@nxgt/janus 0.15.0 → 0.16.0

package/README.md

@@ -589,6 +589,10 @@ every user type with a password.
   and key the recovery codes' hashes. The first seals and every key opens, so
   keys rotate: put the new one first, keep the old one until no secret is
   sealed and no recovery code hashed with it.
+- **The first proof of an e-mail by a sign-in code or link removes the
+  factor too**, active or waiting, with its recovery codes: whoever enrolled
+  it had not proved the address. Send `verifyEmail` before offering
+  `enroll`, and an owner's factor is never dropped this way.
 - **Asking for a password or a code before `enroll`, `disable` or
   `regenerateRecoveryCodes` is your policy**, not the library's — a recent
   `session.authenticatedAt` is one rule. `regenerateRecoveryCodes` asks for
@@ -632,10 +636,19 @@ A six-digit code sent to the user's e-mail signs them in, with no password.
   attempts: a wrong code is `CODE_INVALID` with `attemptsLeft`, and the fifth
   spends it. An e-mail changed since is `TOKEN_STALE`; a user deactivated
   since is `USER_INACTIVE`.
-- **An active second factor is still asked for**: with `secondFactor`
-  configured, `confirm` answers `SignInResult` on a type with a password, and
-  a user whose factor is active gets a challenge for `secondFactor.confirm`
-  — switch on `status`, as after `signIn`.
+- **An e-mail proved for the first time drops the password and the second
+  factor, and signs out every session** before the new one opens, as
+  `resetPassword.confirm` does for the password: whoever registered the
+  address without holding its inbox keeps nothing, and the owner is asked
+  for no factor they never set. `user.passwordChanged` follows
+  `user.emailVerified` when a password was dropped, then
+  `user.secondFactorDisabled` when an active factor was. An e-mail already
+  verified changes nothing.
+- **An active second factor is still asked for** on an e-mail already
+  verified: with `secondFactor` configured, `confirm` answers `SignInResult`
+  on a type with a password, and a user whose factor is active gets a
+  challenge for `secondFactor.confirm` — switch on `status`, as after
+  `signIn`.
 
 [The sign-in code guide](docs/guide/sign-in-code.md) has the request that
 tells nobody who exists, the challenge in a cookie, every error, and a test.
@@ -667,8 +680,10 @@ to type.
 - **`confirm(token)`** spends the token in one conditional write — of two
   confirmations at once, one signs in — marks the e-mail verified and opens
   the session. A link lives `'15m'` (`tokens.magicLink`); there are no
-  attempts, since there is nothing to guess. `TOKEN_STALE`, `USER_INACTIVE`
-  and an active second factor are handled as for a code.
+  attempts, since there is nothing to guess. `TOKEN_STALE`, `USER_INACTIVE`,
+  an active second factor and **an e-mail proved for the first time — the
+  password and the second factor dropped, every session signed out** — are
+  handled as for a code.
 - **Not ended by a password write, nor limited by the sign-in throttle**:
   the password proves nothing a link does, and the throttle counts
   passwords. Rate-limit `request` per address and per client.
@@ -744,10 +759,10 @@ await auth.signUp({ email, password }); // the listener has the event before thi
 | `user.created` | `create`, `signUp` |
 | `user.emailVerified` | `verifyEmail.confirm`; `resetPassword.confirm`, `magicLink.confirm` and `signInCode.confirm`, whose link or code proves the e-mail too — never for an e-mail already verified |
 | `user.passwordReset` | `resetPassword.confirm` |
-| `user.passwordChanged` | `changePassword`, `setPassword` — never a reset, which is `user.passwordReset` alone |
+| `user.passwordChanged` | `changePassword`, `setPassword`; `signInCode.confirm` and `magicLink.confirm` when their first proof of the e-mail dropped a password — never a reset, which is `user.passwordReset` alone |
 | `user.emailChanged` | `update`, when it changed the e-mail — carrying `formerEmail`, the address before (`null` for none) |
 | `user.secondFactorEnabled` | `secondFactor.activate`, once the factor is active — not `enroll`, which leaves it waiting |
-| `user.secondFactorDisabled` | `secondFactor.disable`, when it removed an active factor — never for a user who had none, or one still waiting |
+| `user.secondFactorDisabled` | `secondFactor.disable`, when it removed an active factor; `signInCode.confirm` and `magicLink.confirm` when their first proof of the e-mail removed one, after `user.emailVerified` and any `user.passwordChanged` — never for a user who had none, or one still waiting |
 | `user.recoveryCodesRegenerated` | `secondFactor.regenerateRecoveryCodes` — not `activate`, whose codes come with `user.secondFactorEnabled` |
 | `user.recoveryCodeUsed` | `secondFactor.recover`, once the recovery code is spent: a sign-in without the user's phone |
 | `user.deleted` | `delete`, once — a replay that deletes nobody sends nothing |
@@ -1024,19 +1039,27 @@ the user's click answers `TOKEN_SPENT`. Link to a page that spends nothing,
 whose button posts the token — and echo into that page only a token of the
 token's shape. Refuse that `POST` from another site — check its `Origin`,
 or `Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin` — or any page can sign a visitor into an
-account whose link it holds. Whoever opens the link signs in, on the device
+account whose link it holds. Send that page with
+`Referrer-Policy: strict-origin`, not `no-referrer`, which makes its form's
+`Origin` `null` and the check refuse its own button. Whoever opens the link signs in, on the device
 that opened it: where the sign-in must complete in the browser that asked,
 send a code.
 
