@noy-db/hub 0.7.0-pre.13 → 0.7.0-pre.15

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,174 @@
 # Changelog — hub
 
+## 0.7.0-pre.15
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- CORRECTION to `0.7.0-pre.14`'s description of #1269 — the fix is unchanged; what
+  it covers was described wrongly, twice.
+
+  The guard reads **declarative `spec.groupBy` and nothing else**. So:
+
+  - **caught** — a spec declaring `groupBy: [...]` as a top-level field, whether
+    `unionSources` or query-form;
+  - **silent** — `.groupBy(...)` chained INSIDE a `query: (db) => …` callback,
+    which is a runtime call on the query builder and never appears in the spec;
+  - **irrelevant** — `spec.sources`. The guard never reads it, so declaring it
+    cannot bring a shape into coverage.
+
+  The published `pre.14` entry said the uncovered case was "a single-query MV that
+  constructs its own source before the dependency is recorded". That framing is
+  wrong in a way that misleads: it points at dependency ORDERING and invites a
+  reader to fix coverage by declaring `sources`, which does nothing. Ordering
+  decides which OTHER guard fires first — a late-attach reconcile can loudly
+  refuse a virtual field on an already-constructed collection — not whether this
+  one fires.
+
+  Measured by a consumer on the published `pre.14` and re-derived from the code
+  here. No behaviour change: a `.groupBy()` chained in a callback was silent
+  before this correction and is silent after it. Closing that residue needs the
+  built query plan inspected, or a compute-time refusal, and is not attempted
+  here.
+
+- CORRECTION to `0.7.0-pre.14`: the optional `zod` peer now reads
+  `^3.0.0 || ^4.0.0`, not `^4.0.0`.
+
+  `pre.14` un-vendored zod and declared it as an optional peer — correctly — but
+  declared a range NARROWER THAN WHAT HUB SUPPORTS. Under npm that made
+  `@noy-db/hub@0.7.0-pre.14` + `zod@3` uninstallable by name.
+
+  Measured, with controls in both directions:
+
+  ```
+  npm i @noy-db/hub@0.7.0-pre.14 zod@3.25.76   -> exit 1, ERESOLVE
+  npm i @noy-db/hub@0.7.0-pre.14 zod@4.4.3     -> exit 0   (control: major, not range shape)
+  npm i @noy-db/hub@0.7.0-pre.13 zod@3.25.76   -> exit 0   (control: the DECLARATION changed,
+                                                            not the support)
+  ```
+
+  Zod 3 has always worked and still does — through the `zod-to-json-schema`
+  optional peer, with the v4-native `toJSONSchema` loader falling back when it is
+  absent. The two releases immediately before this one were substantially Zod 3
+  hardening (the `ZodEffects` unwrap, `z.preprocess` on both majors), so the
+  investment and the declaration pointed in opposite directions.
+
+  **Why no gate caught it:** while zod was vendored, no resolver ever saw a range,
+  so none was ever exercised. Every in-repo check stays green under either
+  declaration — a peer FORM deciding installability, which is the same class as
+  this family's exact-peer incident. There is now a test asserting the range
+  admits a real version of each major, and refusing a range that ends in a
+  dangling `||`.
+
+  pnpm only warns, so a pnpm workspace saw nothing; npm refuses.
+
+## 0.7.0-pre.14
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- The bundle-size gate now needs a growth to exceed BOTH its percentage tolerance
+  and an absolute byte allowance before failing (#1268). No runtime change — this
+  is the CI gate only.
+
+  A percentage on a small baseline measures the wrong thing. The `floor` scenario
+  is ~500 gzipped bytes, so 5% is ~25 bytes — narrower than a single
+  registration-time guard. The gate had fired twice on necessary validation
+  (#1249, #1266) and never once on the thing it exists to catch.
+
+  The two are separated by orders of magnitude: a subsystem leaking into a bundle
+  is kilobytes (measured elsewhere in the family: forcing an SDK inline moved a
+  package from 14,069 to 1,081,539 bytes), while a guard is tens of bytes. A
+  192-byte allowance sits far above the latter and far below the former.
+
+  Verified in both directions rather than assumed: a simulated leak (+406 bytes)
+  still FAILS, and a 26-byte guard at +5.2% now PASSES. The numbers still ratchet
+  and nothing was re-baselined.
+
+- A materialized view whose `groupBy` names a VIRTUAL computed field is now
+  refused at collection registration (#1269).
+
+  A virtual field is evaluated on read and never stored, so the MV pipeline read
+  the stored row, found nothing, and bucketed every row under an `undefined` key —
+  a well-formed aggregate carrying a wrong NUMBER rather than an error, on the one
+  path where nobody re-checks the arithmetic. `query().where()` already refuses the
+  same field with `FieldNotQueryableError`, so the two halves of what reads as one
+  query layer disagreed.
+
+  Same principle as the executor's existing object-valued-group-key refusal
+  ("refuse, don't bucket wrong") and the `triggerBy` virtual-target refusal
+  (#1266), applied at the earliest point that can see both the MV and the
+  collection's field modes.
+
+  **Known residue, stated rather than left to be discovered:** a single-query MV of
+  the shape `query: (db) => db.collection(name)…` constructs its own source from
+  inside `MaterializedViewRegistry.register()`, before the dependency is recorded,
+  so that shape is not caught by this guard. `unionSources`, an aggregate with
+  explicit `sources`, and any source built by an earlier `vault.collection()` call
+  are caught. The same ordering is already documented for the neighbouring
+  tiers+crdt guard.
+
+- Two guards now refuse where the information to refuse already exists (design
+  pass: _where a check refuses vs where it quietly answers_).
+
+  **`fieldMeta` typo keys are refused at `vault.collection()`, not only at
+  `describe()`.** A collection nobody describes was never checked at all — and
+  `fieldMeta` is what carries `sensitivity`, so the unchecked case was the one
+  with a data-classification inventory hanging off it.
+
+  ⚠️ **BREAKING for code that catches around `describe()`.** For a validator whose
+  fields read synchronously, `FieldMetaUnknownFieldError` now arrives from
+  `vault.collection()` instead of from `describe()`. This is not only "the throw
+  comes earlier" — **a `try` that wraps only the `describe()` call no longer
+  catches it at all**, so the error escapes the handler written for it. A pilot
+  consumer's guard suite had exactly this shape: it constructed the collection
+  outside the `try`, and on upgrade those tests would have started ERRORING rather
+  than failing with a clear message, reading as "the new release broke our tests"
+  instead of "the guard moved". If you assert on this error, catch around the
+  `vault.collection()` call — or around both, and report which surface rejected,
+  which turns the relocation into a changed label rather than a break.
+
+  The describe-time check is KEPT, not moved, because there are three tiers of
+  knowability rather than two: a name declared in the config itself needs no
+  schema; a validator whose fields read synchronously is checkable at
+  registration; fields that exist only after async derivation are checkable only
+  at `describe()`. Hoisting alone would move the check earlier for some
+  collections and remove it for others. Unchanged: no readable validator means no
+  check, because a TS-generic collection names real fields that appear in no
+  runtime config.
+
+  **`withMaterializedView` distinguishes an absent `rowKey` from a wrong-typed
+  one.** Passing a field NAME — the shape every neighbouring option takes —
+  reported `rowKey is required`, which names absence. It now says it must be a
+  function, names the type it got, and shows the fix. Two states that warrant
+  different responses no longer render identically.
+
+- `zod` is now an OPTIONAL peer dependency instead of being vendored into the
+  bundle (#1227).
+
+  Hub shipped `zod@4.4.3` inside `dist/` — 548 KB, at a build-frozen version,
+  declared in no manifest field. `npm ls zod` in a consumer tree showed nothing
+  while that copy was reachable, so SBOM and audit tooling missed it and a zod
+  advisory could not be remediated by a consumer bumping zod.
+
+  **This was never a deliberate vendoring.** The loader's own comment said "this
+  is a dynamic import so it does not add a static zod dependency to hub" — but
+  tsup externalises DECLARED dependencies and bundles everything else, static or
+  dynamic alike, and zod was a devDependency only. The comment described an
+  intent the build silently defeated; it now records the actual mechanism.
+
+  **Declaring it is also the correctness fix, not only a size one.** Zod's
+  `toJSONSchema` reads a schema's internals, and the schema is built by the
+  CONSUMER's zod. A vendored copy meant hub inspected one zod's objects with a
+  different zod's reader, with version skew that nothing detected. Now there is
+  one zod — theirs.
+
+  Nothing to install: the peer is optional, exactly like `zod-to-json-schema`,
+  and the converter is still loaded lazily. A caller with a Zod v4 schema
+  necessarily already has zod; a caller without one never reaches the path.
+
+  Measured, both sides rebuilt: tarball 3.3 MB → 3.1 MB packed, 12.0 MB → 10.6 MB
+  unpacked. The README claim is updated in the same change to say what is now
+  true.
+
 ## 0.7.0-pre.13
 
