@noy-db/on-webauthn 0.8.0 → 0.9.0

package/README.md

@@ -1,5 +1,16 @@
 # @noy-db/on-webauthn
 
+<!-- prose-preamble
+// Bindings the illustrative blocks below elide — the reader's own storage and
+// store choice. Typed on purpose: an `any` here would stop the blocks below
+// checking anything.
+import type { NoydbStore, UnlockedKeyring } from '@noy-db/hub'
+import type { WebAuthnEnrollment } from '@noy-db/on-webauthn'
+declare const store: NoydbStore
+declare const keyring: UnlockedKeyring
+declare function loadEnrollmentFromIDB(): Promise<WebAuthnEnrollment>
+-->
+
 [![npm](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/%40noy-db/on-webauthn.svg)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@noy-db/on-webauthn)
 
 > WebAuthn hardware-key keyrings for noy-db
@@ -39,6 +50,47 @@ The callback is invoked lazily on the first `openVault(name)` per vault and the
 
 For first-time bootstrap (no enrollment exists yet), open the vault with a secret, enroll WebAuthn from the unlocked keyring (`enrollWebAuthn(keyring, ...)`), persist the enrollment, then swap to `getKeyring` on subsequent sessions.
 
+## One credential across subdomains — the RP ID
+
+A WebAuthn credential belongs to a **relying party ID**, and the browser
+defaults that to the page's own hostname. Enrol on `app.example.com` and the
+credential is invisible to `console.example.com`. To share one tap across
+subdomains, enrol under the **registrable domain**:
+
+```ts
+import { enrollWebAuthn, unlockWebAuthn } from '@noy-db/on-webauthn'
+
+// Enrol once, under the parent domain — valid from any of its subdomains.
+const enrollment = await enrollWebAuthn(keyring, 'company-a', {
+  rp: { id: 'example.com', name: 'Example' },
+})
+
+// The RP ID is recorded on the enrollment, so the assertion reuses it.
+// No second place to keep in sync.
+const unlocked = await unlockWebAuthn(enrollment)
+```
+
+The RP ID must be a registrable suffix of the enrolling page's origin: from
+`app.example.com` you may pass `example.com`, but not `example.org` and not
+`com`. The browser rejects anything else with a `SecurityError`.
+
+⚠️ **Records enrolled before `0.9.0` carry no `rpId`**, and for those the
+assertion sends none — preserving the old behaviour, where the browser
+defaults it to the asserting page. That is correct for a single-hostname
+deployment and wrong for a cross-subdomain one, so pass it explicitly when
+upgrading such a record:
+
+```ts
+import { unlockWebAuthn } from '@noy-db/on-webauthn'
+
+const legacy = await loadEnrollmentFromIDB()
+const unlocked = await unlockWebAuthn(legacy, { rpId: 'example.com' })
+```
+
+The same `rpId` option is accepted by `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony`, whose slot
+`meta` is written by hub and does not carry an RP ID today — so for the
+ceremony path the option is currently the only route.
+
 ## Status
 
 **Pre-release** (`0.1.0-pre.1`). API may change before `1.0`.

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -46,18 +46,18 @@ export { ValidationError } from '@noy-db/hub';
  * Enrollment flow
  * ───────────────
  * 1. User is already authenticated (secret or existing session).
- * 2. Call `enrollWebAuthn(keyring, options)`.
+ * 2. Call `enrollWebAuthn(keyring, vault, options?)`.
  * 3. WebAuthn credential is created; PRF or rawId-derived key wraps the KEK.
- * 4. Returns a `WebAuthnEnrollment` — persist this to the noy-db adapter
- *    via `saveEnrollment()`, or store it yourself in any encrypted collection.
+ * 4. Returns a `WebAuthnEnrollment` — persist it yourself, in any collection
+ *    or in IndexedDB. This package ships no storage helper.
  *
  * Unlock flow
  * ───────────
- * 1. Load the `WebAuthnEnrollment` via `loadEnrollment()`.
- * 2. Call `unlockWebAuthn(enrollment, keyring)` — triggers the WebAuthn
+ * 1. Load the `WebAuthnEnrollment` back from wherever you persisted it.
+ * 2. Call `unlockWebAuthn(enrollment, options?)` — triggers the WebAuthn
  *    assertion prompt.
- * 3. On success, returns the unwrapped `CryptoKey` (the KEK) — use it to
- *    re-hydrate the session via `createSession()`.
+ * 3. On success, returns an `UnlockedKeyring`. Pass it to `createNoydb` via
+ *    the `getKeyring` callback; see this package's README.
  */
 
 /**
@@ -139,6 +139,21 @@ interface WebAuthnEnrollment {
     readonly wrapIv: string;
     /** ISO timestamp of enrollment. */
     readonly enrolledAt: string;
+    /**
+     * The RP ID this credential was created under.
+     *
+     * ⚠️ OPTIONAL, and absence is not a default — records written before
+     * 0.9.0 do not carry it, and for those `unlockWebAuthn` sends no `rpId`,
+     * leaving the browser to default it to the asserting page's hostname.
+     * That is the old behaviour, preserved deliberately: a record enrolled
+     * on `app.example.com` must keep unlocking there.
+     *
+     * When present it is sent back as `publicKey.rpId` at assertion time, so
+     * enrolment and assertion cannot disagree — which is the whole point:
+     * enrol under the registrable domain (`rp: { id: 'example.com' }`) and
+     * every subdomain asserts against the same credential.
+     */
+    readonly rpId?: string;
 }
 /** Options for `enrollWebAuthn()`. */
 interface WebAuthnEnrollOptions {
@@ -182,6 +197,15 @@ interface WebAuthnEnrollOptions {
 interface WebAuthnUnlockOptions {
     /** WebAuthn timeout in milliseconds. Default: 60_000. */
     timeout?: number;
+    /**
+     * RP ID to assert against. Overrides the one recorded at enrolment.
+     *
+     * Needed when the record predates `WebAuthnEnrollment.rpId`, or when the
+     * slot's `meta` carries none — without it the browser defaults the RP ID
+     * to the asserting page's hostname, so a credential enrolled under
+     * `example.com` is invisible to `app.example.com`.
+     */
+    rpId?: string;
     /**
      * Only consulted by `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony()` — `unlockWebAuthn()`
      * ignores it, since unlocking an existing non-PRF record is always

package/dist/index.js

@@ -213,7 +213,8 @@ async function enrollWebAuthn(keyring, vault, options = {}) {
     requireSingleDevice: options.requireSingleDevice ?? false,
     wrappedPayload,
     wrapIv,
-    enrolledAt: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString()
+    enrolledAt: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
+    rpId
   };
 }
 async function unlockWebAuthn(enrollment, options = {}) {
@@ -222,6 +223,7 @@ async function unlockWebAuthn(enrollment, options = {}) {
   }
   const timeout = options.timeout ?? 6e4;
   const credentialId = base64ToBuffer(enrollment.credentialId);
+  const rpId = options.rpId ?? enrollment.rpId;
   const extensionsInput = enrollment.prfUsed ? { prf: { eval: { first: PRF_SALT } } } : {};
   const assertion = await navigator.credentials.get({
     publicKey: {
@@ -229,7 +231,8 @@ async function unlockWebAuthn(enrollment, options = {}) {
       allowCredentials: [{ type: "public-key", id: credentialId }],
       userVerification: "required",
       extensions: extensionsInput,
-      timeout
+      timeout,
+      ...rpId !== void 0 ? { rpId } : {}
     }
   });
   if (!assertion) {
@@ -286,6 +289,7 @@ async function webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony(ctx, options = {}) {
   }
   const credentialIdBuf = base64ToBuffer(meta.credentialId);
   const timeout = options.timeout ?? 6e4;
+  const rpId = options.rpId ?? (typeof meta.rpId === "string" && meta.rpId.length > 0 ? meta.rpId : void 0);
   const extensionsInput = prfUsed ? { prf: { eval: { first: PRF_SALT } } } : {};
   const assertion = await navigator.credentials.get({
     publicKey: {
@@ -293,7 +297,8 @@ async function webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony(ctx, options = {}) {
       allowCredentials: [{ type: "public-key", id: credentialIdBuf }],
       userVerification: "required",
       extensions: extensionsInput,
-      timeout
+      timeout,
+      ...rpId !== void 0 ? { rpId } : {}
     }
   });
   if (!assertion) {

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @noy-db/on-webauthn —\n *\n * Hardware-key keyring for noy-db using the WebAuthn API.\n *\n * Covers every form factor:\n *   - Platform authenticators: Touch ID, Face ID, Windows Hello, Android biometric\n *   - Roaming authenticators: YubiKey (5C NFC, Bio), SoloKey, Titan, any FIDO2 key\n *   - Passkey-capable platform authenticators: iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager\n *\n * Key derivation model\n * ────────────────────\n * This package uses the **PRF (Pseudo-Random Function) extension** when\n * available to derive a deterministic wrapping key from the WebAuthn\n * credential. The PRF output is consistent across assertions on the same\n * device/credential, enabling unlock-without-secret while keeping the\n * derived key bound to the physical authenticator.\n *\n * When PRF is not supported by the authenticator (common on older hardware),\n * the package can fall back to HKDF-SHA256 over the credential's `rawId` —\n * but by default, enrollment refuses this path because the `rawId` is stored\n * in the record itself, making the record self-decrypting (presence gate, not\n * confidentiality). Use `allowNonPrfInsecure: true` to opt in; prefer a\n * PRF-capable device or the secret for real confidentiality.\n *\n * The derived key is NEVER persisted. It exists only in memory during the\n * unlock operation. What IS persisted (in the noy-db adapter, not in browser\n * storage) is the wrapped KEK: `encrypt(KEK, derivedKey)`.\n *\n * BE-flag guards\n * ──────────────\n * The backup-eligibility (BE) flag in a WebAuthn authenticator data signals\n * that the credential is (or can be) synced across devices — e.g. stored in\n * iCloud Keychain. For single-device security policies (air-gapped USB sticks,\n * high-security terminals), this is a threat: the credential is available on\n * any device where the user's iCloud account is signed in.\n *\n * The `requireSingleDevice: true` option rejects credentials with the BE flag\n * set during enrollment. Existing enrollments are checked at assertion time —\n * if the authenticator data shows BE=1 but `requireSingleDevice` was set at\n * enrollment, the assertion throws `WebAuthnMultiDeviceError`.\n *\n * Enrollment flow\n * ───────────────\n * 1. User is already authenticated (secret or existing session).\n * 2. Call `enrollWebAuthn(keyring, options)`.\n * 3. WebAuthn credential is created; PRF or rawId-derived key wraps the KEK.\n * 4. Returns a `WebAuthnEnrollment` — persist this to the noy-db adapter\n *    via `saveEnrollment()`, or store it yourself in any encrypted collection.\n *\n * Unlock flow\n * ───────────\n * 1. Load the `WebAuthnEnrollment` via `loadEnrollment()`.\n * 2. Call `unlockWebAuthn(enrollment, keyring)` — triggers the WebAuthn\n *    assertion prompt.\n * 3. On success, returns the unwrapped `CryptoKey` (the KEK) — use it to\n *    re-hydrate the session via `createSession()`.\n */\n\nimport { bufferToBase64, base64ToBuffer } from '@noy-db/hub'\nimport { ValidationError } from '@noy-db/hub'\nimport type { Role } from '@noy-db/hub'\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring, EnrollAuthenticatorOptions, SlotRewrapContext } from '@noy-db/hub/on'\n\n// Re-export from core for convenience\nexport { ValidationError } from '@noy-db/hub'\n\n// ─── Error types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Thrown when the WebAuthn API is not available in the current environment.\n *\n * Check `isWebAuthnAvailable()` before calling `enrollWebAuthn()` or\n * `unlockWebAuthn()` and show a fallback UI (secret entry) if this\n * returns false. Common scenarios: Node.js environments, older browsers,\n * non-HTTPS origins (WebAuthn requires a Secure Context).\n */\nexport class WebAuthnNotAvailableError extends Error {\n  readonly code = 'WEBAUTHN_NOT_AVAILABLE'\n  constructor() {\n    super('WebAuthn is not available in this environment. A browser with navigator.credentials support is required.')\n    this.name = 'WebAuthnNotAvailableError'\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Thrown when the user dismisses the WebAuthn prompt without completing it.\n *\n * The `op` field distinguishes enrollment cancellation (user chose not to\n * enroll a hardware key) from assertion cancellation (user dismissed the\n * unlock prompt). Treat this as a user-initiated action, not an error — show\n * a \"use secret instead\" option rather than an error message.\n */\nexport class WebAuthnCancelledError extends Error {\n  readonly code = 'WEBAUTHN_CANCELLED'\n  constructor(op: 'enrollment' | 'assertion') {\n    super(`WebAuthn ${op} was cancelled by the user.`)\n    this.name = 'WebAuthnCancelledError'\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Thrown when the authenticator has the backup-eligible (BE) flag set but\n * the vault requires a single-device credential (`requireSingleDevice: true`).\n *\n * A BE credential is synced across devices (e.g. iCloud Keychain, Google\n * Password Manager), which violates the single-device security model. The\n * user must enroll a hardware security key (YubiKey, Titan, SoloKey) instead.