@noy-db/on-totp 0.1.0-pre.3

package/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2026 vLannaAi
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.

package/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# @noy-db/on-totp
+
+[![npm](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/%40noy-db/on-totp.svg)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@noy-db/on-totp)
+
+> TOTP (RFC 6238) authenticator-app second factor for noy-db
+
+Part of [**`@noy-db/hub`**](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@noy-db/hub) — the zero-knowledge, offline-first, encrypted document store.
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+pnpm add @noy-db/hub @noy-db/on-totp
+```
+
+## What it is
+
+TOTP (RFC 6238) authenticator-app second factor for noy-db — generate secrets, otpauth:// provisioning URIs, and constant-time code verification. Zero dependencies (HMAC-SHA1 via Web Crypto). Part of the @noy-db/on-* authentication family.
+
+## Status
+
+**Pre-release** (`0.1.0-pre.1`). API may change before `1.0`.
+
+## Documentation
+
+See the [main repository](https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db#readme) for setup, examples, and the full subsystem catalog.
+
+- Source — [`packages/on-totp`](https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db/tree/main/packages/on-totp)
+- Issues — [github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db/issues](https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db/issues)
+- Spec — [`SPEC.md`](https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db/blob/main/SPEC.md)
+
+## License
+
+[MIT](./LICENSE) © vLannaAi

package/dist/index.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+"use strict";
+var __defProp = Object.defineProperty;
+var __getOwnPropDesc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;
+var __getOwnPropNames = Object.getOwnPropertyNames;
+var __hasOwnProp = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;
+var __export = (target, all) => {
+  for (var name in all)
+    __defProp(target, name, { get: all[name], enumerable: true });
+};
+var __copyProps = (to, from, except, desc) => {
+  if (from && typeof from === "object" || typeof from === "function") {
+    for (let key of __getOwnPropNames(from))
+      if (!__hasOwnProp.call(to, key) && key !== except)
+        __defProp(to, key, { get: () => from[key], enumerable: !(desc = __getOwnPropDesc(from, key)) || desc.enumerable });
+  }
+  return to;
+};
+var __toCommonJS = (mod) => __copyProps(__defProp({}, "__esModule", { value: true }), mod);
+
+// src/index.ts
+var index_exports = {};
+__export(index_exports, {
+  decodeBase32: () => decodeBase32,
+  encodeBase32: () => encodeBase32,
+  generateCode: () => generateCode,
+  generateSecret: () => generateSecret,
+  provisioningUri: () => provisioningUri,
+  verify: () => verify
+});
+module.exports = __toCommonJS(index_exports);
+var BASE32_ALPHABET = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567";
+function encodeBase32(bytes) {
+  let out = "";
+  let buf = 0;
+  let bits = 0;
+  for (const b of bytes) {
+    buf = buf << 8 | b;
+    bits += 8;
+    while (bits >= 5) {
+      bits -= 5;
+      out += BASE32_ALPHABET[buf >> bits & 31];
+    }
+  }
+  if (bits > 0) {
+    out += BASE32_ALPHABET[buf << 5 - bits & 31];
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+function decodeBase32(input) {
+  const cleaned = input.replace(/\s|=/g, "").toUpperCase();
+  const bytes = [];
+  let buf = 0;
+  let bits = 0;
+  for (const ch of cleaned) {
+    const v = BASE32_ALPHABET.indexOf(ch);
+    if (v < 0) throw new Error(`Invalid Base32 character: "${ch}"`);
+    buf = buf << 5 | v;
+    bits += 5;
+    if (bits >= 8) {
+      bits -= 8;
+      bytes.push(buf >> bits & 255);
+    }
+  }
+  return new Uint8Array(bytes);
+}
+function generateSecret() {
+  const bytes = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(20));
+  return encodeBase32(bytes);
+}
+function provisioningUri(secret, options) {
+  const issuer = options.issuer;
+  const label = issuer ? `${encodeURIComponent(issuer)}:${encodeURIComponent(options.account)}` : encodeURIComponent(options.account);
+  const params = new URLSearchParams({
+    secret,
+    algorithm: options.algorithm ?? "SHA1",
+    digits: String(options.digits ?? 6),
+    period: String(options.period ?? 30)
+  });
+  if (issuer) params.set("issuer", issuer);
+  return `otpauth://totp/${label}?${params.toString()}`;
+}
+async function generateCode(secret, options = {}) {
+  const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
+  return codeAt(secret, now, options);
+}
+async function verify(secret, code, options = {}) {
+  const digits = options.digits ?? 6;
+  if (code.length !== digits) return false;
+  const window = options.window ?? 1;
+  const now = options.timestamp ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
