId }) }));
+  let parsed = {};
+  try {
+    const t = await resp.text();
+    parsed = t ? JSON.parse(t) : {};
+  } catch {
+    parsed = {};
+  }
+  if (resp.ok) {
+    return { status: 200, body: { success: true, data: { providerId, verified: true, message: "Domain ownership verified \u2014 this provider can now sign users in." } } };
+  }
+  let message = parsed?.message || "Domain verification failed";
+  if (resp.status === 404 && !parsed?.code) {
+    message = "Domain verification is not enabled for this environment (set OS_SSO_DOMAIN_VERIFICATION).";
+  } else if (parsed?.code === "NO_PENDING_VERIFICATION") {
+    message = "No pending verification \u2014 click \u201CRequest Domain Verification\u201D first to get the DNS record.";
+  } else if (parsed?.code === "DOMAIN_VERIFICATION_FAILED") {
+    message = "DNS TXT record not found yet. Add the record shown when you requested verification, allow time for DNS to propagate, then retry.";
+  }
+  return { status: resp.status, body: { success: false, error: { code: parsed?.code || "verify_domain_failed", message } } };
+}
+
 // src/manifest.ts
 import {
   SysAccount,
@@ -2399,7 +2955,33 @@ var AuthPlugin = class {
       // source of truth.
       dashboards: [SystemOverviewDashboard],
       // ADR-0021 — datasets backing the System Overview dashboard's widgets.
-      datasets: SystemOverviewDatasets
+      datasets: SystemOverviewDatasets,
+      // ADR-0024 / cloud#551 — surface "SSO Providers" (sys_sso_provider) in the
+      // Setup app's Access Control group, but ONLY when the external-IdP RP is
+      // wired (self-host `OS_SSO_ENABLED`, or the cloud per-env `planAllowsSso`
+      // arriving via `plugins.sso`). Without the gate the entry would render an
+      // empty list + a "Register" button whose endpoint 404s when SSO is off.
+      // Owning-plugin-contributes pattern (ADR-0029 K2), mirroring plugin-security.
+      ...this.authManager.isSsoWired() ? {
+        navigationContributions: [
+          {
+            app: "setup",
+            group: "group_access_control",
+            // After Roles/Permission-Sets (100) and Sharing (200), near API Keys (300).
+            priority: 250,
+            items: [
+              {
+                id: "nav_sso_providers",
+                type: "object",
+                label: "SSO Providers",
+                objectName: "sys_sso_provider",
+                icon: "log-in",
+                requiredPermissions: ["manage_platform_settings"]
+              }
+            ]
+          }
+        ]
+      } : {}
     });
     ctx.logger.info("Auth Plugin initialized successfully");
   }
@@ -2624,6 +3206,24 @@ var AuthPlugin = class {
           const n = Math.floor(Number(values.password_history_count));
           if (Number.isFinite(n) && n >= 0) patch.passwordHistoryCount = Math.min(24, n);
         }
+        if (isExplicit("password_expiry_days")) {
+          const n = Math.floor(Number(values.password_expiry_days));
+          if (Number.isFinite(n) && n >= 0) patch.passwordExpiryDays = Math.min(3650, n);
+        }
+        if (isExplicit("mfa_required")) {
+          const on = asBoolean(values.mfa_required, false);
+          patch.mfaRequired = on;
+          if (on) {
+            patch.plugins = {
+              ...patch.plugins ?? {},
+              twoFactor: true
+            };
+          }
+        }
+        if (isExplicit("mfa_grace_period_days")) {
+          const n = Math.floor(Number(values.mfa_grace_period_days));
+          if (Number.isFinite(n) && n >= 0) patch.mfaGracePeriodDays = Math.min(90, n);
+        }
         const session = {};
         if (isExplicit("session_expiry_days")) {
           const d = asPositiveInt(values.session_expiry_days);
@@ -2636,6 +3236,26 @@ var AuthPlugin = class {
         if (Object.keys(session).length > 0) {
           patch.session = session;
         }
+        const asNonNeg = (v) => {
+          const n = Math.floor(Number(v));
+          return Number.isFinite(n) && n >= 0 ? n : void 0;
+        };
+        if (isExplicit("session_idle_timeout_minutes")) {
+          const n = asNonNeg(values.session_idle_timeout_minutes);
+          if (n !== void 0) patch.sessionIdleTimeoutMinutes = n;
+        }
+        if (isExplicit("session_absolute_max_hours")) {
+          const n = asNonNeg(values.session_absolute_max_hours);
+          if (n !== void 0) patch.sessionAbsoluteMaxHours = n;
+        }
+        if (isExplicit("max_concurrent_sessions_per_user")) {
+          const n = asNonNeg(values.max_concurrent_sessions_per_user);
+          if (n !== void 0) patch.maxConcurrentSessions = n;
+        }
+        if (isExplicit("allowed_ip_ranges")) {
