@noy-db/hub 0.9.0-pre.0 → 0.9.0-pre.2

package/dist/chunk-GLSCL74M.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/port/with/team-strategy.ts","../src/with-party/team/wrapped-deks.ts","../src/with-party/team/recovery.ts","../src/with-party/team/magic-link-grant.ts","../src/with-party/team/rotate-recover.ts","../src/with-party/team/peer-recover.ts","../src/with-party/auth-introspection/index.ts","../src/with-party/team/authenticators.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Multi-user team capability contract (#267 Track A tail — the\n * keyring-grant → team split). Lives on the `/with` port (the one seam the\n * kernel spine may import statically) so `Noydb` can hold the `NO_TEAM`\n * floor default without a spine→service static import.\n *\n * The active engine (`withTeam()` in `with-party/team/active.ts`)\n * statically links the grant/revoke/rotate keyring engines from\n * `keyring.ts` — bundle-charged to consumers of the `@noy-db/hub/team`\n * subpath, never to the single-user floor. {@link NO_TEAM} (the floor\n * default) throws {@link TeamNotEnabledError}.\n *\n * `Noydb.grant` / `Noydb.revoke` / `Noydb.rotate` delegate here, passing\n * their `TeamFacade` — the facade owns the policy-gate + keyring plumbing\n * (`runGrant` / `runRevoke` / `runRotate`) and receives the engine as an\n * argument from the strategy.\n *\n * Deliberately NOT gated (single-user primitives): owner keyring creation,\n * unlock, `listUsers`, `updateUser`, secret rotate/recover, and the\n * `createDeedOwner` free function (no createNoydb instance to gate against —\n * the same carve-out as `liberateVault`).\n * @internal\n */\nimport type { GrantOptions, RevokeOptions, FactorProofBundle } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { RotateResult, RevokeResult, RosterVerifyResult, QuarantineResult } from '../../with-party/team/keyring.js'\nimport { TeamNotEnabledError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport type { TeamFacade } from '../../with-party/team/noydb-facade.js'\n\nexport interface TeamStrategy {\n  grant(team: TeamFacade, vault: string, options: GrantOptions, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>\n  revoke(team: TeamFacade, vault: string, options: RevokeOptions, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<RevokeResult>\n  rotate(team: TeamFacade, vault: string, collections: string[]): Promise<RotateResult>\n  /** #1121 — read-only sweep naming every `_keyring` file that fails authentication. */\n  verifyRoster(team: TeamFacade, vault: string): Promise<RosterVerifyResult>\n  /** #1121 — remove an unauthenticatable `_keyring` file and re-key behind it. */\n  quarantineKeyring(team: TeamFacade, vault: string, userId: string, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<QuarantineResult>\n}\n\n/**\n * No-op stub — the floor default. Every multi-user team operation throws\n * {@link TeamNotEnabledError}; opt in with `teamStrategy: withTeam()` in\n * createNoydb. @internal\n */\nexport const NO_TEAM: TeamStrategy = {\n  async grant() { throw new TeamNotEnabledError() },\n  async revoke() { throw new TeamNotEnabledError() },\n  async rotate() { throw new TeamNotEnabledError() },\n  async verifyRoster() { throw new TeamNotEnabledError() },\n  async quarantineKeyring() { throw new TeamNotEnabledError() },\n}\n","/**\n * **Wrap-DEKs primitive** — a single canonical shape for the\n * pattern of \"serialize a DEK set, encrypt it under a credential-derived\n * AES-GCM key.\" Used by:\n *\n *   - **tier-0** — paper recovery entries (`_meta/recovery-paper`),\n *     credential = the printed code.\n *   - **tier-2** — password authenticator slots (`KeyringFile.authenticators`,\n *     `wrapKind: 'deks'`), credential = the user's password.\n *\n * **Not** used by `@noy-db/on-pin` — tier-3 wraps the DEK set under\n * the same conceptual pattern but at **100,000 PBKDF2 iterations**\n * (vs the 600,000 here), because the protection window for a PIN\n * slot is short (idle-timeout-bounded, typically 15 min) and 600k\n * iterations would make every PIN-resume noticeably slow. The wire\n * formats are deliberately incompatible. See `@noy-db/on-pin`'s\n * `PIN_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS` and the threat-model rationale in its\n * module docstring.\n *\n * Previously, the same crypto lived in two places: `mintPaperRecoveryEntry`\n * (in `team/recovery.ts`) and `enrollPasswordAuthenticator` (in\n * `@noy-db/on-password`). Both functions did identical work — PBKDF2\n * the credential, AES-GCM-encrypt the JSON-serialized DEK set — but\n * their implementations had drifted apart enough that fixing a bug\n * in one wouldn't fix the other.\n *\n * This module owns the canonical implementation. Consumers compose:\n *\n *   - `mintPaperRecoveryEntry` is now a thin wrapper that calls\n *     `mintWrappedDeksBlob` and adds `{ codeId, enrolledAt }`.\n *   - `enrollPasswordAuthenticator` calls `mintWrappedDeksBlob` and\n *     wraps the result in the slot envelope.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport {\n  deriveSecretKey,\n  generateSalt,\n  encryptBytes,\n  decryptBytes,\n  bufferToBase64,\n  base64ToBuffer,\n  exportDekSet,\n  importDekSet,\n  type EnclaveKey,\n} from '../../capsule/index.js'\nimport { InvalidKeyError, TamperedError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\nconst PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 600_000\n\n// ─── Type ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * The wrap-DEKs primitive — a serialized + AES-GCM-encrypted DEK set\n * keyed under a credential-derived key.\n *\n * All three fields are base64-encoded so the blob is JSON-safe and\n * round-trips through `_meta/*` envelopes (which carry plaintext\n * JSON in `_data`).\n *\n * Composition: `PaperRecoveryEntry extends WrappedDeksBlob` plus\n * `{ codeId, enrolledAt }`. `KeyringAuthenticatorWrappingDEKs`\n * carries the same three fields with `salt` stored in `meta` for\n * slot-format back-compat (defers moving it to top-level).\n */\nexport interface WrappedDeksBlob {\n  /** Base64 PBKDF2 salt for the credential-derived wrapping key. */\n  readonly salt: string\n  /** Base64 AES-GCM IV used for the `wrappedDeks` ciphertext. */\n  readonly iv: string\n  /** Base64 AES-GCM ciphertext of `{ deks: { collection: base64rawDek } }`. */\n  readonly wrappedDeks: string\n}\n\n// ─── Mint ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Mint a fresh `WrappedDeksBlob` from a DEK set + a string credential.\n *\n * Generates a random salt + IV, derives a 256-bit AES-GCM key via\n * PBKDF2-SHA256(credential, salt, 600K), serializes the DEK set as\n * `{ deks: { coll: rawBase64 } }`, and AES-GCM-encrypts.\n *\n * The `credential` is the user-typed string (recovery code, password,\n * PIN). Caller normalization rules apply (e.g. paper\n * recovery uppercase-strips the code before reaching this function).\n *\n * @param deks - DEK set to wrap. Serialized through the enclave's\n *               `exportDekSet` door (the hub mints DEKs extractable;\n *               consumers feeding non-extractable keys will get\n *               `InvalidAccessError` from WebCrypto).\n * @param credential - String input the consumer minted (paper code,\n *               password, PIN). Treated as opaque bytes by PBKDF2.\n */\nexport async function mintWrappedDeksBlob(\n  deks: Map<string, EnclaveKey>,\n  credential: string,\n): Promise<WrappedDeksBlob> {\n  const salt = generateSalt()\n  const wrappingKey = await deriveWrappingKey(credential, salt)\n\n  // Serialize the DEK set as JSON `{ deks: { collection: base64 } }`.\n  const plaintext = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify({ deks: await exportDekSet(deks) }))\n  const { iv, data } = await encryptBytes(plaintext, wrappingKey)\n\n  return { salt: bufferToBase64(salt), iv, wrappedDeks: data }\n}\n\n// ─── Unwrap ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Reverse of {@link mintWrappedDeksBlob}. Re-derives the wrapping key\n * from the credential + stored salt, AES-GCM-decrypts the wrapped DEK\n * set, and re-imports each DEK as an extractable AES-GCM CryptoKey.\n *\n * Throws (AES-GCM auth tag failure) when the credential doesn't\n * match the blob. Callers iterating over multiple blobs (e.g. paper\n * recovery's \"try every entry until one matches\") should catch.\n */\nexport async function unwrapDeksFromBlob(\n  blob: WrappedDeksBlob,\n  credential: string,\n): Promise<Map<string, EnclaveKey>> {\n  const wrappingKey = await deriveWrappingKey(credential, base64ToBuffer(blob.salt))\n  let plaintext: Uint8Array\n  try {\n    plaintext = await decryptBytes(blob.iv, blob.wrappedDeks, wrappingKey)\n  } catch (e) {\n    // The barrel reports an AEAD failure as TamperedError — which means\n    // exactly \"did not authenticate under THIS key\" and is the enclave's to\n    // throw (lanna-db #4). Here the key was derived from a user-supplied\n    // credential, so the overwhelmingly likely cause is a wrong recovery code\n    // / password / share set, and saying \"tampered\" is the misdiagnosis\n    // #1288 reported. Translate to the class whose contract already reads\n    // \"wrong secret or corrupted keyring\"; on-password does the same one\n    // layer up. Anything else propagates untouched.\n    if (e instanceof TamperedError) {\n      throw new InvalidKeyError('Wrapped DEK set did not open — the credential does not match this blob, or the blob is corrupted')\n    }\n    throw e\n  }\n  const parsed = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext)) as { deks: Record<string, string> }\n  return importDekSet(parsed.deks)\n}\n\n// ─── Internals ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nasync function deriveWrappingKey(credential: string, salt: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return deriveSecretKey(credential, salt, { iterations: PBKDF2_ITERATIONS, keyUsage: 'aes-gcm' })\n}\n","/**\n * Recovery profile persistence + dispatch.\n *\n * Wires the **paper** profile end-to-end through\n * `@noy-db/on-recovery`. The other three profiles (Shamir,\n * multi-channel, admin-mediated) ship the API surface and throw\n * {@link RecoveryProfileNotImplementedError} during use; per-profile\n * dispatch lands in follow-up issues.\n *\n * Storage layout:\n *\n * ```\n * _meta/recovery-paper       — JSON { entries: RecoveryCodeEntry[] } produced by `on-recovery`.\n * _meta/recovery-shamir      — reserved\n * _meta/recovery-multi       — reserved\n * _meta/recovery-admin       — reserved\n * ```\n *\n * Like `_meta/policy` and `_meta/handle`, the documents are plain JSON\n * with empty `_iv` — the recovery-code wrapping is what protects the\n * KEK; the entries themselves are inert without the user's code.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { buildRecordEnvelope, bufferToBase64, generateRecoverySecret } from '../../capsule/index.js'\nimport type { EnclaveKey } from '../../capsule/index.js'\nimport {\n  mintWrappedDeksBlob,\n  unwrapDeksFromBlob,\n  type WrappedDeksBlob,\n} from './wrapped-deks.js'\nimport type { NoydbShamir } from './noydb-shamir.js'\n\n/**\n * One paper recovery code as persisted in `_meta/recovery-paper`.\n *\n * The hub's KEK is intentionally non-extractable (see `crypto.ts`),\n * so the recovery entry can't AES-KW-wrap the KEK directly. Instead\n * we wrap a serialized DEK set: the entry holds the AES-GCM\n * ciphertext of `{ deks: { collection: rawDekBase64 } }`. Recovery\n * deserializes the DEK set, then mints a fresh KEK from the new\n * secret and rewraps the DEKs under it.\n *\n * This is the same pattern `@noy-db/on-pin` uses for tier-3 quick\n * resume — the cryptographic guarantee is identical (AES-GCM with a\n * PBKDF2-derived key), and it sidesteps the non-extractable-KEK\n * constraint cleanly.\n *\n * Type-level composition: `PaperRecoveryEntry extends\n * WrappedDeksBlob` — the three crypto fields (`salt`, `iv`,\n * `wrappedDeks`) come from the shared primitive; `codeId` and\n * `enrolledAt` are paper-recovery's own metadata. Wire format\n * unchanged.\n */\nexport interface PaperRecoveryEntry extends WrappedDeksBlob {\n  readonly codeId: string\n  readonly enrolledAt: string\n}\n\nexport interface PaperRecoveryDoc {\n  readonly _noydb_recovery: 1\n  readonly profile: 'paper'\n  readonly entries: ReadonlyArray<PaperRecoveryEntry>\n}\n\nconst PAPER_DOC_ID = 'recovery-paper'\n\n/** Read the paper-recovery entries. Returns empty array when absent. */\nexport async function loadPaperRecoveryEntries(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<ReadonlyArray<PaperRecoveryEntry>> {\n  const env = await store.get(vault, '_meta', PAPER_DOC_ID)\n  if (!env) return []\n  try {\n    const doc = JSON.parse(env._data ?? '') as PaperRecoveryDoc\n    if (doc.profile !== 'paper' || !Array.isArray(doc.entries)) return []\n    return doc.entries\n  } catch {\n    return []\n  }\n}\n\n/** Replace the paper-recovery entries (used after burn-on-recovery). */\nexport async function savePaperRecoveryEntries(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  entries: ReadonlyArray<PaperRecoveryEntry>,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const doc: PaperRecoveryDoc = {\n    _noydb_recovery: 1,\n    profile: 'paper',\n    entries,\n  }\n  const envelope = buildRecordEnvelope(\n    { collection: '_meta', id: PAPER_DOC_ID, version: 1 },\n    { iv: '', data: JSON.stringify(doc) },\n  )\n  await store.put(vault, '_meta', PAPER_DOC_ID, envelope)\n}\n\n/** Drop a single paper-recovery entry (burn-on-use). */\nexport async function burnPaperRecoveryEntry(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  codeId: string,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const entries = await loadPaperRecoveryEntries(store, vault)\n  const remaining = entries.filter((e) => e.codeId !== codeId)\n  await savePaperRecoveryEntries(store, vault, remaining)\n}\n\n/** Whether at least one recovery profile has any enrolled entries. */\nexport async function hasRecoveryEnrolled(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const paper = await loadPaperRecoveryEntries(store, vault)\n  if (paper.length > 0) return true\n  const shamir = await loadShamirRecoveryEntries(store, vault)\n  return shamir.length > 0\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether at least one **strong** recovery profile is enrolled.\n *\n * \"Strong\" excludes paper-alone — under managed-secret mode the\n * user has no memorized secret, so a stolen/lost paper sheet\n * would be a single point of total loss. Strong profiles today:\n *\n *   - `shamir` (k-of-n threshold; survives loss of up to n-k shares)\n *   - `multi-channel` (when shipped — follow-up slice)\n *   - `admin-mediated` (when shipped — follow-up slice)\n *\n * Managed mode requires this check to pass before `openVault` returns.\n */\nexport async function hasStrongRecoveryEnrolled(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const shamir = await loadShamirRecoveryEntries(store, vault)\n  return shamir.length > 0\n  // When multi-channel / admin-mediated land, extend this check.\n}\n\n// ─── Shamir recovery ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * One Shamir-recovery entry as persisted in `_meta/recovery-shamir`.\n *\n * Like {@link PaperRecoveryEntry}, the entry composes\n * {@link WrappedDeksBlob} (DEKs wrapped under a fresh ephemeral\n * recovery secret) with profile-specific metadata. Unlike paper, the\n * \"credential\" was never visible to the user — it was 32 random\n * bytes split into N Shamir shares at enrollment. The shares ARE\n * the credential; the user holds them, the hub never sees them\n * again after `enrollRecovery` returns.\n *\n * The recovery secret is base64-encoded and\n * passed as the `credential` arg to\n * {@link mintWrappedDeksBlob} / {@link unwrapDeksFromBlob}. The\n * PBKDF2 round over high-entropy input is harmless overhead — it\n * keeps the shared primitive unchanged while letting Shamir reuse\n * the same wrapping pipeline as paper.\n */\nexport interface ShamirRecoveryEntry extends WrappedDeksBlob {\n  /** Stable id for this entry. Allows multiple Shamir splits to coexist. */\n  readonly entryId: string\n  /** Threshold — minimum shares to reconstruct. */\n  readonly k: number\n  /** Total shares minted at enrollment. */\n  readonly n: number\n  /** x-coordinates of the n minted shares. Informational. Omitted as of 0.2\n   *  (string-level provider doesn't expose share x-coords); kept optional so\n   *  pre-0.2 entries still read. */\n  readonly xCoords?: ReadonlyArray<number>\n  /** ISO timestamp. */\n  readonly enrolledAt: string\n  /** Optional caller-supplied label (e.g., \"2-of-3 board escrow\"). */\n  readonly label?: string\n}\n\nexport interface ShamirRecoveryDoc {\n  readonly _noydb_recovery: 1\n  readonly profile: 'shamir'\n  readonly entries: ReadonlyArray<ShamirRecoveryEntry>\n}\n\nconst SHAMIR_DOC_ID = 'recovery-shamir'\n\n/** Read the Shamir-recovery entries. Returns empty array when absent. */\nexport async function loadShamirRecoveryEntries(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<ReadonlyArray<ShamirRecoveryEntry>> {\n  const env = await store.get(vault, '_meta', SHAMIR_DOC_ID)\n  if (!env) return []\n  try {\n    const doc = JSON.parse(env._data ?? '') as ShamirRecoveryDoc\n    if (doc.profile !== 'shamir' || !Array.isArray(doc.entries)) return []\n    return doc.entries\n  } catch {\n    return []\n  }\n}\n\n/** Replace the Shamir-recovery entries (used by enrollment and rotation). */\nexport async function saveShamirRecoveryEntries(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  entries: ReadonlyArray<ShamirRecoveryEntry>,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const doc: ShamirRecoveryDoc = {\n    _noydb_recovery: 1,\n    profile: 'shamir',\n    entries,\n  }\n  const envelope = buildRecordEnvelope(\n    { collection: '_meta', id: SHAMIR_DOC_ID, version: 1 },\n    { iv: '', data: JSON.stringify(doc) },\n  )\n  await store.put(vault, '_meta', SHAMIR_DOC_ID, envelope)\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a fresh Shamir recovery entry from a DEK set.\n *\n * 1. Generates a 32-byte recovery secret.\n * 2. Wraps the DEK set under that secret via\n *    {@link mintWrappedDeksBlob} (the recovery secret is base64-\n *    encoded as the credential string — PBKDF2 over high-entropy\n *    input is harmless overhead).\n * 3. Splits the recovery secret via Shamir into `n` shares with\n *    threshold `k`.\n * 4. Zeros the in-memory recovery secret after wrapping + splitting.\n *\n * Returns:\n *   - `entry` — the {@link ShamirRecoveryEntry} to persist.