\n */\nexport class WebAuthnMultiDeviceError extends Error {\n  readonly code = 'WEBAUTHN_MULTI_DEVICE'\n  constructor() {\n    super(\n      'This credential is backup-eligible (BE flag set) and may be synced across devices. ' +\n      'The vault requires a single-device credential (requireSingleDevice: true). ' +\n      'Please use a hardware security key (YubiKey, Titan, SoloKey) or a platform ' +\n      'authenticator that does not sync credentials across devices.',\n    )\n    this.name = 'WebAuthnMultiDeviceError'\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Thrown when `enrollWebAuthn()` (or `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony()`) is\n * asked to enroll/rewrap without a PRF-capable authenticator and without\n * explicit opt-in via `allowNonPrfInsecure: true`.\n *\n * Non-PRF WebAuthn cannot provide confidentiality: its wrapping key derives\n * entirely from the credential's `rawId`, which is stored in cleartext in\n * the enrollment record itself — the record would self-decrypt with no\n * authenticator involved. By default, enrollment/rewrap refuses this path.\n * Use a PRF-capable credential, fall back to the secret, or set\n * `allowNonPrfInsecure: true` to explicitly accept a non-confidential\n * presence gate instead.\n */\nexport class WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError extends Error {\n  readonly code = 'WEBAUTHN_PRF_UNAVAILABLE'\n  constructor() {\n    super(\n      'The PRF extension is not available on this authenticator, so it cannot provide ' +\n      'WebAuthn confidentiality — the non-PRF wrapping key derives entirely from the ' +\n      \"credential's rawId, which is stored in the enrollment record itself (the record \" +\n      'would self-decrypt with no authenticator involved). Enrollment refuses this path ' +\n      'by default. Use a PRF-capable authenticator, use the secret instead, or pass ' +\n      '{ allowNonPrfInsecure: true } to explicitly accept a non-confidential presence gate.',\n    )\n    this.name = 'WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError'\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * A persisted WebAuthn enrollment record. Store this in a noy-db\n * collection (encrypted like any other record) or return it from\n * `saveEnrollment()` / `loadEnrollment()` helpers.\n */\nexport interface WebAuthnEnrollment {\n  /** Enrollment format version. */\n  readonly _noydb_webauthn: 1\n  /** The vault this enrollment was created for. */\n  readonly vault: string\n  /** The user ID this enrollment belongs to. */\n  readonly userId: string\n  /** WebAuthn credential ID (base64). Use for allowCredentials in assertions. */\n  readonly credentialId: string\n  /** Whether PRF was used for key derivation (vs rawId HKDF fallback). */\n  readonly prfUsed: boolean\n  /** Whether the BE (backup-eligibility) flag was present at enrollment time. */\n  readonly beFlag: boolean\n  /** Whether single-device was required at enrollment time. */\n  readonly requireSingleDevice: boolean\n  /** The wrapped KEK: encrypt(exportedDekMap, derivedKey). Base64. */\n  readonly wrappedPayload: string\n  /** IV used for the wrapping. Base64. */\n  readonly wrapIv: string\n  /** ISO timestamp of enrollment. */\n  readonly enrolledAt: string\n}\n\n/** Options for `enrollWebAuthn()`. */\nexport interface WebAuthnEnrollOptions {\n  /**\n   * Relying party ID and name for the WebAuthn credential.\n   * Defaults to `{ id: window.location.hostname, name: 'NOYDB' }`.\n   */\n  rp?: { id?: string; name: string }\n  /**\n   * If `true`, refuse to enroll credentials with the BE flag set\n   * (multi-device / syncable passkeys). Defaults to `false`.\n   *\n   * Set to `true` for high-security deployments where the credential\n   * must be bound to a single physical device (YubiKey, Titan, etc.).\n   */\n  requireSingleDevice?: boolean\n  /**\n   * WebAuthn timeout in milliseconds. Default: 60_000.\n   */\n  timeout?: number\n  /**\n   * If `true`, prefer a cross-platform authenticator (roaming security key).\n   * If `false`, prefer a platform authenticator (Touch ID, Face ID).\n   * If undefined, let the browser choose.\n   */\n  preferCrossPlatform?: boolean\n  /**\n   * Non-PRF WebAuthn cannot provide confidentiality — its wrapping key\n   * derives from `credentialId`, which is stored in the enrollment record,\n   * so the record self-decrypts with no authenticator. By default,\n   * enrollment REFUSES the non-PRF path (throws `WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError`).\n   * Set `true` ONLY to explicitly opt into a non-confidential presence gate;\n   * prefer the secret or a PRF-capable credential for real confidentiality.\n   */\n  allowNonPrfInsecure?: boolean\n}\n\n/** Options for `unlockWebAuthn()`. */\nexport interface WebAuthnUnlockOptions {\n  /** WebAuthn timeout in milliseconds. Default: 60_000. */\n  timeout?: number\n  /**\n   * Only consulted by `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony()` — `unlockWebAuthn()`\n   * ignores it, since unlocking an existing non-PRF record is always\n   * permitted (back-compat; that record was never confidential). Same\n   * semantics as `WebAuthnEnrollOptions.allowNonPrfInsecure`: required to\n   * rewrap a non-PRF slot, since rewrap produces a fresh self-decrypting\n   * wrapped payload.\n   */\n  allowNonPrfInsecure?: boolean\n}\n\n// ─── Environment check ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Returns `true` if WebAuthn is available and can be used for enrollment or unlock.\n *\n * Checks for `navigator.credentials`, `window.PublicKeyCredential`, and a\n * Secure Context (`window.isSecureContext`). Call this before rendering the\n * \"Register hardware key\" button to avoid showing options that will fail.\n */\nexport function isWebAuthnAvailable(): boolean {\n  return (\n    typeof window !== 'undefined' &&\n    typeof window.PublicKeyCredential !== 'undefined' &&\n    typeof navigator !== 'undefined' &&\n    typeof navigator.credentials !== 'undefined'\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── PRF salt ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nconst PRF_SALT = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-webauthn-kek-derive')\n\n// ─── Key derivation helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive a wrapping key from PRF output.\n * PRF output is 32 bytes of authenticator-bound pseudo-random data.\n */\nasync function deriveKeyFromPRF(prfOutput: ArrayBuffer): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    prfOutput,\n    'HKDF',\n    false,\n    ['deriveKey'],\n  )\n  return globalThis.crypto.subtle.deriveKey(\n    {\n      name: 'HKDF',\n      hash: 'SHA-256',\n      salt: PRF_SALT,\n      info: new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-kek-wrap-v1'),\n    },\n    keyMaterial,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive a wrapping key from the credential's rawId (fallback when PRF unavailable).\n * rawId IS the entire secret and is stored in the record itself — the record\n * self-decrypts with no authenticator involved (presence gate, not confidentiality).\n * Universally supported but only usable via explicit `allowNonPrfInsecure: true`.\n */\nasync function deriveKeyFromRawId(rawId: ArrayBuffer): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    rawId,\n    'HKDF',\n    false,\n    ['deriveKey'],\n  )\n  return globalThis.crypto.subtle.deriveKey(\n    {\n      name: 'HKDF',\n      hash: 'SHA-256',\n      salt: new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-webauthn-rawid-fallback'),\n      info: new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-kek-wrap-v1'),\n    },\n    keyMaterial,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── BE flag extraction ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Extract the BE (backup-eligibility) flag from WebAuthn authenticator data.\n * Authenticator data byte layout (CTAP2 spec):\n *   bytes 0-31:  rpIdHash\n *   byte  32:    flags byte\n *   bytes 33-36: signCount\n *   ...\n *\n * Flags byte bit layout (bit 0 = LSB):\n *   bit 0 (UP):  user presence\n *   bit 2 (UV):  user verification\n *   bit 3 (BE):  backup eligibility\n *   bit 4 (BS):  backup state\n *   bit 6 (AT):  attested credential data present\n *   bit 7 (ED):  extension data present\n */\nfunction extractBEFlag(authData: ArrayBuffer): boolean {\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(authData)\n  if (bytes.length < 33) return false\n  const flagsByte = bytes[32]!\n  return (flagsByte & 0b00001000) !== 0 // bit 3\n}\n\n// ─── Payload wrap/unwrap ───────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Serialize and encrypt the DEK map from `keyring` using `wrappingKey`.\n * The wrapped payload is what gets stored in the enrollment record.\n */\nasync function wrapKeyringSummary(\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  wrappingKey: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<{ wrappedPayload: string; wrapIv: string }> {\n  const dekMap: Record<string, string> = {}\n  for (const [collName, dek] of keyring.deks) {\n    const raw = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n    dekMap[collName] = bufferToBase64(raw)\n  }\n\n  const payload = JSON.stringify({\n    userId: keyring.userId,\n    displayName: keyring.displayName,\n    role: keyring.role,\n    permissions: keyring.permissions,\n    deks: dekMap,\n    salt: bufferToBase64(keyring.salt),\n  })\n\n  const iv = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12))\n  const encrypted = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv },\n    wrappingKey,\n    new TextEncoder().encode(payload),\n  )\n\n  return { wrappedPayload: bufferToBase64(encrypted), wrapIv: bufferToBase64(iv) }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt and deserialize the keyring payload using `wrappingKey`.\n */\nasync function unwrapKeyringSummary(\n  enrollment: WebAuthnEnrollment,\n  wrappingKey: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(enrollment.wrapIv)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(enrollment.wrappedPayload)\n\n  let plaintext: ArrayBuffer\n  try {\n    plaintext = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.decrypt(\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', iv },\n      wrappingKey,\n      ciphertext,\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new ValidationError('WebAuthn decryption failed — the authenticator may have changed or the enrollment may be corrupt.')\n  }\n\n  const parsed = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext)) as {\n    userId: string\n    displayName: string\n    role: Role\n    permissions: Record<string, 'rw' | 'ro'>\n    deks: Record<string, string>\n    salt: string\n  }\n\n  const deks = new Map<string, CryptoKey>()\n  for (const [collName, rawBase64] of Object.entries(parsed.deks)) {\n    const dek = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(\n      'raw',\n      base64ToBuffer(rawBase64),\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n    deks.set(collName, dek)\n  }\n\n  return {\n    userId: parsed.userId,\n    displayName: parsed.displayName,\n    role: parsed.role,\n    permissions: parsed.permissions,\n    deks,\n    kek: null,\n    salt: base64ToBuffer(parsed.salt),\n    authenticators: [],\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Public API ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Enroll a WebAuthn credential for the given keyring.\n *\n * The caller must already have an unlocked keyring (from secret auth or\n * an existing session). The WebAuthn credential creation prompt is triggered\n * by this call.\n *\n * Returns a `WebAuthnEnrollment` that should be persisted — typically via\n * `saveEnrollment()` into a noy-db collection.\n *\n * @throws `WebAuthnNotAvailableError` if the environment doesn't support WebAuthn.\n * @throws `WebAuthnCancelledError` if the user cancels the credential creation.\n * @throws `WebAuthnMultiDeviceError` if `requireSingleDevice` is true and the\n *         authenticator returned a credential with the BE flag set.\n * @throws `WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError` if the authenticator did not provide\n *         PRF output and `options.allowNonPrfInsecure` is not `true` — see\n *         that option's doc for why the non-PRF path is refused by default.\n */\nexport async function enrollWebAuthn(\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  vault: string,\n  options: WebAuthnEnrollOptions = {},\n): Promise<WebAuthnEnrollment> {\n  if (!isWebAuthnAvailable()) {\n    throw new WebAuthnNotAvailableError()\n  }\n\n  const rpId = options.rp?.id ?? (typeof window !== 'undefined' ? window.location.hostname : 'localhost')\n  const rpName = options.rp?.name ?? 'NOYDB'\n  const timeout = options.timeout ?? 