@noy-db/on-password 0.7.0 → 0.8.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/LICENSE +202 -21
- package/NOTICE +1 -0
- package/README.md +32 -0
- package/dist/index.d.ts +55 -8
- package/dist/index.js +11 -0
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +12 -11
package/LICENSE
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Copyright 2026 vLannaAi
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package/NOTICE
ADDED
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noy-db — Copyright 2026 vLannaAi
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package/README.md
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# @noy-db/on-password
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[](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@noy-db/on-password)
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> Tier-2 password authenticator slot for noy-db
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Part of [**`@noy-db/hub`**](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@noy-db/hub) — the zero-knowledge, offline-first, encrypted document store.
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## Install
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```bash
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pnpm add @noy-db/hub @noy-db/on-password
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```
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## What it is
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A password is enrolled as its own keyring slot: PBKDF2-SHA256 at 600,000 iterations derives a wrapping key from the password, and that key wraps the vault's DEK set into the slot — so unlocking is a slot unwrap, never a re-derivation of the tier-1 phrase. It sits at tier 2 deliberately, beside the rarely-typed tier-1 secret rather than replacing it; pair it with [`@noy-db/on-email-otp`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@noy-db/on-email-otp) or [`@noy-db/on-totp`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@noy-db/on-totp) for the familiar SaaS second factor.
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## Status
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**Pre-release.** API may change before `1.0`.
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## Documentation
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See the [main repository](https://github.com/noy-db/on#readme) for setup and the full unlock-primitive catalog.
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- Source — [`on-password`](https://github.com/noy-db/on/tree/main/on-password)
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- Issues — [github.com/noy-db/on/issues](https://github.com/noy-db/on/issues)
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## License
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[Apache-2.0](./LICENSE) © vLannaAi
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package/dist/index.d.ts
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* `rotateSecret`) require a tier-1 unlock anyway — re-enter the
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* master phrase.
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*
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* @see https://github.com/
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* @see https://github.com/noy-db/docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/session-tiers.md → Tier 2 — `on-password`
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*/
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* @throws {@link PasswordInvalidError} when the password is wrong or
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* the slot is not a wrap-DEKs slot (e.g. a legacy wrap-KEK password
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* legacy wrap-KEK slots — those need re-enrollment).
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*
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* ⛔ **A slot blob is a BEARER CREDENTIAL.** This function needs no store,
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* no keyring and no network — the blob authenticates itself under the
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* password. **Removing the slot from the keyring does not invalidate a
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* copy of the blob**, because removal rotates no DEKs. Anyone holding a
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* captured blob and the password keeps the full live DEK set until the
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* vault's keys are rotated. Treat slot removal as *hiding the slot from
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* future lookups*, not as revocation, and rotate if a blob may have
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* leaked. See noy-db/on#6.
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*/
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declare function unwrapDeksWithPassword(slot: KeyringAuthenticator, password: string): Promise<Map<string, CryptoKey>>;
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/**
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* - **Cold-start** (`createNoydb({ getKeyring: ... })`) — consumer
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* does NOT have a keyring yet; the verifier loads identity from
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* disk before returning the unlocked keyring. This is the
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* primary cold-start tier-2 path (
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* primary cold-start tier-2 path (Pilot1 tier-2b uses this).
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*
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* Identity fields (userId, displayName, role, permissions,
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* authenticators, salt, capability bits, per-keyring policy) are read
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* those fields are not encrypted because the sync engine + grant flow
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* need them without a key.
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* Refuses a slot that is no longer enrolled in the keyring it loads —
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* but see the revocation caveat on {@link unwrapDeksWithPassword}: that
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* refusal is hardening, not revocation, and a holder of the raw blob
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* bypasses it by calling the primitive directly. Rotation is the only
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* thing that revokes.
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*
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* @throws {@link PasswordInvalidError} when the password is wrong, the
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* keyring file is missing or carries no body, or the slot is not enrolled
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* in it.
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*/
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declare function verifyPasswordSlot(slot: KeyringAuthenticator, password: string, options: VerifyPasswordSlotOptions): Promise<UnlockedKeyring>;
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/** Adapter shape required by {@link verifyPasswordSlot}. */
|
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@@ -175,10 +191,41 @@ interface VerifyPasswordSlotOptions {
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*
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* The password itself is unaffected by phrase rotation — what needs to
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* change is the **wrapped DEK set**: the encrypted blob the slot's
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* `wrapped_deks` field holds. After rotation
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* the
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*
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* `wrapped_deks` field holds. After rotation the old blob is wrapped
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* under the OLD KEK; the new blob must hold `ctx.newDeks`.
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*
|
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* ⚠️ **The old blob's DEK VALUES are not stale — only its wrapping is.**
|
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* `rotateSecret` rewraps the SAME DEKs under a freshly-derived KEK;
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* only `rotateKeys` re-mints DEK values. Records are encrypted with
|
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* DEKs, so a captured blob keeps decrypting everything across any
|
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* number of phrase rotations — see the bearer-credential warning on
|
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* {@link unwrapDeksWithPassword} and #6. An earlier revision of this
|
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* comment said "now stale because rotateSecret rewrapped them under a
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* fresh KEK", which reads as though rotation invalidated the captured
|
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* blob. It does not.
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*
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* ## Revoking a credential — this ceremony is a REQUIRED INPUT to it
|
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*
|
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* Hub's `revokeAuthenticator` is the real revocation, and it is three steps:
|
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* `removeAuthenticator` (hides the slot), `rotateKeys` (mints fresh DEKs —
|
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* the step that actually revokes), then `rotateSecret` with a
|
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* `slotCeremonies` entry for every slot that STAYS.
|
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*
|
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* ⛔ **A remaining slot handed no ceremony is DROPPED, not preserved.** After
|
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* the `rotateKeys` step its blob wraps DEKs that no longer exist, so keeping
|
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* it would leave a credential that silently fails. Its holder must re-enrol.
|
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|
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*
|
|
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* So revoking ONE credential means supplying `passwordSlotRewrapCeremony(password)` for
|
|
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|
+
* EVERY password slot you intend to keep — and each requires that
|
|
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|
+
* credential to be present (the password itself for a password slot, a live authenticator assertion for a WebAuthn slot). Re-wrapping a credential
|
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|
+
* is the credential's own operation; there is no way to do it on the
|
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* holder's behalf.
|
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|
+
*
|
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* ⚠️ **Not in any published hub at the time of writing.**
|
|
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|
+
* `revokeAuthenticator` landed on noy-db `main` in `0612b4ac`, AFTER
|
|
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|
+
* `@noy-db/hub@0.7.1-pre.0` was cut and published — so it is in neither
|
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|
+
* `@latest` (0.7.0) nor `@next` (0.7.1-pre.0). Ask npm before promising it to
|
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|
+
* a consumer; do not infer its version from hub's `main`.
|
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|
*
|
|
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* Single ceremony, one operation:
|
|
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231
|
* 1. Validate `oldSlot.method === 'password'` and `oldSlot.wrapKind === 'deks'`.
