@objectstack/lint 13.0.0 → 14.5.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.cjs CHANGED
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ var __toCommonJS = (mod) => __copyProps(__defProp({}, "__esModule", { value: tru
20
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  // src/index.ts
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  var index_exports = {};
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  __export(index_exports, {
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+ APPROVAL_APPROVER_TYPE_UNKNOWN: () => APPROVAL_APPROVER_TYPE_UNKNOWN,
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+ APPROVAL_ESCALATION_REASSIGN_NO_TARGET: () => APPROVAL_ESCALATION_REASSIGN_NO_TARGET,
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+ APPROVAL_ROLE_NOT_MEMBERSHIP_TIER: () => APPROVAL_ROLE_NOT_MEMBERSHIP_TIER,
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  CAPABILITY_REFERENCE_UNKNOWN: () => CAPABILITY_REFERENCE_UNKNOWN,
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  CHART_CONFIG_MISSING: () => CHART_CONFIG_MISSING,
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  CHART_FIELD_UNKNOWN: () => CHART_FIELD_UNKNOWN,
@@ -31,7 +34,11 @@ __export(index_exports, {
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  MEASURE_AGGREGATE_INCOHERENT: () => MEASURE_AGGREGATE_INCOHERENT,
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  PAGE_SOURCE_CLASSNAME: () => PAGE_SOURCE_CLASSNAME,
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  SECURITY_ANCHOR_HIGH_PRIVILEGE: () => SECURITY_ANCHOR_HIGH_PRIVILEGE,
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+ SECURITY_BOOK_AUDIENCE_UNKNOWN_SET: () => SECURITY_BOOK_AUDIENCE_UNKNOWN_SET,
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+ SECURITY_DELEGATION_MISSING_REASON: () => SECURITY_DELEGATION_MISSING_REASON,
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  SECURITY_EXTERNAL_WIDER: () => SECURITY_EXTERNAL_WIDER,
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+ SECURITY_GRANT_EXPIRED_AT_AUTHORING: () => SECURITY_GRANT_EXPIRED_AT_AUTHORING,
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+ SECURITY_MASTER_DETAIL_UNGRANTED: () => SECURITY_MASTER_DETAIL_UNGRANTED,
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  SECURITY_OWD_ALIAS: () => SECURITY_OWD_ALIAS,
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  SECURITY_OWD_UNSET: () => SECURITY_OWD_UNSET,
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  SECURITY_PRIVATE_NO_READSCOPE: () => SECURITY_PRIVATE_NO_READSCOPE,
@@ -51,6 +58,7 @@ __export(index_exports, {
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  WIDGET_MEASURE_UNKNOWN: () => WIDGET_MEASURE_UNKNOWN,
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  buildAccessMatrix: () => buildAccessMatrix,
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  diffAccessMatrix: () => diffAccessMatrix,
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+ validateApprovalApprovers: () => validateApprovalApprovers,
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  validateCapabilityReferences: () => validateCapabilityReferences,
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  validateFormLayout: () => validateFormLayout,
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  validateJsxPages: () => validateJsxPages,
@@ -1369,6 +1377,88 @@ function validateCapabilityReferences(stack) {
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  return findings;
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  }
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+ // src/validate-approval-approvers.ts
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+ var import_automation = require("@objectstack/spec/automation");
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+ var APPROVAL_ROLE_NOT_MEMBERSHIP_TIER = "approval-role-not-membership-tier";
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+ var APPROVAL_APPROVER_TYPE_UNKNOWN = "approval-approver-type-unknown";
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+ var APPROVAL_ESCALATION_REASSIGN_NO_TARGET = "approval-escalation-reassign-no-target";
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+ var MEMBERSHIP_TIERS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["owner", "admin", "member", "guest"]);