 ### Patch Changes

package/README.md

@@ -77,9 +77,10 @@ const all = await invoices.list()
 - **Offline-first sync** — push/pull with optimistic concurrency on encrypted envelopes
 - **Audit history** — full-copy snapshots with `history()`, `diff()`, `revert()`, `pruneHistory()`
 - **No third-party runtime dependencies to install** — the only runtime dependency is
-  `@noy-db/attestation`, on the same version line. (`zod` is vendored into the bundle for the
-  optional persisted-schema converter and loaded lazily; it never executes unless you use that
-  path, and it does not appear in your lockfile.)
+  `@noy-db/attestation`, on the same version line. `zod` (v3 or v4) and `zod-to-json-schema` are
+  OPTIONAL peers used by the persisted-schema converter: nothing is installed on your behalf, nothing is
+  vendored into the bundle, and if you do use Zod schemas the converter reads YOUR copy rather
+  than a second one frozen at hub's build time.
 
 ## Cross-vault queries
 

package/dist/{api-UE2XQKDN.js → api-JPZT6BDD.js}

@@ -12,9 +12,8 @@ import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
 import "./chunk-SL3JAAKN.js";
 import "./chunk-N4CHCXDL.js";
 import "./chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
-import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {
   UserApi,
   createUserApi
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=api-UE2XQKDN.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=api-JPZT6BDD.js.map

package/dist/as/index.js

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 import "../chunk-UBSFPGVJ.js";
-import "../chunk-VGICZPVE.js";
+import "../chunk-FUJSIP4K.js";
 import {
   applyListProjection
 } from "../chunk-VG2ZSFYD.js";
 import "../chunk-RXLYKVTF.js";
 import "../chunk-VYYM3MEN.js";
-import "../chunk-URHRIAV6.js";
+import "../chunk-REDOOY2Q.js";
 import "../chunk-Y2NBBT6K.js";
 import "../chunk-WWNYSV7S.js";
 import "../chunk-CIGAQBJR.js";
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ import "../chunk-N4CHCXDL.js";
 import {
   ValidationError
 } from "../chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
-import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/port/as/active.ts
 function redactChunk(chunk, ctx, redact) {
@@ -75,7 +74,7 @@ function contextFor(vault) {
     // export fails instead.
     describe: (collection) => vault.collection(collection).describe(),
     plan: async (records, policy, formatId, idKey) => {
-      const { diffVault } = await import("../vault-diff-FE5J35NJ.js");
+      const { diffVault } = await import("../vault-diff-C6WUJFNP.js");
       const plan = await diffVault(vault, records, idKey ? { idKey } : {});
       return {
         plan,

