npm - @noy-db/on-webauthn - Versions diffs - 0.6.0 → 0.7.0-pre.0 - Mend

@noy-db/on-webauthn 0.6.0 → 0.7.0-pre.0

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Files changed (3) hide show

package/dist/index.d.ts CHANGED Viewed

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { UnlockedKeyring, SlotRewrapContext, EnrollAuthenticatorOptions } from '@noy-db/hub';
+import { UnlockedKeyring, SlotRewrapContext, EnrollAuthenticatorOptions } from '@noy-db/hub/on';
 export { ValidationError } from '@noy-db/hub';
 /**

package/dist/index.js.map CHANGED Viewed

	@@ -1 +1 @@
1	- {"version":3,"sources":["../src/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/*\n @noy-db/on-webauthn —\n \n Hardware-key keyring for noy-db using the WebAuthn API.\n \n Covers every form factor:\n * - Platform authenticators: Touch ID, Face ID, Windows Hello, Android biometric\n * - Roaming authenticators: YubiKey (5C NFC, Bio), SoloKey, Titan, any FIDO2 key\n * - Passkey-capable platform authenticators: iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager\n \n Key derivation model\n * ────────────────────\n * This package uses the PRF (Pseudo-Random Function) extension when\n * available to derive a deterministic wrapping key from the WebAuthn\n * credential. The PRF output is consistent across assertions on the same\n * device/credential, enabling unlock-without-secret while keeping the\n * derived key bound to the physical authenticator.\n \n When PRF is not supported by the authenticator (common on older hardware),\n * the package can fall back to HKDF-SHA256 over the credential's `rawId` —\n * but by default, enrollment refuses this path because the `rawId` is stored\n * in the record itself, making the record self-decrypting (presence gate, not\n * confidentiality). Use `allowNonPrfInsecure: true` to opt in; prefer a\n * PRF-capable device or the secret for real confidentiality.\n \n The derived key is NEVER persisted. It exists only in memory during the\n * unlock operation. What IS persisted (in the noy-db adapter, not in browser\n * storage) is the wrapped KEK: `encrypt(KEK, derivedKey)`.\n \n BE-flag guards\n * ──────────────\n * The backup-eligibility (BE) flag in a WebAuthn authenticator data signals\n * that the credential is (or can be) synced across devices — e.g. stored in\n * iCloud Keychain. For single-device security policies (air-gapped USB sticks,\n * high-security terminals), this is a threat: the credential is available on\n * any device where the user's iCloud account is signed in.\n \n The `requireSingleDevice: true` option rejects credentials with the BE flag\n * set during enrollment. Existing enrollments are checked at assertion time —\n * if the authenticator data shows BE=1 but `requireSingleDevice` was set at\n * enrollment, the assertion throws `WebAuthnMultiDeviceError`.\n \n Enrollment flow\n * ───────────────\n * 1. User is already authenticated (secret or existing session).\n * 2. Call `enrollWebAuthn(keyring, options)`.\n * 3. WebAuthn credential is created; PRF or rawId-derived key wraps the KEK.\n * 4. Returns a `WebAuthnEnrollment` — persist this to the noy-db adapter\n * via `saveEnrollment()`, or store it yourself in any encrypted collection.\n \n Unlock flow\n * ───────────\n * 1. Load the `WebAuthnEnrollment` via `loadEnrollment()`.\n * 2. Call `unlockWebAuthn(enrollment, keyring)` — triggers the WebAuthn\n * assertion prompt.\n * 3. On success, returns the unwrapped `CryptoKey` (the KEK) — use it to\n * re-hydrate the session via `createSession()`.\n /\n\nimport { bufferToBase64, base64ToBuffer } from '@noy-db/hub'\nimport { ValidationError } from '@noy-db/hub'\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring, Role, EnrollAuthenticatorOptions, SlotRewrapContext } from '@noy-db/hub'\n\n// Re-export from core for convenience\nexport { ValidationError } from '@noy-db/hub'\n\n// ─── Error types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/\n Thrown when the WebAuthn API is not available in the current environment.\n \n Check `isWebAuthnAvailable()` before calling `enrollWebAuthn()` or\n * `unlockWebAuthn()` and show a fallback UI (secret entry) if this\n * returns false. Common scenarios: Node.js environments, older browsers,\n * non-HTTPS origins (WebAuthn requires a Secure Context).\n /\nexport class WebAuthnNotAvailableError extends Error {\n readonly code = 'WEBAUTHN_NOT_AVAILABLE'\n constructor() {\n super('WebAuthn is not available in this environment. A browser with navigator.credentials support is required.')\n this.name = 'WebAuthnNotAvailableError'\n }\n}\n\n/\n Thrown when the user dismisses the WebAuthn prompt without completing it.\n \n The `op` field distinguishes enrollment cancellation (user chose not to\n * enroll a hardware key) from assertion cancellation (user dismissed the\n * unlock prompt). Treat this as a user-initiated action, not an error — show\n * a \"use secret instead\" option rather than an error message.\n /\nexport class WebAuthnCancelledError extends Error {\n readonly code = 'WEBAUTHN_CANCELLED'\n constructor(op: 'enrollment' \| 'assertion') {\n super(`WebAuthn ${op} was cancelled by the user.`)\n this.name = 'WebAuthnCancelledError'\n }\n}\n\n/\n Thrown when the authenticator has the backup-eligible (BE) flag set but\n * the vault requires a single-device credential (`requireSingleDevice: true`).\n \n A BE credential is synced across devices (e.g. iCloud Keychain, Google\n * Password Manager), which violates the single-device security model. The\n * user must enroll a hardware security key (YubiKey, Titan, SoloKey) instead.\n /\nexport class WebAuthnMultiDeviceError extends Error {\n readonly code = 'WEBAUTHN_MULTI_DEVICE'\n constructor() {\n super(\n 'This credential is backup-eligible (BE flag set) and may be synced across devices. ' +\n 'The vault requires a single-device credential (requireSingleDevice: true). ' +\n 'Please use a hardware security key (YubiKey, Titan, SoloKey) or a platform ' +\n 'authenticator that does not sync credentials across devices.',\n )\n this.name = 'WebAuthnMultiDeviceError'\n }\n}\n\n/\n Thrown when `enrollWebAuthn()` (or `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony()`) is\n * asked to enroll/rewrap without a PRF-capable authenticator and without\n * explicit opt-in via `allowNonPrfInsecure: true`.\n \n Non-PRF WebAuthn cannot provide confidentiality: its wrapping key derives\n * entirely from the credential's `rawId`, which is stored in cleartext in\n * the enrollment record itself — the record would self-decrypt with no\n * authenticator involved. By default, enrollment/rewrap refuses this path.\n * Use a PRF-capable credential, fall back to the secret, or set\n * `allowNonPrfInsecure: true` to explicitly accept a non-confidential\n * presence gate instead.\n /\nexport class WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError extends Error {\n readonly code = 'WEBAUTHN_PRF_UNAVAILABLE'\n constructor() {\n super(\n 'The PRF extension is not available on this authenticator, so it cannot provide ' +\n 'WebAuthn confidentiality — the non-PRF wrapping key derives entirely from the ' +\n \"credential's rawId, which is stored in the enrollment record itself (the record \" +\n 'would self-decrypt with no authenticator involved). Enrollment refuses this path ' +\n 'by default. Use a PRF-capable authenticator, use the secret instead, or pass ' +\n '{ allowNonPrfInsecure: true } to explicitly accept a non-confidential presence gate.',\n )\n this.name = 'WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError'\n }\n}\n\n// ─── Types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/\n A persisted WebAuthn enrollment record. Store this in a noy-db\n * collection (encrypted like any other record) or return it from\n * `saveEnrollment()` / `loadEnrollment()` helpers.