@noy-db/hub 0.8.0 → 0.9.0-pre.1

package/dist/backup-RJBFQSHE.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-pod/backup.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Vault backup / restore / integrity.\n *\n * Holds `dump()` (verifiable encrypted JSON backup, including the blob\n * collections so blob \"covers\" travel in the bundle), `load()` (restore +\n * post-load integrity gate), `verifyBackupIntegrity()` (chain + data-envelope\n * cross-check), and `exportJSON()` (plaintext per-collection export, built on\n * the vault's `exportStream`). Behaviour is byte-identical to the inline\n * `Vault` methods these functions replaced — every dependency the moving code\n * touched on `this.*` arrives via {@link BackupContext}. `Vault` keeps the\n * public methods as thin delegators.\n *\n * Internal — reached through `vault.dump()` / `vault.load()` / etc.\n */\nimport { NOYDB_BACKUP_VERSION } from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport { BackupLedgerError, BackupCorruptedError } from '../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { LEDGER_COLLECTION, LEDGER_DELTAS_COLLECTION } from '../with-commit/history/ledger/constants.js'\nimport { SCHEMAS_COLLECTION } from '../with-shape/persisted-schemas/storage.js'\nimport { SEQUENCE_COLLECTION } from '../with-commit/sequence/index.js'\nimport { MANIFEST_COLLECTION } from '../with-shape/manifest/reserved-collections.js'\n// #1025 — imported from the dependency-light `window.ts`, not `periods.ts`: that\n// module exists precisely so a consumer can name the period collections without\n// dragging the ledger hash-chain machinery (`sha256Hex`/`canonicalJson`) into a\n// bundle that opted out of the periods service. Same reason the sync engine's\n// period-scoped pull imports it.\nimport {\n  PERIODS_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_FREEZES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_ARCHIVES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_TARGET_PURGES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_REOPENS_COLLECTION,\n} from '../with-audit/periods/window.js'\nimport type {\n  NoydbStore,\n  EncryptedEnvelope,\n  VaultBackup,\n  VaultSnapshot,\n  LoadPodOptions,\n  LoadPodResult,\n  ExportStreamOptions,\n  ExportChunk,\n} from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { LedgerStore } from '../with-commit/history/ledger/store.js'\nimport { buildRecordEnvelope } from '../capsule/index.js'\n\n/** Everything the moving backup methods touched on the vault's `this.*`. */\nexport interface BackupContext {\n  /** The ciphertext store. */\n  readonly adapter: NoydbStore\n  /** Vault namespace name. */\n  readonly vault: string\n  /** The invoking keyring's user id (read fresh per call). */\n  userId(): string\n  /** The vault's ledger store, or null when history is off. */\n  getLedgerOrNull(): LedgerStore | null\n  /** Recompute an envelope's `payloadHash` (bound `historyStrategy.envelopePayloadHash`). */\n  envelopePayloadHash(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope): Promise<string>\n  /**\n   * Refresh the in-memory keyring from the freshly-loaded keyring file and\n   * rebuild the DEK resolver. No-op when the vault has no `reloadKeyring`\n   * callback (plaintext vaults / test constructions).\n   */\n  reloadKeyringAndRebuildDEK(): Promise<void>\n  /**\n   * core#71 — reset every sync engine attached to the vault after a restore:\n   * the dirty log, the watermarks, the adopted epoch. A restore is a new base;\n   * the pre-restore dirty entries refer to records the load just replaced.\n   * Absent on test constructions without sync.\n   */\n  resetSync?(): Promise<void>\n  /** Clear the vault's collection cache (post-load). */\n  clearCollectionCache(): void\n  /** Reset the ledger store so the next `ledger()` rebuilds its head cache. */\n  resetLedgerStore(): void\n  /** The vault's decrypt+ACL export stream (used by `exportJSON`). */\n  exportStream(opts: ExportStreamOptions): AsyncIterableIterator<ExportChunk>\n}\n\n/** Result of {@link verifyBackupIntegrity}. */\nexport type VerifyBackupResult =\n  | { readonly ok: true; readonly head: string; readonly length: number }\n  | {\n      readonly ok: false\n      readonly kind: 'chain'\n      readonly divergedAt: number\n      readonly message: string\n    }\n  | {\n      readonly ok: false\n      readonly kind: 'data'\n      readonly collection: string\n      readonly id: string\n      readonly message: string\n    }\n\n/**\n * Dump vault as a verifiable encrypted JSON backup string.\n *\n * backups embed the current ledger head and the full `_ledger` +\n * `_ledger_deltas` internal collections so the receiver can run\n * `verifyBackupIntegrity()` after `load()` and detect any tampering between\n * dump and restore. Backups produced without a ledger skip the integrity check\n * with a warning — both modes round-trip cleanly.\n */\n/**\n * core#111 — the internal collections a pod carries, derived from its DATA\n * collection names. ⭐ ONE definition, used by the dump AND by the load's\n * clear step: they must agree or a restore leaves rows behind that the pod\n * says should not exist.\n *\n * ⛔ The load side CANNOT just clear what the pod carries. The dump skips a\n * collection with no rows (`if (ids.length === 0) continue`), so a pod taken\n * while `_periods` was empty does not mention `_periods` at all — and a store\n * that has since closed a period would keep those rows through a restore.\n * Absence in a pod means \"empty at dump time\", never \"leave whatever is there\".\n */\nfunction internalCollectionNames(dataCollections: readonly string[]): string[] {\n  return [\n    LEDGER_COLLECTION, LEDGER_DELTAS_COLLECTION, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION, SEQUENCE_COLLECTION,\n    MANIFEST_COLLECTION, // #941: the pod's manifest-set record(s) travel in the bundle too\n    // #1025: the accounting-period close state + its companions. The bundle is\n    // the backup/restore path, so without these a restore discarded the\n    // hash-chained evidence that a month was ever closed — the artifact\n    // `closePeriod` exists to produce — and dropped the write gate with it, so\n    // the restored vault silently accepted back-dated writes into a sealed\n    // month. The companions matter as much as the close: a bounded reopen\n    // window (`reopenPeriod({ until })`) is state a restore must not lose.\n    PERIODS_COLLECTION,\n    PERIOD_REOPENS_COLLECTION,\n    PERIOD_FREEZES_COLLECTION,\n    PERIOD_ARCHIVES_COLLECTION,\n    PERIOD_TARGET_PURGES_COLLECTION,\n    '_history', // full-snapshot version history — so history()/getVersion()/diff() survive the bundle\n    '_blob_index', '_blob_chunks', '_blob_eviction_audit',\n    // #753 spec §7 Q3: `_blob_intent` markers travel too — restoring mid-op\n    // state (a blob row without its marker) would reproduce the ambiguity\n    // the journal exists to prevent. Note: `_mv_stale` does NOT travel\n    // today (a pre-existing, separate gap) — observed here, tracked on\n    // #761, not fixed in this pass.\n    '_blob_intent',\n    // #769: `_blob_slots_<c>` envelopes travel verbatim (raw ciphertext,\n    // same DEK, same vault) — including any `SlotRecord.pendingRelease`\n    // resume breadcrumb they carry. This is INTENTIONALLY the opposite of\n    // `extract-partition`'s `reKeyBlobs`, which STRIPS `pendingRelease`:\n    // a full-vault backup restores into the SAME vault it was taken from,\n    // so a breadcrumb taken mid-rehome (together with its `_blob_intent`\n    // marker, carried above) is resumable on restore — carry-and-resume is\n    // correct here. A partition extraction crosses vaults: the breadcrumb's\n    // old eTag may not exist in the destination, so it must be stripped\n    // there instead. Asymmetry: backup = same-vault-resumable = carry;\n    // partition = cross-vault = strip-breadcrumb-carry-marker.\n    ...dataCollections.flatMap((c) => [`_blob_slots_${c}`, `_blob_versions_${c}`]),\n  ]\n}\n\nexport async function dumpVault(ctx: BackupContext): Promise<string> {\n  const snapshot = await ctx.adapter.loadAll(ctx.vault)\n\n  // Load keyrings (separate path because loadAll filters them out\n  // along with all other underscore-prefixed internal collections).\n  const keyringIds = await ctx.adapter.list(ctx.vault, '_keyring')\n  const keyrings: Record<string, unknown> = {}\n  for (const keyringId of keyringIds) {\n    const envelope = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, '_keyring', keyringId)\n    if (envelope) {\n      keyrings[keyringId] = JSON.parse(envelope._data ?? '')\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Load the ledger entries + deltas so the receiver can replay\n  // the chain after restore. Without this, `load()` would have an\n  // empty ledger and `verifyBackupIntegrity()` would have nothing\n  // to compare against.\n  //\n  // Also enumerate the blob collections so blob content (\"covers\")\n  // travels in the bundle (the blob DEK already travels in `_keyring`).\n  // Literals are inlined (not imported from blobs/blob-set.ts) to keep\n  // the blob runtime out of this kernel hot path — they mirror\n  // BLOB_INDEX/CHUNKS/EVICTION_AUDIT_COLLECTION and SLOTS/VERSIONS_PREFIX.\n  // The collect-loop skips empty ids, so this no-ops without blobs.\n  const internalSnapshot: VaultSnapshot = {}\n  const internalNames = internalCollectionNames(Object.keys(snapshot))\n  for (const internalName of internalNames) {\n    const ids = await ctx.adapter.list(ctx.vault, internalName)\n    if (ids.length === 0) continue\n    const records: Record<string, EncryptedEnvelope> = {}\n    for (const id of ids) {\n      const envelope = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, internalName, id)\n      if (envelope) records[id] = envelope\n    }\n    internalSnapshot[internalName] = records\n  }\n\n  // Embed the ledger head if there's a chain. An empty ledger\n  // (fresh vault) leaves `ledgerHead` undefined, which\n  // load() treats the same as a legacy backup (no integrity\n  // check, console warning). If history is not opted in,\n  // `getLedgerOrNull` returns null and we skip embedding entirely\n  // — the backup is still valid, just without the integrity head.\n  const ledgerForHead = ctx.getLedgerOrNull()\n  const head = ledgerForHead ? await ledgerForHead.head() : null\n  const backup: VaultBackup = {\n    _noydb_backup: NOYDB_BACKUP_VERSION,\n    _compartment: ctx.vault,\n    _exported_at: new Date().toISOString(),\n    _exported_by: ctx.userId(),\n    keyrings: keyrings as VaultBackup['keyrings'],\n    collections: snapshot,\n    ...(Object.keys(internalSnapshot).length > 0\n      ? { _internal: internalSnapshot }\n      : {}),\n    ...(head\n      ? {\n          ledgerHead: {\n            hash: head.hash,\n            index: head.entry.index,\n            ts: head.entry.ts,\n          },\n        }\n      : {}),\n  }\n\n  return JSON.stringify(backup)\n}\n\n/**\n * Restore a vault from a verifiable backup. After loading, runs\n * `verifyBackupIntegrity()` to confirm the hash chain, the embedded head, and\n * every data envelope's payload hash. Legacy backups (no `ledgerHead`) load\n * with a console warning and skip the integrity check.\n */\n/**\n * core#77 — reconcile ONE collection against the pod's rows: write what\n * differs, delete what the pod does not carry, leave the rest untouched.\n *\n * Identity is `(id, _v)`, not a content hash — chunk rows are not\n * content-addressed today. That is enough to avoid rewriting 10 GB that has\n * not changed; it is NOT enough to dedupe across records, and nothing here\n * claims otherwise.\n *\n * ⛔ The DELETE half is what keeps this a restore rather than a merge: an id\n * the store holds and the pod does not is removed, exactly as `saveAll`\n * removes it in replace mode (core#111 — a restore rewinds).\n */\nasync function reconcileCollection(\n  ctx: BackupContext,\n  collection: string,\n  podRows: Record<string, EncryptedEnvelope>,\n): Promise<{ written: number; skipped: number; deleted: number }> {\n  let written = 0, skipped = 0, deleted = 0\n  for (const [id, envelope] of Object.entries(podRows)) {\n    const local = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, collection, id)\n    if (local && local._v === envelope._v) { skipped++; continue }\n    await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, collection, id, envelope)\n    written++\n  }\n  for (const id of await ctx.adapter.list(ctx.vault, collection)) {\n    if (id in podRows) continue\n    await ctx.adapter.delete(ctx.vault, collection, id)\n    deleted++\n  }\n  return { written, skipped, deleted }\n}\n\n/** Fold the per-collection counters into the returned report. */\nfunction podReport(mode: 'replace' | 'incremental', per: Record<string, { written: number; skipped: number; deleted: number }>): LoadPodResult {\n  let written = 0, skipped = 0, deleted = 0\n  for (const r of Object.values(per)) { written += r.written; skipped += r.skipped; deleted += r.deleted }\n  return { mode, written, skipped, deleted, collections: per }\n}\n\nexport async function loadVault(\n  ctx: BackupContext,\n  backupJson: string,\n  options?: LoadPodOptions,\n): Promise<LoadPodResult> {\n  const backup = JSON.parse(backupJson) as VaultBackup\n  const mode = options?.mode ?? 'replace'\n  const per: Record<string, { written: number; skipped: number; deleted: number }> = {}\n\n  // core#77 — a pod from ANOTHER vault is refused in incremental mode. In\n  // replace mode `saveAll` overwrites wholesale and the result is at least\n  // coherent; \"write only the differences\" between unrelated vaults is not a\n  // restore, it is a silent union of two histories, and the keyrings that\n  // arrive with it would not open what is already here.\n  if (mode === 'incremental' && backup._compartment !== ctx.vault) {\n    throw new BackupLedgerError(\n      `Incremental load refused: this pod was taken from vault \"${backup._compartment}\" ` +\n      `and is being loaded into \"${ctx.vault}\". Incremental mode reconciles a vault against ` +\n      `its OWN pod; use mode: 'replace' to overwrite this vault with a foreign pod.`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  // 1. Restore data collections.