package/dist/as/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/port/as/active.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `withFormats()` — the service that consumes the `as-*` port.\n *\n * Everything with a correctness or security consequence lives here rather\n * than in each format: the capability gate, the vault read, and redaction.\n * A {@link NoydbFormat} receives records and returns bytes.\n *\n * That is the whole point of the inversion (ADR 0004). The conformance kit it\n * replaces could only check implementors who ran it; a format that cannot\n * reach a vault is gated whether its author cooperated or not.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { NoydbFormat, ImportPlan } from './types.js'\nimport type {\n  FormatsStrategy,\n  FormatsContext,\n  FormatExportOptions,\n  FormatImportOptions,\n} from '../with/formats-strategy.js'\nimport type { ExportChunk } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { Vault } from '../../kernel/vault.js'\nimport type { ImportPolicy } from './types.js'\nimport { applyListProjection } from '../../with-shape/introspection/index.js'\nimport type { CollectionDescription, ListProjectionOptions } from '../../with-shape/introspection/index.js'\nimport { ValidationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n/** Apply the redaction projection hub owns, so a format never asks for it. */\nfunction redactChunk(\n  chunk: ExportChunk,\n  ctx: FormatsContext,\n  redact: FormatExportOptions['redact'],\n): ExportChunk {\n  if (redact === undefined) return chunk\n  const described = ctx.describe(chunk.collection) as CollectionDescription | undefined\n  if (!described) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `vault.export: redaction was requested but '${chunk.collection}' has no description to redact against. ` +\n        'Open the collection with its classifiedFields / fieldMeta options first.',\n    )\n  }\n  const opts: ListProjectionOptions | undefined =\n    redact === true ? undefined : { sensitivity: redact.sensitivity as never }\n  const records = chunk.records.map((r) =>\n    applyListProjection(described, r as Record<string, unknown>, opts),\n  )\n  return { ...chunk, records: records as typeof chunk.records }\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive the narrow, format-facing capability from the vault.\n *\n * Lives here rather than on `Vault` because `kernel-surface` said so, and it\n * was right: this is service capability, not spine. The spine keeps two\n * delegating methods and nothing else.\n */\nfunction contextFor(vault: Vault): FormatsContext {\n  return {\n    // The empty-id guards are NOT defensive padding. The\n    // plaintext tier is gated per-format, so a missing id means the calling\n    // binding is broken — and without this it would reach the gate, miss the\n    // allowlist, and surface as `ExportCapabilityError`: \"the owner did not\n    // grant this\", which sends the reader to the keyring instead of to the\n    // format. A loud TypeError names the real fault.\n    assertCanExport: (tier, format) => {\n      if (tier === 'bundle') return vault.assertCanExport('bundle')\n      if (!format) throw new TypeError(\"assertCanExport('plaintext') requires a non-empty format id\")\n      vault.assertCanExport('plaintext', format)\n    },\n    assertCanImport: (tier, format) => {\n      if (tier === 'bundle') return vault.assertCanImport('bundle')\n      if (!format) throw new TypeError(\"assertCanImport('plaintext') requires a non-empty format id\")\n      vault.assertCanImport('plaintext', format)\n    },\n    // ⚠️ Filtered HERE, not passed to exportStream — `ExportStreamOptions`\n    // has no `collections` field, so the option I first passed was silently\n    // dropped and hub read every collection. Caught by an as-json test\n    // expecting ['invoices'] and getting ['invoices','payments'].\n    //\n    // Post-read filtering is correct but not free: hub still DECRYPTS the\n    // collections the caller excluded. Pushing the filter down into\n    // exportStream is the real fix and is a hub change beyond this port.\n    chunks: async function* (collections) {\n      const wanted = collections ? new Set(collections) : null\n      for await (const chunk of vault.exportStream({ granularity: 'collection' })) {\n        if (wanted && !wanted.has(chunk.collection)) continue\n        yield chunk\n      }\n    },\n    // NOT swallowed. A caller who asked for redaction and silently got\n    // unredacted output is the exact failure this port exists to remove — a\n    // security duty that fails quiet. If the description cannot be read, the\n    // export fails instead.\n    describe: (collection) => vault.collection(collection).describe() as never,\n    plan: async (records, policy: ImportPolicy, formatId: string, idKey?: string) => {\n      const { diffVault } = await import('../../with-cargo/vault-diff.js')\n      const plan = await diffVault(vault, records as never, idKey ? { idKey } : {})\n      return {\n        plan,\n        policy,\n        // The apply walk every as-* package had independently: added always,\n        // modified unless insert-only, deleted only on replace — in one\n        // transaction so a partial failure rolls back. Owned once, here.\n        apply: async () => {\n          await vault.noydb.transaction((tx) => {\n            const txVault = tx.vault(vault.name)\n            const reason = `import:${formatId}`\n            for (const e of plan.added) {\n              txVault.collection(e.collection).put(e.id, e.record as never, { reason })\n            }\n            if (policy !== 'insert-only') {\n              for (const e of plan.modified) {\n                txVault.collection(e.collection).put(e.id, e.record as never, { reason })\n              }\n            }\n            if (policy === 'replace') {\n              for (const e of plan.deleted) txVault.collection(e.collection).delete(e.id)\n            }\n          })\n        },\n      }\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Enable `vault.export()` / `vault.import()`.\n *\n * ```ts\n * const db = await createNoydb({ store, user, secret, formatsStrategy: withFormats() })\n * const csv = await vault.export(asCsv(), { collections: ['invoices'] })\n * ```\n */\nexport function withFormats(): FormatsStrategy {\n  return {\n    enabled: true,\n\n    async exportWith<Out extends string | Uint8Array>(\n      vault: Vault,\n      format: NoydbFormat<Out>,\n      options: FormatExportOptions = {},\n    ): Promise<Out> {\n      const ctx = contextFor(vault)\n      // FIRST, and before a single record is read. The format is not in scope\n      // yet and could not reach the vault if it were.\n      if (format.tier === 'bundle') ctx.assertCanExport('bundle')\n      else ctx.assertCanExport('plaintext', format.id)\n\n      const chunks: ExportChunk[] = []\n      for await (const chunk of ctx.chunks(options.collections)) {\n        chunks.push(redactChunk(chunk, ctx, options.redact))\n      }\n      return format.encode(chunks)\n    },\n\n    async importWith<Out extends string | Uint8Array>(\n      vault: Vault,\n      format: NoydbFormat<Out>,\n      input: Out,\n      options: FormatImportOptions = {},\n    ): Promise<ImportPlan> {\n      const ctx = contextFor(vault)\n      // Mirrors the export side: the import gate is two-tier as well, and a\n      // bundle format importing under the plaintext tier would be a silent\n      // downgrade in the other direction.\n      if (format.tier === 'bundle') ctx.assertCanImport('bundle')\n      else ctx.assertCanImport('plaintext', format.id)\n      if (!format.decode) {\n        throw new ValidationError(\n          `vault.import: the '${format.id}' format is export-only — it declares no decode(). ` +\n            'Pick a format that round-trips, or write the records directly.',\n        )\n      }\n      const decoded = await format.decode(input)\n      const candidate: Record<string, readonly unknown[]> = {}\n      for (const chunk of decoded) {\n        const target = chunk.collection || options.collection\n        if (!target) {\n          throw new ValidationError(\n            `vault.import: the '${format.id}' input names no collection and none was supplied. ` +\n              'Pass { collection } for formats whose payload is collection-less.',\n          )\n        }\n        candidate[target] = [...(candidate[target] ?? 