+          const raw = asTrimmedString(values.allowed_ip_ranges) ?? "";
+          patch.allowedIpRanges = raw.split(/[\n,]+/).map((r) => r.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+        }
         const asNonNegativeInt = (value) => {
           const n = Math.floor(Number(value));
           return Number.isFinite(n) && n >= 0 ? n : void 0;
@@ -2784,6 +3404,21 @@ var AuthPlugin = class {
       );
     }
     const rawApp = httpServer.getRawApp();
+    if (typeof rawApp.use === "function") rawApp.use(`${basePath}/*`, async (c, next) => {
+      const mgr = this.authManager;
+      if (!mgr || typeof mgr.isClientIpAllowed !== "function") return next();
+      const path = c.req.path || "";
+      if (path.endsWith("/config") || path.endsWith("/bootstrap-status")) return next();
+      const fwd = c.req.header("x-forwarded-for");
+      const ip = typeof fwd === "string" && fwd.split(",")[0].trim() || c.req.header("cf-connecting-ip") || c.req.header("x-real-ip") || void 0;
+      if (!mgr.isClientIpAllowed(ip)) {
+        return c.json(
+          { success: false, error: { code: "IP_NOT_ALLOWED", message: "Sign-in is not allowed from your network." } },
+          403
+        );
+      }
+      return next();
+    });
     rawApp.get(`${basePath}/config`, async (c) => {
       try {
         const config = this.authManager.getPublicConfig();
@@ -2875,6 +3510,19 @@ var AuthPlugin = class {
         return c.json({ success: false, error: { code: "internal", message: err.message } }, 500);
       }
     });
+    rawApp.post(`${basePath}/admin/sso/register`, async (c) => {
+      try {
+        const { status, body } = await runRegisterSsoProviderFromForm(
+          (req) => this.authManager.handleRequest(req),
+          c.req.raw
+        );
+        return c.json(body, status);
+      } catch (error) {
+        const err = error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error));
+        ctx.logger.error("[AuthPlugin] sso/register bridge failed", err);
+        return c.json({ success: false, error: { code: "internal", message: err.message } }, 500);
+      }
+    });
     rawApp.post(`${basePath}/admin/unlock-user`, async (c) => {
       try {
         let body = {};
@@ -2908,6 +3556,45 @@ var AuthPlugin = class {
         return c.json({ success: false, error: { code: "internal", message: err.message } }, 500);
       }
     });
+    rawApp.post(`${basePath}/admin/sso/register-saml`, async (c) => {
+      try {
+        const { status, body } = await runRegisterSamlProviderFromForm(
+          (req) => this.authManager.handleRequest(req),
+          c.req.raw
+        );
+        return c.json(body, status);
+      } catch (error) {
+        const err = error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error));
+        ctx.logger.error("[AuthPlugin] sso/register-saml bridge failed", err);
+        return c.json({ success: false, error: { code: "internal", message: err.message } }, 500);
+      }
+    });
+    rawApp.post(`${basePath}/admin/sso/request-domain-verification`, async (c) => {
+      try {
+        const { status, body } = await runRequestDomainVerification(
+          (req) => this.authManager.handleRequest(req),
+          c.req.raw
+        );
+        return c.json(body, status);
+      } catch (error) {
+        const err = error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error));
+        ctx.logger.error("[AuthPlugin] sso/request-domain-verification bridge failed", err);
+        return c.json({ success: false, error: { code: "internal", message: err.message } }, 500);
+      }
+    });
+    rawApp.post(`${basePath}/admin/sso/verify-domain`, async (c) => {
+      try {
+        const { status, body } = await runVerifyDomain(
+          (req) => this.authManager.handleRequest(req),
+          c.req.raw
+        );
+        return c.json(body, status);
+      } catch (error) {
+        const err = error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error));
+        ctx.logger.error("[AuthPlugin] sso/verify-domain bridge failed", err);
+        return c.json({ success: false, error: { code: "internal", message: err.message } }, 500);
+      }
+    });
     rawApp.post(`${basePath}/sys-oauth-application/register`, async (c) => {
       try {
         let body = {};
@@ -3073,8 +3760,13 @@ export {
   buildTwoFactorPluginSchema,
   createObjectQLAdapter,
   createObjectQLAdapterFactory,
+  ipMatchesRange,
   resolveProtocolName,
+  runRegisterSamlProviderFromForm,
+  runRegisterSsoProviderFromForm,
+  runRequestDomainVerification,
   runSetInitialPassword,
+  runVerifyDomain,
   withSystemReadContext
 };
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.mjs.map