\n  if (mode === 'incremental') {\n    const localData = await ctx.adapter.loadAll(ctx.vault)\n    const names = new Set([...Object.keys(backup.collections), ...Object.keys(localData)])\n    for (const name of names) {\n      const r = await reconcileCollection(ctx, name, backup.collections[name] ?? {})\n      if (r.written || r.skipped || r.deleted) per[name] = r\n    }\n  } else {\n    await ctx.adapter.saveAll(ctx.vault, backup.collections)\n  }\n\n  // 2. Restore keyrings.\n  for (const [userId, keyringFile] of Object.entries(backup.keyrings)) {\n    // ⛔ core#132 — NO CAS HERE, deliberately. A pod restore is state\n    // REPLACEMENT (core#111 made the internal collections wholesale too): the\n    // pod is authoritative and there is no \"version this was based on\" to\n    // compare against. CASing a restore would make it fail precisely when the\n    // store has drifted, which is the case it exists to fix.\n    const envelope = buildRecordEnvelope({ collection: '_keyring', id: userId, version: 1 },\n      { iv: '', data: JSON.stringify(keyringFile) })\n    await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, '_keyring', userId, envelope)\n  }\n\n  // 3. Restore internal collections (`_ledger`, `_ledger_deltas`, history,\n  //    periods, blobs). Required so verifyBackupIntegrity has the chain to walk.\n  //\n  // ⛔⛔ CLEAR FIRST (core#111). This used to `put` the pod's rows id by id and\n  // leave everything else, so entries written AFTER the pod survived the\n  // restore. With history on that is not a cosmetic leftover: the ledger chain\n  // still named `notes/n2`, whose envelope `saveAll` had just removed, and the\n  // integrity check refused the restore outright —\n  //   BackupCorruptedError: Ledger expects data record \"notes/n2\" to exist …\n  // which made restoring an OLDER pod possible only onto a store whose ledger\n  // had not moved. That is never the case that matters: a restore is a step\n  // BACK (core#71/#72).\n  //\n  // ⭐ A restore rewinds the ledger too, and now says so. The internal\n  // collections are replaced wholesale, the way `saveAll` already treats the\n  // data ones — anything else asks the chain to describe a store it does not\n  // match. The names come from `internalCollectionNames`, NOT from the pod's\n  // own keys: see the ⛔ on that function for why absence in a pod cannot mean\n  // \"leave it alone\".\n  //\n  // ⚠️ Known residue, deliberately not chased here: `_blob_slots_<c>` /\n  // `_blob_versions_<c>` for a DATA collection the pod does not carry are not\n  // cleared, because the names are derived from the pod's collections and the\n  // store contract has no way to enumerate `_`-prefixed collections\n  // (`loadAll` skips them). Those rows are already orphaned — `saveAll` has\n  // just removed the collection they describe — so they are unreachable\n  // rather than misleading.\n  //\n  // core#77 — in INCREMENTAL mode the same names are reconciled instead of\n  // cleared and rewritten. ⭐ This is the half that matters for the 10 GB\n  // case: `_blob_chunks` is an internal collection, so a clear-and-rewrite\n  // here would re-upload every chunk and leave \"incremental\" saving only the\n  // record envelopes. Reconciling reaches the SAME end state — extras are\n  // still deleted, so the restore still rewinds — at a cost proportional to\n  // what actually differs.\n  const internalNamesToLoad = internalCollectionNames(Object.keys(backup.collections))\n  if (mode === 'incremental') {\n    for (const internalName of internalNamesToLoad) {\n      const r = await reconcileCollection(ctx, internalName, backup._internal?.[internalName] ?? {})\n      if (r.written || r.skipped || r.deleted) per[internalName] = r\n    }\n  } else {\n    for (const internalName of internalNamesToLoad) {\n      for (const id of await ctx.adapter.list(ctx.vault, internalName)) {\n        await ctx.adapter.delete(ctx.vault, internalName, id)\n      }\n    }\n    if (backup._internal) {\n      for (const [internalName, records] of Object.entries(backup._internal)) {\n        for (const [id, envelope] of Object.entries(records)) {\n          await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, internalName, id, envelope)\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // 4. Refresh the in-memory keyring from the freshly-loaded\n  //    keyring file. Without this, the Vault's getDEK\n  //    closure still holds the OLD session's DEKs, and every\n  //    decrypt of a loaded ledger entry / data envelope fails\n  //    with TamperedError because the DEK doesn't match the\n  //    ciphertext that was encrypted with the SOURCE user's DEK.\n  //    Skipped for plaintext vaults and for tests that\n  //    construct Vault without a reloadKeyring callback.\n  await ctx.reloadKeyringAndRebuildDEK()\n\n  // 5. Clear collection cache + reset the ledger store so the\n  //    next ledger() call rebuilds its head cache from the\n  //    freshly-loaded entries.\n  ctx.clearCollectionCache()\n  ctx.resetLedgerStore()\n\n  // 6. core#71 — a restore is a new base for sync: the pre-restore dirty log\n  //    named records the load replaced, and the watermarks described a state\n  //    that is gone. `replaceRemote` (core#72) is the explicit act that makes\n  //    the restore authoritative on the target; without it, `load()` stays a\n  //    local view — and now says so in `syncTargetStatus()` instead of pushing\n  //    stale entries.\n  await ctx.resetSync?.()\n\n  // 5. Run the verification gate. A backup with no ledgerHead cannot be\n  //    integrity-checked, and skipping silently would collapse\n  //    *unverifiable* into *clean* — so it always warns. But the REMEDY\n  //    depends on the reader, not the pod (#1303): the pod cannot say\n  //    whether its exporter predates the ledger or never enabled it, and\n  //    the reader knows its own configuration.\n  //\n  //    - Reader HAS the ledger: the pod is behind it. \"Re-export\" is\n  //      actionable; keep the migration wording.\n  //    - Reader has NO ledger: nothing is stale and nothing is migrating —\n  //      the consumer priced the ledger (#1248 measured ~2.4x) and declined.\n  //      Prescribing a re-export is advice they should not take, and\n  //      repeating it on every read trains people to filter the one line\n  //      that also fires on a genuinely stale pod. State the consequence,\n  //      name the discriminator, prescribe nothing.\n  if (!backup.ledgerHead) {\n    if (ctx.getLedgerOrNull()) {\n      console.warn(\n        `[noy-db] Loaded a legacy backup with no ledgerHead — ` +\n        `verifiable-backup integrity check skipped. ` +\n        `Re-export with a ledger-aware build to get tamper detection.`,\n      )\n    } else {\n      console.warn(\n        `[noy-db] Loaded a backup with no ledgerHead — this pod is not integrity-checked. ` +\n        `This reader has no ledger enabled (withHistory() is not configured), so nothing is stale: ` +\n        `enable the ledger on both the exporter and this reader if tamper detection is wanted.`,\n      )\n    }\n    return podReport(mode, per)\n  }\n\n  const result = await verifyBackupIntegrity(ctx)\n  if (!result.ok) {\n    // Surface the most specific error class we can. The result\n    // shape carries enough info for callers to inspect.\n    if (result.kind === 'data') {\n      throw new BackupCorruptedError(\n        result.collection,\n        result.id,\n        result.message,\n      )\n    }\n    throw new BackupLedgerError(result.message, result.divergedAt)\n  }\n\n  // 6. Cross-check: the freshly-verified head must match the\n  //    value embedded at dump time. A mismatch means someone\n  //    truncated or extended the chain after dump.\n  if (result.head !== backup.ledgerHead.hash) {\n    throw new BackupLedgerError(\n      `Backup ledger head mismatch: embedded \"${backup.ledgerHead.hash}\" ` +\n      `but reconstructed \"${result.head}\".`,\n    )\n  }\n  return podReport(mode, per)\n}\n\n/**\n * End-to-end backup integrity check: `ledger.verify()` (hash chain) plus a data\n * envelope cross-check (every current record's `_data` hash must match the\n * latest `put` entry's `payloadHash`). Returns a discriminated union so callers\n * can distinguish chain vs data failures.\n */\nexport async function verifyBackupIntegrity(ctx: BackupContext): Promise<VerifyBackupResult> {\n  // Step 1: chain verification. Without the history strategy there\n  // is no ledger; an unaudited backup verifies trivially as `ok`\n  // because there's nothing to diverge from.\n  const ledgerForVerify = ctx.getLedgerOrNull()\n  if (!ledgerForVerify) {\n    return { ok: true, head: '', length: 0 }\n  }\n  const chainResult = await ledgerForVerify.verify()\n  if (!chainResult.ok) {\n    return {\n      ok: false,\n      kind: 'chain',\n      divergedAt: chainResult.divergedAt,\n      message:\n        `Ledger chain diverged at index ${chainResult.divergedAt}: ` +\n        `expected prevHash \"${chainResult.expected}\" but found \"${chainResult.actual}\".`,\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Step 2: data envelope cross-check. Walk every entry in the\n  // ledger and, for the LATEST `put` per (collection, id), recompute\n  // the data envelope's payloadHash and compare. Earlier puts of the\n  // same id are skipped because the data collection only holds the\n  // current version — historical envelopes live in the deltas\n  // collection (which is itself protected by the chain).\n  // Reuse the ledger we already resolved in step 1.\n  const allEntries = await ledgerForVerify.loadAllEntries()\n\n  // Find the latest non-delete entry per (collection, id). Walk\n  // the entries in reverse so we hit the latest first; mark each\n  // (collection, id) as seen and skip subsequent entries.\n  const seen = new Set<string>()\n  const latest = new Map<\n    string,\n    { collection: string; id: string; expectedHash: string }\n  >()\n  for (let i = allEntries.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n    const entry = allEntries[i]\n    if (!entry) continue\n    // Amendment entries are multi-record audit entries whose\n    // `collection` and `id` are empty strings — building a `\"/\"`\n    // key here would mark that synthetic slot as seen and falsely\n    // trip the data check on a record that never existed. Skip\n    // them BEFORE the key/seen bookkeeping so they neither\n    // tombstone real entries nor enter the latest map.\n    if (entry.op === 'amendment' || entry.op === 'lifecycle') continue\n    const key = `${entry.collection}/${entry.id}`\n    if (seen.has(key)) continue\n    seen.add(key)\n    // For deletes the data collection should NOT have the record,\n    // so we skip — there's nothing to cross-check. Marking the key\n    // as seen above ensures any earlier `put` of the same id is\n    // also skipped (the record was subsequently deleted).\n    if (entry.op === 'delete') continue\n    latest.set(key, {\n      collection: entry.collection,\n      id: entry.id,\n      expectedHash: entry.payloadHash,\n    })\n  }\n\n  for (const { collection, id, expectedHash } of latest.values()) {\n    const envelope = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, collection, id)\n    if (!envelope) {\n      return {\n        ok: false,\n        kind: 'data',\n        collection,\n        id,\n        message:\n          `Ledger expects data record \"${collection}/${id}\" to exist, ` +\n          `but the adapter has no envelope for it.`,\n      }\n    }\n    const actualHash = await ctx.envelopePayloadHash(envelope)\n    if (actualHash !== expectedHash) {\n      return {\n        ok: false,\n        kind: 'data',\n        collection,\n        id,\n        message:\n          `Data envelope \"${collection}/${id}\" has been tampered with: ` +\n          `expected payloadHash \"${expectedHash}\", got \"${actualHash}\".`,\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    ok: true,\n    head: chainResult.head,\n    length: chainResult.length,\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Plaintext per-collection export, built on the vault's `exportStream`. Forces\n * collection granularity (record-by-record output makes no sense in a single\n * string) and merges dictionary snapshots across collections.\n */\nexport async function exportVaultJSON(ctx: BackupContext, opts: ExportStreamOptions = {}): Promise<string> {\n  // Force per-collection granularity regardless of caller setting:\n  // record-by-record output doesn't make sense in a single string.\n  const collections: Record<\n    string,\n    {\n      schema: null\n      refs: Record<string, { target: string; mode: 'strict' | 'warn' | 'cascade' }>\n      records: unknown[]\n    }\n  > = {}\n  let ledgerHead: ExportChunk['ledgerHead'] | undefined\n  // Merged dictionary snapshot across all collections.\n  // Only populated when `resolveLabels` is not set.\n  const allDictionaries: Record<\n    string, // collection name\n    Record<string, Record<string, Record<string, string>>>\n  > = {}\n\n  for await (const chunk of ctx.exportStream({\n    granularity: 'collection',\n    withLedgerHead: opts.withLedgerHead === true,\n    // Thread the export locale so records are read at the\n    // `export` layer (i18nText collapsed + dictKey/staticDict labels resolved).\n    ...(opts.resolveLabels !== undefined ? { resolveLabels: opts.resolveLabels } : {}),\n  })) {\n    collections[chunk.collection] = {\n      schema: null, // Standard Schema validators are not JSON-serializable\n      refs: chunk.refs,\n      records: chunk.records,\n    }\n    if (chunk.ledgerHead) ledgerHead = chunk.ledgerHead\n    // Collect dictionary snapshots unless resolveLabels is set\n    if (!opts.resolveLabels && chunk.dictionaries) {\n      allDictionaries[chunk.collection] = chunk.dictionaries\n    }\n  }\n\n  const hasDictionaries = Object.keys(allDictionaries).length > 0\n  return JSON.stringify({\n    _noydb_export: 1,\n    _compartment: ctx.vault,\n    _exported_at: new Date().toISOString(),\n    _exported_by: ctx.userId(),\n    collections,\n    ...(hasDictionaries ? { 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package/dist/blobs/index.js