+  const period = options.period ?? 30;
+  const step = Math.floor(now / period);
+  let matched = false;
+  for (let i = -window; i <= window; i++) {
+    const candidate = await codeAtStep(secret, step + i, options);
+    if (constantTimeEqual(candidate, code)) matched = true;
+  }
+  return matched;
+}
+async function codeAt(secret, timestamp, options) {
+  const period = options.period ?? 30;
+  return codeAtStep(secret, Math.floor(timestamp / period), options);
+}
+async function codeAtStep(secret, step, options) {
+  const digits = options.digits ?? 6;
+  const algorithm = options.algorithm ?? "SHA1";
+  const keyBytes = decodeBase32(secret);
+  const counter = new Uint8Array(8);
+  let s = step;
+  for (let i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
+    counter[i] = s & 255;
+    s = Math.floor(s / 256);
+  }
+  const hmacName = algorithm === "SHA1" ? "SHA-1" : algorithm === "SHA256" ? "SHA-256" : "SHA-512";
+  const cryptoKey = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(
+    "raw",
+    keyBytes,
+    { name: "HMAC", hash: hmacName },
+    false,
+    ["sign"]
+  );
+  const signature = new Uint8Array(
+    await globalThis.crypto.subtle.sign("HMAC", cryptoKey, counter)
+  );
+  const offset = signature[signature.length - 1] & 15;
+  const binary = (signature[offset] & 127) << 24 | (signature[offset + 1] & 255) << 16 | (signature[offset + 2] & 255) << 8 | signature[offset + 3] & 255;
+  const modulus = 10 ** digits;
+  const otp = (binary % modulus).toString().padStart(digits, "0");
+  return otp;
+}
+function constantTimeEqual(a, b) {
+  if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
+  let diff = 0;
+  for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {
+    diff |= a.charCodeAt(i) ^ b.charCodeAt(i);
+  }
+  return diff === 0;
+}
+// Annotate the CommonJS export names for ESM import in node:
+0 && (module.exports = {
+  decodeBase32,
+  encodeBase32,
+  generateCode,
+  generateSecret,
+  provisioningUri,
+  verify
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.cjs.map

package/dist/index.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * **@noy-db/on-totp** — TOTP (RFC 6238) authenticator-app second factor.\n *\n * Generates TOTP secrets, produces the standard `otpauth://` provisioning\n * URI that authenticator apps parse from QR codes, and verifies\n * user-entered 6-digit codes in constant time.\n *\n * **Zero dependencies.** HMAC-SHA1 runs on the Web Crypto API\n * (`crypto.subtle`) — same ethos as the rest of noy-db.\n *\n * ## Security model\n *\n * TOTP is a **second factor**, not an independent strength multiplier.\n * The secret must live somewhere the verifier can read (otherwise no\n * one can validate codes), so a compromised verifier leaks the secret.\n * In noy-db the typical pattern is:\n *\n *   1. User sets a passphrase (primary factor). KEK derives via PBKDF2.\n *   2. On enroll, a TOTP secret is generated and stored **encrypted\n *      under the KEK** in the user's keyring.\n *   3. On unlock, the user enters passphrase → unwraps the secret →\n *      validates the entered code → proceeds only on match.\n *\n * This adds \"something you have\" on top of \"something you know\" but\n * does not defend against a passphrase-KEK compromise. For real\n * hardware-backed second factor, use `@noy-db/on-webauthn`.\n *\n * ## API\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { generateSecret, provisioningUri, verify, generateCode } from '@noy-db/on-totp'\n *\n * // Enroll\n * const secret = generateSecret()\n * const uri = provisioningUri(secret, { account: 'alice@acme.com', issuer: 'Acme' })\n * // Show QR code of `uri`.\n *\n * // Unlock\n * const ok = await verify(secret, userEnteredCode)\n * ```\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\n\n// ─── Base32 encoding (RFC 4648, no padding) ─────────────────────────────\n\nconst BASE32_ALPHABET = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567'\n\n/** Encode raw bytes as RFC 4648 Base32 (no padding — authenticator apps accept this). */\nexport function encodeBase32(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  let out = ''\n  let buf = 0\n  let bits = 0\n  for (const b of bytes) {\n    buf = (buf << 8) | b\n    bits += 8\n    while (bits >= 5) {\n      bits -= 5\n      out += BASE32_ALPHABET[(buf >> bits) & 0x1f]\n    }\n  }\n  if (bits > 0) {\n    out += BASE32_ALPHABET[(buf << (5 - bits)) & 0x1f]\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/** Decode RFC 4648 Base32 (case-insensitive, padding-tolerant, whitespace-stripped). */\nexport function decodeBase32(input: string): Uint8Array {\n  const cleaned = input.replace(/\\s|=/g, '').toUpperCase()\n  const bytes: number[] = []\n  let buf = 0\n  let bits = 0\n  for (const ch of cleaned) {\n    const v = BASE32_ALPHABET.indexOf(ch)\n    if (v < 0) throw new Error(`Invalid Base32 character: \"${ch}\"`)\n    buf = (buf << 5) | v\n    