-**A link or a code proves an e-mail someone else may have registered.**
-`signUp` does not wait for the address to be proved, and `signIn` does not
-ask whether it was: whoever registered the address with a password of theirs
-keeps that password, and their session, after its owner signs in by link or
-code and the e-mail turns verified. Where a password signs in before the
-e-mail is verified, require `verifyEmail` before `signIn` — or, on the
-`user.emailVerified` those confirmations send, sign the user out everywhere
-— the listener runs before the new session opens — and have them set a
-password of their own.
+**The first sign-in by link or code drops the password and the second
+factor.** `signUp` does not wait for the address to be proved, so anyone can
+register somebody else's e-mail with a password of theirs, and enrol a second
+factor on their own phone. When `signInCode.confirm` or `magicLink.confirm`
+proves an e-mail never verified, it drops the password and the second factor
+— active or waiting, with its recovery codes — and signs out every session
+before opening its own — so a user who signed
+up, never verified, and then signs in by code has no password afterwards,
+and `signIn` answers `CREDENTIALS_INVALID` (`reason: 'noPassword'`). Offer
+`setPassword` after such a sign-in, or send `verifyEmail` at sign-up. An
+e-mail changed by `update` is unverified again, and its first proof by link
+or code drops both too. **So does a user who enrolled a factor before
+proving their own e-mail**: they sign in with no challenge, and enrol again
+— offer `secondFactor.enroll` after such a sign-in, or send `verifyEmail`
+before letting anyone enrol. An e-mail already verified keeps both.
 
 **Every `janus()` that signs users in needs the same `secondFactor`.** An
 instance without keys never signs in a user whose factor is active: `signIn`

package/dist/auth/email-sign-in.d.ts

@@ -28,8 +28,13 @@ export declare function keepOnlyLatest(context: Context, userId: string, kind: T
  * since it was sent and an inactive user, proves the e-mail — it reached the
  * inbox — and finishes as a password would.
  *
- * The proof is written under the version read, so an address changed since
- * is not the one proved: a `VERSION_CONFLICT` then, with the token spent.
+ * **An e-mail proved for the first time drops the password and the second
+ * factor, and revokes every session** before the new one opens
+ * (`./first-proof`): whoever signed up with the address without holding its
+ * inbox keeps nothing, and the owner is asked for no factor they never set.
+ * An e-mail already proved changes nothing. The proof is written under the
+ * version read, so an address changed since is not the one proved: a
+ * `VERSION_CONFLICT` then, with the token spent.
  */
 export declare function finishEmailSignIn(context: Context, type: ResolvedType, finish: Finish, signIn: {
     readonly user: UserRecord;