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import {
   createExportBlobsHandle,
   reportOrphanBlobChunks,
   runCompaction
-} from "../chunk-JSMTXZR3.js";
+} from "../chunk-ZWMOHANW.js";
 import {
   BLOB_CHUNKS_COLLECTION,
   BLOB_COLLECTION,
@@ -25,20 +25,20 @@ import {
   detectMimeType,
   isPreCompressed,
   memoryBlobPinStore
-} from "../chunk-G2MVBDFP.js";
-import "../chunk-SYNY3VB5.js";
-import "../chunk-7XMHMVTS.js";
-import "../chunk-FLPCETP6.js";
-import "../chunk-EZGV6F47.js";
-import "../chunk-OIEO4WDL.js";
-import "../chunk-Q2XRFWOI.js";
+} from "../chunk-QFW4MYGN.js";
+import "../chunk-NCTN2FW4.js";
+import "../chunk-NXQEOC3X.js";
+import "../chunk-2LBS62AC.js";
+import "../chunk-WRLWEYHY.js";
+import "../chunk-ZD7WFMV2.js";
+import "../chunk-RRTQAQ3N.js";
 import "../chunk-NH2UOV3B.js";
-import "../chunk-42ALPZ2B.js";
-import "../chunk-QMWY2FDS.js";
-import "../chunk-SV2PM2OY.js";
+import "../chunk-ZF6JECDT.js";
+import "../chunk-THQ3BHLM.js";
+import "../chunk-XX4R7TUB.js";
 import {
   BlobOfflineError
-} from "../chunk-37EPTBBR.js";
+} from "../chunk-IKPQ2GGB.js";
 
