@noy-db/hub 0.8.0-pre.0 → 0.8.0

package/dist/{chunk-IEX7NK2K.js → chunk-2RH777HH.js}

@@ -10,14 +10,21 @@ import {
   verifyPrompt,
   verifyRoster,
   verifyTypedEcho
-} from "./chunk-M7NI3IWE.js";
+} from "./chunk-XSPFDUDG.js";
+import {
+  base64ToBuffer,
+  bufferToBase64,
+  decryptBytes,
+  encryptBytes,
+  generateEphemeralKey
+} from "./chunk-EZGV6F47.js";
 import {
   NoAccessError,
   NoydbError,
   ValidationError,
   WrongEchoError,
   WrongPromptError
-} from "./chunk-244VXYPG.js";
+} from "./chunk-37EPTBBR.js";
 
 // src/with-party/team/echo-ceremony.ts
 async function beginEchoUnlock(store, vault, opts) {
@@ -66,29 +73,23 @@ var MemoryDeviceSeal = class {
   keyPromise;
   constructor(opts) {
     this.id = opts.id;
-    this.keyPromise = globalThis.crypto.subtle.generateKey({ name: "AES-GCM", length: 256 }, false, [
-      "encrypt",
-      "decrypt"
-    ]);
+    this.keyPromise = generateEphemeralKey();
   }
   async seal(plain) {
-    const iv = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12));
-    const ct = new Uint8Array(
-      await globalThis.crypto.subtle.encrypt({ name: "AES-GCM", iv }, await this.keyPromise, plain)
-    );
-    const out = new Uint8Array(12 + ct.length);
-    out.set(iv, 0);
-    out.set(ct, 12);
+    const { iv, data } = await encryptBytes(plain, await this.keyPromise);
+    const ivB = base64ToBuffer(iv);
+    const ct = base64ToBuffer(data);
+    const out = new Uint8Array(ivB.byteLength + ct.byteLength);
+    out.set(ivB, 0);
+    out.set(ct, ivB.byteLength);
     return out;
   }
   async unseal(sealed) {
     try {
-      return new Uint8Array(
-        await globalThis.crypto.subtle.decrypt(
-          { name: "AES-GCM", iv: sealed.slice(0, 12) },
-          await this.keyPromise,
-          sealed.slice(12)
-        )
+      return await decryptBytes(
+        bufferToBase64(sealed.slice(0, 12)),
+        bufferToBase64(sealed.slice(12)),
+        await this.keyPromise
       );
     } catch {
       throw new NoydbError("DEVICE_SEAL_UNSEAL_FAILED", "Device seal: unseal failed (tamper or wrong device).");
@@ -122,4 +123,4 @@ export {
   MemoryDeviceSeal,
   withTeam
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IEX7NK2K.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-2RH777HH.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-IEX7NK2K.js.map → chunk-2RH777HH.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-party/team/echo-ceremony.ts","../src/with-party/team/device-seal.ts","../src/with-party/team/active.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `beginEchoUnlock` — the interactive ceremony API (spec\n * design-history/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md, #940, Task 6).\n *\n * Split out of `echo-secret.ts` (which owns only the block builders +\n * verifiers) because this module orchestrates BOTH `echo-secret.ts`\n * (`verifyPrompt`/`resolveEchoReveal`/`verifyTypedEcho`) AND `keyring.ts`\n * (`loadKeyring`) — and `keyring.ts` itself imports `buildEchoBlock` from\n * `echo-secret.ts`. Keeping the ceremony here instead of inside\n * `echo-secret.ts` yields a clean DAG (`echo-ceremony.ts` → {`echo-secret.ts`,\n * `keyring.ts`}; `keyring.ts` → `echo-secret.ts`) instead of a two-file\n * cycle, and restores `echo-secret.ts`'s documented charter (builders +\n * verifiers only).\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { NoydbDeviceSeal } from './device-seal.js'\nimport { WrongPromptError, WrongEchoError, ValidationError, NoAccessError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { verifyPrompt, resolveEchoReveal, verifyTypedEcho } from './echo-secret.js'\nimport { loadKeyring, readKeyringFile, assertKeyringNotExpired, type UnlockedKeyring } from './keyring.js'\n\n/** Options for {@link beginEchoUnlock}. */\nexport interface BeginEchoUnlockOptions {\n  readonly userId: string\n  readonly prompt: string\n  readonly deviceSeal?: NoydbDeviceSeal\n}\n\n/**\n * A prompt-verified, in-progress echo unlock. Stateless w.r.t. attempts —\n * `complete()` may be called more than once (e.g. retry after a wrong key).\n */\nexport interface EchoCeremony {\n  /**\n   * Echo to display for owner recognition; null ⇒ degraded: ask the owner to\n   * TYPE it.