\n /\nexport interface WebAuthnEnrollment {\n /* Enrollment format version. /\n readonly _noydb_webauthn: 1\n /* The vault this enrollment was created for. /\n readonly vault: string\n /* The user ID this enrollment belongs to. /\n readonly userId: string\n /* WebAuthn credential ID (base64). Use for allowCredentials in assertions. /\n readonly credentialId: string\n /* Whether PRF was used for key derivation (vs rawId HKDF fallback). /\n readonly prfUsed: boolean\n /* Whether the BE (backup-eligibility) flag was present at enrollment time. /\n readonly beFlag: boolean\n /* Whether single-device was required at enrollment time. /\n readonly requireSingleDevice: boolean\n /* The wrapped KEK: encrypt(exportedDekMap, derivedKey). Base64. /\n readonly wrappedPayload: string\n /* IV used for the wrapping. Base64. /\n readonly wrapIv: string\n /* ISO timestamp of enrollment. /\n readonly enrolledAt: string\n}\n\n/* Options for `enrollWebAuthn()`. /\nexport interface WebAuthnEnrollOptions {\n /\n Relying party ID and name for the WebAuthn credential.\n * Defaults to `{ id: window.location.hostname, name: 'NOYDB' }`.\n /\n rp?: { id?: string; name: string }\n /\n If `true`, refuse to enroll credentials with the BE flag set\n * (multi-device / syncable passkeys). Defaults to `false`.\n \n Set to `true` for high-security deployments where the credential\n * must be bound to a single physical device (YubiKey, Titan, etc.).\n /\n requireSingleDevice?: boolean\n /\n WebAuthn timeout in milliseconds. Default: 60_000.\n /\n timeout?: number\n /\n If `true`, prefer a cross-platform authenticator (roaming security key).\n * If `false`, prefer a platform authenticator (Touch ID, Face ID).\n * If undefined, let the browser choose.\n /\n preferCrossPlatform?: boolean\n /\n Non-PRF WebAuthn cannot provide confidentiality — its wrapping key\n * derives from `credentialId`, which is stored in the enrollment record,\n * so the record self-decrypts with no authenticator. By default,\n * enrollment REFUSES the non-PRF path (throws `WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError`).\n * Set `true` ONLY to explicitly opt into a non-confidential presence gate;\n * prefer the secret or a PRF-capable credential for real confidentiality.\n /\n allowNonPrfInsecure?: boolean\n}\n\n/* Options for `unlockWebAuthn()`. /\nexport interface WebAuthnUnlockOptions {\n /* WebAuthn timeout in milliseconds. Default: 60_000. /\n timeout?: number\n /\n Only consulted by `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony()` — `unlockWebAuthn()`\n * ignores it, since unlocking an existing non-PRF record is always\n * permitted (back-compat; that record was never confidential). Same\n * semantics as `WebAuthnEnrollOptions.allowNonPrfInsecure`: required to\n * rewrap a non-PRF slot, since rewrap produces a fresh self-decrypting\n * wrapped payload.\n /\n allowNonPrfInsecure?: boolean\n}\n\n// ─── Environment check ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/\n Returns `true` if WebAuthn is available and can be used for enrollment or unlock.\n \n Checks for `navigator.credentials`, `window.PublicKeyCredential`, and a\n * Secure Context (`window.isSecureContext`). Call this before rendering the\n * \"Register hardware key\" button to avoid showing options that will fail.\n /\nexport function isWebAuthnAvailable(): boolean {\n return (\n typeof window !== 'undefined' &&\n typeof window.PublicKeyCredential !== 'undefined' &&\n typeof navigator !== 'undefined' &&\n typeof navigator.credentials !== 'undefined'\n )\n}\n\n// ─── PRF salt ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nconst PRF_SALT = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-webauthn-kek-derive')\n\n// ─── Key derivation helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/\n Derive a wrapping key from PRF output.\n * PRF output is 32 bytes of authenticator-bound pseudo-random data.\n /\nasync function deriveKeyFromPRF(prfOutput: ArrayBuffer): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n const keyMaterial = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(\n 'raw',\n prfOutput,\n 'HKDF',\n false,\n ['deriveKey'],\n )\n return globalThis.crypto.subtle.deriveKey(\n {\n name: 'HKDF',\n hash: 'SHA-256',\n salt: PRF_SALT,\n info: new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-kek-wrap-v1'),\n },\n keyMaterial,\n { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },\n false,\n ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n )\n}\n\n/\n Derive a wrapping key from the credential's rawId (fallback when PRF unavailable).\n * rawId IS the entire secret and is stored in the record itself — the record\n * self-decrypts with no authenticator involved (presence gate, not confidentiality).\n * Universally supported but only usable via explicit `allowNonPrfInsecure: true`.\n /\nasync function deriveKeyFromRawId(rawId: ArrayBuffer): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n const keyMaterial = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(\n 'raw',\n rawId,\n 'HKDF',\n false,\n ['deriveKey'],\n )\n return globalThis.crypto.subtle.deriveKey(\n {\n name: 'HKDF',\n hash: 'SHA-256',\n salt: new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-webauthn-rawid-fallback'),\n info: new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-kek-wrap-v1'),\n },\n keyMaterial,\n { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },\n false,\n ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n )\n}\n\n// ─── BE flag extraction ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/\n Extract the BE (backup-eligibility) flag from WebAuthn authenticator data.\n * Authenticator data byte layout (CTAP2 spec):\n * bytes 0-31: rpIdHash\n * byte 32: flags byte\n * bytes 33-36: signCount\n * ...\n \n Flags byte bit layout (bit 0 = LSB):\n * bit 0 (UP): user presence\n * bit 2 (UV): user verification\n * bit 3 (BE): backup eligibility\n * bit 4 (BS): backup state\n * bit 6 (AT): attested credential data present\n * bit 7 (ED): extension data present\n /\nfunction extractBEFlag(authData: ArrayBuffer): boolean {\n const bytes = new Uint8Array(authData)\n if (bytes.length < 33) return false\n const flagsByte = bytes[32]!\n return (flagsByte & 0b00001000) !== 0 // bit 3\n}\n\n// ─── Payload wrap/unwrap ───────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/\n Serialize and encrypt the DEK map from `keyring` using `wrappingKey`.\n * The wrapped payload is what gets stored in the enrollment record.