@noy-db/hub 0.7.0-pre.8 → 0.7.0

package/dist/registry-YLEWMGAC.js

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+import {
+  DerivationRegistry
+} from "./chunk-HDOU6I2Y.js";
+import "./chunk-FFWI7UH7.js";
+import "./chunk-2C3AQB46.js";
+import "./chunk-TFMM5DBB.js";
+import "./chunk-RTBJ5IOO.js";
+import "./chunk-5VCRVKOZ.js";
+import "./chunk-VYYM3MEN.js";
+import "./chunk-REDOOY2Q.js";
+import "./chunk-Y2NBBT6K.js";
+import "./chunk-2Y4IMKA6.js";
+import "./chunk-U4FOQDY4.js";
+import "./chunk-V4PXLYWM.js";
+import "./chunk-MVMXZYXT.js";
+import "./chunk-6I2RQCET.js";
+import "./chunk-TRGTKX5E.js";
+import "./chunk-UXVWEX5L.js";
+import "./chunk-BOET4NA4.js";
+import "./chunk-77K4PG6P.js";
+import "./chunk-SZJ3DLZA.js";
+import "./chunk-BOWNCWZT.js";
+import "./chunk-YSRUYAVU.js";
+import "./chunk-RMF67KCG.js";
+import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
+import "./chunk-SL3JAAKN.js";
+import "./chunk-7MG7SJT7.js";
+import "./chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
+export {
+  DerivationRegistry
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=registry-YLEWMGAC.js.map

package/dist/request-withdrawal-KFQHEZ25.js

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+import {
+  WITHDRAWAL_REQUESTS_COLLECTION,
+  WithdrawalRequestError,
+  approveWithdrawal,
+  listWithdrawalRequests,
+  rejectWithdrawal,
+  requestWithdrawal
+} from "./chunk-XTXOCYOJ.js";
+import "./chunk-BSFNRLK2.js";
+import "./chunk-L7CIOOBW.js";
+import "./chunk-5WDXHNSW.js";
+import "./chunk-EQEYOJBM.js";
+import "./chunk-77K4PG6P.js";
+import "./chunk-SZJ3DLZA.js";
+import "./chunk-BOWNCWZT.js";
+import "./chunk-YSRUYAVU.js";
+import "./chunk-RMF67KCG.js";
+import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
+import "./chunk-SL3JAAKN.js";
+import "./chunk-7MG7SJT7.js";
+import "./chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
+export {
+  WITHDRAWAL_REQUESTS_COLLECTION,
+  WithdrawalRequestError,
+  approveWithdrawal,
+  listWithdrawalRequests,
+  rejectWithdrawal,
+  requestWithdrawal
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=request-withdrawal-KFQHEZ25.js.map

package/dist/{reveal-X2QMWOVX.js → reveal-67RDQRIN.js}

@@ -1,15 +1,14 @@
 import {
   isTombstone
-} from "./chunk-QU3YUP2X.js";
+} from "./chunk-SZJ3DLZA.js";
 import {
   dualReadSealedSlot
-} from "./chunk-KDJGJR7F.js";
-import "./chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
-import "./chunk-GU3LQYW2.js";
+} from "./chunk-YSRUYAVU.js";
+import "./chunk-SL3JAAKN.js";
+import "./chunk-7MG7SJT7.js";
 import {
   ClassifiedRevealError
-} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
-import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
+} from "./chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
 
 // src/kernel/enclave/classify/reveal.ts
 async function revealSealedField(ctx, id, field) {
@@ -35,4 +34,4 @@ async function revealSealedField(ctx, id, field) {
 export {
   revealSealedField
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=reveal-X2QMWOVX.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=reveal-67RDQRIN.js.map

package/dist/{reveal-X2QMWOVX.js.map → reveal-67RDQRIN.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/enclave/classify/reveal.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Single-point audited reveal, stage-2 rework (I6): decrypt ONE sealed slot\n * from the raw envelope — no full record view, no collection.get(), so no\n * spurious 'get' consent entry. Fail-closed gates (b)/(c) live here; gate\n * (a) (storage:'never') fires in collection.reveal before any strategy call.\n * @module\n */\nimport { dualReadSealedSlot } from '../record-keys/sealed-slot.js'\nimport { isTombstone } from '../record-keys/tombstone.js'\nimport { ClassifiedRevealError } from '../../errors.js'\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../types.js'\nimport type { EnclaveKey } from '../crypto.js'\n\nexport interface RevealEngineCtx {\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly encrypted: boolean\n  getEnvelope(id: string): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope | null>\n  resolveCek(env: EncryptedEnvelope): Promise<EnclaveKey | undefined>\n  getDEK(): Promise<EnclaveKey>\n}\n\nexport async function revealSealedField(ctx: RevealEngineCtx, id: string, field: string): Promise<unknown> {\n  const env = await ctx.getEnvelope(id)\n  if (env === null || isTombstone(env, ctx.encrypted) || (env._tier ?? 0) > 0) {\n    throw new ClassifiedRevealError(ctx.collection, field, `record \"${id}\" not found in \"${ctx.collection}\"`)\n  }\n  if (!ctx.encrypted) {\n    // Plaintext collection: nothing is sealed; the value sits in the open body.\n    const record = JSON.parse(env._data || '{}') as Record<string, unknown>\n    if (!(field in record)) {\n      throw new ClassifiedRevealError(ctx.collection, field, `no stored value for \"${field}\"`)\n    }\n    return record[field]\n  }\n  const blob = env._sealed?.[field]\n  if (blob === undefined) {\n    // Gate (c): fail-closed error, never parseSealedSlot(undefined)'s TypeError.\n    throw new ClassifiedRevealError(ctx.collection, field, `no sealed value stored for \"${field}\"`)\n  }\n  const cek = await ctx.resolveCek(env)\n  const dek = await ctx.getDEK()\n  return JSON.parse(await dualReadSealedSlot(blob, field, ctx.collection, cek, dek))\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAqBA,eAAsB,kBAAkB,KAAsB,IAAY,OAAiC;AACzG,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE;AACpC,MAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ,YAAY,KAAK,IAAI,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG;AAC3E,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,WAAW,EAAE,mBAAmB,IAAI,UAAU,GAAG;AAAA,EAC1G;AACA,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,WAAW;AAElB,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,IAAI;AAC3C,QAAI,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS;AACtB,YAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,wBAAwB,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,IACzF;AACA,WAAO,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,EACrB;AACA,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,UAAU,KAAK;AAChC,MAAI,SAAS,QAAW;AAEtB,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,+BAA+B,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,EAChG;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,GAAG;AACpC,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO;AAC7B,SAAO,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,mBAAmB,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC;AACnF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/enclave/classify/reveal.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Single-point audited reveal, stage-2 rework (I6): decrypt ONE sealed slot\n * from the raw envelope — no full record view, no collection.get(), so no\n * spurious 'get' consent entry. Fail-closed gates (b)/(c) live here; gate\n * (a) (storage:'never') fires in collection.reveal before any strategy call.\n * @module\n */\nimport { dualReadSealedSlot } from '../record-keys/sealed-slot.js'\nimport { isTombstone } from '../record-keys/tombstone.js'\nimport { ClassifiedRevealError } from '../../errors.js'\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../types.js'\nimport type { EnclaveKey } from '../crypto.js'\n\nexport interface RevealEngineCtx {\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly encrypted: boolean\n  getEnvelope(id: string): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope | null>\n  resolveCek(env: EncryptedEnvelope): Promise<EnclaveKey | undefined>\n  getDEK(): Promise<EnclaveKey>\n}\n\nexport async function revealSealedField(ctx: RevealEngineCtx, id: string, field: string): Promise<unknown> {\n  const env = await ctx.getEnvelope(id)\n  if (env === null || isTombstone(env, ctx.encrypted) || (env._tier ?? 0) > 0) {\n    throw new ClassifiedRevealError(ctx.collection, field, `record \"${id}\" not found in \"${ctx.collection}\"`)\n  }\n  if (!ctx.encrypted) {\n    // Plaintext collection: nothing is sealed; the value sits in the open body.\n    const record = JSON.parse(env._data || '{}') as Record<string, unknown>\n    if (!(field in record)) {\n      throw new ClassifiedRevealError(ctx.collection, field, `no stored value for \"${field}\"`)\n    }\n    return record[field]\n  }\n  const blob = env._sealed?.[field]\n  if (blob === undefined) {\n    // Gate (c): fail-closed error, never parseSealedSlot(undefined)'s TypeError.\n    throw new ClassifiedRevealError(ctx.collection, field, `no sealed value stored for \"${field}\"`)\n  }\n  const cek = await ctx.resolveCek(env)\n  const dek = await ctx.getDEK()\n  return JSON.parse(await dualReadSealedSlot(blob, field, ctx.collection, cek, dek))\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;AAqBA,eAAsB,kBAAkB,KAAsB,IAAY,OAAiC;AACzG,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE;AACpC,MAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ,YAAY,KAAK,IAAI,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG;AAC3E,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,WAAW,EAAE,mBAAmB,IAAI,UAAU,GAAG;AAAA,EAC1G;AACA,MAAI,CAAC,IAAI,WAAW;AAElB,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,IAAI;AAC3C,QAAI,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS;AACtB,YAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,wBAAwB,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,IACzF;AACA,WAAO,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,EACrB;AACA,QAAM,OAAO,IAAI,UAAU,KAAK;AAChC,MAAI,SAAS,QAAW;AAEtB,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,IAAI,YAAY,OAAO,+BAA+B,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,EAChG;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,GAAG;AACpC,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO;AAC7B,SAAO,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,mBAAmB,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI,YAAY,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC;AACnF;","names":[]}