60_000\n\n  const challenge = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))\n  const userIdBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(keyring.userId)\n\n  const authenticatorSelection: AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria = {\n    userVerification: 'required',\n    residentKey: 'preferred',\n  }\n  if (options.preferCrossPlatform === true) {\n    authenticatorSelection.authenticatorAttachment = 'cross-platform'\n  } else if (options.preferCrossPlatform === false) {\n    authenticatorSelection.authenticatorAttachment = 'platform'\n  }\n\n  // Request PRF extension for deterministic key derivation\n  const extensionsInput = {\n    prf: { eval: { first: PRF_SALT } },\n  } as AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs\n\n  const credential = await navigator.credentials.create({\n    publicKey: {\n      challenge,\n      rp: { id: rpId, name: rpName },\n      user: {\n        id: userIdBytes,\n        name: keyring.userId,\n        displayName: keyring.displayName,\n      },\n      pubKeyCredParams: [\n        { type: 'public-key', alg: -7 },   // ES256\n        { type: 'public-key', alg: -257 },  // RS256\n        { type: 'public-key', alg: -8 },    // EdDSA\n      ],\n      authenticatorSelection,\n      extensions: extensionsInput,\n      timeout,\n    },\n  }) as PublicKeyCredential | null\n\n  if (!credential) {\n    throw new WebAuthnCancelledError('enrollment')\n  }\n\n  const authData = (credential.response as AuthenticatorAttestationResponse).getAuthenticatorData()\n  const beFlag = extractBEFlag(authData)\n\n  if (options.requireSingleDevice && beFlag) {\n    throw new WebAuthnMultiDeviceError()\n  }\n\n  // Try to get PRF output from extensions\n  const extensions = credential.getClientExtensionResults() as {\n    prf?: { results?: { first?: ArrayBuffer } }\n  }\n  const prfOutput = extensions.prf?.results?.first\n  const prfUsed = !!prfOutput\n\n  if (!prfUsed && !options.allowNonPrfInsecure) {\n    throw new WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError()\n  }\n\n  const wrappingKey = prfOutput\n    ? await deriveKeyFromPRF(prfOutput)\n    : await deriveKeyFromRawId(credential.rawId)\n\n  const { wrappedPayload, wrapIv } = await wrapKeyringSummary(keyring, wrappingKey)\n\n  return {\n    _noydb_webauthn: 1,\n    vault,\n    userId: keyring.userId,\n    credentialId: bufferToBase64(credential.rawId),\n    prfUsed,\n    beFlag,\n    requireSingleDevice: options.requireSingleDevice ?? false,\n    wrappedPayload,\n    wrapIv,\n    enrolledAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Unlock a vault using a previously enrolled WebAuthn credential.\n *\n * Triggers the WebAuthn assertion prompt. On success, decrypts the keyring\n * payload from the enrollment record and returns an `UnlockedKeyring`.\n *\n * The returned keyring has the same DEKs as at enrollment time. If DEK\n * VALUES have been re-minted since enrollment — `rotateKeys`, not\n * `rotateSecret` — this returns stale DEKs and the caller should detect\n * decryption failures and prompt for re-enrollment. A `rotateSecret`\n * phrase rotation does NOT stale them: it rewraps the same values.\n *\n * Non-PRF unlock (`enrollment.prfUsed === false`) is a presence gate, not\n * zero-knowledge confidentiality — it is kept working here for back-compat\n * with existing non-PRF enrollments; new enrollments refuse that path by\n * default (see `WebAuthnEnrollOptions.allowNonPrfInsecure`).\n *\n * @throws `WebAuthnNotAvailableError` if the environment doesn't support WebAuthn.\n * @throws `WebAuthnCancelledError` if the user cancels the assertion.\n * @throws `WebAuthnMultiDeviceError` if `requireSingleDevice` was set at\n *         enrollment and the authenticator data now shows BE=1.\n * @throws `ValidationError` if decryption of the keyring payload fails.\n */\nexport async function unlockWebAuthn(\n  enrollment: WebAuthnEnrollment,\n  options: WebAuthnUnlockOptions = {},\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  if (!isWebAuthnAvailable()) {\n    throw new WebAuthnNotAvailableError()\n  }\n\n  const timeout = options.timeout ?? 60_000\n  const credentialId = base64ToBuffer(enrollment.credentialId)\n\n  const extensionsInput = (enrollment.prfUsed\n    ? { prf: { eval: { first: PRF_SALT } } }\n    : {}\n  ) as AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs\n\n  const assertion = await navigator.credentials.get({\n    publicKey: {\n      challenge: globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)),\n      allowCredentials: [{ type: 'public-key', id: credentialId }],\n      userVerification: 'required',\n      extensions: extensionsInput,\n      timeout,\n    },\n  }) as PublicKeyCredential | null\n\n  if (!assertion) {\n    throw new WebAuthnCancelledError('assertion')\n  }\n\n  // BE-flag guard at assertion time\n  const authData = (assertion.response as AuthenticatorAssertionResponse).authenticatorData\n  const beFlag = extractBEFlag(authData)\n  if (enrollment.requireSingleDevice && beFlag) {\n    throw new WebAuthnMultiDeviceError()\n  }\n\n  // Derive the wrapping key using the same method as enrollment\n  let wrappingKey: CryptoKey\n  if (enrollment.prfUsed) {\n    const extensions = assertion.getClientExtensionResults() as {\n      prf?: { results?: { first?: ArrayBuffer } }\n    }\n    const prfOutput = extensions.prf?.results?.first\n    if (!prfOutput) {\n      throw new ValidationError(\n        'PRF extension output not available at assertion time. ' +\n        'The authenticator may not support PRF. Re-enroll without PRF support.',\n      )\n    }\n    wrappingKey = await deriveKeyFromPRF(prfOutput)\n  } else {\n    wrappingKey = await deriveKeyFromRawId(assertion.rawId)\n  }\n\n  return unwrapKeyringSummary(enrollment, wrappingKey)\n}\n\n/**\n * `SlotRewrapCeremony` for WebAuthn slots — used by hub's\n * `rotateSecret({ slotCeremonies: { [slotId]: webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony } })`\n * to preserve a tier-2 WebAuthn enrollment across a tier-1 phrase\n * rotation without requiring re-enrollment of the credential.\n *\n * The credential itself is unaffected by phrase rotation — the\n * wrapping key derived from PRF (or rawId fallback) is bound to the\n * authenticator, not to the secret. What needs to change is the\n * **wrapped payload**: the encrypted blob the slot's `wrapped_kek`\n * field holds. After rotation the old payload is wrapped under the\n * OLD KEK, so hub can no longer thread it through the rotated\n * keyring; the new payload must hold `ctx.newDeks`.\n *\n * ⚠️ **The old payload's DEK VALUES are not stale — only its wrapping\n * is.** `rotateSecret` rewraps the SAME DEKs under a freshly-derived\n * KEK; only `rotateKeys` re-mints DEK values. Records are encrypted\n * with DEKs, so a captured `wrappedPayload` keeps decrypting\n * everything across any number of phrase rotations. An earlier\n * revision of this comment said \"now stale because rotateSecret\n * rewrapped them under a fresh KEK\", which reads as though rotation\n * invalidated the captured blob. It does not, and nothing in this\n * ceremony is a revocation step.\n *\n * ## Revoking a credential — this ceremony is a REQUIRED INPUT to it\n *\n * Hub's `revokeAuthenticator` is the real revocation, and it is three steps:\n * `removeAuthenticator` (hides the slot), `rotateKeys` (mints fresh DEKs —\n * the step that actually revokes), then `rotateSecret` with a\n * `slotCeremonies` entry for every slot that STAYS.\n *\n * ⛔ **A remaining slot handed no ceremony is DROPPED, not preserved.** After\n * the `rotateKeys` step its blob wraps DEKs that no longer exist, so keeping\n * it would leave a credential that silently fails. Its holder must re-enrol.\n *\n * So revoking ONE credential means supplying `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony` for\n * EVERY WebAuthn slot you intend to keep — and each requires that\n * credential to be present (a live assertion on the authenticator, which means the user in front of the device). Re-wrapping a credential\n * is the credential's own operation; there is no way to do it on the\n * holder's behalf.\n *\n * ⚠️ **Not in any published hub at the time of writing.**\n * `revokeAuthenticator` landed on noy-db `main` in `0612b4ac`, AFTER\n * `@noy-db/hub@0.7.1-pre.0` was cut and published — so it is in neither\n * `@latest` (0.7.0) nor `@next` (0.7.1-pre.0). Ask npm before promising it to\n * a consumer; do not infer its version from hub's `main`.\n *\n * Single ceremony, two operations:\n *   1. Trigger one WebAuthn assertion to derive the wrapping key.\n *   2. Decrypt the OLD `wrapped_kek` to extract identity fields\n *      (userId, displayName, role, permissions, salt) — these don't\n *      change on rotation, so they're carried verbatim into the new\n *      payload.\n *   3. Encrypt the NEW payload (same identity + `ctx.newDeks`) under\n *      the same wrapping key, with a fresh IV.\n *   4. Return `EnrollAuthenticatorOptions` preserving `oldSlot.id`\n *      and `method: 'webauthn'` (hub validates these to prevent\n *      slot-type swap mid-rotation).\n *\n * Previously a workaround was needed — detect dropped slots after\n * rotate and offer \"Re-enrol Touch ID\" inline. This ceremony\n * eliminates that step.\n *\n * Out of scope: tier-3 PIN. PIN state lives in `QuickUnlockStore`\n * (RAM-only), not in `KeyringFile.authenticators[]`, so\n * `slotCeremonies` doesn't apply. Clear PIN state on rotate; let\n * the user set a fresh PIN via `db.enrollUnlock` immediately after.\n *\n * @throws {WebAuthnNotAvailableError} when the environment lacks WebAuthn.\n * @throws {WebAuthnCancelledError} when the user dismisses the assertion.\n * @throws {WebAuthnMultiDeviceError} when `meta.requireSingleDevice` was\n *         set at enrollment and the authenticator now reports BE=1.\n * @throws {ValidationError} when `oldSlot.method !== 'webauthn'`,\n *         when required `meta` fields are missing, or when the old\n *         payload fails to decrypt (credential changed / payload\n *         tampered).\n * @throws {WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError} when the old slot is non-PRF and\n *         `options.allowNonPrfInsecure` is not `true` — rewrapping a\n *         non-PRF slot produces a fresh self-decrypting payload, so it\n *         requires the same explicit acknowledgement as enrollment.\n *\n * @see passwordSlotRewrapCeremony — the password parallel.\n */\nexport async function webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony(\n  ctx: SlotRewrapContext,\n  options: WebAuthnUnlockOptions = {},\n): Promise<EnrollAuthenticatorOptions> {\n  if (ctx.oldSlot.method !== 'webauthn') {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot.method is \"${ctx.oldSlot.method}\"; expected \"webauthn\". ` +\n        'This ceremony only handles WebAuthn slots — pair other methods with their own helpers.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (ctx.oldSlot.wrapKind === 'deks') {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot is a wrap-DEKs slot; expected wrap-KEK. ' +\n        'WebAuthn slots use the wrap-KEK variant; mismatch indicates the slot was ' +\n        'enrolled by a different on-* package.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (!isWebAuthnAvailable()) {\n    throw new WebAuthnNotAvailableError()\n  }\n\n  // Pull the per-slot fields needed for assertion + decrypt. These were\n  // written into `meta` by `enrollWebAuthn` (via `db.enrollWebAuthn`).\n  const meta = ctx.oldSlot.meta as {\n    credentialId?: unknown\n    wrapIv?: unknown\n    prfUsed?: unknown\n    beFlag?: unknown\n    requireSingleDevice?: unknown\n  }\n  if (typeof meta.credentialId !== 'string' || meta.credentialId.length === 0) {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot.meta.credentialId is missing or invalid. ' +\n        'The slot was not enrolled via @noy-db/on-webauthn.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (typeof meta.wrapIv !== 'string' || meta.wrapIv.length === 0) {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot.meta.wrapIv is missing — the slot may be ' +\n        'pre-#16 (synthetic-keyring shape) and must be re-enrolled via db.enrollWebAuthn.',\n    )\n  }\n  const prfUsed = meta.prfUsed === true\n\n  if (!prfUsed && !options.allowNonPrfInsecure) {\n    throw new WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError()\n  }\n\n  // 1. Trigger the assertion. Same path `unlockWebAuthn` uses.\n  const credentialIdBuf = base64ToBuffer(meta.credentialId)\n  const timeout = options.timeout ?? 60_000\n  const extensionsInput = (prfUsed\n    ? { prf: { eval: { first: PRF_SALT } } }\n    : {}\n  ) as AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs\n\n  const assertion = await navigator.credentials.get({\n    publicKey: {\n      challenge: globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)),\n      allowCredentials: [{ type: 'public-key', id: credentialIdBuf }],\n      userVerification: 'required',\n      extensions: extensionsInput,\n      timeout,\n    },\n  }) as PublicKeyCredential | null\n\n  if (!assertion) {\n    throw new WebAuthnCancelledError('assertion')\n  }\n\n  // BE-flag guard at assertion time — same rule unlockWebAuthn enforces.\n  const authData = (assertion.response as AuthenticatorAssertionResponse).authenticatorData\n  const beFlag = extractBEFlag(authData)\n  if (meta.requireSingleDevice === true && beFlag) {\n    throw new WebAuthnMultiDeviceError()\n  }\n\n  // 2. Derive the wrapping key — deterministic per credential, so this\n  //    is the SAME key the original enrollment used.