bits += 5\n    if (bits >= 8) {\n      bits -= 8\n      bytes.push((buf >> bits) & 0xff)\n    }\n  }\n  return new Uint8Array(bytes)\n}\n\n// ─── Secret generation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Random 20-byte (160-bit) TOTP secret — RFC 4226 recommended minimum. */\nexport function generateSecret(): string {\n  const bytes = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(20))\n  return encodeBase32(bytes)\n}\n\n// ─── Provisioning URI ───────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface ProvisioningUriOptions {\n  /** Account label shown in the authenticator — typically the user's email. */\n  readonly account: string\n  /** Issuer name shown in the authenticator — your product name. */\n  readonly issuer?: string\n  /** Code digits. Default 6. */\n  readonly digits?: 6 | 7 | 8\n  /** Step in seconds. Default 30. */\n  readonly period?: number\n  /** Hash algorithm. Default SHA1 (compatibility — Google Authenticator etc.). */\n  readonly algorithm?: 'SHA1' | 'SHA256' | 'SHA512'\n}\n\n/** Build a standard `otpauth://totp/` URI that authenticator apps parse from QR codes. */\nexport function provisioningUri(secret: string, options: ProvisioningUriOptions): string {\n  const issuer = options.issuer\n  const label = issuer\n    ? `${encodeURIComponent(issuer)}:${encodeURIComponent(options.account)}`\n    : encodeURIComponent(options.account)\n\n  const params = new URLSearchParams({\n    secret,\n    algorithm: options.algorithm ?? 'SHA1',\n    digits: String(options.digits ?? 6),\n    period: String(options.period ?? 30),\n  })\n  if (issuer) params.set('issuer', issuer)\n\n  return `otpauth://totp/${label}?${params.toString()}`\n}\n\n// ─── Code generation + verification ─────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface TotpOptions {\n  readonly digits?: 6 | 7 | 8\n  readonly period?: number\n  readonly algorithm?: 'SHA1' | 'SHA256' | 'SHA512'\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyOptions extends TotpOptions {\n  /**\n   * Clock-drift tolerance window, in steps before/after the current\n   * interval. `1` (default) accepts the current step ± 1. `0` is\n   * strictly exact — authenticators rarely stay that precise.\n   */\n  readonly window?: number\n  /** Override \"now\" for deterministic tests. */\n  readonly timestamp?: number\n}\n\n/** Compute the TOTP code for the given secret at the current time. */\nexport async function generateCode(secret: string, options: TotpOptions = {}): Promise<string> {\n  const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)\n  return codeAt(secret, now, options)\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a user-entered code against the secret. Constant-time comparison;\n * accepts drift within `window` steps.\n */\nexport async function verify(secret: string, code: string, options: VerifyOptions = {}): Promise<boolean> {\n  const digits = options.digits ?? 6\n  if (code.length !== digits) return false\n  const window = options.window ?? 1\n  const now = options.timestamp ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)\n  const period = options.period ?? 30\n  const step = Math.floor(now / period)\n\n  // Gather the candidate codes and do constant-time equality — avoids the\n  // wall-clock timing oracle on mismatches.\n  let matched = false\n  for (let i = -window; i <= window; i++) {\n    const candidate = await codeAtStep(secret, step + i, options)\n    if (constantTimeEqual(candidate, code)) matched = true\n  }\n  return matched\n}\n\nasync function codeAt(secret: string, timestamp: number, options: TotpOptions): Promise<string> {\n  const period = options.period ?? 30\n  return codeAtStep(secret, Math.floor(timestamp / period), options)\n}\n\nasync function codeAtStep(secret: string, step: number, options: TotpOptions): Promise<string> {\n  const digits = options.digits ?? 6\n  const algorithm = options.algorithm ?? 'SHA1'\n\n  const keyBytes = decodeBase32(secret)\n  // 8-byte big-endian step counter (HOTP/TOTP convention).\n  const counter = new Uint8Array(8)\n  let s = step\n  for (let i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {\n    counter[i] = s & 0xff\n    s = Math.floor(s / 256)\n  }\n\n  const hmacName = algorithm === 'SHA1' ? 'SHA-1' : algorithm === 'SHA256' ? 'SHA-256' : 'SHA-512'\n  const cryptoKey = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    keyBytes as BufferSource,\n    { name: 'HMAC', hash: hmacName },\n    false,\n    ['sign'],\n  )\n  const signature = new Uint8Array(\n    await globalThis.crypto.subtle.sign('HMAC', cryptoKey, counter as BufferSource),\n  )\n\n  // Dynamic truncation per RFC 4226 §5.3.\n  const offset = signature[signature.length - 1]! & 0x0f\n  const binary =\n    ((signature[offset]! & 0x7f) << 24) |\n    ((signature[offset + 1]! & 0xff) << 16) |\n    ((signature[offset + 2]! & 0xff) << 8) |\n    (signature[offset + 3]! & 0xff)\n\n  const modulus = 10 ** digits\n  const otp = (binary % modulus).toString().padStart(digits, '0')\n  return otp\n}\n\nfunction constantTimeEqual(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  if (a.length !