package/dist/revoke-DQDZAZZM.js

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+import {
+  getRevokedDocIdsCore,
+  publishRevocationListCore,
+  revokeDocCore,
+  unrevokeDocCore
+} from "./chunk-ELNXJMGB.js";
+import "./chunk-ANATMFIO.js";
+import "./chunk-77K4PG6P.js";
+import "./chunk-SZJ3DLZA.js";
+import "./chunk-BOWNCWZT.js";
+import "./chunk-YSRUYAVU.js";
+import "./chunk-RMF67KCG.js";
+import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
+import "./chunk-SL3JAAKN.js";
+import "./chunk-7MG7SJT7.js";
+import "./chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
+export {
+  getRevokedDocIdsCore,
+  publishRevocationListCore,
+  revokeDocCore,
+  unrevokeDocCore
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=revoke-DQDZAZZM.js.map

package/dist/satellites/index.js

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 import {
   SatelliteConfigError
-} from "../chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
-import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
+} from "../chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
 export {
   SatelliteConfigError
 };

package/dist/schema-update/index.js

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import {
   blindUpdate,
   coordinatedCutover,
   lockSchema
-} from "../chunk-YCSM3GZU.js";
+} from "../chunk-RMS3NEA3.js";
 import {
   computeSchemaDelta,
   evaluateStrategies
@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ import {
   SchemaUpdateGate
 } from "../chunk-6LJY7X5A.js";
 import "../chunk-Y2NBBT6K.js";
-import "../chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
-import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
+import "../chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
 export {
   SchemaUpdateGate,
   additiveOnly,

package/dist/sealed-record/index.js

@@ -1,40 +1,39 @@
 import {
   NO_SEALED_RECORD
-} from "../chunk-UCUALOSM.js";
+} from "../chunk-6YXCPL4T.js";
 import {
   recordAadFor
-} from "../chunk-BYBB4ABD.js";
-import "../chunk-QU3YUP2X.js";
-import "../chunk-FOG7YEJP.js";
-import "../chunk-KDJGJR7F.js";
-import "../chunk-LKFKXS5K.js";
+} from "../chunk-77K4PG6P.js";
+import "../chunk-SZJ3DLZA.js";
+import "../chunk-BOWNCWZT.js";
+import "../chunk-YSRUYAVU.js";
+import "../chunk-RMF67KCG.js";
 import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
 import {
   base64ToBuffer,
   decrypt,
   importCek
-} from "../chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
-import "../chunk-GU3LQYW2.js";
+} from "../chunk-SL3JAAKN.js";
+import "../chunk-7MG7SJT7.js";
 import {
   SealedRecordExpiredError,
   SealedRecordMismatchError,
   SealedRecordNotEnabledError
-} from "../chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
-import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
+} from "../chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/sealed-record/active.ts
 function withSealedRecord() {
   return {
     async sealRecordToHost(ctx, collection, id, hostSealer, opts) {
-      const { sealRecordToHost } = await import("../enclave-4P4KH5ZW.js");
+      const { sealRecordToHost } = await import("../enclave-KJOTOH7X.js");
       return sealRecordToHost(ctx, collection, id, hostSealer, opts);
     },
     async revokeSealedRecord(ctx, collection, id, pid, opts) {
-      const { revokeSealedRecord } = await import("../enclave-4P4KH5ZW.js");
+      const { revokeSealedRecord } = await import("../enclave-KJOTOH7X.js");
       return revokeSealedRecord(ctx, collection, id, pid, opts);
     },
     async rotateRecordCek(ctx, collection, id) {
-      const { rotateRecordCek } = await import("../enclave-4P4KH5ZW.js");
+      const { rotateRecordCek } = await import("../enclave-KJOTOH7X.js");
       return rotateRecordCek(ctx, collection, id);
     }
   };