\n   *\n   * Conforming-player contract (spec\n   * design-history/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md, \"Ceremony\"):\n   * when the owner does NOT recognize the revealed echo, the player MUST show\n   * a hard phishing warning — do not continue, open the official app, rotate\n   * the secret immediately — MUST NOT offer any skip or\n   * \"verification unavailable\" fallback, and MUST simply abandon the ceremony\n   * by never calling {@link EchoCeremony.complete}. The kernel cannot enforce\n   * this terminal state; it is the player's obligation.\n   */\n  readonly reveal: string | null\n  readonly maskHint: string | undefined\n  /** Complete the ceremony. `echo` is REQUIRED when `reveal` is null. */\n  complete(input: { readonly echo?: string; readonly key: string }): Promise<UnlockedKeyring>\n}\n\n/**\n * Begin the interactive anti-phishing unlock ceremony (spec decision 4):\n * prompt → echo reveal → key. Fetches and parses the `_keyring/{userId}`\n * row (same store path as `loadKeyring`), verifies the prompt, and resolves\n * the echo for display (or degrades to the typed-echo path when the reveal\n * cannot be resolved — sealed reveal under a foreign device).\n *\n * Conforming-player contract (spec\n * design-history/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md): an owner who does\n * not recognize `ceremony.reveal` is looking at a phish. The player MUST then\n * show a hard warning (stop, open the official app, rotate the secret now),\n * MUST NOT offer a skip / \"verification unavailable\" fallback or any\n * single-field secret entry, and MUST abandon the ceremony without calling\n * `complete()`.\n *\n * @throws NoAccessError when no keyring exists for `userId` (mirrors\n * `loadKeyring`'s missing-row error).\n * @throws KeyringExpiredError when the slot is past its `expires_at` —\n * checked before the prompt is verified, so an expired slot never reveals.\n * @throws ValidationError when the keyring is not an echo keyring.\n * @throws WrongPromptError when the prompt fails its verifier.\n */\nexport async function beginEchoUnlock(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  opts: BeginEchoUnlockOptions,\n): Promise<EchoCeremony> {\n  const { userId, prompt, deviceSeal } = opts\n\n  // Same store path + missing-row error as loadKeyring, now shared via\n  // `readKeyringFile` (#951).\n  const found = await readKeyringFile(store, vault, userId)\n  if (!found) {\n    throw new NoAccessError(`No keyring found for user \"${userId}\" in vault \"${vault}\"`)\n  }\n  const { file: keyringFile } = found\n\n  // Same expiry gate as loadKeyring, applied BEFORE the prompt is verified so\n  // an expired slot never reveals its echo (and leaks no timing on the\n  // prompt). Now shared via `assertKeyringNotExpired` (#951).\n  assertKeyringNotExpired(keyringFile)\n\n  const block = keyringFile.echo\n  if (block === undefined) {\n    throw new ValidationError('not an echo keyring')\n  }\n\n  if (!(await verifyPrompt(block, prompt))) {\n    throw new WrongPromptError()\n  }\n\n  const reveal = await resolveEchoReveal(block, prompt, deviceSeal)\n\n  return {\n    reveal,\n    maskHint: block.mask_hint,\n    async complete(input: { readonly echo?: string; readonly key: string }): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n      let echo: string\n      if (reveal !== null) {\n        // A supplied input.echo must agree with the revealed echo — defensive:\n        // a player that collects a typed echo despite a reveal must not\n        // silently unlock with a mismatched pair.\n        if (input.echo !== undefined && input.echo !== reveal) {\n          throw new WrongEchoError()\n        }\n        echo = reveal\n      } else {\n        if (input.echo === undefined) {\n          throw new ValidationError('beginEchoUnlock: echo is required to complete a degraded (typed-echo) ceremony.')\n        }\n        if (!(await verifyTypedEcho(block, input.echo))) {\n          throw new WrongEchoError()\n        }\n        echo = input.echo\n      }\n      return loadKeyring(store, vault, { userId, secret: { prompt, echo, key: input.key } })\n    },\n  }\n}\n","import { NoydbError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport type { NoydbDeviceSeal } from '../../port/with/device-seal-strategy.js'\n\n/**\n * Device-local sealer for the echo reveal-blob (spec decision 5).