\n *   - `shareStrings` — the `n` Base32-encoded share strings to\n *     return to the caller. The HUB MUST NOT PERSIST THESE; once\n *     returned they are the user's responsibility.\n *\n * @param deks - DEK set to wrap.\n * @param entryId - Stable id for this entry (caller-supplied or\n *                  hub-generated).\n * @param k - Threshold (>= 2).\n * @param n - Total shares (k <= n <= 255).\n * @param label - Optional caller label.\n */\nexport async function mintShamirRecoveryEntry(\n  provider: NoydbShamir,\n  deks: Map<string, EnclaveKey>,\n  entryId: string,\n  k: number,\n  n: number,\n  label?: string,\n): Promise<{ entry: ShamirRecoveryEntry; shareStrings: string[] }> {\n  const recoverySecret = generateRecoverySecret()\n  try {\n    const credential = bufferToBase64(recoverySecret)\n    const blob = await mintWrappedDeksBlob(deks, credential)\n    const shareStrings = provider.splitToShares(recoverySecret, k, n)\n    const entry: ShamirRecoveryEntry = {\n      ...blob, entryId, k, n,\n      enrolledAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n      ...(label !== undefined && { label }),\n    }\n    return { entry, shareStrings }\n  } finally {\n    recoverySecret.fill(0)\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt a Shamir recovery entry to recover the raw DEK set.\n *\n * Combines K or more `shares`, reconstructs the recovery secret,\n * unwraps the DEKs via {@link unwrapDeksFromBlob}.\n *\n * Throws (AES-GCM auth-tag mismatch) when the shares don't combine\n * to the secret originally used to mint the entry — typically\n * because they came from a different enrollment or were tampered\n * with. Callers iterating multiple entries should catch.\n */\nexport async function unwrapDeksFromShamirEntry(\n  provider: NoydbShamir,\n  entry: ShamirRecoveryEntry,\n  shareStrings: readonly string[],\n): Promise<Map<string, EnclaveKey>> {\n  if (shareStrings.length < entry.k) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `Insufficient shares: this Shamir entry needs ${entry.k} of ${entry.n}, `\n      + `but ${shareStrings.length} were provided.`,\n    )\n  }\n  const secret = provider.combineShares(shareStrings)\n  try {\n    return await unwrapDeksFromBlob(entry, bufferToBase64(secret))\n  } finally {\n    secret.fill(0)\n  }\n}\n\n\n/**\n * Generate one paper-recovery entry from an unlocked DEK set.\n *\n * Returns the serializable entry (persisted via\n * {@link savePaperRecoveryEntries}). The recovery flow unwraps the\n * DEK set, then mints a fresh KEK from the user's new secret.\n *\n * Thin wrapper over {@link mintWrappedDeksBlob} — the crypto\n * lives in the shared primitive; this function just adds paper-\n * recovery's own metadata (`codeId`, `enrolledAt`).\n *\n * @param deks      Map of collection-name → DEK (extractable).\n * @param code      The plaintext recovery code (caller-supplied;\n *                  pair this with `@noy-db/on-recovery`'s code\n *                  generator/parser if available).\n * @param codeId    Stable id used by `burnPaperRecoveryEntry`.\n */\nexport async function mintPaperRecoveryEntry(\n  deks: Map<string, EnclaveKey>,\n  code: string,\n  codeId: string,\n): Promise<PaperRecoveryEntry> {\n  const blob = await mintWrappedDeksBlob(deks, code)\n  return {\n    ...blob,\n    codeId,\n    enrolledAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt a recovery entry to recover the raw DEK set. Used by the\n * `recoverSecret` flow after the user's code has been parsed.\n *\n * Thin wrapper over {@link unwrapDeksFromBlob}.\n *\n * @throws when the code does not match the entry (AES-GCM auth tag fail).\n */\nexport async function unwrapDeksFromPaperEntry(\n  entry: PaperRecoveryEntry,\n  code: string,\n): Promise<Map<string, EnclaveKey>> {\n  return unwrapDeksFromBlob(entry, code)\n}\n\n// The wrap crypto lives in the canonical wrap-DEKs primitive at\n// `./wrapped-deks.ts` and is reached via\n// `mintWrappedDeksBlob` / `unwrapDeksFromBlob`; base64 comes from the\n// enclave barrel.\n","/**\n * Magic-link-bound cross-user delegation grants.\n *\n * This module is the **core storage + encryption layer** that lets a\n * grantor issue a tier-DEK to a user whose KEK they do not know. The\n * trust bridge is provided by the `@noy-db/on-magic-link` package:\n *\n *   1. Grantor picks a grantee identity (user id + email handle).\n *   2. Grantor mints a magic-link token (ULID) via `createMagicLinkToken`.\n *   3. Grantor derives a **content key** + a **KEK** from\n *      `(serverSecret, token, vault)` using HKDF-SHA256 with separate\n *      `info` tags — both callers (grantor and grantee) can derive the\n *      same keys given the same inputs.\n *   4. Grantor persists a record in `_magic_link_grants/<token>`:\n *        - envelope `_data` is AES-GCM encrypted under the content key\n *        - the inner `wrappedDek` is AES-KW wrapped under the KEK\n *   5. Grantee receives the URL, derives the same content key + KEK,\n *      loads the grant, decrypts the envelope, unwraps the tier DEK.\n *\n * ## Why a separate collection from `_delegations`\n *\n * `_delegations` envelopes are encrypted under a DEK shared across\n * every vault user (audit-visibility). External auditors / client\n * portal users have NO pre-existing keyring, so they cannot read that\n * DEK. Magic-link grants live in their own collection whose envelope\n * encryption is derived purely from the magic-link URL + server secret\n * — nothing else is required to decrypt.\n *\n * ## Batch grants\n *\n * One magic-link token may point to MULTIPLE grants (e.g. the client\n * portal case: invoices + payments + etax all share one link). Each\n * grant is persisted under a distinct record id:\n *\n *   `<token>` for the single-grant / primary entry\n *   `<token>:<index>` for subsequent entries\n *\n * `listMagicLinkGrants(store, vault, token)` enumerates every record\n * whose id begins with `<token>` so the claimant can materialize all\n * DEKs in one pass.\n *\n * ## Revocation\n *\n * `store.delete(vault, _magic_link_grants, <token>)` immediately\n * invalidates the link — even if the URL was captured and the server\n * secret leaked, no payload remains to decrypt.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring } from './keyring.js'\nimport { buildRecordAad, buildRecordEnvelope, encrypt, openEnvelopeJson, wrapKey, unwrapKey, sha256Bytes, hkdfAesGcmKey, type EnclaveKey } from '../../capsule/index.js'\nimport { dekKey } from './tiers.js'\nimport { DelegationTargetMissingError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n/** Reserved collection holding magic-link grant envelopes. */\nexport const MAGIC_LINK_GRANTS_COLLECTION = '_magic_link_grants'\n\n/** HKDF `info` for the AES-GCM content key. Version-namespaced. */\nexport const MAGIC_LINK_CONTENT_INFO_PREFIX = 'noydb-magic-link-content-v1:'\n\n/**\n * HKDF `info` for the AES-KW KEK. Matches `@noy-db/on-magic-link`.\n *\n * No importer inside hub, and that is not a defect: this is one half of a\n * CROSS-PACKAGE protocol constant. The satellite derives the same KEK from\n * the same string, so the value has to be stated here to be reviewable\n * against it. Deleting it would leave the wire format pinned in one repo\n * only (#55).\n *\n * @seam\n */\nexport const MAGIC_LINK_KEK_INFO_PREFIX = 'noydb-magic-link-v1:'\n\n// ─── Types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Decrypted payload of a magic-link grant record. Mirrors\n * `DelegationToken` in `team/delegation.ts` but tracked separately\n * because the two flows persist under different collections + envelope\n * encryption schemes.\n */\nexport interface MagicLinkGrantPayload {\n  readonly id: string\n  readonly toUser: string\n  readonly fromUser: string\n  readonly tier: number\n  /** Collection name or `null` for the vault-wide tier DEK. */\n  readonly collection: string | null\n  /** Optional specific record id scope. */\n  readonly record?: string\n  /** ISO timestamp — grant expires at this instant. */\n  readonly until: string\n  /** AES-KW-wrapped tier DEK, unwrap with the magic-link KEK. */\n  readonly wrappedDek: string\n  /** ISO timestamp the grant was issued. */\n  readonly createdAt: string\n  /** Optional caller-provided label (surfaced in audit UIs). */\n  readonly note?: string\n}\n\nexport interface IssueMagicLinkGrantOptions {\n  readonly toUser: string\n  readonly tier: number\n  readonly collection?: string\n  readonly record?: string\n  readonly until: Date | string\n  readonly note?: string\n}\n\nexport interface MagicLinkGrantRecord {\n  /** Store record id — `<token>` or `<token>:<index>` for batch entries. */\n  readonly recordId: string\n  readonly payload: MagicLinkGrantPayload\n}\n\n// ─── Key derivation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive the AES-GCM content key from the same HKDF inputs used for\n * the magic-link KEK. Different `info` suffix → domain-separated key.\n *\n * Exported so the `@noy-db/on-magic-link` package can share the exact\n * derivation path without cross-dependency between the two modules.\n */\nexport async function deriveMagicLinkContentKey(\n  serverSecret: string | Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>,\n  token: string,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<EnclaveKey> {\n  const ikmBytes =\n    serverSecret instanceof Uint8Array\n      ? serverSecret\n      : new TextEncoder().encode(serverSecret)\n  const salt = await sha256Bytes(new TextEncoder().encode(token))\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(MAGIC_LINK_CONTENT_INFO_PREFIX + vault)\n  return hkdfAesGcmKey(ikmBytes, salt, info)\n}\n\n// ─── Issue ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Persist a magic-link grant record. Caller derives + provides both\n * the content key and the KEK; this function performs the wrap/encrypt\n * and writes the envelope.\n *\n * `recordId` lets the caller use either the bare token (primary grant)\n * or a suffixed id (batch entry). The writer is responsible for\n * collision-avoidance across batch entries.\n */\nexport async function writeMagicLinkGrant(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  grantor: UnlockedKeyring,\n  contentKey: EnclaveKey,\n  grantKek: EnclaveKey,\n  recordId: string,\n  opts: IssueMagicLinkGrantOptions,\n): Promise<MagicLinkGrantRecord> {\n  const collectionName = opts.collection ?? null\n  // ⛔ COLLECTION-WIDE IS NOT SUPPORTED HERE, and after core#56 the reason is\n  // specific to this function rather than shared with `issueDelegation`.\n  //\n  // A magic-link grant wraps ONE source DEK under ONE derived grant KEK. \"Every\n  // collection\" needs one wrapped DEK PER COLLECTION, because each collection\n  // has its own tier DEK — measured, `docs#1` and `ledger#1` are different\n  // keys. `issueDelegation` now expresses that with a `wrappedDeks` MAP; this\n  // record shape carries a single `wrappedDek` and cannot.\n  //\n  // ⚠️ The wildcard slot `__any#<tier>` this branch used to read is GONE. It\n  // could never have worked: one key cannot decrypt two collections, so a\n  // wildcard accepted at the gate would pass the check and then fail\n  // decryption. Do not reintroduce it here.\n  //\n  // The real consumer is `@noy-db/on-magic-link`'s `issueMagicLinkDelegation()`\n  // in the `on` repo, so this message is the only thing telling them which side\n  // the fault is on and what the supported shape is.\n  if (!collectionName) {\n    throw new DelegationTargetMissingError(\n      opts.toUser,\n      `writeMagicLinkGrant({ collection: undefined }) — a magic-link grant carries a ` +\n      `single wrapped DEK and cannot express \"every collection\", because each ` +\n      `collection has its own tier-${opts.tier} DEK. Pass an explicit \\`collection\\`, ` +\n      `or use a collection-wide delegation token (core#56).`,\n    )\n  }\n  const sourceDek = grantor.deks.get(dekKey(collectionName, opts.tier))\n  if (!sourceDek) {\n    throw new DelegationTargetMissingError(\n      opts.toUser,\n      `grantor holds no tier-${opts.tier} DEK for collection \"${collectionName}\", ` +\n      `so there is nothing to grant. Obtain the tier grant first.`,\n    )\n  }\n  const wrappedDek = await wrapKey(sourceDek, grantKek)\n\n  const until = typeof opts.until === 'string' ? opts.until : opts.until.toISOString()\n  const createdAt = new Date().toISOString()\n  const payload: MagicLinkGrantPayload = {\n    id: recordId,\n    toUser: opts.toUser,\n    fromUser: grantor.userId,\n    tier: opts.tier,\n    collection: collectionName,\n    ...(opts.record && { record: opts.record }),\n    until,\n    wrappedDek,\n    createdAt,\n    ...(opts.note && { note: opts.note }),\n  }\n\n  const identity = { collection: MAGIC_LINK_GRANTS_COLLECTION, id: recordId, by: grantor.userId, version: 1 }\n  const { iv, data } = await encrypt(JSON.stringify(payload), contentKey, buildRecordAad(identity))\n  const envelope = buildRecordEnvelope(\n    identity,\n    { ts: createdAt, iv, data},\n  )\n  await store.put(vault, MAGIC_LINK_GRANTS_COLLECTION, recordId, envelope)\n  return { recordId, payload }\n}\n\n// ─── Claim ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Fetch + decrypt a single magic-link grant record by id. Returns null\n * when the record is absent OR when decryption fails (wrong server\n * secret, wrong vault, tampered envelope) — callers treat a null as\n * \"this URL is not valid for this server\".\n *\n * The returned payload's `wrappedDek` is still AES-KW-wrapped; the\n * caller unwraps it with the magic-link KEK to obtain the tier DEK.\n */\nexport async function readMagicLinkGrantRecord(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  contentKey: EnclaveKey,\n  recordId: string,\n): Promise<MagicLinkGrantPayload | null> {\n  const env = await store.get(vault, MAGIC_LINK_GRANTS_COLLECTION, recordId)\n  if (!env) return null\n  try {\n    const json = await openEnvelopeJson({ collection: MAGIC_LINK_GRANTS_COLLECTION, id: recordId }, env, contentKey)\n    return JSON.parse(json) as MagicLinkGrantPayload\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Enumerate every grant record sharing the magic-link `token` prefix\n * (i.e. the primary `<token>` entry plus any `<token>:*` batch entries).\n * Expired grants are still returned — the caller filters on `until`.\n */\nexport async function listMagicLinkGrants(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  contentKey: EnclaveKey,\n  token: string,\n): Promise<MagicLinkGrantPayload[]> {\n  const ids = await store.list(vault, MAGIC_LINK_GRANTS_COLLECTION)\n  const matching = ids.filter(id => id === token || id.startsWith(`${token}:`))\n  const out: MagicLinkGrantPayload[] = []\n  for (const id of matching) {\n    const payload = await readMagicLinkGrantRecord(store, vault, contentKey, id)\n    if (payload) out.push(payload)\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Unwrap the tier DEK from a grant payload using the magic-link KEK.\n * Thin wrapper around `unwrapKey` — provided so the claimant can avoid\n * importing `crypto.js` directly.\n */\nexport async function unwrapMagicLinkGrant(\n  payload: MagicLinkGrantPayload,\n  grantKek: EnclaveKey,\n): Promise<EnclaveKey> {\n  return unwrapKey(payload.wrappedDek, grantKek)\n}\n\n/**\n * Delete a magic-link grant (primary + every batch entry sharing the\n * token). Safe to call when nothing exists.\n */\nexport async function revokeMagicLinkGrant(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  token: string,\n): Promise<number> {\n  const ids = await store.list(vault, MAGIC_LINK_GRANTS_COLLECTION)\n  const matching = ids.filter(id => id === token || id.startsWith(`${token}:`))\n  for (const id of matching) {\n    await store.delete(vault, MAGIC_LINK_GRANTS_COLLECTION, id)\n  }\n  return matching.length\n}\n\n// ─── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Compose the batch-entry record id. `index === 0` → bare token.\n * Subsequent entries use `<token>:<index>` so `store.list()` can\n * enumerate them all by common prefix.\n */\nexport function magicLinkGrantRecordId(token: string, index: number): string {\n  return index === 0 ? token : `${token}:${index}`\n}\n\n/**\n * True when the payload's `until` is in the past relative to `now`.\n * Kept here (rather than inlined) so the semantics stay aligned with\n * the canonical `DelegationToken` expiry check.\n */\nexport function isMagicLinkGrantExpired(\n  payload: MagicLinkGrantPayload,\n  now: Date = new Date(),\n): boolean {\n  return payload.until <= now.toISOString()\n}\n","/**\n * Tier-1 change flows — `rotateSecret` (user remembers old) and\n * `recoverSecret` (user supplies a recovery proof).\n *\n * The two flows share the post-verification half — fresh salt, fresh\n * KEK, rewrap every DEK — and differ only in how they re-derive the\n * old KEK:\n *\n * - **Rotate**: derive from the supplied `oldSecret`.\n * - **Recover (paper)**: unwrap from a `RecoveryCodeEntry` using a\n *   user-supplied recovery code. The entry is burned on success.\n *\n * The non-paper recovery profiles (Shamir, multi-channel,\n * admin-mediated) are not yet wired — calling them throws\n * {@link RecoveryProfileNotImplementedError} with a tracking link.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { NoydbStore, KeyringFile, KeyringEchoBlock } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_KEYRING_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport {\n  deriveKey,\n  deriveEchoKey,\n  generateSalt,\n  wrapKey,\n  unwrapKey,\n  bufferToBase64,\n  base64ToBuffer,\n  type EnclaveKey,\n  type EchoSecretParts,\n} from '../../capsule/index.js'\nimport { InvalidKeyError, NoAccessError, RecoveryProfileNotImplementedError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport {\n  loadPaperRecoveryEntries,\n  burnPaperRecoveryEntry,\n  unwrapDeksFromPaperEntry,\n  loadShamirRecoveryEntries,\n  unwrapDeksFromShamirEntry,\n  type PaperRecoveryEntry,\n  type ShamirRecoveryEntry,\n} from './recovery.js'\nimport type { NoydbShamir } from './noydb-shamir.js'\nimport {\n  assertStrongSecret,\n  assertStrongEchoSecret,\n  type SecretPolicy,\n  type EchoSecretPolicy,\n} from '../../kernel/validation.js'\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring } from './keyring.js'\nimport { mintKeyringCanary, deriveKekForKeyring, readKeyringFile, writeKeyringFile, basisOf } from './keyring.js'\nimport { assertRosterAuthenticated, mintRosterTag } from './roster-tag.js'\nimport { stampAuthority } from './roster-tag.js'\nimport { ROSTER_KEY_ID } from '../../kernel/constants.js'\nimport { buildEchoBlock } from './echo-secret.js'\nimport type { NoydbDeviceSeal } from './device-seal.js'\nimport type { KeyringAuthenticator } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { EnrollAuthenticatorOptions } from './authenticators.js'\nimport { ValidationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n/**\n * Echo-enrollment knobs for a rotation whose NEW secret is 3-part (spec #940).