== b.length) return false\n  let diff = 0\n  for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {\n    diff |= a.charCodeAt(i) ^ b.charCodeAt(i)\n  }\n  return diff === 0\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AA8CA,IAAM,kBAAkB;AAGjB,SAAS,aAAa,OAA2B;AACtD,MAAI,MAAM;AACV,MAAI,MAAM;AACV,MAAI,OAAO;AACX,aAAW,KAAK,OAAO;AACrB,UAAO,OAAO,IAAK;AACnB,YAAQ;AACR,WAAO,QAAQ,GAAG;AAChB,cAAQ;AACR,aAAO,gBAAiB,OAAO,OAAQ,EAAI;AAAA,IAC7C;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,GAAG;AACZ,WAAO,gBAAiB,OAAQ,IAAI,OAAS,EAAI;AAAA,EACnD;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGO,SAAS,aAAa,OAA2B;AACtD,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,QAAQ,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,YAAY;AACvD,QAAM,QAAkB,CAAC;AACzB,MAAI,MAAM;AACV,MAAI,OAAO;AACX,aAAW,MAAM,SAAS;AACxB,UAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,QAAQ,EAAE;AACpC,QAAI,IAAI,EAAG,OAAM,IAAI,MAAM,8BAA8B,EAAE,GAAG;AAC9D,UAAO,OAAO,IAAK;AACnB,YAAQ;AACR,QAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;AACb,cAAQ;AACR,YAAM,KAAM,OAAO,OAAQ,GAAI;AAAA,IACjC;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO,IAAI,WAAW,KAAK;AAC7B;AAKO,SAAS,iBAAyB;AACvC,QAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AAClE,SAAO,aAAa,KAAK;AAC3B;AAkBO,SAAS,gBAAgB,QAAgB,SAAyC;AACvF,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ;AACvB,QAAM,QAAQ,SACV,GAAG,mBAAmB,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,mBAAmB,QAAQ,OAAO,CAAC,KACpE,mBAAmB,QAAQ,OAAO;AAEtC,QAAM,SAAS,IAAI,gBAAgB;AAAA,IACjC;AAAA,IACA,WAAW,QAAQ,aAAa;AAAA,IAChC,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU,CAAC;AAAA,IAClC,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU,EAAE;AAAA,EACrC,CAAC;AACD,MAAI,OAAQ,QAAO,IAAI,UAAU,MAAM;AAEvC,SAAO,kBAAkB,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AACrD;AAsBA,eAAsB,aAAa,QAAgB,UAAuB,CAAC,GAAoB;AAC7F,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI;AACxC,SAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO;AACpC;AAMA,eAAsB,OAAO,QAAgB,MAAc,UAAyB,CAAC,GAAqB;AACxG,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU;AACjC,MAAI,KAAK,WAAW,OAAQ,QAAO;AACnC,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU;AACjC,QAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,aAAa,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,GAAI;AAC7D,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU;AACjC,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AAIpC,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,WAAS,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK;AACtC,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO;AAC5D,QAAI,kBAAkB,WAAW,IAAI,EAAG,WAAU;AAAA,EACpD;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,eAAe,OAAO,QAAgB,WAAmB,SAAuC;AAC9F,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU;AACjC,SAAO,WAAW,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,YAAY,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO;AACnE;AAEA,eAAe,WAAW,QAAgB,MAAc,SAAuC;AAC7F,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,UAAU;AACjC,QAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,aAAa;AAEvC,QAAM,WAAW,aAAa,MAAM;AAEpC,QAAM,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC;AAChC,MAAI,IAAI;AACR,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK;AAC3B,YAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,IAAI;AACjB,QAAI,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,EACxB;AAEA,QAAM,WAAW,cAAc,SAAS,UAAU,cAAc,WAAW,YAAY;AACvF,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IAC/C;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,SAAS;AAAA,IAC/B;AAAA,IACA,CAAC,MAAM;AAAA,EACT;AACA,QAAM,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,IACpB,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ,WAAW,OAAuB;AAAA,EAChF;AAGA,QAAM,SAAS,UAAU,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC,IAAK;AAClD,QAAM,UACF,UAAU,MAAM,IAAK,QAAS,MAC9B,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC,IAAK,QAAS,MAClC,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC,IAAK,QAAS,IACnC,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC,IAAK;AAE5B,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM;AACtB,QAAM,OAAO,SAAS,SAAS,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC9D,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,kBAAkB,GAAW,GAAoB;AACxD,MAAI,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,OAAQ,QAAO;AAClC,MAAI,OAAO;AACX,WAAS,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK;AACjC,YAAQ,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;AAAA,EAC1C;AACA,SAAO,SAAS;AAClB;","names":[]}

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/**
+ * **@noy-db/on-totp** — TOTP (RFC 6238) authenticator-app second factor.