\n /\nasync function wrapKeyringSummary(\n keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n wrappingKey: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<{ wrappedPayload: string; wrapIv: string }> {\n const dekMap: Record<string, string> = {}\n for (const [collName, dek] of keyring.deks) {\n const raw = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n dekMap[collName] = bufferToBase64(raw)\n }\n\n const payload = JSON.stringify({\n userId: keyring.userId,\n displayName: keyring.displayName,\n role: keyring.role,\n permissions: keyring.permissions,\n deks: dekMap,\n salt: bufferToBase64(keyring.salt),\n })\n\n const iv = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12))\n const encrypted = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.encrypt(\n { name: 'AES-GCM', iv },\n wrappingKey,\n new TextEncoder().encode(payload),\n )\n\n return { wrappedPayload: bufferToBase64(encrypted), wrapIv: bufferToBase64(iv) }\n}\n\n/\n Decrypt and deserialize the keyring payload using `wrappingKey`.\n /\nasync function unwrapKeyringSummary(\n enrollment: WebAuthnEnrollment,\n wrappingKey: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n const iv = base64ToBuffer(enrollment.wrapIv)\n const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(enrollment.wrappedPayload)\n\n let plaintext: ArrayBuffer\n try {\n plaintext = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.decrypt(\n { name: 'AES-GCM', iv },\n wrappingKey,\n ciphertext,\n )\n } catch {\n throw new ValidationError('WebAuthn decryption failed — the authenticator may have changed or the enrollment may be corrupt.')\n }\n\n const parsed = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext)) as {\n userId: string\n displayName: string\n role: Role\n permissions: Record<string, 'rw' \| 'ro'>\n deks: Record<string, string>\n salt: string\n }\n\n const deks = new Map<string, CryptoKey>()\n for (const [collName, rawBase64] of Object.entries(parsed.deks)) {\n const dek = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(\n 'raw',\n base64ToBuffer(rawBase64),\n { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },\n true,\n ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n )\n deks.set(collName, dek)\n }\n\n return {\n userId: parsed.userId,\n displayName: parsed.displayName,\n role: parsed.role,\n permissions: parsed.permissions,\n deks,\n kek: null,\n salt: base64ToBuffer(parsed.salt),\n authenticators: [],\n }\n}\n\n// ─── Public API ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/\n Enroll a WebAuthn credential for the given keyring.\n \n The caller must already have an unlocked keyring (from secret auth or\n * an existing session). The WebAuthn credential creation prompt is triggered\n * by this call.\n \n Returns a `WebAuthnEnrollment` that should be persisted — typically via\n * `saveEnrollment()` into a noy-db collection.\n \n @throws `WebAuthnNotAvailableError` if the environment doesn't support WebAuthn.\n * @throws `WebAuthnCancelledError` if the user cancels the credential creation.\n * @throws `WebAuthnMultiDeviceError` if `requireSingleDevice` is true and the\n * authenticator returned a credential with the BE flag set.\n * @throws `WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError` if the authenticator did not provide\n * PRF output and `options.allowNonPrfInsecure` is not `true` — see\n * that option's doc for why the non-PRF path is refused by default.\n /\nexport async function enrollWebAuthn(\n keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n vault: string,\n options: WebAuthnEnrollOptions = {},\n): Promise<WebAuthnEnrollment> {\n if (!isWebAuthnAvailable()) {\n throw new WebAuthnNotAvailableError()\n }\n\n const rpId = options.rp?.id ?? (typeof window !== 'undefined' ? window.location.hostname : 'localhost')\n const rpName = options.rp?.name ?? 'NOYDB'\n const timeout = options.timeout ?? 60_000\n\n const challenge = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))\n const userIdBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(keyring.userId)\n\n const authenticatorSelection: AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria = {\n userVerification: 'required',\n residentKey: 'preferred',\n }\n if (options.preferCrossPlatform === true) {\n authenticatorSelection.authenticatorAttachment = 'cross-platform'\n } else if (options.preferCrossPlatform === false) {\n authenticatorSelection.authenticatorAttachment = 'platform'\n }\n\n // Request PRF extension for deterministic key derivation\n const extensionsInput = {\n prf: { eval: { first: PRF_SALT } },\n } as AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs\n\n const credential = await navigator.credentials.create({\n publicKey: {\n challenge,\n rp: { id: rpId, name: rpName },\n user: {\n id: userIdBytes,\n name: keyring.userId,\n displayName: keyring.displayName,\n },\n pubKeyCredParams: [\n { type: 'public-key', alg: -7 }, // ES256\n { type: 'public-key', alg: -257 }, // RS256\n { type: 'public-key', alg: -8 }, // EdDSA\n ],\n authenticatorSelection,\n extensions: extensionsInput,\n timeout,\n },\n }) as PublicKeyCredential \| null\n\n if (!credential) {\n throw new WebAuthnCancelledError('enrollment')\n }\n\n const authData = (credential.response as AuthenticatorAttestationResponse).getAuthenticatorData()\n const beFlag = extractBEFlag(authData)\n\n if (options.requireSingleDevice && beFlag) {\n throw new WebAuthnMultiDeviceError()\n }\n\n // Try to get PRF output from extensions\n const extensions = credential.getClientExtensionResults() as {\n prf?: { results?: { first?: ArrayBuffer } }\n }\n const prfOutput = extensions.prf?.results?.first\n const prfUsed = !!prfOutput\n\n if (!prfUsed && !options.allowNonPrfInsecure) {\n throw new WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError()\n }\n\n const wrappingKey = prfOutput\n ? await deriveKeyFromPRF(prfOutput)\n : await deriveKeyFromRawId(credential.rawId)\n\n const { wrappedPayload, wrapIv } = await wrapKeyringSummary(keyring, wrappingKey)\n\n return {\n _noydb_webauthn: 1,\n vault,\n userId: keyring.userId,\n credentialId: bufferToBase64(credential.rawId),\n prfUsed,\n beFlag,\n requireSingleDevice: options.requireSingleDevice ?? false,\n wrappedPayload,\n wrapIv,\n enrolledAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n }\n}\n\n/\n Unlock a vault using a previously enrolled WebAuthn credential.\n \n Triggers the WebAuthn assertion prompt. On success, decrypts the keyring\n * payload from the enrollment record and returns an `UnlockedKeyring`.\n \n The returned keyring has the same DEKs as at enrollment time. If DEKs\n * have been rotated since enrollment, this will return stale DEKs — the\n * caller should detect decryption failures and prompt for re-enrollment.\n \n Non-PRF unlock (`enrollment.prfUsed === false`) is a presence gate, not\n * zero-knowledge confidentiality — it is kept working here for back-compat\n * with existing non-PRF enrollments; new enrollments refuse that path by\n * default (see `WebAuthnEnrollOptions.allowNonPrfInsecure`).\n \n @throws `WebAuthnNotAvailableError` if the environment doesn't support WebAuthn.\n * @throws `WebAuthnCancelledError` if the user cancels the assertion.\n * @throws `WebAuthnMultiDeviceError` if `requireSingleDevice` was set at\n * enrollment and the authenticator data now shows BE=1.\n * @throws `ValidationError` if decryption of the keyring payload fails.\n /\nexport async function unlockWebAuthn(\n enrollment: WebAuthnEnrollment,\n options: WebAuthnUnlockOptions = {},\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n if (!isWebAuthnAvailable()) {\n throw new WebAuthnNotAvailableError()\n }\n\n const timeout = options.timeout ?? 