\n *\n * Deliberately NOT exported: it is reachable structurally through\n * {@link RotateSecretInput.echoOptions}, and exporting it would mean adding it\n * to the team + root barrels for a type consumers never need to name.\n */\ninterface RotateEchoOptions {\n  /**\n   * Device-local sealer for the reveal blob. Present ⇒ `reveal: 'sealed'`;\n   * absent ⇒ `reveal: 'portable'`. Mirrors\n   * {@link CreateOwnerKeyringOptions.deviceSeal}.\n   */\n  readonly deviceSeal?: NoydbDeviceSeal\n  /** Optional display hint for the masked echo. */\n  readonly maskHint?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * The `echo` field for the keyring file a tier-1 change is about to write.\n *\n * Every write site rebuilds the persisted file WITHOUT the old block (a\n * `{ ...file }` spread would carry it) and then re-attaches whatever the NEW\n * secret's shape demands:\n *\n * - parts ⇒ a FRESH block (the standard→echo upgrade, and the re-mint on an\n *   echo→echo rotation — the old block's verifiers are bound to the old parts).\n * - string ⇒ `{}`, i.e. no block at all (the echo→standard downgrade).\n *\n * Getting this wrong bricks the keyring: a stale block makes\n * `deriveKekForKeyring` demand the echo ceremony and derive via the echo KDF,\n * while the DEKs sit wrapped under a string-derived KEK — neither the old parts\n * nor the new string can open it.\n */\nasync function echoFieldForNewSecret(\n  newSecret: string | EchoSecretParts,\n  echoOptions?: RotateEchoOptions,\n): Promise<{ echo?: KeyringEchoBlock }> {\n  if (typeof newSecret === 'string') return {}\n  return {\n    echo: await buildEchoBlock(\n      newSecret,\n      echoOptions?.deviceSeal\n        ? { kind: 'sealed', deviceSeal: echoOptions.deviceSeal }\n        : { kind: 'portable' },\n      echoOptions?.maskHint,\n    ),\n  }\n}\n\n/** Derive the KEK for a freshly-chosen tier-1 secret, dispatching on its shape. */\nasync function deriveKekForNewSecret(\n  newSecret: string | EchoSecretParts,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<EnclaveKey> {\n  return typeof newSecret === 'string'\n    ? deriveKey(newSecret, salt)\n    : deriveEchoKey(newSecret, salt)\n}\n\n/** Strength gate for a freshly-chosen tier-1 secret, dispatching on its shape. */\nfunction assertStrongNewSecret(\n  newSecret: string | EchoSecretParts,\n  secretPolicy?: SecretPolicy,\n  echoSecretPolicy?: EchoSecretPolicy,\n): void {\n  if (typeof newSecret === 'string') assertStrongSecret(newSecret, secretPolicy)\n  else assertStrongEchoSecret(newSecret, echoSecretPolicy)\n}\n\n/**\n * Context handed to a {@link SlotRewrapCeremony} when `rotateSecret`\n * preserves a tier-2 slot. The ceremony's job is to re-derive its\n * method-specific wrapping material (PRF assertion, PBKDF2 of the\n * password, etc.) and wrap the freshly rewrapped DEK set under\n * the new wrapping key.\n *\n * Two surfaces are exposed:\n *\n *   - `newDeks` — the rewrapped (extractable) DEK set the slot will\n *     wrap. This is what `mintPaperRecoveryEntry` / `enrollPassword-\n *     Authenticator` / `wrapKeyringSummary` (in `@noy-db/on-webauthn`)\n *     all consume; effectively the canonical input for every\n *     post-Path C tier-2 ceremony.\n *\n *   - `newKek` — the freshly-derived KEK (extractable for the\n *     ceremony scope only). Only relevant for forward-compatibility\n *     with a hypothetical future on-* package that wants to wrap the\n *     KEK itself under a method-derived key. None of the shipped\n *     on-* packages need this; they all operate on `newDeks`.\n *\n * The ceremony MUST preserve `oldSlot.id` and `oldSlot.method` in the\n * returned `EnrollAuthenticatorOptions`. Hub validates these — a\n * mismatch throws `ValidationError` (prevents slot-type swap mid-\n * rotation, e.g. converting a webauthn slot to a password slot under\n * cover of preservation).\n */\nexport interface SlotRewrapContext {\n  readonly newKek: EnclaveKey\n  readonly newDeks: Map<string, EnclaveKey>\n  readonly oldSlot: KeyringAuthenticator\n}\n\n/**\n * Callback that re-enrolls one tier-2 slot during `rotateSecret`.\n * Returns the new slot's `EnrollAuthenticatorOptions` — same shape\n * the consumer would pass to `db.enrollAuthenticator` for a fresh\n * enrollment. Hub persists the result atomically with the rotation.\n */\nexport type SlotRewrapCeremony = (\n  ctx: SlotRewrapContext,\n) => Promise<EnrollAuthenticatorOptions>\n\n/** Caller payload for {@link rotateSecret}. */\nexport interface RotateSecretInput {\n  /**\n   * The secret currently opening the keyring — a string for a standard\n   * keyring, the 3-part {@link EchoSecretParts} for an echo one. The shape\n   * must MATCH the stored keyring: `deriveKekForKeyring` refuses a string on\n   * an echo keyring (`EchoCeremonyRequiredError`, AG-1) and parts on a\n   * standard one (`ValidationError`).\n   */\n  readonly oldSecret: string | EchoSecretParts\n  /**\n   * The secret to rotate TO. Its shape — independent of `oldSecret`'s —\n   * decides the keyring's mode after rotation: parts enroll an `echo` block\n   * (standard→echo upgrade, or a re-mint on echo→echo), a string removes any\n   * existing one (echo→standard downgrade).\n   */\n  readonly newSecret: string | EchoSecretParts\n  /**\n   * Strength-policy knobs applied when `newSecret` is a STRING. Ignored\n   * for 3-part {@link EchoSecretParts} — see `echoSecretPolicy` for the\n   * parts-path counterpart.\n   */\n  readonly secretPolicy?: SecretPolicy\n  /**\n   * Strength-policy knobs applied when `newSecret` is 3-part\n   * {@link EchoSecretParts} (prompt / combined floors). Ignored for a\n   * string `newSecret` — see `secretPolicy` for the string-path\n   * counterpart.\n   */\n  readonly echoSecretPolicy?: EchoSecretPolicy\n  readonly allowWeakSecret?: boolean\n  /**\n   * Echo-enrollment knobs for the block minted when `newSecret` is 3-part.\n   * Ignored for a string `newSecret` (no block is written).\n   */\n  readonly echoOptions?: RotateEchoOptions\n  /**\n   * Explicit confirmation for an echo→standard rotation. When the stored\n   * keyring has an `echo` block AND `newSecret` is a plain string, the\n   * rotation is a security-posture downgrade — and that shape is decided\n   * purely by argument shape, so it must be opted into explicitly. Without\n   * this flag such a rotation throws `ValidationError` BEFORE any write\n   * (and before deriving the new KEK). Upgrades (string→parts) and\n   * same-mode rotations (string→string, parts→parts) never require it.\n   */\n  readonly allowModeDowngrade?: boolean\n  /**\n   * Map of slot id → re-enrolment ceremony. Slots whose id appears\n   * here are PRESERVED across rotation (the ceremony re-derives the\n   * method-specific wrapping under the new keyring); slots whose id\n   * is absent are DROPPED (the pre-slot-ceremony behavior).\n   *\n   * Without this map, `rotateSecret` wipes every tier-2 slot. Consumers building a\n   * \"rotate without losing my biometric\" flow supply ceremonies for\n   * each slot they want to keep.\n   *\n   * If a ceremony throws, the entire rotation throws — no partial\n   * state. Callers wrap individual ceremonies in try/catch + return\n   * a sentinel if they want graceful degradation per slot.\n   *\n   * Added when slot-ceremony rewrapping landed.\n   */\n  readonly slotCeremonies?: { readonly [slotId: string]: SlotRewrapCeremony }\n}\n\n/**\n * Re-derive the user's KEK from `oldSecret`, rewrap every DEK\n * under a freshly-derived KEK from `newSecret`, and persist.\n *\n * Tier-2 authenticator slots are dropped UNLESS the caller supplies\n * a `slotCeremonies` map — each ceremony re-derives its\n * method-specific wrapping under the new keyring, and hub persists\n * the rewrapped slots atomically with the rotation. Slots whose id\n * isn't in the map are still dropped.\n *\n * Either secret may be a string or 3-part {@link EchoSecretParts}; the two\n * shapes are independent, so a rotation doubles as the standard↔echo\n * upgrade/downgrade ceremony (spec #940).\n *\n * @throws `InvalidKeyError` if `oldSecret` does not unwrap the keyring.\n * @throws `EchoCeremonyRequiredError` if `oldSecret` is a string but the\n *         keyring is an echo keyring.\n * @throws `WeakSecretError` if `newSecret` fails the strength rule.\n * @throws `ValidationError` if a ceremony's result mismatches the\n *         slot's id or method (anti-slot-swap guard).\n */\nexport async function rotateSecret(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  userId: string,\n  input: RotateSecretInput,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  if (!input.allowWeakSecret) {\n    assertStrongNewSecret(input.newSecret, input.secretPolicy, input.echoSecretPolicy)\n  }\n\n  const found = await readKeyringFile(store, vault, userId)\n  if (!found) {\n    throw new NoAccessError(`No keyring found for user \"${userId}\" in vault \"${vault}\".`)\n  }\n  const { file } = found\n  const oldSalt = base64ToBuffer(file.salt)\n  // Dispatches on the STORED keyring's mode, so a string presented to an echo\n  // keyring (or parts to a standard one) is refused before any unwrap.\n  const oldKek = await deriveKekForKeyring(file, input.oldSecret, oldSalt)\n\n  // Unwrap every DEK with the OLD KEK first — this also validates the\n  // secret (a bad KEK throws InvalidKeyError on the first unwrap).\n  const deks = new Map<string, EnclaveKey>()\n  for (const [coll, wrapped] of Object.entries(file.deks)) {\n    deks.set(coll, await unwrapKey(wrapped, oldKek))\n  }\n\n  // #1096 — this function returns an `UnlockedKeyring` whose `role` and\n  // `permissions` come from the plaintext header, so it must authenticate the\n  // roster like `loadKeyring` does. Checked BEFORE anything is written: a\n  // forged roster must be refused, not rewrapped under a fresh secret and\n  // thereby blessed.\n  await assertRosterAuthenticated(file, deks, userId)\n\n  // Echo→standard is a security-posture downgrade decided by argument shape\n  // alone — require explicit opt-in, and refuse before deriving the new KEK\n  // or writing anything.\n  if (file.echo !== undefined && typeof input.newSecret === 'string' && !input.allowModeDowngrade) {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      'Rotating an echo-secret keyring to a plain string secret is a security-posture downgrade — pass allowModeDowngrade: true to confirm.',\n    )\n  }\n\n  const newSalt = generateSalt()\n  const newKek = await deriveKekForNewSecret(input.newSecret, newSalt)\n\n  // Rewrap with the new KEK.\n  const wrappedDeks: Record<string, string> = {}\n  for (const [coll, dek] of deks) {\n    wrappedDeks[coll] = await wrapKey(dek, newKek)\n  }\n\n  // Slot rewrap. Without slotCeremonies, we drop every existing\n  // slot. With a ceremony map, slots whose id appears in the map\n  // are preserved; the rest are dropped.\n  const oldSlots = file.authenticators ?? []\n  const newSlots: KeyringAuthenticator[] = []\n  if (input.slotCeremonies && oldSlots.length > 0) {\n    for (const oldSlot of oldSlots) {\n      const ceremony = input.slotCeremonies[oldSlot.id]\n      if (!ceremony) continue // drop — not in slotCeremonies map\n\n      const result = await ceremony({ newKek, newDeks: deks, oldSlot })\n\n      // Anti-slot-swap guard. The ceremony MUST preserve identity —\n      // a mismatch would let the consumer convert a webauthn slot to\n      // a password slot mid-rotation, which would silently change\n      // the security profile of the slot under cover of \"rotation.\"\n      if (result.id !== oldSlot.id) {\n        throw new ValidationError(\n          `slotCeremonies['${oldSlot.id}'] returned id=\"${result.id}\". ` +\n            'The id must match the rotated slot — a ceremony cannot ' +\n            'change a slot\\'s identity.',\n        )\n      }\n      if (result.method !== oldSlot.method) {\n        throw new ValidationError(\n          `slotCeremonies['${oldSlot.id}'] returned method=\"${result.method}\", ` +\n            `expected \"${oldSlot.method}\". The method must match the rotated ` +\n            'slot — a ceremony cannot change the auth method (e.g. webauthn ' +\n            '→ password) under cover of rotation.',\n        )\n      }\n      // wrapKind absent on legacy slots / wrap-KEK enroll inputs; treat as 'kek'.\n      const oldWrapKind = oldSlot.wrapKind ?? 'kek'\n      const newWrapKind = result.wrapKind ?? 'kek'\n      if (oldWrapKind !== newWrapKind) {\n        throw new ValidationError(\n          `slotCeremonies['${oldSlot.id}'] returned wrapKind=\"${newWrapKind}\", ` +\n            `expected \"${oldWrapKind}\". The wrap format must match the rotated ` +\n            'slot — a ceremony cannot change the wrap shape (e.g. wrap-KEK → ' +\n            'wrap-DEKs) under cover of rotation, since that would silently ' +\n            'change the session tier produced at unlock.',\n        )\n      }\n\n      // Build the persisted slot from the ceremony result. Mirrors\n      // the same construction `enrollAuthenticator` does — wrap-DEKs\n      // variants carry { wrapped_deks, iv }; wrap-KEK variants\n      // carry { wrapped_kek }.\n      const baseFields = {\n        id: result.id,\n        method: result.method,\n        // Preserve original enrolled_at — rotation is rewrapping, not\n        // re-enrollment. The slot's enrolment timestamp tracks when\n        // the user originally added the slot, not when it was last\n        // rewrapped. Forensics consumers reading enrolled_at are\n        // tracking the slot's ORIGIN, not its CURRENT wrapping.\n        enrolled_at: oldSlot.enrolled_at,\n        enrolled_via_tier: result.enrolled_via_tier ?? oldSlot.enrolled_via_tier,\n        meta: result.meta,\n      } as const\n      const newSlot: KeyringAuthenticator = result.wrapKind === 'deks'\n        ? {\n            ...baseFields,\n            wrapKind: 'deks',\n            wrapped_deks: result.wrapped_deks,\n            iv: result.iv,\n          }\n        : {\n            ...baseFields,\n            wrapped_kek: result.wrapped_kek,\n          }\n      newSlots.push(newSlot)\n    }\n  }\n\n  const canary = await mintKeyringCanary(newKek)\n  // Drop the OLD echo block explicitly — a `{ ...file }` spread would carry it\n  // across a downgrade and miss it on an upgrade. See echoFieldForNewSecret.\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars -- excluded from ...carried\n  const { echo: _staleEcho, ...carried } = file\n  // #1115/#1126 — RESTAMP. This is a read-modify-write of a file whose roster\n  // tag now covers the DEK key SET, and the rebuild replaces `deks` wholesale.\n  // Carrying the old tag across leaves the vault unopenable the moment the\n  // recovered set differs from the one the tag was minted over, and fragile\n  // even when it does not.\n  const rebuilt = {\n    ...carried,\n    _noydb_keyring: NOYDB_KEYRING_VERSION,\n    deks: wrappedDeks,\n    salt: bufferToBase64(newSalt),\n    authenticators: newSlots,\n    canary,\n    ...(await echoFieldForNewSecret(input.newSecret, input.echoOptions)),\n  }\n  // #1097 — stamped BEFORE the tag is minted, so it lands inside the\n  // authenticated canonical and a store can neither edit nor strip it.\n  const withEpoch = stampAuthority(rebuilt, found?.file.roster_epoch)\n  const next: KeyringFile = {\n    ...withEpoch,\n    roster_tag: await mintRosterTag(withEpoch, requireRecoveredRosterKey(deks)),\n  }\n\n  await writeKeyringFile(store, vault, userId, next, basisOf(found))\n\n  return {\n    userId: file.user_id,\n    displayName: file.display_name,\n    role: file.role,\n    permissions: file.permissions,\n    deks,\n    kek: newKek,\n    salt: newSalt,\n    authenticators: newSlots,\n    ...(file.export_capability !== undefined && { exportCapability: file.export_capability }),\n    ...(file.import_capability !== undefined && { importCapability: file.import_capability }),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Caller payload for {@link recoverSecret}.\n *\n * `paper` and `shamir` are wired end-to-end.\n * The remaining two profiles (`multi-channel`, `admin-mediated`)\n * stay outside the union and throw\n * {@link RecoveryProfileNotImplementedError} at the runtime guard\n * when bypassed via `as unknown as RecoveryProof`.\n */\nexport type RecoveryProof =\n  | { readonly profile: 'paper'; readonly payload: { readonly code: string } }\n  | { readonly profile: 'shamir'; readonly payload: {\n      /** Optional disambiguator when multiple Shamir entries are enrolled.\n       *  When omitted, hub tries each entry until one combines. */\n      readonly entryId?: string\n      /** K or more opaque share strings, as returned by `NoydbShamir.splitToShares`. */\n      readonly shares: ReadonlyArray<string>\n    } }\n\nexport interface RecoverSecretInput {\n  /**\n   * The secret to recover TO. As in {@link RotateSecretInput}, the shape\n   * decides the recovered keyring's mode: 3-part {@link EchoSecretParts}\n   * enroll a fresh (always PORTABLE) `echo` block, a string leaves the\n   * keyring standard and removes any block the old one carried.\n   *\n   * Recovery deliberately has no `echoOptions` counterpart — a device seal\n   * would bind the reveal blob to the device running the recovery, which is\n   * not necessarily the device the user will unlock from. Seal it afterwards\n   * with an explicit `rotateSecret`.\n   *\n   * A string `newSecret` on a previously-echo keyring performs the same\n   * echo→standard downgrade as `rotateSecret`, but WITHOUT an\n   * `allowModeDowngrade` gate — recovery is already a proof-gated reset\n   * ceremony (a valid recovery code/shares), so the shape-alone check\n   * `rotateSecret` needs is redundant here by design.\n   */\n  readonly newSecret: string | EchoSecretParts\n  readonly recoveryProof: RecoveryProof\n  /**\n   * Strength-policy knobs applied when `newSecret` is a STRING. Ignored\n   * for 3-part {@link EchoSecretParts} — see `echoSecretPolicy` for the\n   * parts-path counterpart.\n   */\n  readonly secretPolicy?: SecretPolicy\n  /**\n   * Strength-policy knobs applied when `newSecret` is 3-part\n   * {@link EchoSecretParts} (prompt / combined floors). Ignored for a\n   * string `newSecret` — see `secretPolicy` for the string-path\n   * counterpart.\n   */\n  readonly echoSecretPolicy?: EchoSecretPolicy\n  readonly allowWeakSecret?: boolean\n  /**\n   * After a successful paper-recovery, replace ALL remaining recovery\n   * entries with freshly-minted ones. Defaults to `true` (defensive).