@noy-db/hub 0.7.1-pre.0 → 0.8.0

package/dist/{chunk-TUFM4UZP.js → chunk-XQRFSKYM.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   SatelliteConfigError
-} from "./chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
+} from "./chunk-37EPTBBR.js";
 
 // src/with-shape/satellites/validate.ts
 function validateSatelliteDeclaration(input) {
@@ -47,4 +47,4 @@ export {
   validateSatelliteDeclaration,
   hashFields
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-TUFM4UZP.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-XQRFSKYM.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-3V4KWFX7.js → chunk-XSPFDUDG.js}

@@ -5,36 +5,36 @@ import {
   readDirectoryConfig,
   readUserVisibility,
   saveUserEnvelope
-} from "./chunk-XKWGNJ26.js";
+} from "./chunk-LIOVX5TJ.js";
 import {
   parseDekKey
-} from "./chunk-JMGDHKQF.js";
-import {
-  envelopeOpensUnderAny,
-  rekeyBlobSet,
-  rekeyEnvelopeIfNeeded
-} from "./chunk-4ZS56W5S.js";
-import {
-  buildRecordEnvelope
-} from "./chunk-SZJ3DLZA.js";
+} from "./chunk-FLPCETP6.js";
 import {
   base64ToBuffer,
   bufferToBase64,
+  buildRecordEnvelope,
+  checkCanary,
   decrypt,
+  decryptBytes,
   deriveEchoKey,
   deriveKey,
   deriveSecretKey,
   encodeEchoParts,
   encrypt,
+  encryptBytes,
+  envelopeOpensUnderAny,
   generateDEK,
-  generateIV,
   generateSalt,
+  hasSealedBody,
+  mintCanary,
+  rekeyBlobSet,
+  rekeyEnvelopeIfNeeded,
   unwrapKey,
   wrapKey
-} from "./chunk-HPVZCW43.js";
+} from "./chunk-EZGV6F47.js";
 import {
   NOYDB_KEYRING_VERSION
-} from "./chunk-7MG7SJT7.js";
+} from "./chunk-SV2PM2OY.js";
 import {
   BLOB_ADDRESS_KEY_ID,
   DirectoryDisabledError,
@@ -48,10 +48,11 @@ import {
   PermissionDeniedError,
   PrivilegeEscalationError,
   ROSTER_KEY_ID,
+  TamperedError,
   USER_ENVELOPE_COLLECTION,
   ValidationError,
   WrongPromptError
-} from "./chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
+} from "./chunk-37EPTBBR.js";
 