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/port/as/active.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `withFormats()` — the service that consumes the `as-*` port.\n *\n * Everything with a correctness or security consequence lives here rather\n * than in each format: the capability gate, the vault read, and redaction.\n * A {@link NoydbFormat} receives records and returns bytes.\n *\n * That is the whole point of the inversion (ADR 0004). The conformance kit it\n * replaces could only check implementors who ran it; a format that cannot\n * reach a vault is gated whether its author cooperated or not.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { NoydbFormat, ImportPlan } from './types.js'\nimport type {\n  FormatsStrategy,\n  FormatsContext,\n  FormatExportOptions,\n  FormatImportOptions,\n} from '../with/formats-strategy.js'\nimport type { ExportChunk } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { Vault } from '../../kernel/vault.js'\nimport type { ImportPolicy } from './types.js'\nimport { applyListProjection } from '../../with-shape/introspection/index.js'\nimport type { CollectionDescription, ListProjectionOptions } from '../../with-shape/introspection/index.js'\nimport { ValidationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n/** Apply the redaction projection hub owns, so a format never asks for it. */\nfunction redactChunk(\n  chunk: ExportChunk,\n  ctx: FormatsContext,\n  redact: FormatExportOptions['redact'],\n): ExportChunk {\n  if (redact === undefined) return chunk\n  const described = ctx.describe(chunk.collection) as CollectionDescription | undefined\n  if (!described) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `vault.export: redaction was requested but '${chunk.collection}' has no description to redact against. ` +\n        'Open the collection with its classifiedFields / fieldMeta options first.',\n    )\n  }\n  const opts: ListProjectionOptions | undefined =\n    redact === true ? undefined : { sensitivity: redact.sensitivity as never }\n  const records = chunk.records.map((r) =>\n    applyListProjection(described, r as Record<string, unknown>, opts),\n  )\n  return { ...chunk, records: records as typeof chunk.records }\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive the narrow, format-facing capability from the vault.\n *\n * Lives here rather than on `Vault` because `kernel-surface` said so, and it\n * was right: this is service capability, not spine. The spine keeps two\n * delegating methods and nothing else.\n */\nfunction contextFor(vault: Vault): FormatsContext {\n  return {\n    // The empty-id guards are NOT defensive padding. The\n    // plaintext tier is gated per-format, so a missing id means the calling\n    // binding is broken — and without this it would reach the gate, miss the\n    // allowlist, and surface as `ExportCapabilityError`: \"the owner did not\n    // grant this\", which sends the reader to the keyring instead of to the\n    // format. A loud TypeError names the real fault.\n    assertCanExport: (tier, format) => {\n      if (tier === 'bundle') return vault.assertCanExport('bundle')\n      if (!format) throw new TypeError(\"assertCanExport('plaintext') requires a non-empty format id\")\n      vault.assertCanExport('plaintext', format)\n    },\n    assertCanImport: (tier, format) => {\n      if (tier === 'bundle') return vault.assertCanImport('bundle')\n      if (!format) throw new TypeError(\"assertCanImport('plaintext') requires a non-empty format id\")\n      vault.assertCanImport('plaintext', format)\n    },\n    // ⚠️ Filtered HERE, not passed to exportStream — `ExportStreamOptions`\n    // has no `collections` field, so the option I first passed was silently\n    // dropped and hub read every collection. Caught by an as-json test\n    // expecting ['invoices'] and getting ['invoices','payments'].\n    //\n    // Post-read filtering is correct but not free: hub still DECRYPTS the\n    // collections the caller excluded. Pushing the filter down into\n    // exportStream is the real fix and is a hub change beyond this port.\n    chunks: async function* (collections) {\n      const wanted = collections ? new Set(collections) : null\n      for await (const chunk of vault.exportStream({ granularity: 'collection' })) {\n        if (wanted && !wanted.has(chunk.collection)) continue\n        yield chunk\n      }\n    },\n    // NOT swallowed. A caller who asked for redaction and silently got\n    // unredacted output is the exact failure this port exists to remove — a\n    // security duty that fails quiet. If the description cannot be read, the\n    // export fails instead.\n    describe: (collection) => vault.collection(collection).describe() as never,\n    plan: async (records, policy: ImportPolicy, formatId: string, idKey?: string) => {\n      const { diffVault } = await import('../../with-cargo/vault-diff.js')\n      const plan = await diffVault(vault, records as never, idKey ? { idKey } : {})\n      return {\n        plan,\n        policy,\n        // The apply walk every as-* package had independently: added always,\n        // modified unless insert-only, deleted only on replace — in one\n        // transaction so a partial failure rolls back. Owned once, here.\n        apply: async () => {\n          await vault.noydb.transaction((tx) => {\n            const txVault = tx.vault(vault.name)\n            const reason = `import:${formatId}`\n            for (const e of plan.added) {\n              txVault.collection(e.collection).put(e.id, e.record as never, { reason })\n            }\n            if (policy !== 'insert-only') {\n              for (const e of plan.modified) {\n                txVault.collection(e.collection).put(e.id, e.record as never, { reason })\n              }\n            }\n            if (policy === 'replace') {\n              for (const e of plan.deleted) txVault.collection(e.collection).delete(e.id)\n            }\n          })\n        },\n      }\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Enable `vault.export()` / `vault.import()`.\n *\n * ```ts\n * const db = await createNoydb({ store, user, secret, formatsStrategy: withFormats() })\n * const csv = await vault.export(asCsv(), { collections: ['invoices'] })\n * ```\n */\nexport function withFormats(): FormatsStrategy {\n  return {\n    enabled: true,\n\n    async exportWith<Out extends string | Uint8Array>(\n      vault: Vault,\n      format: NoydbFormat<Out>,\n      options: FormatExportOptions = {},\n    ): Promise<Out> {\n      const ctx = contextFor(vault)\n      // FIRST, and before a single record is read. The format is not in scope\n      // yet and could not reach the vault if it were.\n      if (format.tier === 'bundle') ctx.assertCanExport('bundle')\n      else ctx.assertCanExport('plaintext', format.id)\n\n      const chunks: ExportChunk[] = []\n      for await (const chunk of ctx.chunks(options.collections)) {\n        chunks.push(redactChunk(chunk, ctx, options.redact))\n      }\n      return format.encode(chunks)\n    },\n\n    async importWith<Out extends string | Uint8Array>(\n      vault: Vault,\n      format: NoydbFormat<Out>,\n      input: Out,\n      options: FormatImportOptions = {},\n    ): Promise<ImportPlan> {\n      const ctx = contextFor(vault)\n      // Mirrors the export side: the import gate is two-tier as well, and a\n      // bundle format importing under the plaintext tier would be a silent\n      // downgrade in the other direction.\n      if (format.tier === 'bundle') ctx.assertCanImport('bundle')\n      else ctx.assertCanImport('plaintext', format.id)\n      if (!format.decode) {\n        throw new ValidationError(\n          `vault.import: the '${format.id}' format is export-only — it declares no decode(). ` +\n            'Pick a format that round-trips, or write the records directly.',\n        )\n      }\n      const decoded = await format.decode(input)\n      const candidate: Record<string, readonly unknown[]> = {}\n      for (const chunk of decoded) {\n        const target = chunk.collection || options.collection\n        if (!target) {\n          throw new ValidationError(\n            `vault.import: the '${format.id}' input names no collection and none was supplied. ` +\n              'Pass { collection } for formats whose payload is collection-less.',\n          )\n        }\n        candidate[target] = [...(candidate[target] ?? 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package/dist/at/index.js