\n  let wrappingKey: CryptoKey\n  if (prfUsed) {\n    const extensions = assertion.getClientExtensionResults() as {\n      prf?: { results?: { first?: ArrayBuffer } }\n    }\n    const prfOutput = extensions.prf?.results?.first\n    if (!prfOutput) {\n      throw new ValidationError(\n        'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: PRF output missing at assertion time. ' +\n          'The authenticator may have lost PRF capability — re-enrol the slot via db.enrollWebAuthn.',\n      )\n    }\n    wrappingKey = await deriveKeyFromPRF(prfOutput)\n  } else {\n    wrappingKey = await deriveKeyFromRawId(assertion.rawId)\n  }\n\n  // 3. Decrypt the OLD wrapped_kek to extract carry-through identity\n  //    fields. The slot's wrapped_kek IS the old wrappedPayload\n  //    (mapping established by db.enrollWebAuthn at noydb.ts:1178).\n  const oldIv = base64ToBuffer(meta.wrapIv)\n  const oldCiphertext = base64ToBuffer(ctx.oldSlot.wrapped_kek)\n  let oldPlaintext: ArrayBuffer\n  try {\n    oldPlaintext = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.decrypt(\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: oldIv },\n      wrappingKey,\n      oldCiphertext,\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: failed to decrypt the old wrapped payload. ' +\n        'The wrapping key derived from this credential does not match — possible ' +\n        'cross-tenant slot mix-up or a corrupted enrollment.',\n    )\n  }\n  const oldPayload = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(oldPlaintext)) as {\n    userId: string\n    displayName: string\n    role: Role\n    permissions: Record<string, 'rw' | 'ro'>\n    deks: Record<string, string>\n    salt: string\n  }\n\n  // 4. Build the NEW payload — identity fields preserved, deks\n  //    replaced with ctx.newDeks (rewrapped under the new KEK in the\n  //    keyring file; here we serialize them as raw bytes for the\n  //    self-contained webauthn-side reconstruction).\n  const newDekMap: Record<string, string> = {}\n  for (const [collName, dek] of ctx.newDeks) {\n    const raw = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n    newDekMap[collName] = bufferToBase64(raw)\n  }\n  const newPayload = JSON.stringify({\n    userId: oldPayload.userId,\n    displayName: oldPayload.displayName,\n    role: oldPayload.role,\n    permissions: oldPayload.permissions,\n    deks: newDekMap,\n    salt: oldPayload.salt,\n  })\n\n  // 5. Encrypt with the same wrapping key under a fresh IV.\n  const newIv = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12))\n  const newCiphertext = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: newIv },\n    wrappingKey,\n    new TextEncoder().encode(newPayload),\n  )\n\n  // 6. Return EnrollAuthenticatorOptions preserving id + method.\n  //    Hub's rotate validates these — a mismatch throws ValidationError\n  //    (slot-type swap defense; see SlotRewrapContext docstring).\n  return {\n    id: ctx.oldSlot.id,\n    method: 'webauthn',\n    wrapped_kek: bufferToBase64(newCiphertext),\n    enrolled_via_tier: ctx.oldSlot.enrolled_via_tier,\n    meta: {\n      credentialId: meta.credentialId,\n      wrapIv: bufferToBase64(newIv),\n      prfUsed,\n      beFlag,\n      requireSingleDevice: meta.requireSingleDevice === true,\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Check whether a `WebAuthnEnrollment` record looks well-formed.\n * Does not perform any cryptographic verification.\n */\nexport function isValidEnrollment(value: unknown): value is WebAuthnEnrollment {\n  if (!value || typeof value !== 'object') return false\n  const e = value as Record<string, unknown>\n  return (\n    e._noydb_webauthn === 1 &&\n    typeof e.vault === 'string' &&\n    typeof e.userId === 'string' &&\n    typeof e.credentialId === 'string' &&\n    typeof e.wrappedPayload === 'string' &&\n    typeof e.wrapIv === 'string'\n  )\n}\n"],"mappings":";AA2DA,SAAS,gBAAgB,sBAAsB;AAC/C,SAAS,uBAAuB;AAKhC,SAAS,mBAAAA,wBAAuB;AAYzB,IAAM,4BAAN,cAAwC,MAAM;AAAA,EAC1C,OAAO;AAAA,EAChB,cAAc;AACZ,UAAM,0GAA0G;AAChH,SAAK,OAAO;AAAA,EACd;AACF;AAUO,IAAM,yBAAN,cAAqC,MAAM;AAAA,EACvC,OAAO;AAAA,EAChB,YAAY,IAAgC;AAC1C,UAAM,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B;AACjD,SAAK,OAAO;AAAA,EACd;AACF;AAUO,IAAM,2BAAN,cAAuC,MAAM;AAAA,EACzC,OAAO;AAAA,EAChB,cAAc;AACZ;AAAA,MACE;AAAA,IAIF;AACA,SAAK,OAAO;AAAA,EACd;AACF;AAeO,IAAM,8BAAN,cAA0C,MAAM;AAAA,EAC5C,OAAO;AAAA,EAChB,cAAc;AACZ;AAAA,MACE;AAAA,IAMF;AACA,SAAK,OAAO;AAAA,EACd;AACF;AA4FO,SAAS,sBAA+B;AAC7C,SACE,OAAO,WAAW,eAClB,OAAO,OAAO,wBAAwB,eACtC,OAAO,cAAc,eACrB,OAAO,UAAU,gBAAgB;AAErC;AAIA,IAAM,WAAW,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,2BAA2B;AAQrE,eAAe,iBAAiB,WAA4C;AAC1E,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACjD;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,WAAW;AAAA,EACd;AACA,SAAO,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IAC9B;AAAA,MACE,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAAA,IACpD;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,IAC/B;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,EACvB;AACF;AAQA,eAAe,mBAAmB,OAAwC;AACxE,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACjD;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,WAAW;AAAA,EACd;AACA,SAAO,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IAC9B;AAAA,MACE,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,+BAA+B;AAAA,MAC9D,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAAA,IACpD;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,IAC/B;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,EACvB;AACF;AAoBA,SAAS,cAAc,UAAgC;AACrD,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW,QAAQ;AACrC,MAAI,MAAM,SAAS,GAAI,QAAO;AAC9B,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,EAAE;AAC1B,UAAQ,YAAY,OAAgB;AACtC;AAQA,eAAe,mBACb,SACA,aACqD;AACrD,QAAM,SAAiC,CAAC;AACxC,aAAW,CAAC,UAAU,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM;AAC1C,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;AAC/D,WAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,eAAe,GAAG;AAAA,EACvC;AAEA,QAAM,UAAU,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,IAC7B,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAAA,IAChB,aAAa,QAAQ;AAAA,IACrB,MAAM,QAAQ;AAAA,IACd,aAAa,QAAQ;AAAA,IACrB,MAAM;AAAA,IACN,MAAM,eAAe,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,EACnC,CAAC;AAED,QAAM,KAAK,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AAC/D,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IAC/C,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG;AAAA,IACtB;AAAA,IACA,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,EAClC;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,eAAe,SAAS,GAAG,QAAQ,eAAe,EAAE,EAAE;AACjF;AAKA,eAAe,qBACb,YACA,aAC0B;AAC1B,QAAM,KAAK,eAAe,WAAW,MAAM;AAC3C,QAAM,aAAa,eAAe,WAAW,cAAc;AAE3D,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,gBAAY,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,MACzC,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG;AAAA,MACtB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,QAAQ;AACN,UAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,wGAAmG;AAAA,EAC/H;AAEA,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AAS7D,QAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAAuB;AACxC,aAAW,CAAC,UAAU,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI,GAAG;AAC/D,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,MACzC;AAAA,MACA,eAAe,SAAS;AAAA,MACxB,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,MAC/B;AAAA,MACA,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,IACvB;AACA,SAAK,IAAI,UAAU,GAAG;AAAA,EACxB;AAEA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,QAAQ,OAAO;AAAA,IACf,aAAa,OAAO;AAAA,IACpB,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACb,aAAa,OAAO;AAAA,IACpB;AAAA,IACA,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,eAAe,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,IAChC,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAAA,EACnB;AACF;AAsBA,eAAsB,eACpB,SACA,OACA,UAAiC,CAAC,GACL;AAC7B,MAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,GAAG;AAC1B,UAAM,IAAI,0BAA0B;AAAA,EACtC;AAEA,QAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,OAAO,WAAW,cAAc,OAAO,SAAS,WAAW;AAC3F,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ;AACnC,QAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,WAAW;AAEnC,QAAM,YAAY,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AACtE,QAAM,cAAc,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,QAAQ,MAAM;AAE3D,QAAM,yBAAyD;AAAA,IAC7D,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAClB,aAAa;AAAA,EACf;AACA,MAAI,QAAQ,wBAAwB,MAAM;AACxC,2BAAuB,0BAA0B;AAAA,EACnD,WAAW,QAAQ,wBAAwB,OAAO;AAChD,2BAAuB,0BAA0B;AAAA,EACnD;AAGA,QAAM,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACtB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,EAAE;AAAA,EACnC;AAEA,QAAM,aAAa,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,OAAO;AAAA,IACpD,WAAW;AAAA,MACT;AAAA,MACA,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,MAC7B,MAAM;AAAA,QACJ,IAAI;AAAA,QACJ,MAAM,QAAQ;AAAA,QACd,aAAa,QAAQ;AAAA,MACvB;AAAA,MACA,kBAAkB;AAAA,QAChB,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA;AAAA,QAC9B,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA;AAAA,QAChC,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA;AAAA,MAChC;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,YAAY;AAAA,MACZ;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,CAAC;AAED,MAAI,CAAC,YAAY;AACf,UAAM,IAAI,uBAAuB,YAAY;AAAA,EAC/C;AAEA,QAAM,WAAY,WAAW,SAA8C,qBAAqB;AAChG,QAAM,SAAS,cAAc,QAAQ;AAErC,MAAI,QAAQ,uBAAuB,QAAQ;AACzC,UAAM,IAAI,yBAAyB;AAAA,EACrC;AAGA,QAAM,aAAa,WAAW,0BAA0B;AAGxD,QAAM,YAAY,WAAW,KAAK,SAAS;AAC3C,QAAM,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;AAElB,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,QAAQ,qBAAqB;AAC5C,UAAM,IAAI,4BAA4B;AAAA,EACxC;AAEA,QAAM,cAAc,YAChB,MAAM,iBAAiB,SAAS,IAChC,MAAM,mBAAmB,WAAW,KAAK;AAE7C,QAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,mBAAmB,SAAS,WAAW;AAEhF,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,iBAAiB;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAAA,IAChB,cAAc,eAAe,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,IAC7C;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,qBAAqB,QAAQ,uBAAuB;AAAA,IACpD;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,aAAY,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EACrC;AACF;AAyBA,eAAsB,eACpB,YACA,UAAiC,CAAC,GACR;AAC1B,MAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,GAAG;AAC1B,UAAM,IAAI,0BAA0B;AAAA,EACtC;AAEA,QAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,WAAW;AACnC,QAAM,eAAe,eAAe,WAAW,YAAY;AAE3D,QAAM,kBAAmB,WAAW,UAChC,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,IACrC,CAAC;AAGL,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,IAChD,WAAW;AAAA,MACT,WAAW,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,MAC/D,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,IAAI,aAAa,CAAC;AAAA,MAC3D,kBAAkB;AAAA,MAClB,YAAY;AAAA,MACZ;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,CAAC;AAED,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW;AACd,UAAM,IAAI,uBAAuB,WAAW;AAAA,EAC9C;AAGA,QAAM,WAAY,UAAU,SAA4C;AACxE,QAAM,SAAS,cAAc,QAAQ;AACrC,MAAI,WAAW,uBAAuB,QAAQ;AAC5C,UAAM,IAAI,yBAAyB;AAAA,EACrC;AAGA,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,WAAW,SAAS;AACtB,UAAM,aAAa,UAAU,0BAA0B;AAGvD,UAAM,YAAY,WAAW,KAAK,SAAS;AAC3C,QAAI,CAAC,WAAW;AACd,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,MAEF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,kBAAc,MAAM,iBAAiB,SAAS;AAAA,EAChD,OAAO;AACL,kBAAc,MAAM,mBAAmB,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,EACxD;AAEA,SAAO,qBAAqB,YAAY,WAAW;AACrD;AAqFA,eAAsB,2BACpB,KACA,UAAiC,CAAC,GACG;AACrC,MAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,YAAY;AACrC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,kDAAkD,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,IAEtE;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,aAAa,QAAQ;AACnC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IAGF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,GAAG;AAC1B,UAAM,IAAI,0BAA0B;AAAA,EACtC;AAIA,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ;AAOzB,MAAI,OAAO,KAAK,iBAAiB,YAAY,KAAK,aAAa,WAAW,GAAG;AAC3E,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IAEF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,KAAK,WAAW,YAAY,KAAK,OAAO,WAAW,GAAG;AAC/D,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IAEF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,UAAU,KAAK,YAAY;AAEjC,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,QAAQ,qBAAqB;AAC5C,UAAM,IAAI,4BAA4B;AAAA,EACxC;AAGA,QAAM,kBAAkB,eAAe,KAAK,YAAY;AACxD,QAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,WAAW;AACnC,QAAM,kBAAmB,UACrB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,IACrC,CAAC;AAGL,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,IAChD,WAAW;AAAA,MACT,WAAW,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,MAC/D,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,IAAI,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAAA,MAC9D,kBAAkB;AAAA,MAClB,YAAY;AAAA,MACZ;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,CAAC;AAED,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW;AACd,UAAM,IAAI,uBAAuB,WAAW;AAAA,EAC9C;AAGA,QAAM,WAAY,UAAU,SAA4C;AACxE,QAAM,SAAS,cAAc,QAAQ;AACrC,MAAI,KAAK,wBAAwB,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAC/C,UAAM,IAAI,yBAAyB;AAAA,EACrC;AAIA,