 // src/with-party/team/roster-epoch.ts
 function assertRosterEpochCurrent(found, expected, userId) {
@@ -164,12 +165,20 @@ function mismatchReason(file) {
 // src/kernel/validation.ts
 var WeakSecretError = class extends NoydbError {
   reason;
+  /**
+   * Remediation copy. Empty string when no truthful advice was
+   * available — a `customValidator` rejected the phrase and supplied
+   * none, so the hub has no rules to describe (#1430). Never populated
+   * with the built-in copy in that case: wrong advice is worse than
+   * none, especially for a vault whose own credentials violate it.
+   */
   suggestion;
   constructor(reason, suggestion) {
-    super("WEAK_SECRET", `Weak secret (${reason}). ${suggestion}`);
+    const advice = suggestion ?? "";
+    super("WEAK_SECRET", advice ? `Weak secret (${reason}). ${advice}` : `Weak secret (${reason}).`);
     this.name = "WeakSecretError";
     this.reason = reason;
-    this.suggestion = suggestion;
+    this.suggestion = advice;
   }
 };
 var DEFAULT_MIN_WORDS = 6;
@@ -221,11 +230,19 @@ function validateSecret(s, opts) {
   }
   return { ok: true, words: words.length };
 }
+function resolveSuggestion(result, customValidatorInUse) {
+  if (result.suggestion !== void 0) return result.suggestion;
+  if (customValidatorInUse) return void 0;
+  return SUGGESTIONS[result.reason];
+}
 function assertStrongSecret(s, opts) {
   if (opts?.allowWeakSecret) return;
   const result = validateSecret(s, opts);
   if (result.ok) return;
-  throw new WeakSecretError(result.reason, SUGGESTIONS[result.reason]);
+  throw new WeakSecretError(
+    result.reason,
+    resolveSuggestion(result, opts?.customValidator !== void 0)
+  );
 }
 function estimateEntropy(secret) {
   const result = validateSecret(secret);
@@ -271,26 +288,22 @@ function assertStrongEchoSecret(parts, opts) {
   const { result, failedCheck } = validateEchoSecretDetailed(parts, opts);
   if (result.ok) return;
   const promptMinWords = opts?.prompt?.minWords ?? DEFAULT_ECHO_PROMPT_MIN_WORDS;
-  const suggestion = failedCheck === "prompt" ? promptSuggestion(result.reason, promptMinWords) : SUGGESTIONS[result.reason];
+  const customInUse = failedCheck === "prompt" ? opts?.prompt?.customValidator !== void 0 : opts?.combined?.customValidator !== void 0;
+  const suggestion = result.suggestion !== void 0 ? result.suggestion : failedCheck === "prompt" && !customInUse ? promptSuggestion(result.reason, promptMinWords) : resolveSuggestion(result, customInUse);
   throw new WeakSecretError(result.reason, suggestion);
 }
 