package/dist/sealed-record/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/with-audit/sealed-record/active.ts","../../src/with-audit/sealed-record/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Enable the sealed-record (grantor-side) capability.\n * Pass to `createNoydb({ sealedRecordStrategy: withSealedRecord() })` to make a\n * vault's `sealRecordToHost` / `revokeSealedRecord` / `rotateRecordCek` methods\n * live. The `record-keys` grantor engine is dynamically imported here, so it is\n * reached only via opt-in.\n */\nimport type { SealedRecordStrategy } from './strategy.js'\n\nexport function withSealedRecord(): SealedRecordStrategy {\n  return {\n    async sealRecordToHost(ctx, collection, id, hostSealer, opts) {\n      const { sealRecordToHost } = await import('../../kernel/enclave/index.js')\n      return sealRecordToHost(ctx, collection, id, hostSealer, opts)\n    },\n    async revokeSealedRecord(ctx, collection, id, pid, opts) {\n      const { revokeSealedRecord } = await import('../../kernel/enclave/index.js')\n      return revokeSealedRecord(ctx, collection, id, pid, opts)\n    },\n    async rotateRecordCek(ctx, collection, id) {\n      const { rotateRecordCek } = await import('../../kernel/enclave/index.js')\n      return rotateRecordCek(ctx, collection, id)\n    },\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * `@noy-db/hub/sealed-record` — host-side opener for record-scoped CEK\n * sealing.\n *\n * The **grantor** side (sealing a record's CEK to a host, revoking, and hard\n * rotation) lives on `Vault` (`vault.sealRecordToHost` /\n * `vault.revokeSealedRecord` / `vault.rotateRecordCek`) because it needs the\n * collection DEK. This subpath exposes the **recipient host** side:\n * {@link openSealedRecord} reconstructs a single record's plaintext from\n * (a) the sealed-CEK delivery envelope, (b) the record's encrypted envelope\n * body, and (c) the host's own unsealer — and **nothing else**. The host never\n * touches a vault DEK and can decrypt exactly the one bound record.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { recordAadFor, decrypt, base64ToBuffer, importCek } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport {\n  SealedRecordExpiredError,\n  SealedRecordMismatchError,\n} from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport type {\n  SealedCekDeliveryEnvelope,\n  SealedCekBinding,\n} from './types.js'\n\nexport type { SealedCekDeliveryEnvelope, SealedCekBinding } from './types.js'\nexport { SealedRecordExpiredError, SealedRecordMismatchError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nexport { withSealedRecord } from './active.js'\nexport { NO_SEALED_RECORD, type SealedRecordStrategy } from './strategy.js'\nexport { SealedRecordNotEnabledError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n/**\n * Host-side: decrypt a single record whose CEK was sealed to this host by a\n * vault grantor via `vault.sealRecordToHost()`.\n *\n * Verification order (security-critical — do NOT reorder past the unseal):\n *  1. **Fast-path expiry** — reject on the delivery envelope's clear-text\n *     `expiresAt` before doing any (potentially expensive) unseal work. This is\n *     a hint only.\n *  2. **Unseal** the `payload` with the host's `recipientSealer.unseal` →\n *     parse the {@link SealedCekBinding}.\n *  3. **Binding match** — the binding's `{collection, id}` MUST equal the\n *     expected pair, else {@link SealedRecordMismatchError}. This is the\n *     host-denial boundary (a CEK sealed for record A cannot open record B).\n *  4. **Authoritative expiry** — re-check `binding.expiresAt` (the copy that\n *     cannot be forged by editing the delivery envelope), else\n *     {@link SealedRecordExpiredError}.\n *  5. **Decrypt** the record body under the unsealed CEK. A CEK from a\n *     PRE-rotation seal applied to a POST-rotation live envelope passes (1)-(4)\n *     but fails the AES-GCM auth tag → `TamperedError` from `decrypt`.\n *\n * @param sealedCekEnvelope The `SealedCekDeliveryEnvelope` written by the grantor.\n * @param recordEnvelope    The record's `{ _iv, _data }` (the encrypted body).\n * @param recipientSealer   The host's unsealer (`{ unseal(bytes) }`) — e.g. a\n *                          KMS-backed sealer or `MemoryRecipientSealer`.\n * @param expectedCollection Collection the caller believes `recordEnvelope` is in.\n * @param expectedId         Record id the caller believes `recordEnvelope` is.\n * @returns The decrypted record body as a JSON string.\n *\n * ⚠️ **`recordEnvelope` must carry `_tier` and `_by`, not just the body**\n * (#1041). They are plaintext metadata rather than secrets, but they are bound\n * into the record's AAD, so a host handed only `{_iv, _data}` cannot\n * reconstruct the identity the body was sealed against.\n *\n * That is a feature, not a tax: it means a host cannot be fed a body with its\n * tags stripped or rewritten — a re-tiered or re-authored envelope no longer\n * opens, even with a valid sealed CEK.\n */\nexport async function openSealedRecord(\n  sealedCekEnvelope: SealedCekDeliveryEnvelope,\n  recordEnvelope: {\n    readonly _iv: string\n    readonly _data: string\n    /** Bound into the AAD since #1093 — a rewound body no longer opens. */\n    readonly _v: number\n    readonly _tier?: number | undefined\n    readonly _by?: string | undefined\n  },\n  recipientSealer: { unseal(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> },\n  expectedCollection: string,\n  expectedId: string,\n): Promise<string> {\n  // (1) Fast-path expiry on the (unauthenticated) delivery envelope. Fail\n  // CLOSED (M-4): a malformed/empty `expiresAt` parses to NaN — treat it as\n  // expired rather than letting `NaN <= now` (which is `false`) skip the check.\n  const fastT = Date.parse(sealedCekEnvelope.expiresAt)\n  if (!Number.isFinite(fastT) || fastT <= Date.now()) {\n    throw new SealedRecordExpiredError(sealedCekEnvelope.expiresAt)\n  }\n\n  // (2) Unseal → parse binding.\n  const payloadBytes = base64ToBuffer(sealedCekEnvelope.payload)\n  const openedBytes = await recipientSealer.unseal(payloadBytes)\n  const binding = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(openedBytes)) as SealedCekBinding\n\n  // (3) Binding match — host-denial boundary.\n  if (binding.collection !== expectedCollection || binding.id !== expectedId) {\n    throw new SealedRecordMismatchError(\n      { collection: expectedCollection, id: expectedId },\n      { collection: binding.collection, id: binding.id },\n    )\n  }\n\n  // (4) Authoritative expiry — the copy that cannot be forged on the envelope.\n  // Fail CLOSED (M-4): a malformed/empty `expiresAt` → NaN → treat as expired.\n  const t = Date.parse(binding.expiresAt)\n  if (!Number.isFinite(t) || t <= Date.now()) {\n    throw new SealedRecordExpiredError(binding.expiresAt)\n  }\n\n  // (5) Import the raw CEK + decrypt the body. Wrong-key (pre-rotation CEK vs\n  // post-rotation body) surfaces as TamperedError from decrypt's GCM tag check.\n  const cek = await importCek(base64ToBuffer(binding.cek))\n  // AAD from the binding's OWN collection/id — which step (3) has just proven\n  // match the caller's expectation. So a host cannot be handed record A's\n  // sealed CEK alongside record B's body and open it (#1041): the AAD would\n  // describe A while the ciphertext was sealed for B.\n  return decrypt(\n    recordEnvelope._iv,\n    recordEnvelope._data,\n    cek,\n    recordAadFor({ collection: expectedCollection, id: expectedId }, recordEnvelope),\n  )\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AASO,SAAS,mBAAyC;AACvD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI,YAAY,MAAM;AAC5D,YAAM,EAAE,iBAAiB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,wBAA+B;AACzE,aAAO,iBAAiB,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,IAC/D;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,mBAAmB,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM;AACvD,YAAM,EAAE,mBAAmB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,wBAA+B;AAC3E,aAAO,mBAAmB,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,IAC1D;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,gBAAgB,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI;AACzC,YAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,wBAA+B;AACxE,aAAO,gBAAgB,KAAK,YAAY,EAAE;AAAA,IAC5C;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;AC6CA,eAAsB,iBACpB,mBACA,gBAQA,iBACA,oBACA,YACiB;AAIjB,QAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,kBAAkB,SAAS;AACpD,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AAClD,UAAM,IAAI,yBAAyB,kBAAkB,SAAS;AAAA,EAChE;AAGA,QAAM,eAAe,eAAe,kBAAkB,OAAO;AAC7D,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,gBAAgB,OAAO,YAAY;AAC7D,QAAM,UAAU,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,WAAW,CAAC;AAGhE,MAAI,QAAQ,eAAe,sBAAsB,QAAQ,OAAO,YAAY;AAC1E,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,EAAE,YAAY,oBAAoB,IAAI,WAAW;AAAA,MACjD,EAAE,YAAY,QAAQ,YAAY,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;AAAA,IACnD;AAAA,EACF;AAIA,QAAM,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,SAAS;AACtC,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AAC1C,UAAM,IAAI,yBAAyB,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,EACtD;AAIA,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,eAAe,QAAQ,GAAG,CAAC;AAKvD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,eAAe;AAAA,IACf,eAAe;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,EAAE,YAAY,oBAAoB,IAAI,WAAW,GAAG,cAAc;AAAA,EACjF;AACF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/with-audit/sealed-record/active.ts","../../src/with-audit/sealed-record/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Enable the sealed-record (grantor-side) capability.\n * Pass to `createNoydb({ sealedRecordStrategy: withSealedRecord() })` to make a\n * vault's `sealRecordToHost` / `revokeSealedRecord` / `rotateRecordCek` methods\n * live. The `record-keys` grantor engine is dynamically imported here, so it is\n * reached only via opt-in.\n */\nimport type { SealedRecordStrategy } from './strategy.js'\n\nexport function withSealedRecord(): SealedRecordStrategy {\n  return {\n    async sealRecordToHost(ctx, collection, id, hostSealer, opts) {\n      const { sealRecordToHost } = await import('../../kernel/enclave/index.js')\n      return sealRecordToHost(ctx, collection, id, hostSealer, opts)\n    },\n    async revokeSealedRecord(ctx, collection, id, pid, opts) {\n      const { revokeSealedRecord } = await import('../../kernel/enclave/index.js')\n      return revokeSealedRecord(ctx, collection, id, pid, opts)\n    },\n    async rotateRecordCek(ctx, collection, id) {\n      const { rotateRecordCek } = await import('../../kernel/enclave/index.js')\n      return rotateRecordCek(ctx, collection, id)\n    },\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * `@noy-db/hub/sealed-record` — host-side opener for record-scoped CEK\n * sealing.\n *\n * The **grantor** side (sealing a record's CEK to a host, revoking, and hard\n * rotation) lives on `Vault` (`vault.sealRecordToHost` /\n * `vault.revokeSealedRecord` / `vault.rotateRecordCek`) because it needs the\n * collection DEK. This subpath exposes the **recipient host** side:\n * {@link openSealedRecord} reconstructs a single record's plaintext from\n * (a) the sealed-CEK delivery envelope, (b) the record's encrypted envelope\n * body, and (c) the host's own unsealer — and **nothing else**. The host never\n * touches a vault DEK and can decrypt exactly the one bound record.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { recordAadFor, decrypt, base64ToBuffer, importCek } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport {\n  SealedRecordExpiredError,\n  SealedRecordMismatchError,\n} from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport type {\n  SealedCekDeliveryEnvelope,\n  SealedCekBinding,\n} from './types.js'\n\nexport type { SealedCekDeliveryEnvelope, SealedCekBinding } from './types.js'\nexport { SealedRecordExpiredError, SealedRecordMismatchError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nexport { withSealedRecord } from './active.js'\nexport { NO_SEALED_RECORD, type SealedRecordStrategy } from './strategy.js'\nexport { SealedRecordNotEnabledError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n/**\n * Host-side: decrypt a single record whose CEK was sealed to this host by a\n * vault grantor via `vault.sealRecordToHost()`.\n *\n * Verification order (security-critical — do NOT reorder past the unseal):\n *  1. **Fast-path expiry** — reject on the delivery envelope's clear-text\n *     `expiresAt` before doing any (potentially expensive) unseal work. This is\n *     a hint only.\n *  2. **Unseal** the `payload` with the host's `recipientSealer.unseal` →\n *     parse the {@link SealedCekBinding}.\n *  3. **Binding match** — the binding's `{collection, id}` MUST equal the\n *     expected pair, else {@link SealedRecordMismatchError}. This is the\n *     host-denial boundary (a CEK sealed for record A cannot open record B).\n *  4. **Authoritative expiry** — re-check `binding.expiresAt` (the copy that\n *     cannot be forged by editing the delivery envelope), else\n *     {@link SealedRecordExpiredError}.\n *  5. **Decrypt** the record body under the unsealed CEK. A CEK from a\n *     PRE-rotation seal applied to a POST-rotation live envelope passes (1)-(4)\n *     but fails the AES-GCM auth tag → `TamperedError` from `decrypt`.\n *\n * @param sealedCekEnvelope The `SealedCekDeliveryEnvelope` written by the grantor.\n * @param recordEnvelope    The record's `{ _iv, _data }` (the encrypted body).\n * @param recipientSealer   The host's unsealer (`{ unseal(bytes) }`) — e.g. a\n *                          KMS-backed sealer or `MemoryRecipientSealer`.\n * @param expectedCollection Collection the caller believes `recordEnvelope` is in.\n * @param expectedId         Record id the caller believes `recordEnvelope` is.\n * @returns The decrypted record body as a JSON string.\n *\n * ⚠️ **`recordEnvelope` must carry `_tier` and `_by`, not just the body**\n * (#1041). They are plaintext metadata rather than secrets, but they are bound\n * into the record's AAD, so a host handed only `{_iv, _data}` cannot\n * reconstruct the identity the body was sealed against.\n *\n * That is a feature, not a tax: it means a host cannot be fed a body with its\n * tags stripped or rewritten — a re-tiered or re-authored envelope no longer\n * opens, even with a valid sealed CEK.\n */\nexport async function openSealedRecord(\n  sealedCekEnvelope: SealedCekDeliveryEnvelope,\n  recordEnvelope: {\n    readonly _iv: string\n    readonly _data: string\n    /** Bound into the AAD since #1093 — a rewound body no longer opens. */\n    readonly _v: number\n    readonly _tier?: number | undefined\n    readonly _by?: string | undefined\n  },\n  recipientSealer: { unseal(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> },\n  expectedCollection: string,\n  expectedId: string,\n): Promise<string> {\n  // (1) Fast-path expiry on the (unauthenticated) delivery envelope. Fail\n  // CLOSED (M-4): a malformed/empty `expiresAt` parses to NaN — treat it as\n  // expired rather than letting `NaN <= now` (which is `false`) skip the check.\n  const fastT = Date.parse(sealedCekEnvelope.expiresAt)\n  if (!Number.isFinite(fastT) || fastT <= Date.now()) {\n    throw new SealedRecordExpiredError(sealedCekEnvelope.expiresAt)\n  }\n\n  // (2) Unseal → parse binding.\n  const payloadBytes = base64ToBuffer(sealedCekEnvelope.payload)\n  const openedBytes = await recipientSealer.unseal(payloadBytes)\n  const binding = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(openedBytes)) as SealedCekBinding\n\n  // (3) Binding match — host-denial boundary.\n  if (binding.collection !== expectedCollection || binding.id !== expectedId) {\n    throw new SealedRecordMismatchError(\n      { collection: expectedCollection, id: expectedId },\n      { collection: binding.collection, id: binding.id },\n    )\n  }\n\n  // (4) Authoritative expiry — the copy that cannot be forged on the envelope.\n  // Fail CLOSED (M-4): a malformed/empty `expiresAt` → NaN → treat as expired.\n  const t = Date.parse(binding.expiresAt)\n  if (!Number.isFinite(t) || t <= Date.now()) {\n    throw new SealedRecordExpiredError(binding.expiresAt)\n  }\n\n  // (5) Import the raw CEK + decrypt the body. Wrong-key (pre-rotation CEK vs\n  // post-rotation body) surfaces as TamperedError from decrypt's GCM tag check.\n  const cek = await importCek(base64ToBuffer(binding.cek))\n  // AAD from the binding's OWN collection/id — which step (3) has just proven\n  // match the caller's expectation. So a host cannot be handed record A's\n  // sealed CEK alongside record B's body and open it (#1041): the AAD would\n  // describe A while the ciphertext was sealed for B.\n  return decrypt(\n    recordEnvelope._iv,\n    recordEnvelope._data,\n    cek,\n    recordAadFor({ collection: expectedCollection, id: expectedId }, recordEnvelope),\n  )\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AASO,SAAS,mBAAyC;AACvD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI,YAAY,MAAM;AAC5D,YAAM,EAAE,iBAAiB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,wBAA+B;AACzE,aAAO,iBAAiB,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI,YAAY,IAAI;AAAA,IAC/D;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,mBAAmB,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM;AACvD,YAAM,EAAE,mBAAmB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,wBAA+B;AAC3E,aAAO,mBAAmB,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,IAC1D;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,gBAAgB,KAAK,YAAY,IAAI;AACzC,YAAM,EAAE,gBAAgB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,wBAA+B;AACxE,aAAO,gBAAgB,KAAK,YAAY,EAAE;AAAA,IAC5C;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;AC6CA,eAAsB,iBACpB,mBACA,gBAQA,iBACA,oBACA,YACiB;AAIjB,QAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,kBAAkB,SAAS;AACpD,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AAClD,UAAM,IAAI,yBAAyB,kBAAkB,SAAS;AAAA,EAChE;AAGA,QAAM,eAAe,eAAe,kBAAkB,OAAO;AAC7D,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,gBAAgB,OAAO,YAAY;AAC7D,QAAM,UAAU,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,WAAW,CAAC;AAGhE,MAAI,QAAQ,eAAe,sBAAsB,QAAQ,OAAO,YAAY;AAC1E,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,EAAE,YAAY,oBAAoB,IAAI,WAAW;AAAA,MACjD,EAAE,YAAY,QAAQ,YAAY,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;AAAA,IACnD;AAAA,EACF;AAIA,QAAM,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,SAAS;AACtC,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AAC1C,UAAM,IAAI,yBAAyB,QAAQ,SAAS;AAAA,EACtD;AAIA,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,eAAe,QAAQ,GAAG,CAAC;AAKvD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,eAAe;AAAA,IACf,eAAe;AAAA,IACf;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,EAAE,YAAY,oBAAoB,IAAI,WAAW,GAAG,cAAc;AAAA,EACjF;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/search/index.js