+ *
+ * Generates TOTP secrets, produces the standard `otpauth://` provisioning
+ * URI that authenticator apps parse from QR codes, and verifies
+ * user-entered 6-digit codes in constant time.
+ *
+ * **Zero dependencies.** HMAC-SHA1 runs on the Web Crypto API
+ * (`crypto.subtle`) — same ethos as the rest of noy-db.
+ *
+ * ## Security model
+ *
+ * TOTP is a **second factor**, not an independent strength multiplier.
+ * The secret must live somewhere the verifier can read (otherwise no
+ * one can validate codes), so a compromised verifier leaks the secret.
+ * In noy-db the typical pattern is:
+ *
+ *   1. User sets a passphrase (primary factor). KEK derives via PBKDF2.
+ *   2. On enroll, a TOTP secret is generated and stored **encrypted
+ *      under the KEK** in the user's keyring.
+ *   3. On unlock, the user enters passphrase → unwraps the secret →
+ *      validates the entered code → proceeds only on match.
+ *
+ * This adds "something you have" on top of "something you know" but
+ * does not defend against a passphrase-KEK compromise. For real
+ * hardware-backed second factor, use `@noy-db/on-webauthn`.
+ *
+ * ## API
+ *
+ * ```ts
+ * import { generateSecret, provisioningUri, verify, generateCode } from '@noy-db/on-totp'
+ *
+ * // Enroll
+ * const secret = generateSecret()
+ * const uri = provisioningUri(secret, { account: 'alice@acme.com', issuer: 'Acme' })
+ * // Show QR code of `uri`.
+ *
+ * // Unlock
+ * const ok = await verify(secret, userEnteredCode)
+ * ```
+ *
+ * @packageDocumentation
+ */
+/** Encode raw bytes as RFC 4648 Base32 (no padding — authenticator apps accept this). */
+declare function encodeBase32(bytes: Uint8Array): string;
+/** Decode RFC 4648 Base32 (case-insensitive, padding-tolerant, whitespace-stripped). */
+declare function decodeBase32(input: string): Uint8Array;
+/** Random 20-byte (160-bit) TOTP secret — RFC 4226 recommended minimum. */
+declare function generateSecret(): string;
+interface ProvisioningUriOptions {
+    /** Account label shown in the authenticator — typically the user's email. */
+    readonly account: string;
+    /** Issuer name shown in the authenticator — your product name. */
+    readonly issuer?: string;
+    /** Code digits. Default 6. */
+    readonly digits?: 6 | 7 | 8;
+    /** Step in seconds. Default 30. */
+    readonly period?: number;
+    /** Hash algorithm. Default SHA1 (compatibility — Google Authenticator etc.). */
+    readonly algorithm?: 'SHA1' | 'SHA256' | 'SHA512';
+}
+/** Build a standard `otpauth://totp/` URI that authenticator apps parse from QR codes. */
+declare function provisioningUri(secret: string, options: ProvisioningUriOptions): string;
+interface TotpOptions {
+    readonly digits?: 6 | 7 | 8;
+    readonly period?: number;
+    readonly algorithm?: 'SHA1' | 'SHA256' | 'SHA512';
+}
+interface VerifyOptions extends TotpOptions {
+    /**
+     * Clock-drift tolerance window, in steps before/after the current
+     * interval. `1` (default) accepts the current step ± 1. `0` is
+     * strictly exact — authenticators rarely stay that precise.
+     */
+    readonly window?: number;
+    /** Override "now" for deterministic tests. */
+    readonly timestamp?: number;
+}
+/** Compute the TOTP code for the given secret at the current time. */
+declare function generateCode(secret: string, options?: TotpOptions): Promise<string>;
+/**
+ * Verify a user-entered code against the secret. Constant-time comparison;
+ * accepts drift within `window` steps.
+ */
+declare function verify(secret: string, code: string, options?: VerifyOptions): Promise<boolean>;
+
+export { type ProvisioningUriOptions, type TotpOptions, type VerifyOptions, decodeBase32, encodeBase32, generateCode, generateSecret, provisioningUri, verify };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/**
+ * **@noy-db/on-totp** — TOTP (RFC 6238) authenticator-app second factor.
+ *
+ * Generates TOTP secrets, produces the standard `otpauth://` provisioning
+ * URI that authenticator apps parse from QR codes, and verifies
+ * user-entered 6-digit codes in constant time.
+ *
+ * **Zero dependencies.** HMAC-SHA1 runs on the Web Crypto API
+ * (`crypto.subtle`) — same ethos as the rest of noy-db.
+ *
+ * ## Security model
+ *
+ * TOTP is a **second factor**, not an independent strength multiplier.
+ * The secret must live somewhere the verifier can read (otherwise no
+ * one can validate codes), so a compromised verifier leaks the secret.
+ * In noy-db the typical pattern is:
+ *
+ *   1. User sets a passphrase (primary factor). KEK derives via PBKDF2.
+ *   2. On enroll, a TOTP secret is generated and stored **encrypted
+ *      under the KEK** in the user's keyring.