|
package/dist/index.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -80,8 +80,19 @@ async function verifyPasswordSlot(slot, password, options) {
|
|
|
80
80
|
`verifyPasswordSlot: no keyring found at "${options.vault}/_keyring/${options.userId}". Verify the vault and userId are correct.`
|
|
81
81
|
);
|
|
82
82
|
}
|
|
83
|
+
if (!env._data) {
|
|
84
|
+
throw new PasswordInvalidError(
|
|
85
|
+
`verifyPasswordSlot: the keyring at "${options.vault}/_keyring/${options.userId}" carries no body. The record exists but is empty \u2014 it was not written by a keyring writer.`
|
|
86
|
+
);
|
|
87
|
+
}
|
|
83
88
|
const file = JSON.parse(env._data);
|
|
84
89
|
const salt = new Uint8Array(base64ToBuffer(file.salt));
|
|
90
|
+
const stillEnrolled = (file.authenticators ?? []).some((a) => a.id === slot.id);
|
|
91
|
+
if (!stillEnrolled) {
|
|
92
|
+
throw new PasswordInvalidError(
|
|
93
|
+
`verifyPasswordSlot: slot "${slot.id}" is not enrolled in "${options.vault}/_keyring/${options.userId}". It may have been removed.`
|
|
94
|
+
);
|
|
95
|
+
}
|
|
85
96
|
await assertRosterAuthenticated(file, deks, options.userId);
|
|
86
97
|
return {
|
|
87
98
|
userId: file.user_id,
|
package/dist/index.js.map
CHANGED
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"sources":["../src/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * **@noy-db/on-password** — tier-2 password authenticator slot.\n *\n * The user's tier-1 *phrase* is the rarely-typed master that derives\n * the KEK. This package adds a SEPARATE secret — a password the user\n * types at each unlock — as a tier-2 slot in the multi-slot keyring.\n * The two credentials have:\n *\n * - **Different lifecycles** — the phrase rotates yearly; the password\n * rotates per the developer's policy.\n * - **Different strength rules** — the phrase is validated against the\n * phrase format; the password is validated against a\n * length / regex rule the developer chooses.\n * - **Different storage** — the phrase derives the KEK; the password\n * derives a wrapping key that wraps the SAME DEK SET in its own\n * keyring slot (LUKS-like multi-slot, wrap-DEKs variant).\n *\n * ## Wrap-DEKs format (Path C)\n *\n * Slots produced by this package use the wrap-DEKs variant of\n * `KeyringAuthenticator` — they encrypt the serialized DEK set under\n * a password-derived AES-GCM key, NOT the KEK. This unifies tier-2\n * password slots with the tier-0 (paper recovery, `mintPaperRecoveryEntry`)\n * and tier-3 (`@noy-db/on-pin`'s `wrappedKeyring`) primitives — all\n * three sidestep the non-extractable-KEK constraint by wrapping the\n * DEK set rather than the KEK itself.\n *\n * Trade-off: an `UnlockedKeyring` produced via password-slot unlock\n * has `kek: null`. Sensitive operations (`enrollAuthenticator`,\n * `rotateSecret`) require a tier-1 unlock anyway — re-enter the\n * master phrase.\n *\n * @see https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db-docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/session-tiers.md → Tier 2 — `on-password`\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\nimport { assertRosterAuthenticated, base64ToBuffer, mintWrappedDeksBlob, unwrapDeksFromBlob, ValidationError, type KeyringFile, type NoydbStore } from '@noy-db/hub'\nimport type { EnrollAuthenticatorOptions, KeyringAuthenticator, SlotRewrapCeremony, SlotRewrapContext, UnlockedKeyring } from '@noy-db/hub/on'\n\n/**\n * PBKDF2 iteration count — matches the tier-1 phrase derivation.\n * Exported as a documented invariant; the actual derivation lives\n * in hub's canonical wrap-DEKs primitive.\n */\nexport const PASSWORD_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 600_000\n\n/** Default minimum password length. Override per-app via `enrollPasswordAuthenticator`. */\nexport const PASSWORD_DEFAULT_MIN_LENGTH = 12\n\n// ─── Errors ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport class PasswordTooWeakError extends Error {\n readonly code = 'PASSWORD_TOO_WEAK' as const\n readonly minLength: number\n constructor(minLength: number, message?: string) {\n super(\n message ??\n `Password must be at least ${String(minLength)} characters. ` +\n 'For accounts with a separate tier-1 phrase, prefer a longer password ' +\n 'or pair with TOTP/email-OTP via @noy-db/on-totp or @noy-db/on-email-otp.',\n )\n this.name = 'PasswordTooWeakError'\n this.minLength = minLength\n }\n}\n\nexport class PasswordInvalidError extends Error {\n readonly code = 'PASSWORD_INVALID' as const\n constructor(message = 'Password does not unlock this slot.') {\n super(message)\n this.name = 'PasswordInvalidError'\n }\n}\n\n// ─── Public API ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Options for {@link enrollPasswordAuthenticator}. */\nexport interface EnrollPasswordOptions {\n /** Slot id. Default: `'password'`. */\n readonly id?: string\n /** Password the user will type at unlock. Distinct from the tier-1 phrase. */\n readonly password: string\n /** Minimum length. Default 12. */\n readonly minLength?: number\n /** Optional regex the password must satisfy in addition to length. */\n readonly pattern?: RegExp\n /** Tier the active session held when enrolling. Default 1. */\n readonly enrolledViaTier?: 1 | 2\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the keyring slot for a tier-2 password authenticator. Returns\n * an `EnrollAuthenticatorOptions` value the caller hands to\n * `db.team.enrollAuthenticator(vault, slot)` — separating the cryptographic\n * step (this function) from the persistence step (the hub) keeps the\n * package small and lets the hub's policy gate run between the two.\n *\n * The slot uses the **wrap-DEKs** variant of `KeyringAuthenticator`:\n * the DEK set is serialized to JSON and encrypted with AES-GCM under\n * a PBKDF2-derived key. No requirement on `keyring.kek` — works with\n * tier-1 unlocked keyrings; throws if `keyring.deks` is empty.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { enrollPasswordAuthenticator } from '@noy-db/on-password'\n *\n * const keyring = await db.team.getKeyring('acme')\n * const slot = await enrollPasswordAuthenticator(keyring, {\n * password: 'strong-password-2026',\n * minLength: 14,\n * })\n * await db.team.enrollAuthenticator('acme', slot, {\n * factors: [{ kind: 'totp' }],\n * })\n * ```\n */\nexport async function enrollPasswordAuthenticator(\n keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n options: EnrollPasswordOptions,\n): Promise<EnrollAuthenticatorOptions> {\n const minLength = options.minLength ?? PASSWORD_DEFAULT_MIN_LENGTH\n if (options.password.length < minLength) {\n throw new PasswordTooWeakError(minLength)\n }\n if (options.pattern && !options.pattern.test(options.password)) {\n throw new PasswordTooWeakError(\n minLength,\n `Password does not match the configured pattern: ${options.pattern.toString()}.`,\n )\n }\n\n if (keyring.deks.size === 0) {\n throw new Error(\n 'enrollPasswordAuthenticator: the supplied keyring has no DEKs in memory. ' +\n 'Re-authenticate at tier 1 first.',\n )\n }\n\n // Delegate the wrap-DEKs crypto to the canonical hub primitive.\n // The slot envelope still stores `salt` inside `meta` for backward\n // compatibility with the legacy slot format; moving it to top-level\n // for parity with PaperRecoveryEntry is deferred.