\n * DISTINCT from `NoydbSealer` (managed-secret mode, which seals\n * the WHOLE secret): this seals only the echo part, and only so an\n * enrolled device can display it during the unlock ceremony. The\n * sealed bytes may sit in the (untrusted) keyring file — attacker-B\n * resistance comes from `unseal` requiring this device's key store.\n *\n * The interface itself is declared on the `/with` port\n * ({@link NoydbDeviceSeal} from `port/with/device-seal-strategy.js`)\n * so the kernel spine can reference it without a static spine→service\n * import; re-exported here as the canonical consumer-facing home.\n */\nexport type { NoydbDeviceSeal }\n\n/** In-memory test provider — AES-GCM under a per-instance random key. */\nexport class MemoryDeviceSeal implements NoydbDeviceSeal {\n  readonly id: string\n  private readonly keyPromise: Promise<CryptoKey>\n  constructor(opts: { id: string }) {\n    this.id = opts.id\n    this.keyPromise = globalThis.crypto.subtle.generateKey({ name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 }, false, [\n      'encrypt',\n      'decrypt',\n    ])\n  }\n  async seal(plain: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const iv = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12))\n    const ct = new Uint8Array(\n      await globalThis.crypto.subtle.encrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv }, await this.keyPromise, plain as BufferSource),\n    )\n    const out = new Uint8Array(12 + ct.length)\n    out.set(iv, 0)\n    out.set(ct, 12)\n    return out\n  }\n  async unseal(sealed: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    try {\n      return new Uint8Array(\n        await globalThis.crypto.subtle.decrypt(\n          { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: sealed.slice(0, 12) },\n          await this.keyPromise,\n          sealed.slice(12) as BufferSource,\n        ),\n      )\n    } catch {\n      throw new NoydbError('DEVICE_SEAL_UNSEAL_FAILED', 'Device seal: unseal failed (tamper or wrong device).')\n    }\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Enable the multi-user team capability (#267 Track A tail).\n *\n * Pass to `createNoydb({ teamStrategy: withTeam() })` to make `db.grant` /\n * `db.revoke` / `db.rotate` live. The keyring grant/revoke/rotate engines\n * are statically imported HERE — this module is reachable only through the\n * `@noy-db/hub/team` subpath (and the root barrel's tree-shakeable\n * re-export), so a single-user floor bundle never carries them. The facade\n * (`TeamFacade.runGrant` / `runRevoke` / `runRotate`) owns the policy-gate +\n * keyring plumbing and receives the engine as an argument.\n */\nimport type { TeamStrategy } from './strategy.js'\nimport { grant as grantEngine, revoke as revokeEngine, rotateKeys as rotateEngine, verifyRoster as verifyRosterEngine, quarantineKeyring as quarantineEngine } from './keyring.js'\n\nexport function withTeam(): TeamStrategy {\n  return {\n    async grant(team, vault, options, factors) {\n      return team.runGrant(grantEngine, vault, options, factors)\n    },\n    async revoke(team, vault, options, factors) {\n      return team.runRevoke(revokeEngine, vault, options, factors)\n    },\n    async rotate(team, vault, collections) {\n      return team.runRotate(rotateEngine, vault, collections)\n    },\n    async verifyRoster(team, vault) {\n      return team.runVerifyRoster(verifyRosterEngine, vault)\n    },\n    async quarantineKeyring(team, vault, userId, factors) {\n      return team.runQuarantine(quarantineEngine, vault, userId, factors)\n    },\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA4EA,eAAsB,gBACpB,OACA,OACA,MACuB;AACvB,QAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,QAAQ,WAAW,IAAI;AAIvC,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,gBAAgB,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM;AACxD,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AACV,UAAM,IAAI,cAAc,8BAA8B,MAAM,eAAe,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,EACrF;AACA,QAAM,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI;AAK9B,0BAAwB,WAAW;AAEnC,QAAM,QAAQ,YAAY;AAC1B,MAAI,UAAU,QAAW;AACvB,UAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,qBAAqB;AAAA,EACjD;AAEA,MAAI,CAAE,MAAM,aAAa,OAAO,MAAM,GAAI;AACxC,UAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB;AAAA,EAC7B;AAEA,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,kBAAkB,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAEhE,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA,UAAU,MAAM;AAAA,IAChB,MAAM,SAAS,OAAmF;AAChG,UAAI;AACJ,UAAI,WAAW,MAAM;AAInB,YAAI,MAAM,SAAS,UAAa,MAAM,SAAS,QAAQ;AACrD,gBAAM,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,QAC3B;AACA,eAAO;AAAA,MACT,OAAO;AACL,YAAI,MAAM,SAAS,QAAW;AAC5B,gBAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,iFAAiF;AAAA,QAC7G;AACA,YAAI,CAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI,GAAI;AAC/C,gBAAM,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,QAC3B;AACA,eAAO,MAAM;AAAA,MACf;AACA,aAAO,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,IACvF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;ACjHO,IAAM,mBAAN,MAAkD;AAAA,EAC9C;AAAA,EACQ;AAAA,EACjB,YAAY,MAAsB;AAChC,SAAK,KAAK,KAAK;AACf,SAAK,aAAa,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,OAAO;AAAA,MAC9F;AAAA,MACA;AAAA,IACF,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AAAA,EACA,MAAM,KAAK,OAAwC;AACjD,UAAM,KAAK,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AAC/D,UAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,MACb,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,GAAG,MAAM,KAAK,YAAY,KAAqB;AAAA,IAC9G;AACA,UAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM;AACzC,QAAI,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC;AACb,QAAI,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE;AACd,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA,EACA,MAAM,OAAO,QAAyC;AACpD,QAAI;AACF,aAAO,IAAI;AAAA,QACT,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,UAC7B,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE;AAAA,UAC3C,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,UACX,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,QACjB;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF,QAAQ;AACN,YAAM,IAAI,WAAW,6BAA6B,sDAAsD;AAAA,IAC1G;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;ACtCO,SAAS,WAAyB;AACvC,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS,SAAS;AACzC,aAAO,KAAK,SAAS,OAAa,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO;AAAA,IAC3D;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS,SAAS;AAC1C,aAAO,KAAK,UAAU,QAAc,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO;AAAA,IAC7D;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,aAAa;AACrC,aAAO,KAAK,UAAU,YAAc,OAAO,WAAW;AAAA,IACxD;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,OAAO;AAC9B,aAAO,KAAK,gBAAgB,cAAoB,KAAK;AAAA,IACvD;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,kBAAkB,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,SAAS;AACpD,aAAO,KAAK,cAAc,mBAAkB,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO;AAAA,IACpE;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-party/team/echo-ceremony.ts","../src/with-party/team/device-seal.ts","../src/with-party/team/active.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `beginEchoUnlock` — the interactive ceremony API (spec\n * design-history/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md, #940, Task 6).\n *\n * Split out of `echo-secret.ts` (which owns only the block builders +\n * verifiers) because this module orchestrates BOTH `echo-secret.ts`\n * (`verifyPrompt`/`resolveEchoReveal`/`verifyTypedEcho`) AND `keyring.ts`\n * (`loadKeyring`) — and `keyring.ts` itself imports `buildEchoBlock` from\n * `echo-secret.ts`. Keeping the ceremony here instead of inside\n * `echo-secret.ts` yields a clean DAG (`echo-ceremony.ts` → {`echo-secret.ts`,\n * `keyring.ts`}; `keyring.ts` → `echo-secret.ts`) instead of a two-file\n * cycle, and restores `echo-secret.ts`'s documented charter (builders +\n * verifiers only).