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+ var TYPE_FIX = {
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+ business_unit: "department",
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+ bu: "department"
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+ };
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+ function asArray13(v) {
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+ if (Array.isArray(v)) return v;
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+ if (v && typeof v === "object") {
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+ return Object.entries(v).map(([name, def]) => ({ name, ...def }));
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+ }
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+ return [];
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+ }
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+ function validateApprovalApprovers(stack) {
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+ const findings = [];
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+ if (!stack || typeof stack !== "object") return findings;
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+ const flows = asArray13(stack.flows);
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+ const validTypes = new Set(import_automation.ApproverType.options);
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+ for (let fi = 0; fi < flows.length; fi++) {
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+ const flow = flows[fi];
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+ if (!flow || typeof flow !== "object") continue;
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+ const flowName = typeof flow.name === "string" ? flow.name : `(flow ${fi})`;
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+ const nodes = Array.isArray(flow.nodes) ? flow.nodes : [];
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+ for (let ni = 0; ni < nodes.length; ni++) {
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+ const node = nodes[ni];
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+ if (!node || node.type !== import_automation.APPROVAL_NODE_TYPE) continue;
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+ const nodeId = typeof node.id === "string" ? node.id : `(node ${ni})`;
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+ const cfg = node.config ?? {};
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+ const approvers = Array.isArray(cfg.approvers) ? cfg.approvers : [];
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+ const where = `flow "${flowName}" \xB7 node "${nodeId}"`;
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+ for (let ai = 0; ai < approvers.length; ai++) {
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+ const a = approvers[ai];
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+ if (!a || typeof a !== "object") continue;
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+ const type = typeof a.type === "string" ? a.type : "";
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+ const value = typeof a.value === "string" ? a.value : "";
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+ const path = `flows[${fi}].nodes[${ni}].config.approvers[${ai}]`;
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+ if (type && !validTypes.has(type)) {
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+ const fix = TYPE_FIX[type];
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+ findings.push({
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+ severity: "warning",
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+ rule: APPROVAL_APPROVER_TYPE_UNKNOWN,
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+ where,
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+ path: `${path}.type`,
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+ message: `approver type '${type}' is not an ApproverType (${import_automation.ApproverType.options.join(" | ")}).`,
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+ hint: fix ? `Use the spec value: { type: '${fix}', value: '${value}' }.` : `Pick one of the spec values; unmapped types degrade to an inert '${type}:${value}' literal at runtime.`
