@objectstack/plugin-approvals 17.0.0-rc.6 → 17.1.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.mjs CHANGED
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ var init_en_objects_generated = __esm({
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  },
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  approval_reject: {
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  label: "Reject",
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- confirmText: "Reject this request? A rejection is final for every approver.",
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+ description: "Reject this request? A rejection is final for every approver.",
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  successMessage: "Rejected.",
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  params: {
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  comment: {
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ var init_en_objects_generated = __esm({
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  },
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  approval_recall: {
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  label: "Recall",
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- confirmText: "Recall this request? Approvers can no longer act on it and the record is unlocked.",
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+ description: "Recall this request? Approvers can no longer act on it and the record is unlocked.",
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  successMessage: "Recalled.",
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  params: {
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  comment: {
@@ -225,18 +225,18 @@ var init_en_objects_generated = __esm({
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  action: {
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  label: "Action",
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  options: {
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- submit: "submit",
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- approve: "approve",
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- reject: "reject",
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- recall: "recall",
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- escalate: "escalate",
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- reassign: "reassign",
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- remind: "remind",
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- request_info: "request_info",
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- comment: "comment",
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- revise: "revise",
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- resubmit: "resubmit",
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- ooo_substitute: "ooo_substitute"
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+ submit: "Submit",
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+ approve: "Approve",
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+ reject: "Reject",
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+ recall: "Recall",
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+ escalate: "Escalate",
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+ reassign: "Reassign",
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+ remind: "Remind",
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+ request_info: "Request Info",
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+ comment: "Comment",
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+ revise: "Revise",
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+ resubmit: "Resubmit",
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+ ooo_substitute: "Out-of-Office Substitution"
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  }
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  },
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  actor_id: {
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ var init_zh_CN_objects_generated = __esm({
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  },
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  approval_reject: {
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  label: "\u62D2\u7EDD",
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- confirmText: "\u62D2\u7EDD\u8BE5\u8BF7\u6C42\uFF1F\u62D2\u7EDD\u5BF9\u6240\u6709\u5BA1\u6279\u4EBA\u7ACB\u5373\u751F\u6548\u3002",
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+ description: "\u62D2\u7EDD\u8BE5\u8BF7\u6C42\uFF1F\u62D2\u7EDD\u5BF9\u6240\u6709\u5BA1\u6279\u4EBA\u7ACB\u5373\u751F\u6548\u3002",
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  successMessage: "\u5DF2\u62D2\u7EDD\u3002",
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  params: {
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  comment: {
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ var init_zh_CN_objects_generated = __esm({
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  },
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  approval_recall: {
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  label: "\u64A4\u56DE",
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- confirmText: "\u64A4\u56DE\u8BE5\u8BF7\u6C42\uFF1F\u64A4\u56DE\u540E\u5BA1\u6279\u4EBA\u5C06\u65E0\u6CD5\u7EE7\u7EED\u5904\u7406\uFF0C\u8BB0\u5F55\u968F\u5373\u89E3\u9501\u3002",
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+ description: "\u64A4\u56DE\u8BE5\u8BF7\u6C42\uFF1F\u64A4\u56DE\u540E\u5BA1\u6279\u4EBA\u5C06\u65E0\u6CD5\u7EE7\u7EED\u5904\u7406\uFF0C\u8BB0\u5F55\u968F\u5373\u89E3\u9501\u3002",
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  successMessage: "\u5DF2\u64A4\u56DE\u3002",
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  params: {
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  comment: {
@@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ var init_ja_JP_objects_generated = __esm({
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  },
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  approval_reject: {
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  label: "\u5374\u4E0B",
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- confirmText: "\u3053\u306E\u30EA\u30AF\u30A8\u30B9\u30C8\u3092\u5374\u4E0B\u3057\u307E\u3059\u304B\uFF1F\u5374\u4E0B\u306F\u3059\u3079\u3066\u306E\u627F\u8A8D\u8005\u306B\u5BFE\u3057\u3066\u6700\u7D42\u6C7A\u5B9A\u306B\u306A\u308A\u307E\u3059\u3002",
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+ description: "\u3053\u306E\u30EA\u30AF\u30A8\u30B9\u30C8\u3092\u5374\u4E0B\u3057\u307E\u3059\u304B\uFF1F\u5374\u4E0B\u306F\u3059\u3079\u3066\u306E\u627F\u8A8D\u8005\u306B\u5BFE\u3057\u3066\u6700\u7D42\u6C7A\u5B9A\u306B\u306A\u308A\u307E\u3059\u3002",