\n const blob = await mintWrappedDeksBlob(keyring.deks, options.password)\n\n return {\n id: options.id ?? 'password',\n method: 'password',\n wrapKind: 'deks',\n wrapped_deks: blob.wrappedDeks,\n iv: blob.iv,\n meta: {\n salt: blob.salt,\n minLength,\n ...(options.pattern !== undefined ? { pattern: options.pattern.source } : {}),\n },\n enrolled_via_tier: options.enrolledViaTier ?? 1,\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Recover the DEK set from a wrap-DEKs password slot. Returns the raw\n * DEK map; the hub-friendly verifier {@link verifyPasswordSlot} wraps\n * this and produces a full `UnlockedKeyring`.\n *\n * @throws {@link PasswordInvalidError} when the password is wrong or\n * the slot is not a wrap-DEKs slot (e.g. a legacy wrap-KEK password\n * legacy wrap-KEK slots — those need re-enrollment).\n */\nexport async function unwrapDeksWithPassword(\n slot: KeyringAuthenticator,\n password: string,\n): Promise<Map<string, CryptoKey>> {\n if (slot.wrapKind !== 'deks') {\n throw new PasswordInvalidError(\n 'Password slot is not a wrap-DEKs slot. Pre-pre.8 wrap-KEK password ' +\n 'slots are no longer supported — re-enrol via enrollPasswordAuthenticator.',\n )\n }\n\n const meta = slot.meta as { salt?: unknown }\n if (typeof meta.salt !== 'string') {\n throw new PasswordInvalidError(\n 'Password slot is missing the per-slot salt — keyring may be corrupted.',\n )\n }\n\n // Delegate to the canonical wrap-DEKs primitive. The blob's\n // three fields (salt / iv / wrappedDeks) are reconstructed from\n // the slot's split layout: salt lives in meta, iv + wrappedDeks\n // at top level. Previously, this code re-implemented the same crypto\n // inline.\n try {\n return await unwrapDeksFromBlob(\n { salt: meta.salt, iv: slot.iv, wrappedDeks: slot.wrapped_deks },\n password,\n )\n } catch {\n throw new PasswordInvalidError()\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Hub-friendly verify callback. Pass to `db.unlockViaAuthenticator`:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { verifyPasswordSlot } from '@noy-db/on-password'\n *\n * const unlocked = await db.team.unlockViaAuthenticator('acme', 'password',\n * (slot) => verifyPasswordSlot(slot, 'strong-password-2026',\n * { store, vault: 'acme', userId: 'alice' }),\n * )\n * ```\n *\n * Unwraps the DEK set with the supplied password and returns an\n * `UnlockedKeyring` the hub installs in its keyring cache. The\n * returned keyring has `kek: null` — sensitive operations (enrol new\n * slot, rotate phrase) require a tier-1 unlock from the master phrase.\n *\n * The `{ store, vault, userId }` shape works in both contexts:\n * - **Warm re-unlock** — db is alive; consumer already has identity\n * in memory but pays one cheap `_keyring/<userId>` read.\n * - **Cold-start** (`createNoydb({ getKeyring: ... })`) — consumer\n * does NOT have a keyring yet; the verifier loads identity from\n * disk before returning the unlocked keyring. This is the\n * primary cold-start tier-2 path (Niwat tier-2b uses this).\n *\n * Identity fields (userId, displayName, role, permissions,\n * authenticators, salt, capability bits, per-keyring policy) are read\n * directly from the `_keyring/<userId>` envelope's plaintext header —\n * those fields are not encrypted because the sync engine + grant flow\n * need them without a key.\n *\n * @throws {@link PasswordInvalidError} when the password is wrong or\n * the keyring file is missing.\n */\nexport async function verifyPasswordSlot(\n slot: KeyringAuthenticator,\n password: string,\n options: VerifyPasswordSlotOptions,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n const deks = await unwrapDeksWithPassword(slot, password)\n\n const env = await options.store.get(options.vault, '_keyring', options.userId)\n if (!env) {\n throw new PasswordInvalidError(\n `verifyPasswordSlot: no keyring found at \"${options.vault}/_keyring/${options.userId}\". ` +\n 'Verify the vault and userId are correct.',\n )\n }\n const file = JSON.parse(env._data) as KeyringFile\n const salt = new Uint8Array(base64ToBuffer(file.salt))\n\n // #1096 — the identity fields below are read from the PLAINTEXT header, so\n // without this the store could promote a viewer to admin by editing one word\n // and have it refused at tier-1 open but accepted here. A vault is only as\n // strong as its weakest unlock path.\n //\n // Verifiable at tier 2 because `deks` above already carries the vault roster\n // key — it rides the slot's wrapped-DEK blob like any other DEK, and that\n // blob is authenticated by its own AES-GCM tag under the password. The\n // canary is deliberately NOT checked: it proves the KEK, and this path has\n // no KEK by design.\n await assertRosterAuthenticated(file, deks, options.userId)\n\n return {\n userId: file.user_id,\n displayName: file.display_name,\n role: file.role,\n permissions: file.permissions,\n authenticators: file.authenticators ?? [],\n salt,\n ...(file.export_capability !== undefined && { exportCapability: file.export_capability }),\n ...(file.import_capability !== undefined && { importCapability: file.import_capability }),\n ...(file.policy !== undefined && { policy: file.policy }),\n deks,\n // Wrap-DEKs unlock cannot recover the KEK. Sensitive ops route\n // through tier-1 via re-entry of the master phrase. Matches the\n // existing tier-3 (`@noy-db/on-pin`) pattern.\n kek: null,\n }\n}\n\n/** Adapter shape required by {@link verifyPasswordSlot}. */\nexport interface VerifyPasswordSlotOptions {\n /** The vault's NoydbStore — used to load `_keyring/<userId>`. */\n readonly store: NoydbStore\n /** Vault name — same value passed to `db.openVault(name)`. */\n readonly vault: string\n /** User id — same value passed to `createNoydb({ user })`. */\n readonly userId: string\n}\n\n/**\n * `SlotRewrapCeremony` factory for password slots — the password parallel\n * to `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony`. Used by hub's\n * `rotateSecret({ slotCeremonies: { [slotId]: passwordSlotRewrapCeremony(pwd) } })`\n * to preserve a tier-2 password enrollment across a tier-1 phrase\n * rotation without forcing the user to re-enroll the password.\n *\n * Returns a closure capturing the password so the result matches\n * hub's `SlotRewrapCeremony` signature `(ctx) => Promise<EnrollAuthenticatorOptions>`\n * directly. Pass into `slotCeremonies` keyed by the existing slot id:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { passwordSlotRewrapCeremony } from '@noy-db/on-password'\n *\n * await db.team.rotateSecret('acme', {\n * oldSecret: oldPhrase,\n * newSecret: newPhrase,\n * slotCeremonies: {\n * 'password': passwordSlotRewrapCeremony('strong-password-2026'),\n * },\n * })\n * ```\n *\n * The password itself is unaffected by phrase rotation — what needs to\n * change is the **wrapped DEK set**: the encrypted blob the slot's\n * `wrapped_deks` field holds. After rotation, the old blob still has\n * the old DEKs (now stale because rotateSecret rewrapped them\n * under a fresh KEK); the new blob must hold the freshly rewrapped\n * `ctx.newDeks`.\n *\n * Single ceremony, one operation:\n * 1. Validate `oldSlot.method === 'password'` and `oldSlot.wrapKind === 'deks'`.\n * 2. Re-mint the wrap-DEKs blob via {@link enrollPasswordAuthenticator}\n * using the supplied password against `ctx.newDeks`.