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
 import "../chunk-SL3JAAKN.js";
 import "../chunk-N4CHCXDL.js";
 import "../chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
-import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {
   MemoryRecipientSealer,
   MemorySealer,

package/dist/attestation/index.js

@@ -26,17 +26,16 @@ import {
   AttestationError,
   AttestationNotEnabledError
 } from "../chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
-import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/attestation/active.ts
 function withAttestation() {
   return {
     async issueAttestation(ctx, args) {
-      const { issueAttestationCore: issueAttestationCore2 } = await import("../issue-IOXM3RSJ.js");
+      const { issueAttestationCore: issueAttestationCore2 } = await import("../issue-RH4H733Z.js");
       return issueAttestationCore2(ctx, args);
     },
     async getDocumentSigningPublicKey(deps) {
-      const { loadSigner, loadOrCreateSigner } = await import("../signer-7NK7TMWU.js");
+      const { loadSigner, loadOrCreateSigner } = await import("../signer-5K3WDHOC.js");
       const existing = await loadSigner(deps.adapter, deps.vault, deps.getDEK);
       if (existing) return { keyId: existing.keyId, publicKeyB64: existing.publicKeyB64 };
       if (deps.role !== "owner") {
@@ -46,19 +45,19 @@ function withAttestation() {
       return { keyId: signer.keyId, publicKeyB64: signer.publicKeyB64 };
     },
     async revokeAttestation(ctx, docId) {
-      const { revokeDocCore: revokeDocCore2 } = await import("../revoke-U7U3FMXU.js");
+      const { revokeDocCore: revokeDocCore2 } = await import("../revoke-POHP4GPB.js");
       return revokeDocCore2(ctx, docId);
     },
     async unrevokeAttestation(ctx, docId) {
-      const { unrevokeDocCore: unrevokeDocCore2 } = await import("../revoke-U7U3FMXU.js");
+      const { unrevokeDocCore: unrevokeDocCore2 } = await import("../revoke-POHP4GPB.js");
       return unrevokeDocCore2(ctx, docId);
     },
     async getRevokedDocIds(ctx) {
-      const { getRevokedDocIdsCore: getRevokedDocIdsCore2 } = await import("../revoke-U7U3FMXU.js");
+      const { getRevokedDocIdsCore: getRevokedDocIdsCore2 } = await import("../revoke-POHP4GPB.js");
       return getRevokedDocIdsCore2(ctx);
     },
     async publishRevocationList(ctx) {
-      const { publishRevocationListCore: publishRevocationListCore2 } = await import("../revoke-U7U3FMXU.js");
+      const { publishRevocationListCore: publishRevocationListCore2 } = await import("../revoke-POHP4GPB.js");
       return publishRevocationListCore2(ctx);
     }
   };