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  successMessage: "\u5374\u4E0B\u3057\u307E\u3057\u305F\u3002",
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  params: {
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  comment: {
@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ var init_ja_JP_objects_generated = __esm({
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  },
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  approval_recall: {
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  label: "\u53D6\u308A\u4E0B\u3052",
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- confirmText: "\u3053\u306E\u30EA\u30AF\u30A8\u30B9\u30C8\u3092\u53D6\u308A\u4E0B\u3052\u307E\u3059\u304B\uFF1F\u627F\u8A8D\u8005\u306F\u64CD\u4F5C\u3067\u304D\u306A\u304F\u306A\u308A\u3001\u30EC\u30B3\u30FC\u30C9\u306E\u30ED\u30C3\u30AF\u304C\u89E3\u9664\u3055\u308C\u307E\u3059\u3002",
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+ description: "\u3053\u306E\u30EA\u30AF\u30A8\u30B9\u30C8\u3092\u53D6\u308A\u4E0B\u3052\u307E\u3059\u304B\uFF1F\u627F\u8A8D\u8005\u306F\u64CD\u4F5C\u3067\u304D\u306A\u304F\u306A\u308A\u3001\u30EC\u30B3\u30FC\u30C9\u306E\u30ED\u30C3\u30AF\u304C\u89E3\u9664\u3055\u308C\u307E\u3059\u3002",
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  successMessage: "\u53D6\u308A\u4E0B\u3052\u307E\u3057\u305F\u3002",
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  params: {
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  comment: {
@@ -1091,7 +1091,7 @@ var init_es_ES_objects_generated = __esm({
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  },
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  approval_reject: {
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  label: "Rechazar",
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- confirmText: "\xBFRechazar esta solicitud? Un rechazo es definitivo para todos los aprobadores.",
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+ description: "\xBFRechazar esta solicitud? Un rechazo es definitivo para todos los aprobadores.",
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  successMessage: "Rechazada.",
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  params: {
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  comment: {
@@ -1144,7 +1144,7 @@ var init_es_ES_objects_generated = __esm({
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  },
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  approval_recall: {
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  label: "Retirar",
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- confirmText: "\xBFRetirar esta solicitud? Los aprobadores ya no podr\xE1n actuar sobre ella y el registro se desbloquear\xE1.",
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+ description: "\xBFRetirar esta solicitud? Los aprobadores ya no podr\xE1n actuar sobre ella y el registro se desbloquear\xE1.",
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  successMessage: "Retirada.",
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  params: {
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  comment: {
@@ -1321,7 +1321,7 @@ var init_translations = __esm({
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  // src/sys-approval-request.object.ts
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  import { ObjectSchema, Field } from "@objectstack/spec/data";
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- import { APPROVAL_STATUSES } from "@objectstack/spec/contracts";
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+ import { APPROVAL_STATUSES, APPROVAL_STATUS_LABELS } from "@objectstack/spec/contracts";
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  var SysApprovalRequest = ObjectSchema.create({
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  name: "sys_approval_request",
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  label: "Approval Request",
@@ -1384,10 +1384,45 @@ var SysApprovalRequest = ObjectSchema.create({
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  },
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  fields: {
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  id: Field.text({ label: "Request ID", required: true, readonly: true, group: "System" }),
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+ // ⚠️ MEASURED DEFECT, cloud#1395 — read this before trusting the column.
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+ //
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+ // An approval request DOES belong to an organization: it is read through the
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+ // organization wall by the approvals inbox, and on a shared-database
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+ // deployment a row carrying no organization is not filtered BY that wall —
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+ // it is either invisible to everyone or visible to everyone, decided by
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+ // whatever filter each surface happens to apply rather than by the data.
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+ //
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+ // The value is resolved from the ACTING CONTEXT only (`openNodeRequest`'s
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+ // `ctxOrg`), so it is NULL whenever the flow that opened the request ran
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+ // without one — every schedule / time-relative / api triggered run, none of
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+ // which sets a tenant. On a walled single-database HotCRM SaaS boot this
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+ // measured 27 of 27 rows org-less, each naming an `object_name` /
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+ // `record_id` owned by a specific customer.
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+ //
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+ // ⛔ Do NOT read that as "platform tables do not carry an organization".
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+ // `sys_audit_log` (1669 rows) was correctly attributed on the SAME boot,
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+ // because its writer takes the organization from the RECORD the row is
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+ // about, with the session only as fallback (plugin-audit
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+ // `resolveRecordOrganizationField`, #8707 honouring #8287's ruling). Two
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+ // writers read the actor; a third reads the subject. That disagreement is
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+ // the defect.