@@ -9,16 +9,15 @@ import {
   segmentTokens,
   tokenize,
   withSearch
-} from "../chunk-FKFIEEY6.js";
+} from "../chunk-UXWB3FPF.js";
 import {
   fuseRetrieval
 } from "../chunk-AURFOK3D.js";
-import "../chunk-X67FCULK.js";
-import "../chunk-XDVVBETV.js";
+import "../chunk-TRGTKX5E.js";
+import "../chunk-UXVWEX5L.js";
 import {
   SearchNotEnabledError
-} from "../chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
-import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
+} from "../chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
 export {
   InvertedIndex,
   MemoryIndexStore,

package/dist/{seed-IX5NFSH5.js → seed-G42JYN56.js}

@@ -1,27 +1,27 @@
 import {
   BROKER_COLLECTION,
   ensureCollectionDEK
-} from "./chunk-ZTYG36DH.js";
-import "./chunk-26W5VETY.js";
-import "./chunk-POS53FG6.js";
+} from "./chunk-G56KBWFY.js";
+import "./chunk-KG7TZKZG.js";
+import "./chunk-JMGDHKQF.js";
 import {
   computeBrokerProof,
   deriveBrokerProofBits,
   openEnvelopeJson,
   writeEnvelopeBody
-} from "./chunk-BYBB4ABD.js";
+} from "./chunk-77K4PG6P.js";
 import {
   buildSealedRecordEnvelope
-} from "./chunk-QU3YUP2X.js";
-import "./chunk-FOG7YEJP.js";
-import "./chunk-KDJGJR7F.js";
-import "./chunk-LKFKXS5K.js";
+} from "./chunk-SZJ3DLZA.js";
+import "./chunk-BOWNCWZT.js";
+import "./chunk-YSRUYAVU.js";
+import "./chunk-RMF67KCG.js";
 import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
 import {
   base64ToBuffer,
   bufferToBase64
-} from "./chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
-import "./chunk-GU3LQYW2.js";
+} from "./chunk-SL3JAAKN.js";
+import "./chunk-7MG7SJT7.js";
 import {
   BrokerEnrolmentError,
   BrokerProofError,
@@ -29,8 +29,7 @@ import {
   PermissionDeniedError,
   ValidationError,
   isConflictError
-} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
-import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
+} from "./chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
 