package/dist/attestation/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/with-audit/attestation/active.ts","../../src/with-audit/attestation/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { AttestationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport type { AttestationStrategy } from './strategy.js'\n\n/**\n * Enable the attestation capability.\n * Pass to `createNoydb({ attestationStrategy: withAttestation() })` to make the\n * vault's `issueAttestation` / `getDocumentSigningPublicKey` / `revokeAttestation`\n * / `unrevokeAttestation` / `getRevokedDocIds` / `publishRevocationList` methods\n * live. The issue/revoke/signer engines are dynamically imported here, so they\n * stay out of the floor bundle until opted in.\n */\nexport function withAttestation(): AttestationStrategy {\n  return {\n    async issueAttestation(ctx, args) {\n      const { issueAttestationCore } = await import('./issue.js')\n      return issueAttestationCore(ctx, args)\n    },\n    async getDocumentSigningPublicKey(deps) {\n      const { loadSigner, loadOrCreateSigner } = await import('./signer.js')\n      // Reading an existing public key is open to any role that holds the\n      // _attestations DEK — the public key is not secret. But MINTING the\n      // signer is the firm's identity operation (same rule as issueAttestation):\n      // a non-owner read must not silently create it.\n      const existing = await loadSigner(deps.adapter, deps.vault, deps.getDEK)\n      if (existing) return { keyId: existing.keyId, publicKeyB64: existing.publicKeyB64 }\n      if (deps.role !== 'owner') {\n        throw new AttestationError(`getDocumentSigningPublicKey: no document-signing key exists yet; only the 'owner' may mint it. Caller is '${deps.role}'. Have the owner issue an attestation (or call this) first.`)\n      }\n      const signer = await loadOrCreateSigner(deps.adapter, deps.vault, deps.getDEK)\n      return { keyId: signer.keyId, publicKeyB64: signer.publicKeyB64 }\n    },\n    async revokeAttestation(ctx, docId) {\n      const { revokeDocCore } = await import('./revoke.js')\n      return revokeDocCore(ctx, docId)\n    },\n    async unrevokeAttestation(ctx, docId) {\n      const { unrevokeDocCore } = await import('./revoke.js')\n      return unrevokeDocCore(ctx, docId)\n    },\n    async getRevokedDocIds(ctx) {\n      const { getRevokedDocIdsCore } = await import('./revoke.js')\n      return getRevokedDocIdsCore(ctx)\n    },\n    async publishRevocationList(ctx) {\n      const { publishRevocationListCore } = await import('./revoke.js')\n      return publishRevocationListCore(ctx)\n    },\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * @category capability\n * Document attestation — issue side. Mint a signed, per-field commitment\n * for a record and emit a QR credential verifiable offline via\n * `@noy-db/attestation`. See design-history/2026-05-29-attestation-core-and-issue-design.md.\n */\nexport { withAttestation } from './active.js'\nexport { NO_ATTESTATION, type AttestationStrategy } from './strategy.js'\nexport { AttestationNotEnabledError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nexport { issueAttestationCore } from './issue.js'\nexport type { IssueContext, IssueArgs, IssueResult } from './issue.js'\nexport { ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION } from './signer.js'\nexport { revokeDocCore, unrevokeDocCore, getRevokedDocIdsCore, publishRevocationListCore } from './revoke.js'\nexport type { RevokeContext } from './revoke.js'\nexport { AttestationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n// Re-export the pure verifier surface so consumers can verify from one import:\nexport { verifyAttestation, decodeQr, verifyRevocationList, isRevoked, signRevocationList, type QrPayload, type AttestationFieldSchema, type VerifyResult, type VerifyInput, type RevocationList } from '@noy-db/attestation'\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAWO,SAAS,kBAAuC;AACrD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK,MAAM;AAChC,YAAM,EAAE,sBAAAA,sBAAqB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,sBAAY;AAC1D,aAAOA,sBAAqB,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,IACvC;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,4BAA4B,MAAM;AACtC,YAAM,EAAE,YAAY,mBAAmB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,uBAAa;AAKrE,YAAM,WAAW,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AACvE,UAAI,SAAU,QAAO,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO,cAAc,SAAS,aAAa;AAClF,UAAI,KAAK,SAAS,SAAS;AACzB,cAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,6GAA6G,KAAK,IAAI,8DAA8D;AAAA,MACjN;AACA,YAAM,SAAS,MAAM,mBAAmB,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AAC7E,aAAO,EAAE,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,cAAc,OAAO,aAAa;AAAA,IAClE;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,kBAAkB,KAAK,OAAO;AAClC,YAAM,EAAE,eAAAC,eAAc,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,uBAAa;AACpD,aAAOA,eAAc,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,IACjC;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,oBAAoB,KAAK,OAAO;AACpC,YAAM,EAAE,iBAAAC,iBAAgB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,uBAAa;AACtD,aAAOA,iBAAgB,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,IACnC;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK;AAC1B,YAAM,EAAE,sBAAAC,sBAAqB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,uBAAa;AAC3D,aAAOA,sBAAqB,GAAG;AAAA,IACjC;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,sBAAsB,KAAK;AAC/B,YAAM,EAAE,2BAAAC,2BAA0B,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,uBAAa;AAChE,aAAOA,2BAA0B,GAAG;AAAA,IACtC;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;AChCA,SAAS,mBAAmB,UAAU,sBAAsB,WAAW,0BAAiI;","names":["issueAttestationCore","revokeDocCore","unrevokeDocCore","getRevokedDocIdsCore","publishRevocationListCore"]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/with-audit/attestation/active.ts","../../src/with-audit/attestation/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { AttestationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport type { AttestationStrategy } from './strategy.js'\n\n/**\n * Enable the attestation capability.\n * Pass to `createNoydb({ attestationStrategy: withAttestation() })` to make the\n * vault's `issueAttestation` / `getDocumentSigningPublicKey` / `revokeAttestation`\n * / `unrevokeAttestation` / `getRevokedDocIds` / `publishRevocationList` methods\n * live. The issue/revoke/signer engines are dynamically imported here, so they\n * stay out of the floor bundle until opted in.\n */\nexport function withAttestation(): AttestationStrategy {\n  return {\n    async issueAttestation(ctx, args) {\n      const { issueAttestationCore } = await import('./issue.js')\n      return issueAttestationCore(ctx, args)\n    },\n    async getDocumentSigningPublicKey(deps) {\n      const { loadSigner, loadOrCreateSigner } = await import('./signer.js')\n      // Reading an existing public key is open to any role that holds the\n      // _attestations DEK — the public key is not secret. But MINTING the\n      // signer is the firm's identity operation (same rule as issueAttestation):\n      // a non-owner read must not silently create it.\n      const existing = await loadSigner(deps.adapter, deps.vault, deps.getDEK)\n      if (existing) return { keyId: existing.keyId, publicKeyB64: existing.publicKeyB64 }\n      if (deps.role !== 'owner') {\n        throw new AttestationError(`getDocumentSigningPublicKey: no document-signing key exists yet; only the 'owner' may mint it. Caller is '${deps.role}'. Have the owner issue an attestation (or call this) first.`)\n      }\n      const signer = await loadOrCreateSigner(deps.adapter, deps.vault, deps.getDEK)\n      return { keyId: signer.keyId, publicKeyB64: signer.publicKeyB64 }\n    },\n    async revokeAttestation(ctx, docId) {\n      const { revokeDocCore } = await import('./revoke.js')\n      return revokeDocCore(ctx, docId)\n    },\n    async unrevokeAttestation(ctx, docId) {\n      const { unrevokeDocCore } = await import('./revoke.js')\n      return unrevokeDocCore(ctx, docId)\n    },\n    async getRevokedDocIds(ctx) {\n      const { getRevokedDocIdsCore } = await import('./revoke.js')\n      return getRevokedDocIdsCore(ctx)\n    },\n    async publishRevocationList(ctx) {\n      const { publishRevocationListCore } = await import('./revoke.js')\n      return publishRevocationListCore(ctx)\n    },\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * @category capability\n * Document attestation — issue side. Mint a signed, per-field commitment\n * for a record and emit a QR credential verifiable offline via\n * `@noy-db/attestation`. See design-history/2026-05-29-attestation-core-and-issue-design.md.\n */\nexport { withAttestation } from './active.js'\nexport { NO_ATTESTATION, type AttestationStrategy } from './strategy.js'\nexport { AttestationNotEnabledError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nexport { issueAttestationCore } from './issue.js'\nexport type { IssueContext, IssueArgs, IssueResult } from './issue.js'\nexport { ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION } from './signer.js'\nexport { revokeDocCore, unrevokeDocCore, getRevokedDocIdsCore, publishRevocationListCore } from './revoke.js'\nexport type { RevokeContext } from './revoke.js'\nexport { AttestationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n// Re-export the pure verifier surface so consumers can verify from one import:\nexport { verifyAttestation, decodeQr, verifyRevocationList, isRevoked, signRevocationList, type QrPayload, type AttestationFieldSchema, type VerifyResult, type VerifyInput, type RevocationList } from '@noy-db/attestation'\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAWO,SAAS,kBAAuC;AACrD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK,MAAM;AAChC,YAAM,EAAE,sBAAAA,sBAAqB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,sBAAY;AAC1D,aAAOA,sBAAqB,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,IACvC;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,4BAA4B,MAAM;AACtC,YAAM,EAAE,YAAY,mBAAmB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,uBAAa;AAKrE,YAAM,WAAW,MAAM,WAAW,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AACvE,UAAI,SAAU,QAAO,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,OAAO,cAAc,SAAS,aAAa;AAClF,UAAI,KAAK,SAAS,SAAS;AACzB,cAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,6GAA6G,KAAK,IAAI,8DAA8D;AAAA,MACjN;AACA,YAAM,SAAS,MAAM,mBAAmB,KAAK,SAAS,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AAC7E,aAAO,EAAE,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO,cAAc,OAAO,aAAa;AAAA,IAClE;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,kBAAkB,KAAK,OAAO;AAClC,YAAM,EAAE,eAAAC,eAAc,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,uBAAa;AACpD,aAAOA,eAAc,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,IACjC;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,oBAAoB,KAAK,OAAO;AACpC,YAAM,EAAE,iBAAAC,iBAAgB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,uBAAa;AACtD,aAAOA,iBAAgB,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,IACnC;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK;AAC1B,YAAM,EAAE,sBAAAC,sBAAqB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,uBAAa;AAC3D,aAAOA,sBAAqB,GAAG;AAAA,IACjC;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,sBAAsB,KAAK;AAC/B,YAAM,EAAE,2BAAAC,2BAA0B,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,uBAAa;AAChE,aAAOA,2BAA0B,GAAG;AAAA,IACtC;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;AChCA,SAAS,mBAAmB,UAAU,sBAAsB,WAAW,0BAAiI;","names":["issueAttestationCore","revokeDocCore","unrevokeDocCore","getRevokedDocIdsCore","publishRevocationListCore"]}

package/dist/{backup-R6A4VZRX.js → backup-AKWIMYWU.js}

@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ import {
   BackupCorruptedError,
   BackupLedgerError
 } from "./chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
-import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/with-pod/backup.ts
 async function dumpVault(ctx) {
@@ -262,4 +261,4 @@ export {
   loadVault,
   verifyBackupIntegrity
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=backup-R6A4VZRX.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=backup-AKWIMYWU.js.map