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+ //
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+ // Which of the two a side-table row should follow is an open contract
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+ // question on cloud#1395 — the audit resolver is scope-pinned to audit
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+ // stamping by the #8778 ruling, so this writer needs its own. The same
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+ // `ctxOrg` also stamps `sys_approval_action` and `sys_approval_approver`,
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+ // so all three move together.
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  organization_id: Field.lookup("sys_organization", {
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  label: "Organization",
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  required: false,
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  group: "System",
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+ // ⛔ String unchanged on purpose: it is extracted into the generated i18n
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+ // bundles (`translations/*.objects.generated.ts`, as `help`), so rewording
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+ // it is a translation-regeneration change and not a comment. The
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+ // correction it needs — it claims a propagation that measurably does not
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+ // happen, and says "Tenant" where ADR-0120 §Terminology requires
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+ // "organization" — rides the cloud#1395 write-side fix, which rewrites the
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+ // sentence and regenerates the four locales in one pass.
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  description: "Tenant that owns this approval request (propagated from submitter context)"
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  }),
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  process_name: Field.text({
@@ -1420,10 +1455,13 @@ var SysApprovalRequest = ObjectSchema.create({
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  group: "Target"
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  }),
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  status: Field.select(
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- // Spread from the contract, not re-typed (#3786). `APPROVAL_STATUSES` is
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+ // Derived from the contract, not re-typed (#3786). `APPROVAL_STATUSES` is
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  // where the list and the reason for each entry live; `ApprovalStatus` is
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- // derived from it, so this column and the contract cannot disagree.
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- [...APPROVAL_STATUSES],
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+ // derived from it, so this column and the contract cannot disagree. The
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+ // authored English label per entry lives beside it in
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+ // `APPROVAL_STATUS_LABELS` (#8543) — mapped here, never re-typed, so the
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+ // `en` bundle regenerates from the contract's own text.
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+ APPROVAL_STATUSES.map((value) => ({ value, label: APPROVAL_STATUS_LABELS[value] })),
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  {
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  label: "Status",
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  required: true,
@@ -1528,6 +1566,28 @@ var SysApprovalRequest = ObjectSchema.create({
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  // approving, rejecting, or reassigning it to a real approver. `viewer` is
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  // attached by getRequest/listRequests; where it is absent the predicate fails
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  // closed.
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+ //
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+ // Every predicate below is guarded for the SPARSE action face (#8990). This
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+ // binding is a list row or a record read carrying only what the caller
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+ // projected, and CEL aborts the whole expression at key resolution — so the
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+ // unguarded `record.viewer.can_act` faulted (`No such key: viewer`) on any
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+ // row without the block, and the button silently vanished, indistinguishable
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+ // from "the gate said no". `materializeDeclaredFields`'s doc comment in
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+ // `@objectstack/objectql` is the canonical statement of the guard rule; this
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+ // file follows it and does not restate it.
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+ //
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+ // `viewer` is a NESTED block, which needs one measurement the canonical rule
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+ // does not spell out. Measured against the `@objectstack/formula` CEL engine:
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+ // `has(record.viewer) && record.viewer != null && record.viewer.can_act`
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+ // still FAULTS on `{viewer: {}}` (`No such key: can_act`) and on
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+ // `{viewer: {can_act: null}}` (`Logical operator requires bool operands`).
1584
+ // Guarding the LEAF instead — `has(record.viewer) &&
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+ // has(record.viewer.can_act) && record.viewer.can_act == true` — is total
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+ // over every binding AND subsumes the parent `!= null` half, because `has()`
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+ // on a path whose parent is null answers `false` rather than faulting. So the
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+ // leaf `has()` plus the `== true` comparison is the MINIMAL safe form here,
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+ // not a longer one: `== true` is load-bearing (a bare truthy read of a null
1590
+ // leaf faults the logical operator), the parent `!= null` is not.
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  actions: [
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  {
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  name: "approval_approve",
@@ -1547,7 +1607,7 @@ var SysApprovalRequest = ObjectSchema.create({
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  // string[]`; the decision route persists them on `sys_approval_action`.