 // src/with-party/broker/seed.ts
 function requireAdminAccess(keyring) {
@@ -226,4 +225,4 @@ export {
   mintStoreCredentials,
   rotateSeed
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=seed-IX5NFSH5.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=seed-G42JYN56.js.map

package/dist/{seed-IX5NFSH5.js.map → seed-G42JYN56.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-party/broker/seed.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `_broker` reserved-collection seed lifecycle (#479, credential-broker\n * spec §2/§3). Modeled on `with-sync/credentials.ts`: a\n * `_`-prefixed reserved collection, record id = `brokerId`, encrypted under\n * the collection's own DEK, `requireAdminAccess` role gate (owner/admin\n * only — custodian intentionally excluded, same rationale as\n * `_sync_credentials`: this is transport-auth material, not the\n * custodian's operational scope).\n *\n * Three operations, each a free function taking a {@link BrokerSeedCtx}\n * (the {@link BrokerCtx} threaded through `with-party/broker/active.ts`,\n * augmented there with the `config` its closure was built with):\n *\n *  - {@link enrollSeed} — two-phase commit (I9): create-if-absent CAS the\n *    seed (I4), then register its derived proof key with the broker host,\n *    then (only on a 2xx) mark the record `registered: true`. A seed\n *    persisted whose `/enroll` POST failed stays `registered: false` so a\n *    later `credentialSource()` fails fast instead of degrading into an\n *    opaque `BrokerProofError` (I9/V23).\n *  - {@link rotateSeed} — quiesce-then-swap (I5): mint a fresh seed,\n *    register-new-first, THEN overwrite the local record — closing the\n *    torn-proof window a naive local-overwrite-then-register order would\n *    open. The single-flight cache quiesce itself (await in-flight, bump\n *    epoch) is the caller's job (`with-party/broker/active.ts`) since the\n *    cache lives in that closure, not here.\n *  - {@link mintStoreCredentials} — the challenge/response round trip\n *    (`/challenge` then `/credentials`) that produces one `StoreCredentials`\n *    value; the single-flight cache wrapping it lives in `active.ts`.\n *\n * First-seed creation calls `ensureCollectionDEK`, which throws\n * (`ValidationError`) when the keyring's KEK is `null` (PIN quick-resume /\n * session-restore) — this module intercepts that and re-surfaces it as\n * {@link BrokerEnrolmentError} (R-B8/I3): *enrol* needs the KEK; *use* of an\n * already-enrolled seed needs only the DEK.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope, StoreCredentials } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring } from '../../with-party/team/keyring.js'\nimport { ensureCollectionDEK } from '../../with-party/team/keyring.js'\nimport { BROKER_COLLECTION } from '../../with-party/team/reserved-secret-collections.js'\nimport {\n  buildSealedRecordEnvelope,\n  openEnvelopeJson,\n  writeEnvelopeBody,\n  bufferToBase64,\n  base64ToBuffer,\n  deriveBrokerProofBits,\n  computeBrokerProof,\n} from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport type { EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport {\n  PermissionDeniedError,\n  ValidationError,\n  isConflictError,\n  NetworkError,\n  BrokerEnrolmentError,\n  BrokerProofError,\n} from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport type { BrokerSeedCtx, BrokerConfig } from '../../port/with/broker-strategy.js'\n\n/** The `_broker/<brokerId>` record payload (spec §3). */\nexport interface BrokerSeedRecord {\n  readonly brokerId: string\n  /** base64(32 random bytes). */\n  readonly seed: string\n  readonly endpoint: string\n  readonly createdAt: string\n  /** `true` only once `/enroll` has returned a 2xx for this seed (I9). */\n  readonly registered: boolean\n}\n\nfunction requireAdminAccess(keyring: UnlockedKeyring): void {\n  // Custodian is INTENTIONALLY excluded — the _broker seed is transport-auth\n  // material (mints cloud store credentials), not the custodian's\n  // operational data scope. Same rationale as _sync_credentials' FR-6 note.\n  if (keyring.role !== 'owner' && keyring.role !== 'admin') {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `Credential-broker operations require owner or admin role. Current role: \"${keyring.role}\"`,\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n// `ensureCollectionDEK` only dedupes concurrent first-time DEK creates WITHIN one\n// closure instance — since every call site here asks for a fresh closure, two\n// concurrent `enrollSeed()` calls sharing the same (store, vault, keyring) would\n// otherwise each mint a DIFFERENT `_broker` DEK and race `persistKeyring`, leaving\n// the seed record encrypted under a DEK the keyring no longer holds (TamperedError\n// on the next read). Dedupe across calls here, keyed by store identity + vault\n// (V20 — the CAS enrol vector actually exercises this).\nconst inFlightDekByStore = new WeakMap<NoydbStore, Map<string, Promise<EnclaveKey>>>()\n\nasync function brokerDek(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, keyring: UnlockedKeyring): Promise<EnclaveKey> {\n  const existing = keyring.deks.get(BROKER_COLLECTION)\n  if (existing) return existing\n\n  let perStore = inFlightDekByStore.get(store)\n  if (!perStore) { perStore = new Map(); inFlightDekByStore.set(store, perStore) }\n  const pending = perStore.get(vault)\n  if (pending) return pending\n\n  const promise = (async () => {\n    try {\n      const getDek = await ensureCollectionDEK(store, vault, keyring)\n      return await getDek(BROKER_COLLECTION)\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (err instanceof ValidationError) {\n        throw new BrokerEnrolmentError(\n          'enroll()/rotate() need the KEK to provision the _broker DEK on first use — ' +\n            're-authenticate at tier 1 (secret) before enrolling. Using an already-' +\n            'enrolled seed (credentialSource()) needs only the DEK.',\n        )\n      }\n      throw err\n    }\n  })()\n  perStore.set(vault, promise)\n  try {\n    return await promise\n  } finally {\n    perStore.delete(vault)\n  }\n}\n\nasync function readRecord(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  brokerId: string,\n  dek: EnclaveKey,\n): Promise<{ envelope: EncryptedEnvelope; record: BrokerSeedRecord } | null> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, BROKER_COLLECTION, brokerId)\n  if (!envelope) return null\n  const record = JSON.parse(await openEnvelopeJson({ collection: BROKER_COLLECTION, id: brokerId }, envelope, dek)) as BrokerSeedRecord\n  return { envelope, record }\n}\n\nasync function persistRecord(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  dek: EnclaveKey,\n  record: BrokerSeedRecord,\n  expectedVersion: number,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const envelope = await buildSealedRecordEnvelope(\n    { collection: BROKER_COLLECTION, id: record.brokerId, by: keyring.userId, version: expectedVersion + 1 },\n    (identity) => writeEnvelopeBody(identity, JSON.stringify(record), dek),\n    {},\n  )\n  await store.put(vault, BROKER_COLLECTION, record.brokerId, envelope, expectedVersion)\n}\n\ninterface SeedState {\n  readonly seedBytes: Uint8Array\n  readonly record: BrokerSeedRecord\n  readonly dek: EnclaveKey\n  readonly version: number\n}\n\n/** Create-if-absent CAS (I4/V20): a concurrent enrol that loses the race\n *  re-reads the winner's seed instead of persisting a second one. */\nasync function ensureSeedRecord(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, keyring: UnlockedKeyring, config: BrokerConfig): Promise<SeedState> {\n  requireAdminAccess(keyring)\n  const dek = await brokerDek(store, vault, keyring)\n\n  const existing = await readRecord(store, vault, config.brokerId, dek)\n  if (existing) {\n    return { seedBytes: base64ToBuffer(existing.record.seed), record: existing.record, dek, version: existing.envelope._v }\n  }\n\n  const seedBytes = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))\n  const record: BrokerSeedRecord = {\n    brokerId: config.brokerId,\n    seed: bufferToBase64(seedBytes),\n    endpoint: config.endpoint,\n    createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n    registered: false,\n  }\n  try {\n    await persistRecord(store, vault, keyring, dek, record, 0)\n    return { seedBytes, record, dek, version: 1 }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (!(isConflictError(err))) throw err\n    const winner = await readRecord(store, vault, config.brokerId, dek)\n    if (!winner) throw err\n    return { seedBytes: base64ToBuffer(winner.record.seed), record: winner.record, dek, version: winner.envelope._v }\n  }\n}\n\nasync function postEnroll(config: BrokerConfig, vault: string, proofBits: Uint8Array): Promise<void> {\n  const fetchFn = config.fetch ?? globalThis.fetch\n  const attestation = config.attestation ? await config.attestation() : undefined\n  let res: Response\n  try {\n    res = await fetchFn(`${config.endpoint}/enroll`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/json',\n        ...(attestation !== undefined ? { authorization: `Bearer ${attestation}` } : {}),\n      },\n      body: JSON.stringify({ vaultId: vault, brokerId: config.brokerId, proofKey: bufferToBase64(proofBits) }),\n    })\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new BrokerEnrolmentError(`broker /enroll request failed: ${(err as Error).message}`)\n  }\n  if (!res.ok) {\n    throw new BrokerEnrolmentError(`broker refused enrolment (status ${res.status}) — attestation likely missing or invalid`)\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Enrol (idempotent, two-phase commit — I9): create-if-absent the `_broker`\n * seed (I4), derive+register its proof key with the broker host, and only\n * on a 2xx mark the record `registered: true`. Requires owner/admin role\n * and (for first-seed creation only) the KEK.