\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { NoydbDeviceSeal } from './device-seal.js'\nimport { WrongPromptError, WrongEchoError, ValidationError, NoAccessError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { verifyPrompt, resolveEchoReveal, verifyTypedEcho } from './echo-secret.js'\nimport { loadKeyring, readKeyringFile, assertKeyringNotExpired, type UnlockedKeyring } from './keyring.js'\n\n/** Options for {@link beginEchoUnlock}. */\nexport interface BeginEchoUnlockOptions {\n  readonly userId: string\n  readonly prompt: string\n  readonly deviceSeal?: NoydbDeviceSeal\n}\n\n/**\n * A prompt-verified, in-progress echo unlock. Stateless w.r.t. attempts —\n * `complete()` may be called more than once (e.g. retry after a wrong key).\n */\nexport interface EchoCeremony {\n  /**\n   * Echo to display for owner recognition; null ⇒ degraded: ask the owner to\n   * TYPE it.\n   *\n   * Conforming-player contract (spec\n   * design-history/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md, \"Ceremony\"):\n   * when the owner does NOT recognize the revealed echo, the player MUST show\n   * a hard phishing warning — do not continue, open the official app, rotate\n   * the secret immediately — MUST NOT offer any skip or\n   * \"verification unavailable\" fallback, and MUST simply abandon the ceremony\n   * by never calling {@link EchoCeremony.complete}. The kernel cannot enforce\n   * this terminal state; it is the player's obligation.\n   */\n  readonly reveal: string | null\n  readonly maskHint: string | undefined\n  /** Complete the ceremony. `echo` is REQUIRED when `reveal` is null. */\n  complete(input: { readonly echo?: string; readonly key: string }): Promise<UnlockedKeyring>\n}\n\n/**\n * Begin the interactive anti-phishing unlock ceremony (spec decision 4):\n * prompt → echo reveal → key. Fetches and parses the `_keyring/{userId}`\n * row (same store path as `loadKeyring`), verifies the prompt, and resolves\n * the echo for display (or degrades to the typed-echo path when the reveal\n * cannot be resolved — sealed reveal under a foreign device).\n *\n * Conforming-player contract (spec\n * design-history/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md): an owner who does\n * not recognize `ceremony.reveal` is looking at a phish. The player MUST then\n * show a hard warning (stop, open the official app, rotate the secret now),\n * MUST NOT offer a skip / \"verification unavailable\" fallback or any\n * single-field secret entry, and MUST abandon the ceremony without calling\n * `complete()`.\n *\n * @throws NoAccessError when no keyring exists for `userId` (mirrors\n * `loadKeyring`'s missing-row error).\n * @throws KeyringExpiredError when the slot is past its `expires_at` —\n * checked before the prompt is verified, so an expired slot never reveals.\n * @throws ValidationError when the keyring is not an echo keyring.\n * @throws WrongPromptError when the prompt fails its verifier.\n */\nexport async function beginEchoUnlock(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  opts: BeginEchoUnlockOptions,\n): Promise<EchoCeremony> {\n  const { userId, prompt, deviceSeal } = opts\n\n  // Same store path + missing-row error as loadKeyring, now shared via\n  // `readKeyringFile` (#951).\n  const found = await readKeyringFile(store, vault, userId)\n  if (!found) {\n    throw new NoAccessError(`No keyring found for user \"${userId}\" in vault \"${vault}\"`)\n  }\n  const { file: keyringFile } = found\n\n  // Same expiry gate as loadKeyring, applied BEFORE the prompt is verified so\n  // an expired slot never reveals its echo (and leaks no timing on the\n  // prompt). Now shared via `assertKeyringNotExpired` (#951).\n  assertKeyringNotExpired(keyringFile)\n\n  const block = keyringFile.echo\n  if (block === undefined) {\n    throw new ValidationError('not an echo keyring')\n  }\n\n  if (!(await verifyPrompt(block, prompt))) {\n    throw new WrongPromptError()\n  }\n\n  const reveal = await resolveEchoReveal(block, prompt, deviceSeal)\n\n  return {\n    reveal,\n    maskHint: block.mask_hint,\n    async complete(input: { readonly echo?: string; readonly key: string }): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n      let echo: string\n      if (reveal !== null) {\n        // A supplied input.echo must agree with the revealed echo — defensive:\n        // a player that collects a typed echo despite a reveal must not\n        // silently unlock with a mismatched pair.\n        if (input.echo !== undefined && input.echo !