package/dist/auth/email-sign-in.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"email-sign-in.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/auth/email-sign-in.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;GAMG;AAGH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,UAAU,CAAC;AAC7C,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,OAAO,EAAiB,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAGtE,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAEvE,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AAE5C,uFAAuF;AACvF,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,CACpB,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,EAClB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,KACT,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEpC;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAsB,YAAY,CACjC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAChB,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY,EAClB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,GACX,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAG5B;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAsB,cAAc,CACnC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAChB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EACd,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EACf,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,GACZ,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAOf;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,wBAAsB,iBAAiB,CACtC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAChB,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY,EAClB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EACd,MAAM,EAAE;IACP,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IAC1B,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;IAC5B,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;CAChC,GACC,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAYhC"}

package/dist/auth/events.d.ts

@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ import type { Context } from './context';
  *   `signInCode.confirm`, which prove the e-mail too; never for an e-mail
  *   already verified;
  * - `user.passwordReset` — by `resetPassword.confirm`;
- * - `user.passwordChanged` — by `changePassword` and `setPassword`; never by a
+ * - `user.passwordChanged` — by `changePassword` and `setPassword`, and by
+ *   `signInCode.confirm` and `magicLink.confirm` when their first proof of
+ *   the e-mail dropped a password, after `user.emailVerified`; never by a
  *   reset, which is `user.passwordReset` alone;
  * - `user.emailChanged` — by `update`, when it changed the e-mail — compared
  *   normalised, the same test that makes the new one unverified. The one
@@ -17,7 +19,10 @@ import type { Context } from './context';
  * - `user.secondFactorEnabled` — by `secondFactor.activate`, once the factor
  *   is active: not by `enroll`, which leaves it waiting for its first code;
  * - `user.secondFactorDisabled` — by `secondFactor.disable`, when it removed
- *   an active factor; never for a user who had none, or one still waiting;
+ *   an active factor, and by `signInCode.confirm` and `magicLink.confirm`
+ *   when their first proof of the e-mail removed one, after
+ *   `user.emailVerified` and any `user.passwordChanged`; never for a user who
+ *   had none, or one still waiting;
  * - `user.recoveryCodesRegenerated` — by `secondFactor.regenerateRecoveryCodes`:
  *   the codes the user held stopped working. Not by `activate`, whose codes
  *   come with `user.secondFactorEnabled`;

package/dist/auth/events.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"events.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/auth/events.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,EAAU,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAC5C,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAEzC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAwBG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,aAAa,GACtB,cAAc,GACd,oBAAoB,GACpB,oBAAoB,GACpB,sBAAsB,GACtB,mBAAmB,GACnB,0BAA0B,GAC1B,2BAA2B,GAC3B,+BAA+B,GAC/B,uBAAuB,GACvB,cAAc,CAAC;AAElB;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS;IACzB,kEAAkE;IAClE,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;IAChB,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC;IAC7B;;;OAGG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;IAC1B,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;IACpB,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC1B;;;;;OAKG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;CACrC;AAED,wEAAwE;AACxE,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;AAEzD;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;AAE3E,oFAAoF;AACpF,wBAAgB,aAAa,CAC5B,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,EACf,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,GACX,iBAAiB,GAAG,IAAI,CAQ1B;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAsB,IAAI,CACzB,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAChB,IAAI,EAAE,aAAa,EACnB,IAAI,EAAE;IAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;IAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,EAChD,UAAU,EAAE,IAAI,EAChB,MAAM,GAAE,WAAgB,GACtB,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAqBf"}
+{"version":3,"file":"events.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/auth/events.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,EAAU,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAC5C,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAEzC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA6BG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,aAAa,GACtB,cAAc,GACd,oBAAoB,GACpB,oBAAoB,GACpB,sBAAsB,GACtB,mBAAmB,GACnB,0BAA0B,GAC1B,2BAA2B,GAC3B,+BAA+B,GAC/B,uBAAuB,GACvB,cAAc,CAAC;AAElB;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS;IACzB,kEAAkE;IAClE,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;IAChB,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC;IAC7B;;;OAGG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;IAC1B,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;IACpB,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC1B;;;;;OAKG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;CACrC;AAED,wEAAwE;AACxE,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;AAEzD;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;AAE3E,oFAAoF;AACpF,wBAAgB,aAAa,CAC5B,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,EACf,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,GACX,iBAAiB,GAAG,IAAI,CAQ1B;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAsB,IAAI,CACzB,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAChB,IAAI,EAAE,aAAa,EACnB,IAAI,EAAE;IAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC;IAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,EAChD,UAAU,EAAE,IAAI,EAChB,MAAM,GAAE,WAAgB,GACtB,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAqBf"}