\n * 3. Return `EnrollAuthenticatorOptions` preserving `oldSlot.id`,\n * `method: 'password'`, and the strength config (`minLength`,\n * `pattern`) carried in the old slot's `meta`. Hub validates\n * `id` + `method` + `wrapKind` to prevent slot-type swap mid-\n * rotation.\n *\n * Legacy wrap-KEK password slots cannot be rewrapped via\n * this ceremony — they must be re-enrolled fresh via\n * {@link enrollPasswordAuthenticator}. The validation throws\n * {@link ValidationError} for those.\n *\n * @throws {ValidationError} when `oldSlot.method !== 'password'` or\n * `oldSlot.wrapKind !== 'deks'`.\n * @throws {PasswordTooWeakError} when the supplied password fails the\n * strength rules carried in `oldSlot.meta` (minLength, pattern).\n *\n * @see webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony — the WebAuthn parallel.\n */\nexport function passwordSlotRewrapCeremony(password: string): SlotRewrapCeremony {\n return async (ctx: SlotRewrapContext): Promise<EnrollAuthenticatorOptions> => {\n if (ctx.oldSlot.method !== 'password') {\n throw new ValidationError(\n `passwordSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot.method is \"${ctx.oldSlot.method}\"; expected \"password\". ` +\n 'This ceremony only handles password slots — pair other methods with their own helpers.',\n )\n }\n if (ctx.oldSlot.wrapKind !== 'deks') {\n throw new ValidationError(\n 'passwordSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot is a wrap-KEK slot; expected wrap-DEKs. ' +\n 'Password slots use the wrap-DEKs variant since #26 Path C; legacy wrap-KEK ' +\n 'password slots are not supported here — re-enrol via enrollPasswordAuthenticator.',\n )\n }\n\n // Preserve the strength config the slot was originally enrolled with —\n // a rotation should not silently downgrade minLength or drop a pattern.\n const oldMeta = ctx.oldSlot.meta as { minLength?: unknown; pattern?: unknown }\n const minLength = typeof oldMeta.minLength === 'number' ? oldMeta.minLength : undefined\n const pattern = typeof oldMeta.pattern === 'string' ? new RegExp(oldMeta.pattern) : undefined\n\n return enrollPasswordAuthenticator(\n // enrollPasswordAuthenticator only reads `keyring.deks`, so a\n // synthetic minimal keyring is enough. The freshly-rewrapped DEKs\n // come from hub via `ctx.newDeks`.\n { deks: ctx.newDeks } as UnlockedKeyring,\n {\n id: ctx.oldSlot.id,\n password,\n ...(minLength !== undefined && { minLength }),\n ...(pattern !== undefined && { pattern }),\n // Carry the original tier so hub's anti-slot-swap guard plus\n // the rotate-recover preservation rule keep the slot's\n // provenance honest.\n enrolledViaTier: ctx.oldSlot.enrolled_via_tier,\n },\n )\n }\n}\n\n// All wrap-DEKs crypto helpers (PBKDF2 derivation, base64\n// codecs) live in hub's `team/wrapped-deks.ts` — both this\n// package and `mintPaperRecoveryEntry` share one implementation.\n"],"mappings":";AAoCA,SAAS,2BAA2B,gBAAgB,qBAAqB,oBAAoB,uBAA0D;AAQhJ,IAAM,6BAA6B;AAGnC,IAAM,8BAA8B;AAIpC,IAAM,uBAAN,cAAmC,MAAM;AAAA,EACrC,OAAO;AAAA,EACP;AAAA,EACT,YAAY,WAAmB,SAAkB;AAC/C;AAAA,MACE,WACE,6BAA6B,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,IAGlD;AACA,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,YAAY;AAAA,EACnB;AACF;AAEO,IAAM,uBAAN,cAAmC,MAAM;AAAA,EACrC,OAAO;AAAA,EAChB,YAAY,UAAU,uCAAuC;AAC3D,UAAM,OAAO;AACb,SAAK,OAAO;AAAA,EACd;AACF;AA6CA,eAAsB,4BACpB,SACA,SACqC;AACrC,QAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,aAAa;AACvC,MAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,SAAS,WAAW;AACvC,UAAM,IAAI,qBAAqB,SAAS;AAAA,EAC1C;AACA,MAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,CAAC,QAAQ,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC9D,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA,mDAAmD,QAAQ,QAAQ,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/E;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,MAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG;AAC3B,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IAEF;AAAA,EACF;AAMA,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,oBAAoB,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAErE,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,IAClB,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,UAAU;AAAA,IACV,cAAc,KAAK;AAAA,IACnB,IAAI,KAAK;AAAA,IACT,MAAM;AAAA,MACJ,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,MACA,GAAI,QAAQ,YAAY,SAAY,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC7E;AAAA,IACA,mBAAmB,QAAQ,mBAAmB;AAAA,EAChD;AACF;AAWA,eAAsB,uBACpB,MACA,UACiC;AACjC,MAAI,KAAK,aAAa,QAAQ;AAC5B,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IAEF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK;AAClB,MAAI,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,UAAU;AACjC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAOA,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,MAAM;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,aAAa,KAAK,aAAa;AAAA,MAC/D;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,QAAQ;AACN,UAAM,IAAI,qBAAqB;AAAA,EACjC;AACF;AAoCA,eAAsB,mBACpB,MACA,UACA,SAC0B;AAC1B,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,MAAM,QAAQ;AAExD,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,OAAO,YAAY,QAAQ,MAAM;AAC7E,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK;AACR,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,4CAA4C,QAAQ,KAAK,aAAa,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,IAEtF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK;AACjC,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,WAAW,eAAe,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAYrD,QAAM,0BAA0B,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM;AAE1D,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,IACb,aAAa,KAAK;AAAA,IAClB,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IACX,aAAa,KAAK;AAAA,IAClB,gBAAgB,KAAK,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAAA,IACxC;AAAA,IACA,GAAI,KAAK,sBAAsB,UAAa,EAAE,kBAAkB,KAAK,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACvF,GAAI,KAAK,sBAAsB,UAAa,EAAE,kBAAkB,KAAK,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACvF,GAAI,KAAK,WAAW,UAAa,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO;AAAA,IACvD;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAIA,KAAK;AAAA,EACP;AACF;AAgEO,SAAS,2BAA2B,UAAsC;AAC/E,SAAO,OAAO,QAAgE;AAC5E,QAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,YAAY;AACrC,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR,kDAAkD,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,MAEtE;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,aAAa,QAAQ;AACnC,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,MAGF;AAAA,IACF;AAIA,UAAM,UAAU,IAAI,QAAQ;AAC5B,UAAM,YAAY,OAAO,QAAQ,cAAc,WAAW,QAAQ,YAAY;AAC9E,UAAM,UAAU,OAAO,QAAQ,YAAY,WAAW,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI;AAEpF,WAAO;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAIL,EAAE,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,MACpB;AAAA,QACE,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,QAChB;AAAA,QACA,GAAI,cAAc,UAAa,EAAE,UAAU;AAAA,QAC3C,GAAI,YAAY,UAAa,EAAE,QAAQ;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,QAIvC,iBAAiB,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,MAC/B;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":[]}