\n   *\n   * Rationale: the user just demonstrated they had access\n   * to AT LEAST one code. The remaining codes from the same printed\n   * sheet may also be compromised — photographed, leaked via a\n   * screen-share slip, or in the hands of whoever stole the sheet.\n   * Auto-rotation closes the window without requiring consumer action.\n   *\n   * Set to `false` to preserve the original behavior (only the matched\n   * code is burned; the rest stay valid).\n   *\n   * Hub-side orchestration is non-atomic with the recovery itself:\n   * if the rotation step fails after a successful burn, the user\n   * falls back to the pre-rotation state (remaining codes still\n   * valid). Strictly safer than the previous default — a failed\n   * rotation degrades gracefully rather than leaving the vault\n   * locked or codes dual-existing.\n   */\n  readonly rotateRemainingCodes?: boolean\n  /**\n   * Number of fresh codes to mint when `rotateRemainingCodes` is on.\n   * Defaults to the count of remaining entries POST-burn (e.g. if\n   * the user enrolled 8 originally and just consumed 1, defaults to\n   * 7). Pass an explicit number to mint a different count — useful\n   * when the consumer wants to refresh to a target N regardless of\n   * how many were left.\n   */\n  readonly newCodeCount?: number\n  /**\n   * Override the default raw-code generator. The default is hub's\n   * {@link generateULID} — uppercase Crockford-Base32, 26 chars,\n   * passes through `normalizePaperCode` untouched.\n   *\n   * Pass `() => generateRawCode()` from `@noy-db/on-recovery` when\n   * the consumer prefers the Base32 + checksum format with hyphenated\n   * display. The `mintPaperRecoveryEntry` helper accepts any string —\n   * the generator just needs to produce a high-entropy unique value.\n   */\n  readonly codeGenerator?: () => string\n}\n\n/**\n * Return shape of `db.recoverSecret`. `newCodes` is populated when\n * `rotateRemainingCodes` was enabled and at least one entry was\n * rotated; an empty array means no rotation happened (rotation\n * disabled, or no remaining codes after burn). Show the codes to the\n * user once — they are the canonical credential for future recovery\n * and CANNOT be retrieved again.\n */\nexport interface RecoverSecretResult {\n  readonly newCodes: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Input for {@link Noydb.rotateRecovery} — deliberate\n * recovery-credential regeneration when the user knows their\n * secret but wants a fresh sheet (paper) or fresh shares\n * (shamir). Symmetric to {@link RotateSecretInput}.\n */\nexport type RotateRecoveryOptions =\n  | {\n      readonly profile: 'paper'\n      /** How many fresh codes to mint. Default: existing sheet size. */\n      readonly count?: number\n      /** Optional code generator — see {@link RecoverSecretInput.codeGenerator}. */\n      readonly codeGenerator?: () => string\n    }\n  | {\n      readonly profile: 'shamir'\n      /** New threshold. */\n      readonly k: number\n      /** New total share count. */\n      readonly n: number\n      /** Disambiguator when multiple Shamir entries exist; required if there are 2+. */\n      readonly entryId?: string\n      /** Optional updated label. */\n      readonly label?: string\n    }\n\n/**\n * Result of {@link Noydb.rotateRecovery}. Shape varies by profile:\n *\n * - `paper` → `{ newCodes: string[] }` (and `entryId === 'paper-batch'`)\n * - `shamir` → `{ newShares: string[], entryId }`\n *\n * `newCodes` is populated for paper rotations; `newShares` for\n * Shamir rotations. Both are show-once — the hub does not\n * retain them.\n */\nexport interface RotateRecoveryResult {\n  readonly newCodes?: readonly string[]\n  readonly newShares?: readonly string[]\n  readonly entryId?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Result of {@link Noydb.enrollRecovery}. Shape varies by profile:\n *\n * - `paper` → `{ entryId: 'paper-batch' }` (caller minted the\n *   entries; this is a sentinel since paper enrollments are batch-shaped).\n * - `shamir` → `{ entryId, shares: string[] }` — shares are\n *   show-once; the hub does not retain them.\n */\nexport interface EnrollRecoveryResult {\n  readonly entryId: string\n  readonly shares?: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Input shape for {@link Noydb.enrollRecovery} and\n * {@link Noydb.openVaultAndEnrollRecovery}. Discriminated\n * union over recovery profiles.\n *\n * - `paper`: caller pre-mints entries (typically via\n *   `mintPaperRecoveryEntry` or `@noy-db/on-recovery`'s\n *   `generateRecoveryCodeSet`) and passes them in. The hub stores\n *   them and surfaces an opaque batch id.\n * - `shamir`: hub mints the recovery secret + the shares at\n *   enrollment time. The shares are returned in\n *   {@link EnrollRecoveryResult.shares} (show-once); the hub never\n *   retains them.\n *\n * Multi-channel and admin-mediated will be added when the respective\n * dispatch slices ship.\n */\nexport type RecoveryEnrollmentInput =\n  | { readonly profile: 'paper'; readonly entries: ReadonlyArray<PaperRecoveryEntry> }\n  | {\n      readonly profile: 'shamir'\n      readonly k: number\n      readonly n: number\n      readonly label?: string\n      readonly entryId?: string\n    }\n\n/**\n * Reset the user's secret using a recovery proof.\n * Supports `'paper'` and `'shamir'` profiles. The other profiles throw\n * {@link RecoveryProfileNotImplementedError}.\n *\n * On success, the used recovery entry is burned (deleted from the\n * stored set).\n */\nexport async function recoverSecret(\n  provider: NoydbShamir | undefined,\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  userId: string,\n  input: RecoverSecretInput,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  if (!input.allowWeakSecret) {\n    assertStrongNewSecret(input.newSecret, input.secretPolicy, input.echoSecretPolicy)\n  }\n\n  // Runtime defense-in-depth: the type narrows to 'paper' | 'shamir',\n  // but a consumer bypassing TS via\n  // `as unknown as RecoveryProof` should still hit a clear error\n  // rather than silently fall into a handler with a malformed payload.\n  const profile = (input.recoveryProof as { profile: string }).profile\n  if (profile === 'paper') {\n    return recoverViaPaperCode(store, vault, userId, input)\n  }\n  if (profile === 'shamir') {\n    return recoverViaShamir(provider, store, vault, userId, input)\n  }\n  throw new RecoveryProfileNotImplementedError(\n    profile,\n    'https://github.com/noy-db/core/issues/196',\n  )\n}\n\nasync function recoverViaPaperCode(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  userId: string,\n  input: RecoverSecretInput,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  if (input.recoveryProof.profile !== 'paper') throw new Error('unreachable')\n  const { code } = input.recoveryProof.payload\n\n  const found = await readKeyringFile(store, vault, userId)\n  if (!found) {\n    throw new NoAccessError(`No keyring found for user \"${userId}\" in vault \"${vault}\".`)\n  }\n  const { file } = found\n\n  const entries = await loadPaperRecoveryEntries(store, vault)\n  if (entries.length === 0) {\n    throw new NoAccessError(\n      `No paper-recovery entries enrolled for vault \"${vault}\". ` +\n        'Enroll via `db.team.enrollRecovery({ profile: \"paper\", entries })` before relying on recovery.',\n    )\n  }\n\n  const normalized = normalizePaperCode(code)\n  let recovered: { deks: Map<string, EnclaveKey>; entry: PaperRecoveryEntry } | undefined\n  for (const entry of entries) {\n    try {\n      const deks = await unwrapDeksFromPaperEntry(entry, normalized)\n      recovered = { deks, entry }\n      break\n    } catch {\n      // wrong code for this entry — try the next one\n    }\n  }\n  if (!recovered) {\n    throw new InvalidKeyError(\n      'Recovery code does not match any enrolled paper entry. The code may have been ' +\n        'previously used (single-use) or typed incorrectly.',\n    )\n  }\n\n  const deks = recovered.deks\n\n  // #1096 — same as the rotateSecret path: the returned keyring's authority\n  // comes from the plaintext header. The roster key rides the paper entry's\n  // wrapped-DEK blob, so it is in reach here even though no KEK ever is.\n  await assertRosterAuthenticated(file, deks, userId)\n\n  // Fresh salt + KEK from the new secret, rewrap.\n  const newSalt = generateSalt()\n  const newKek = await deriveKekForNewSecret(input.newSecret, newSalt)\n  const wrappedDeks: Record<string, string> = {}\n  for (const [coll, dek] of deks) {\n    wrappedDeks[coll] = await wrapKey(dek, newKek)\n  }\n\n  const canary = await mintKeyringCanary(newKek)\n  // Explicit rebuild — the old echo block must not ride the spread. See\n  // echoFieldForNewSecret.\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars -- excluded from ...carried\n  const { echo: _staleEcho, ...carried } = file\n  // #1115/#1126 — RESTAMP, same reason as the other rebuild sites.\n  const rebuilt = {\n    ...carried,\n    _noydb_keyring: NOYDB_KEYRING_VERSION,\n    deks: wrappedDeks,\n    salt: bufferToBase64(newSalt),\n    authenticators: [], // tier-2 slots wrap old KEK, drop them\n    canary,\n    ...(await echoFieldForNewSecret(input.newSecret)),\n  }\n  // #1097 — stamped BEFORE the tag is minted, so it lands inside the\n  // authenticated canonical and a store can neither edit nor strip it.\n  const withEpoch = stampAuthority(rebuilt, found?.file.roster_epoch)\n  const next: KeyringFile = {\n    ...withEpoch,\n    roster_tag: await mintRosterTag(withEpoch, requireRecoveredRosterKey(deks)),\n  }\n\n  // Burn first, then rewrite the keyring. The two writes are not\n  // atomic — if the second fails, the safer ordering is:\n  //\n  //   1. Code burned, keyring untouched: user keeps their old secret\n  //      and loses one recovery code (recoverable: contact admin / use\n  //      another code).\n  //\n  //   2. Keyring rewritten, code unburned: user has rotated, but the\n  //      consumed code REMAINS VALID. Anyone with access to the paper\n  //      sheet can use it again. Security regression.\n  //\n  // Burning first picks (1) over (2).\n  await burnPaperRecoveryEntry(store, vault, recovered.entry.codeId)\n  await writeKeyringFile(store, vault, userId, next, basisOf(found))\n\n  return {\n    userId: file.user_id,\n    displayName: file.display_name,\n    role: file.role,\n    permissions: file.permissions,\n    deks,\n    kek: newKek,\n    salt: newSalt,\n    authenticators: [],\n    ...(file.export_capability !== undefined && { exportCapability: file.export_capability }),\n    ...(file.import_capability !== undefined && { importCapability: file.import_capability }),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Mirror of `@noy-db/on-recovery/parseRecoveryCode`. Inlined so the\n * hub does not gain a peer dep on on-recovery — both implementations\n * follow the same RFC 4648 Base32 + checksum format and round-trip\n * through the same KDF.\n *\n * Accepts hyphenated, lowercase, or whitespace-padded input.\n */\nfunction normalizePaperCode(input: string): string {\n  return input.toUpperCase().replace(/[\\s\\-_]/g, '')\n}\n\n/**\n * Recover the user's keyring via the Shamir profile.\n *\n * 1. Decode each supplied share string into a {@link RawShare}.\n * 2. Load `_meta/recovery-shamir` entries.\n * 3. If `payload.entryId` is supplied, restrict to that entry; else\n *    iterate over all entries and try each until one combines.\n * 4. For each candidate: filter shares to those whose `(k, n)`\n *    match the entry's parameters, then attempt\n *    `unwrapDeksFromShamirEntry`. AES-GCM auth-tag failure means\n *    the combined secret doesn't match — try the next entry.\n * 5. With unwrapped DEKs: derive fresh KEK from `newSecret` +\n *    fresh salt, rewrap, write the keyring.\n * 6. Shamir entries are NOT burned on recovery (shares reusable);\n *    explicit {@link Noydb.rotateRecovery} is the refresh ceremony.\n */\nasync function recoverViaShamir(\n  provider: NoydbShamir | undefined,\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  userId: string,\n  input: RecoverSecretInput,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  if (input.recoveryProof.profile !== 'shamir') throw new Error('unreachable')\n  const { entryId: requestedEntryId, shares: shareStrings } = input.recoveryProof.payload\n\n  if (shareStrings.length === 0) {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      'Shamir recovery requires at least one share; received an empty array.',\n    )\n  }\n\n  const found = await readKeyringFile(store, vault, userId)\n  if (!found) {\n    throw new NoAccessError(`No keyring found for user \"${userId}\" in vault \"${vault}\".`)\n  }\n  const { file } = found\n\n  const allEntries = await loadShamirRecoveryEntries(store, vault)\n  if (allEntries.length === 0) {\n    throw new NoAccessError(\n      `No Shamir-recovery entries enrolled for vault \"${vault}\". `\n      + 'Enroll via `db.team.enrollRecovery({ profile: \"shamir\", k, n })` before relying on recovery.',\n    )\n  }\n\n  if (!provider) {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"shamir recovery requires a NoydbShamir — pass \"\n      + \"shamirRecovery: shamirRecoveryProvider() from '@noy-db/on-shamir' to createNoydb()\",\n    )\n  }\n\n  // Restrict to a specific entry when entryId supplied.\n  let candidates: ReadonlyArray<ShamirRecoveryEntry>\n  if (requestedEntryId !== undefined) {\n    candidates = allEntries.filter(e => e.entryId === requestedEntryId)\n    if (candidates.length === 0) {\n      throw new NoAccessError(\n        `No Shamir-recovery entry with entryId=\"${requestedEntryId}\" found `\n        + `in vault \"${vault}\". Available entries: `\n        + allEntries.map(e => `\"${e.entryId}\"`).join(', '),\n      )\n    }\n  } else {\n    candidates = allEntries\n  }\n\n  // Try each candidate entry. Pass all share strings to the provider;\n  // provider.combineShares validates and throws on mismatch — the\n  // AES-GCM auth-tag is an additional guard.\n  let recoveredDeks: Map<string, EnclaveKey> | undefined\n  for (const entry of candidates) {\n    if (shareStrings.length < entry.k) {\n      // Not enough shares for this entry — could still match another.\n      continue\n    }\n    try {\n      const deks = await unwrapDeksFromShamirEntry(provider, entry, shareStrings)\n      recoveredDeks = deks\n      break\n    } catch {\n      // provider.combineShares threw (malformed/mismatched shares) or\n      // AES-GCM auth-tag failure → try the next entry.\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (!recoveredDeks) {\n    // Distinguish \"below-threshold\" from \"no entry matches\" so the\n    // error message is actionable.\n    const minK = Math.min(...candidates.map(e => e.k))\n    if (shareStrings.length < minK) {\n      throw new InvalidKeyError(\n        `Insufficient Shamir shares to combine: the smallest enrolled threshold is ${minK}, `\n        + `but only ${shareStrings.length} share${shareStrings.length === 1 ? ' was' : 's were'} provided.`,\n      )\n    }\n    throw new InvalidKeyError(\n      'Shamir shares do not match any enrolled entry. Possible causes: '\n      + 'shares were tampered with, came from a different enrollment, '\n      + 'or the entry was rotated after these shares were distributed.',\n    )\n  }\n\n  // #1096 — mirrors paper: authenticate the roster before rewrapping it under\n  // a fresh secret. The roster key rides the Shamir entry's wrapped-DEK blob.\n  await assertRosterAuthenticated(file, recoveredDeks, userId)\n\n  // Mint fresh KEK from new secret, rewrap DEKs (mirrors paper).\n  const newSalt = generateSalt()\n  const newKek = await deriveKekForNewSecret(input.newSecret, newSalt)\n  const wrappedDeks: Record<string, string> = {}\n  for (const [coll, dek] of recoveredDeks) {\n    wrappedDeks[coll] = await wrapKey(dek, newKek)\n  }\n\n  const canary = await mintKeyringCanary(newKek)\n  // Explicit rebuild — the old echo block must not ride the spread. See\n  // echoFieldForNewSecret.\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars -- excluded from ...carried\n  const { echo: _staleEcho, ...carried } = file\n  // #1115/#1126 — RESTAMP, same reason as the paper path above.\n  const rebuilt = {\n    ...carried,\n    _noydb_keyring: NOYDB_KEYRING_VERSION,\n    deks: wrappedDeks,\n    salt: bufferToBase64(newSalt),\n    authenticators: [], // tier-2 slots wrap old KEK, drop them on recovery\n    canary,\n    ...(await echoFieldForNewSecret(input.newSecret)),\n  }\n  // #1097 — stamped BEFORE the tag is minted, so it lands inside the\n  // authenticated canonical and a store can neither edit nor strip it.\n  const withEpoch = stampAuthority(rebuilt, file.roster_epoch)\n  const next: KeyringFile = {\n    ...withEpoch,\n    roster_tag: await mintRosterTag(withEpoch, requireRecoveredRosterKey(recoveredDeks)),\n  }\n\n  // No burn: Shamir entries persist across recoveries. Explicit\n  // rotateRecovery is the refresh ceremony.\n  await writeKeyringFile(store, vault, userId, next, basisOf(found))\n\n  return {\n    userId: file.user_id,\n    displayName: file.display_name,\n    role: file.role,\n    permissions: file.permissions,\n    deks: recoveredDeks,\n    kek: newKek,\n    salt: newSalt,\n    authenticators: [],\n    ...(file.export_capability !== undefined && { exportCapability: file.export_capability }),\n    ...(file.import_capability !== undefined && { importCapability: file.import_capability }),\n  }\n}\n\n// core#132 — the local copy of `writeKeyringFile` was DELETED here. It was\n// byte-identical to `keyring.ts`'s, comment included, so hardening one left the\n// other unprotected under a name a reader would assume was shared. Imported now.\n\n/**\n * The roster key out of a RECOVERED DEK map. Recovery rebuilds the keyring file\n * from scratch, so it must restamp — and it can, because the roster key travels\n * inside the recovered set like any other `_`-prefixed slot.\n *\n * Throws rather than skipping the restamp: a recovery that cannot produce a\n * verifiable tag has produced a file nobody can open, and failing here says so\n * instead of writing it.\n */\nfunction requireRecoveredRosterKey(deks: Map<string, EnclaveKey>): EnclaveKey {\n  const key = deks.get(ROSTER_KEY_ID)\n  if (!key) {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      `recoverSecret: the recovered DEK set carries no \"${ROSTER_KEY_ID}\" entry, so the rebuilt ` +\n        'keyring could not be re-signed. The recovery material predates the authenticated roster ' +\n        'and the vault must be re-seeded.',\n    )\n  }\n  return key\n}\n","/**\n * Atomic peer-recovery primitive.