60_000\n const credentialId = base64ToBuffer(enrollment.credentialId)\n\n const extensionsInput = (enrollment.prfUsed\n ? { prf: { eval: { first: PRF_SALT } } }\n : {}\n ) as AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs\n\n const assertion = await navigator.credentials.get({\n publicKey: {\n challenge: globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)),\n allowCredentials: [{ type: 'public-key', id: credentialId as BufferSource }],\n userVerification: 'required',\n extensions: extensionsInput,\n timeout,\n },\n }) as PublicKeyCredential \| null\n\n if (!assertion) {\n throw new WebAuthnCancelledError('assertion')\n }\n\n // BE-flag guard at assertion time\n const authData = (assertion.response as AuthenticatorAssertionResponse).authenticatorData\n const beFlag = extractBEFlag(authData)\n if (enrollment.requireSingleDevice && beFlag) {\n throw new WebAuthnMultiDeviceError()\n }\n\n // Derive the wrapping key using the same method as enrollment\n let wrappingKey: CryptoKey\n if (enrollment.prfUsed) {\n const extensions = assertion.getClientExtensionResults() as {\n prf?: { results?: { first?: ArrayBuffer } }\n }\n const prfOutput = extensions.prf?.results?.first\n if (!prfOutput) {\n throw new ValidationError(\n 'PRF extension output not available at assertion time. ' +\n 'The authenticator may not support PRF. Re-enroll without PRF support.',\n )\n }\n wrappingKey = await deriveKeyFromPRF(prfOutput)\n } else {\n wrappingKey = await deriveKeyFromRawId(assertion.rawId)\n }\n\n return unwrapKeyringSummary(enrollment, wrappingKey)\n}\n\n/\n `SlotRewrapCeremony` for WebAuthn slots — used by hub's\n * `rotateSecret({ slotCeremonies: { [slotId]: webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony } })`\n * to preserve a tier-2 WebAuthn enrollment across a tier-1 phrase\n * rotation without requiring re-enrollment of the credential.\n \n The credential itself is unaffected by phrase rotation — the\n * wrapping key derived from PRF (or rawId fallback) is bound to the\n * authenticator, not to the secret. What needs to change is the\n * wrapped payload: the encrypted blob the slot's `wrapped_kek`\n * field holds. After rotation, the old payload still has the old\n * DEKs (now stale because rotateSecret rewrapped them under a\n * fresh KEK); the new payload must hold the freshly rewrapped\n * `ctx.newDeks`.\n \n Single ceremony, two operations:\n * 1. Trigger one WebAuthn assertion to derive the wrapping key.\n * 2. Decrypt the OLD `wrapped_kek` to extract identity fields\n * (userId, displayName, role, permissions, salt) — these don't\n * change on rotation, so they're carried verbatim into the new\n * payload.\n * 3. Encrypt the NEW payload (same identity + `ctx.newDeks`) under\n * the same wrapping key, with a fresh IV.\n * 4. Return `EnrollAuthenticatorOptions` preserving `oldSlot.id`\n * and `method: 'webauthn'` (hub validates these to prevent\n * slot-type swap mid-rotation).\n \n Previously a workaround was needed — detect dropped slots after\n * rotate and offer \"Re-enrol Touch ID\" inline. This ceremony\n * eliminates that step.\n \n Out of scope: tier-3 PIN. PIN state lives in `QuickUnlockStore`\n * (RAM-only), not in `KeyringFile.authenticators[]`, so\n * `slotCeremonies` doesn't apply. Clear PIN state on rotate; let\n * the user set a fresh PIN via `db.enrollUnlock` immediately after.\n \n @throws {WebAuthnNotAvailableError} when the environment lacks WebAuthn.\n * @throws {WebAuthnCancelledError} when the user dismisses the assertion.\n * @throws {WebAuthnMultiDeviceError} when `meta.requireSingleDevice` was\n * set at enrollment and the authenticator now reports BE=1.\n * @throws {ValidationError} when `oldSlot.method !== 'webauthn'`,\n * when required `meta` fields are missing, or when the old\n * payload fails to decrypt (credential changed / payload\n * tampered).\n * @throws {WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError} when the old slot is non-PRF and\n * `options.allowNonPrfInsecure` is not `true` — rewrapping a\n * non-PRF slot produces a fresh self-decrypting payload, so it\n * requires the same explicit acknowledgement as enrollment.\n \n @see passwordSlotRewrapCeremony — the password parallel.\n /\nexport async function webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony(\n ctx: SlotRewrapContext,\n options: WebAuthnUnlockOptions = {},\n): Promise<EnrollAuthenticatorOptions> {\n if (ctx.oldSlot.method !== 'webauthn') {\n throw new ValidationError(\n `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot.method is \"${ctx.oldSlot.method}\"; expected \"webauthn\". ` +\n 'This ceremony only handles WebAuthn slots — pair other methods with their own helpers.',\n )\n }\n if (ctx.oldSlot.wrapKind === 'deks') {\n throw new ValidationError(\n 'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot is a wrap-DEKs slot; expected wrap-KEK. ' +\n 'WebAuthn slots use the wrap-KEK variant; mismatch indicates the slot was ' +\n 'enrolled by a different on- package.',\n )\n }\n if (!isWebAuthnAvailable()) {\n throw new WebAuthnNotAvailableError()\n }\n\n // Pull the per-slot fields needed for assertion + decrypt. These were\n // written into `meta` by `enrollWebAuthn` (via `db.enrollWebAuthn`).\n const meta = ctx.oldSlot.meta as {\n credentialId?: unknown\n wrapIv?: unknown\n prfUsed?: unknown\n beFlag?: unknown\n requireSingleDevice?: unknown\n }\n if (typeof meta.credentialId !== 'string' \|\| meta.credentialId.length === 0) {\n throw new ValidationError(\n 'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot.meta.credentialId is missing or invalid. ' +\n 'The slot was not enrolled via @noy-db/on-webauthn.',\n )\n }\n if (typeof meta.wrapIv !== 'string' \|\| meta.wrapIv.length === 0) {\n throw new ValidationError(\n 'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot.meta.wrapIv is missing — the slot may be ' +\n 'pre-#16 (synthetic-keyring shape) and must be re-enrolled via db.enrollWebAuthn.',\n )\n }\n const prfUsed = meta.prfUsed === true\n\n if (!prfUsed && !options.allowNonPrfInsecure) {\n throw new WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError()\n }\n\n // 1. Trigger the assertion. 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Derive the wrapping key — deterministic per credential, so this\n // is the SAME key the original enrollment used.\n let wrappingKey: CryptoKey\n if (prfUsed) {\n const extensions = assertion.getClientExtensionResults() as {\n prf?: { results?: { first?: ArrayBuffer } }\n }\n const prfOutput = extensions.prf?.results?.first\n if (!prfOutput) {\n throw new ValidationError(\n 'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: PRF output missing at assertion time. ' +\n 'The authenticator may have lost PRF capability — re-enrol the slot via db.enrollWebAuthn.',\n )\n }\n wrappingKey = await deriveKeyFromPRF(prfOutput)\n } else {\n wrappingKey = await deriveKeyFromRawId(assertion.rawId)\n }\n\n // 3. Decrypt the OLD wrapped_kek to extract carry-through identity\n // fields. 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1	+ {"version":3,"sources":["../src/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/*\n @noy-db/on-webauthn —\n \n Hardware-key keyring for noy-db using the WebAuthn API.\n \n Covers every form factor:\n * - Platform authenticators: Touch ID, Face ID, Windows Hello, Android biometric\n * - Roaming authenticators: YubiKey (5C NFC, Bio), SoloKey, Titan, any FIDO2 key\n * - Passkey-capable platform authenticators: iCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager\n \n Key derivation model\n * ────────────────────\n * This package uses the PRF (Pseudo-Random Function) extension when\n * available to derive a deterministic wrapping key from the WebAuthn\n * credential. The PRF output is consistent across assertions on the same\n * device/credential, enabling unlock-without-secret while keeping the\n * derived key bound to the physical authenticator.