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,SAAS;AACX,UAAM,aAAa,UAAU,0BAA0B;AAGvD,UAAM,YAAY,WAAW,KAAK,SAAS;AAC3C,QAAI,CAAC,WAAW;AACd,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,MAEF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,kBAAc,MAAM,iBAAiB,SAAS;AAAA,EAChD,OAAO;AACL,kBAAc,MAAM,mBAAmB,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,EACxD;AAKA,QAAM,QAAQ,eAAe,KAAK,MAAM;AACxC,QAAM,gBAAgB,eAAe,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW;AAC5D,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,mBAAe,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,MAC5C,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM;AAAA,MAC7B;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,QAAQ;AACN,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IAGF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,aAAa,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,YAAY,CAAC;AAapE,QAAM,YAAoC,CAAC;AAC3C,aAAW,CAAC,UAAU,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI,SAAS;AACzC,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;AAC/D,cAAU,QAAQ,IAAI,eAAe,GAAG;AAAA,EAC1C;AACA,QAAM,aAAa,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,IAChC,QAAQ,WAAW;AAAA,IACnB,aAAa,WAAW;AAAA,IACxB,MAAM,WAAW;AAAA,IACjB,aAAa,WAAW;AAAA,IACxB,MAAM;AAAA,IACN,MAAM,WAAW;AAAA,EACnB,CAAC;AAGD,QAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AAClE,QAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACnD,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM;AAAA,IAC7B;AAAA,IACA,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,UAAU;AAAA,EACrC;AAKA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,IAChB,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,aAAa,eAAe,aAAa;AAAA,IACzC,mBAAmB,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,IAC/B,MAAM;AAAA,MACJ,cAAc,KAAK;AAAA,MACnB,QAAQ,eAAe,KAAK;AAAA,MAC5B;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,qBAAqB,KAAK,wBAAwB;AAAA,IACpD;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAMO,SAAS,kBAAkB,OAA6C;AAC7E,MAAI,CAAC,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU,SAAU,QAAO;AAChD,QAAM,IAAI;AACV,SACE,EAAE,oBAAoB,KACtB,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,YACnB,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,YACpB,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,YAC1B,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,YAC5B,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW;AAExB;","names":["ValidationError"]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * @noy-db/on-webauthn —\n *\n * Hardware-key keyring for noy-db using the WebAuthn API.\n *\n * Covers every form factor:\n *   - Platform authenticators: Touch ID, Face ID, Windows Hello, Android biometric\n *   - Roaming authenticators: YubiKey (5C NFC, Bio), SoloKey, Titan, any FIDO2 key\n *   - Passkey-capable platform authenticators: iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager\n *\n * Key derivation model\n * ────────────────────\n * This package uses the **PRF (Pseudo-Random Function) extension** when\n * available to derive a deterministic wrapping key from the WebAuthn\n * credential. The PRF output is consistent across assertions on the same\n * device/credential, enabling unlock-without-secret while keeping the\n * derived key bound to the physical authenticator.\n *\n * When PRF is not supported by the authenticator (common on older hardware),\n * the package can fall back to HKDF-SHA256 over the credential's `rawId` —\n * but by default, enrollment refuses this path because the `rawId` is stored\n * in the record itself, making the record self-decrypting (presence gate, not\n * confidentiality). Use `allowNonPrfInsecure: true` to opt in; prefer a\n * PRF-capable device or the secret for real confidentiality.\n *\n * The derived key is NEVER persisted. It exists only in memory during the\n * unlock operation. What IS persisted (in the noy-db adapter, not in browser\n * storage) is the wrapped KEK: `encrypt(KEK, derivedKey)`.\n *\n * BE-flag guards\n * ──────────────\n * The backup-eligibility (BE) flag in a WebAuthn authenticator data signals\n * that the credential is (or can be) synced across devices — e.g. stored in\n * iCloud Keychain. For single-device security policies (air-gapped USB sticks,\n * high-security terminals), this is a threat: the credential is available on\n * any device where the user's iCloud account is signed in.\n *\n * The `requireSingleDevice: true` option rejects credentials with the BE flag\n * set during enrollment. Existing enrollments are checked at assertion time —\n * if the authenticator data shows BE=1 but `requireSingleDevice` was set at\n * enrollment, the assertion throws `WebAuthnMultiDeviceError`.\n *\n * Enrollment flow\n * ───────────────\n * 1. User is already authenticated (secret or existing session).\n * 2. Call `enrollWebAuthn(keyring, vault, options?)`.\n * 3. WebAuthn credential is created; PRF or rawId-derived key wraps the KEK.\n * 4. Returns a `WebAuthnEnrollment` — persist it yourself, in any collection\n *    or in IndexedDB. This package ships no storage helper.\n *\n * Unlock flow\n * ───────────\n * 1. Load the `WebAuthnEnrollment` back from wherever you persisted it.\n * 2. Call `unlockWebAuthn(enrollment, options?)` — triggers the WebAuthn\n *    assertion prompt.\n * 3. On success, returns an `UnlockedKeyring`. Pass it to `createNoydb` via\n *    the `getKeyring` callback; see this package's README.\n */\n\nimport { bufferToBase64, base64ToBuffer } from '@noy-db/hub'\nimport { ValidationError } from '@noy-db/hub'\nimport type { Role } from '@noy-db/hub'\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring, EnrollAuthenticatorOptions, SlotRewrapContext } from '@noy-db/hub/on'\n\n// Re-export from core for convenience\nexport { ValidationError } from '@noy-db/hub'\n\n// ─── Error types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Thrown when the WebAuthn API is not available in the current environment.\n *\n * Check `isWebAuthnAvailable()` before calling `enrollWebAuthn()` or\n * `unlockWebAuthn()` and show a fallback UI (secret entry) if this\n * returns false. Common scenarios: Node.js environments, older browsers,\n * non-HTTPS origins (WebAuthn requires a Secure Context).\n */\nexport class WebAuthnNotAvailableError extends Error {\n  readonly code = 'WEBAUTHN_NOT_AVAILABLE'\n  constructor() {\n    super('WebAuthn is not available in this environment. A browser with navigator.credentials support is required.')\n    this.name = 'WebAuthnNotAvailableError'\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Thrown when the user dismisses the WebAuthn prompt without completing it.\n *\n * The `op` field distinguishes enrollment cancellation (user chose not to\n * enroll a hardware key) from assertion cancellation (user dismissed the\n * unlock prompt). Treat this as a user-initiated action, not an error — show\n * a \"use secret instead\" option rather than an error message.\n */\nexport class WebAuthnCancelledError extends Error {\n  readonly code = 'WEBAUTHN_CANCELLED'\n  constructor(op: 'enrollment' | 'assertion') {\n    super(`WebAuthn ${op} was cancelled by the user.`)\n    this.name = 'WebAuthnCancelledError'\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Thrown when the authenticator has the backup-eligible (BE) flag set but\n * the vault requires a single-device credential (`requireSingleDevice: true`).\n *\n * A BE credential is synced across devices (e.g. iCloud Keychain, Google\n * Password Manager), which violates the single-device security model. The\n * user must enroll a hardware security key (YubiKey, Titan, SoloKey) instead.\n */\nexport class WebAuthnMultiDeviceError extends Error {\n  readonly code = 'WEBAUTHN_MULTI_DEVICE'\n  constructor() {\n    super(\n      'This credential is backup-eligible (BE flag set) and may be synced across devices. ' +\n      'The vault requires a single-device credential (requireSingleDevice: true). ' +\n      'Please use a hardware security key (YubiKey, Titan, SoloKey) or a platform ' +\n      'authenticator that does not sync credentials across devices.',\n    )\n    this.name = 'WebAuthnMultiDeviceError'\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Thrown when `enrollWebAuthn()` (or `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony()`) is\n * asked to enroll/rewrap without a PRF-capable authenticator and without\n * explicit opt-in via `allowNonPrfInsecure: true`.\n *\n * Non-PRF WebAuthn cannot provide confidentiality: its wrapping key derives\n * entirely from the credential's `rawId`, which is stored in cleartext in\n * the enrollment record itself — the record would self-decrypt with no\n * authenticator involved. By default, enrollment/rewrap refuses this path.\n * Use a PRF-capable credential, fall back to the secret, or set\n * `allowNonPrfInsecure: true` to explicitly accept a non-confidential\n * presence gate instead.\n */\nexport class WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError extends Error {\n  readonly code = 'WEBAUTHN_PRF_UNAVAILABLE'\n  constructor() {\n    super(\n      'The PRF extension is not available on this authenticator, so it cannot provide ' +\n      'WebAuthn confidentiality — the non-PRF wrapping key derives entirely from the ' +\n      \"credential's rawId, which is stored in the enrollment record itself (the record \" +\n      'would self-decrypt with no authenticator involved). Enrollment refuses this path ' +\n      'by default. Use a PRF-capable authenticator, use the secret instead, or pass ' +\n      '{ allowNonPrfInsecure: true } to explicitly accept a non-confidential presence gate.',\n    )\n    this.name = 'WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError'\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * A persisted WebAuthn enrollment record. Store this in a noy-db\n * collection (encrypted like any other record) or return it from\n * `saveEnrollment()` / `loadEnrollment()` helpers.\n */\nexport interface WebAuthnEnrollment {\n  /** Enrollment format version. */\n  readonly _noydb_webauthn: 1\n  /** The vault this enrollment was created for. */\n  readonly vault: string\n  /** The user ID this enrollment belongs to. */\n  readonly userId: string\n  /** WebAuthn credential ID (base64). Use for allowCredentials in assertions. */\n  readonly credentialId: string\n  /** Whether PRF was used for key derivation (vs rawId HKDF fallback). */\n  readonly prfUsed: boolean\n  /** Whether the BE (backup-eligibility) flag was present at enrollment time. */\n  readonly beFlag: boolean\n  /** Whether single-device was required at enrollment time. */\n  readonly requireSingleDevice: boolean\n  /** The wrapped KEK: encrypt(exportedDekMap, derivedKey). Base64. */\n  readonly wrappedPayload: string\n  /** IV used for the wrapping. Base64. */\n  readonly wrapIv: string\n  /** ISO timestamp of enrollment. */\n  readonly enrolledAt: string\n  /**\n   * The RP ID this credential was created under.\n   *\n   * ⚠️ OPTIONAL, and absence is not a default — records written before\n   * 0.9.0 do not carry it, and for those `unlockWebAuthn` sends no `rpId`,\n   * leaving the browser to default it to the asserting page's hostname.\n   * That is the old behaviour, preserved deliberately: a record enrolled\n   * on `app.example.com` must keep unlocking there.\n   *\n   * When present it is sent back as `publicKey.rpId` at assertion time, so\n   * enrolment and assertion cannot disagree — which is the whole point:\n   * enrol under the registrable domain (`rp: { id: 'example.com' }`) and\n   * every subdomain asserts against the same credential.\n   */\n  readonly rpId?: string\n}\n\n/** Options for `enrollWebAuthn()`. */\nexport interface WebAuthnEnrollOptions {\n  /**\n   * Relying party ID and name for the WebAuthn credential.\n   * Defaults to `{ id: window.location.hostname, name: 'NOYDB' }`.\n   */\n  rp?: { id?: string; name: string }\n  /**\n   * If `true`, refuse to enroll credentials with the BE flag set\n   * (multi-device / syncable passkeys). Defaults to `false`.\n   *\n   * Set to `true` for high-security deployments where the credential\n   * must be bound to a single physical device (YubiKey, Titan, etc.).\n   */\n  requireSingleDevice?: boolean\n  /**\n   * WebAuthn timeout in milliseconds. Default: 60_000.\n   */\n  timeout?: number\n  /**\n   * If `true`, prefer a cross-platform authenticator (roaming security key).\n   * If `false`, prefer a platform authenticator (Touch ID, Face ID).\n   * If undefined, let the browser choose.\n   */\n  preferCrossPlatform?: boolean\n  /**\n   * Non-PRF WebAuthn cannot provide confidentiality — its wrapping key\n   * derives from `credentialId`, which is stored in the enrollment record,\n   * so the record self-decrypts with no authenticator. By default,\n   * enrollment REFUSES the non-PRF path (throws `WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError`).\n   * Set `true` ONLY to explicitly opt into a non-confidential presence gate;\n   * prefer the secret or a PRF-capable credential for real confidentiality.\n   */\n  allowNonPrfInsecure?: boolean\n}\n\n/** Options for `unlockWebAuthn()`. */\nexport interface WebAuthnUnlockOptions {\n  /** WebAuthn timeout in milliseconds. Default: 60_000. */\n  timeout?: number\n  /**\n   * RP ID to assert against. Overrides the one recorded at enrolment.