 // src/via/blob/active.ts
 function withBlobs(options = {}) {

package/dist/broker/index.js

@@ -1,21 +1,21 @@
 import {
   NO_BROKER
-} from "../chunk-GZT3NQRA.js";
+} from "../chunk-25FXU6WS.js";
 import {
   issueChallenge,
   verifyBrokerProof
-} from "../chunk-EZGV6F47.js";
-import "../chunk-OIEO4WDL.js";
-import "../chunk-Q2XRFWOI.js";
+} from "../chunk-WRLWEYHY.js";
+import "../chunk-ZD7WFMV2.js";
+import "../chunk-RRTQAQ3N.js";
 import "../chunk-NH2UOV3B.js";
-import "../chunk-42ALPZ2B.js";
-import "../chunk-QMWY2FDS.js";
-import "../chunk-SV2PM2OY.js";
+import "../chunk-ZF6JECDT.js";
+import "../chunk-THQ3BHLM.js";
+import "../chunk-XX4R7TUB.js";
 import {
   BrokerEnrolmentError,
   BrokerNotEnabledError,
   BrokerProofError
-} from "../chunk-37EPTBBR.js";
+} from "../chunk-IKPQ2GGB.js";
 
 // src/with-party/broker/active.ts
 var DEFAULT_SKEW_MS = 6e4;
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ function withBroker(config) {
   const cache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
   return {
     async enroll(ctx) {
-      const { enrollSeed } = await import("../seed-XNSE4U3S.js");
+      const { enrollSeed } = await import("../seed-GFLA4FCK.js");
       return enrollSeed({ ...ctx, config });
     },
     async rotate(ctx) {
@@ -37,9 +37,17 @@ function withBroker(config) {
       const inFlight = scoped.map(([, e]) => e.inFlight).filter((p) => p !== void 0);
       await Promise.allSettled(inFlight);
       for (const [key] of scoped) cache.delete(key);
-      const { rotateSeed } = await import("../seed-XNSE4U3S.js");
+      const { rotateSeed } = await import("../seed-GFLA4FCK.js");
       return rotateSeed({ ...ctx, config });
     },
+    async enrolMember(ctx, member) {
+      const { enrolMemberSeed } = await import("../seed-GFLA4FCK.js");
+      return enrolMemberSeed({ ...ctx, config }, member);
+    },
+    async revokeMember(ctx, userId) {
+      const { revokeMemberSeed } = await import("../seed-GFLA4FCK.js");
+      return revokeMemberSeed({ ...ctx, config }, userId);
+    },
     credentialSource(ctx, profile) {
       const key = `${ctx.vault}\0${profile ?? ""}`;
       return async () => {
@@ -54,7 +62,7 @@ function withBroker(config) {
         const skewMs = config.skewMs ?? DEFAULT_SKEW_MS;
         const capturedEntry = entry;
         const inFlight = (async () => {
-          const { mintStoreCredentials } = await import("../seed-XNSE4U3S.js");
+          const { mintStoreCredentials } = await import("../seed-GFLA4FCK.js");
           const creds = await mintStoreCredentials({ ...ctx, config }, profile);
           capturedEntry.cached = { creds, validUntil: cacheFloor(creds, skewMs) };
           return creds;