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{"version":3,"sources":["../src/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * **@noy-db/on-password** — tier-2 password authenticator slot.\n *\n * The user's tier-1 *phrase* is the rarely-typed master that derives\n * the KEK. This package adds a SEPARATE secret — a password the user\n * types at each unlock — as a tier-2 slot in the multi-slot keyring.\n * The two credentials have:\n *\n * - **Different lifecycles** — the phrase rotates yearly; the password\n * rotates per the developer's policy.\n * - **Different strength rules** — the phrase is validated against the\n * phrase format; the password is validated against a\n * length / regex rule the developer chooses.\n * - **Different storage** — the phrase derives the KEK; the password\n * derives a wrapping key that wraps the SAME DEK SET in its own\n * keyring slot (LUKS-like multi-slot, wrap-DEKs variant).\n *\n * ## Wrap-DEKs format (Path C)\n *\n * Slots produced by this package use the wrap-DEKs variant of\n * `KeyringAuthenticator` — they encrypt the serialized DEK set under\n * a password-derived AES-GCM key, NOT the KEK. This unifies tier-2\n * password slots with the tier-0 (paper recovery, `mintPaperRecoveryEntry`)\n * and tier-3 (`@noy-db/on-pin`'s `wrappedKeyring`) primitives — all\n * three sidestep the non-extractable-KEK constraint by wrapping the\n * DEK set rather than the KEK itself.\n *\n * Trade-off: an `UnlockedKeyring` produced via password-slot unlock\n * has `kek: null`. Sensitive operations (`enrollAuthenticator`,\n * `rotateSecret`) require a tier-1 unlock anyway — re-enter the\n * master phrase.\n *\n * @see https://github.com/noy-db/docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/session-tiers.md → Tier 2 — `on-password`\n *\n * @packageDocumentation\n */\nimport { assertRosterAuthenticated, base64ToBuffer, mintWrappedDeksBlob, unwrapDeksFromBlob, ValidationError, type KeyringFile, type NoydbStore } from '@noy-db/hub'\nimport type { EnrollAuthenticatorOptions, KeyringAuthenticator, SlotRewrapCeremony, SlotRewrapContext, UnlockedKeyring } from '@noy-db/hub/on'\n\n/**\n * PBKDF2 iteration count — matches the tier-1 phrase derivation.\n * Exported as a documented invariant; the actual derivation lives\n * in hub's canonical wrap-DEKs primitive.\n */\nexport const PASSWORD_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 600_000\n\n/** Default minimum password length. Override per-app via `enrollPasswordAuthenticator`. */\nexport const PASSWORD_DEFAULT_MIN_LENGTH = 12\n\n// ─── Errors ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport class PasswordTooWeakError extends Error {\n readonly code = 'PASSWORD_TOO_WEAK' as const\n readonly minLength: number\n constructor(minLength: number, message?: string) {\n super(\n message ??\n `Password must be at least ${String(minLength)} characters. ` +\n 'For accounts with a separate tier-1 phrase, prefer a longer password ' +\n 'or pair with TOTP/email-OTP via @noy-db/on-totp or @noy-db/on-email-otp.',\n )\n this.name = 'PasswordTooWeakError'\n this.minLength = minLength\n }\n}\n\nexport class PasswordInvalidError extends Error {\n readonly code = 'PASSWORD_INVALID' as const\n constructor(message = 'Password does not unlock this slot.') {\n super(message)\n this.name = 'PasswordInvalidError'\n }\n}\n\n// ─── Public API ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Options for {@link enrollPasswordAuthenticator}. */\nexport interface EnrollPasswordOptions {\n /** Slot id. Default: `'password'`. */\n readonly id?: string\n /** Password the user will type at unlock. Distinct from the tier-1 phrase. */\n readonly password: string\n /** Minimum length. Default 12. */\n readonly minLength?: number\n /** Optional regex the password must satisfy in addition to length. */\n readonly pattern?: RegExp\n /** Tier the active session held when enrolling. Default 1. */\n readonly enrolledViaTier?: 1 | 2\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the keyring slot for a tier-2 password authenticator. Returns\n * an `EnrollAuthenticatorOptions` value the caller hands to\n * `db.team.enrollAuthenticator(vault, slot)` — separating the cryptographic\n * step (this function) from the persistence step (the hub) keeps the\n * package small and lets the hub's policy gate run between the two.\n *\n * The slot uses the **wrap-DEKs** variant of `KeyringAuthenticator`:\n * the DEK set is serialized to JSON and encrypted with AES-GCM under\n * a PBKDF2-derived key. No requirement on `keyring.kek` — works with\n * tier-1 unlocked keyrings; throws if `keyring.deks` is empty.\n *\n * Usage:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { enrollPasswordAuthenticator } from '@noy-db/on-password'\n *\n * const keyring = await db.team.getKeyring('acme')\n * const slot = await enrollPasswordAuthenticator(keyring, {\n * password: 'strong-password-2026',\n * minLength: 14,\n * })\n * await db.team.enrollAuthenticator('acme', slot, {\n * factors: [{ kind: 'totp' }],\n * })\n * ```\n */\nexport async function enrollPasswordAuthenticator(\n keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n options: EnrollPasswordOptions,\n): Promise<EnrollAuthenticatorOptions> {\n const minLength = options.minLength ?? PASSWORD_DEFAULT_MIN_LENGTH\n if (options.password.length < minLength) {\n throw new PasswordTooWeakError(minLength)\n }\n if (options.pattern && !options.pattern.test(options.password)) {\n throw new PasswordTooWeakError(\n minLength,\n `Password does not match the configured pattern: ${options.pattern.toString()}.`,\n )\n }\n\n if (keyring.deks.size === 0) {\n throw new Error(\n 'enrollPasswordAuthenticator: the supplied keyring has no DEKs in memory. ' +\n 'Re-authenticate at tier 1 first.',\n )\n }\n\n // Delegate the wrap-DEKs crypto to the canonical hub primitive.\n // The slot envelope still stores `salt` inside `meta` for backward\n // compatibility with the legacy slot format; moving it to top-level\n // for parity with PaperRecoveryEntry is deferred.\n const blob = await mintWrappedDeksBlob(keyring.deks, options.password)\n\n return {\n id: options.id ?? 'password',\n method: 'password',\n wrapKind: 'deks',\n wrapped_deks: blob.wrappedDeks,\n iv: blob.iv,\n meta: {\n salt: blob.salt,\n minLength,\n ...(options.pattern !== undefined ? { pattern: options.pattern.source } : {}),\n },\n enrolled_via_tier: options.enrolledViaTier ?? 1,\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Recover the DEK set from a wrap-DEKs password slot. Returns the raw\n * DEK map; the hub-friendly verifier {@link verifyPasswordSlot} wraps\n * this and produces a full `UnlockedKeyring`.\n *\n * @throws {@link PasswordInvalidError} when the password is wrong or\n * the slot is not a wrap-DEKs slot (e.g. a legacy wrap-KEK password\n * legacy wrap-KEK slots — those need re-enrollment).\n *\n * ⛔ **A slot blob is a BEARER CREDENTIAL.** This function needs no store,\n * no keyring and no network — the blob authenticates itself under the\n * password. **Removing the slot from the keyring does not invalidate a\n * copy of the blob**, because removal rotates no DEKs. Anyone holding a\n * captured blob and the password keeps the full live DEK set until the\n * vault's keys are rotated. Treat slot removal as *hiding the slot from\n * future lookups*, not as revocation, and rotate if a blob may have\n * leaked. See noy-db/on#6.