package/dist/{backup-R6A4VZRX.js.map → backup-AKWIMYWU.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-pod/backup.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Vault backup / restore / integrity.\n *\n * Holds `dump()` (verifiable encrypted JSON backup, including the blob\n * collections so blob \"covers\" travel in the bundle), `load()` (restore +\n * post-load integrity gate), `verifyBackupIntegrity()` (chain + data-envelope\n * cross-check), and `exportJSON()` (plaintext per-collection export, built on\n * the vault's `exportStream`). Behaviour is byte-identical to the inline\n * `Vault` methods these functions replaced — every dependency the moving code\n * touched on `this.*` arrives via {@link BackupContext}. `Vault` keeps the\n * public methods as thin delegators.\n *\n * Internal — reached through `vault.dump()` / `vault.load()` / etc.\n */\nimport { NOYDB_BACKUP_VERSION } from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport { BackupLedgerError, BackupCorruptedError } from '../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { LEDGER_COLLECTION, LEDGER_DELTAS_COLLECTION } from '../with-commit/history/ledger/constants.js'\nimport { SCHEMAS_COLLECTION } from '../with-shape/persisted-schemas/storage.js'\nimport { SEQUENCE_COLLECTION } from '../with-commit/sequence/index.js'\nimport { MANIFEST_COLLECTION } from '../with-shape/manifest/reserved-collections.js'\n// #1025 — imported from the dependency-light `window.ts`, not `periods.ts`: that\n// module exists precisely so a consumer can name the period collections without\n// dragging the ledger hash-chain machinery (`sha256Hex`/`canonicalJson`) into a\n// bundle that opted out of the periods service. Same reason the sync engine's\n// period-scoped pull imports it.\nimport {\n  PERIODS_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_FREEZES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_ARCHIVES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_TARGET_PURGES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_REOPENS_COLLECTION,\n} from '../with-audit/periods/window.js'\nimport type {\n  NoydbStore,\n  EncryptedEnvelope,\n  VaultBackup,\n  VaultSnapshot,\n  ExportStreamOptions,\n  ExportChunk,\n} from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { LedgerStore } from '../with-commit/history/ledger/store.js'\nimport { buildRecordEnvelope } from '../kernel/enclave/index.js'\n\n/** Everything the moving backup methods touched on the vault's `this.*`. */\nexport interface BackupContext {\n  /** The ciphertext store. */\n  readonly adapter: NoydbStore\n  /** Vault namespace name. */\n  readonly vault: string\n  /** The invoking keyring's user id (read fresh per call). */\n  userId(): string\n  /** The vault's ledger store, or null when history is off. */\n  getLedgerOrNull(): LedgerStore | null\n  /** Recompute an envelope's `payloadHash` (bound `historyStrategy.envelopePayloadHash`). */\n  envelopePayloadHash(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope): Promise<string>\n  /**\n   * Refresh the in-memory keyring from the freshly-loaded keyring file and\n   * rebuild the DEK resolver. No-op when the vault has no `reloadKeyring`\n   * callback (plaintext vaults / test constructions).\n   */\n  reloadKeyringAndRebuildDEK(): Promise<void>\n  /** Clear the vault's collection cache (post-load). */\n  clearCollectionCache(): void\n  /** Reset the ledger store so the next `ledger()` rebuilds its head cache. */\n  resetLedgerStore(): void\n  /** The vault's decrypt+ACL export stream (used by `exportJSON`). */\n  exportStream(opts: ExportStreamOptions): AsyncIterableIterator<ExportChunk>\n}\n\n/** Result of {@link verifyBackupIntegrity}. */\nexport type VerifyBackupResult =\n  | { readonly ok: true; readonly head: string; readonly length: number }\n  | {\n      readonly ok: false\n      readonly kind: 'chain'\n      readonly divergedAt: number\n      readonly message: string\n    }\n  | {\n      readonly ok: false\n      readonly kind: 'data'\n      readonly collection: string\n      readonly id: string\n      readonly message: string\n    }\n\n/**\n * Dump vault as a verifiable encrypted JSON backup string.\n *\n * backups embed the current ledger head and the full `_ledger` +\n * `_ledger_deltas` internal collections so the receiver can run\n * `verifyBackupIntegrity()` after `load()` and detect any tampering between\n * dump and restore. Backups produced without a ledger skip the integrity check\n * with a warning — both modes round-trip cleanly.\n */\nexport async function dumpVault(ctx: BackupContext): Promise<string> {\n  const snapshot = await ctx.adapter.loadAll(ctx.vault)\n\n  // Load keyrings (separate path because loadAll filters them out\n  // along with all other underscore-prefixed internal collections).\n  const keyringIds = await ctx.adapter.list(ctx.vault, '_keyring')\n  const keyrings: Record<string, unknown> = {}\n  for (const keyringId of keyringIds) {\n    const envelope = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, '_keyring', keyringId)\n    if (envelope) {\n      keyrings[keyringId] = JSON.parse(envelope._data)\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Load the ledger entries + deltas so the receiver can replay\n  // the chain after restore. Without this, `load()` would have an\n  // empty ledger and `verifyBackupIntegrity()` would have nothing\n  // to compare against.\n  //\n  // Also enumerate the blob collections so blob content (\"covers\")\n  // travels in the bundle (the blob DEK already travels in `_keyring`).\n  // Literals are inlined (not imported from blobs/blob-set.ts) to keep\n  // the blob runtime out of this kernel hot path — they mirror\n  // BLOB_INDEX/CHUNKS/EVICTION_AUDIT_COLLECTION and SLOTS/VERSIONS_PREFIX.\n  // The collect-loop skips empty ids, so this no-ops without blobs.\n  const internalSnapshot: VaultSnapshot = {}\n  const internalNames = [\n    LEDGER_COLLECTION, LEDGER_DELTAS_COLLECTION, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION, SEQUENCE_COLLECTION,\n    MANIFEST_COLLECTION, // #941: the pod's manifest-set record(s) travel in the bundle too\n    // #1025: the accounting-period close state + its companions. The bundle is\n    // the backup/restore path, so without these a restore discarded the\n    // hash-chained evidence that a month was ever closed — the artifact\n    // `closePeriod` exists to produce — and dropped the write gate with it, so\n    // the restored vault silently accepted back-dated writes into a sealed\n    // month. The companions matter as much as the close: a bounded reopen\n    // window (`reopenPeriod({ until })`) is state a restore must not lose.\n    PERIODS_COLLECTION,\n    PERIOD_REOPENS_COLLECTION,\n    PERIOD_FREEZES_COLLECTION,\n    PERIOD_ARCHIVES_COLLECTION,\n    PERIOD_TARGET_PURGES_COLLECTION,\n    '_history', // full-snapshot version history — so history()/getVersion()/diff() survive the bundle\n    '_blob_index', '_blob_chunks', '_blob_eviction_audit',\n    // #753 spec §7 Q3: `_blob_intent` markers travel too — restoring mid-op\n    // state (a blob row without its marker) would reproduce the ambiguity\n    // the journal exists to prevent. Note: `_mv_stale` does NOT travel\n    // today (a pre-existing, separate gap) — observed here, tracked on\n    // #761, not fixed in this pass.