\n   *\n   * Needed when the record predates `WebAuthnEnrollment.rpId`, or when the\n   * slot's `meta` carries none — without it the browser defaults the RP ID\n   * to the asserting page's hostname, so a credential enrolled under\n   * `example.com` is invisible to `app.example.com`.\n   */\n  rpId?: string\n  /**\n   * Only consulted by `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony()` — `unlockWebAuthn()`\n   * ignores it, since unlocking an existing non-PRF record is always\n   * permitted (back-compat; that record was never confidential). Same\n   * semantics as `WebAuthnEnrollOptions.allowNonPrfInsecure`: required to\n   * rewrap a non-PRF slot, since rewrap produces a fresh self-decrypting\n   * wrapped payload.\n   */\n  allowNonPrfInsecure?: boolean\n}\n\n// ─── Environment check ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Returns `true` if WebAuthn is available and can be used for enrollment or unlock.\n *\n * Checks for `navigator.credentials`, `window.PublicKeyCredential`, and a\n * Secure Context (`window.isSecureContext`). Call this before rendering the\n * \"Register hardware key\" button to avoid showing options that will fail.\n */\nexport function isWebAuthnAvailable(): boolean {\n  return (\n    typeof window !== 'undefined' &&\n    typeof window.PublicKeyCredential !== 'undefined' &&\n    typeof navigator !== 'undefined' &&\n    typeof navigator.credentials !== 'undefined'\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── PRF salt ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nconst PRF_SALT = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-webauthn-kek-derive')\n\n// ─── Key derivation helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive a wrapping key from PRF output.\n * PRF output is 32 bytes of authenticator-bound pseudo-random data.\n */\nasync function deriveKeyFromPRF(prfOutput: ArrayBuffer): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    prfOutput,\n    'HKDF',\n    false,\n    ['deriveKey'],\n  )\n  return globalThis.crypto.subtle.deriveKey(\n    {\n      name: 'HKDF',\n      hash: 'SHA-256',\n      salt: PRF_SALT,\n      info: new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-kek-wrap-v1'),\n    },\n    keyMaterial,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive a wrapping key from the credential's rawId (fallback when PRF unavailable).\n * rawId IS the entire secret and is stored in the record itself — the record\n * self-decrypts with no authenticator involved (presence gate, not confidentiality).\n * Universally supported but only usable via explicit `allowNonPrfInsecure: true`.\n */\nasync function deriveKeyFromRawId(rawId: ArrayBuffer): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    rawId,\n    'HKDF',\n    false,\n    ['deriveKey'],\n  )\n  return globalThis.crypto.subtle.deriveKey(\n    {\n      name: 'HKDF',\n      hash: 'SHA-256',\n      salt: new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-webauthn-rawid-fallback'),\n      info: new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-kek-wrap-v1'),\n    },\n    keyMaterial,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── BE flag extraction ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Extract the BE (backup-eligibility) flag from WebAuthn authenticator data.\n * Authenticator data byte layout (CTAP2 spec):\n *   bytes 0-31:  rpIdHash\n *   byte  32:    flags byte\n *   bytes 33-36: signCount\n *   ...\n *\n * Flags byte bit layout (bit 0 = LSB):\n *   bit 0 (UP):  user presence\n *   bit 2 (UV):  user verification\n *   bit 3 (BE):  backup eligibility\n *   bit 4 (BS):  backup state\n *   bit 6 (AT):  attested credential data present\n *   bit 7 (ED):  extension data present\n */\nfunction extractBEFlag(authData: ArrayBuffer): boolean {\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(authData)\n  if (bytes.length < 33) return false\n  const flagsByte = bytes[32]!\n  return (flagsByte & 0b00001000) !== 0 // bit 3\n}\n\n// ─── Payload wrap/unwrap ───────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Serialize and encrypt the DEK map from `keyring` using `wrappingKey`.\n * The wrapped payload is what gets stored in the enrollment record.\n */\nasync function wrapKeyringSummary(\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  wrappingKey: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<{ wrappedPayload: string; wrapIv: string }> {\n  const dekMap: Record<string, string> = {}\n  for (const [collName, dek] of keyring.deks) {\n    const raw = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n    dekMap[collName] = bufferToBase64(raw)\n  }\n\n  const payload = JSON.stringify({\n    userId: keyring.userId,\n    displayName: keyring.displayName,\n    role: keyring.role,\n    permissions: keyring.permissions,\n    deks: dekMap,\n    salt: bufferToBase64(keyring.salt),\n  })\n\n  const iv = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12))\n  const encrypted = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv },\n    wrappingKey,\n    new TextEncoder().encode(payload),\n  )\n\n  return { wrappedPayload: bufferToBase64(encrypted), wrapIv: bufferToBase64(iv) }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt and deserialize the keyring payload using `wrappingKey`.\n */\nasync function unwrapKeyringSummary(\n  enrollment: WebAuthnEnrollment,\n  wrappingKey: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(enrollment.wrapIv)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(enrollment.wrappedPayload)\n\n  let plaintext: ArrayBuffer\n  try {\n    plaintext = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.decrypt(\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', iv },\n      wrappingKey,\n      ciphertext,\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new ValidationError('WebAuthn decryption failed — the authenticator may have changed or the enrollment may be corrupt.')\n  }\n\n  const parsed = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext)) as {\n    userId: string\n    displayName: string\n    role: Role\n    permissions: Record<string, 'rw' | 'ro'>\n    deks: Record<string, string>\n    salt: string\n  }\n\n  const deks = new Map<string, CryptoKey>()\n  for (const [collName, rawBase64] of Object.entries(parsed.deks)) {\n    const dek = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(\n      'raw',\n      base64ToBuffer(rawBase64),\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n    deks.set(collName, dek)\n  }\n\n  return {\n    userId: parsed.userId,\n    displayName: parsed.displayName,\n    role: parsed.role,\n    permissions: parsed.permissions,\n    deks,\n    kek: null,\n    salt: base64ToBuffer(parsed.salt),\n    authenticators: [],\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Public API ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Enroll a WebAuthn credential for the given keyring.\n *\n * The caller must already have an unlocked keyring (from secret auth or\n * an existing session). The WebAuthn credential creation prompt is triggered\n * by this call.\n *\n * Returns a `WebAuthnEnrollment` that should be persisted — typically via\n * `saveEnrollment()` into a noy-db collection.\n *\n * @throws `WebAuthnNotAvailableError` if the environment doesn't support WebAuthn.\n * @throws `WebAuthnCancelledError` if the user cancels the credential creation.\n * @throws `WebAuthnMultiDeviceError` if `requireSingleDevice` is true and the\n *         authenticator returned a credential with the BE flag set.\n * @throws `WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError` if the authenticator did not provide\n *         PRF output and `options.allowNonPrfInsecure` is not `true` — see\n *         that option's doc for why the non-PRF path is refused by default.\n */\nexport async function enrollWebAuthn(\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  vault: string,\n  options: WebAuthnEnrollOptions = {},\n): Promise<WebAuthnEnrollment> {\n  if (!isWebAuthnAvailable()) {\n    throw new WebAuthnNotAvailableError()\n  }\n\n  const rpId = options.rp?.id ?? (typeof window !== 'undefined' ? window.location.hostname : 'localhost')\n  const rpName = options.rp?.name ?? 'NOYDB'\n  const timeout = options.timeout ?? 60_000\n\n  const challenge = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))\n  const userIdBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(keyring.userId)\n\n  const authenticatorSelection: AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria = {\n    userVerification: 'required',\n    residentKey: 'preferred',\n  }\n  if (options.preferCrossPlatform === true) {\n    authenticatorSelection.authenticatorAttachment = 'cross-platform'\n  } else if (options.preferCrossPlatform === false) {\n    authenticatorSelection.authenticatorAttachment = 'platform'\n  }\n\n  // Request PRF extension for deterministic key derivation\n  const extensionsInput = {\n    prf: { eval: { first: PRF_SALT } },\n  } as AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs\n\n  const credential = await navigator.credentials.create({\n    publicKey: {\n      challenge,\n      rp: { id: rpId, name: rpName },\n      user: {\n        id: userIdBytes,\n        name: keyring.userId,\n        displayName: keyring.displayName,\n      },\n      pubKeyCredParams: [\n        { type: 'public-key', alg: -7 },   // ES256\n        { type: 'public-key', alg: -257 },  // RS256\n        { type: 'public-key', alg: -8 },    // EdDSA\n      ],\n      authenticatorSelection,\n      extensions: extensionsInput,\n      timeout,\n    },\n  }) as PublicKeyCredential | null\n\n  if (!credential) {\n    throw new WebAuthnCancelledError('enrollment')\n  }\n\n  const authData = (credential.response as AuthenticatorAttestationResponse).getAuthenticatorData()\n  const beFlag = extractBEFlag(authData)\n\n  if (options.requireSingleDevice && beFlag) {\n    throw new WebAuthnMultiDeviceError()\n  }\n\n  // Try to get PRF output from extensions\n  const extensions = credential.getClientExtensionResults() as {\n    prf?: { results?: { first?: ArrayBuffer } }\n  }\n  const prfOutput = extensions.prf?.results?.first\n  const prfUsed = !!prfOutput\n\n  if (!prfUsed && !options.allowNonPrfInsecure) {\n    throw new WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError()\n  }\n\n  const wrappingKey = prfOutput\n    ? await deriveKeyFromPRF(prfOutput)\n    : await deriveKeyFromRawId(credential.rawId)\n\n  const { wrappedPayload, wrapIv } = await wrapKeyringSummary(keyring, wrappingKey)\n\n  return {\n    _noydb_webauthn: 1,\n    vault,\n    userId: keyring.userId,\n    credentialId: bufferToBase64(credential.rawId),\n    prfUsed,\n    beFlag,\n    requireSingleDevice: options.requireSingleDevice ?? false,\n    wrappedPayload,\n    wrapIv,\n    enrolledAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n    rpId,\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Unlock a vault using a previously enrolled WebAuthn credential.\n *\n * Triggers the WebAuthn assertion prompt. On success, decrypts the keyring\n * payload from the enrollment record and returns an `UnlockedKeyring`.\n *\n * The returned keyring has the same DEKs as at enrollment time. If DEK\n * VALUES have been re-minted since enrollment — `rotateKeys`, not\n * `rotateSecret` — this returns stale DEKs and the caller should detect\n * decryption failures and prompt for re-enrollment. A `rotateSecret`\n * phrase rotation does NOT stale them: it rewraps the same values.\n *\n * Non-PRF unlock (`enrollment.prfUsed === false`) is a presence gate, not\n * zero-knowledge confidentiality — it is kept working here for back-compat\n * with existing non-PRF enrollments; new enrollments refuse that path by\n * default (see `WebAuthnEnrollOptions.allowNonPrfInsecure`).\n *\n * @throws `WebAuthnNotAvailableError` if the environment doesn't support WebAuthn.\n * @throws `WebAuthnCancelledError` if the user cancels the assertion.\n * @throws `WebAuthnMultiDeviceError` if `requireSingleDevice` was set at\n *         enrollment and the authenticator data now shows BE=1.\n * @throws `ValidationError` if decryption of the keyring payload fails.\n */\nexport async function unlockWebAuthn(\n  enrollment: WebAuthnEnrollment,\n  options: WebAuthnUnlockOptions = {},\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  if (!isWebAuthnAvailable()) {\n    throw new WebAuthnNotAvailableError()\n  }\n\n  const timeout = options.timeout ?? 60_000\n  const credentialId = base64ToBuffer(enrollment.credentialId)\n  // Omitted, not defaulted: sending `rpId: undefined` is not the same as\n  // sending nothing, and an old record has no RP ID to send.\n  const rpId = options.rpId ?? enrollment.rpId\n\n  const extensionsInput = (enrollment.prfUsed\n    ? { prf: { eval: { first: PRF_SALT } } }\n    : {}\n  ) as AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs\n\n  const assertion = await navigator.credentials.get({\n    publicKey: {\n      challenge: globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)),\n      allowCredentials: [{ type: 'public-key', id: credentialId }],\n      userVerification: 'required',\n      extensions: extensionsInput,\n      timeout,\n      ...(rpId !