\n *\n * `recoverUser` is a SEPARATE operation from `revoke + grant`. It\n * exists because peer-recovery has different semantics than account\n * removal-then-reissue:\n *\n *   1. **Same identity preserved.** `userId`, `role`, `permissions`,\n *      capability bits, user envelope (if any), policy override (if\n *      any) all survive. Only the wrapping changes.\n *   2. **No key rotation.** The existing DEKs stay valid — every\n *      OTHER principal in the vault keeps their access. Rotating\n *      keys would invalidate every co-user's wrapping.\n *   3. **Atomic by construction.** A single `store.put` overwrites\n *      `_keyring/<userId>` with the recovered file. No revoke step\n *      means no partial-failure window.\n *   4. **Owner→owner natively allowed.** Two co-owners recovering\n *      each other is the explicitly-intentional case (a partner\n *      forgot the master phrase). The existing `canRevoke` rule that\n *      blocks owner→owner is correct for `revoke` (which is account\n *      *removal*) and intentionally NOT replicated here. The policy\n *      gate `peer-recover-user` carries the freshness requirement.\n *   5. **Tier-2 slots dropped.** The slots wrap the OLD KEK under\n *      method-derived keys; after recovery the KEK is re-derived\n *      from the new temp secret. Match `rotateSecret`'s\n *      precedent — the recovered user re-enrols slots after picking\n *      their own phrase.\n *\n * Caller must be at least as privileged as the target. The hub\n * `db.recoverUser` method gates this with the `peer-recover-user`\n * policy gate (the `peer-recover-user` factor-proof requirement); the function below\n * enforces only the role + anti-privilege-escalation invariants.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { NoydbStore, KeyringFile, Role } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_KEYRING_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { buildRecordEnvelope, deriveKey, generateSalt, wrapKey, bufferToBase64, generateDEK } from '../../capsule/index.js'\nimport { BROKER_MEMBER_COLLECTION } from './reserved-secret-collections.js'\nimport { INBOX_KEY_ID } from '../../kernel/constants.js'\nimport { mintInboxKey, inboxSlots } from './keyring.js'\nimport { NoAccessError, PermissionDeniedError, PrivilegeEscalationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { assertStrongSecret, type SecretPolicy } from '../../kernel/validation.js'\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring } from './keyring.js'\nimport { mintKeyringCanary, readKeyringFile, requireRosterKey } from './keyring.js'\nimport { mintRosterTag, assertRosterTagValid } from './roster-tag.js'\nimport { stampAuthority } from './roster-tag.js'\n\n// FR-6: 'custodian' is deliberately ABSENT — an admin cannot peer-recover a\n// custodian (mirrors ADMIN_GRANTABLE_TARGETS: custodians are owner-managed\n// only). The owner CAN recover one (canRecover returns true for owner). As a\n// CALLER, a custodian recovers nobody (it is neither owner nor admin → false).\nconst ADMIN_RECOVERABLE_TARGETS: readonly Role[] = ['operator', 'viewer', 'client', 'admin']\n\n/**\n * Whether `callerRole` may recover `targetRole`.\n *\n * Differs from `canRevoke` (in `keyring.ts`) in one critical place:\n * **owner→owner IS allowed**. Peer recovery is the explicitly\n * intentional case (a co-owner forgot their phrase); the freshness\n * binding lives in the `peer-recover-user` policy gate, not in the\n * permission predicate.\n *\n * Admins can recover everyone they could grant (operator / viewer /\n * client / admin) but NOT owners — that boundary stays as a hard\n * structural rule even under recovery.\n */\nfunction canRecover(callerRole: Role, targetRole: Role): boolean {\n  if (callerRole === 'owner') return true\n  if (callerRole === 'admin') return ADMIN_RECOVERABLE_TARGETS.includes(targetRole)\n  return false\n}\n\n/** Input shape for {@link recoverUser}. */\nexport interface RecoverUserOptions {\n  /** Target user id whose keyring is being recovered. */\n  readonly userId: string\n  /**\n   * Temporary secret under which the new keyring is wrapped.\n   * The recipient should call `db.rotateSecret` immediately on\n   * acceptance to choose their own phrase — this temp acts as a\n   * single-use bridge in invite / peer-recovery flows.\n   */\n  readonly secret: string\n  /** Override the target's role. Defaults to the existing target's role. */\n  readonly role?: Role\n  /** Override the target's display name. Defaults to existing. */\n  readonly displayName?: string\n  /** Validate phrase strength against the configured policy. */\n  readonly validateSecret?: boolean\n  /**\n   * Skip phrase strength validation even when `validateSecret` is\n   * set. The escape hatch matches `grant`'s shape — used when the\n   * temp phrase is a high-entropy one-shot string that doesn't need\n   * to satisfy the human-typeable rules.\n   */\n  readonly allowWeakSecret?: boolean\n  /**\n   * Optional explicit phrase policy override (passed through to\n   * `assertStrongSecret`). Mirrors how `grant` accepts a custom\n   * `SecretPolicy` for app-specific tightening.\n   */\n  readonly secretPolicy?: SecretPolicy\n}\n\n/**\n * Atomically rewrap the target user's keyring under a fresh temp\n * secret. Single store write; no revoke step; no key rotation.\n *\n * Caller's responsibilities (NOT enforced here):\n *   - Run the `peer-recover-user` policy gate first via\n *     `Noydb.checkGate` to enforce the freshness factor proof.\n *   - Communicate the temp secret to the recipient via a secure\n *     channel (URL fragment, in-person, etc.) — the hub does not\n *     transport secrets.\n */\nexport async function recoverUser(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  options: RecoverUserOptions,\n): Promise<void> {\n  // 1. Load the target's existing keyring file (plaintext header).\n  const found = await readKeyringFile(store, vault, options.userId)\n  if (!found) {\n    throw new NoAccessError(\n      `recoverUser: user \"${options.userId}\" has no keyring in vault \"${vault}\".`,\n    )\n  }\n  const target = found.file\n\n  // #1096 — verify BEFORE anything reads this file, because the very next line\n  // adopts `target.role` as the recovered role. The attack is self-triggering:\n  // a store forges a member's role, that member is locked out at load, and the\n  // admin's natural remedy IS recovery — which without this check would rewrap\n  // the forged authority under a fresh secret and stamp it genuine.\n  const rosterKey = requireRosterKey(callerKeyring, 'recoverUser')\n  await assertRosterTagValid(target, rosterKey, options.userId)\n\n  const targetRole = options.role ?? target.role\n\n  // 2. Permission check — caller must be allowed to recover this role.\n  //    Owner→owner natively allowed; admin→admin allowed; admin→owner blocked.\n  if (!canRecover(callerKeyring.role, targetRole)) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `Role \"${callerKeyring.role}\" cannot recover role \"${targetRole}\"`,\n    )\n  }\n  // Also guard against role-uplift via the override — admin cannot\n  // promote a target to owner under cover of recovery.\n  if (!canRecover(callerKeyring.role, target.role)) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `Role \"${callerKeyring.role}\" cannot recover role \"${target.role}\"`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  // 3. Anti-privilege-escalation. Every collection the target had\n  //    access to must be in the caller's DEK set — the recoverer\n  //    cannot give the recovered user access to a collection the\n  //    recoverer themselves can't read. Mirrors `grant()`'s check.\n  //    core#73 — `_broker_member` is the one DEK a keyring holds that its\n  //    grantor never did: minted per grantee at grant time. It is not carried\n  //    over (the caller cannot unwrap it) but MINTED AFRESH below, and the\n  //    kernel re-enrols the member with the broker host under the new key.\n  //    core#96 — `_inbox_key` is the same kind of key (per member, minted at\n  //    grant, never the grantor's); a fresh inbox pair is minted below. A DEK\n  //    still in the target's undrained inbox is one they were handed and may\n  //    hold: it goes straight into the recovered file, under the new KEK.\n  const carriedSlots = [...Object.keys(target.deks), ...inboxSlots(target)]\n  for (const coll of carriedSlots) {\n    if (coll === BROKER_MEMBER_COLLECTION || coll === INBOX_KEY_ID) continue\n    if (!callerKeyring.deks.has(coll)) {\n      throw new PrivilegeEscalationError(coll)\n    }\n  }\n\n  // 4. Optional phrase strength validation (mirrors `grant` opt-in).\n  if (options.validateSecret && !options.allowWeakSecret) {\n    assertStrongSecret(options.secret, options.secretPolicy)\n  }\n\n\n  // 5. Mint a fresh salt + KEK from the temp secret. The DEKs\n  //    themselves are unchanged — only the wrapping is replaced.\n  const newSalt = generateSalt()\n  const newKek = await deriveKey(options.secret, newSalt)\n\n  const wrappedDeks: Record<string, string> = {}\n  if (targetRole !== 'owner' && targetRole !== 'admin') {\n    wrappedDeks[BROKER_MEMBER_COLLECTION] = await wrapKey(await generateDEK(), newKek) // core#73\n  }\n  const inbox = await mintInboxKey(newKek) // core#96\n  wrappedDeks[INBOX_KEY_ID] = inbox.wrappedInboxKey\n  for (const coll of carriedSlots) {\n    if (coll === BROKER_MEMBER_COLLECTION || coll === INBOX_KEY_ID) continue\n    const callerDek = callerKeyring.deks.get(coll)\n    if (!callerDek) {\n      // Already caught by the anti-privilege-escalation loop above.\n      // This branch is defensive belt-and-braces; if it ever fires,\n      // the target had a collection the caller's deks Map disagrees\n      // with — fail loud rather than silently dropping access.\n      throw new PrivilegeEscalationError(coll)\n    }\n    wrappedDeks[coll] = await wrapKey(callerDek, newKek)\n  }\n\n  // 6. Build the recovered keyring file. Identity preserved; wrapping\n  //    refreshed; tier-2 slots dropped (they wrap the OLD KEK and\n  //    can't survive a tier-1 phrase change — same precedent as\n  //    rotateSecret). Mint a fresh canary under newKek; the\n  //    OLD canary on the spread `...target` would fail to verify against\n  //    the new KEK and trip KeyringCorruptError on next load.\n  //\n  //    An echo block on the target is dropped for the same reason\n  //    (spec #940): `options.secret` is a STRING, so the rewrapped DEKs sit\n  //    under a string-derived KEK. Carrying the block over would make\n  //    `deriveKekForKeyring` demand the echo ceremony and derive via the echo\n  //    KDF — bricking the keyring for old parts AND new temp alike. The\n  //    recovered user therefore gets a STANDARD keyring; picking the echo\n  //    shape back up is their own `rotateSecret` away (peer recovery is a\n  //    single-use bridge, and widening `RecoverUserOptions.secret` to 3-part\n  //    parts would mean transporting three secrets over the out-of-band\n  //    channel — deliberately out of scope).\n  const canary = await mintKeyringCanary(newKek)\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-unused-vars -- excluded from ...carried (core#96: the inbox was folded into `wrappedDeks`, the pair is re-minted)\n  const { echo: _staleEcho, inbox: _drainedInbox, ...carried } = target\n  const edited: KeyringFile = {\n    ...carried,\n    _noydb_keyring: NOYDB_KEYRING_VERSION,\n    role: targetRole,\n    display_name: options.displayName ?? target.display_name,\n    deks: wrappedDeks,\n    salt: bufferToBase64(newSalt),\n    granted_by: callerKeyring.userId,\n    authenticators: [],\n    canary,\n    inbox_key: inbox.inboxKey,\n  }\n  // #1097 — stamped BEFORE the tag is minted, so it lands inside the\n  // authenticated canonical and a store can neither edit nor strip it.\n  const withEpoch = stampAuthority(edited, target.roster_epoch)\n  // #1096 — a restamp is REQUIRED here, not merely uniform: `granted_by`\n  // becomes the recoverer and `role` may change, so the carried tag no longer\n  // describes the file. The recovered user's own copy of the roster key was\n  // re-wrapped into `wrappedDeks` above (it is one of the target's DEKs), so\n  // they can verify this on first unlock with the temp secret.\n  const next: KeyringFile = {\n    ...withEpoch,\n    roster_tag: await mintRosterTag(withEpoch, rosterKey),\n  }\n\n  // 7. Single atomic write — overwrites the existing envelope.\n  //    Backend `put` is the canonical write primitive across every\n  //    `to-*` store; no partial-failure window between revoke + grant.\n  // core#132 — CAS on the file this recovery was computed from (read at\n  // `found` above). A peer recovery races any concurrent admin edit to the\n  // same member, and losing that race used to be silent.\n  const base = found?.envelope._v ?? 0\n  const envelope = buildRecordEnvelope(\n    { collection: '_keyring', id: options.userId, version: base + 1 },\n    { iv: '', data: JSON.stringify(next) },\n  )\n  await store.put(vault, '_keyring', options.userId, envelope, found ? base : undefined)\n}\n","/**\n * Authentication introspection.\n *\n * Three surfaces over the configured tier model and the actual\n * per-user enrollment state:\n *\n * 1. **Vault-wide English summary** — {@link describeAuthConfig}.\n * 2. **Vault-wide Mermaid diagram** — {@link diagramAuthConfig}.\n * 3. **Per-user introspection** — {@link describeUserAuth}, gated by\n *    the `view-user-auth` policy gate (off by default).\n *\n * The per-user surface is held to a strict allowlist — fields not on\n * the allowlist are dropped, never rendered. The negative test in\n * `auth-introspection.test.ts` exercises the allowlist by feeding a\n * contrived keyring with fake \"secret\" fields and asserting that none\n * of them appear in the output.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { NoydbStore, KeyringFile, KeyringAuthenticator, VaultPolicy, GatePolicy } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { loadVaultPolicy } from '../policy/storage.js'\nimport { loadPaperRecoveryEntries } from '../team/recovery.js'\n\n/** Vault-wide English summary of the configured authentication graph. */\nexport async function describeAuthConfig(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const policy = (await loadVaultPolicy(store, vault)) ?? defaultPolicySnapshot()\n  const recoveryProfiles = await listRecoveryProfilesEnrolled(store, vault)\n\n  const lines: string[] = []\n  lines.push(`Vault \"${vault}\" — three-tier authentication`)\n  lines.push('')\n  lines.push('Tier 1 — Secret (master)')\n  lines.push(`  Phrase format: ${policy.secret?.minWords ?? 6}+ words, lowercase letters, ≥${policy.secret?.minWordLength ?? 3} chars/word`)\n  lines.push('  Strength validator: enforced (override available for tests only)')\n  lines.push('')\n  lines.push('Tier 2 — Authenticate (routine login)')\n  lines.push('  Allowed methods: WebAuthn (passkey), OIDC, Password')\n  lines.push('  Slots per user: unlimited')\n  lines.push('')\n  lines.push('Tier 3 — Unlock (quick resume)')\n  lines.push('  Method: PIN (per-app configurable)')\n  lines.push('')\n  lines.push(`Recovery profiles enrolled: ${recoveryProfiles.length === 0 ? 'none' : recoveryProfiles.join(', ')}`)\n  lines.push('Managed-secret mode: off (post-1.0)')\n  lines.push('')\n  lines.push('Sensitive-action gates:')\n  for (const [gate, gp] of Object.entries(policy.gates) as Array<[string, GatePolicy]>) {\n    lines.push(`  ${gate} — ${describeGatePolicy(gp)}`)\n  }\n  return lines.join('\\n')\n}\n\n/**\n * Render the vault's auth graph as Mermaid `flowchart TB` source. The\n * caller pipes this through Mermaid (CLI or browser) to get an SVG.\n */\nexport async function diagramAuthConfig(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const policy = (await loadVaultPolicy(store, vault)) ?? defaultPolicySnapshot()\n  const lines: string[] = []\n  lines.push('flowchart TB')\n  lines.push(`  vault[\"Vault: ${escapeMermaid(vault)}\"]`)\n  lines.push('  tier1[\"Tier 1<br/>Secret\"]')\n  lines.push('  tier2[\"Tier 2<br/>Multi-slot Authenticate\"]')\n  lines.push('  tier3[\"Tier 3<br/>PIN / Quick-resume\"]')\n  lines.push('  vault --> tier1')\n  lines.push('  tier1 --> tier2')\n  lines.push('  tier2 --> tier3')\n  for (const [gateName, gp] of Object.entries(policy.gates) as Array<[string, GatePolicy]>) {\n    if (gp.enabled === false) continue\n    const id = sanitizeId(gateName)\n    const label = `${gateName}<br/>tier ≥ ${gp.minTier}`\n    lines.push(`  ${id}[\"${escapeMermaid(label)}\"]`)\n    const tierNode = gp.minTier === 1 ? 'tier1' : gp.minTier === 2 ? 'tier2' : 'tier3'\n    lines.push(`  ${tierNode} --> ${id}`)\n  }\n  return lines.join('\\n')\n}\n\n/**\n * Render the per-user enrollment summary. Returns an empty\n * (non-throwing) string when the user has no keyring file — never\n * confirms or denies the existence of the user from the document\n * alone.\n *\n * Sanitization is strict: only the slot list, enrollment dates, and\n * recovery-profile counts are rendered. WebAuthn cred ids, OIDC\n * subject ids, password hashes, recovery codes, TOTP secrets — all\n * dropped at the allowlist boundary, not redacted.\n */\nexport async function describeUserAuth(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  userId: string,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const env = await store.get(vault, '_keyring', userId)\n  if (!env) return ''\n  // #1096 — DELIBERATELY UNVERIFIED. This is a key-free plaintext-header\n  // reader (no KEK, no DEKs, so no roster key to verify a `roster_tag` with).\n  // The `role` reported here is therefore what the STORE says, not what an\n  // authorised editor wrote. Safe because this is descriptive output, never an\n  // authorisation input — do not let it become one.\n  const file = JSON.parse(env._data ?? '') as KeyringFile\n\n  const lines: string[] = []\n  lines.push(\n    `User: ${file.user_id} (joined ${file.created_at.slice(0, 10)}, role: ${file.role})`,\n  )\n  lines.push('')\n  lines.push('Tier 2 enrollments:')\n  if (!file.authenticators || file.authenticators.length === 0) {\n    lines.push('  (none enrolled)')\n  } else {\n    for (const slot of file.authenticators) {\n      lines.push(`  - ${describeSlot(slot)}`)\n    }\n  }\n  return lines.join('\\n')\n}\n\n/** Bulk variant for owner dashboards. */\nexport async function describeAllUsersAuth(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<Array<{ userId: string; description: string }>> {\n  const ids = await store.list(vault, '_keyring')\n  const results: Array<{ userId: string; description: string }> = []\n  for (const userId of ids) {\n    const description = await describeUserAuth(store, vault, userId)\n    if (description !