 // src/with-party/team/echo-secret.ts
 var ECHO_KDF_ITERATIONS = 6e5;
 var VERIFIER_PLAINTEXT = new Uint8Array(32).fill(90);
-var subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle;
-async function getVerifierKey() {
-  return subtle.importKey("raw", VERIFIER_PLAINTEXT, { name: "AES-GCM" }, true, ["encrypt"]);
-}
 async function mintVerifier(part, salt) {
   const kek = await deriveSecretKey(part, salt, { iterations: ECHO_KDF_ITERATIONS, keyUsage: "aes-kw" });
-  return wrapKey(await getVerifierKey(), kek);
+  return mintCanary(kek, VERIFIER_PLAINTEXT);
 }
 async function checkVerifier(verifier, part, saltB64) {
   try {
     const kek = await deriveSecretKey(part, base64ToBuffer(saltB64), { iterations: ECHO_KDF_ITERATIONS, keyUsage: "aes-kw" });
-    await subtle.unwrapKey("raw", base64ToBuffer(verifier), kek, "AES-KW", { name: "AES-GCM" }, false, ["encrypt"]);
-    return true;
+    return await checkCanary(verifier, kek);
   } catch {
     return false;
   }
@@ -302,12 +315,9 @@ async function buildEchoBlock(parts, reveal, maskHint) {
   let revealField;
   if (reveal.kind === "portable") {
     const blobSalt = generateSalt();
-    const iv = generateIV();
     const gcmKey = await deriveSecretKey(parts.prompt, blobSalt, { iterations: ECHO_KDF_ITERATIONS, keyUsage: "aes-gcm" });
-    const ct = new Uint8Array(
-      await subtle.encrypt({ name: "AES-GCM", iv }, gcmKey, new TextEncoder().encode(parts.echo))
-    );
-    revealField = { kind: "portable", blob: bufferToBase64(ct), iv: bufferToBase64(iv), salt: bufferToBase64(blobSalt) };
+    const { iv, data } = await encryptBytes(new TextEncoder().encode(parts.echo), gcmKey);
+    revealField = { kind: "portable", blob: data, iv, salt: bufferToBase64(blobSalt) };
   } else if (reveal.kind === "sealed") {
     const sealed = await reveal.deviceSeal.seal(new TextEncoder().encode(parts.echo));
     revealField = { kind: "sealed", blob: bufferToBase64(sealed), provider_hint: reveal.deviceSeal.id };
@@ -334,11 +344,7 @@ async function resolveEchoReveal(block, prompt, deviceSeal) {
         iterations: ECHO_KDF_ITERATIONS,
         keyUsage: "aes-gcm"
       });
-      const plain = await subtle.decrypt(
-        { name: "AES-GCM", iv: base64ToBuffer(block.reveal.iv) },
-        gcmKey,
-        base64ToBuffer(block.reveal.blob)
-      );
+      const plain = await decryptBytes(block.reveal.iv, block.reveal.blob, gcmKey);
       return new TextDecoder().decode(plain);
     } catch {
       throw new WrongPromptError();
@@ -389,23 +395,8 @@ function canUpdateRole(callerRole, targetRole) {
   return false;
 }
 var CANARY_PLAINTEXT_BYTES = new Uint8Array(32);
-var canaryKeyPromise = null;
-function getCanaryKey() {
-  if (canaryKeyPromise === null) {
-    canaryKeyPromise = globalThis.crypto.subtle.importKey(
-      "raw",
-      CANARY_PLAINTEXT_BYTES,
-      { name: "AES-GCM", length: 256 },
-      true,
-      // extractable so AES-KW can wrap it
-      ["encrypt", "decrypt"]
-    );
-  }
-  return canaryKeyPromise;
-}
 async function mintKeyringCanary(kek) {
-  const canaryKey = await getCanaryKey();
-  return wrapKey(canaryKey, kek);
+  return mintCanary(kek, CANARY_PLAINTEXT_BYTES);
 }
 async function verifyKeyringCanary(wrappedCanary, kek) {
   try {
@@ -438,7 +429,7 @@ async function deriveKekForKeyring(file, secret, salt) {
   return deriveKey(secret, salt);
 }
 function parseKeyringEnvelope(envelope) {
-  return JSON.parse(envelope._data);
+  return JSON.parse(envelope._data ?? "");
 }
 async function readKeyringFile(store, vault, userId) {
   const envelope = await store.get(vault, "_keyring", userId);
@@ -1227,6 +1218,13 @@ async function collectionHasRecords(store, vault, collectionName) {
   const ids = await store.list(vault, collectionName);
   return ids.length > 0;
 }
+async function reservedCollectionHasSealedRecords(store, vault, collectionName) {
+  for (const id of await store.list(vault, collectionName)) {
+    const env = await store.get(vault, collectionName, id);
+    if (env && hasSealedBody(env)) return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
 async function reloadPersistedDEK(store, vault, keyring, collectionName) {
   if (!keyring.kek) return null;
   const found = await readKeyringFile(store, vault, keyring.userId);
@@ -1261,6 +1259,13 @@ async function ensureCollectionDEK(store, vault, keyring) {
             `No access \u2014 user "${keyring.userId}" is entitled to collection "${collectionName}" but holds no key for it, because the collection was created AFTER their grant. A collection DEK can only be wrapped at grant time (wrapping needs the grantee's secret, which the vault never stores), so this cannot be back-filled \u2014 re-grant the user to give them the key.`
           );
         }
+      } else if (await reservedCollectionHasSealedRecords(store, vault, collectionName)) {
+        const refreshed = await reloadPersistedDEK(store, vault, keyring, collectionName);
+        if (refreshed) return refreshed;
+        throw new TamperedError(
+          `User "${keyring.userId}" holds no key for reserved collection "${collectionName}", which already holds sealed records \u2014 the collection was created AFTER their grant and a DEK cannot be back-filled (wrapping needs the grantee's secret, which the vault never stores). Re-grant the user to give them the key. Not a tamper: no decrypt was attempted.`,
+          "key-absent"
+        );
       }
       const dek = await generateDEK();
       keyring.deks.set(collectionName, dek);
@@ -1440,4 +1445,4 @@ export {
   hasImportCapability,
   evaluateImportCapability
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-3V4KWFX7.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-XSPFDUDG.js.map