package/dist/auth/first-proof.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/**
+ * The first proof of an e-mail by a sign-in code or a sign-in link: the
+ * address reached an inbox no one had proved before, so whatever was set on
+ * the account before that proof is not the inbox holder's to keep.
+ *
+ * Anybody can sign up with somebody else's e-mail and a password of their
+ * own — and enrol a second factor on their own phone. Without this, the real
+ * holder signing in by e-mail later would verify the address and leave that
+ * password, that factor and their sessions working: locked out by a factor
+ * they never set, or signed in beside someone who still holds the account.
+ * So the write that proves the address also drops the password and the
+ * second factor with its recovery codes, and every session is revoked before
+ * the new one opens: the same ending as `resetPassword.confirm`, which
+ * proves the address too, plus the factor it keeps.
+ */
+import type { ResolvedType } from './config';
+import { type Context } from './context';
+import type { UserRecord } from './port/types';
+/**
+ * Proves `user`'s e-mail, never proved before, under the version read — an
+ * address changed since is not the one proved: a `VERSION_CONFLICT` then.
+ * Drops the password and the second factor — active or waiting, and its
+ * recovery codes with it — in the same write, and revokes every session and
+ * spends what the password opened — reset links and second-factor
+ * challenges — **both before the write and after it**.
+ *
+ * Before, so an outage there leaves the e-mail unproved and the owner's next
+ * code or link runs this again; after, so a sign-in landing in between is
+ * ended too. An outage after the write is the one that leaves a session live.
+ *
+ * `user.emailVerified` is sent, then `user.passwordChanged` when a password
+ * was dropped and `user.secondFactorDisabled` when an active factor was —
+ * the rule of `secondFactor.disable` — from a `finally`, so an outage ending
+ * the sessions still reports the write, which a retry would not make again.
+ */
+export declare function proveFirstEmail(context: Context, type: ResolvedType, user: UserRecord, where: string): Promise<UserRecord>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=first-proof.d.ts.map

package/dist/auth/first-proof.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"first-proof.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/auth/first-proof.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AAGH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,UAAU,CAAC;AAC7C,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,OAAO,EAAa,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAGpD,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAG/C;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AACH,wBAAsB,eAAe,CACpC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAChB,IAAI,EAAE,YAAY,EAClB,IAAI,EAAE,UAAU,EAChB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,GACX,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAwCrB"}

package/dist/auth/types/email-flows.d.ts

@@ -51,7 +51,10 @@ export interface SignInCodeApi<U, Answer = SignedIn<U>> {
         request(email: string): Promise<IssuedCode<U> | null>;
         /**
          * Checks the code against its challenge, marks the e-mail verified —
-         * the code reached the inbox — and signs the user in.
+         * the code reached the inbox — and signs the user in. **An e-mail
+         * proved for the first time drops the password and the second factor,
+         * and signs out every session** before the new one opens, as for a
+         * link. An e-mail already verified changes nothing.
          *
          * A challenge takes **five attempts**: a code that does not match is
          * `CODE_INVALID` with `attemptsLeft`, and the fifth spends it. An

package/dist/auth/types/email-flows.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/auth/types/magic-link.d.ts