\n */\nexport async function enrollSeed(ctx: BrokerSeedCtx): Promise<void> {\n  const { store, vault, keyring, config } = ctx\n  const { seedBytes, record, dek, version } = await ensureSeedRecord(store, vault, keyring, config)\n  if (record.registered) {\n    seedBytes.fill(0)\n    return\n  }\n\n  const proofBits = await deriveBrokerProofBits(seedBytes, vault, config.brokerId)\n  seedBytes.fill(0)\n  try {\n    await postEnroll(config, vault, proofBits)\n  } finally {\n    proofBits.fill(0)\n  }\n\n  try {\n    await persistRecord(store, vault, keyring, dek, { ...record, registered: true }, version)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (isConflictError(err)) {\n      const latest = await readRecord(store, vault, config.brokerId, dek)\n      if (latest?.record.registered) return // a concurrent enrol already committed the same outcome\n    }\n    throw err\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Rotate (quiesce-then-swap — I5): mint a fresh seed, register its proof\n * key with the broker host FIRST, then overwrite the local `_broker`\n * record. The broker host is expected to accept both the old and new\n * registration for a short grace window, so an in-flight proof computed\n * under the old key (from before rotation started) still verifies. Cache\n * quiescing (awaiting any in-flight round-trip, bumping the refresh-cache\n * epoch) is the caller's job — `with-party/broker/active.ts` — since the\n * cache lives in that closure, not here.\n */\nexport async function rotateSeed(ctx: BrokerSeedCtx): Promise<void> {\n  const { store, vault, keyring, config } = ctx\n  requireAdminAccess(keyring)\n  const dek = await brokerDek(store, vault, keyring)\n\n  const existing = await readRecord(store, vault, config.brokerId, dek)\n  if (!existing) {\n    // Nothing to rotate yet — behaves like a first enrol.\n    await enrollSeed(ctx)\n    return\n  }\n\n  const newSeedBytes = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))\n  const newProofBits = await deriveBrokerProofBits(newSeedBytes, vault, config.brokerId)\n  try {\n    await postEnroll(config, vault, newProofBits)\n  } finally {\n    newProofBits.fill(0)\n  }\n\n  const record: BrokerSeedRecord = {\n    brokerId: config.brokerId,\n    seed: bufferToBase64(newSeedBytes),\n    endpoint: config.endpoint,\n    createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n    registered: true,\n  }\n  newSeedBytes.fill(0)\n  await persistRecord(store, vault, keyring, dek, record, existing.envelope._v)\n}\n\n/**\n * The challenge/response round trip: `POST /challenge`, derive+sign the\n * proof from the decrypted seed, `POST /credentials`. One network round\n * trip per call — the single-flight/cache wrapping lives in `active.ts`.\n *\n * Fails fast with {@link BrokerEnrolmentError} if the seed hasn't completed\n * enrolment yet (`registered !== true` — I9/V23), never degrading into an\n * opaque {@link BrokerProofError}.\n */\nexport async function mintStoreCredentials(ctx: BrokerSeedCtx, profile?: string): Promise<StoreCredentials> {\n  const { store, vault, keyring, config } = ctx\n  requireAdminAccess(keyring)\n  const dek = await brokerDek(store, vault, keyring)\n\n  const found = await readRecord(store, vault, config.brokerId, dek)\n  if (!found) throw new BrokerEnrolmentError(`No _broker seed enrolled for brokerId \"${config.brokerId}\" — call enroll() first.`)\n  if (!found.record.registered) {\n    throw new BrokerEnrolmentError(\n      `The _broker seed for \"${config.brokerId}\" has not completed enrolment with the broker host — call enroll() again.`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  const fetchFn = config.fetch ?? globalThis.fetch\n  const endpointOrigin = new URL(config.endpoint).origin\n\n  let challengeRes: Response\n  try {\n    challengeRes = await fetchFn(`${config.endpoint}/challenge`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },\n      body: JSON.stringify({ vaultId: vault, brokerId: config.brokerId }),\n    })\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new NetworkError(`broker /challenge request failed: ${(err as Error).message}`)\n  }\n  if (!challengeRes.ok) throw new NetworkError(`broker /challenge failed with status ${challengeRes.status}`)\n  const { challenge, expiresAt } = (await challengeRes.json()) as { challenge: string; expiresAt: string }\n\n  const seedBytes = base64ToBuffer(found.record.seed)\n  const proof = await computeBrokerProof(seedBytes, vault, config.brokerId, { endpointOrigin, profile, challenge, expiresAt })\n\n  let credsRes: Response\n  try {\n    credsRes = await fetchFn(`${config.endpoint}/credentials`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },\n      body: JSON.stringify({ vaultId: vault, brokerId: config.brokerId, challenge, proof, ...(profile !== undefined ? { profile } : {}) }),\n    })\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new NetworkError(`broker /credentials request failed: ${(err as Error).message}`)\n  }\n  if (credsRes.status === 401 || credsRes.status === 403) throw new BrokerProofError('broker rejected the challenge proof')\n  if (!credsRes.ok) throw new NetworkError(`broker /credentials failed with status ${credsRes.status}`)\n  return (await credsRes.json()) as 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-party/broker/seed.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `_broker` reserved-collection seed lifecycle (#479, credential-broker\n * spec §2/§3). Modeled on `with-sync/credentials.ts`: a\n * `_`-prefixed reserved collection, record id = `brokerId`, encrypted under\n * the collection's own DEK, `requireAdminAccess` role gate (owner/admin\n * only — custodian intentionally excluded, same rationale as\n * `_sync_credentials`: this is transport-auth material, not the\n * custodian's operational scope).\n *\n * Three operations, each a free function taking a {@link BrokerSeedCtx}\n * (the {@link BrokerCtx} threaded through `with-party/broker/active.ts`,\n * augmented there with the `config` its closure was built with):\n *\n *  - {@link enrollSeed} — two-phase commit (I9): create-if-absent CAS the\n *    seed (I4), then register its derived proof key with the broker host,\n *    then (only on a 2xx) mark the record `registered: true`. A seed\n *    persisted whose `/enroll` POST failed stays `registered: false` so a\n *    later `credentialSource()` fails fast instead of degrading into an\n *    opaque `BrokerProofError` (I9/V23).\n *  - {@link rotateSeed} — quiesce-then-swap (I5): mint a fresh seed,\n *    register-new-first, THEN overwrite the local record — closing the\n *    torn-proof window a naive local-overwrite-then-register order would\n *    open. The single-flight cache quiesce itself (await in-flight, bump\n *    epoch) is the caller's job (`with-party/broker/active.ts`) since the\n *    cache lives in that closure, not here.\n *  - {@link mintStoreCredentials} — the challenge/response round trip\n *    (`/challenge` then `/credentials`) that produces one `StoreCredentials`\n *    value; the single-flight cache wrapping it lives in `active.ts`.\n *\n * First-seed creation calls `ensureCollectionDEK`, which throws\n * (`ValidationError`) when the keyring's KEK is `null` (PIN quick-resume /\n * session-restore) — this module intercepts that and re-surfaces it as\n * {@link BrokerEnrolmentError} (R-B8/I3): *enrol* needs the KEK; *use* of an\n * already-enrolled seed needs only the DEK.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope, StoreCredentials } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring } from '../../with-party/team/keyring.js'\nimport { ensureCollectionDEK } from '../../with-party/team/keyring.js'\nimport { BROKER_COLLECTION } from '../../with-party/team/reserved-secret-collections.js'\nimport {\n  buildSealedRecordEnvelope,\n  openEnvelopeJson,\n  writeEnvelopeBody,\n  bufferToBase64,\n  base64ToBuffer,\n  deriveBrokerProofBits,\n  computeBrokerProof,\n} from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport type { EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport {\n  PermissionDeniedError,\n  ValidationError,\n  isConflictError,\n  NetworkError,\n  BrokerEnrolmentError,\n  BrokerProofError,\n} from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport type { BrokerSeedCtx, BrokerConfig } from '../../port/with/broker-strategy.js'\n\n/** The `_broker/<brokerId>` record payload (spec §3). */\nexport interface BrokerSeedRecord {\n  readonly brokerId: string\n  /** base64(32 random bytes). */\n  readonly seed: string\n  readonly endpoint: string\n  readonly createdAt: string\n  /** `true` only once `/enroll` has returned a 2xx for this seed (I9). */\n  readonly registered: boolean\n}\n\nfunction requireAdminAccess(keyring: UnlockedKeyring): void {\n  // Custodian is INTENTIONALLY excluded — the _broker seed is transport-auth\n  // material (mints cloud store credentials), not the custodian's\n  // operational data scope. Same rationale as _sync_credentials' FR-6 note.\n  if (keyring.role !== 'owner' && keyring.role !== 'admin') {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `Credential-broker operations require owner or admin role. Current role: \"${keyring.role}\"`,\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n// `ensureCollectionDEK` only dedupes concurrent first-time DEK creates WITHIN one\n// closure instance — since every call site here asks for a fresh closure, two\n// concurrent `enrollSeed()` calls sharing the same (store, vault, keyring) would\n// otherwise each mint a DIFFERENT `_broker` DEK and race `persistKeyring`, leaving\n// the seed record encrypted under a DEK the keyring no longer holds (TamperedError\n// on the next read). Dedupe across calls here, keyed by store identity + vault\n// (V20 — the CAS enrol vector actually exercises this).