== undefined ? { rpId } : {}),\n    },\n  }) as PublicKeyCredential | null\n\n  if (!assertion) {\n    throw new WebAuthnCancelledError('assertion')\n  }\n\n  // BE-flag guard at assertion time\n  const authData = (assertion.response as AuthenticatorAssertionResponse).authenticatorData\n  const beFlag = extractBEFlag(authData)\n  if (enrollment.requireSingleDevice && beFlag) {\n    throw new WebAuthnMultiDeviceError()\n  }\n\n  // Derive the wrapping key using the same method as enrollment\n  let wrappingKey: CryptoKey\n  if (enrollment.prfUsed) {\n    const extensions = assertion.getClientExtensionResults() as {\n      prf?: { results?: { first?: ArrayBuffer } }\n    }\n    const prfOutput = extensions.prf?.results?.first\n    if (!prfOutput) {\n      throw new ValidationError(\n        'PRF extension output not available at assertion time. ' +\n        'The authenticator may not support PRF. Re-enroll without PRF support.',\n      )\n    }\n    wrappingKey = await deriveKeyFromPRF(prfOutput)\n  } else {\n    wrappingKey = await deriveKeyFromRawId(assertion.rawId)\n  }\n\n  return unwrapKeyringSummary(enrollment, wrappingKey)\n}\n\n/**\n * `SlotRewrapCeremony` for WebAuthn slots — used by hub's\n * `rotateSecret({ slotCeremonies: { [slotId]: webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony } })`\n * to preserve a tier-2 WebAuthn enrollment across a tier-1 phrase\n * rotation without requiring re-enrollment of the credential.\n *\n * The credential itself is unaffected by phrase rotation — the\n * wrapping key derived from PRF (or rawId fallback) is bound to the\n * authenticator, not to the secret. What needs to change is the\n * **wrapped payload**: the encrypted blob the slot's `wrapped_kek`\n * field holds. After rotation the old payload is wrapped under the\n * OLD KEK, so hub can no longer thread it through the rotated\n * keyring; the new payload must hold `ctx.newDeks`.\n *\n * ⚠️ **The old payload's DEK VALUES are not stale — only its wrapping\n * is.** `rotateSecret` rewraps the SAME DEKs under a freshly-derived\n * KEK; only `rotateKeys` re-mints DEK values. Records are encrypted\n * with DEKs, so a captured `wrappedPayload` keeps decrypting\n * everything across any number of phrase rotations. An earlier\n * revision of this comment said \"now stale because rotateSecret\n * rewrapped them under a fresh KEK\", which reads as though rotation\n * invalidated the captured blob. It does not, and nothing in this\n * ceremony is a revocation step.\n *\n * ## Revoking a credential — this ceremony is a REQUIRED INPUT to it\n *\n * Hub's `revokeAuthenticator` is the real revocation, and it is three steps:\n * `removeAuthenticator` (hides the slot), `rotateKeys` (mints fresh DEKs —\n * the step that actually revokes), then `rotateSecret` with a\n * `slotCeremonies` entry for every slot that STAYS.\n *\n * ⛔ **A remaining slot handed no ceremony is DROPPED, not preserved.** After\n * the `rotateKeys` step its blob wraps DEKs that no longer exist, so keeping\n * it would leave a credential that silently fails. Its holder must re-enrol.\n *\n * So revoking ONE credential means supplying `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony` for\n * EVERY WebAuthn slot you intend to keep — and each requires that\n * credential to be present (a live assertion on the authenticator, which means the user in front of the device). Re-wrapping a credential\n * is the credential's own operation; there is no way to do it on the\n * holder's behalf.\n *\n * ⚠️ **Not in any published hub at the time of writing.**\n * `revokeAuthenticator` landed on noy-db `main` in `0612b4ac`, AFTER\n * `@noy-db/hub@0.7.1-pre.0` was cut and published — so it is in neither\n * `@latest` (0.7.0) nor `@next` (0.7.1-pre.0). Ask npm before promising it to\n * a consumer; do not infer its version from hub's `main`.\n *\n * Single ceremony, two operations:\n *   1. Trigger one WebAuthn assertion to derive the wrapping key.\n *   2. Decrypt the OLD `wrapped_kek` to extract identity fields\n *      (userId, displayName, role, permissions, salt) — these don't\n *      change on rotation, so they're carried verbatim into the new\n *      payload.\n *   3. Encrypt the NEW payload (same identity + `ctx.newDeks`) under\n *      the same wrapping key, with a fresh IV.\n *   4. Return `EnrollAuthenticatorOptions` preserving `oldSlot.id`\n *      and `method: 'webauthn'` (hub validates these to prevent\n *      slot-type swap mid-rotation).\n *\n * Previously a workaround was needed — detect dropped slots after\n * rotate and offer \"Re-enrol Touch ID\" inline. This ceremony\n * eliminates that step.\n *\n * Out of scope: tier-3 PIN. PIN state lives in `QuickUnlockStore`\n * (RAM-only), not in `KeyringFile.authenticators[]`, so\n * `slotCeremonies` doesn't apply. Clear PIN state on rotate; let\n * the user set a fresh PIN via `db.enrollUnlock` immediately after.\n *\n * @throws {WebAuthnNotAvailableError} when the environment lacks WebAuthn.\n * @throws {WebAuthnCancelledError} when the user dismisses the assertion.\n * @throws {WebAuthnMultiDeviceError} when `meta.requireSingleDevice` was\n *         set at enrollment and the authenticator now reports BE=1.\n * @throws {ValidationError} when `oldSlot.method !== 'webauthn'`,\n *         when required `meta` fields are missing, or when the old\n *         payload fails to decrypt (credential changed / payload\n *         tampered).\n * @throws {WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError} when the old slot is non-PRF and\n *         `options.allowNonPrfInsecure` is not `true` — rewrapping a\n *         non-PRF slot produces a fresh self-decrypting payload, so it\n *         requires the same explicit acknowledgement as enrollment.\n *\n * @see passwordSlotRewrapCeremony — the password parallel.\n */\nexport async function webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony(\n  ctx: SlotRewrapContext,\n  options: WebAuthnUnlockOptions = {},\n): Promise<EnrollAuthenticatorOptions> {\n  if (ctx.oldSlot.method !== 'webauthn') {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot.method is \"${ctx.oldSlot.method}\"; expected \"webauthn\". ` +\n        'This ceremony only handles WebAuthn slots — pair other methods with their own helpers.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (ctx.oldSlot.wrapKind === 'deks') {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot is a wrap-DEKs slot; expected wrap-KEK. ' +\n        'WebAuthn slots use the wrap-KEK variant; mismatch indicates the slot was ' +\n        'enrolled by a different on-* package.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (!isWebAuthnAvailable()) {\n    throw new WebAuthnNotAvailableError()\n  }\n\n  // Pull the per-slot fields needed for assertion + decrypt. These were\n  // written into `meta` by `enrollWebAuthn` (via `db.enrollWebAuthn`).\n  const meta = ctx.oldSlot.meta as {\n    credentialId?: unknown\n    wrapIv?: unknown\n    prfUsed?: unknown\n    beFlag?: unknown\n    requireSingleDevice?: unknown\n    rpId?: unknown\n  }\n  if (typeof meta.credentialId !== 'string' || meta.credentialId.length === 0) {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot.meta.credentialId is missing or invalid. ' +\n        'The slot was not enrolled via @noy-db/on-webauthn.',\n    )\n  }\n  if (typeof meta.wrapIv !== 'string' || meta.wrapIv.length === 0) {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot.meta.wrapIv is missing — the slot may be ' +\n        'pre-#16 (synthetic-keyring shape) and must be re-enrolled via db.enrollWebAuthn.',\n    )\n  }\n  const prfUsed = meta.prfUsed === true\n\n  if (!prfUsed && !options.allowNonPrfInsecure) {\n    throw new WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError()\n  }\n\n  // 1. Trigger the assertion. Same path `unlockWebAuthn` uses.\n  const credentialIdBuf = base64ToBuffer(meta.credentialId)\n  const timeout = options.timeout ?? 60_000\n  // `meta` is written by hub's `db.enrollWebAuthn`, not by this package, so\n  // an RP ID may simply not be there. Read it defensively and let the\n  // caller override — same omit-don't-default rule as `unlockWebAuthn`.\n  const rpId = options.rpId ?? (typeof meta.rpId === 'string' && meta.rpId.length > 0 ? meta.rpId : undefined)\n  const extensionsInput = (prfUsed\n    ? { prf: { eval: { first: PRF_SALT } } }\n    : {}\n  ) as AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs\n\n  const assertion = await navigator.credentials.get({\n    publicKey: {\n      challenge: globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)),\n      allowCredentials: [{ type: 'public-key', id: credentialIdBuf }],\n      userVerification: 'required',\n      extensions: extensionsInput,\n      timeout,\n      ...(rpId !== undefined ? { rpId } : {}),\n    },\n  }) as PublicKeyCredential | null\n\n  if (!assertion) {\n    throw new WebAuthnCancelledError('assertion')\n  }\n\n  // BE-flag guard at assertion time — same rule unlockWebAuthn enforces.\n  const authData = (assertion.response as AuthenticatorAssertionResponse).authenticatorData\n  const beFlag = extractBEFlag(authData)\n  if (meta.requireSingleDevice === true && beFlag) {\n    throw new WebAuthnMultiDeviceError()\n  }\n\n  // 2. Derive the wrapping key — deterministic per credential, so this\n  //    is the SAME key the original enrollment used.\n  let wrappingKey: CryptoKey\n  if (prfUsed) {\n    const extensions = assertion.getClientExtensionResults() as {\n      prf?: { results?: { first?: ArrayBuffer } }\n    }\n    const prfOutput = extensions.prf?.results?.first\n    if (!prfOutput) {\n      throw new ValidationError(\n        'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: PRF output missing at assertion time. ' +\n          'The authenticator may have lost PRF capability — re-enrol the slot via db.enrollWebAuthn.',\n      )\n    }\n    wrappingKey = await deriveKeyFromPRF(prfOutput)\n  } else {\n    wrappingKey = await deriveKeyFromRawId(assertion.rawId)\n  }\n\n  // 3. Decrypt the OLD wrapped_kek to extract carry-through identity\n  //    fields. The slot's wrapped_kek IS the old wrappedPayload\n  //    (mapping established by db.enrollWebAuthn at noydb.ts:1178).\n  const oldIv = base64ToBuffer(meta.wrapIv)\n  const oldCiphertext = base64ToBuffer(ctx.oldSlot.wrapped_kek)\n  let oldPlaintext: ArrayBuffer\n  try {\n    oldPlaintext = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.decrypt(\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: oldIv },\n      wrappingKey,\n      oldCiphertext,\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: failed to decrypt the old wrapped payload. ' +\n        'The wrapping key derived from this credential does not match — possible ' +\n        'cross-tenant slot mix-up or a corrupted enrollment.',\n    )\n  }\n  const oldPayload = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(oldPlaintext)) as {\n    userId: string\n    displayName: string\n    role: Role\n    permissions: Record<string, 'rw' | 'ro'>\n    deks: Record<string, string>\n    salt: string\n  }\n\n  // 4. Build the NEW payload — identity fields preserved, deks\n  //    replaced with ctx.newDeks (rewrapped under the new KEK in the\n  //    keyring file; here we serialize them as raw bytes for the\n  //    self-contained webauthn-side reconstruction).\n  const newDekMap: Record<string, string> = {}\n  for (const [collName, dek] of ctx.newDeks) {\n    const raw = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n    newDekMap[collName] = bufferToBase64(raw)\n  }\n  const newPayload = JSON.stringify({\n    userId: oldPayload.userId,\n    displayName: oldPayload.displayName,\n    role: oldPayload.role,\n    permissions: oldPayload.permissions,\n    deks: newDekMap,\n    salt: oldPayload.salt,\n  })\n\n  // 5. Encrypt with the same wrapping key under a fresh IV.\n  const newIv = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12))\n  const newCiphertext = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: newIv },\n    wrappingKey,\n    new TextEncoder().encode(newPayload),\n  )\n\n  // 6. Return EnrollAuthenticatorOptions preserving id + method.\n  //    Hub's rotate validates these — a mismatch throws ValidationError\n  //    (slot-type swap defense; see SlotRewrapContext docstring).\n  return {\n    id: ctx.oldSlot.id,\n    method: 'webauthn',\n    wrapped_kek: bufferToBase64(newCiphertext),\n    enrolled_via_tier: ctx.oldSlot.enrolled_via_tier,\n    meta: {\n      credentialId: meta.credentialId,\n      wrapIv: bufferToBase64(newIv),\n      prfUsed,\n      beFlag,\n      requireSingleDevice: meta.requireSingleDevice === true,\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Check whether a `WebAuthnEnrollment` record looks well-formed.\n * Does not perform any cryptographic verification.\n */\nexport function isValidEnrollment(value: unknown): value is WebAuthnEnrollment {\n  if (!value || typeof value !