\n */\nexport async function unwrapDeksWithPassword(\n slot: KeyringAuthenticator,\n password: string,\n): Promise<Map<string, CryptoKey>> {\n if (slot.wrapKind !== 'deks') {\n throw new PasswordInvalidError(\n 'Password slot is not a wrap-DEKs slot. Pre-pre.8 wrap-KEK password ' +\n 'slots are no longer supported — re-enrol via enrollPasswordAuthenticator.',\n )\n }\n\n const meta = slot.meta as { salt?: unknown }\n if (typeof meta.salt !== 'string') {\n throw new PasswordInvalidError(\n 'Password slot is missing the per-slot salt — keyring may be corrupted.',\n )\n }\n\n // Delegate to the canonical wrap-DEKs primitive. The blob's\n // three fields (salt / iv / wrappedDeks) are reconstructed from\n // the slot's split layout: salt lives in meta, iv + wrappedDeks\n // at top level. Previously, this code re-implemented the same crypto\n // inline.\n try {\n return await unwrapDeksFromBlob(\n { salt: meta.salt, iv: slot.iv, wrappedDeks: slot.wrapped_deks },\n password,\n )\n } catch {\n throw new PasswordInvalidError()\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * Hub-friendly verify callback. Pass to `db.unlockViaAuthenticator`:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { verifyPasswordSlot } from '@noy-db/on-password'\n *\n * const unlocked = await db.team.unlockViaAuthenticator('acme', 'password',\n * (slot) => verifyPasswordSlot(slot, 'strong-password-2026',\n * { store, vault: 'acme', userId: 'alice' }),\n * )\n * ```\n *\n * Unwraps the DEK set with the supplied password and returns an\n * `UnlockedKeyring` the hub installs in its keyring cache. The\n * returned keyring has `kek: null` — sensitive operations (enrol new\n * slot, rotate phrase) require a tier-1 unlock from the master phrase.\n *\n * The `{ store, vault, userId }` shape works in both contexts:\n * - **Warm re-unlock** — db is alive; consumer already has identity\n * in memory but pays one cheap `_keyring/<userId>` read.\n * - **Cold-start** (`createNoydb({ getKeyring: ... })`) — consumer\n * does NOT have a keyring yet; the verifier loads identity from\n * disk before returning the unlocked keyring. This is the\n * primary cold-start tier-2 path (Pilot1 tier-2b uses this).\n *\n * Identity fields (userId, displayName, role, permissions,\n * authenticators, salt, capability bits, per-keyring policy) are read\n * directly from the `_keyring/<userId>` envelope's plaintext header —\n * those fields are not encrypted because the sync engine + grant flow\n * need them without a key.\n *\n * Refuses a slot that is no longer enrolled in the keyring it loads —\n * but see the revocation caveat on {@link unwrapDeksWithPassword}: that\n * refusal is hardening, not revocation, and a holder of the raw blob\n * bypasses it by calling the primitive directly. Rotation is the only\n * thing that revokes.\n *\n * @throws {@link PasswordInvalidError} when the password is wrong, the\n * keyring file is missing or carries no body, or the slot is not enrolled\n * in it.\n */\nexport async function verifyPasswordSlot(\n slot: KeyringAuthenticator,\n password: string,\n options: VerifyPasswordSlotOptions,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n const deks = await unwrapDeksWithPassword(slot, password)\n\n const env = await options.store.get(options.vault, '_keyring', options.userId)\n if (!env) {\n throw new PasswordInvalidError(\n `verifyPasswordSlot: no keyring found at \"${options.vault}/_keyring/${options.userId}\". ` +\n 'Verify the vault and userId are correct.',\n )\n }\n // ⚠️ `_data` is OPTIONAL since hub 0.8.0's capsule seam, and hub documents\n // absence and `''` as the SAME thing: no sealed body. A `_keyring` record\n // with no body is unreadable, so it fails the same way a missing one does —\n // kept a separate branch from `!env` only so the message names which it was.\n if (!env._data) {\n throw new PasswordInvalidError(\n `verifyPasswordSlot: the keyring at \"${options.vault}/_keyring/${options.userId}\" ` +\n 'carries no body. The record exists but is empty — it was not written by a keyring writer.',\n )\n }\n const file = JSON.parse(env._data) as KeyringFile\n const salt = new Uint8Array(base64ToBuffer(file.salt))\n\n // #6 — refuse a slot that is no longer in the keyring. Hub's own tier-2\n // dispatch reaches the verifier through `findAuthenticator`, so it never\n // presents a removed slot; this guards the DIRECT-primitive path, where a\n // caller hands us a blob it captured earlier.\n //\n // ⛔ THIS IS NOT REVOCATION, and must not be read as closing #6. Two\n // measured reasons, both of which survive this check:\n // 1. `unwrapDeksWithPassword` above is EXPORTED. A holder of the blob\n // calls it directly, gets the live DEK set, and never reaches this\n // line. The assertion is not on that path and cannot be.\n // 2. Removal rotates nothing, so every DEK the blob unwrapped stays\n // valid forever. Declining to hand back a keyring object does not\n // un-extract keys that are already in the caller's hands.\n // Real revocation is rotate-on-removal, which lives in hub\n // (`removeAuthenticator`), not here. Do not \"complete\" this by hardening\n // the message or widening the check — neither moves the guarantee.\n const stillEnrolled = (file.authenticators ?? []).some((a) => a.id === slot.id)\n if (!stillEnrolled) {\n throw new PasswordInvalidError(\n `verifyPasswordSlot: slot \"${slot.id}\" is not enrolled in ` +\n `\"${options.vault}/_keyring/${options.userId}\". It may have been removed.`,\n )\n }\n\n // #1096 — the identity fields below are read from the PLAINTEXT header, so\n // without this the store could promote a viewer to admin by editing one word\n // and have it refused at tier-1 open but accepted here. A vault is only as\n // strong as its weakest unlock path.\n //\n // Verifiable at tier 2 because `deks` above already carries the vault roster\n // key — it rides the slot's wrapped-DEK blob like any other DEK, and that\n // blob is authenticated by its own AES-GCM tag under the password. The\n // canary is deliberately NOT checked: it proves the KEK, and this path has\n // no KEK by design.\n await assertRosterAuthenticated(file, deks, options.userId)\n\n return {\n userId: file.user_id,\n displayName: file.display_name,\n role: file.role,\n permissions: file.permissions,\n authenticators: file.authenticators ?? [],\n salt,\n ...(file.export_capability !== undefined && { exportCapability: file.export_capability }),\n ...(file.import_capability !== undefined && { importCapability: file.import_capability }),\n ...(file.policy !== undefined && { policy: file.policy }),\n deks,\n // Wrap-DEKs unlock cannot recover the KEK. Sensitive ops route\n // through tier-1 via re-entry of the master phrase. Matches the\n // existing tier-3 (`@noy-db/on-pin`) pattern.\n kek: null,\n }\n}\n\n/** Adapter shape required by {@link verifyPasswordSlot}. */\nexport interface VerifyPasswordSlotOptions {\n /** The vault's NoydbStore — used to load `_keyring/<userId>`. */\n readonly store: NoydbStore\n /** Vault name — same value passed to `db.openVault(name)`. */\n readonly vault: string\n /** User id — same value passed to `createNoydb({ user })`. */\n readonly userId: string\n}\n\n/**\n * `SlotRewrapCeremony` factory for password slots — the password parallel\n * to `webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony`. Used by hub's\n * `rotateSecret({ slotCeremonies: { [slotId]: passwordSlotRewrapCeremony(pwd) } })`\n * to preserve a tier-2 password enrollment across a tier-1 phrase\n * rotation without forcing the user to re-enroll the password.