\n \n When PRF is not supported by the authenticator (common on older hardware),\n * the package can fall back to HKDF-SHA256 over the credential's `rawId` —\n * but by default, enrollment refuses this path because the `rawId` is stored\n * in the record itself, making the record self-decrypting (presence gate, not\n * confidentiality). Use `allowNonPrfInsecure: true` to opt in; prefer a\n * PRF-capable device or the secret for real confidentiality.\n \n The derived key is NEVER persisted. It exists only in memory during the\n * unlock operation. What IS persisted (in the noy-db adapter, not in browser\n * storage) is the wrapped KEK: `encrypt(KEK, derivedKey)`.\n \n BE-flag guards\n * ──────────────\n * The backup-eligibility (BE) flag in a WebAuthn authenticator data signals\n * that the credential is (or can be) synced across devices — e.g. stored in\n * iCloud Keychain. For single-device security policies (air-gapped USB sticks,\n * high-security terminals), this is a threat: the credential is available on\n * any device where the user's iCloud account is signed in.\n \n The `requireSingleDevice: true` option rejects credentials with the BE flag\n * set during enrollment. Existing enrollments are checked at assertion time —\n * if the authenticator data shows BE=1 but `requireSingleDevice` was set at\n * enrollment, the assertion throws `WebAuthnMultiDeviceError`.\n \n Enrollment flow\n * ───────────────\n * 1. User is already authenticated (secret or existing session).\n * 2. Call `enrollWebAuthn(keyring, options)`.\n * 3. WebAuthn credential is created; PRF or rawId-derived key wraps the KEK.\n * 4. Returns a `WebAuthnEnrollment` — persist this to the noy-db adapter\n * via `saveEnrollment()`, or store it yourself in any encrypted collection.\n \n Unlock flow\n * ───────────\n * 1. Load the `WebAuthnEnrollment` via `loadEnrollment()`.\n * 2. Call `unlockWebAuthn(enrollment, keyring)` — triggers the WebAuthn\n * assertion prompt.\n * 3. On success, returns the unwrapped `CryptoKey` (the KEK) — use it to\n * re-hydrate the session via `createSession()`.\n /\n\nimport { bufferToBase64, base64ToBuffer } from '@noy-db/hub'\nimport { ValidationError } from '@noy-db/hub'\nimport type { Role } from '@noy-db/hub'\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring, EnrollAuthenticatorOptions, SlotRewrapContext } from '@noy-db/hub/on'\n\n// Re-export from core for convenience\nexport { ValidationError } from '@noy-db/hub'\n\n// ─── Error types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/\n Thrown when the WebAuthn API is not available in the current environment.\n \n Check `isWebAuthnAvailable()` before calling `enrollWebAuthn()` or\n * `unlockWebAuthn()` and show a fallback UI (secret entry) if this\n * returns false. Common scenarios: Node.js environments, older browsers,\n * non-HTTPS origins (WebAuthn requires a Secure Context).\n /\nexport class WebAuthnNotAvailableError extends Error {\n readonly code = 'WEBAUTHN_NOT_AVAILABLE'\n constructor() {\n super('WebAuthn is not available in this environment. A browser with navigator.credentials support is required.')\n this.name = 'WebAuthnNotAvailableError'\n }\n}\n\n/\n Thrown when the user dismisses the WebAuthn prompt without completing it.\n \n The `op` field distinguishes enrollment cancellation (user chose not to\n * enroll a hardware key) from assertion cancellation (user dismissed the\n * unlock prompt). Treat this as a user-initiated action, not an error — show\n * a \"use secret instead\" option rather than an error message.\n /\nexport class WebAuthnCancelledError extends Error {\n readonly code = 'WEBAUTHN_CANCELLED'\n constructor(op: 'enrollment' \| 'assertion') {\n super(`WebAuthn ${op} was cancelled by the user.`)\n this.name = 'WebAuthnCancelledError'\n }\n}\n\n/\n Thrown when the authenticator has the backup-eligible (BE) flag set but\n * the vault requires a single-device credential (`requireSingleDevice: true`).\n \n A BE credential is synced across devices (e.g. iCloud Keychain, Google\n * Password Manager), which violates the single-device security model. The\n * user must enroll a hardware security key (YubiKey, Titan, SoloKey) instead.\n /\nexport class WebAuthnMultiDeviceError extends Error {\n readonly code = 'WEBAUTHN_MULTI_DEVICE'\n constructor() {\n super(\n 'This credential is backup-eligible (BE flag set) and may be synced across devices. ' +\n 'The vault requires a single-device credential (requireSingleDevice: true). ' +\n 'Please use a hardware security key (YubiKey, Titan, SoloKey) or a platform ' +\n 'authenticator that does not sync credentials across devices.',\n )\n this.name = 'WebAuthnMultiDeviceError'\n }\n}\n\n/\n Thrown when `enrollWebAuthn()` (or `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony()`) is\n * asked to enroll/rewrap without a PRF-capable authenticator and without\n * explicit opt-in via `allowNonPrfInsecure: true`.\n \n Non-PRF WebAuthn cannot provide confidentiality: its wrapping key derives\n * entirely from the credential's `rawId`, which is stored in cleartext in\n * the enrollment record itself — the record would self-decrypt with no\n * authenticator involved. By default, enrollment/rewrap refuses this path.\n * Use a PRF-capable credential, fall back to the secret, or set\n * `allowNonPrfInsecure: true` to explicitly accept a non-confidential\n * presence gate instead.\n /\nexport class WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError extends Error {\n readonly code = 'WEBAUTHN_PRF_UNAVAILABLE'\n constructor() {\n super(\n 'The PRF extension is not available on this authenticator, so it cannot provide ' +\n 'WebAuthn confidentiality — the non-PRF wrapping key derives entirely from the ' +\n \"credential's rawId, which is stored in the enrollment record itself (the record \" +\n 'would self-decrypt with no authenticator involved). Enrollment refuses this path ' +\n 'by default. Use a PRF-capable authenticator, use the secret instead, or pass ' +\n '{ allowNonPrfInsecure: true } to explicitly accept a non-confidential presence gate.',\n )\n this.name = 'WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError'\n }\n}\n\n// ─── Types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/\n A persisted WebAuthn enrollment record. Store this in a noy-db\n * collection (encrypted like any other record) or return it from\n * `saveEnrollment()` / `loadEnrollment()` helpers.\n /\nexport interface WebAuthnEnrollment {\n /* Enrollment format version. /\n readonly _noydb_webauthn: 1\n /* The vault this enrollment was created for. /\n readonly vault: string\n /* The user ID this enrollment belongs to. /\n readonly userId: string\n /* WebAuthn credential ID (base64). Use for allowCredentials in assertions. /\n readonly credentialId: string\n /* Whether PRF was used for key derivation (vs rawId HKDF fallback). /\n readonly prfUsed: boolean\n /* Whether the BE (backup-eligibility) flag was present at enrollment time. /\n readonly beFlag: boolean\n /* Whether single-device was required at enrollment time. /\n readonly requireSingleDevice: boolean\n /* The wrapped KEK: encrypt(exportedDekMap, derivedKey). Base64. /\n readonly wrappedPayload: string\n /* IV used for the wrapping. Base64. /\n readonly wrapIv: string\n /* ISO timestamp of enrollment. /\n readonly enrolledAt: string\n}\n\n/* Options for `enrollWebAuthn()`. /\nexport interface WebAuthnEnrollOptions {\n /\n Relying party ID and name for the WebAuthn credential.