== 'object') return false\n  const e = value as Record<string, unknown>\n  return (\n    e._noydb_webauthn === 1 &&\n    typeof e.vault === 'string' &&\n    typeof e.userId === 'string' &&\n    typeof e.credentialId === 'string' &&\n    typeof e.wrappedPayload === 'string' &&\n    typeof e.wrapIv === 'string'\n  )\n}\n"],"mappings":";AA2DA,SAAS,gBAAgB,sBAAsB;AAC/C,SAAS,uBAAuB;AAKhC,SAAS,mBAAAA,wBAAuB;AAYzB,IAAM,4BAAN,cAAwC,MAAM;AAAA,EAC1C,OAAO;AAAA,EAChB,cAAc;AACZ,UAAM,0GAA0G;AAChH,SAAK,OAAO;AAAA,EACd;AACF;AAUO,IAAM,yBAAN,cAAqC,MAAM;AAAA,EACvC,OAAO;AAAA,EAChB,YAAY,IAAgC;AAC1C,UAAM,YAAY,EAAE,6BAA6B;AACjD,SAAK,OAAO;AAAA,EACd;AACF;AAUO,IAAM,2BAAN,cAAuC,MAAM;AAAA,EACzC,OAAO;AAAA,EAChB,cAAc;AACZ;AAAA,MACE;AAAA,IAIF;AACA,SAAK,OAAO;AAAA,EACd;AACF;AAeO,IAAM,8BAAN,cAA0C,MAAM;AAAA,EAC5C,OAAO;AAAA,EAChB,cAAc;AACZ;AAAA,MACE;AAAA,IAMF;AACA,SAAK,OAAO;AAAA,EACd;AACF;AAoHO,SAAS,sBAA+B;AAC7C,SACE,OAAO,WAAW,eAClB,OAAO,OAAO,wBAAwB,eACtC,OAAO,cAAc,eACrB,OAAO,UAAU,gBAAgB;AAErC;AAIA,IAAM,WAAW,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,2BAA2B;AAQrE,eAAe,iBAAiB,WAA4C;AAC1E,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACjD;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,WAAW;AAAA,EACd;AACA,SAAO,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IAC9B;AAAA,MACE,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAAA,IACpD;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,IAC/B;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,EACvB;AACF;AAQA,eAAe,mBAAmB,OAAwC;AACxE,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACjD;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,WAAW;AAAA,EACd;AACA,SAAO,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IAC9B;AAAA,MACE,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,+BAA+B;AAAA,MAC9D,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAAA,IACpD;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,IAC/B;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,EACvB;AACF;AAoBA,SAAS,cAAc,UAAgC;AACrD,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW,QAAQ;AACrC,MAAI,MAAM,SAAS,GAAI,QAAO;AAC9B,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,EAAE;AAC1B,UAAQ,YAAY,OAAgB;AACtC;AAQA,eAAe,mBACb,SACA,aACqD;AACrD,QAAM,SAAiC,CAAC;AACxC,aAAW,CAAC,UAAU,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM;AAC1C,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;AAC/D,WAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,eAAe,GAAG;AAAA,EACvC;AAEA,QAAM,UAAU,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,IAC7B,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAAA,IAChB,aAAa,QAAQ;AAAA,IACrB,MAAM,QAAQ;AAAA,IACd,aAAa,QAAQ;AAAA,IACrB,MAAM;AAAA,IACN,MAAM,eAAe,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,EACnC,CAAC;AAED,QAAM,KAAK,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AAC/D,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IAC/C,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG;AAAA,IACtB;AAAA,IACA,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,EAClC;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,eAAe,SAAS,GAAG,QAAQ,eAAe,EAAE,EAAE;AACjF;AAKA,eAAe,qBACb,YACA,aAC0B;AAC1B,QAAM,KAAK,eAAe,WAAW,MAAM;AAC3C,QAAM,aAAa,eAAe,WAAW,cAAc;AAE3D,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,gBAAY,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,MACzC,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG;AAAA,MACtB;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,QAAQ;AACN,UAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,wGAAmG;AAAA,EAC/H;AAEA,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AAS7D,QAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAAuB;AACxC,aAAW,CAAC,UAAU,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI,GAAG;AAC/D,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,MACzC;AAAA,MACA,eAAe,SAAS;AAAA,MACxB,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI;AAAA,MAC/B;AAAA,MACA,CAAC,WAAW,SAAS;AAAA,IACvB;AACA,SAAK,IAAI,UAAU,GAAG;AAAA,EACxB;AAEA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,QAAQ,OAAO;AAAA,IACf,aAAa,OAAO;AAAA,IACpB,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,IACb,aAAa,OAAO;AAAA,IACpB;AAAA,IACA,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,eAAe,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,IAChC,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAAA,EACnB;AACF;AAsBA,eAAsB,eACpB,SACA,OACA,UAAiC,CAAC,GACL;AAC7B,MAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,GAAG;AAC1B,UAAM,IAAI,0BAA0B;AAAA,EACtC;AAEA,QAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,OAAO,WAAW,cAAc,OAAO,SAAS,WAAW;AAC3F,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ;AACnC,QAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,WAAW;AAEnC,QAAM,YAAY,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AACtE,QAAM,cAAc,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,QAAQ,MAAM;AAE3D,QAAM,yBAAyD;AAAA,IAC7D,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAClB,aAAa;AAAA,EACf;AACA,MAAI,QAAQ,wBAAwB,MAAM;AACxC,2BAAuB,0BAA0B;AAAA,EACnD,WAAW,QAAQ,wBAAwB,OAAO;AAChD,2BAAuB,0BAA0B;AAAA,EACnD;AAGA,QAAM,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACtB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,EAAE;AAAA,EACnC;AAEA,QAAM,aAAa,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,OAAO;AAAA,IACpD,WAAW;AAAA,MACT;AAAA,MACA,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO;AAAA,MAC7B,MAAM;AAAA,QACJ,IAAI;AAAA,QACJ,MAAM,QAAQ;AAAA,QACd,aAAa,QAAQ;AAAA,MACvB;AAAA,MACA,kBAAkB;AAAA,QAChB,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA;AAAA,QAC9B,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA;AAAA,QAChC,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA;AAAA,MAChC;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,YAAY;AAAA,MACZ;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,CAAC;AAED,MAAI,CAAC,YAAY;AACf,UAAM,IAAI,uBAAuB,YAAY;AAAA,EAC/C;AAEA,QAAM,WAAY,WAAW,SAA8C,qBAAqB;AAChG,QAAM,SAAS,cAAc,QAAQ;AAErC,MAAI,QAAQ,uBAAuB,QAAQ;AACzC,UAAM,IAAI,yBAAyB;AAAA,EACrC;AAGA,QAAM,aAAa,WAAW,0BAA0B;AAGxD,QAAM,YAAY,WAAW,KAAK,SAAS;AAC3C,QAAM,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;AAElB,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,QAAQ,qBAAqB;AAC5C,UAAM,IAAI,4BAA4B;AAAA,EACxC;AAEA,QAAM,cAAc,YAChB,MAAM,iBAAiB,SAAS,IAChC,MAAM,mBAAmB,WAAW,KAAK;AAE7C,QAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,mBAAmB,SAAS,WAAW;AAEhF,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,iBAAiB;AAAA,IACjB;AAAA,IACA,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAAA,IAChB,cAAc,eAAe,WAAW,KAAK;AAAA,IAC7C;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,qBAAqB,QAAQ,uBAAuB;AAAA,IACpD;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,aAAY,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IACnC;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAyBA,eAAsB,eACpB,YACA,UAAiC,CAAC,GACR;AAC1B,MAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,GAAG;AAC1B,UAAM,IAAI,0BAA0B;AAAA,EACtC;AAEA,QAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,WAAW;AACnC,QAAM,eAAe,eAAe,WAAW,YAAY;AAG3D,QAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,WAAW;AAExC,QAAM,kBAAmB,WAAW,UAChC,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,IACrC,CAAC;AAGL,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,IAChD,WAAW;AAAA,MACT,WAAW,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,MAC/D,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,IAAI,aAAa,CAAC;AAAA,MAC3D,kBAAkB;AAAA,MAClB,YAAY;AAAA,MACZ;AAAA,MACA,GAAI,SAAS,SAAY,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACvC;AAAA,EACF,CAAC;AAED,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW;AACd,UAAM,IAAI,uBAAuB,WAAW;AAAA,EAC9C;AAGA,QAAM,WAAY,UAAU,SAA4C;AACxE,QAAM,SAAS,cAAc,QAAQ;AACrC,MAAI,WAAW,uBAAuB,QAAQ;AAC5C,UAAM,IAAI,yBAAyB;AAAA,EACrC;AAGA,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,WAAW,SAAS;AACtB,UAAM,aAAa,UAAU,0BAA0B;AAGvD,UAAM,YAAY,WAAW,KAAK,SAAS;AAC3C,QAAI,CAAC,WAAW;AACd,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,MAEF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,kBAAc,MAAM,iBAAiB,SAAS;AAAA,EAChD,OAAO;AACL,kBAAc,MAAM,mBAAmB,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,EACxD;AAEA,SAAO,qBAAqB,YAAY,WAAW;AACrD;AAqFA,eAAsB,2BACpB,KACA,UAAiC,CAAC,GACG;AACrC,MAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,YAAY;AACrC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,kDAAkD,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,IAEtE;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,aAAa,QAAQ;AACnC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IAGF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,CAAC,oBAAoB,GAAG;AAC1B,UAAM,IAAI,0BAA0B;AAAA,EACtC;AAIA,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ;AAQzB,MAAI,OAAO,KAAK,iBAAiB,YAAY,KAAK,aAAa,WAAW,GAAG;AAC3E,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IAEF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,KAAK,WAAW,YAAY,KAAK,OAAO,WAAW,GAAG;AAC/D,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IAEF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,UAAU,KAAK,YAAY;AAEjC,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,QAAQ,qBAAqB;AAC5C,UAAM,IAAI,4BAA4B;AAAA,EACxC;AAGA,QAAM,kBAAkB,eAAe,KAAK,YAAY;AACxD,QAAM,UAAU,QAAQ,WAAW;AAInC,QAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,YAAY,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO;AAClG,QAAM,kBAAmB,UACrB,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,IACrC,CAAC;AAGL,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,IAChD,WAAW;AAAA,MACT,WAAW,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,MAC/D,kBAAkB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,IAAI,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAAA,MAC9D,kBAAkB;AAAA,MAClB,YAAY;AAAA,MACZ;AAAA,MACA,GAAI,SAAS,SAAY,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IACvC;AAAA,EACF,CAAC;AAED,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW;AACd,UAAM,IAAI,uBAAuB,WAAW;AAAA,EAC9C;AAGA,QAAM,WAAY,UAAU,SAA4C;AACxE,QAAM,SAAS,cAAc,QAAQ;AACrC,MAAI,KAAK,wBAAwB,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAC/C,UAAM,IAAI,yBAAyB;AAAA,EACrC;AAIA,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,SAAS;AACX,UAAM,aAAa,UAAU,0BAA0B;AAGvD,UAAM,YAAY,WAAW,KAAK,SAAS;AAC3C,QAAI,CAAC,WAAW;AACd,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,MAEF;AAAA,IACF;AACA,kBAAc,MAAM,iBAAiB,SAAS;AAAA,EAChD,OAAO;AACL,kBAAc,MAAM,mBAAmB,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,EACxD;AAKA,QAAM,QAAQ,eAAe,KAAK,MAAM;AACxC,QAAM,gBAAgB,eAAe,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW;AAC5D,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,mBAAe,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,MAC5C,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM;AAAA,MAC7B;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,QAAQ;AACN,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IAGF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,aAAa,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,YAAY,CAAC;AAapE,QAAM,YAAoC,CAAC;AAC3C,aAAW,CAAC,UAAU,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI,SAAS;AACzC,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;AAC/D,cAAU,QAAQ,IAAI,eAAe,GAAG;AAAA,EAC1C;AACA,QAAM,aAAa,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,IAChC,QAAQ,WAAW;AAAA,IACnB,aAAa,WAAW;AAAA,IACxB,MAAM,WAAW;AAAA,IACjB,aAAa,WAAW;AAAA,IACxB,MAAM;AAAA,IACN,MAAM,WAAW;AAAA,EACnB,CAAC;AAGD,QAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AAClE,QAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACnD,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM;AAAA,IAC7B;AAAA,IACA,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,UAAU;AAAA,EACrC;AAKA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,IAChB,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,aAAa,eAAe,aAAa;AAAA,IACzC,mBAAmB,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,IAC/B,MAAM;AAAA,MACJ,cAAc,KAAK;AAAA,MACnB,QAAQ,eAAe,KAAK;AAAA,MAC5B;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,MACA,qBAAqB,KAAK,wBAAwB;AAAA,IACpD;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAMO,SAAS,kBAAkB,OAA6C;AAC7E,MAAI,CAAC,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU,SAAU,QAAO;AAChD,QAAM,IAAI;AACV,SACE,EAAE,oBAAoB,KACtB,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,YACnB,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW,YACpB,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,YAC1B,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,YAC5B,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW;AAExB;","names":["ValidationError"]}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@noy-db/on-webauthn",
-  "version": "0.8.0",
+  "version": "0.9.0",
   "description": "WebAuthn hardware-key keyrings for noy-db — Touch ID, Face ID, Windows Hello, YubiKey, FIDO2 passkeys",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "author": "vLannaAi <vicio@lanna.ai>",
@@ -33,11 +33,11 @@
     "node": ">=22.0.0"
   },
   "peerDependencies": {
-    "@noy-db/hub": "^0.7.0 || ^0.7.1-pre.0 || ^0.8.0-pre.0"
+    "@noy-db/hub": "^0.7.0 || ^0.7.1-pre.0 || ^0.8.0-pre.0 || ^0.9.0-pre.1"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
-    "@noy-db/hub": "0.8.0",
-    "@noy-db/test-ceremony-conformance": "0.8.0",
+    "@noy-db/hub": "0.9.0",
+    "@noy-db/ports": "0.9.0",
     "happy-dom": "^18.0.0"
   },
   "keywords": [
@@ -59,10 +59,11 @@
     "access": "public",
     "tag": "latest"
   },
+  "dependencies": {},
   "scripts": {
     "build": "tsup",
     "test": "vitest run",
     "lint": "eslint src/",
-    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
+    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit && tsc --noEmit -p tsconfig.test.json"
   }
 }