\nconst inFlightDekByStore = new WeakMap<NoydbStore, Map<string, Promise<EnclaveKey>>>()\n\nasync function brokerDek(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, keyring: UnlockedKeyring): Promise<EnclaveKey> {\n  const existing = keyring.deks.get(BROKER_COLLECTION)\n  if (existing) return existing\n\n  let perStore = inFlightDekByStore.get(store)\n  if (!perStore) { perStore = new Map(); inFlightDekByStore.set(store, perStore) }\n  const pending = perStore.get(vault)\n  if (pending) return pending\n\n  const promise = (async () => {\n    try {\n      const getDek = await ensureCollectionDEK(store, vault, keyring)\n      return await getDek(BROKER_COLLECTION)\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (err instanceof ValidationError) {\n        throw new BrokerEnrolmentError(\n          'enroll()/rotate() need the KEK to provision the _broker DEK on first use — ' +\n            're-authenticate at tier 1 (secret) before enrolling. Using an already-' +\n            'enrolled seed (credentialSource()) needs only the DEK.',\n        )\n      }\n      throw err\n    }\n  })()\n  perStore.set(vault, promise)\n  try {\n    return await promise\n  } finally {\n    perStore.delete(vault)\n  }\n}\n\nasync function readRecord(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  brokerId: string,\n  dek: EnclaveKey,\n): Promise<{ envelope: EncryptedEnvelope; record: BrokerSeedRecord } | null> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, BROKER_COLLECTION, brokerId)\n  if (!envelope) return null\n  const record = JSON.parse(await openEnvelopeJson({ collection: BROKER_COLLECTION, id: brokerId }, envelope, dek)) as BrokerSeedRecord\n  return { envelope, record }\n}\n\nasync function persistRecord(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  keyring: UnlockedKeyring,\n  dek: EnclaveKey,\n  record: BrokerSeedRecord,\n  expectedVersion: number,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const envelope = await buildSealedRecordEnvelope(\n    { collection: BROKER_COLLECTION, id: record.brokerId, by: keyring.userId, version: expectedVersion + 1 },\n    (identity) => writeEnvelopeBody(identity, JSON.stringify(record), dek),\n    {},\n  )\n  await store.put(vault, BROKER_COLLECTION, record.brokerId, envelope, expectedVersion)\n}\n\ninterface SeedState {\n  readonly seedBytes: Uint8Array\n  readonly record: BrokerSeedRecord\n  readonly dek: EnclaveKey\n  readonly version: number\n}\n\n/** Create-if-absent CAS (I4/V20): a concurrent enrol that loses the race\n *  re-reads the winner's seed instead of persisting a second one. */\nasync function ensureSeedRecord(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, keyring: UnlockedKeyring, config: BrokerConfig): Promise<SeedState> {\n  requireAdminAccess(keyring)\n  const dek = await brokerDek(store, vault, keyring)\n\n  const existing = await readRecord(store, vault, config.brokerId, dek)\n  if (existing) {\n    return { seedBytes: base64ToBuffer(existing.record.seed), record: existing.record, dek, version: existing.envelope._v }\n  }\n\n  const seedBytes = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))\n  const record: BrokerSeedRecord = {\n    brokerId: config.brokerId,\n    seed: bufferToBase64(seedBytes),\n    endpoint: config.endpoint,\n    createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n    registered: false,\n  }\n  try {\n    await persistRecord(store, vault, keyring, dek, record, 0)\n    return { seedBytes, record, dek, version: 1 }\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (!(isConflictError(err))) throw err\n    const winner = await readRecord(store, vault, config.brokerId, dek)\n    if (!winner) throw err\n    return { seedBytes: base64ToBuffer(winner.record.seed), record: winner.record, dek, version: winner.envelope._v }\n  }\n}\n\nasync function postEnroll(config: BrokerConfig, vault: string, proofBits: Uint8Array): Promise<void> {\n  const fetchFn = config.fetch ?? globalThis.fetch\n  const attestation = config.attestation ? await config.attestation() : undefined\n  let res: Response\n  try {\n    res = await fetchFn(`${config.endpoint}/enroll`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/json',\n        ...(attestation !== undefined ? { authorization: `Bearer ${attestation}` } : {}),\n      },\n      body: JSON.stringify({ vaultId: vault, brokerId: config.brokerId, proofKey: bufferToBase64(proofBits) }),\n    })\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new BrokerEnrolmentError(`broker /enroll request failed: ${(err as Error).message}`)\n  }\n  if (!res.ok) {\n    throw new BrokerEnrolmentError(`broker refused enrolment (status ${res.status}) — attestation likely missing or invalid`)\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Enrol (idempotent, two-phase commit — I9): create-if-absent the `_broker`\n * seed (I4), derive+register its proof key with the broker host, and only\n * on a 2xx mark the record `registered: true`. Requires owner/admin role\n * and (for first-seed creation only) the KEK.\n */\nexport async function enrollSeed(ctx: BrokerSeedCtx): Promise<void> {\n  const { store, vault, keyring, config } = ctx\n  const { seedBytes, record, dek, version } = await ensureSeedRecord(store, vault, keyring, config)\n  if (record.registered) {\n    seedBytes.fill(0)\n    return\n  }\n\n  const proofBits = await deriveBrokerProofBits(seedBytes, vault, config.brokerId)\n  seedBytes.fill(0)\n  try {\n    await postEnroll(config, vault, proofBits)\n  } finally {\n    proofBits.fill(0)\n  }\n\n  try {\n    await persistRecord(store, vault, keyring, dek, { ...record, registered: true }, version)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (isConflictError(err)) {\n      const latest = await readRecord(store, vault, config.brokerId, dek)\n      if (latest?.record.registered) return // a concurrent enrol already committed the same outcome\n    }\n    throw err\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Rotate (quiesce-then-swap — I5): mint a fresh seed, register its proof\n * key with the broker host FIRST, then overwrite the local `_broker`\n * record. The broker host is expected to accept both the old and new\n * registration for a short grace window, so an in-flight proof computed\n * under the old key (from before rotation started) still verifies. Cache\n * quiescing (awaiting any in-flight round-trip, bumping the refresh-cache\n * epoch) is the caller's job — `with-party/broker/active.ts` — since the\n * cache lives in that closure, not here.\n */\nexport async function rotateSeed(ctx: BrokerSeedCtx): Promise<void> {\n  const { store, vault, keyring, config } = ctx\n  requireAdminAccess(keyring)\n  const dek = await brokerDek(store, vault, keyring)\n\n  const existing = await readRecord(store, vault, config.brokerId, dek)\n  if (!existing) {\n    // Nothing to rotate yet — behaves like a first enrol.\n    await enrollSeed(ctx)\n    return\n  }\n\n  const newSeedBytes = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))\n  const newProofBits = await deriveBrokerProofBits(newSeedBytes, vault, config.brokerId)\n  try {\n    await postEnroll(config, vault, newProofBits)\n  } finally {\n    newProofBits.fill(0)\n  }\n\n  const record: BrokerSeedRecord = {\n    brokerId: config.brokerId,\n    seed: bufferToBase64(newSeedBytes),\n    endpoint: config.endpoint,\n    createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n    registered: true,\n  }\n  newSeedBytes.fill(0)\n  await persistRecord(store, vault, keyring, dek, record, existing.envelope._v)\n}\n\n/**\n * The challenge/response round trip: `POST /challenge`, derive+sign the\n * proof from the decrypted seed, `POST /credentials`. One network round\n * trip per call — the single-flight/cache wrapping lives in `active.ts`.\n *\n * Fails fast with {@link BrokerEnrolmentError} if the seed hasn't completed\n * enrolment yet (`registered !== true` — I9/V23), never degrading into an\n * opaque {@link BrokerProofError}.\n */\nexport async function mintStoreCredentials(ctx: BrokerSeedCtx, profile?: string): Promise<StoreCredentials> {\n  const { store, vault, keyring, config } = ctx\n  requireAdminAccess(keyring)\n  const dek = await brokerDek(store, vault, keyring)\n\n  const found = await readRecord(store, vault, config.brokerId, dek)\n  if (!found) throw new BrokerEnrolmentError(`No _broker seed enrolled for brokerId \"${config.brokerId}\" — call enroll() first.`)\n  if (!found.record.registered) {\n    throw new BrokerEnrolmentError(\n      `The _broker seed for \"${config.brokerId}\" has not completed enrolment with the broker host — call enroll() again.`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  const fetchFn = config.fetch ?? globalThis.fetch\n  const endpointOrigin = new URL(config.endpoint).origin\n\n  let challengeRes: Response\n  try {\n    challengeRes = await fetchFn(`${config.endpoint}/challenge`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },\n      body: JSON.stringify({ vaultId: vault, brokerId: config.brokerId }),\n    })\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new NetworkError(`broker /challenge request failed: ${(err as Error).message}`)\n  }\n  if (!challengeRes.ok) throw new NetworkError(`broker /challenge failed with status ${challengeRes.status}`)\n  const { challenge, expiresAt } = (await challengeRes.json()) as { challenge: string; expiresAt: string }\n\n  const seedBytes = base64ToBuffer(found.record.seed)\n  const proof = await computeBrokerProof(seedBytes, vault, config.brokerId, { endpointOrigin, profile, challenge, expiresAt })\n\n  let credsRes: Response\n  try {\n    credsRes = await fetchFn(`${config.endpoint}/credentials`, {\n      method: 'POST',\n      headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' },\n      body: JSON.stringify({ vaultId: vault, brokerId: config.brokerId, challenge, proof, ...(profile !== undefined ? { profile } : {}) }),\n    })\n  } catch (err) {\n    throw new NetworkError(`broker /credentials request failed: ${(err as Error).message}`)\n  }\n  if (credsRes.status === 401 || credsRes.status === 403) throw new BrokerProofError('broker rejected the challenge proof')\n  if (!credsRes.ok) throw new NetworkError(`broker /credentials failed with status ${credsRes.status}`)\n  return (await credsRes.json()) as 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package/dist/sequence/index.js