package/dist/broker/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/with-party/broker/active.ts","../../src/with-party/broker/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Enable the credential-broker capability (#479, spec §5).\n *\n * Pass to `createNoydb({ brokerStrategy: withBroker(config) })` to make\n * `vault.broker()` live. Each method dynamic-imports the seed lifecycle\n * engine (`./seed.js`) — mirroring `via/classified/active.ts`'s per-method\n * dynamic-import seam — so `with-party/broker/seed.ts` (the heavy module:\n * the CAS enrol, quiesce-then-swap rotate, and the challenge/response round\n * trip) is reachable only through the `@noy-db/hub/broker` subpath and\n * never enters the single-user floor bundle.\n *\n * The single-flight, per-vault-per-profile refresh cache (H-6/I6) lives\n * HERE, in this factory's closure — shared across every `credentialSource(profile)`\n * call for this one broker instance (in turn shared across every vault of a\n * `createNoydb()` instance — `vault.broker()` passes the SAME `BrokerStrategy`\n * for all of them), so `rotate()` can quiesce it (await any in-flight\n * round-trip, then drop it) before the seed swap. The cache key is\n * `${vault}\\0${profile}` — keyed by vault FIRST, or two vaults sharing this\n * one strategy would collide and hand vault-B a cached credential minted\n * (and STS-scoped) for vault-A.\n */\nimport type { BrokerStrategy, BrokerConfig, BrokerCtx } from '../../port/with/broker-strategy.js'\nimport type { StoreCredentials, StoreCredentialSource } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\nconst DEFAULT_SKEW_MS = 60_000\n/** Floor under the skew-adjusted boundary so a sub-skew credential TTL\n *  doesn't collapse to \"already expired\" and thrash re-proving every call (I6b). */\nconst MIN_CACHE_MS = 1_000\n\ninterface CacheEntry {\n  cached?: { creds: StoreCredentials; validUntil: number } | undefined\n  inFlight?: Promise<StoreCredentials> | undefined\n}\n\nfunction cacheFloor(creds: StoreCredentials, skewMs: number): number {\n  const expiresAtMs = creds.expiresAt ? Date.parse(creds.expiresAt) : Date.now() + skewMs * 2\n  return Math.max(expiresAtMs - skewMs, Date.now() + MIN_CACHE_MS)\n}\n\nexport function withBroker(config: BrokerConfig): BrokerStrategy {\n  const cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>()\n\n  return {\n    async enroll(ctx) {\n      const { enrollSeed } = await import('./seed.js')\n      return enrollSeed({ ...ctx, config })\n    },\n    async rotate(ctx) {\n      // Quiesce (I5): let any in-flight round-trip finish (it may still be\n      // proving under the pre-rotation seed) before the local record is\n      // overwritten, then drop the cache — scoped to THIS vault's entries\n      // only (`${ctx.vault}\\0`-prefixed keys). A global cache.clear() here\n      // would blow away every OTHER vault's cache on this shared strategy\n      // too — same root cause as the cross-vault read collision this fixes.\n      const vaultPrefix = `${ctx.vault}\\0`\n      const scoped = [...cache.entries()].filter(([key]) => key.startsWith(vaultPrefix))\n      const inFlight = scoped.map(([, e]) => e.inFlight).filter((p): p is Promise<StoreCredentials> => p !== undefined)\n      await Promise.allSettled(inFlight)\n      for (const [key] of scoped) cache.delete(key)\n      const { rotateSeed } = await import('./seed.js')\n      return rotateSeed({ ...ctx, config })\n    },\n    credentialSource(ctx: BrokerCtx, profile?: string): StoreCredentialSource {\n      const key = `${ctx.vault}\\0${profile ?? ''}`\n      return async () => {\n        let entry = cache.get(key)\n        if (!entry) {\n          entry = {}\n          cache.set(key, entry)\n        }\n        const now = Date.now()\n        if (entry.cached && now < entry.cached.validUntil) return entry.cached.creds\n        if (entry.inFlight) return entry.inFlight\n\n        const skewMs = config.skewMs ?? DEFAULT_SKEW_MS\n        const capturedEntry = entry\n        const inFlight = (async () => {\n          const { mintStoreCredentials } = await import('./seed.js')\n          const creds = await mintStoreCredentials({ ...ctx, config }, profile)\n          capturedEntry.cached = { creds, validUntil: cacheFloor(creds, skewMs) }\n          return creds\n        })()\n        entry.inFlight = inFlight\n        try {\n          return await inFlight\n        } finally {\n          // Clear-on-settle (I6a): a rejected in-flight promise must never\n          // stay pinned in the cache, or every subsequent call would wedge\n          // on the same rejection instead of retrying.\n          capturedEntry.inFlight = undefined\n        }\n      }\n    },\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * `@noy-db/hub/broker` — subpath export for the credential-broker capability\n * (#479, credential-broker spec). Apps that never call `vault.broker()` can\n * exclude this subpath entirely: the floor default `NO_BROKER` throws, and\n * this module's real engine (`with-party/broker/{seed,active}.ts`) is only\n * ever reached through `withBroker()`'s dynamic imports, so it never enters\n * a floor bundle.\n *\n * Also re-exports the host-side helpers (`issueChallenge`, `verifyBrokerProof`)\n * from the enclave barrel, so a Lambda/Worker implementing the reference\n * broker host can import just this one subpath and get everything it\n * needs, `crypto.subtle`-only.\n */\n\n// ─── Capability opt-in seam ──────────────────────────────────\nexport { withBroker } from './active.js'\nexport {\n  NO_BROKER,\n  type BrokerStrategy,\n  type BrokerCtx,\n  type BrokerConfig,\n  type CredentialBrokerHandle,\n} from '../../port/with/broker-strategy.js'\nexport { BrokerNotEnabledError, BrokerEnrolmentError, BrokerProofError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n// ─── Host helpers (verify side — for a reference broker host) ───\nimport { issueChallenge as issueChallengeRaw, verifyBrokerProof } from '../../capsule/index.js'\nimport type { IssuedChallenge, VerifyBrokerProofArgs } from '../../capsule/index.js'\n\n/**\n * Floor — a challenge TTL must survive network latency + clock drift\n * between host and client. The enclave's `issueChallenge` is deliberately\n * unclamped (a mechanical primitive, not a policy); this floor is host\n * POLICY, so it lives here in the party layer, not\n * `capsule/enclave-aes/broker/proof.ts` (carried forward from Task 2's review,\n * I6b).\n */\nconst MIN_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS = 10_000\n/** Ceiling — spec §2 step 2: \"TTL ≤ 60 s\". */\nconst MAX_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS = 60_000\n\n/**\n * {@link issueChallengeRaw} (the enclave's mechanical primitive) with a\n * `[10s, 60s]` TTL clamp applied, so a reference host built on this barrel\n * gets a safe challenge TTL without having to know the bounds itself.\n */\nexport function issueChallenge(opts?: { ttlMs?: number }): IssuedChallenge {\n  const requested = opts?.ttlMs ?? MAX_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS\n  const clamped = Math.min(Math.max(requested, MIN_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS), MAX_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS)\n  return issueChallengeRaw({ ttlMs: clamped })\n}\nexport { verifyBrokerProof }\nexport type { VerifyBrokerProofArgs }\n\n// #837 — issueChallenge's return type must be nameable from this entry.\nexport type { IssuedChallenge } from '../../capsule/index.js'\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAwBA,IAAM,kBAAkB;AAGxB,IAAM,eAAe;AAOrB,SAAS,WAAW,OAAyB,QAAwB;AACnE,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,YAAY,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS;AAC1F,SAAO,KAAK,IAAI,cAAc,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,YAAY;AACjE;AAEO,SAAS,WAAW,QAAsC;AAC/D,QAAM,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAAwB;AAE1C,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK;AAChB,YAAM,EAAE,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,qBAAW;AAC/C,aAAO,WAAW,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;AAAA,IACtC;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK;AAOhB,YAAM,cAAc,GAAG,IAAI,KAAK;AAChC,YAAM,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,WAAW,CAAC;AACjF,YAAM,WAAW,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,MAAsC,MAAM,MAAS;AAChH,YAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAQ;AACjC,iBAAW,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,OAAQ,OAAM,OAAO,GAAG;AAC5C,YAAM,EAAE,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,qBAAW;AAC/C,aAAO,WAAW,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;AAAA,IACtC;AAAA,IACA,iBAAiB,KAAgB,SAAyC;AACxE,YAAM,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,WAAW,EAAE;AAC1C,aAAO,YAAY;AACjB,YAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG;AACzB,YAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AACV,kBAAQ,CAAC;AACT,gBAAM,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,QACtB;AACA,cAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AACrB,YAAI,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,WAAY,QAAO,MAAM,OAAO;AACvE,YAAI,MAAM,SAAU,QAAO,MAAM;AAEjC,cAAM,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU;AAChC,cAAM,gBAAgB;AACtB,cAAM,YAAY,YAAY;AAC5B,gBAAM,EAAE,qBAAqB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,qBAAW;AACzD,gBAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,qBAAqB,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO;AACpE,wBAAc,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,YAAY,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE;AACtE,iBAAO;AAAA,QACT,GAAG;AACH,cAAM,WAAW;AACjB,YAAI;AACF,iBAAO,MAAM;AAAA,QACf,UAAE;AAIA,wBAAc,WAAW;AAAA,QAC3B;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;ACzDA,IAAM,uBAAuB;AAE7B,IAAM,uBAAuB;AAOtB,SAASA,gBAAe,MAA4C;AACzE,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,SAAS;AACjC,QAAM,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,WAAW,oBAAoB,GAAG,oBAAoB;AACxF,SAAO,eAAkB,EAAE,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;AAC7C;","names":["issueChallenge"]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/with-party/broker/active.ts","../../src/with-party/broker/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Enable the credential-broker capability (#479, spec §5).