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  { name: "attachments", label: "Attachments", type: "file", multiple: true, required: false }
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  ],
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- visible: "record.viewer.can_act || record.viewer.can_override",
1610
+ visible: "has(record.viewer) && has(record.viewer.can_act) && record.viewer.can_act == true || has(record.viewer) && has(record.viewer.can_override) && record.viewer.can_override == true",
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  locations: ["record_section", "list_item"],
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  successMessage: "Approved.",
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  refreshAfter: true
@@ -1555,6 +1615,15 @@ var SysApprovalRequest = ObjectSchema.create({
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  {
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  name: "approval_reject",
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  label: "Reject",
1618
+ // The confirm question lives HERE, not in `confirmText`: this action
1619
+ // collects params, so the console would otherwise chain a confirm dialog
1620
+ // and then the param dialog for one decision — and the first one already
1621
+ // reads as "the action ran" (#7278, maintainer ruling 2026-08-10). The
1622
+ // param dialog renders this as its description, and nothing is POSTed
1623
+ // until its own Confirm: one condition, one wording, one dialog.
1624
+ // NB: the top-level action `description` (#7367), never `ai.description`
1625
+ // — that one is the LLM-facing tool contract and is not shown to anyone.
1626
+ description: "Reject this request? A rejection is final for every approver.",
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  icon: "x-circle",
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  // Destructive decision — rendered in the console's danger styling so it
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  // reads as the irreversible action it is (objectui#2762 P1-5).
@@ -1566,8 +1635,7 @@ var SysApprovalRequest = ObjectSchema.create({
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  { name: "comment", label: "Comment", type: "textarea", required: false },
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  { name: "attachments", label: "Attachments", type: "file", multiple: true, required: false }
1568
1637
  ],
1569
- visible: "record.viewer.can_act || record.viewer.can_override",
1570
- confirmText: "Reject this request? A rejection is final for every approver.",
1638
+ visible: "has(record.viewer) && has(record.viewer.can_act) && record.viewer.can_act == true || has(record.viewer) && has(record.viewer.can_override) && record.viewer.can_override == true",
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  locations: ["record_section", "list_item"],
1572
1640
  successMessage: "Rejected.",
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1641
  refreshAfter: true
@@ -1588,7 +1656,7 @@ var SysApprovalRequest = ObjectSchema.create({
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  { field: "submitter_id", name: "to", label: "New approver", required: true, helpText: "User to hand this step to" },
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  { name: "comment", label: "Comment", type: "textarea", required: false }
1590
1658
  ],
1591
- visible: "record.viewer.can_act || record.viewer.can_override",
1659
+ visible: "has(record.viewer) && has(record.viewer.can_act) && record.viewer.can_act == true || has(record.viewer) && has(record.viewer.can_override) && record.viewer.can_override == true",
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  locations: ["record_section"],
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1661
  successMessage: "Reassigned.",
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  refreshAfter: true
@@ -1607,7 +1675,7 @@ var SysApprovalRequest = ObjectSchema.create({
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  params: [
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  { name: "comment", label: "Reason", type: "textarea", required: false }
1609
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  ],
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- visible: "record.viewer.can_act",
1678
+ visible: "has(record.viewer) && has(record.viewer.can_act) && record.viewer.can_act == true",
1611
1679
  locations: ["record_section"],
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  successMessage: "Sent back for revision.",
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  refreshAfter: true
@@ -1622,7 +1690,7 @@ var SysApprovalRequest = ObjectSchema.create({
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  params: [
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  { name: "comment", label: "What do you need?", type: "textarea", required: true }
1624
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  ],
1625
- visible: "record.viewer.can_act",
1693
+ visible: "has(record.viewer) && has(record.viewer.can_act) && record.viewer.can_act == true",
1626
1694
  locations: ["record_section"],
1627
1695
  successMessage: "Information requested.",
1628
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  refreshAfter: true
@@ -1643,7 +1711,7 @@ var SysApprovalRequest = ObjectSchema.create({
1643
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  params: [
1644
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  { name: "comment", label: "Note", type: "textarea", required: false }
1645
1713
  ],
1646
- visible: 'record.status == "pending" && record.viewer.is_submitter',
1714
+ visible: 'has(record.status) && record.status == "pending" && has(record.viewer) && has(record.viewer.is_submitter) && record.viewer.is_submitter == true',
1647
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  locations: ["record_section"],
1648
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  successMessage: "Reminder sent.",
1649
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  refreshAfter: true
@@ -1651,6 +1719,9 @@ var SysApprovalRequest = ObjectSchema.create({
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1719
  {
1652
1720
  name: "approval_recall",
1653
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  label: "Recall",
1722
+ // Confirm question as the param dialog's description, not `confirmText`
1723
+ // — same one-decision-one-dialog rule as `approval_reject` above (#7278).