\n * Defaults to `{ id: window.location.hostname, name: 'NOYDB' }`.\n /\n rp?: { id?: string; name: string }\n /\n If `true`, refuse to enroll credentials with the BE flag set\n * (multi-device / syncable passkeys). Defaults to `false`.\n \n Set to `true` for high-security deployments where the credential\n * must be bound to a single physical device (YubiKey, Titan, etc.).\n /\n requireSingleDevice?: boolean\n /\n WebAuthn timeout in milliseconds. Default: 60_000.\n /\n timeout?: number\n /\n If `true`, prefer a cross-platform authenticator (roaming security key).\n * If `false`, prefer a platform authenticator (Touch ID, Face ID).\n * If undefined, let the browser choose.\n /\n preferCrossPlatform?: boolean\n /\n Non-PRF WebAuthn cannot provide confidentiality — its wrapping key\n * derives from `credentialId`, which is stored in the enrollment record,\n * so the record self-decrypts with no authenticator. By default,\n * enrollment REFUSES the non-PRF path (throws `WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError`).\n * Set `true` ONLY to explicitly opt into a non-confidential presence gate;\n * prefer the secret or a PRF-capable credential for real confidentiality.\n /\n allowNonPrfInsecure?: boolean\n}\n\n/* Options for `unlockWebAuthn()`. /\nexport interface WebAuthnUnlockOptions {\n /* WebAuthn timeout in milliseconds. Default: 60_000. /\n timeout?: number\n /\n Only consulted by `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony()` — `unlockWebAuthn()`\n * ignores it, since unlocking an existing non-PRF record is always\n * permitted (back-compat; that record was never confidential). Same\n * semantics as `WebAuthnEnrollOptions.allowNonPrfInsecure`: required to\n * rewrap a non-PRF slot, since rewrap produces a fresh self-decrypting\n * wrapped payload.\n /\n allowNonPrfInsecure?: boolean\n}\n\n// ─── Environment check ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/\n Returns `true` if WebAuthn is available and can be used for enrollment or unlock.\n \n Checks for `navigator.credentials`, `window.PublicKeyCredential`, and a\n * Secure Context (`window.isSecureContext`). Call this before rendering the\n * \"Register hardware key\" button to avoid showing options that will fail.\n /\nexport function isWebAuthnAvailable(): boolean {\n return (\n typeof window !== 'undefined' &&\n typeof window.PublicKeyCredential !== 'undefined' &&\n typeof navigator !== 'undefined' &&\n typeof navigator.credentials !== 'undefined'\n )\n}\n\n// ─── PRF salt ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nconst PRF_SALT = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-webauthn-kek-derive')\n\n// ─── Key derivation helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/\n Derive a wrapping key from PRF output.\n * PRF output is 32 bytes of authenticator-bound pseudo-random data.\n /\nasync function deriveKeyFromPRF(prfOutput: ArrayBuffer): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n const keyMaterial = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(\n 'raw',\n prfOutput,\n 'HKDF',\n false,\n ['deriveKey'],\n )\n return globalThis.crypto.subtle.deriveKey(\n {\n name: 'HKDF',\n hash: 'SHA-256',\n salt: PRF_SALT,\n info: new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-kek-wrap-v1'),\n },\n keyMaterial,\n { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },\n false,\n ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n )\n}\n\n/\n Derive a wrapping key from the credential's rawId (fallback when PRF unavailable).\n * rawId IS the entire secret and is stored in the record itself — the record\n * self-decrypts with no authenticator involved (presence gate, not confidentiality).\n * Universally supported but only usable via explicit `allowNonPrfInsecure: true`.\n /\nasync function deriveKeyFromRawId(rawId: ArrayBuffer): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n const keyMaterial = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(\n 'raw',\n rawId,\n 'HKDF',\n false,\n ['deriveKey'],\n )\n return globalThis.crypto.subtle.deriveKey(\n {\n name: 'HKDF',\n hash: 'SHA-256',\n salt: new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-webauthn-rawid-fallback'),\n info: new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-kek-wrap-v1'),\n },\n keyMaterial,\n { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },\n false,\n ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n )\n}\n\n// ─── BE flag extraction ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/\n Extract the BE (backup-eligibility) flag from WebAuthn authenticator data.\n * Authenticator data byte layout (CTAP2 spec):\n * bytes 0-31: rpIdHash\n * byte 32: flags byte\n * bytes 33-36: signCount\n * ...\n \n Flags byte bit layout (bit 0 = LSB):\n * bit 0 (UP): user presence\n * bit 2 (UV): user verification\n * bit 3 (BE): backup eligibility\n * bit 4 (BS): backup state\n * bit 6 (AT): attested credential data present\n * bit 7 (ED): extension data present\n /\nfunction extractBEFlag(authData: ArrayBuffer): boolean {\n const bytes = new Uint8Array(authData)\n if (bytes.length < 33) return false\n const flagsByte = bytes[32]!\n return (flagsByte & 0b00001000) !== 0 // bit 3\n}\n\n// ─── Payload wrap/unwrap ───────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/\n Serialize and encrypt the DEK map from `keyring` using `wrappingKey`.\n * The wrapped payload is what gets stored in the enrollment record.\n /\nasync function wrapKeyringSummary(\n keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n wrappingKey: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<{ wrappedPayload: string; wrapIv: string }> {\n const dekMap: Record<string, string> = {}\n for (const [collName, dek] of keyring.deks) {\n const raw = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n dekMap[collName] = bufferToBase64(raw)\n }\n\n const payload = JSON.stringify({\n userId: keyring.userId,\n displayName: keyring.displayName,\n role: keyring.role,\n permissions: keyring.permissions,\n deks: dekMap,\n salt: bufferToBase64(keyring.salt),\n })\n\n const iv = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12))\n const encrypted = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.encrypt(\n { name: 'AES-GCM', iv },\n wrappingKey,\n new TextEncoder().encode(payload),\n )\n\n return { wrappedPayload: bufferToBase64(encrypted), wrapIv: bufferToBase64(iv) }\n}\n\n/\n Decrypt and deserialize the keyring payload using `wrappingKey`.\n /\nasync function unwrapKeyringSummary(\n enrollment: WebAuthnEnrollment,\n wrappingKey: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n const iv = base64ToBuffer(enrollment.wrapIv)\n const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(enrollment.wrappedPayload)\n\n let plaintext: ArrayBuffer\n try {\n plaintext = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.decrypt(\n { name: 'AES-GCM', iv },\n wrappingKey,\n ciphertext,\n )\n } catch {\n throw new ValidationError('WebAuthn decryption failed — the authenticator may have changed or the enrollment may be corrupt.')