\n *\n * Pass to `createNoydb({ brokerStrategy: withBroker(config) })` to make\n * `vault.broker()` live. Each method dynamic-imports the seed lifecycle\n * engine (`./seed.js`) — mirroring `via/classified/active.ts`'s per-method\n * dynamic-import seam — so `with-party/broker/seed.ts` (the heavy module:\n * the CAS enrol, quiesce-then-swap rotate, and the challenge/response round\n * trip) is reachable only through the `@noy-db/hub/broker` subpath and\n * never enters the single-user floor bundle.\n *\n * The single-flight, per-vault-per-profile refresh cache (H-6/I6) lives\n * HERE, in this factory's closure — shared across every `credentialSource(profile)`\n * call for this one broker instance (in turn shared across every vault of a\n * `createNoydb()` instance — `vault.broker()` passes the SAME `BrokerStrategy`\n * for all of them), so `rotate()` can quiesce it (await any in-flight\n * round-trip, then drop it) before the seed swap. The cache key is\n * `${vault}\\0${profile}` — keyed by vault FIRST, or two vaults sharing this\n * one strategy would collide and hand vault-B a cached credential minted\n * (and STS-scoped) for vault-A.\n */\nimport type { BrokerStrategy, BrokerConfig, BrokerCtx } from '../../port/with/broker-strategy.js'\nimport type { StoreCredentials, StoreCredentialSource } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\nconst DEFAULT_SKEW_MS = 60_000\n/** Floor under the skew-adjusted boundary so a sub-skew credential TTL\n *  doesn't collapse to \"already expired\" and thrash re-proving every call (I6b). */\nconst MIN_CACHE_MS = 1_000\n\ninterface CacheEntry {\n  cached?: { creds: StoreCredentials; validUntil: number } | undefined\n  inFlight?: Promise<StoreCredentials> | undefined\n}\n\nfunction cacheFloor(creds: StoreCredentials, skewMs: number): number {\n  const expiresAtMs = creds.expiresAt ? Date.parse(creds.expiresAt) : Date.now() + skewMs * 2\n  return Math.max(expiresAtMs - skewMs, Date.now() + MIN_CACHE_MS)\n}\n\nexport function withBroker(config: BrokerConfig): BrokerStrategy {\n  const cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>()\n\n  return {\n    async enroll(ctx) {\n      const { enrollSeed } = await import('./seed.js')\n      return enrollSeed({ ...ctx, config })\n    },\n    async rotate(ctx) {\n      // Quiesce (I5): let any in-flight round-trip finish (it may still be\n      // proving under the pre-rotation seed) before the local record is\n      // overwritten, then drop the cache — scoped to THIS vault's entries\n      // only (`${ctx.vault}\\0`-prefixed keys). A global cache.clear() here\n      // would blow away every OTHER vault's cache on this shared strategy\n      // too — same root cause as the cross-vault read collision this fixes.\n      const vaultPrefix = `${ctx.vault}\\0`\n      const scoped = [...cache.entries()].filter(([key]) => key.startsWith(vaultPrefix))\n      const inFlight = scoped.map(([, e]) => e.inFlight).filter((p): p is Promise<StoreCredentials> => p !== undefined)\n      await Promise.allSettled(inFlight)\n      for (const [key] of scoped) cache.delete(key)\n      const { rotateSeed } = await import('./seed.js')\n      return rotateSeed({ ...ctx, config })\n    },\n    async enrolMember(ctx, member) {\n      const { enrolMemberSeed } = await import('./seed.js')\n      return enrolMemberSeed({ ...ctx, config }, member)\n    },\n    async revokeMember(ctx, userId) {\n      const { revokeMemberSeed } = await import('./seed.js')\n      return revokeMemberSeed({ ...ctx, config }, userId)\n    },\n    credentialSource(ctx: BrokerCtx, profile?: string): StoreCredentialSource {\n      const key = `${ctx.vault}\\0${profile ?? ''}`\n      return async () => {\n        let entry = cache.get(key)\n        if (!entry) {\n          entry = {}\n          cache.set(key, entry)\n        }\n        const now = Date.now()\n        if (entry.cached && now < entry.cached.validUntil) return entry.cached.creds\n        if (entry.inFlight) return entry.inFlight\n\n        const skewMs = config.skewMs ?? DEFAULT_SKEW_MS\n        const capturedEntry = entry\n        const inFlight = (async () => {\n          const { mintStoreCredentials } = await import('./seed.js')\n          const creds = await mintStoreCredentials({ ...ctx, config }, profile)\n          capturedEntry.cached = { creds, validUntil: cacheFloor(creds, skewMs) }\n          return creds\n        })()\n        entry.inFlight = inFlight\n        try {\n          return await inFlight\n        } finally {\n          // Clear-on-settle (I6a): a rejected in-flight promise must never\n          // stay pinned in the cache, or every subsequent call would wedge\n          // on the same rejection instead of retrying.\n          capturedEntry.inFlight = undefined\n        }\n      }\n    },\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * `@noy-db/hub/broker` — subpath export for the credential-broker capability\n * (#479, credential-broker spec). Apps that never call `vault.broker()` can\n * exclude this subpath entirely: the floor default `NO_BROKER` throws, and\n * this module's real engine (`with-party/broker/{seed,active}.ts`) is only\n * ever reached through `withBroker()`'s dynamic imports, so it never enters\n * a floor bundle.\n *\n * Also re-exports the host-side helpers (`issueChallenge`, `verifyBrokerProof`)\n * from the enclave barrel, so a Lambda/Worker implementing the reference\n * broker host can import just this one subpath and get everything it\n * needs, `crypto.subtle`-only.\n */\n\n// ─── Capability opt-in seam ──────────────────────────────────\nexport { withBroker } from './active.js'\nexport {\n  NO_BROKER,\n  type BrokerStrategy,\n  type BrokerCtx,\n  type BrokerConfig,\n  type CredentialBrokerHandle,\n} from '../../port/with/broker-strategy.js'\nexport { BrokerNotEnabledError, BrokerEnrolmentError, BrokerProofError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n// ─── Host helpers (verify side — for a reference broker host) ───\nimport { issueChallenge as issueChallengeRaw, verifyBrokerProof } from '../../capsule/index.js'\nimport type { IssuedChallenge, VerifyBrokerProofArgs, BrokerMemberIdentity } from '../../capsule/index.js'\n\n/**\n * Floor — a challenge TTL must survive network latency + clock drift\n * between host and client. The enclave's `issueChallenge` is deliberately\n * unclamped (a mechanical primitive, not a policy); this floor is host\n * POLICY, so it lives here in the party layer, not\n * `capsule/enclave-aes/broker/proof.ts` (carried forward from Task 2's review,\n * I6b).\n */\nconst MIN_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS = 10_000\n/** Ceiling — spec §2 step 2: \"TTL ≤ 60 s\". */\nconst MAX_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS = 60_000\n\n/**\n * {@link issueChallengeRaw} (the enclave's mechanical primitive) with a\n * `[10s, 60s]` TTL clamp applied, so a reference host built on this barrel\n * gets a safe challenge TTL without having to know the bounds itself.\n */\nexport function issueChallenge(opts?: { ttlMs?: number }): IssuedChallenge {\n  const requested = opts?.ttlMs ?? MAX_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS\n  const clamped = Math.min(Math.max(requested, MIN_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS), MAX_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS)\n  return issueChallengeRaw({ ttlMs: clamped })\n}\nexport { verifyBrokerProof }\nexport type { VerifyBrokerProofArgs, BrokerMemberIdentity }\n\n// #837 — issueChallenge's return type must be nameable from this entry.\nexport type { IssuedChallenge } from '../../capsule/index.js'\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAwBA,IAAM,kBAAkB;AAGxB,IAAM,eAAe;AAOrB,SAAS,WAAW,OAAyB,QAAwB;AACnE,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,YAAY,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS;AAC1F,SAAO,KAAK,IAAI,cAAc,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,YAAY;AACjE;AAEO,SAAS,WAAW,QAAsC;AAC/D,QAAM,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAAwB;AAE1C,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK;AAChB,YAAM,EAAE,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,qBAAW;AAC/C,aAAO,WAAW,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;AAAA,IACtC;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK;AAOhB,YAAM,cAAc,GAAG,IAAI,KAAK;AAChC,YAAM,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,WAAW,CAAC;AACjF,YAAM,WAAW,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,MAAsC,MAAM,MAAS;AAChH,YAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAQ;AACjC,iBAAW,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,OAAQ,OAAM,OAAO,GAAG;AAC5C,YAAM,EAAE,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,qBAAW;AAC/C,aAAO,WAAW,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;AAAA,IACtC;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,YAAY,KAAK,QAAQ;AAC7B,YAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,qBAAW;AACpD,aAAO,gBAAgB,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM;AAAA,IACnD;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,aAAa,KAAK,QAAQ;AAC9B,YAAM,EAAE,iBAAiB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,qBAAW;AACrD,aAAO,iBAAiB,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM;AAAA,IACpD;AAAA,IACA,iBAAiB,KAAgB,SAAyC;AACxE,YAAM,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,WAAW,EAAE;AAC1C,aAAO,YAAY;AACjB,YAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG;AACzB,YAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AACV,kBAAQ,CAAC;AACT,gBAAM,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,QACtB;AACA,cAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AACrB,YAAI,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,WAAY,QAAO,MAAM,OAAO;AACvE,YAAI,MAAM,SAAU,QAAO,MAAM;AAEjC,cAAM,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU;AAChC,cAAM,gBAAgB;AACtB,cAAM,YAAY,YAAY;AAC5B,gBAAM,EAAE,qBAAqB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,qBAAW;AACzD,gBAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,qBAAqB,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO;AACpE,wBAAc,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,YAAY,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE;AACtE,iBAAO;AAAA,QACT,GAAG;AACH,cAAM,WAAW;AACjB,YAAI;AACF,iBAAO,MAAM;AAAA,QACf,UAAE;AAIA,wBAAc,WAAW;AAAA,QAC3B;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;ACjEA,IAAM,uBAAuB;AAE7B,IAAM,uBAAuB;AAOtB,SAASA,gBAAe,MAA4C;AACzE,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,SAAS;AACjC,QAAM,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,WAAW,oBAAoB,GAAG,oBAAoB;AACxF,SAAO,eAAkB,EAAE,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;AAC7C;","names":["issueChallenge"]}