@@ -5,19 +5,18 @@ import {
   compileSequenceFormat,
   resolveSequenceKey,
   withSequence
-} from "../chunk-S3I7VKID.js";
-import "../chunk-BYBB4ABD.js";
-import "../chunk-QU3YUP2X.js";
-import "../chunk-FOG7YEJP.js";
-import "../chunk-KDJGJR7F.js";
-import "../chunk-LKFKXS5K.js";
+} from "../chunk-ZVO4QVPD.js";
+import "../chunk-77K4PG6P.js";
+import "../chunk-SZJ3DLZA.js";
+import "../chunk-BOWNCWZT.js";
+import "../chunk-YSRUYAVU.js";
+import "../chunk-RMF67KCG.js";
 import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
-import "../chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
-import "../chunk-GU3LQYW2.js";
+import "../chunk-SL3JAAKN.js";
+import "../chunk-7MG7SJT7.js";
 import {
   SequenceNotEnabledError
-} from "../chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
-import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
+} from "../chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
 export {
   NO_SEQUENCE,
   SEQUENCE_COLLECTION,

package/dist/session/index.js

@@ -12,25 +12,24 @@ import {
   revokeAllSessions,
   revokeSession,
   validateSessionPolicy
-} from "../chunk-T3PHCEN4.js";
+} from "../chunk-ANSIZYEG.js";
 import {
   NO_SESSION
 } from "../chunk-VKQCVU2Z.js";
 import "../chunk-4AOERLTV.js";
-import "../chunk-BYBB4ABD.js";
-import "../chunk-QU3YUP2X.js";
-import "../chunk-FOG7YEJP.js";
-import "../chunk-KDJGJR7F.js";
-import "../chunk-LKFKXS5K.js";
+import "../chunk-77K4PG6P.js";
+import "../chunk-SZJ3DLZA.js";
+import "../chunk-BOWNCWZT.js";
+import "../chunk-YSRUYAVU.js";
+import "../chunk-RMF67KCG.js";
 import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
-import "../chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
-import "../chunk-GU3LQYW2.js";
+import "../chunk-SL3JAAKN.js";
+import "../chunk-7MG7SJT7.js";
 import {
   SessionExpiredError,
   SessionNotFoundError,
   SessionPolicyError
-} from "../chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
-import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
+} from "../chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
 
 // src/with-party/session/active.ts
 function withSession() {

package/dist/session/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/with-party/session/active.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Active session strategy — `withSession()` returns the real\n * implementation that wires `SessionPolicy` validation, the\n * `PolicyEnforcer`, and the global session-token registry into the\n * Noydb lifecycle.\n *\n * Consumers opt in by:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { createNoydb } from '@noy-db/hub'\n * import { withSession } from '@noy-db/hub/session'\n *\n * const db = await createNoydb({\n *   store: ...,\n *   user: ...,\n *   sessionPolicy: { idleTimeoutMs: 15 * 60_000 },\n *   sessionStrategy: withSession(),\n * })\n * ```\n *\n * The factory delegates to the existing `session-policy.ts` and\n * `session.ts` modules. Splitting the import chain through this file\n * is what lets tsup tree-shake the ~495 LOC of policy + token code\n * out of the default bundle when no `withSession()` import is\n * present.\n *\n * Note: dev-unlock (`devUnlock`, `cancelDevUnlock`) is a separate\n * named import from `@noy-db/hub` and tree-shakes independently —\n * apps that don't import it never include it.\n *\n * @public\n */\n\nimport type { SessionStrategy } from './strategy.js'\nimport { createEnforcer, validateSessionPolicy } from './session-policy.js'\nimport { revokeAllSessions } from './session.js'\n\nexport function withSession(): SessionStrategy {\n  return {\n    validateSessionPolicy,\n    createEnforcer,\n    revokeAllSessions,\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAqCO,SAAS,cAA+B;AAC7C,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/with-party/session/active.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Active session strategy — `withSession()` returns the real\n * implementation that wires `SessionPolicy` validation, the\n * `PolicyEnforcer`, and the global session-token registry into the\n * Noydb lifecycle.\n *\n * Consumers opt in by:\n *\n * ```ts\n * import { createNoydb } from '@noy-db/hub'\n * import { withSession } from '@noy-db/hub/session'\n *\n * const db = await createNoydb({\n *   store: ...,\n *   user: ...,\n *   sessionPolicy: { idleTimeoutMs: 15 * 60_000 },\n *   sessionStrategy: withSession(),\n * })\n * ```\n *\n * The factory delegates to the existing `session-policy.ts` and\n * `session.ts` modules. Splitting the import chain through this file\n * is what lets tsup tree-shake the ~495 LOC of policy + token code\n * out of the default bundle when no `withSession()` import is\n * present.\n *\n * Note: dev-unlock (`devUnlock`, `cancelDevUnlock`) is a separate\n * named import from `@noy-db/hub` and tree-shakes independently —\n * apps that don't import it never include it.\n *\n * @public\n */\n\nimport type { SessionStrategy } from './strategy.js'\nimport { createEnforcer, validateSessionPolicy } from './session-policy.js'\nimport { revokeAllSessions } from './session.js'\n\nexport function withSession(): SessionStrategy {\n  return {\n    validateSessionPolicy,\n    createEnforcer,\n    revokeAllSessions,\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAqCO,SAAS,cAA+B;AAC7C,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/shadow/index.js

@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
 import {
   CollectionFrame,
   VaultFrame
-} from "../chunk-XVU7J43V.js";
+} from "../chunk-XLMEZIAJ.js";
 import {
   NO_SHADOW
 } from "../chunk-SMY5X46Z.js";
-import "../chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
-import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
+import "../chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
 
 // src/with-fork/shadow/active.ts
 function withShadow() {

package/dist/shadow/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/with-fork/shadow/active.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Active shadow strategy — the only place `VaultFrame` is constructed.\n * Only reachable through `@noy-db/hub/shadow`.\n */\n\nimport { VaultFrame } from './vault-frame.js'\nimport type { ShadowStrategy } from './strategy.js'\nimport type { Vault } from '../../kernel/vault.js'\n\nexport function withShadow(): ShadowStrategy {\n  return {\n    buildFrame(vault) { return new VaultFrame(vault as Vault) },\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;AASO,SAAS,aAA6B;AAC3C,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,WAAW,OAAO;AAAE,aAAO,IAAI,WAAW,KAAc;AAAA,IAAE;AAAA,EAC5D;AACF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/with-fork/shadow/active.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Active shadow strategy — the only place `VaultFrame` is constructed.\n * Only reachable through `@noy-db/hub/shadow`.\n */\n\nimport { VaultFrame } from './vault-frame.js'\nimport type { ShadowStrategy } from './strategy.js'\nimport type { Vault } from '../../kernel/vault.js'\n\nexport function withShadow(): ShadowStrategy {\n  return {\n    buildFrame(vault) { return new VaultFrame(vault as Vault) },\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;AASO,SAAS,aAA6B;AAC3C,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,WAAW,OAAO;AAAE,aAAO,IAAI,WAAW,KAAc;AAAA,IAAE;AAAA,EAC5D;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/share-link/index.js

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 import {
   isULID
 } from "../chunk-4AOERLTV.js";
-import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/share-link/share-link.ts
 var ShareLinkParseError = class extends Error {