@@ -31,7 +31,11 @@ export interface MagicLinkApi<U, Answer = SignedIn<U>> {
         }) | null>;
         /**
          * Spends the link's token, marks the e-mail verified — the link reached
-         * the inbox — and signs the user in.
+         * the inbox — and signs the user in. **An e-mail proved for the first
+         * time drops the password and the second factor, and signs out every
+         * session** before the new one opens: whoever registered the address
+         * without its inbox keeps nothing, and no factor is asked for. An
+         * e-mail already verified changes nothing.
          *
          * **Call it from a `POST`**, never from the `GET` of the link: a mail
          * scanner that opens the link would spend it. An unknown, spent or

package/dist/auth/types/magic-link.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/index.js

@@ -1200,6 +1200,140 @@ function emailFlows(context, type, at) {
     resetPassword: resetPasswordFlows(context, type, at)
   };
 }
+// src/auth/totp.ts
+import { createHmac, randomBytes as randomBytes4 } from "node:crypto";
+var TOTP = { digits: 6, stepMs: 30000, drift: 1 };
+var BASE32 = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567";
+function mintTotpSecret() {
+  return toBase32(randomBytes4(20));
+}
+function toBase32(bytes) {
+  let bits = 0;
+  let value = 0;
+  let out = "";
+  for (const byte of bytes) {
+    value = value << 8 | byte;
+    bits += 8;
+    while (bits >= 5) {
+      out += BASE32[value >>> bits - 5 & 31];
+      bits -= 5;
+    }
+  }
+  if (bits > 0)
+    out += BASE32[value << 5 - bits & 31];
+  return out;
+}
+function fromBase32(text) {
+  let bits = 0;
+  let value = 0;
+  const out = [];
+  for (const char of text) {
+    const index = BASE32.indexOf(char);
+    if (index === -1)
+      throw new TypeError("totp: the secret is not base32");
+    value = value << 5 | index;
+    bits += 5;
+    if (bits >= 8) {
+      out.push(value >>> bits - 8 & 255);
+      bits -= 8;
+    }
+  }
+  return Buffer.from(out);
+}
+var stepAt = (now) => Math.floor(now.getTime() / TOTP.stepMs);
+function codeAt(secret, step) {
+  const counter = Buffer.alloc(8);
+  counter.writeBigUInt64BE(BigInt(step));
+  const digest = createHmac("sha1", secret).update(counter).digest();
+  const offset = digest[19] & 15;
+  const binary = digest.readUInt32BE(offset) & 2147483647;
+  return String(binary % 10 ** TOTP.digits).padStart(TOTP.digits, "0");
+}
+function matchStep(secret, code, now, lastStep) {
+  if (!/^\d{6}$/.test(code))
+    return null;
+  const current = stepAt(now);
+  let matched = null;
+  for (let step = current - TOTP.drift;step <= current + TOTP.drift; step++) {
+    const fresh = lastStep === null || step > lastStep;
+    if (equalCodes(codeAt(secret, step), code) && fresh && matched === null) {
+      matched = step;
+    }
+  }
+  return matched;
+}
+function equalCodes(a, b) {
+  let difference = a.length ^ b.length;
+  for (let i = 0;i < a.length; i++) {
+    difference |= a.charCodeAt(i) ^ b.charCodeAt(i);