1724
+ description: "Recall this request? Approvers can no longer act on it and the record is unlocked.",
1654
1725
  icon: "undo-2",
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  type: "api",
1656
1727
  method: "POST",
@@ -1660,8 +1731,7 @@ var SysApprovalRequest = ObjectSchema.create({
1660
1731
  ],
1661
1732
  // Recall applies while the request is live for the submitter — pending
1662
1733
  // (withdraw) or returned (abandon the revision instead of resubmitting).
1663
- visible: '(record.status == "pending" || record.status == "returned") && record.viewer.is_submitter',
1664
- confirmText: "Recall this request? Approvers can no longer act on it and the record is unlocked.",
1734
+ visible: 'has(record.status) && (record.status == "pending" || record.status == "returned") && has(record.viewer) && has(record.viewer.is_submitter) && record.viewer.is_submitter == true',
1665
1735
  locations: ["record_section"],
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1736
  successMessage: "Recalled.",
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  refreshAfter: true
@@ -1676,7 +1746,7 @@ var SysApprovalRequest = ObjectSchema.create({
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1746
  params: [
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1747
  { name: "comment", label: "What changed?", type: "textarea", required: false }
1678
1748
  ],
1679
- visible: 'record.status == "returned" && record.viewer.is_submitter',
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+ visible: 'has(record.status) && record.status == "returned" && has(record.viewer) && has(record.viewer.is_submitter) && record.viewer.is_submitter == true',
1680
1750
  locations: ["record_section"],
1681
1751
  successMessage: "Resubmitted.",
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  refreshAfter: true
@@ -1692,7 +1762,7 @@ var SysApprovalRequest = ObjectSchema.create({
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1762
 
1693
1763
  // src/sys-approval-action.object.ts
1694
1764
  import { ObjectSchema as ObjectSchema2, Field as Field2 } from "@objectstack/spec/data";
1695
- import { APPROVAL_ACTION_KINDS } from "@objectstack/spec/contracts";
1765
+ import { APPROVAL_ACTION_KINDS, APPROVAL_ACTION_KIND_LABELS } from "@objectstack/spec/contracts";
1696
1766
  var SysApprovalAction = ObjectSchema2.create({
1697
1767
  name: "sys_approval_action",
1698
1768
  label: "Approval Action",
@@ -1771,11 +1841,14 @@ var SysApprovalAction = ObjectSchema2.create({
1771
1841
  group: "Target"
1772
1842
  }),
1773
1843
  action: Field2.select(
1774
- // Spread from the contract, not re-typed (#3786). `APPROVAL_ACTION_KINDS`
1844
+ // Derived from the contract, not re-typed (#3786). `APPROVAL_ACTION_KINDS`
1775
1845
  // is where the list and the per-kind notes live (which kinds move the flow
1776
1846
  // and which are thread-only); `ApprovalActionKind` is derived from it, so
1777
- // this column and the contract cannot disagree.
1778
- [...APPROVAL_ACTION_KINDS],
1847
+ // this column and the contract cannot disagree. The authored English label
1848
+ // per kind lives beside it in `APPROVAL_ACTION_KIND_LABELS` (#8580 — the
1849
+ // #7232 humanization pass missed this field) — mapped here, never
1850
+ // re-typed, so the `en` bundle regenerates from the contract's own text.
1851
+ APPROVAL_ACTION_KINDS.map((value) => ({ value, label: APPROVAL_ACTION_KIND_LABELS[value] })),
1779
1852
  {
1780
1853
  label: "Action",
1781
1854
  required: true,
@@ -2319,6 +2392,9 @@ var _ApprovalService = class _ApprovalService {
2319
2392
  this.messaging = opts.messaging;
2320
2393
  this.publicBaseUrl = (opts.publicBaseUrl ?? "").replace(/\/$/, "");
2321
2394
  this.tenancyPosture = opts.tenancyPosture;
2395
+ this.recordReaderVisibleObjects = new Set(
2396
+ (Array.isArray(opts.recordReaderVisibleObjects) ? opts.recordReaderVisibleObjects : []).map((n) => String(n ?? "").trim()).filter(Boolean)
2397
+ );
2322
2398
  }
2323
2399
  /** Attach (or replace) the ADR-0105 D9 posture provider. */
2324
2400
  attachTenancyPosture(provider) {
@@ -2820,9 +2896,48 @@ var _ApprovalService = class _ApprovalService {
2820
2896
  * Position holders (ADR-0090 D3): `sys_user_position` is the platform-owned
2821
2897
  * assignment table, keyed by the position's machine name (ADR-0057 D4),
2822
2898
  * unioned with the better-auth membership string (`sys_member.role`) as a
2823
- * transition source — the same semantics as `PositionGraphService` in
2824
- * `plugin-sharing`, so an approval routes to exactly the users the sharing
2825
- * engine would expand for the same position.