== '') results.push({ userId, description })\n  }\n  return results\n}\n\n// ─── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nconst SLOT_FIELD_ALLOWLIST: ReadonlyArray<keyof KeyringAuthenticator> = [\n  'id',\n  'method',\n  'enrolled_at',\n  'enrolled_via_tier',\n] as const\n\nfunction describeSlot(slot: KeyringAuthenticator): string {\n  // Project to the allowlist FIRST — never read meta/wrapped_kek into\n  // any user-facing string. The allowlist is the only path values\n  // take to the renderer; off-allowlist fields are dropped, not redacted.\n  const sanitized: Partial<KeyringAuthenticator> = {}\n  for (const key of SLOT_FIELD_ALLOWLIST) {\n    if (key in slot) {\n      // @ts-expect-error narrow assignment from allowlist iteration\n      sanitized[key] = slot[key]\n    }\n  }\n  const date = (sanitized.enrolled_at ?? '').slice(0, 10)\n  return `${sanitized.method ?? '?'} (id=${sanitized.id ?? '?'}, enrolled ${date}, via tier ${sanitized.enrolled_via_tier ?? '?'})`\n}\n\nfunction describeGatePolicy(gp: GatePolicy): string {\n  if (gp.enabled === false) return 'disabled'\n  const parts: string[] = []\n  parts.push(`tier ${gp.minTier}`)\n  if (gp.factors && gp.factors.length > 0) {\n    for (const f of gp.factors) {\n      parts.push(`+ ${f.count ?? 1}× ${f.anyOf.join('|')}`)\n    }\n  }\n  if (gp.warn?.sharedDevice === 'block') parts.push('block-on-shared-device')\n  return parts.join(' ')\n}\n\nfunction defaultPolicySnapshot(): VaultPolicy {\n  return {\n    secret: { minWords: 6, minWordLength: 3, rejectRepeatedAdjacent: true },\n    gates: {},\n  }\n}\n\nasync function listRecoveryProfilesEnrolled(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<ReadonlyArray<string>> {\n  const enrolled: string[] = []\n  const paper = await loadPaperRecoveryEntries(store, vault)\n  if (paper.length > 0) enrolled.push(`paper (${paper.length} codes)`)\n  return enrolled\n}\n\nfunction escapeMermaid(s: string): string {\n  return s.replace(/\"/g, '\\\\\"').replace(/\\n/g, ' ')\n}\n\nfunction sanitizeId(s: string): string {\n  return s.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9]/g, '_')\n}\n","/**\n * Tier-2 authenticator slot management.\n *\n * Each slot independently wraps the SAME KEK under a method-specific\n * derived key (LUKS pattern). Enrolling adds a slot; removing drops\n * one. Both are constant-time keyring writes — no DEK re-keying.\n *\n * The crypto for each method lives in its `@noy-db/on-*` package\n * (`on-webauthn`, `on-oidc`, `on-password`); this module accepts the\n * package's `wrapped_kek` ciphertext + `meta` payload and persists it.\n *\n * @see https://github.com/noy-db/docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/session-tiers.md → Tier 2 — Authenticate\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { NoydbStore, KeyringAuthenticator } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NoAccessError, ValidationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring } from './keyring.js'\nimport { persistKeyring, rotateKeys, NON_ROTATABLE_SLOTS } from './keyring.js'\nimport { rotateSecret, type SlotRewrapCeremony } from './rotate-recover.js'\nimport type { RotateSecretInput } from './rotate-recover.js'\n\n/** Fields shared across both wrap-KEK and wrap-DEKs enroll inputs. */\ninterface EnrollAuthenticatorBase {\n  readonly id: string\n  readonly method: KeyringAuthenticator['method']\n  /** Method-specific metadata (cred id, salt, …). */\n  readonly meta: Record<string, unknown>\n  /** Tier the active session held when enrolling. Defaults to 1. */\n  readonly enrolled_via_tier?: 1 | 2\n}\n\n/** Wrap-KEK enroll input (WebAuthn, OIDC). */\nexport interface EnrollAuthenticatorWrappingKEKOptions extends EnrollAuthenticatorBase {\n  /** Already-wrapped KEK ciphertext (base64) — produced by the on-* package. */\n  readonly wrapped_kek: string\n  readonly wrapKind?: 'kek'\n}\n\n/** Wrap-DEKs enroll input (password, future on-* using the unified wrap-DEKs primitive). */\nexport interface EnrollAuthenticatorWrappingDEKsOptions extends EnrollAuthenticatorBase {\n  readonly wrapKind: 'deks'\n  /** Base64 AES-GCM ciphertext of `{ deks: { collection: base64rawDek } }`. */\n  readonly wrapped_deks: string\n  /** Base64 AES-GCM IV used for the `wrapped_deks` ciphertext. */\n  readonly iv: string\n}\n\n/** Discriminated union over the two enroll input shapes. */\nexport type EnrollAuthenticatorOptions =\n  | EnrollAuthenticatorWrappingKEKOptions\n  | EnrollAuthenticatorWrappingDEKsOptions\n\n/**\n * Append a new authenticator slot to the keyring file. Throws\n * `ValidationError` if a slot with the same id already exists — the\n * caller decides whether to remove + re-enroll.\n *\n * Accepts either wrap-KEK (WebAuthn, OIDC) or wrap-DEKs (password)\n * input. The variant is preserved verbatim into `KeyringAuthenticator`.\n */\nexport async function enrollAuthenticator(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  options: EnrollAuthenticatorOptions,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  assertSlotListVisible(keyring, 'enrollAuthenticator', vault)\n  const existing = keyring.authenticators.find((a) => a.id === options.id)\n  if (existing) {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      `enrollAuthenticator: slot id \"${options.id}\" already exists in vault \"${vault}\". ` +\n        'Remove the slot first or pick a unique id.',\n    )\n  }\n\n  const base = {\n    id: options.id,\n    method: options.method,\n    enrolled_at: new Date().toISOString(),\n    enrolled_via_tier: options.enrolled_via_tier ?? 1,\n    meta: options.meta,\n  } as const\n\n  const slot: KeyringAuthenticator = options.wrapKind === 'deks'\n    ? {\n        ...base,\n        wrapKind: 'deks',\n        wrapped_deks: options.wrapped_deks,\n        iv: options.iv,\n      }\n    : {\n        ...base,\n        wrapped_kek: options.wrapped_kek,\n      }\n\n  const next = appendSlot(keyring, slot)\n  await persistKeyring(store, vault, next)\n  return next\n}\n\n/**\n * Caller payload for {@link updateAuthenticator}. Mutates only\n * `meta` — the slot's id, method, and wrap material are immutable\n * through this primitive, preserving the anti-slot-swap guard.\n *\n * `meta` is **merged** at the top level: keys absent from the patch\n * are preserved, keys present overwrite. To clear a meta key, pass\n * `null` for that key explicitly. (Same top-level merge semantics as\n * `UserApi.updateMe`, non-recursive — meta is a flat label bag.)\n */\nexport interface UpdateAuthenticatorOptions {\n  readonly meta?: Record<string, unknown>\n}\n\n/**\n * Mutate a tier-2 authenticator slot's `meta` blob (slot rename,\n * label changes). The slot's `id`, `method`, and wrap material\n * (`wrapped_kek` for wrap-KEK; `wrapped_deks` + `iv` for wrap-DEKs)\n * are immutable through this entry point — the anti-slot-swap guard\n * is structural, not gate-driven, so even if the policy gate is\n * weakened a future caller cannot use this path to swap one slot's\n * crypto for another's.\n *\n * `meta` patch semantics:\n *   - Top-level merge — absent keys preserved, present keys overwrite\n *   - `null` value — delete that meta key\n *   - Non-object values (string, number, boolean, array) — replace verbatim\n *\n * @throws `NoAccessError` when no slot with the given id exists.\n * @throws `ValidationError` when no patch field is provided.\n *\n */\nexport async function updateAuthenticator(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  slotId: string,\n  options: UpdateAuthenticatorOptions,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  if (options.meta === undefined) {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      `updateAuthenticator: at least one of meta must be provided ` +\n        `(slotId: \"${slotId}\").`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  assertSlotListVisible(keyring, 'updateAuthenticator', vault)\n  const idx = keyring.authenticators.findIndex((a) => a.id === slotId)\n  if (idx === -1) {\n    throw new NoAccessError(\n      `updateAuthenticator: slot \"${slotId}\" not found in vault \"${vault}\".`,\n    )\n  }\n  const existing = keyring.authenticators[idx]!\n\n  // Merge at the top level. Absent keys preserved (non-recursive —\n  // meta is a flat label bag in practice, no consumer nests it).\n  const mergedMeta: Record<string, unknown> = { ...existing.meta }\n  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(options.meta)) {\n    if (v === undefined) continue // skip\n    if (v === null) {\n      delete mergedMeta[k]\n      continue\n    }\n    mergedMeta[k] = v\n  }\n\n  // Reconstruct the slot preserving wrapKind discrimination. The\n  // immutable fields (id, method, wrapped_kek / wrapped_deks + iv,\n  // enrolled_at, enrolled_via_tier) all flow through ...existing.\n  const next: KeyringAuthenticator = { ...existing, meta: mergedMeta }\n  const nextSlots = [...keyring.authenticators]\n  nextSlots[idx] = next\n\n  const nextKeyring: UnlockedKeyring = {\n    ...keyring,\n    authenticators: nextSlots,\n  }\n  await persistKeyring(store, vault, nextKeyring)\n  return nextKeyring\n}\n\n/**\n * Refuse any slot-list decision taken from a keyring that cannot be\n * persisted (#1426).\n *\n * `UnlockedKeyring.authenticators` is a snapshot, and a tier-3\n * PIN-resumed / session-restored keyring carries an EMPTY one\n * alongside `kek === null` — not because the vault has no slots, but\n * because that session never unwrapped the KEK and so never read\n * them. Deciding \"the slot isn't there\" from that snapshot answers a\n * question the session cannot see the answer to.\n *\n * `persistKeyring` already refuses a null KEK, so every write path\n * here ends in a throw regardless. What this guard buys is that the\n * throw happens BEFORE the decision instead of after it — otherwise\n * `removeAuthenticator` short-circuits on the empty list and returns\n * a successful no-op, and `updateAuthenticator` reports the slot as\n * \"not found\" when the truthful answer is \"not visible from here\".\n *\n * Same class as the `echo` / `granted_by` / `expires_at` carry-forward\n * comments in `persistKeyring`: an UnlockedKeyring is a partial view,\n * and treating an absent field as a known-empty one silently destroys\n * or misreports state.\n */\nfunction assertSlotListVisible(\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  op: string,\n  vault: string,\n): void {\n  if (keyring.kek) return\n  throw new ValidationError(\n    `${op}: keyring.kek is null, so the authenticator slot list for vault ` +\n      `\"${vault}\" is not readable from this session and no slot decision can ` +\n      'be made. This typically means the keyring was opened via tier-3 PIN ' +\n      'resume, session restore, or a wrap-DEKs tier-2 unlock. Re-authenticate ' +\n      'at tier 1 (secret) before enrolling, updating or removing a slot.',\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Drop a slot by id. No-op if the slot doesn't exist (idempotent —\n * removing a non-existent slot is a recoverable retry, not an error).\n *\n * ⛔ **THIS HIDES A CREDENTIAL. IT DOES NOT REVOKE ONE.** (#1445) The slot\n * leaves the keyring file and nothing else happens — no key material moves. A\n * slot blob captured before removal, or cached by an honest client earlier in\n * the same session, still unwraps the FULL LIVE DEK SET and reads every record,\n * for as long as those DEKs remain current.\n *\n * That is not a leak in one `on-*` package. `@noy-db/on-password`'s\n * `unwrapDeksWithPassword` and `@noy-db/on-webauthn`'s `unwrapKeyringSummary`\n * both carry the DEK map inside the blob and need no store, no keyring and no\n * network — the blob authenticates itself. A membership check inside a verifier\n * cannot close it, because a blob holder calls the primitive directly and never\n * reaches the verifier.\n *\n * ⭐ To actually revoke, see {@link revokeAuthenticator} — removal, then a DEK\n * rotation, then a re-wrap of the slots that stay. Every step is required and\n * the reasons are measured, not assumed; read that doc before assembling the\n * sequence by hand.\n *\n * ⚠️ Idempotency is only sound when the slot list is actually\n * visible — see {@link assertSlotListVisible} (#1426).\n *\n * @throws `ValidationError` when the session cannot see the slot list.\n */\nexport async function removeAuthenticator(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  slotId: string,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  assertSlotListVisible(keyring, 'removeAuthenticator', vault)\n  const filtered = keyring.authenticators.filter((a) => a.id !== slotId)\n  if (filtered.length === keyring.authenticators.length) {\n    return keyring // idempotent — nothing to do\n  }\n  const next: UnlockedKeyring = {\n    ...keyring,\n    authenticators: filtered,\n  }\n  await persistKeyring(store, vault, next)\n  return next\n}\n\n/**\n * Look up a slot by id. Returns `undefined` when no slot matches.\n * Used by tier-2 unlock dispatchers to fetch the wrapped KEK + meta\n * before invoking the method-specific verifier.\n */\nexport function findAuthenticator(\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  slotId: string,\n): KeyringAuthenticator | undefined {\n  return keyring.authenticators.find((a) => a.id === slotId)\n}\n\nfunction appendSlot(\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  slot: KeyringAuthenticator,\n): UnlockedKeyring {\n  return {\n    ...keyring,\n    authenticators: [...keyring.authenticators, slot],\n  }\n}\n\n/** Inputs for {@link revokeAuthenticator}. */\nexport interface RevokeAuthenticatorOptions {\n  /** The slot to revoke. */\n  readonly slotId: string\n  /**\n   * The vault owner's CURRENT secret. Passed as both `oldSecret` and\n   * `newSecret` to `rotateSecret`, which accepts them being equal — measured,\n   * so revoking one credential does not force everyone onto a new phrase.\n   */\n  readonly secret: RotateSecretInput['oldSecret']\n  /**\n   * A re-wrap ceremony for EVERY slot that stays, keyed by slot id.\n   *\n   * ⛔ A slot with no ceremony is DROPPED, not preserved — that is\n   * `rotateSecret`'s existing behaviour (#29 / PR5: \"without `slotCeremonies`,\n   * rotation drops every slot\"), and it is the honest outcome, because after\n   * step 2 its blob wraps DEKs that no longer exist. Supplying one requires\n   * that credential to be present: the password for `on-password`, a live\n   * assertion for `on-webauthn`. There is no way around that — re-wrapping a\n   * credential is the credential's own operation.\n   */\n  readonly slotCeremonies?: { readonly [slotId: string]: SlotRewrapCeremony }\n}\n\n/**\n * Actually revoke an authenticator slot: remove it, mint fresh DEKs, and\n * re-wrap the slots that stay (#1445).\n *\n * ## Why this is three steps and not one\n *\n * Each was measured, because the composition looks obvious and the obvious\n * compositions do not work:\n *\n * 1. **{@link removeAuthenticator}** hides the slot. On its own it revokes\n *    nothing — the captured blob carries its own DEKs.\n * 2. **`rotateKeys`** is the step that revokes. It is the ONLY one that calls\n *    `generateDEK()`. Measured: a collection's DEK is byte-identical across a\n *    `rotateSecret` and different across a `rotateKeys`.\n *    ⚠️ `rotateSecret` alone does NOT revoke, however it reads:\n *    it unwraps every DEK with the old KEK and rewraps THE SAME KEY MATERIAL\n *    under the new one. A captured blob holds DEK VALUES and records are\n *    encrypted with DEKs, so rewrapping them changes nothing the holder needs.\n * 3. **`rotateSecret` with `slotCeremonies`** re-wraps the remaining slots\n *    around the new DEKs. Without it they survive step 2 BYTE-IDENTICAL\n *    (measured: `rotateKeys` never touches `authenticators[]`) and therefore\n *    silently wrap keys that no longer exist — every other credential in the\n *    vault dies quietly. This step is what makes the operation safe for\n *    everyone who was not being revoked.\n *\n * ⭐ Neither primitive is sufficient alone and they are not interchangeable:\n * `rotateKeys` mints keys but cannot re-wrap slots; `rotateSecret` re-wraps\n * slots but cannot mint keys.\n *\n * ## Cost\n *\n * Step 2 re-encrypts every record in every affected collection, and every\n * remaining credential holder must be present for step 3. This is expensive on\n * purpose: it is what revocation costs when the credential is a bearer token.\n *\n * @throws `ValidationError` when the session cannot see the slot list\n *   ({@link assertSlotListVisible}) — a tier-1 unlock is required, and #1432\n *   guarantees the KEK rotation needs is present at this point.\n */\nexport async function revokeAuthenticator(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  options: RevokeAuthenticatorOptions,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  // 1. Hide it. Also runs the #1426 visibility guard, so everything below is\n  //    reached only from a session that can actually see (and persist) slots.\n  const next = await removeAuthenticator(store, vault, keyring, options.slotId)\n\n  // 2. Mint fresh DEKs — the step that revokes.\n  //    The set is derived from the DEK map the way `revoke` derives its own,\n  //    minus the reserved slots that are KEYS rather than collections —\n  //    {@link NON_ROTATABLE_SLOTS}, the one list. `rotateKeys` throws on each if\n  //    named explicitly, so they are dropped here at the site that gathers them\n  //    implicitly. ⛔ This was a hand-copied pair (roster key, blob root) and it\n  //    broke the day the list grew (core#65's inbox key), which is why the list\n  //    now lives in one place.\n  const collections = new Set(next.deks.keys())\n  for (const slot of NON_ROTATABLE_SLOTS) collections.delete(slot)\n  if (collections.size > 0) {\n    await rotateKeys(store, vault, next, { collections: [...collections] })\n  }\n\n  // 3. Re-wrap the slots that stay, around the DEKs step 2 just minted.\n  //    `oldSecret === newSecret` is accepted (measured), so this re-wraps\n  //    without forcing a phrase change. A slot with no ceremony is dropped —\n  //    see `slotCeremonies`.\n  return rotateSecret(store, vault, next.userId, {\n    oldSecret: options.secret,\n    newSecret: options.secret,\n    ...(options.slotCeremonies !== undefined && { slotCeremonies: options.slotCeremonies }),\n  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package/dist/{chunk-XKBTJGFP.js → chunk-GU6QXHPZ.js}