+  }
+  return difference === 0;
+}
+function otpauthUri(issuer, account, secret) {
+  const label = `${encodeURIComponent(issuer)}:${encodeURIComponent(account)}`;
+  const query = new URLSearchParams({
+    secret,
+    issuer,
+    algorithm: "SHA1",
+    digits: String(TOTP.digits),
+    period: String(TOTP.stepMs / 1000)
+  });
+  return `otpauth://totp/${label}?${query}`;
+}
+
+// src/auth/second-factor/factor.ts
+var isActive = (factor) => factor !== null && factor.confirmedAt !== null;
+function requireSettings(context, where, why) {
+  const configured = context.config.secondFactor;
+  if (configured === null) {
+    throw new TypeError(`${where}: ${why}, and janus() was given no secondFactor — pass secondFactor: { issuer, keys }`);
+  }
+  return configured;
+}
+function acceptCode(configured, record, factor, code, now, where) {
+  const { plain, keyId } = unseal(configured.sealer, factor.secret, record.id, where);
+  const step = matchStep(fromBase32(plain), code, now, factor.lastStep);
+  if (step === null)
+    return null;
+  return {
+    ...factor,
+    lastStep: step,
+    secret: keyId === configured.sealer.sealWith ? factor.secret : seal(configured.sealer, plain, record.id)
+  };
+}
+
+// src/auth/first-proof.ts
+async function proveFirstEmail(context, type, user, where) {
+  await endWhatTheSquatterOpened(context, user.id);
+  let dropped = false;
+  let disabled = false;
+  const proved = await writeUser(context, user.id, type, { ifVersion: user.version }, where, (record, now) => {
+    dropped = record.password !== null;
+    disabled = isActive(record.secondFactor);
+    return {
+      emailVerifiedAt: now,
+      ...dropped ? { password: null } : {},
+      ...record.secondFactor === null ? {} : { secondFactor: null }
+    };
+  });
+  try {
+    await endWhatTheSquatterOpened(context, proved.id);
+  } finally {
+    await emit(context, "user.emailVerified", proved, proved.updatedAt);
+    if (dropped) {
+      await emit(context, "user.passwordChanged", proved, proved.updatedAt);
+    }
+    if (disabled) {
+      await emit(context, "user.secondFactorDisabled", proved, proved.updatedAt);
+    }
+  }
+  return proved;
+}
+async function endWhatTheSquatterOpened(context, userId) {
+  await context.store.sessions.revokeUserSessions(userId, context.clock.now());
+  await endWhatThePasswordOpened(context, userId);
+}
+
 // src/auth/email-sign-in.ts
 async function signInHolder(context, type, email) {
   const record = await holderOfEmail(context, type, email);
@@ -1219,9 +1353,7 @@ async function finishEmailSignIn(context, type, finish, signIn) {
   }
   if (user.emailVerifiedAt !== null)
     return finish(user, where);
-  const proved = await writeUser(context, user.id, type, { ifVersion: user.version }, where, (_, now) => ({ emailVerifiedAt: now }));
-  await emit(context, "user.emailVerified", proved, proved.updatedAt);
-  return finish(proved, where);
+  return finish(await proveFirstEmail(context, type, user, where), where);
 }
 