2899
+ * transition source.
2900
+ *
2901
+ * ⚠️ This is a ROUTING read (approver slates and escalation targets), and it
2902
+ * is deliberately NOT the same read as `PositionGraphService` in
2903
+ * `plugin-sharing`, whatever the shared method name suggests. Both answer
2904
+ * "who holds position P"; this one reads the directory RAW — neither the
2905
+ * ADR-0091 D2 validity window nor the `sys_position.active` catalogue flag is
2906
+ * applied. Maintainer ruling, 2026-08-15 (#8710, inheriting #8613), verbatim:
2907
+ *
2908
+ * > Access-conferring paths filter deactivated positions; addressing paths
2909
+ * > do not.
2910
+ *
2911
+ * Routing is an addressing path, so dropping a holder here is fail-OPEN, not
2912
+ * fail-closed: an expansion that comes back empty does not narrow the slate,
2913
+ * it falls through to the literal `position:` slot no user can ever act on —
2914
+ * the permanently stuck request of #3807 / #3424. A step routing to nobody is
2915
+ * worse than one routing to a lapsed holder, so the lapsed holder stays.
2916
+ *
2917
+ * Where the two implementations actually stand, per source. Both limbs are
2918
+ * listed because a statement about one of them is not a statement about this
2919
+ * method:
2920
+ *
2921
+ * 1. `sys_user_position` — sharing projects `valid_from` / `valid_until` and
2922
+ * drops rows on `isGrantActive` inside its own helper; we project
2923
+ * `user_id` alone, so an assignment that expired last month still routes.
2924
+ * This is the one real divergence, and it is the intended one.
2925
+ * 2. `sys_member.role` — raw on BOTH sides (`TeamGraphService.expandRoleUsers`
2926
+ * projects `user_id` too). The table carries no window columns at all and
2927
+ * `isGrantActive` reads an absent bound as unbounded, so there is nothing
2928
+ * a filter could do here; membership tier names have no `sys_position`
2929
+ * row either (#8710's "a name with no row is untouched" fallback), so no
2930
+ * catalogue flag either. This limb cannot be brought into parity by
2931
+ * adding a filter — see {@link expandMembershipTierUsers}.
2932
+ * 3. `sys_position.active` — the sharing engine's gate for it lives at the
2933
+ * RULE EVALUATOR's call site (`positionConfersAccess` in
2934
+ * `sharing-rule-service.ts`), not inside `PositionGraphService`; the same
2935
+ * ruling gives it no counterpart on this path.
2936
+ *
2937
+ * The omission is per-READ, not a missing dependency: `isGrantActive` is
2938
+ * imported in this file and IS applied to `sys_approval_delegation` in
2939
+ * {@link lookupActiveDelegation}. ⛔ So do not "fix" this by adding the window
2940
+ * filter here — that is the option #8710 rejected, on the reasoning above.
2826
2941
  */
2827
2942
  async expandPositionUsers(positionName, organizationId) {
2828
2943
  if (!positionName) return [];
@@ -2850,6 +2965,13 @@ var _ApprovalService = class _ApprovalService {
2850
2965
  * NOT positions. Named for the projection (`org_membership_level`, ADR-0057
2851
2966
  * D7 / ADR-0090 D3), not for better-auth's column: the column name is theirs
2852
2967
  * and stays, the platform-facing word does not.
2968
+ *
2969
+ * Read RAW, like every routing read here, and with nothing available to
2970
+ * filter even if it were not: `sys_member` carries no ADR-0091 D2 window
2971
+ * columns, and a tier name has no `sys_position` row to read `active` off.
2972
+ * {@link expandPositionUsers} carries the ruling both reads inherit
2973
+ * (#8613 / #8710) — this method is also the second limb of that union, so a
2974
+ * change here changes position routing too.
2853
2975
  */
2854
2976
  async expandMembershipTierUsers(tier, organizationId) {
2855
2977
  if (!tier) return [];
@@ -4386,10 +4508,14 @@ var _ApprovalService = class _ApprovalService {
4386
4508
  * class of failure stayed silent.
4387
4509
  *
4388
4510
  * It also could not have answered the question even if it looked: its
4389
- * liveness oracle is `getRun`, which reads the execution LOG, and after a
4390
- * restart that returns `null` for a perfectly ALIVE suspended run. It treats
4391
- * `null` as alive (conservative, correct) but that means it has no way to
4392
- * say "this run is really gone".