1429
+ });
1430
+ continue;
1431
+ }
1432
+ if (type === "role" && value && !MEMBERSHIP_TIERS.has(value.toLowerCase())) {
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+ findings.push({
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+ severity: "warning",
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+ rule: APPROVAL_ROLE_NOT_MEMBERSHIP_TIER,
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+ where,
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+ path: `${path}.value`,
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+ message: `approver { type: 'role', value: '${value}' } resolves against the better-auth org-membership tier (sys_member.role: owner/admin/member) \u2014 '${value}' is not a membership tier, so this approver matches nobody and the request stalls.`,
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+ hint: `If '${value}' is an org position, author { type: 'position', value: '${value}' } (resolved via sys_user_position, ADR-0090 D3). Keep type 'role' only for membership tiers (owner/admin/member).`
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+ });
1441
+ }
1442
+ }
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+ const escalation = cfg.escalation ?? null;
1444
+ if (escalation && typeof escalation === "object" && escalation.action === "reassign") {
1445
+ const target = typeof escalation.escalateTo === "string" ? escalation.escalateTo.trim() : "";
1446
+ if (!target) {
1447
+ findings.push({
1448
+ severity: "warning",
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+ rule: APPROVAL_ESCALATION_REASSIGN_NO_TARGET,
1450
+ where,
1451
+ path: `flows[${fi}].nodes[${ni}].config.escalation.escalateTo`,
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+ message: `escalation.action is 'reassign' but escalateTo is empty \u2014 at runtime the escalation degrades to a notify and the request stays with the original approvers.`,
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+ hint: `Set escalateTo to a position machine name (expanded via sys_user_position, ADR-0090 D3) or a specific user id, or change action to 'notify'.`
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+ });
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+ }
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+ }
1457
+ }
1458
+ }
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+ return findings;
1460
+ }
1461
+
1372
1462
  // src/validate-security-posture.ts
1373
1463
  var import_security2 = require("@objectstack/spec/security");
1374
1464
  var SECURITY_OWD_UNSET = "security-owd-unset";
@@ -1377,7 +1467,12 @@ var SECURITY_EXTERNAL_WIDER = "security-external-wider-than-internal";
1377
1467
  var SECURITY_WILDCARD_VAMA = "security-wildcard-vama";
1378
1468
  var SECURITY_ANCHOR_HIGH_PRIVILEGE = "security-anchor-high-privilege";
1379
1469
  var SECURITY_ROLE_WORD = "security-role-word";
1470
+ var SECURITY_BOOK_AUDIENCE_UNKNOWN_SET = "security-book-audience-unknown-set";
1380
1471
  var SECURITY_PRIVATE_NO_READSCOPE = "security-private-no-readscope";
1472
+ var SECURITY_MASTER_DETAIL_UNGRANTED = "security-master-detail-ungranted";
1473
+ var SECURITY_FLS_UNQUALIFIED_KEY = "security-fls-unqualified-key";
1474
+ var SECURITY_GRANT_EXPIRED_AT_AUTHORING = "security-grant-expired-at-authoring";
1475
+ var SECURITY_DELEGATION_MISSING_REASON = "security-delegation-missing-reason";
1381
1476
  var CANONICAL_OWD = ["private", "public_read", "public_read_write", "controlled_by_parent"];
1382
1477
  var OWD_ALIAS_FIX = {
1383
1478
  read: "public_read",
@@ -1390,7 +1485,7 @@ var OWD_WIDTH = {
1390
1485
  public_read: 1,
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1486
  public_read_write: 2
1392
1487
  };
1393
- function asArray13(v) {
1488
+ function asArray14(v) {
1394
1489
  if (Array.isArray(v)) return v;
1395
1490
  if (v && typeof v === "object") {
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1491
  return Object.entries(v).map(([name, def]) => ({ name, ...def }));
@@ -1411,11 +1506,26 @@ function labelHasRoleWord(label) {
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1506
  if (typeof label !== "string") return false;
1412
1507
  return /\brole(s)?\b/i.test(label);
1413
1508
  }
1414
- function validateSecurityPosture(stack) {