+ *   3. On unlock, the user enters passphrase → unwraps the secret →
+ *      validates the entered code → proceeds only on match.
+ *
+ * This adds "something you have" on top of "something you know" but
+ * does not defend against a passphrase-KEK compromise. For real
+ * hardware-backed second factor, use `@noy-db/on-webauthn`.
+ *
+ * ## API
+ *
+ * ```ts
+ * import { generateSecret, provisioningUri, verify, generateCode } from '@noy-db/on-totp'
+ *
+ * // Enroll
+ * const secret = generateSecret()
+ * const uri = provisioningUri(secret, { account: 'alice@acme.com', issuer: 'Acme' })
+ * // Show QR code of `uri`.
+ *
+ * // Unlock
+ * const ok = await verify(secret, userEnteredCode)
+ * ```
+ *
+ * @packageDocumentation
+ */
+/** Encode raw bytes as RFC 4648 Base32 (no padding — authenticator apps accept this). */
+declare function encodeBase32(bytes: Uint8Array): string;
+/** Decode RFC 4648 Base32 (case-insensitive, padding-tolerant, whitespace-stripped). */
+declare function decodeBase32(input: string): Uint8Array;
+/** Random 20-byte (160-bit) TOTP secret — RFC 4226 recommended minimum. */
+declare function generateSecret(): string;
+interface ProvisioningUriOptions {
+    /** Account label shown in the authenticator — typically the user's email. */
+    readonly account: string;
+    /** Issuer name shown in the authenticator — your product name. */
+    readonly issuer?: string;
+    /** Code digits. Default 6. */
+    readonly digits?: 6 | 7 | 8;
+    /** Step in seconds. Default 30. */
+    readonly period?: number;
+    /** Hash algorithm. Default SHA1 (compatibility — Google Authenticator etc.). */
+    readonly algorithm?: 'SHA1' | 'SHA256' | 'SHA512';
+}
+/** Build a standard `otpauth://totp/` URI that authenticator apps parse from QR codes. */
+declare function provisioningUri(secret: string, options: ProvisioningUriOptions): string;
+interface TotpOptions {
+    readonly digits?: 6 | 7 | 8;
+    readonly period?: number;
+    readonly algorithm?: 'SHA1' | 'SHA256' | 'SHA512';
+}
+interface VerifyOptions extends TotpOptions {
+    /**
+     * Clock-drift tolerance window, in steps before/after the current
+     * interval. `1` (default) accepts the current step ± 1. `0` is
+     * strictly exact — authenticators rarely stay that precise.
+     */
+    readonly window?: number;
+    /** Override "now" for deterministic tests. */
+    readonly timestamp?: number;
+}
+/** Compute the TOTP code for the given secret at the current time. */
+declare function generateCode(secret: string, options?: TotpOptions): Promise<string>;
+/**
+ * Verify a user-entered code against the secret. Constant-time comparison;
+ * accepts drift within `window` steps.
+ */
+declare function verify(secret: string, code: string, options?: VerifyOptions): Promise<boolean>;
+
+export { type ProvisioningUriOptions, type TotpOptions, type VerifyOptions, decodeBase32, encodeBase32, generateCode, generateSecret, provisioningUri, verify };

package/dist/index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+// src/index.ts
+var BASE32_ALPHABET = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567";
+function encodeBase32(bytes) {
+  let out = "";
+  let buf = 0;
+  let bits = 0;
+  for (const b of bytes) {
+    buf = buf << 8 | b;
+    bits += 8;
+    while (bits >= 5) {
+      bits -= 5;
+      out += BASE32_ALPHABET[buf >> bits & 31];
+    }
+  }
+  if (bits > 0) {
+    out += BASE32_ALPHABET[buf << 5 - bits & 31];
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+function decodeBase32(input) {
+  const cleaned = input.replace(/\s|=/g, "").toUpperCase();
+  const bytes = [];
+  let buf = 0;
+  let bits = 0;
+  for (const ch of cleaned) {
+    const v = BASE32_ALPHABET.indexOf(ch);
+    if (v < 0) throw new Error(`Invalid Base32 character: "${ch}"`);
+    buf = buf << 5 | v;
+    bits += 5;
+    if (bits >= 8) {
+      bits -= 8;
+      bytes.push(buf >> bits & 255);
+    }
+  }
+  return new Uint8Array(bytes);
+}
+function generateSecret() {
+  const bytes = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(20));
+  return encodeBase32(bytes);
+}
+function provisioningUri(secret, options) {
+  const issuer = options.issuer;
+  const label = issuer ? `${encodeURIComponent(issuer)}:${encodeURIComponent(options.account)}` : encodeURIComponent(options.account);
+  const params = new URLSearchParams({
+    secret,
+    algorithm: options.algorithm ?? "SHA1",
+    digits: String(options.digits ?? 6),
+    period: String(options.period ?? 30)
+  });
+  if (issuer) params.set("issuer", issuer);
+  return `otpauth://totp/${label}?${params.toString()}`;
+}
+async function generateCode(secret, options = {}) {
+  const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
+  return codeAt(secret, now, options);
+}
+async function verify(secret, code, options = {}) {