4511
+ * liveness oracle is `getRun`, which treats both `null` and `paused` as alive
4512
+ * (conservative, correct) so it has no way to say "this run is really
4513
+ * gone". (Until #8050 that oracle was weaker still: after a restart it
4514
+ * returned `null` for a perfectly ALIVE suspended run, so "alive" and
4515
+ * "unknown" were the same answer. It now reports such a run as `paused`,
4516
+ * which does not change any branch here — both already meant "leave alone" —
4517
+ * but it is why the sweep below needs `hasSuspendedRun` as a second oracle
4518
+ * rather than a sharper reading of the first.)
4393
4519
  *
4394
4520
  * So this uses BOTH oracles, and a row must fail both to be reported:
4395
4521
  *
@@ -5075,7 +5201,7 @@ var _ApprovalService = class _ApprovalService {
5075
5201
  * is a plain membership test over the resolved ids). So this cannot hide a
5076
5202
  * request from someone who could actually act on it.
5077
5203
  */
5078
- async visibleRequestIds(context, tenantOrg) {
5204
+ async visibleRequestIds(context, tenantOrg, target) {
5079
5205
  if (this.isOverrideActor(context, tenantOrg)) return null;
5080
5206
  const uid2 = context?.userId != null ? String(context.userId) : "";
5081
5207
  if (!uid2) return /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
@@ -5117,8 +5243,90 @@ var _ApprovalService = class _ApprovalService {
5117
5243
  error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
5118
5244
  });
5119
5245
  }
5246
+ await this.addRecordReaderVisibleIds(ids, context, tenantOrg, target);
5120
5247
  return ids;
5121
5248
  }
5249
+ /**
5250
+ * [#8652] Read-only approval visibility derived from READ ACCESS TO THE
5251
+ * TARGET BUSINESS RECORD.
5252
+ *
5253
+ * Maintainer ruling 2026-08-15: a user who can read the target record may
5254
+ * view that record's approval requests and full action history, read-only,
5255
+ * behind a switch that is default OFF, anchored on the EXISTING record-read
5256
+ * permission. The rejected alternative was a host-injected visibility hook —
5257
+ * a security predicate the platform could neither constrain nor audit.
5258
+ *
5259
+ * ## How the anchor is evaluated
5260
+ *
5261
+ * By asking the engine to read the record AS THE CALLER. That is the whole
5262
+ * check: `engine.find(object, { where: { id }, context })` runs the ordinary
5263
+ * ObjectQL middleware — object CRUD read, then RLS — so a denial throws and a
5264
+ * row the caller may not see comes back empty. Both mean "no". No new
5265
+ * permission, role or grant type is invented, and no second copy of the
5266
+ * access rule exists to drift from the first.
5267
+ *
5268
+ * ⚠️ The caller's context is load-bearing. Probing with {@link SYSTEM_CTX} —
5269
+ * the context every other read in this service uses — would read exactly like
5270
+ * a permission check while admitting every authenticated user in the tenant.
5271
+ *
5272
+ * ## Why it needs a NAMED TARGET, and what that deliberately excludes
5273
+ *
5274
+ * The rule is anchored on one record, so it can only be evaluated where a
5275
+ * record is named: a list filtered by `object` + `recordId` (what a record
5276
+ * page's approval tab sends), or a request loaded by id (whose own row names
5277
+ * its target). An UNTARGETED list — the inbox — is left exactly as it was:
5278
+ * answering it under this tier would mean probing every request in the tenant
5279
+ * for read access, which is unbounded, and would turn a work queue into a
5280
+ * browse surface. The confirmed consumer is the record page; the inbox is not
5281
+ * part of the ruling and is not widened here.
5282
+ *
5283
+ * ## What becomes visible (stated plainly, because the switch is an opt-in)
5284
+ *
5285
+ * The request row — including its `payload` snapshot of the record at
5286
+ * submission time — plus the full action history: actor, decision, timestamp,
5287
+ * the action's COMMENT text, and (through the same gate, via
5288
+ * {@link ApprovalService.authorizeFileRead}) any decision attachments. The
5289
+ * comment text is the ruling's "full action history" read literally; it is
5290
+ * flagged on the card as the one granularity edge worth a second look.
5291
+ *
5292
+ * Read-only is not enforced here and must not be: the decision paths
5293
+ * (`decideNode` / `reassign` / `recall` / `comment`) authorize on the pending
5294
+ * approver slate, the submitter, or {@link ApprovalService.isOverrideActor},
5295
+ * none of which this tier touches. Seeing a request confers nothing.
