@objectstack/platform-objects 6.9.0 → 7.0.0

package/dist/security/index.js

@@ -342,6 +342,24 @@ var SysPermissionSet = data.ObjectSchema.create({
       description: "JSON-serialized field-level read/write permissions",
       group: "Permissions"
     }),
+    system_permissions: data.Field.textarea({
+      label: "System Permissions",
+      required: false,
+      description: 'JSON-serialized array of system capability names (e.g. ["setup.access","studio.access","manage_users"])',
+      group: "Permissions"
+    }),
+    row_level_security: data.Field.textarea({
+      label: "Row-Level Security",
+      required: false,
+      description: "JSON-serialized array of row-level security policies (USING/CHECK clauses)",
+      group: "Permissions"
+    }),
+    tab_permissions: data.Field.textarea({
+      label: "Tab Permissions",
+      required: false,
+      description: "JSON-serialized map of app tab visibility (visible | hidden | default_on | default_off)",
+      group: "Permissions"
+    }),
     // ── Status ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
     active: data.Field.boolean({
       label: "Active",
@@ -1061,7 +1079,176 @@ var defaultPermissionSets = [
         modifyAllRecords: true
       }
     },
-    systemPermissions: ["manage_users", "manage_metadata", "setup.access", "studio.access"]
+    systemPermissions: [
+      "manage_users",
+      "manage_metadata",
+      "manage_platform_settings",
+      "setup.access",
+      "studio.access"
+    ]
+  }),
+  // ── Organization Administrator ──────────────────────────────────────
+  //
+  // Third tier between platform admin (`admin_full_access`) and rank-and-file
+  // member. Lives at the *organization* scope: full CRUD on business
+  // objects within their org (governed by `tenant_isolation` RLS), plus
+  // `setup.access` so the Setup app shell is reachable.
+  //
+  // **Deliberately withheld** vs `admin_full_access`:
+  //   - `studio.access` — schema-design surfaces are platform-level (a
+  //     tenant cannot mutate the shared metadata) and Studio is hidden.
+  //   - `manage_metadata` — same reasoning.
+  //   - `manage_platform_settings` — global settings manifests
+  //     (mail / storage / AI / knowledge) and platform-only Setup pages
+  //     (sharing rules, audit logs, OAuth apps, JWKS, …) require this
+  //     and are hidden / 403'd for org admins. Tenant-scoped manifests
+  //     (`branding`, `feature_flags`) keep using `setup.access` so org
+  //     admins CAN configure their own org's branding.
+  //
+  // **Anti-escalation**: writes to the global RBAC tables
+  // (`sys_role`, `sys_permission_set`, `sys_role_permission_set`,
+  // `sys_user_permission_set`, `sys_user_role`) are denied. Allowing
+  // them would let an org admin bind `admin_full_access` (which has no
+  // RLS) to themselves and break out of tenant isolation. Reads are
+  // permitted so the Roles / Permission Sets nav entries still render.
+  //
+  // Auto-granted to every `sys_member` whose role contains `owner` or
+  // `admin` by `plugin-security/src/auto-org-admin-grant.ts`.
+  security.PermissionSetSchema.parse({
+    name: "organization_admin",
+    label: "Organization Administrator",
+    isProfile: true,
+    objects: {
+      "*": {
+        allowRead: true,
+        allowCreate: true,
+        allowEdit: true,
+        allowDelete: true,
+        viewAllRecords: true,
+        modifyAllRecords: true
+      },
+      // Identity tables — go through better-auth endpoints (invite,
+      // accept, remove-member, transfer, …) rather than raw CRUD.
+      ...denyWritesOnManagedObjects(),
+      // RBAC tables — read-only to prevent privilege escalation.
+      sys_role: { allowRead: true, allowCreate: false, allowEdit: false, allowDelete: false },
+      sys_permission_set: { allowRead: true, allowCreate: false, allowEdit: false, allowDelete: false },
+      sys_role_permission_set: { allowRead: true, allowCreate: false, allowEdit: false, allowDelete: false },
+      sys_user_permission_set: { allowRead: true, allowCreate: false, allowEdit: false, allowDelete: false },
+      sys_user_role: { allowRead: true, allowCreate: false, allowEdit: false, allowDelete: false }
+    },
+    systemPermissions: ["manage_org_users", "setup.access"],
+    rowLevelSecurity: [
+      {
+        name: "tenant_isolation",
+        object: "*",
+        operation: "all",
+        using: "organization_id = current_user.organization_id"
+      },
+      // ── better-auth system tables that lack `organization_id` and would
+      //    otherwise be denied by the wildcard policy. Same self-only
+      //    carve-outs as `member_default` — an org admin does not get to
+      //    inspect cross-tenant identity rows.
+      {
+        name: "sys_organization_self",
+        object: "sys_organization",
+        operation: "all",
+        using: "id = current_user.organization_id"
+      },
+      {
+        name: "sys_user_self",
+        object: "sys_user",
+        operation: "select",
+        using: "id = current_user.id"
+      },
+      {
+        name: "sys_user_org_members",
+        object: "sys_user",
+        operation: "select",
+        using: "id IN (current_user.org_user_ids)"
+      },
+      {
+        name: "sys_session_self",
+        object: "sys_session",
+        operation: "all",
+        using: "user_id = current_user.id"
+      },
+      {
+        name: "sys_account_self",
+        object: "sys_account",
+        operation: "select",
+        using: "user_id = current_user.id"
+      },
+      {
+        name: "sys_team_member_self",
+        object: "sys_team_member",
+        operation: "select",
+        using: "user_id = current_user.id"
+      },
+      {
+        name: "sys_two_factor_self",
+        object: "sys_two_factor",
+        operation: "all",
+        using: "user_id = current_user.id"
+      },
+      {
+        name: "sys_user_preference_self",
+        object: "sys_user_preference",
+        operation: "all",
+        using: "user_id = current_user.id"
+      },
+      {
+        name: "sys_api_key_self",
+        object: "sys_api_key",
+        operation: "all",
+        using: "user_id = current_user.id"
+      },
+      {
+        name: "sys_device_code_self",
+        object: "sys_device_code",
+        operation: "all",
+        using: "user_id = current_user.id"
+      },
+      {
+        name: "sys_oauth_access_token_self",
+        object: "sys_oauth_access_token",
+        operation: "select",
+        using: "user_id = current_user.id"
+      },
+      {
+        name: "sys_oauth_refresh_token_self",
+        object: "sys_oauth_refresh_token",
+        operation: "select",
+        using: "user_id = current_user.id"
+      },
+      {
+        name: "sys_oauth_consent_self",
+        object: "sys_oauth_consent",
+        operation: "all",
+        using: "user_id = current_user.id"
+      },
+      // Org-scoped visibility for organization-owned identity-adjacent
+      // tables. Org admins may inspect their own org's invitations and
+      // memberships (read; writes still flow through better-auth).
+      {
+        name: "sys_member_org",
+        object: "sys_member",
+        operation: "select",
+        using: "organization_id = current_user.organization_id"
+      },
+      {
+        name: "sys_invitation_org",
+        object: "sys_invitation",
+        operation: "select",
+        using: "organization_id = current_user.organization_id"
+      },
+      {
+        name: "sys_team_org",
+        object: "sys_team",
+        operation: "select",
+        using: "organization_id = current_user.organization_id"
+      }
+    ]
   }),
   security.PermissionSetSchema.parse({
     name: "member_default",