== reveal) {\n          throw new WrongEchoError()\n        }\n        echo = reveal\n      } else {\n        if (input.echo === undefined) {\n          throw new ValidationError('beginEchoUnlock: echo is required to complete a degraded (typed-echo) ceremony.')\n        }\n        if (!(await verifyTypedEcho(block, input.echo))) {\n          throw new WrongEchoError()\n        }\n        echo = input.echo\n      }\n      return loadKeyring(store, vault, { userId, secret: { prompt, echo, key: input.key } })\n    },\n  }\n}\n","import { NoydbError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport {\n  generateEphemeralKey, encryptBytes, decryptBytes, bufferToBase64, base64ToBuffer, type EnclaveKey,\n} from '../../capsule/index.js'\nimport type { NoydbDeviceSeal } from '../../port/with/device-seal-strategy.js'\n\n/**\n * Device-local sealer for the echo reveal-blob (spec decision 5).\n * DISTINCT from `NoydbSealer` (managed-secret mode, which seals\n * the WHOLE secret): this seals only the echo part, and only so an\n * enrolled device can display it during the unlock ceremony. The\n * sealed bytes may sit in the (untrusted) keyring file — attacker-B\n * resistance comes from `unseal` requiring this device's key store.\n *\n * The interface itself is declared on the `/with` port\n * ({@link NoydbDeviceSeal} from `port/with/device-seal-strategy.js`)\n * so the kernel spine can reference it without a static spine→service\n * import; re-exported here as the canonical consumer-facing home.\n */\nexport type { NoydbDeviceSeal }\n\n/** In-memory test provider — AES-GCM under a per-instance random key. */\nexport class MemoryDeviceSeal implements NoydbDeviceSeal {\n  readonly id: string\n  private readonly keyPromise: Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  constructor(opts: { id: string }) {\n    this.id = opts.id\n    this.keyPromise = generateEphemeralKey()\n  }\n  async seal(plain: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const { iv, data } = await encryptBytes(plain, await this.keyPromise)\n    const ivB = base64ToBuffer(iv)\n    const ct = base64ToBuffer(data)\n    const out = new Uint8Array(ivB.byteLength + ct.byteLength)\n    out.set(ivB, 0)\n    out.set(ct, ivB.byteLength)\n    return out\n  }\n  async unseal(sealed: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    try {\n      return await decryptBytes(\n        bufferToBase64(sealed.slice(0, 12)),\n        bufferToBase64(sealed.slice(12)),\n        await this.keyPromise,\n      )\n    } catch {\n      throw new NoydbError('DEVICE_SEAL_UNSEAL_FAILED', 'Device seal: unseal failed (tamper or wrong device).')\n    }\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Enable the multi-user team capability (#267 Track A tail).\n *\n * Pass to `createNoydb({ teamStrategy: withTeam() })` to make `db.grant` /\n * `db.revoke` / `db.rotate` live. The keyring grant/revoke/rotate engines\n * are statically imported HERE — this module is reachable only through the\n * `@noy-db/hub/team` subpath (and the root barrel's tree-shakeable\n * re-export), so a single-user floor bundle never carries them. The facade\n * (`TeamFacade.runGrant` / `runRevoke` / `runRotate`) owns the policy-gate +\n * keyring plumbing and receives the engine as an argument.\n */\nimport type { TeamStrategy } from './strategy.js'\nimport { grant as grantEngine, revoke as revokeEngine, rotateKeys as rotateEngine, verifyRoster as verifyRosterEngine, quarantineKeyring as quarantineEngine } from './keyring.js'\n\nexport function withTeam(): TeamStrategy {\n  return {\n    async grant(team, vault, options, factors) {\n      return team.runGrant(grantEngine, vault, options, factors)\n    },\n    async revoke(team, vault, options, factors) {\n      return team.runRevoke(revokeEngine, vault, options, factors)\n    },\n    async rotate(team, vault, collections) {\n      return team.runRotate(rotateEngine, vault, collections)\n    },\n    async verifyRoster(team, vault) {\n      return team.runVerifyRoster(verifyRosterEngine, vault)\n    },\n    async quarantineKeyring(team, vault, userId, factors) {\n      return team.runQuarantine(quarantineEngine, vault, userId, factors)\n    },\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AA4EA,eAAsB,gBACpB,OACA,OACA,MACuB;AACvB,QAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,QAAQ,WAAW,IAAI;AAIvC,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,gBAAgB,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM;AACxD,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AACV,UAAM,IAAI,cAAc,8BAA8B,MAAM,eAAe,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,EACrF;AACA,QAAM,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,IAAI;AAK9B,0BAAwB,WAAW;AAEnC,QAAM,QAAQ,YAAY;AAC1B,MAAI,UAAU,QAAW;AACvB,UAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,qBAAqB;AAAA,EACjD;AAEA,MAAI,CAAE,MAAM,aAAa,OAAO,MAAM,GAAI;AACxC,UAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB;AAAA,EAC7B;AAEA,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,kBAAkB,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAEhE,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA,UAAU,MAAM;AAAA,IAChB,MAAM,SAAS,OAAmF;AAChG,UAAI;AACJ,UAAI,WAAW,MAAM;AAInB,YAAI,MAAM,SAAS,UAAa,MAAM,SAAS,QAAQ;AACrD,gBAAM,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,QAC3B;AACA,eAAO;AAAA,MACT,OAAO;AACL,YAAI,MAAM,SAAS,QAAW;AAC5B,gBAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,iFAAiF;AAAA,QAC7G;AACA,YAAI,CAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI,GAAI;AAC/C,gBAAM,IAAI,eAAe;AAAA,QAC3B;AACA,eAAO,MAAM;AAAA,MACf;AACA,aAAO,YAAY,OAAO,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,IACvF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;AC9GO,IAAM,mBAAN,MAAkD;AAAA,EAC9C;AAAA,EACQ;AAAA,EACjB,YAAY,MAAsB;AAChC,SAAK,KAAK,KAAK;AACf,SAAK,aAAa,qBAAqB;AAAA,EACzC;AAAA,EACA,MAAM,KAAK,OAAwC;AACjD,UAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,aAAa,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU;AACpE,UAAM,MAAM,eAAe,EAAE;AAC7B,UAAM,KAAK,eAAe,IAAI;AAC9B,UAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI,aAAa,GAAG,UAAU;AACzD,QAAI,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;AACd,QAAI,IAAI,IAAI,IAAI,UAAU;AAC1B,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAAA,EACA,MAAM,OAAO,QAAyC;AACpD,QAAI;AACF,aAAO,MAAM;AAAA,QACX,eAAe,OAAO,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,QAClC,eAAe,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,QAC/B,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,MACb;AAAA,IACF,QAAQ;AACN,YAAM,IAAI,WAAW,6BAA6B,sDAAsD;AAAA,IAC1G;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;ACnCO,SAAS,WAAyB;AACvC,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS,SAAS;AACzC,aAAO,KAAK,SAAS,OAAa,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO;AAAA,IAC3D;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,SAAS,SAAS;AAC1C,aAAO,KAAK,UAAU,QAAc,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO;AAAA,IAC7D;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,aAAa;AACrC,aAAO,KAAK,UAAU,YAAc,OAAO,WAAW;AAAA,IACxD;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,aAAa,MAAM,OAAO;AAC9B,aAAO,KAAK,gBAAgB,cAAoB,KAAK;AAAA,IACvD;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,kBAAkB,MAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,SAAS;AACpD,aAAO,KAAK,cAAc,mBAAkB,OAAO,QAAQ,OAAO;AAAA,IACpE;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-244VXYPG.js → chunk-37EPTBBR.js}

@@ -36,6 +36,18 @@ var DecryptionError = class extends NoydbError {
     this.name = "DecryptionError";
   }
 };
+var MissingEnvelopeBodyError = class extends NoydbError {
+  /** The operation that required a sealed body, e.g. `'openEnvelopeJson'`. */
+  where;
+  constructor(where) {
+    super(
+      "ENVELOPE_BODY_MISSING",
+      `${where}: this envelope carries no sealed body (_iv/_data absent). An enclave capsule cannot open a row written by an exclave capsule.`
+    );
+    this.name = "MissingEnvelopeBodyError";
+    this.where = where;
+  }
+};
 var TamperedError = class extends NoydbError {
   /**
    * Evidence the thrower held BEFORE decrypting, when it held any. Additive
@@ -1734,6 +1746,7 @@ export {
   DebugPlaintextError,
   DebugReservedFieldError,
   DecryptionError,
+  MissingEnvelopeBodyError,
   TamperedError,
   InvalidKeyError,
   KeyringCorruptError,
@@ -1885,4 +1898,4 @@ export {
   ClassifiedRotationError,
   SatelliteConfigError
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-244VXYPG.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-37EPTBBR.js.map