\n }\n\n const parsed = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext)) as {\n userId: string\n displayName: string\n role: Role\n permissions: Record<string, 'rw' \| 'ro'>\n deks: Record<string, string>\n salt: string\n }\n\n const deks = new Map<string, CryptoKey>()\n for (const [collName, rawBase64] of Object.entries(parsed.deks)) {\n const dek = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(\n 'raw',\n base64ToBuffer(rawBase64),\n { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },\n true,\n ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n )\n deks.set(collName, dek)\n }\n\n return {\n userId: parsed.userId,\n displayName: parsed.displayName,\n role: parsed.role,\n permissions: parsed.permissions,\n deks,\n kek: null,\n salt: base64ToBuffer(parsed.salt),\n authenticators: [],\n }\n}\n\n// ─── Public API ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/\n Enroll a WebAuthn credential for the given keyring.\n \n The caller must already have an unlocked keyring (from secret auth or\n * an existing session). The WebAuthn credential creation prompt is triggered\n * by this call.\n \n Returns a `WebAuthnEnrollment` that should be persisted — typically via\n * `saveEnrollment()` into a noy-db collection.\n \n @throws `WebAuthnNotAvailableError` if the environment doesn't support WebAuthn.\n * @throws `WebAuthnCancelledError` if the user cancels the credential creation.\n * @throws `WebAuthnMultiDeviceError` if `requireSingleDevice` is true and the\n * authenticator returned a credential with the BE flag set.\n * @throws `WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError` if the authenticator did not provide\n * PRF output and `options.allowNonPrfInsecure` is not `true` — see\n * that option's doc for why the non-PRF path is refused by default.\n /\nexport async function enrollWebAuthn(\n keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n vault: string,\n options: WebAuthnEnrollOptions = {},\n): Promise<WebAuthnEnrollment> {\n if (!isWebAuthnAvailable()) {\n throw new WebAuthnNotAvailableError()\n }\n\n const rpId = options.rp?.id ?? (typeof window !== 'undefined' ? window.location.hostname : 'localhost')\n const rpName = options.rp?.name ?? 'NOYDB'\n const timeout = options.timeout ?? 60_000\n\n const challenge = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))\n const userIdBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(keyring.userId)\n\n const authenticatorSelection: AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria = {\n userVerification: 'required',\n residentKey: 'preferred',\n }\n if (options.preferCrossPlatform === true) {\n authenticatorSelection.authenticatorAttachment = 'cross-platform'\n } else if (options.preferCrossPlatform === false) {\n authenticatorSelection.authenticatorAttachment = 'platform'\n }\n\n // Request PRF extension for deterministic key derivation\n const extensionsInput = {\n prf: { eval: { first: PRF_SALT } },\n } as AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs\n\n const credential = await navigator.credentials.create({\n publicKey: {\n challenge,\n rp: { id: rpId, name: rpName },\n user: {\n id: userIdBytes,\n name: keyring.userId,\n displayName: keyring.displayName,\n },\n pubKeyCredParams: [\n { type: 'public-key', alg: -7 }, // ES256\n { type: 'public-key', alg: -257 }, // RS256\n { type: 'public-key', alg: -8 }, // EdDSA\n ],\n authenticatorSelection,\n extensions: extensionsInput,\n timeout,\n },\n }) as PublicKeyCredential \| null\n\n if (!credential) {\n throw new WebAuthnCancelledError('enrollment')\n }\n\n const authData = (credential.response as AuthenticatorAttestationResponse).getAuthenticatorData()\n const beFlag = extractBEFlag(authData)\n\n if (options.requireSingleDevice && beFlag) {\n throw new WebAuthnMultiDeviceError()\n }\n\n // Try to get PRF output from extensions\n const extensions = credential.getClientExtensionResults() as {\n prf?: { results?: { first?: ArrayBuffer } }\n }\n const prfOutput = extensions.prf?.results?.first\n const prfUsed = !!prfOutput\n\n if (!prfUsed && !options.allowNonPrfInsecure) {\n throw new WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError()\n }\n\n const wrappingKey = prfOutput\n ? await deriveKeyFromPRF(prfOutput)\n : await deriveKeyFromRawId(credential.rawId)\n\n const { wrappedPayload, wrapIv } = await wrapKeyringSummary(keyring, wrappingKey)\n\n return {\n _noydb_webauthn: 1,\n vault,\n userId: keyring.userId,\n credentialId: bufferToBase64(credential.rawId),\n prfUsed,\n beFlag,\n requireSingleDevice: options.requireSingleDevice ?? false,\n wrappedPayload,\n wrapIv,\n enrolledAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n }\n}\n\n/\n Unlock a vault using a previously enrolled WebAuthn credential.\n \n Triggers the WebAuthn assertion prompt. On success, decrypts the keyring\n * payload from the enrollment record and returns an `UnlockedKeyring`.\n \n The returned keyring has the same DEKs as at enrollment time. If DEKs\n * have been rotated since enrollment, this will return stale DEKs — the\n * caller should detect decryption failures and prompt for re-enrollment.\n \n Non-PRF unlock (`enrollment.prfUsed === false`) is a presence gate, not\n * zero-knowledge confidentiality — it is kept working here for back-compat\n * with existing non-PRF enrollments; new enrollments refuse that path by\n * default (see `WebAuthnEnrollOptions.allowNonPrfInsecure`).\n \n @throws `WebAuthnNotAvailableError` if the environment doesn't support WebAuthn.\n * @throws `WebAuthnCancelledError` if the user cancels the assertion.\n * @throws `WebAuthnMultiDeviceError` if `requireSingleDevice` was set at\n * enrollment and the authenticator data now shows BE=1.\n * @throws `ValidationError` if decryption of the keyring payload fails.\n /\nexport async function unlockWebAuthn(\n enrollment: WebAuthnEnrollment,\n options: WebAuthnUnlockOptions = {},\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n if (!isWebAuthnAvailable()) {\n throw new WebAuthnNotAvailableError()\n }\n\n const timeout = options.timeout ?? 60_000\n const credentialId = base64ToBuffer(enrollment.credentialId)\n\n const extensionsInput = (enrollment.prfUsed\n ? { prf: { eval: { first: PRF_SALT } } }\n : {}\n ) as AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs\n\n const assertion = await navigator.credentials.get({\n publicKey: {\n challenge: globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)),\n allowCredentials: [{ type: 'public-key', id: credentialId as BufferSource }],\n userVerification: 'required',\n extensions: extensionsInput,\n timeout,\n },\n }) as PublicKeyCredential \| null\n\n if (!assertion) {\n throw new WebAuthnCancelledError('assertion')\n }\n\n // BE-flag guard at assertion time\n const authData = (assertion.response as AuthenticatorAssertionResponse).authenticatorData\n const beFlag = extractBEFlag(authData)\n if (enrollment.requireSingleDevice && beFlag) {\n throw new WebAuthnMultiDeviceError()\n }\n\n // Derive the wrapping key using the same method as enrollment\n let wrappingKey: CryptoKey\n if (enrollment.prfUsed) {\n const extensions = assertion.getClientExtensionResults() as {\n prf?: { results?: { first?: ArrayBuffer } }\n }\n const prfOutput = extensions.prf?.results?.first\n if (!prfOutput) {\n throw new ValidationError(\n 'PRF extension output not available at assertion time. ' +\n 'The authenticator may not support PRF. Re-enroll without PRF support.',\n )\n }\n wrappingKey = await deriveKeyFromPRF(prfOutput)\n } else {\n wrappingKey = await deriveKeyFromRawId(assertion.rawId)\n }\n\n return unwrapKeyringSummary(enrollment, wrappingKey)\n}\n\n/\n `SlotRewrapCeremony` for WebAuthn slots — used by hub's\n * `rotateSecret({ slotCeremonies: { [slotId]: webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony } })`\n * to preserve a tier-2 WebAuthn enrollment across a tier-1 phrase\n * rotation without requiring re-enrollment of the credential.