1509
+ function refOf(def) {
1510
+ const r = def.reference ?? def.reference_to;
1511
+ return typeof r === "string" && r ? r : void 0;
1512
+ }
1513
+ function firstMasterDetailField(obj) {
1514
+ for (const f of asArray14(obj.fields)) {
1515
+ if (f.type === "master_detail") {
1516
+ return { name: String(f.name ?? "?"), parent: refOf(f) };
1517
+ }
1518
+ }
1519
+ return void 0;
1520
+ }
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+ function grantsObjectAccess(p) {
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+ return p.allowRead === true || p.allowCreate === true || p.allowEdit === true || p.allowDelete === true || p.viewAllRecords === true || p.modifyAllRecords === true;
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+ }
1524
+ function validateSecurityPosture(stack, opts) {
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1525
  const findings = [];
1416
1526
  if (!stack || typeof stack !== "object") return findings;
1417
- const objects = asArray13(stack.objects);
1418
- const permissionSets = asArray13(stack.permissions);
1527
+ const objects = asArray14(stack.objects);
1528
+ const permissionSets = asArray14(stack.permissions);
1419
1529
  for (let i = 0; i < objects.length; i++) {
1420
1530
  const obj = objects[i];
1421
1531
  if (!obj || typeof obj !== "object") continue;
@@ -1481,6 +1591,18 @@ function validateSecurityPosture(stack) {
1481
1591
  const psName = typeof ps.name === "string" ? ps.name : `(permission set ${i})`;
1482
1592
  const psPath = `permissions[${i}]`;
1483
1593
  const objectsMap = ps.objects && typeof ps.objects === "object" ? ps.objects : {};
1594
+ const flsMap = ps.fields && typeof ps.fields === "object" ? ps.fields : {};
1595
+ for (const flsKey of Object.keys(flsMap)) {
1596
+ if (flsKey.includes(".")) continue;
1597
+ findings.push({
1598
+ severity: "error",
1599
+ rule: SECURITY_FLS_UNQUALIFIED_KEY,
1600
+ where: `permission set "${psName}"`,
1601
+ path: `${psPath}.fields["${flsKey}"]`,
1602
+ message: `field-permission key '${flsKey}' is not object-qualified \u2014 the runtime matches FLS keys by '<object>.<field>' prefix, so a bare key is silently IGNORED and the declared masking never enforces.`,
1603
+ hint: `Qualify the key with its object, e.g. 'crm_opportunity.${flsKey}': { readable: true, editable: false }.`
1604
+ });
1605
+ }
1484
1606
  const wildcard = objectsMap["*"];
1485
1607
  if (wildcard && (wildcard.viewAllRecords === true || wildcard.modifyAllRecords === true)) {
1486
1608
  findings.push({
@@ -1532,10 +1654,10 @@ function validateSecurityPosture(stack) {
1532
1654
  if (!obj || typeof obj !== "object" || isSystemObject(obj)) continue;
1533
1655
  const objName = typeof obj.name === "string" ? obj.name : `(object ${i})`;
1534
1656
  flagRole("object", obj.name, obj.label, `object "${objName}"`, `objects[${i}].name`);
1535
- for (const f of asArray13(obj.fields)) {
1657
+ for (const f of asArray14(obj.fields)) {
1536
1658
  flagRole("field", f.name, f.label, `field "${objName}.${String(f.name ?? "?")}"`, `objects[${i}].fields.${String(f.name ?? "?")}.name`);
1537
1659
  }
1538
- for (const [ai, action] of asArray13(obj.actions).entries()) {
1660
+ for (const [ai, action] of asArray14(obj.actions).entries()) {
1539
1661
  flagRole("action", action.name, action.label, `action "${objName}.${String(action.name ?? "?")}"`, `objects[${i}].actions[${ai}].name`);
1540
1662
  }
1541
1663
  }
@@ -1544,12 +1666,34 @@ function validateSecurityPosture(stack) {
1544
1666
  if (!ps || typeof ps !== "object") continue;
1545
1667
  flagRole("permission set", ps.name, ps.label, `permission set "${String(ps.name ?? i)}"`, `permissions[${i}].name`);
1546
1668
  }
1547
- for (const [i, pos] of asArray13(stack.positions).entries()) {
1669
+ for (const [i, pos] of asArray14(stack.positions).entries()) {
1548
1670
  flagRole("position", pos.name, pos.label, `position "${String(pos.name ?? i)}"`, `positions[${i}].name`);
1549
1671
  }
1550
- for (const [i, app] of asArray13(stack.apps).entries()) {
1672
+ for (const [i, app] of asArray14(stack.apps).entries()) {
1551
1673
  flagRole("app", app.name, app.label, `app "${String(app.name ?? i)}"`, `apps[${i}].name`);
1552
1674
  }
1675