+  const digits = options.digits ?? 6;
+  if (code.length !== digits) return false;
+  const window = options.window ?? 1;
+  const now = options.timestamp ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
+  const period = options.period ?? 30;
+  const step = Math.floor(now / period);
+  let matched = false;
+  for (let i = -window; i <= window; i++) {
+    const candidate = await codeAtStep(secret, step + i, options);
+    if (constantTimeEqual(candidate, code)) matched = true;
+  }
+  return matched;
+}
+async function codeAt(secret, timestamp, options) {
+  const period = options.period ?? 30;
+  return codeAtStep(secret, Math.floor(timestamp / period), options);
+}
+async function codeAtStep(secret, step, options) {
+  const digits = options.digits ?? 6;
+  const algorithm = options.algorithm ?? "SHA1";
+  const keyBytes = decodeBase32(secret);
+  const counter = new Uint8Array(8);
+  let s = step;
+  for (let i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
+    counter[i] = s & 255;
+    s = Math.floor(s / 256);
+  }
+  const hmacName = algorithm === "SHA1" ? "SHA-1" : algorithm === "SHA256" ? "SHA-256" : "SHA-512";
+  const cryptoKey = await globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(
+    "raw",
+    keyBytes,
+    { name: "HMAC", hash: hmacName },
+    false,
+    ["sign"]
+  );
+  const signature = new Uint8Array(
+    await globalThis.crypto.subtle.sign("HMAC", cryptoKey, counter)
+  );
+  const offset = signature[signature.length - 1] & 15;
+  const binary = (signature[offset] & 127) << 24 | (signature[offset + 1] & 255) << 16 | (signature[offset + 2] & 255) << 8 | signature[offset + 3] & 255;
+  const modulus = 10 ** digits;
+  const otp = (binary % modulus).toString().padStart(digits, "0");
+  return otp;
+}
+function constantTimeEqual(a, b) {
+  if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
+  let diff = 0;
+  for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {
+    diff |= a.charCodeAt(i) ^ b.charCodeAt(i);
+  }
+  return diff === 0;
+}
+export {
+  decodeBase32,
+  encodeBase32,
+  generateCode,
+  generateSecret,
+  provisioningUri,
+  verify
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * **@noy-db/on-totp** — TOTP (RFC 6238) authenticator-app second factor.\n *\n * Generates TOTP secrets, produces the standard `otpauth://` provisioning\n * URI that authenticator apps parse from QR codes, and verifies\n * user-entered 6-digit codes in constant time.\n *\n * **Zero dependencies.** HMAC-SHA1 runs on the Web Crypto API\n * (`crypto.subtle`) — same ethos as the rest of noy-db.\n *\n * ## Security model\n *\n * TOTP is a **second factor**, not an independent strength multiplier.\n * The secret must live somewhere the verifier can read (otherwise no\n * one can validate codes), so a compromised verifier leaks the secret.\n * In noy-db the typical pattern is:\n *\n *   1. User sets a passphrase (primary factor). KEK derives via PBKDF2.\n *   2. On enroll, a TOTP secret is generated and stored **encrypted\n *      under the KEK** in the user's keyring.\n *   3. On unlock, the user enters passphrase → unwraps the secret →\n *      validates the entered code → proceeds only on match.\n *\n * This adds \"something you have\" on top of \"something you know\" but\n * does not defend against a passphrase-KEK compromise. For real\n * hardware-backed second factor, use `@noy-db/on-webauthn`.\n *\n * ## API\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { generateSecret, provisioningUri, verify, generateCode } from '@noy-db/on-totp'\n *\n * // Enroll\n * const secret = generateSecret()\n * const uri = provisioningUri(secret, { account: 'alice@acme.com', issuer: 'Acme' })\n * // Show QR code of `uri`.\n *\n * // Unlock\n * const ok = await verify(secret, userEnteredCode)\n * ```\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\n\n// ─── Base32 encoding (RFC 4648, no padding) ─────────────────────────────\n\nconst BASE32_ALPHABET = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ234567'\n\n/** Encode raw bytes as RFC 4648 Base32 (no padding — authenticator apps accept this). */\nexport function encodeBase32(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  let out = ''\n  let buf = 0\n  let bits = 0\n  for (const b of bytes) {\n    buf = (buf << 8) | b\n    bits += 8\n    while (bits >= 5) {\n      bits -= 5\n      out += BASE32_ALPHABET[(buf >> bits) & 0x1f]\n    }\n  }\n  if (bits > 0) {\n    out += BASE32_ALPHABET[(buf << (5 - bits)) & 0x1f]\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/** Decode RFC 4648 Base32 (case-insensitive, padding-tolerant, whitespace-stripped). */\nexport function decodeBase32(input: string): Uint8Array {\n  const cleaned = input.replace(/\\s|=/g, '').toUpperCase()\n  const bytes: number[] = []\n  let buf = 0\n  let bits = 0\n  for (const ch of cleaned) {\n    