package/dist/by/index.js

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 import {
   isQuorum,
   runDrainBarrier
-} from "../chunk-DIZLQVAA.js";
-import "../chunk-37EPTBBR.js";
+} from "../chunk-4CHM2TRS.js";
+import "../chunk-IKPQ2GGB.js";
 export {
   isQuorum,
   runDrainBarrier

package/dist/capsule/contract.d.ts

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ export type CapsuleKeyPair = CryptoKeyPair;
  * suite from the package name, which is what makes the prefix a trust posture
  * rather than a naming convention.
  */
-export type CapsuleGroup = 'authenticate' | 'seal' | 'cipher' | 'digest' | 'sign' | 'codec' | 'sealing' | 'deterministic' | 'classify';
+export type CapsuleGroup = 'authenticate' | 'seal' | 'cipher' | 'digest' | 'sign' | 'codec' | 'sealing' | 'deterministic' | 'classify' | 'per-record-keys';
 /**
  * Thrown at `createNoydb()` when a service needs a group the bound capsule
  * does not support.

package/dist/capsule/contract.js

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 import {
   CapsuleNotSupportedError,
   assertCapsuleSupports
-} from "../chunk-OIEO4WDL.js";
+} from "../chunk-ZD7WFMV2.js";
 import {
   generateSigningKeyPair,
   signBytes,
   verifyBytes
-} from "../chunk-Q2XRFWOI.js";
+} from "../chunk-RRTQAQ3N.js";
 import {
   evaluateKofN
 } from "../chunk-NH2UOV3B.js";
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ import {
   recordAadFor,
   requireSealedBody,
   sealedBodyArgs
-} from "../chunk-42ALPZ2B.js";
+} from "../chunk-ZF6JECDT.js";
 import {
   KEY_BITS,
   base64ToBuffer,
@@ -47,9 +47,9 @@ import {
   normalizeForVerify,
   sha256Bytes,
   sha256Hex
-} from "../chunk-QMWY2FDS.js";
-import "../chunk-SV2PM2OY.js";
-import "../chunk-37EPTBBR.js";
+} from "../chunk-THQ3BHLM.js";
+import "../chunk-XX4R7TUB.js";
+import "../chunk-IKPQ2GGB.js";
 export {
   CapsuleNotSupportedError,
   KEY_BITS,

package/dist/capsule/enclave-aes/broker/proof.d.ts

@@ -69,11 +69,18 @@
 import type { EnclaveKey } from '../crypto.js';
 /** HKDF salt domain for the broker proof key — also the first `info` array element. */
 export declare const BROKER_PROOF_DOMAIN = "noydb-broker-proof";
-/** MAC version tag — the first element of the `canonical` array signed/verified. */
+/** MAC version tag — the first element of the `canonical` array signed/verified (admin shared seed). */
 export declare const BROKER_PROOF_VERSION = "noydb-broker-proof-v1";
+/** The member identity bound into a v2 canonical and into the HKDF info (core#73). */
+export interface BrokerMemberIdentity {
+    readonly userId: string;
+    readonly role: string;
+}
 /** The canonical-binding fields a client supplies alongside `vaultId`/`brokerId` (spec §2 step 3). */
 export interface BrokerProofCanonicalParts {
     readonly endpointOrigin: string;
+    /** Present ⇒ a member proof (canonical v2, member-scoped HKDF); absent ⇒ the admin shared seed (v1). */
+    readonly member?: BrokerMemberIdentity | undefined;
     readonly profile?: string | undefined;
     readonly instancePid?: string | undefined;
     readonly challenge: string;
@@ -97,6 +104,8 @@ export interface VerifyBrokerProofArgs {
     readonly vaultId: string;
     readonly endpointOrigin: string;
     readonly brokerId: string;
+    /** The member the `registeredProofKey` was registered FOR; the host supplies its own record, never the client's claim. */
+    readonly member?: BrokerMemberIdentity | undefined;
     readonly profile?: string | undefined;
     readonly instancePid?: string | undefined;
     readonly challenge: string;
@@ -110,14 +119,14 @@ export interface VerifyBrokerProofArgs {
  * value registered with the broker host once at enrol (spec §2 step 2/3).
  * Does not mutate or zero `seed`; the caller owns the seed's lifecycle.
  */
-export declare function deriveBrokerProofBits(seed: Uint8Array, vaultId: string, brokerId: string): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+export declare function deriveBrokerProofBits(seed: Uint8Array, vaultId: string, brokerId: string, memberUserId?: string): Promise<Uint8Array>;
 /**
  * Derive the steady-state, non-extractable `['sign']` HMAC proof key from
  * the `_broker` seed. Zeroes the transient HKDF-output bytes in a `finally`
  * once the key has been imported (F5) — the raw bits never leave this
  * function in usable form after import.
  */
-export declare function deriveBrokerProofKey(seed: Uint8Array, vaultId: string, brokerId: string): Promise<EnclaveKey>;
+export declare function deriveBrokerProofKey(seed: Uint8Array, vaultId: string, brokerId: string, memberUserId?: string): Promise<EnclaveKey>;
 /**
  * Compose derive + sign for the client: re-derive the proof key from the
  * seed and sign the canonical over `canonicalParts` (spec §2 step 3).

package/dist/capsule/enclave-aes/crypto.d.ts

@@ -124,6 +124,16 @@ export declare function importCek(rawKey: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey>;
  * here; the bytes never become a key anywhere else.
  */
 export declare function importTransferKey(raw: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey>;
+/**
+ * core#65 — import raw 32 bytes as a NON-extractable AES-KW key (wrap +
+ * unwrap). The per-delegation CONTENT KEY: a delegation's tier DEKs are
+ * AES-KW-wrapped under it exactly as they are under a KEK, and the key itself
+ * travels RSA-OAEP-sealed to the target's inbox public half — so the token's
+ * slot NAMES stay readable to any vault member for audit while its keys open
+ * for the target alone. Distinct from {@link importTransferKey}, which imports
+ * an AES-GCM key for body encryption and cannot wrap.
+ */
+export declare function importWrappingKey(raw: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey>;
 export interface EncryptResult {
     iv: string;
     data: string;
@@ -253,3 +263,11 @@ export declare function recipientWrap(pub: CryptoKey, bytes: Uint8Array): Promis
  * error on failure — callers that need a typed error map it themselves.
  */
 export declare function recipientUnwrap(pair: CryptoKeyPair, wrapped: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+/**
+ * core#96 — the private half of a recipient pair as PKCS#8 bytes, so a caller
+ * can seal it under a key it holds and persist it (a member's keyring inbox
+ * key pair lives in the keyring file). The caller zeroes the bytes after use.
+ */
+export declare function exportRecipientPrivateKeyPkcs8(pair: CryptoKeyPair): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+/** core#96 — rebuild a recipient pair from persisted PKCS#8 private + SPKI public bytes. */
+export declare function importRecipientKeyPair(pkcs8: Uint8Array, spki: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKeyPair>;