 // src/auth/magic-link.ts
@@ -1260,7 +1392,7 @@ async function confirmLink(context, type, finish, secret, where) {
 }
 
 // src/auth/derived-keys.ts
-import { createHmac, hkdfSync } from "node:crypto";
+import { createHmac as createHmac2, hkdfSync } from "node:crypto";
 var derived = new WeakMap;
 function derivedKey(sealer, purpose, keyId = sealer.sealWith) {
   let keys = derived.get(sealer);
@@ -1280,7 +1412,7 @@ function derivedKey(sealer, purpose, keyId = sealer.sealWith) {
   return key;
 }
 function keyedHash(key, parts) {
-  return createHmac("sha256", key).update(parts.join("\x00")).digest();
+  return createHmac2("sha256", key).update(parts.join("\x00")).digest();
 }
 
 // src/auth/sign-in-attempts.ts
@@ -1329,108 +1461,6 @@ async function restartSignInCount(context, type, record, where) {
   await context.store.tokens.consumeToken(counted.link, "secondFactor", context.clock.now());
 }
 
-// src/auth/totp.ts
-import { createHmac as createHmac2, randomBytes as randomBytes4 } from "node:crypto";
-var TOTP = { digits: 6, stepMs: 30000, drift: 1 };
-var BASE32 = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567";
-function mintTotpSecret() {
-  return toBase32(randomBytes4(20));
-}
-function toBase32(bytes) {
-  let bits = 0;
-  let value = 0;
-  let out = "";
-  for (const byte of bytes) {
-    value = value << 8 | byte;
-    bits += 8;
-    while (bits >= 5) {
-      out += BASE32[value >>> bits - 5 & 31];
-      bits -= 5;
-    }
-  }
-  if (bits > 0)
-    out += BASE32[value << 5 - bits & 31];
-  return out;
-}
-function fromBase32(text) {
-  let bits = 0;
-  let value = 0;
-  const out = [];
-  for (const char of text) {
-    const index = BASE32.indexOf(char);
-    if (index === -1)
-      throw new TypeError("totp: the secret is not base32");
-    value = value << 5 | index;
-    bits += 5;
-    if (bits >= 8) {
-      out.push(value >>> bits - 8 & 255);
-      bits -= 8;
-    }
-  }
-  return Buffer.from(out);
-}
-var stepAt = (now) => Math.floor(now.getTime() / TOTP.stepMs);
-function codeAt(secret, step) {
-  const counter = Buffer.alloc(8);
-  counter.writeBigUInt64BE(BigInt(step));
-  const digest = createHmac2("sha1", secret).update(counter).digest();
-  const offset = digest[19] & 15;
-  const binary = digest.readUInt32BE(offset) & 2147483647;
-  return String(binary % 10 ** TOTP.digits).padStart(TOTP.digits, "0");
-}
-function matchStep(secret, code, now, lastStep) {
-  if (!/^\d{6}$/.test(code))
-    return null;
-  const current = stepAt(now);
-  let matched = null;
-  for (let step = current - TOTP.drift;step <= current + TOTP.drift; step++) {
-    const fresh = lastStep === null || step > lastStep;
-    if (equalCodes(codeAt(secret, step), code) && fresh && matched === null) {
-      matched = step;
-    }
-  }
-  return matched;
-}
-function equalCodes(a, b) {
-  let difference = a.length ^ b.length;
-  for (let i = 0;i < a.length; i++) {
-    difference |= a.charCodeAt(i) ^ b.charCodeAt(i);
-  }
-  return difference === 0;
-}
-function otpauthUri(issuer, account, secret) {
-  const label = `${encodeURIComponent(issuer)}:${encodeURIComponent(account)}`;
-  const query = new URLSearchParams({
-    secret,
-    issuer,
-    algorithm: "SHA1",
-    digits: String(TOTP.digits),
-    period: String(TOTP.stepMs / 1000)
-  });
-  return `otpauth://totp/${label}?${query}`;
-}
-
-// src/auth/second-factor/factor.ts
-var isActive = (factor) => factor !== null && factor.confirmedAt !== null;
-function requireSettings(context, where, why) {
-  const configured = context.config.secondFactor;
-  if (configured === null) {
-    throw new TypeError(`${where}: ${why}, and janus() was given no secondFactor — pass secondFactor: { issuer, keys }`);
-  }
-  return configured;
-}
-function acceptCode(configured, record, factor, code, now, where) {
-  const { plain, keyId } = unseal(configured.sealer, factor.secret, record.id, where);
-  const step = matchStep(fromBase32(plain), code, now, factor.lastStep);
-  if (step === null)
-    return null;
-  return {
-    ...factor,
-    lastStep: step,
-    secret: keyId === configured.sealer.sealWith ? factor.secret : seal(configured.sealer, plain, record.id)
-  };
-}
-
 // src/auth/second-factor/redeem.ts
 var spendChallenge = (context, challenge, where) => spendOneTime(context, challenge, "secondFactor", where, "challenge");
 async function openChallenge(context, type, challenge, where) {
@@ -2270,5 +2300,5 @@ export {
   systemClock
 };
 
-//# debugId=56E4EBD3ED51BF6B64756E2164756E21
+//# debugId=BC1254710D035B0264756E2164756E21
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map