const v = BASE32_ALPHABET.indexOf(ch)\n    if (v < 0) throw new Error(`Invalid Base32 character: \"${ch}\"`)\n    buf = (buf << 5) | v\n    bits += 5\n    if (bits >= 8) {\n      bits -= 8\n      bytes.push((buf >> bits) & 0xff)\n    }\n  }\n  return new Uint8Array(bytes)\n}\n\n// ─── Secret generation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Random 20-byte (160-bit) TOTP secret — RFC 4226 recommended minimum. */\nexport function generateSecret(): string {\n  const bytes = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(20))\n  return encodeBase32(bytes)\n}\n\n// ─── Provisioning URI ───────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface ProvisioningUriOptions {\n  /** Account label shown in the authenticator — typically the user's email. */\n  readonly account: string\n  /** Issuer name shown in the authenticator — your product name. */\n  readonly issuer?: string\n  /** Code digits. Default 6. */\n  readonly digits?: 6 | 7 | 8\n  /** Step in seconds. Default 30. */\n  readonly period?: number\n  /** Hash algorithm. Default SHA1 (compatibility — Google Authenticator etc.). */\n  readonly algorithm?: 'SHA1' | 'SHA256' | 'SHA512'\n}\n\n/** Build a standard `otpauth://totp/` URI that authenticator apps parse from QR codes. */\nexport function provisioningUri(secret: string, options: ProvisioningUriOptions): string {\n  const issuer = options.issuer\n  const label = issuer\n    ? `${encodeURIComponent(issuer)}:${encodeURIComponent(options.account)}`\n    : encodeURIComponent(options.account)\n\n  const params = new URLSearchParams({\n    secret,\n    algorithm: options.algorithm ?? 'SHA1',\n    digits: String(options.digits ?? 6),\n    period: String(options.period ?? 30),\n  })\n  if (issuer) params.set('issuer', issuer)\n\n  return `otpauth://totp/${label}?${params.toString()}`\n}\n\n// ─── Code generation + verification ─────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface TotpOptions {\n  readonly digits?: 6 | 7 | 8\n  readonly period?: number\n  readonly algorithm?: 'SHA1' | 'SHA256' | 'SHA512'\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyOptions extends TotpOptions {\n  /**\n   * Clock-drift tolerance window, in steps before/after the current\n   * interval. `1` (default) accepts the current step ± 1. `0` is\n   * strictly exact — authenticators rarely stay that precise.\n   */\n  readonly window?: number\n  /** Override \"now\" for deterministic tests. */\n  readonly timestamp?: number\n}\n\n/** Compute the TOTP code for the given secret at the current time. */\nexport async function generateCode(secret: string, options: TotpOptions = {}): Promise<string> {\n  const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)\n  return codeAt(secret, now, options)\n}\n\n/**\n * Verify a user-entered code against the secret. 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package/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+{
+  "name": "@noy-db/on-totp",
+  "version": "0.1.0-pre.3",
+  "description": "TOTP (RFC 6238) authenticator-app second factor for noy-db — generate secrets, otpauth:// provisioning URIs, and constant-time code verification. Zero dependencies (HMAC-SHA1 via Web Crypto). Part of the @noy-db/on-* authentication family.",
+  "license": "MIT",
+  "author": "vLannaAi <vicio@lanna.ai>",
+  "homepage": "https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db/tree/main/packages/on-totp#readme",
+  "repository": {
+    "type": "git",
+    "url": "git+https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db.git",
+    "directory": "packages/on-totp"
+  },
+  "bugs": {
+    "url": "https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db/issues"
+  },
+  "type": "module",
+  "sideEffects": false,
+  "exports": {
+    ".": {
+      "import": {
+        "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
+        "default": "./dist/index.js"
+      },
+      "require": {
+        "types": "./dist/index.d.cts",
+        "default": "./dist/index.cjs"
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  "main": "./dist/index.cjs",
+  "module": "./dist/index.js",
+  "types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
+  "files": [
+    "dist",
+    "README.md",
+    "LICENSE"
+  ],
+  "engines": {
+    "node": ">=18.0.0"
+  },
+  "peerDependencies": {
+    "@noy-db/hub": "0.1.0-pre.3"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "@types/node": "^22.0.0",
+    "@noy-db/hub": "0.1.0-pre.3"
+  },
+  "keywords": [
+    "noy-db",
+    "on-totp",
+    "totp",
+    "rfc-6238",
+    "2fa",
+    "mfa",
+    "authenticator"
+  ],
+  "publishConfig": {
+    "access": "public",
+    "tag": "latest"
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "tsup",
+    "test": "vitest run",
+    "lint": "eslint src/",
+    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
+  }
+}