package/dist/capsule/enclave-aes/index.d.ts

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
  */
 export type { EnclaveKey, EncryptResult } from './crypto.js';
 export { encrypt, decrypt, encryptBytes, decryptBytes, encryptBytesWithAAD, decryptBytesWithAAD, encryptDeterministic, decryptDeterministic, } from './crypto.js';
-export { deriveKey, deriveSecretKey, generateDEK, generateEphemeralKey, importTransferKey, exportDekSet, importDekSet, wrapKey, unwrapKey, mintCanary, checkCanary, deriveDeterministicKey, deriveSealedFieldKey, deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek, wrapCek, unwrapCek, importCek, deriveEchoKey, } from './crypto.js';
+export { deriveKey, deriveSecretKey, generateDEK, generateEphemeralKey, importTransferKey, importWrappingKey, exportDekSet, importDekSet, wrapKey, unwrapKey, mintCanary, checkCanary, deriveDeterministicKey, deriveSealedFieldKey, deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek, wrapCek, unwrapCek, importCek, deriveEchoKey, } from './crypto.js';
 export type { SecretKeyUsage } from './crypto.js';
 export { buildRecordAad, recordAadFor, buildRecordEnvelope, isTombstone, isTombstoneShape, buildTombstone, isDeleteMarker, buildDeleteMarker, requireSealedBody, sealedBodyArgs, envelopeBodySize, hasPerRecordKey, envelopeBodyForHash, hasSealedBody, } from '../plumbing/index.js';
 export { sha256Hex, sha256Bytes, hmacSha256Hex, hmacSignHex, hkdfAesGcmKey, deriveBlobAddressKey, derivePresenceKey, derivePresenceTagKey, generateIV, generateSalt, generateRecoverySecret, bufferToBase64, base64ToBuffer, encodeEchoParts, } from '../plumbing/digest.js';
@@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ export { evaluateKofN } from '../plumbing/kofn.js';
 export { deriveClassifyIndexKey, deriveClassifyIndexSalt, mintBidxTag } from './classify/bidx.js';
 export { computeBidxTarget } from './classify/find.js';
 export { deriveBrokerProofBits, deriveBrokerProofKey, computeBrokerProof, issueChallenge, verifyBrokerProof, } from './broker/proof.js';
-export type { BrokerProofCanonicalParts, VerifyBrokerProofArgs, IssuedChallenge } from './broker/proof.js';
+export type { BrokerProofCanonicalParts, BrokerMemberIdentity, VerifyBrokerProofArgs, IssuedChallenge } from './broker/proof.js';
 export { generateSigningKeyPair, signBytes, verifyBytes } from '../plumbing/sign.js';
 export type { EnclaveKeyPair } from './crypto.js';
-export { generateRecipientKeyPair, exportRecipientPublicKeySpki, importRecipientPublicKeySpki, recipientWrap, recipientUnwrap, } from './crypto.js';
+export { generateRecipientKeyPair, exportRecipientPrivateKeyPkcs8, importRecipientKeyPair, exportRecipientPublicKeySpki, importRecipientPublicKeySpki, recipientWrap, recipientUnwrap, } from './crypto.js';
 export { capabilities } from './capabilities.js';

package/dist/capsule/enclave-aes/index.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   computeBidxTarget
-} from "../../chunk-BNWA3WG5.js";
+} from "../../chunk-72FQ46VW.js";
 import {
   aesCapsule,
   checkCanary,
@@ -20,14 +20,17 @@ import {
   encryptBytesWithAAD,
   encryptDeterministic,
   exportDekSet,
+  exportRecipientPrivateKeyPkcs8,
   exportRecipientPublicKeySpki,
   generateDEK,
   generateEphemeralKey,
   generateRecipientKeyPair,
   importCek,
   importDekSet,
+  importRecipientKeyPair,
   importRecipientPublicKeySpki,
   importTransferKey,
+  importWrappingKey,
   mintCanary,
   recipientUnwrap,
   recipientWrap,
@@ -35,18 +38,18 @@ import {
   unwrapKey,
   wrapCek,
   wrapKey
-} from "../../chunk-5KC7QYEC.js";
+} from "../../chunk-YH4OUOSI.js";
 import {
   deriveClassifyIndexKey,
   deriveClassifyIndexSalt,
   mintBidxTag,
   pbkdf2VerifyDigest
-} from "../../chunk-EZOAKKTB.js";
+} from "../../chunk-MBPZMZVB.js";
 import {
   generateSigningKeyPair,
   signBytes,
   verifyBytes
-} from "../../chunk-Q2XRFWOI.js";
+} from "../../chunk-RRTQAQ3N.js";
 import {
   evaluateKofN
 } from "../../chunk-NH2UOV3B.js";
@@ -67,7 +70,7 @@ import {
   recordAadFor,
   requireSealedBody,
   sealedBodyArgs
-} from "../../chunk-42ALPZ2B.js";
+} from "../../chunk-ZF6JECDT.js";
 import {
   base64ToBuffer,
   bufferToBase64,
@@ -83,18 +86,33 @@ import {
   hmacSignHex,
   sha256Bytes,
   sha256Hex
-} from "../../chunk-QMWY2FDS.js";
-import "../../chunk-SV2PM2OY.js";
+} from "../../chunk-THQ3BHLM.js";
+import "../../chunk-XX4R7TUB.js";
 import {
   ValidationError
-} from "../../chunk-37EPTBBR.js";
+} from "../../chunk-IKPQ2GGB.js";
 
 // src/capsule/enclave-aes/broker/proof.ts
 var subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle;
 var BROKER_PROOF_DOMAIN = "noydb-broker-proof";
 var BROKER_PROOF_VERSION = "noydb-broker-proof-v1";
+var BROKER_PROOF_MEMBER_VERSION = "noydb-broker-proof-v2";
 var DEFAULT_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS = 6e4;
 function buildCanonical(vaultId, brokerId, parts) {
+  if (parts.member) {
+    return JSON.stringify([
+      BROKER_PROOF_MEMBER_VERSION,
+      vaultId,
+      parts.endpointOrigin,
+      brokerId,
+      parts.member.userId,
+      parts.member.role,
+      parts.profile ?? "",
+      parts.instancePid ?? "",
+      parts.challenge,
+      parts.expiresAt
+    ]);
+  }
   return JSON.stringify([
     BROKER_PROOF_VERSION,
     vaultId,
@@ -106,15 +124,17 @@ function buildCanonical(vaultId, brokerId, parts) {
     parts.expiresAt
   ]);
 }
-async function deriveBrokerProofBits(seed, vaultId, brokerId) {
+async function deriveBrokerProofBits(seed, vaultId, brokerId, memberUserId) {
   const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey("raw", seed, "HKDF", false, ["deriveBits"]);
   const salt = new TextEncoder().encode(BROKER_PROOF_DOMAIN);
-  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify([BROKER_PROOF_DOMAIN, vaultId, brokerId]));
+  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(
+    memberUserId === void 0 ? [BROKER_PROOF_DOMAIN, vaultId, brokerId] : [BROKER_PROOF_DOMAIN, vaultId, brokerId, memberUserId]
+  ));
   const bits = await subtle.deriveBits({ name: "HKDF", hash: "SHA-256", salt, info }, hkdfKey, 256);
   return new Uint8Array(bits);
 }
-async function deriveBrokerProofKey(seed, vaultId, brokerId) {
-  const proofBits = await deriveBrokerProofBits(seed, vaultId, brokerId);
+async function deriveBrokerProofKey(seed, vaultId, brokerId, memberUserId) {
+  const proofBits = await deriveBrokerProofBits(seed, vaultId, brokerId, memberUserId);
   try {
     return await subtle.importKey("raw", proofBits, { name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" }, false, ["sign"]);
   } finally {
@@ -129,7 +149,7 @@ async function computeBrokerProof(seed, vaultId, brokerId, canonicalParts) {
       );
     }
     const canonical = buildCanonical(vaultId, brokerId, canonicalParts);
-    const key = await deriveBrokerProofKey(seed, vaultId, brokerId);
+    const key = await deriveBrokerProofKey(seed, vaultId, brokerId, canonicalParts.member?.userId);
     const mac = await subtle.sign("HMAC", key, new TextEncoder().encode(canonical));
     return bufferToBase64(new Uint8Array(mac));
   } finally {
@@ -150,6 +170,7 @@ async function verifyBrokerProof(args) {
   if (args.instancePid === "") return false;
   const canonical = buildCanonical(args.vaultId, args.brokerId, {
     endpointOrigin: args.endpointOrigin,
+    member: args.member,
     profile: args.profile,
     instancePid: args.instancePid,
     challenge: args.challenge,
@@ -194,7 +215,15 @@ var ALL = sealedSet([
   "codec",
   "sealing",
   "deterministic",
-  "classify"
+  "classify",
+  // ⭐ ADDED 2026-09-16 (core#42). `enclave-aes` implements `wrapCek` and
+  // `unwrapCek`, so advertising the group is the truthful `capabilities()`.
+  // The nine-member set was the REFERENCE capsule under-reporting itself:
+  // "supports every group" was the documented intent above, and it had been
+  // untrue since `per-record-keys` existed as a refusable thing.
+  // ⛔ This is a published behaviour change — `capabilities()` returns one
+  // more member to any consumer that inspects it. Release-noted by name.
+  "per-record-keys"
 ]);
 function capabilities() {
   return ALL;
@@ -277,6 +306,7 @@ export {
   envelopeOpensUnderAny,
   evaluateKofN,
   exportDekSet,
+  exportRecipientPrivateKeyPkcs8,
   exportRecipientPublicKeySpki,
   findByDet,
   generateDEK,
@@ -293,8 +323,10 @@ export {
   hmacSignHex,
   importCek,
   importDekSet,
+  importRecipientKeyPair,
   importRecipientPublicKeySpki,
   importTransferKey,
+  importWrappingKey,
   isDeleteMarker,
   isRewrappedUnder,
   isTombstone,