\n \n The credential itself is unaffected by phrase rotation — the\n * wrapping key derived from PRF (or rawId fallback) is bound to the\n * authenticator, not to the secret. What needs to change is the\n * wrapped payload: the encrypted blob the slot's `wrapped_kek`\n * field holds. After rotation, the old payload still has the old\n * DEKs (now stale because rotateSecret rewrapped them under a\n * fresh KEK); the new payload must hold the freshly rewrapped\n * `ctx.newDeks`.\n \n Single ceremony, two operations:\n * 1. Trigger one WebAuthn assertion to derive the wrapping key.\n * 2. Decrypt the OLD `wrapped_kek` to extract identity fields\n * (userId, displayName, role, permissions, salt) — these don't\n * change on rotation, so they're carried verbatim into the new\n * payload.\n * 3. Encrypt the NEW payload (same identity + `ctx.newDeks`) under\n * the same wrapping key, with a fresh IV.\n * 4. Return `EnrollAuthenticatorOptions` preserving `oldSlot.id`\n * and `method: 'webauthn'` (hub validates these to prevent\n * slot-type swap mid-rotation).\n \n Previously a workaround was needed — detect dropped slots after\n * rotate and offer \"Re-enrol Touch ID\" inline. This ceremony\n * eliminates that step.\n \n Out of scope: tier-3 PIN. PIN state lives in `QuickUnlockStore`\n * (RAM-only), not in `KeyringFile.authenticators[]`, so\n * `slotCeremonies` doesn't apply. Clear PIN state on rotate; let\n * the user set a fresh PIN via `db.enrollUnlock` immediately after.\n \n @throws {WebAuthnNotAvailableError} when the environment lacks WebAuthn.\n * @throws {WebAuthnCancelledError} when the user dismisses the assertion.\n * @throws {WebAuthnMultiDeviceError} when `meta.requireSingleDevice` was\n * set at enrollment and the authenticator now reports BE=1.\n * @throws {ValidationError} when `oldSlot.method !== 'webauthn'`,\n * when required `meta` fields are missing, or when the old\n * payload fails to decrypt (credential changed / payload\n * tampered).\n * @throws {WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError} when the old slot is non-PRF and\n * `options.allowNonPrfInsecure` is not `true` — rewrapping a\n * non-PRF slot produces a fresh self-decrypting payload, so it\n * requires the same explicit acknowledgement as enrollment.\n \n @see passwordSlotRewrapCeremony — the password parallel.\n /\nexport async function webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony(\n ctx: SlotRewrapContext,\n options: WebAuthnUnlockOptions = {},\n): Promise<EnrollAuthenticatorOptions> {\n if (ctx.oldSlot.method !== 'webauthn') {\n throw new ValidationError(\n `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot.method is \"${ctx.oldSlot.method}\"; expected \"webauthn\". ` +\n 'This ceremony only handles WebAuthn slots — pair other methods with their own helpers.',\n )\n }\n if (ctx.oldSlot.wrapKind === 'deks') {\n throw new ValidationError(\n 'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot is a wrap-DEKs slot; expected wrap-KEK. ' +\n 'WebAuthn slots use the wrap-KEK variant; mismatch indicates the slot was ' +\n 'enrolled by a different on- package.',\n )\n }\n if (!isWebAuthnAvailable()) {\n throw new WebAuthnNotAvailableError()\n }\n\n // Pull the per-slot fields needed for assertion + decrypt. These were\n // written into `meta` by `enrollWebAuthn` (via `db.enrollWebAuthn`).\n const meta = ctx.oldSlot.meta as {\n credentialId?: unknown\n wrapIv?: unknown\n prfUsed?: unknown\n beFlag?: unknown\n requireSingleDevice?: unknown\n }\n if (typeof meta.credentialId !== 'string' \|\| meta.credentialId.length === 0) {\n throw new ValidationError(\n 'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot.meta.credentialId is missing or invalid. ' +\n 'The slot was not enrolled via @noy-db/on-webauthn.',\n )\n }\n if (typeof meta.wrapIv !== 'string' \|\| meta.wrapIv.length === 0) {\n throw new ValidationError(\n 'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot.meta.wrapIv is missing — the slot may be ' +\n 'pre-#16 (synthetic-keyring shape) and must be re-enrolled via db.enrollWebAuthn.',\n )\n }\n const prfUsed = meta.prfUsed === true\n\n if (!prfUsed && !options.allowNonPrfInsecure) {\n throw new WebAuthnPRFUnavailableError()\n }\n\n // 1. Trigger the assertion. Same path `unlockWebAuthn` uses.\n const credentialIdBuf = base64ToBuffer(meta.credentialId)\n const timeout = options.timeout ?? 60_000\n const extensionsInput = (prfUsed\n ? { prf: { eval: { first: PRF_SALT } } }\n : {}\n ) as AuthenticationExtensionsClientInputs\n\n const assertion = await navigator.credentials.get({\n publicKey: {\n challenge: globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32)),\n allowCredentials: [{ type: 'public-key', id: credentialIdBuf as BufferSource }],\n userVerification: 'required',\n extensions: extensionsInput,\n timeout,\n },\n }) as PublicKeyCredential \| null\n\n if (!assertion) {\n throw new WebAuthnCancelledError('assertion')\n }\n\n // BE-flag guard at assertion time — same rule unlockWebAuthn enforces.\n const authData = (assertion.response as AuthenticatorAssertionResponse).authenticatorData\n const beFlag = extractBEFlag(authData)\n if (meta.requireSingleDevice === true && beFlag) {\n throw new WebAuthnMultiDeviceError()\n }\n\n // 2. Derive the wrapping key — deterministic per credential, so this\n // is the SAME key the original enrollment used.\n let wrappingKey: CryptoKey\n if (prfUsed) {\n const extensions = assertion.getClientExtensionResults() as {\n prf?: { results?: { first?: ArrayBuffer } }\n }\n const prfOutput = extensions.prf?.results?.first\n if (!prfOutput) {\n throw new ValidationError(\n 'webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony: PRF output missing at assertion time. ' +\n 'The authenticator may have lost PRF capability — re-enrol the slot via db.enrollWebAuthn.',\n )\n }\n wrappingKey = await deriveKeyFromPRF(prfOutput)\n } else {\n wrappingKey = await deriveKeyFromRawId(assertion.rawId)\n }\n\n // 3. Decrypt the OLD wrapped_kek to extract carry-through identity\n // fields. 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package/package.json CHANGED Viewed

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@noy-db/on-webauthn",
-  "version": "0.6.0",
+  "version": "0.7.0-pre.0",
   "description": "WebAuthn hardware-key keyrings for noy-db — Touch ID, Face ID, Windows Hello, YubiKey, FIDO2 passkeys",
   "license": "MIT",
   "author": "vLannaAi <vicio@lanna.ai>",
@@ -32,10 +32,11 @@
     "node": ">=22.0.0"
   },
   "peerDependencies": {
-    "@noy-db/hub": "0.6.0"
+    "@noy-db/hub": "0.7.0-pre.0"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
-    "@noy-db/hub": "0.6.0"
+    "@noy-db/hub": "0.7.0-pre.0",
+    "@noy-db/test-ceremony-conformance": "0.7.0-pre.0"
   },
   "keywords": [
     "noy-db",