+ for (const [i, book] of asArray14(stack.books).entries()) {
1676
+ flagRole("book", book.name, book.label, `book "${String(book.name ?? i)}"`, `books[${i}].name`);
1677
+ }
1678
+ const stackSetNames = new Set(
1679
+ permissionSets.map((ps) => typeof ps.name === "string" ? ps.name : void 0).filter((n) => !!n)
1680
+ );
1681
+ for (const [i, book] of asArray14(stack.books).entries()) {
1682
+ const audience = book.audience;
1683
+ if (!audience || typeof audience !== "object") continue;
1684
+ const setName = audience.permissionSet;
1685
+ if (typeof setName !== "string" || setName.length === 0) continue;
1686
+ if (!stackSetNames.has(setName)) {
1687
+ findings.push({
1688
+ severity: "warning",
1689
+ rule: SECURITY_BOOK_AUDIENCE_UNKNOWN_SET,
1690
+ where: `book "${String(book.name ?? i)}"`,
1691
+ path: `books[${i}].audience.permissionSet`,
1692
+ message: `book audience references permission set "${setName}", which this stack does not declare. The runtime fails closed \u2014 no holder means NO reader can open the book.`,
1693
+ hint: `Gate the book on one of this package's own permission sets (ADR-0090 D9, e.g. its admin set), or fix the typo. Ignore if the set is intentionally provided by another installed package.`
1694
+ });
1695
+ }
1696
+ }
1553
1697
  const privateObjects = new Set(
1554
1698
  objects.filter((o) => o && typeof o === "object" && !isSystemObject(o)).filter((o) => {
1555
1699
  const owd = owdOf(o);
@@ -1578,11 +1722,82 @@ function validateSecurityPosture(stack) {
1578
1722
  }
1579
1723
  }
1580
1724
  }
1725
+ if (permissionSets.length > 0) {
1726
+ const wildcardGrantsAll = permissionSets.some(
1727
+ (ps) => grantsObjectAccess(ps.objects?.["*"] ?? {})
1728
+ );
1729
+ if (!wildcardGrantsAll) {
1730
+ const grantedObjects = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
1731
+ for (const ps of permissionSets) {
1732
+ const objectsMap = ps.objects && typeof ps.objects === "object" ? ps.objects : {};
1733
+ for (const [objName, rawPerm] of Object.entries(objectsMap)) {
1734
+ if (objName === "*") continue;
1735
+ if (grantsObjectAccess(rawPerm ?? {})) grantedObjects.add(objName);
1736
+ }
1737
+ }
1738
+ for (let i = 0; i < objects.length; i++) {
1739
+ const obj = objects[i];
1740
+ if (!obj || typeof obj !== "object" || isSystemObject(obj)) continue;
1741
+ const objName = typeof obj.name === "string" ? obj.name : "";
1742
+ if (!objName || grantedObjects.has(objName)) continue;
1743
+ const md = firstMasterDetailField(obj);
1744
+ if (!md) continue;
1745
+ const parentText = md.parent ? ` \u2192 "${md.parent}"` : "";
1746
+ findings.push({
1747
+ severity: "warning",
1748
+ rule: SECURITY_MASTER_DETAIL_UNGRANTED,
1749
+ where: `object "${objName}"`,
1750
+ path: `objects[${i}].fields.${md.name}`,
1751
+ message: `detail object "${objName}" (master_detail "${md.name}"${parentText}) has no object-level CRUD grant in any permission set. A master-detail child derives its RECORD-level access from the master (ADR-0055 controlled_by_parent), but object-level CRUD is a SEPARATE gate that is never derived \u2014 role-bound non-admin users are denied (403) before the parent-derived access is ever consulted (the silent "can't submit the subtable" trap).`,
1752
+ hint: `Grant "${objName}" in at least one permission set that already grants its master${md.parent ? ` "${md.parent}"` : ""} \u2014 e.g. permissions[i].objects.${objName} = { allowRead: true, allowCreate: true, allowEdit: true }. If no role should ever touch it (a pure system/internal table), name it sys_* or set isSystem: true.`
1753
+ });
1754
+ }
1755
+ }
1756
+ }
1757
+ const GRANT_SEED_OBJECTS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["sys_user_position", "sys_user_permission_set"]);
1758
+ const nowMs = opts?.nowMs ?? Date.now();
1759
+ for (const [i, seed] of asArray14(stack.data).entries()) {
1760
+ const seedObject = typeof seed.object === "string" ? seed.object : "";
1761
+ if (!GRANT_SEED_OBJECTS.has(seedObject)) continue;
1762
+ const records = Array.isArray(seed.records) ? seed.records : [];
1763
+ for (let j = 0; j < records.length; j++) {
1764
+ const rec = records[j] ?? {};
1765
+ const where = `seed "${seedObject}" record #${j}`;
1766
+ const until = rec.valid_until;
1767
+ if (until != null && until !== "") {