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import {
   importTransferKey,
   recipientUnwrap,
   recipientWrap
-} from "./chunk-4J3MNVVX.js";
+} from "./chunk-WRLWEYHY.js";
 
 // src/with-party/team/managed-secret.ts
 var MemorySealer = class {
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ var MemorySealer = class {
    * says `unseal` MUST throw on tamper, and a double that silently returns
    * corrupted bytes is not modelling the contract it stands in for. Without
    * it, every managed-mode test ran against a provider that could not fail
-   * the way a real one must (found by @noy-db/test-sealer-conformance).
+   * the way a real one must (found by @noy-db/ports/at).
    */
   tag(cipher) {
     let a = 2654435769;
@@ -249,4 +249,4 @@ export {
   loadSealedSecret,
   resolveManagedSecret
 };
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+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-party/team/managed-secret.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Managed-secret mode — rubber-hose-resistant vaults.\n *\n * A vault mode where the secret is machine-generated and never\n * exposed to the user, sealed under a developer-provided\n * {@link NoydbSealer} (macOS Keychain, Windows Credential\n * Manager, libsecret, AWS KMS, …). The user has no secret to give\n * up to coercion — they can't reveal what they don't know.\n *\n * ## Components in this file\n *\n *   - {@link NoydbSealer} — the interface concrete providers\n *     implement. Provider implementations live OUTSIDE hub (per-\n *     platform packages).\n *   - {@link MemorySealer} — in-memory test provider; uses\n *     a deterministic per-instance \"key\" so two providers with\n *     different ids cannot unseal each other's outputs.\n *   - {@link RecipientHint} — public material a sender uses to seal\n *     plaintext for a specific recipient; published by\n *     {@link RecipientSealer.publishRecipientHint} and transported\n *     out-of-band to the sender before bundle writes.\n *   - {@link RecipientSealer} — interface for asymmetric/granted\n *     providers that support recipient-target sealing (RSA-OAEP,\n *     cloud-KMS asymmetric, etc.); distinct from self-only\n *     {@link NoydbSealer} (macOS Keychain, WebAuthn-PRF).\n *   - {@link MemoryRecipientSealer} — in-process reference\n *     implementation of both `RecipientSealer` and\n *     `NoydbSealer` using real WebCrypto RSA-OAEP + AES-GCM;\n *     safe for tests and same-process sender/recipient scenarios.\n *   - {@link loadSealedSecret} / {@link saveSealedSecret} —\n *     plaintext envelope storage at `_meta/sealed-secret`.\n *     Mirrors the `_meta/handle` and `_meta/public-envelope` AES-\n *     GCM-bypassed patterns. The sealing layer (provider's job)\n *     is the security boundary; hub doesn't have a key to encrypt\n *     with at this layer — that's the whole point of the design.\n *   - {@link resolveManagedSecret} — orchestrates the \"generate +\n *     seal + persist on first open; unseal on reopen\" flow.\n *     Returns the plaintext secret string that the rest of the\n *     `createNoydb` keyring path consumes.\n *\n * Deferred to follow-ups:\n *   - Block `rotate-secret` policy gate under managed mode.\n *   - Mandatory strong-recovery enforcement.\n *   - Recovery flow under managed mode (generates fresh sealed phrase).\n *\n * @see https://github.com/noy-db/docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/session-tiers.md → Managed-secret mode\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport {\n  buildRecordEnvelope,\n  importTransferKey,\n  encryptBytes,\n  decryptBytes,\n  bufferToBase64,\n  base64ToBuffer,\n  generateRecipientKeyPair,\n  exportRecipientPublicKeySpki,\n  importRecipientPublicKeySpki,\n  recipientWrap,\n  recipientUnwrap,\n  type EnclaveKeyPair,\n} from '../../capsule/index.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore, RecipientSealer } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\n/**\n * The contract concrete providers (per-platform key stores) implement\n * to seal and unseal a hub-generated random secret. The plaintext\n * secret NEVER leaves hub-controlled memory in unsealed form —\n * the provider receives the bytes, returns opaque sealed bytes, and\n * later reverses the operation. Hub treats the sealed bytes as\n * fully opaque.\n *\n * Implementations live OUTSIDE `@noy-db/hub` (separate packages\n * per the issue's \"Concrete providers (live outside hub)\" note):\n *\n * | Platform | Package (TBD) | Backing |\n * |---|---|---|\n * | macOS | `@noy-db/seal-macos-keychain` | Security.framework |\n * | Windows | `@noy-db/seal-wincred` | Credential Manager |\n * | Linux | `@noy-db/seal-libsecret` | libsecret / secret-service |\n * | Cloud / server | `@noy-db/seal-aws-kms` | AWS KMS Decrypt |\n */\nexport interface NoydbSealer {\n  /**\n   * Non-sensitive identifier disclosed in the persisted envelope.\n   * Surfaced to consumers via `loadSealedSecret().providerId` so\n   * a vault opened with the wrong provider class can detect the\n   * mismatch and surface a clear error. NOT secret — fine to log.\n   *\n   * Suggested format: `<family>:<scope>` — e.g. `macos-keychain:com.acme.app`,\n   * `aws-kms:arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123:key/abc`. The hub never\n   * parses this; it's purely audit metadata.\n   */\n  readonly id: string\n\n  /** Seal raw secret bytes. Output bytes are opaque to hub. */\n  seal(secret: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>\n\n  /**\n   * Reverse {@link seal}. MUST throw on tamper, wrong-provider, or\n   * any other failure — hub treats a thrown error as \"this provider\n   * cannot unlock this vault\" and surfaces it to the caller.\n   */\n  unseal(sealed: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>\n}\n\n/**\n * In-memory test provider. NOT secure — uses a deterministic\n * per-instance \"key\" (16-byte SHA-256 of `id`) XOR'd over the\n * secret plus a 4-byte provider-id fingerprint prefix. The XOR is\n * sufficient to make different `id` values produce mutually-unsealable\n * outputs (the contract tests for that), but offers ZERO real\n * confidentiality — never use outside tests.\n *\n * Replace with a real platform provider in production.\n */\nexport class MemorySealer implements NoydbSealer {\n  readonly id: string\n  private readonly fingerprint: Uint8Array\n  private readonly keyBytes: Uint8Array\n\n  constructor(opts: { id: string }) {\n    this.id = opts.id\n    // Deterministic 4-byte fingerprint of the provider id, prepended\n    // to every sealed output so we can detect \"wrong provider\" at\n    // unseal time without leaking anything sensitive about either\n    // provider's actual key material.\n    const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(opts.id)\n    let h = 0\n    for (let i = 0; i < encoded.length; i++) {\n      h = (h * 31 + encoded[i]!) >>> 0\n    }\n    this.fingerprint = new Uint8Array([\n      (h >>> 24) & 0xff, (h >>> 16) & 0xff, (h >>> 8) & 0xff, h & 0xff,\n    ])\n    // Deterministic 16-byte \"key\" derived from the id by repeating\n    // the fingerprint with offsets. Good enough for the XOR-stream\n    // test cipher; never confuse this with real key derivation.\n    this.keyBytes = new Uint8Array(16)\n    for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) {\n      this.keyBytes[i] = this.fingerprint[i % 4]! ^ (i * 17)\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Deterministic 4-byte integrity tag over the ciphertext, keyed by the\n   * same derived bytes. NOT a MAC and not forgery-resistant — a real\n   * provider authenticates with its backend. It exists because the contract\n   * says `unseal` MUST throw on tamper, and a double that silently returns\n   * corrupted bytes is not modelling the contract it stands in for. Without\n   * it, every managed-mode test ran against a provider that could not fail\n   * the way a real one must (found by @noy-db/ports/at).\n   */\n  private tag(cipher: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n    let a = 0x9e3779b9\n    for (let i = 0; i < cipher.length; i++) {\n      a = ((a ^ (cipher[i]! ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16]!)) * 0x01000193) >>> 0\n    }\n    return new Uint8Array([(a >>> 24) & 0xff, (a >>> 16) & 0xff, (a >>> 8) & 0xff, a & 0xff])\n  }\n\n  async seal(secret: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const cipher = new Uint8Array(secret.length)\n    for (let i = 0; i < secret.length; i++) {\n      cipher[i] = secret[i]! ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16]!\n    }\n    const out = new Uint8Array(8 + secret.length)\n    out.set(this.fingerprint, 0)\n    out.set(this.tag(cipher), 4)\n    out.set(cipher, 8)\n    return out\n  }\n\n  async unseal(sealed: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    if (sealed.length < 8) {\n      throw new Error('MemorySealer: sealed input too short')\n    }\n    for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {\n      if (sealed[i] !== this.fingerprint[i]) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `MemorySealer(\"${this.id}\"): provider-id mismatch on unseal `\n          + '(sealed bytes were produced by a different provider)',\n        )\n      }\n    }\n    const cipher = sealed.subarray(8)\n    const expected = this.tag(cipher)\n    for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {\n      if (sealed[4 + i] !== expected[i]) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `MemorySealer(\"${this.id}\"): integrity check failed on unseal `\n          + '(the sealed bytes were modified after sealing)',\n        )\n      }\n    }\n    const out = new Uint8Array(cipher.length)\n    for (let i = 0; i < cipher.length; i++) {\n      out[i] = cipher[i]! ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16]!\n    }\n    return out\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Public material a sender uses to seal-for-this-recipient. Published by\n * a recipient's RecipientSealer; transported to the sender out-of-band\n * (email, S3, in-app message). The sender obtains the hint, supplies it\n * to writePod's sealedCredentials.perUser[userId].hint, and the\n * hub seals each user's credential against it. Per foundation §11.4.\n */\nexport type RecipientHint = {\n  readonly v: 1\n  /** Recipient's provider id; matches the SealedAutoUnlockEntry.pid they'll unseal under. */\n  readonly pid: string\n  /** Algorithm the sender uses to produce the seal. Slice 1 ships RSA-OAEP-SHA256 only. */\n  readonly alg: 'rsa-oaep-sha256'\n  /** Public material — alg-specific. For 'rsa-oaep-sha256': { publicKeyPem: string }. */\n  readonly material: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>\n}\n\n// Hoisted to kernel/types.ts (C3 — enclave self-containment: sealing.ts\n// consumes this as a spine-owned contract type). Re-exported here so existing\n// importers of this module are unaffected.\nexport type { RecipientSealer } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\n/**\n * Shared RSA-OAEP-SHA256 + AES-GCM seal in the canonical recipient-target\n * TLV wire format. Mints a fresh 32-byte CEK, AES-GCM-encrypts `plaintext`\n * under it, RSA-OAEP-SHA256-wraps the CEK to `publicKeyPem`, and packs:\n *\n *   byte  0       : version (0x01)\n *   bytes 1..256  : RSA-OAEP-wrapped CEK (fixed 256 bytes at RSA-2048)\n *   bytes 257..268: AES-GCM IV (12 bytes)\n *   bytes 269..   : AES-GCM ciphertext ‖ 16-byte tag\n *\n * This is the single source of truth for the wire format — both\n * {@link MemoryRecipientSealer} and external sealers (e.g. `@noy-db/at-aws-kms`'s\n * asymmetric-KMS recipient sealer) call it so a blob sealed by one unseals\n * by the other. WebCrypto RSA-OAEP/SHA-256 here is wire-compatible with\n * AWS KMS `RSAES_OAEP_SHA_256` (both RSAES-OAEP, SHA-256 hash, MGF1-SHA256,\n * empty label).\n *\n * @public — re-exported from the hub barrel for external sealer packages.\n */\nexport async function sealRsaOaepTlv(plaintext: Uint8Array, publicKeyPem: string): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  // Parse PEM → SPKI bytes.\n  const b64 = publicKeyPem.replace(/-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----/, '').replace(/-----END PUBLIC KEY-----/, '').replace(/\\s+/g, '')\n  const recipientPub = await importRecipientPublicKeySpki(base64ToBytes(b64))\n  // Mint fresh CEK, AES-GCM encrypt plaintext.\n  const cekBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))\n  const cek = await importTransferKey(cekBytes)\n  const { iv: ivB64, data } = await encryptBytes(plaintext, cek)\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivB64)\n  const ct = base64ToBuffer(data)\n  // RSA-OAEP-wrap the CEK bytes.\n  const wrapped = await recipientWrap(recipientPub, cekBytes)\n  cekBytes.fill(0)\n  if (wrapped.length !== 256) {\n    throw new Error(`sealRsaOaepTlv: expected 256-byte RSA-OAEP wrap, got ${wrapped.length}`)\n  }\n  // TLV layout.\n  const out = new Uint8Array(1 + 256 + 12 + ct.length)\n  out[0] = 0x01\n  out.set(wrapped, 1)\n  out.set(iv, 1 + 256)\n  out.set(ct, 1 + 256 + 12)\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a {@link sealRsaOaepTlv} blob into its three segments without\n * decrypting. The `wrapped` CEK is RSA-OAEP-SHA256 ciphertext over a\n * 32-byte CEK — the unwrap step is pluggable: {@link MemoryRecipientSealer}\n * decrypts it with a local RSA private key; `@noy-db/at-aws-kms` hands it to\n * KMS `Decrypt`. After unwrapping, pass the CEK + `iv` + `ct` to\n * {@link aesGcmOpen}.\n *\n * @public — re-exported from the hub barrel for external sealer packages.\n */\nexport function parseRsaOaepTlv(bytes: Uint8Array): { wrapped: Uint8Array; iv: Uint8Array; ct: Uint8Array } {\n  if (bytes.length < 1 + 256 + 12 + 16) {\n    throw new Error('parseRsaOaepTlv: sealed input too short')\n  }\n  if (bytes[0] !== 0x01) {\n    throw new Error(`parseRsaOaepTlv: unknown TLV version ${bytes[0]}`)\n  }\n  return {\n    wrapped: bytes.subarray(1, 1 + 256),\n    iv: bytes.subarray(1 + 256, 1 + 256 + 12),\n    ct: bytes.subarray(1 + 256 + 12),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * AES-GCM-decrypt the `ct` segment of a {@link parseRsaOaepTlv} result under\n * the unwrapped 32-byte CEK and its `iv`. Throws on a bad tag (tamper) — the\n * same authenticated-decryption guarantee the TLV relies on.\n *\n * @public — re-exported from the hub barrel for external sealer packages.\n */\nexport async function aesGcmOpen(cekBytes: Uint8Array, iv: Uint8Array, ct: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const cek = await importTransferKey(cekBytes)\n  return decryptBytes(bufferToBase64(iv), bufferToBase64(ct), cek)\n}\n\n/**\n * Reference implementation of `RecipientSealer` + `NoydbSealer`.\n * Uses WebCrypto RSA-OAEP-SHA256 (2048-bit) to wrap a fresh 32-byte\n * AES-GCM CEK, AES-GCM-encrypts plaintext under it, and packs the\n * result into a self-describing TLV:\n *\n *   byte  0       : version (0x01)\n *   bytes 1..256  : RSA-OAEP-wrapped CEK (fixed 256 bytes at RSA-2048)\n *   bytes 257..268: AES-GCM IV (12 bytes)\n *   bytes 269..   : AES-GCM ciphertext ‖ 16-byte tag\n *\n * Implements BOTH interfaces. `seal(plaintext)` (self-target) is just\n * `sealForRecipient(plaintext, this own hint)` — same TLV. Convenient\n * for tests where one provider plays both ends. Real cloud providers\n * (`at-aws-kms`, etc.) will pick their own internal layouts; the only\n * contract is round-trip identity.\n *\n * SAFE for production within its scope — the cryptography is real\n * (RSA-OAEP + AES-GCM via WebCrypto), but the keypair lives in-process\n * and is regenerated on every construction. Not suitable as a managed\n * keychain; use it for tests and for shipping bundles where the\n * recipient instance lives in the same process as the sender (rare).\n */\nexport class MemoryRecipientSealer implements NoydbSealer, RecipientSealer {\n  readonly id: string\n  private readonly keypair: Promise<EnclaveKeyPair>\n\n  constructor(opts: { id: string }) {\n    this.id = opts.id\n    this.keypair = generateRecipientKeyPair()\n  }\n\n  async publishRecipientHint(): Promise<RecipientHint> {\n    const spki = await exportRecipientPublicKeySpki(await this.keypair)\n    const pem = '-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\\n'\n      + bytesToBase64(spki).match(/.{1,64}/g)!.join('\\n')\n      + '\\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\\n'\n    return { v: 1, pid: this.id, alg: 'rsa-oaep-sha256', material: { publicKeyPem: pem } }\n  }\n\n  async sealForRecipient(plaintext: Uint8Array, hint: RecipientHint): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    if (hint.v !== 1) {\n      throw new Error(`MemoryRecipientSealer.sealForRecipient: unsupported hint.v ${String(hint.v)} (expected 1)`)\n    }\n    if (hint.alg !== 'rsa-oaep-sha256') {\n      throw new Error(`MemoryRecipientSealer.sealForRecipient: unsupported hint.alg '${String(hint.alg)}' (expected 'rsa-oaep-sha256')`)\n    }\n    const pem = hint.material['publicKeyPem']\n    if (typeof pem !== 'string') {\n      throw new Error('MemoryRecipientSealer.sealForRecipient: hint.material.publicKeyPem missing or not a string')\n    }\n    return sealRsaOaepTlv(plaintext, pem)\n  }\n\n  async seal(plaintext: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const hint = await this.publishRecipientHint()\n    return this.sealForRecipient(plaintext, hint)\n  }\n\n  async unseal(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const { wrapped, iv, ct } = parseRsaOaepTlv(bytes)\n    // Local RSA-OAEP-SHA256 unwrap of the CEK — the pluggable step external\n    // sealers replace with KMS Decrypt.\n    const cekBytes = await recipientUnwrap(await this.keypair, wrapped)\n    const pt = await aesGcmOpen(cekBytes, iv, ct)\n    cekBytes.fill(0)\n    return pt\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Persisted envelope ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Reserved id for the managed-secret envelope under `_meta`. */\nexport const SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID = 'sealed-secret' as const\n\n/** Plaintext payload stored inside the `_meta/sealed-secret` envelope. */\nexport interface SealedSecret {\n  readonly _noydb_sealed: 1\n  readonly providerId: string\n  /** Sealed bytes. Base64-encoded on the wire; decoded on load. */\n  readonly sealed: Uint8Array\n}\n\n/**\n * Wire-format envelope persisted at `_meta/sealed-secret` for\n * managed-mode vaults. The provider produces raw sealed bytes via\n * {@link NoydbSealer.seal}; this wrapper carries the dispatch\n * metadata hub needs to pick the right provider on the unseal path.\n *\n * Stability boundary: once shipped, the wire format only grows by\n * adding optional fields. See the at-* sealing dimension foundation\n * doc, §11.9.1.\n *\n * v1 shape (this release): `{ v: 1, _noydb_sealed: 1, pid, payload }`.\n *\n * Legacy shape (earlier releases): `{ _noydb_sealed: 1, providerId, sealed }`\n * — accepted on read for backwards compatibility; never produced on\n * write going forward.\n */\nexport interface SealedEnvelope {\n  /** Envelope schema version. v1 is the current shape. */\n  readonly v: 1\n  /** Magic marker for forensics + legacy-shape detection. */\n  readonly _noydb_sealed: 1\n  /** Matches the producing provider's `.id`. Dispatch key on unseal. */\n  readonly pid: string\n  /** Sealed bytes from the provider, base64-encoded on the wire. */\n  readonly payload: string\n}\n\nfunction bytesToBase64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  let binary = ''\n  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) binary += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]!)\n  return btoa(binary)\n}\n\nfunction base64ToBytes(b64: string): Uint8Array {\n  const binary = atob(b64)\n  const out = new Uint8Array(binary.length)\n  for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) out[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i)\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a `_meta/sealed-secret` `_data` JSON string into the\n * in-memory {@link SealedSecret} representation. Accepts both:\n *\n *   1. v1 wire format `{ v: 1, _noydb_sealed: 1, pid, payload }` —\n *      the current shape.\n *   2. Legacy wire format `{ _noydb_sealed: 1, providerId, sealed }` —\n *      read-only; never written\n *      going forward.\n *\n * Returns `undefined` for any input that doesn't match either shape,\n * so callers can fall back to \"no managed-mode envelope present.\"\n *\n * @internal — exported only for the migration safety-net test suite.\n */\nexport function parseSealedEnvelope(raw: unknown): SealedSecret | undefined {\n  if (typeof raw !== 'object' || raw === null) return undefined\n  const r = raw as Record<string, unknown>\n  if (r._noydb_sealed !== 1) return undefined\n\n  // v1 shape — preferred.\n  if (\n    r.v === 1\n    && typeof r.pid === 'string'\n    && typeof r.payload === 'string'\n  ) {\n    return {\n      _noydb_sealed: 1,\n      providerId: r.pid,\n      sealed: base64ToBytes(r.payload),\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Legacy shape — earlier releases. Accept on read for compat.\n  if (\n    typeof r.providerId === 'string'\n    && typeof r.sealed === 'string'\n  ) {\n    return {\n      _noydb_sealed: 1,\n      providerId: r.providerId,\n      sealed: base64ToBytes(r.sealed),\n    }\n  }\n\n  return undefined\n}\n\nexport async function saveSealedSecret(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  payload: { readonly providerId: string; readonly sealed: Uint8Array },\n): Promise<void> {\n  const persisted: SealedEnvelope = {\n    v: 1,\n    _noydb_sealed: 1,\n    pid: payload.providerId,\n    payload: bytesToBase64(payload.sealed),\n  }\n  const prior = await store.get(vault, '_meta', SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID)\n  const env = buildRecordEnvelope(\n    { collection: '_meta', id: SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID, version: (prior?._v ?? 0) + 1 },\n    // AES-GCM bypassed — the sealing layer is the security boundary.\n    { iv: '', data: JSON.stringify(persisted) },\n  )\n  await store.put(vault, '_meta', SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID, env)\n}\n\nexport async function loadSealedSecret(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<SealedSecret | undefined> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, '_meta', SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!envelope) return undefined\n  try {\n    return parseSealedEnvelope(JSON.parse(envelope._data ?? ''))\n  } catch {\n    return undefined\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── createNoydb orchestration ─────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Resolve the effective plaintext secret string for a managed-mode\n * vault. Two paths:\n *\n *   1. **First open (no envelope persisted):** generate a 256-bit random\n *      via `crypto.getRandomValues`, base64-encode for use as a\n *      secret string, seal the underlying bytes under the\n *      provider, persist `_meta/sealed-secret`, return the\n *      base64 string.\n *\n *   2. **Reopen (envelope exists):** read + unseal + decode → return.\n *      A different provider whose `seal` output disagrees on the\n *      stored bytes throws here, surfaced as a clear error.\n *\n * The returned string is the same shape that `secret:` would take in\n * standard mode — the rest of the keyring path consumes it\n * unchanged.\n *\n * @internal — called from `createNoydb` / `getKeyringInternal`.\n */\nexport async function resolveManagedSecret(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  provider: NoydbSealer,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const existing = await loadSealedSecret(store, vault)\n  if (existing) {\n    if (existing.providerId !== provider.id) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Managed-mode vault \"${vault}\" was sealed under provider id `\n        + `\"${existing.providerId}\" but the current NoydbSealer is `\n        + `\"${provider.id}\". Pass the same provider that originally enrolled `\n        + 'the vault, or treat this as a fresh enrollment and clear '\n        + '`_meta/sealed-secret` first.',\n      )\n    }\n    const plaintext = await provider.unseal(existing.sealed)\n    return bytesToBase64(plaintext)\n  }\n\n  // First open: mint a 256-bit random, seal, persist.\n  const random = new Uint8Array(32)\n  globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(random)\n  const sealed = await provider.seal(random)\n  await saveSealedSecret(store, vault, { providerId: provider.id, sealed })\n  return 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package/dist/{chunk-QGFEBNHO.js → chunk-GZISWBCJ.js}