5296
+ */
5297
+ async addRecordReaderVisibleIds(ids, context, tenantOrg, target) {
5298
+ if (this.recordReaderVisibleObjects.size === 0) return;
5299
+ const object = String(target?.object ?? "").trim();
5300
+ const recordId = String(target?.recordId ?? "").trim();
5301
+ if (!object || !recordId) return;
5302
+ if (!this.recordReaderVisibleObjects.has(object)) return;
5303
+ const uid2 = context?.userId != null ? String(context.userId) : "";
5304
+ if (!uid2) return;
5305
+ try {
5306
+ const readable = await this.engine.find(object, {
5307
+ where: { id: recordId },
5308
+ fields: ["id"],
5309
+ limit: 1,
5310
+ context
5311
+ });
5312
+ if (!Array.isArray(readable) || readable.length === 0) return;
5313
+ const orgWhere = tenantOrg ? { organization_id: tenantOrg } : {};
5314
+ const rows = await this.engine.find("sys_approval_request", {
5315
+ where: { object_name: object, record_id: recordId, ...orgWhere },
5316
+ fields: ["id"],
5317
+ limit: _ApprovalService.APPROVER_INDEX_CAP,
5318
+ context: SYSTEM_CTX2
5319
+ });
5320
+ for (const r of Array.isArray(rows) ? rows : []) {
5321
+ if (r?.id != null) ids.add(String(r.id));
5322
+ }
5323
+ } catch (err) {
5324
+ this.logger?.debug?.("[approvals] record-reader visibility probe declined", {
5325
+ object,
5326
+ error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
5327
+ });
5328
+ }
5329
+ }
5122
5330
  /** Intersect an existing `where.id` constraint with the participant set. */
5123
5331
  applyVisibility(where, visible) {
5124
5332
  if (!visible) return true;
@@ -5142,7 +5350,10 @@ var _ApprovalService = class _ApprovalService {
5142
5350
  if (ids.length === 0) return [];
5143
5351
  where.id = ids.length === 1 ? ids[0] : { $in: ids };
5144
5352
  }
5145
- if (!this.applyVisibility(where, await this.visibleRequestIds(context, tenantOrg))) return [];
5353
+ if (!this.applyVisibility(where, await this.visibleRequestIds(context, tenantOrg, {
5354
+ object: filter?.object,
5355
+ recordId: filter?.recordId
5356
+ }))) return [];
5146
5357
  const findOpts = {
5147
5358
  where,
5148
5359
  orderBy: [{ field: "created_at", order: "desc" }],
@@ -5168,7 +5379,10 @@ var _ApprovalService = class _ApprovalService {
5168
5379
  if (ids.length === 0) return 0;
5169
5380
  where.id = ids.length === 1 ? ids[0] : { $in: ids };
5170
5381
  }
5171
- if (!this.applyVisibility(where, await this.visibleRequestIds(context, tenantOrg))) return 0;
5382
+ if (!this.applyVisibility(where, await this.visibleRequestIds(context, tenantOrg, {
5383
+ object: filter?.object,
5384
+ recordId: filter?.recordId
5385
+ }))) return 0;
5172
5386
  const countFn = this.engine.count;
5173
5387
  if (typeof countFn === "function") {
5174
5388
  try {
@@ -5214,7 +5428,10 @@ var _ApprovalService = class _ApprovalService {
5214
5428
  });
5215
5429
  if (!Array.isArray(rows) || !rows[0]) return null;
5216
5430
  if (enforceVisibility) {
5217
- const visible = await this.visibleRequestIds(context, tenantOrg ?? null);
5431
+ const visible = await this.visibleRequestIds(context, tenantOrg ?? null, {
5432
+ object: rows[0].object_name,
5433
+ recordId: rows[0].record_id
5434
+ });
5218
5435
  if (visible && !visible.has(String(rows[0].id))) return null;
5219
5436
  }
5220
5437
  const row = rowFromRequest(rows[0]);
@@ -5974,6 +6191,9 @@ var ApprovalsServicePlugin = class {
5974
6191
  engine,
5975
6192
  logger: ctx.logger,
5976
6193
  publicBaseUrl: this.options.publicBaseUrl,
6194
+ // [#8652] Read-only record-reader visibility. Default OFF — an absent
6195
+ // declaration reaches the service as an empty set and changes nothing.
6196
+ recordReaderVisibleObjects: this.options.recordReaderVisibleObjects,
5977
6197
  // [ADR-0105 D9] Cross-organization approver targeting is a `group`-posture
5978
6198
  // capability. Read LAZILY (not captured at start) because the tenancy
5979
6199
  // service resolves its posture during its own start, which may not have