\n *\n * Returns a closure capturing the password so the result matches\n * hub's `SlotRewrapCeremony` signature `(ctx) => Promise<EnrollAuthenticatorOptions>`\n * directly. Pass into `slotCeremonies` keyed by the existing slot id:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { passwordSlotRewrapCeremony } from '@noy-db/on-password'\n *\n * await db.team.rotateSecret('acme', {\n * oldSecret: oldPhrase,\n * newSecret: newPhrase,\n * slotCeremonies: {\n * 'password': passwordSlotRewrapCeremony('strong-password-2026'),\n * },\n * })\n * ```\n *\n * The password itself is unaffected by phrase rotation — what needs to\n * change is the **wrapped DEK set**: the encrypted blob the slot's\n * `wrapped_deks` field holds. After rotation the old blob is wrapped\n * under the OLD KEK; the new blob must hold `ctx.newDeks`.\n *\n * ⚠️ **The old blob's DEK VALUES are not stale — only its wrapping is.**\n * `rotateSecret` rewraps the SAME DEKs under a freshly-derived KEK;\n * only `rotateKeys` re-mints DEK values. Records are encrypted with\n * DEKs, so a captured blob keeps decrypting everything across any\n * number of phrase rotations — see the bearer-credential warning on\n * {@link unwrapDeksWithPassword} and #6. An earlier revision of this\n * comment said \"now stale because rotateSecret rewrapped them under a\n * fresh KEK\", which reads as though rotation invalidated the captured\n * blob. It does not.\n *\n * ## Revoking a credential — this ceremony is a REQUIRED INPUT to it\n *\n * Hub's `revokeAuthenticator` is the real revocation, and it is three steps:\n * `removeAuthenticator` (hides the slot), `rotateKeys` (mints fresh DEKs —\n * the step that actually revokes), then `rotateSecret` with a\n * `slotCeremonies` entry for every slot that STAYS.\n *\n * ⛔ **A remaining slot handed no ceremony is DROPPED, not preserved.** After\n * the `rotateKeys` step its blob wraps DEKs that no longer exist, so keeping\n * it would leave a credential that silently fails. Its holder must re-enrol.\n *\n * So revoking ONE credential means supplying `passwordSlotRewrapCeremony(password)` for\n * EVERY password slot you intend to keep — and each requires that\n * credential to be present (the password itself for a password slot, a live authenticator assertion for a WebAuthn slot). Re-wrapping a credential\n * is the credential's own operation; there is no way to do it on the\n * holder's behalf.\n *\n * ⚠️ **Not in any published hub at the time of writing.**\n * `revokeAuthenticator` landed on noy-db `main` in `0612b4ac`, AFTER\n * `@noy-db/hub@0.7.1-pre.0` was cut and published — so it is in neither\n * `@latest` (0.7.0) nor `@next` (0.7.1-pre.0). Ask npm before promising it to\n * a consumer; do not infer its version from hub's `main`.\n *\n * Single ceremony, one operation:\n * 1. Validate `oldSlot.method === 'password'` and `oldSlot.wrapKind === 'deks'`.\n * 2. Re-mint the wrap-DEKs blob via {@link enrollPasswordAuthenticator}\n * using the supplied password against `ctx.newDeks`.\n * 3. Return `EnrollAuthenticatorOptions` preserving `oldSlot.id`,\n * `method: 'password'`, and the strength config (`minLength`,\n * `pattern`) carried in the old slot's `meta`. Hub validates\n * `id` + `method` + `wrapKind` to prevent slot-type swap mid-\n * rotation.\n *\n * Legacy wrap-KEK password slots cannot be rewrapped via\n * this ceremony — they must be re-enrolled fresh via\n * {@link enrollPasswordAuthenticator}. The validation throws\n * {@link ValidationError} for those.\n *\n * @throws {ValidationError} when `oldSlot.method !== 'password'` or\n * `oldSlot.wrapKind !== 'deks'`.\n * @throws {PasswordTooWeakError} when the supplied password fails the\n * strength rules carried in `oldSlot.meta` (minLength, pattern).\n *\n * @see webAuthnSlotRewrapCeremony — the WebAuthn parallel.\n */\nexport function passwordSlotRewrapCeremony(password: string): SlotRewrapCeremony {\n return async (ctx: SlotRewrapContext): Promise<EnrollAuthenticatorOptions> => {\n if (ctx.oldSlot.method !== 'password') {\n throw new ValidationError(\n `passwordSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot.method is \"${ctx.oldSlot.method}\"; expected \"password\". ` +\n 'This ceremony only handles password slots — pair other methods with their own helpers.',\n )\n }\n if (ctx.oldSlot.wrapKind !== 'deks') {\n throw new ValidationError(\n 'passwordSlotRewrapCeremony: oldSlot is a wrap-KEK slot; expected wrap-DEKs. ' +\n 'Password slots use the wrap-DEKs variant since #26 Path C; legacy wrap-KEK ' +\n 'password slots are not supported here — re-enrol via enrollPasswordAuthenticator.',\n )\n }\n\n // Preserve the strength config the slot was originally enrolled with —\n // a rotation should not silently downgrade minLength or drop a pattern.\n const oldMeta = ctx.oldSlot.meta as { minLength?: unknown; pattern?: unknown }\n const minLength = typeof oldMeta.minLength === 'number' ? oldMeta.minLength : undefined\n const pattern = typeof oldMeta.pattern === 'string' ? new RegExp(oldMeta.pattern) : undefined\n\n return enrollPasswordAuthenticator(\n // enrollPasswordAuthenticator only reads `keyring.deks`, so a\n // synthetic minimal keyring is enough. The freshly-rewrapped DEKs\n // come from hub via `ctx.newDeks`.\n { deks: ctx.newDeks } as UnlockedKeyring,\n {\n id: ctx.oldSlot.id,\n password,\n ...(minLength !== undefined && { minLength }),\n ...(pattern !== undefined && { pattern }),\n // Carry the original tier so hub's anti-slot-swap guard plus\n // the rotate-recover preservation rule keep the slot's\n // provenance honest.\n enrolledViaTier: ctx.oldSlot.enrolled_via_tier,\n },\n )\n }\n}\n\n// All wrap-DEKs crypto helpers (PBKDF2 derivation, base64\n// codecs) live in hub's `team/wrapped-deks.ts` — both this\n// package and `mintPaperRecoveryEntry` share one implementation.\n"],"mappings":";AAoCA,SAAS,2BAA2B,gBAAgB,qBAAqB,oBAAoB,uBAA0D;AAQhJ,IAAM,6BAA6B;AAGnC,IAAM,8BAA8B;AAIpC,IAAM,uBAAN,cAAmC,MAAM;AAAA,EACrC,OAAO;AAAA,EACP;AAAA,EACT,YAAY,WAAmB,SAAkB;AAC/C;AAAA,MACE,WACE,6BAA6B,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,IAGlD;AACA,SAAK,OAAO;AACZ,SAAK,YAAY;AAAA,EACnB;AACF;AAEO,IAAM,uBAAN,cAAmC,MAAM;AAAA,EACrC,OAAO;AAAA,EAChB,YAAY,UAAU,uCAAuC;AAC3D,UAAM,OAAO;AACb,SAAK,OAAO;AAAA,EACd;AACF;AA6CA,eAAsB,4BACpB,SACA,SACqC;AACrC,QAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,aAAa;AACvC,MAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,SAAS,WAAW;AACvC,UAAM,IAAI,qBAAqB,SAAS;AAAA,EAC1C;AACA,MAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,CAAC,QAAQ,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC9D,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA,mDAAmD,QAAQ,QAAQ,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,IAC/E;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,MAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG;AAC3B,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IAEF;AAAA,EACF;AAMA,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,oBAAoB,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAErE,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,IAClB,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,UAAU;AAAA,IACV,cAAc,KAAK;AAAA,IACnB,IAAI,KAAK;AAAA,IACT,MAAM;AAAA,MACJ,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,MACX;AAAA,MACA,GAAI,QAAQ,YAAY,SAAY,EAAE,SAAS,QAAQ,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC7E;AAAA,IACA,mBAAmB,QAAQ,mBAAmB;AAAA,EAChD;AACF;AAoBA,eAAsB,uBACpB,MACA,UACiC;AACjC,MAAI,KAAK,aAAa,QAAQ;AAC5B,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IAEF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK;AAClB,MAAI,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS,UAAU;AACjC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAOA,MAAI;AACF,WAAO,MAAM;AAAA,MACX,EAAE,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,aAAa,KAAK,aAAa;AAAA,MAC/D;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF,QAAQ;AACN,UAAM,IAAI,qBAAqB;AAAA,EACjC;AACF;AA2CA,eAAsB,mBACpB,MACA,UACA,SAC0B;AAC1B,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,MAAM,QAAQ;AAExD,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,OAAO,YAAY,QAAQ,MAAM;AAC7E,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK;AACR,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,4CAA4C,QAAQ,KAAK,aAAa,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,IAEtF;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO;AACd,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,uCAAuC,QAAQ,KAAK,aAAa,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,IAEjF;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK;AACjC,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,WAAW,eAAe,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;AAkBrD,QAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK,kBAAkB,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE;AAC9E,MAAI,CAAC,eAAe;AAClB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,6BAA6B,KAAK,EAAE,yBAC9B,QAAQ,KAAK,aAAa,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,IAChD;AAAA,EACF;AAYA,QAAM,0BAA0B,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM;AAE1D,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,IACb,aAAa,KAAK;AAAA,IAClB,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IACX,aAAa,KAAK;AAAA,IAClB,gBAAgB,KAAK,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAAA,IACxC;AAAA,IACA,GAAI,KAAK,sBAAsB,UAAa,EAAE,kBAAkB,KAAK,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACvF,GAAI,KAAK,sBAAsB,UAAa,EAAE,kBAAkB,KAAK,kBAAkB;AAAA,IACvF,GAAI,KAAK,WAAW,UAAa,EAAE,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO;AAAA,IACvD;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAIA,KAAK;AAAA,EACP;AACF;AA+FO,SAAS,2BAA2B,UAAsC;AAC/E,SAAO,OAAO,QAAgE;AAC5E,QAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,YAAY;AACrC,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR,kDAAkD,IAAI,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,MAEtE;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,aAAa,QAAQ;AACnC,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,MAGF;AAAA,IACF;AAIA,UAAM,UAAU,IAAI,QAAQ;AAC5B,UAAM,YAAY,OAAO,QAAQ,cAAc,WAAW,QAAQ,YAAY;AAC9E,UAAM,UAAU,OAAO,QAAQ,YAAY,WAAW,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO,IAAI;AAEpF,WAAO;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,MAIL,EAAE,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,MACpB;AAAA,QACE,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,QAChB;AAAA,QACA,GAAI,cAAc,UAAa,EAAE,UAAU;AAAA,QAC3C,GAAI,YAAY,UAAa,EAAE,QAAQ;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,QAIvC,iBAAiB,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,MAC/B;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":[]}
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package/package.json
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{
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"name": "@noy-db/on-password",
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"version": "0.
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"version": "0.8.0",
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"description": "Tier-2 password authenticator slot for noy-db. PBKDF2-SHA256 600K wraps the DEK set in its own keyring slot, distinct from the rarely-typed tier-1 phrase. Pair with @noy-db/on-email-otp or @noy-db/on-totp for the SaaS UX.",
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"license": "
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"license": "Apache-2.0",
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"author": "vLannaAi <vicio@lanna.ai>",
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-
"homepage": "https://github.com/
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"homepage": "https://github.com/noy-db/on/tree/main/on-password#readme",
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"repository": {
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"type": "git",
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"url": "git+https://github.com/
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"directory": "
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"url": "git+https://github.com/noy-db/on.git",
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"directory": "on-password"
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},
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"bugs": {
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"url": "https://github.com/
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"url": "https://github.com/noy-db/on/issues"
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},
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"type": "module",
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"sideEffects": false,
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"files": [
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"dist",
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"README.md",
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"LICENSE"
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"LICENSE",
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"NOTICE"
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],
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"engines": {
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"node": ">=22.0.0"
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},
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"peerDependencies": {
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"@noy-db/hub": "^0.7.0"
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"@noy-db/hub": "^0.7.0 || ^0.7.1-pre.0 || ^0.8.0-pre.0"
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},
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"devDependencies": {
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"
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"@noy-db/
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"
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"@noy-db/hub": "0.8.0",
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"@noy-db/test-ceremony-conformance": "0.8.0",
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"happy-dom": "^18.0.0"
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},
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"keywords": [
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"noy-db",
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