@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
 import {
   splitAroundJoins
-} from "./chunk-ZVSKSUGI.js";
+} from "./chunk-7C7OF26T.js";
 import {
   evaluateClause,
   hasFnClause,
   normalizeMatches,
   normalizeSubqueryOperand
-} from "./chunk-BUE7R3B5.js";
+} from "./chunk-SXPLIRQH.js";
 import {
   FieldNotQueryableError,
   QueryExtensionMissingError
-} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
+} from "./chunk-2RH5SEY7.js";
 
 // src/kernel/query/scan-builder.ts
 var DEFAULT_SCAN_PAGE_SIZE = 100;
@@ -190,4 +190,4 @@ for (const [method, subpath] of SCAN_EXTENSION_METHODS) {
 export {
   ScanBuilder
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-QGFEBNHO.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-GZISWBCJ.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-OM3SEDI4.js → chunk-HTRLQ4ZZ.js}

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 import {
   normalizeForVerify
-} from "./chunk-PUBI455O.js";
+} from "./chunk-EPPAEGH5.js";
 import {
   NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,
   SealedHandle
-} from "./chunk-2ELOCEXE.js";
+} from "./chunk-URGHKZPL.js";
 import {
   ClassifiedConfigError,
   DebugReservedFieldError,
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import {
   RecordCekNotFoundError,
   SchemaValidationError,
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
+} from "./chunk-2RH5SEY7.js";
 
 // src/capsule/plumbing/record-aad.ts
 var SCHEME = "noydb-aad/2";
@@ -1372,4 +1372,4 @@ export {
   makeCapsule,
   ctEqualTags
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-OM3SEDI4.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-HTRLQ4ZZ.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-SWXLZ4HX.js → chunk-ICHHNI5E.js}

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 import {
   SCHEMAS_COLLECTION
-} from "./chunk-H3YM66EI.js";
+} from "./chunk-IF2M43G4.js";
 import {
   assemblePodContainer,
   buildExtractedPartitionWrapper
-} from "./chunk-RDOEOPOI.js";
+} from "./chunk-4N4OIVK3.js";
 import {
   BLOB_CHUNKS_COLLECTION,
   BLOB_COLLECTION,
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import {
   BLOB_INTENT_COLLECTION,
   BLOB_SLOTS_PREFIX,
   BLOB_VERSIONS_PREFIX
-} from "./chunk-QXJXG7DN.js";
+} from "./chunk-7IV7GVOS.js";
 import {
   generateULID
 } from "./chunk-4AOERLTV.js";
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import {
   canonicalJson,
   envelopePayloadHash,
   hashEntry
-} from "./chunk-2WJKJZSO.js";
+} from "./chunk-QHG7GQKM.js";
 import {
   base64ToBuffer,
   bufferToBase64,
@@ -43,13 +43,13 @@ import {
   unwrapCek,
   wrapCek,
   writeEnvelopeBody
-} from "./chunk-4J3MNVVX.js";
+} from "./chunk-WRLWEYHY.js";
 import {
   NOYDB_BACKUP_VERSION
-} from "./chunk-2ELOCEXE.js";
+} from "./chunk-URGHKZPL.js";
 import {
   PartitionExtractionError
-} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
+} from "./chunk-2RH5SEY7.js";
 
 // src/with-cargo/walk-closure.ts
 async function walkClosure(vault, opts) {
@@ -490,4 +490,4 @@ export {
   extractPartition,
   extractPartitionCore
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-SWXLZ4HX.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ICHHNI5E.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-K673OO6B.js → chunk-ID4ZBC3X.js}

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 import {
   installViaBinder
-} from "./chunk-PTJY5R3O.js";
+} from "./chunk-PIO6NW7O.js";
 import {
   SealedHandle
-} from "./chunk-2ELOCEXE.js";
+} from "./chunk-URGHKZPL.js";
 import {
   ClassifiedConfigError,
   ClassifiedNotEnabledError
-} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
+} from "./chunk-2RH5SEY7.js";
 
 // src/via/classified/descriptor.ts
 function isClassifiedFieldSpec(x) {
@@ -270,4 +270,4 @@ export {
   enforceClassifiedWrite,
   NO_CLASSIFIED
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-K673OO6B.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ID4ZBC3X.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-H3YM66EI.js → chunk-IF2M43G4.js}

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import {
   buildRecordEnvelope,
   encrypt,
   openEnvelopeJson
-} from "./chunk-4J3MNVVX.js";
+} from "./chunk-WRLWEYHY.js";
 
 // src/with-shape/persisted-schemas/storage.ts
 var SCHEMAS_COLLECTION = "_schemas";
@@ -41,4 +41,4 @@ export {
   loadPersistedSchema,
   savePersistedSchema
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-H3YM66EI.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IF2M43G4.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-QGSNJD3B.js → chunk-IFUYLIEY.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   CargoNotEnabledError
-} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
+} from "./chunk-2RH5SEY7.js";
 
 // src/with-cargo/strategy.ts
 var NO_CARGO = {
@@ -12,4 +12,4 @@ var NO_CARGO = {
 export {
   NO_CARGO
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-QGSNJD3B.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IFUYLIEY.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-D5A3GCZ4.js → chunk-IPF5ORDI.js}

@@ -5,10 +5,10 @@ import {
   generateSigningKeyPair,
   openEnvelopeJson,
   sha256Hex
-} from "./chunk-4J3MNVVX.js";
+} from "./chunk-WRLWEYHY.js";
 import {
   ConflictError
-} from "./chunk-VSUQI5Q6.js";
+} from "./chunk-2RH5SEY7.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/attestation/signer.ts
 var ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION = "_attestations";
@@ -54,4 +54,4 @@ export {
   loadSigner,
   loadOrCreateSigner
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-D5A3GCZ4.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IPF5ORDI.js.map