1768
+ const ms = typeof until === "number" ? until < 1e12 ? until * 1e3 : until : until instanceof Date ? until.getTime() : typeof until === "string" ? Date.parse(until) : Number.NaN;
1769
+ if (Number.isNaN(ms) || ms <= nowMs) {
1770
+ findings.push({
1771
+ severity: "error",
1772
+ rule: SECURITY_GRANT_EXPIRED_AT_AUTHORING,
1773
+ where,
1774
+ path: `data[${i}].records[${j}].valid_until`,
1775
+ message: Number.isNaN(ms) ? `valid_until ${JSON.stringify(until)} is not a parseable timestamp \u2014 the resolver fails closed (ADR-0091 D2), so this grant will NEVER be active.` : `valid_until ${JSON.stringify(until)} is already in the past \u2014 this grant is expired at authoring time and will never resolve (ADR-0091 D2 filters it fail-closed).`,
1776
+ hint: `Set valid_until to a future instant (ISO-8601 UTC), or drop the column for an unbounded grant. If the row is a historical record, it belongs in audit history, not seed data.`
1777
+ });
1778
+ }
1779
+ }
1780
+ const delegatedFrom = rec.delegated_from;
1781
+ if (delegatedFrom != null && delegatedFrom !== "") {
1782
+ const reason = rec.reason;
1783
+ if (typeof reason !== "string" || reason.trim().length === 0) {
1784
+ findings.push({
1785
+ severity: "error",
1786
+ rule: SECURITY_DELEGATION_MISSING_REASON,
1787
+ where,
1788
+ path: `data[${i}].records[${j}].reason`,
1789
+ message: `delegation row (delegated_from = ${JSON.stringify(delegatedFrom)}) has no reason. ADR-0091 D3 requires a mandatory reason on every delegation for the dual audit trail (granted_by = writer, delegated_from = authority source, reason = why).`,
1790
+ hint: `Add reason: 'vacation stand-in for \u5F20\u4E09, 2026-08-01..15' (free text, required).`
1791
+ });
1792
+ }
1793
+ }
1794
+ }
1795
+ }
1581
1796
  return findings;
1582
1797
  }
1583
1798
 
1584
1799
  // src/build-access-matrix.ts
1585
- function asArray14(v) {
1800
+ function asArray15(v) {
1586
1801
  if (Array.isArray(v)) return v;
1587
1802
  if (v && typeof v === "object") {
1588
1803
  return Object.entries(v).map(([name, def]) => ({ name, ...def }));
@@ -1593,13 +1808,13 @@ function buildAccessMatrix(stack) {
1593
1808
  const entries = [];
1594
1809
  if (!stack || typeof stack !== "object") return { version: 1, entries };
1595
1810
  const owdByObject = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
1596
- for (const obj of asArray14(stack.objects)) {
1811
+ for (const obj of asArray15(stack.objects)) {
1597
1812
  const name = typeof obj.name === "string" ? obj.name : "";
1598
1813
  if (!name) continue;
1599
1814
  const owd = obj.sharingModel ?? obj.security?.sharingModel;
1600
1815
  if (typeof owd === "string") owdByObject.set(name, owd);
1601
1816
  }
1602
- for (const ps of asArray14(stack.permissions)) {
1817
+ for (const ps of asArray15(stack.permissions)) {
1603
1818
  const psName = typeof ps.name === "string" ? ps.name : "";
1604
1819
  if (!psName) continue;
1605
1820
  const objects = ps.objects && typeof ps.objects === "object" ? ps.objects : {};
@@ -1671,6 +1886,9 @@ function diffAccessMatrix(before, after) {
1671
1886
  }
1672
1887
  // Annotate the CommonJS export names for ESM import in node:
1673
1888
  0 && (module.exports = {
1889
+ APPROVAL_APPROVER_TYPE_UNKNOWN,
1890
+ APPROVAL_ESCALATION_REASSIGN_NO_TARGET,
1891
+ APPROVAL_ROLE_NOT_MEMBERSHIP_TIER,
1674
1892
  CAPABILITY_REFERENCE_UNKNOWN,
1675
1893
  CHART_CONFIG_MISSING,
1676
1894
  CHART_FIELD_UNKNOWN,
@@ -1682,7 +1900,11 @@ function diffAccessMatrix(before, after) {
1682
1900
  MEASURE_AGGREGATE_INCOHERENT,
1683
1901
  PAGE_SOURCE_CLASSNAME,
1684
1902
  SECURITY_ANCHOR_HIGH_PRIVILEGE,
1903
+ SECURITY_BOOK_AUDIENCE_UNKNOWN_SET,
1904
+ SECURITY_DELEGATION_MISSING_REASON,
1685
1905
  SECURITY_EXTERNAL_WIDER,
1906
+ SECURITY_GRANT_EXPIRED_AT_AUTHORING,
1907
+ SECURITY_MASTER_DETAIL_UNGRANTED,
1686
1908
  SECURITY_OWD_ALIAS,
1687
1909
  SECURITY_OWD_UNSET,
1688
1910
  SECURITY_PRIVATE_NO_READSCOPE,
@@ -1702,6 +1924,7 @@ function diffAccessMatrix(before, after) {
1702
1924
  WIDGET_MEASURE_UNKNOWN,
1703
1925
  buildAccessMatrix,
1704
1926
  diffAccessMatrix,
1927
+ validateApprovalApprovers,
1705
1928
  validateCapabilityReferences,
1706
1929
  validateFormLayout,
1707
1930
  validateJsxPages,