\n    '_blob_intent',\n    // #769: `_blob_slots_<c>` envelopes travel verbatim (raw ciphertext,\n    // same DEK, same vault) — including any `SlotRecord.pendingRelease`\n    // resume breadcrumb they carry. This is INTENTIONALLY the opposite of\n    // `extract-partition`'s `reKeyBlobs`, which STRIPS `pendingRelease`:\n    // a full-vault backup restores into the SAME vault it was taken from,\n    // so a breadcrumb taken mid-rehome (together with its `_blob_intent`\n    // marker, carried above) is resumable on restore — carry-and-resume is\n    // correct here. A partition extraction crosses vaults: the breadcrumb's\n    // old eTag may not exist in the destination, so it must be stripped\n    // there instead. Asymmetry: backup = same-vault-resumable = carry;\n    // partition = cross-vault = strip-breadcrumb-carry-marker.\n    ...Object.keys(snapshot).flatMap((c) => [`_blob_slots_${c}`, `_blob_versions_${c}`]),\n  ]\n  for (const internalName of internalNames) {\n    const ids = await ctx.adapter.list(ctx.vault, internalName)\n    if (ids.length === 0) continue\n    const records: Record<string, EncryptedEnvelope> = {}\n    for (const id of ids) {\n      const envelope = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, internalName, id)\n      if (envelope) records[id] = envelope\n    }\n    internalSnapshot[internalName] = records\n  }\n\n  // Embed the ledger head if there's a chain. An empty ledger\n  // (fresh vault) leaves `ledgerHead` undefined, which\n  // load() treats the same as a legacy backup (no integrity\n  // check, console warning). If history is not opted in,\n  // `getLedgerOrNull` returns null and we skip embedding entirely\n  // — the backup is still valid, just without the integrity head.\n  const ledgerForHead = ctx.getLedgerOrNull()\n  const head = ledgerForHead ? await ledgerForHead.head() : null\n  const backup: VaultBackup = {\n    _noydb_backup: NOYDB_BACKUP_VERSION,\n    _compartment: ctx.vault,\n    _exported_at: new Date().toISOString(),\n    _exported_by: ctx.userId(),\n    keyrings: keyrings as VaultBackup['keyrings'],\n    collections: snapshot,\n    ...(Object.keys(internalSnapshot).length > 0\n      ? { _internal: internalSnapshot }\n      : {}),\n    ...(head\n      ? {\n          ledgerHead: {\n            hash: head.hash,\n            index: head.entry.index,\n            ts: head.entry.ts,\n          },\n        }\n      : {}),\n  }\n\n  return JSON.stringify(backup)\n}\n\n/**\n * Restore a vault from a verifiable backup. After loading, runs\n * `verifyBackupIntegrity()` to confirm the hash chain, the embedded head, and\n * every data envelope's payload hash. Legacy backups (no `ledgerHead`) load\n * with a console warning and skip the integrity check.\n */\nexport async function loadVault(ctx: BackupContext, backupJson: string): Promise<void> {\n  const backup = JSON.parse(backupJson) as VaultBackup\n\n  // 1. Restore data collections.\n  await ctx.adapter.saveAll(ctx.vault, backup.collections)\n\n  // 2. Restore keyrings.\n  for (const [userId, keyringFile] of Object.entries(backup.keyrings)) {\n    const envelope = buildRecordEnvelope({ collection: '_keyring', id: userId, version: 1 },\n      { iv: '', data: JSON.stringify(keyringFile) })\n    await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, '_keyring', userId, envelope)\n  }\n\n  // 3. Restore internal collections (`_ledger`, `_ledger_deltas`).\n  //    Required so verifyBackupIntegrity has the chain to walk.\n  if (backup._internal) {\n    for (const [internalName, records] of Object.entries(backup._internal)) {\n      for (const [id, envelope] of Object.entries(records)) {\n        await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, internalName, id, envelope)\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // 4. Refresh the in-memory keyring from the freshly-loaded\n  //    keyring file. Without this, the Vault's getDEK\n  //    closure still holds the OLD session's DEKs, and every\n  //    decrypt of a loaded ledger entry / data envelope fails\n  //    with TamperedError because the DEK doesn't match the\n  //    ciphertext that was encrypted with the SOURCE user's DEK.\n  //    Skipped for plaintext vaults and for tests that\n  //    construct Vault without a reloadKeyring callback.\n  await ctx.reloadKeyringAndRebuildDEK()\n\n  // 5. Clear collection cache + reset the ledger store so the\n  //    next ledger() call rebuilds its head cache from the\n  //    freshly-loaded entries.\n  ctx.clearCollectionCache()\n  ctx.resetLedgerStore()\n\n  // 5. Run the verification gate. Legacy backups (no ledgerHead)\n  //    skip this with a one-line warning so existing consumers can\n  //    still read them while migrating.\n  if (!backup.ledgerHead) {\n    console.warn(\n      `[noy-db] Loaded a legacy backup with no ledgerHead — ` +\n      `verifiable-backup integrity check skipped. ` +\n      `Re-export with a ledger-aware build to get tamper detection.`,\n    )\n    return\n  }\n\n  const result = await verifyBackupIntegrity(ctx)\n  if (!result.ok) {\n    // Surface the most specific error class we can. The result\n    // shape carries enough info for callers to inspect.\n    if (result.kind === 'data') {\n      throw new BackupCorruptedError(\n        result.collection,\n        result.id,\n        result.message,\n      )\n    }\n    throw new BackupLedgerError(result.message, result.divergedAt)\n  }\n\n  // 6. Cross-check: the freshly-verified head must match the\n  //    value embedded at dump time. A mismatch means someone\n  //    truncated or extended the chain after dump.\n  if (result.head !== backup.ledgerHead.hash) {\n    throw new BackupLedgerError(\n      `Backup ledger head mismatch: embedded \"${backup.ledgerHead.hash}\" ` +\n      `but reconstructed \"${result.head}\".`,\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * End-to-end backup integrity check: `ledger.verify()` (hash chain) plus a data\n * envelope cross-check (every current record's `_data` hash must match the\n * latest `put` entry's `payloadHash`). Returns a discriminated union so callers\n * can distinguish chain vs data failures.\n */\nexport async function verifyBackupIntegrity(ctx: BackupContext): Promise<VerifyBackupResult> {\n  // Step 1: chain verification. Without the history strategy there\n  // is no ledger; an unaudited backup verifies trivially as `ok`\n  // because there's nothing to diverge from.\n  const ledgerForVerify = ctx.getLedgerOrNull()\n  if (!ledgerForVerify) {\n    return { ok: true, head: '', length: 0 }\n  }\n  const chainResult = await ledgerForVerify.verify()\n  if (!chainResult.ok) {\n    return {\n      ok: false,\n      kind: 'chain',\n      divergedAt: chainResult.divergedAt,\n      message:\n        `Ledger chain diverged at index ${chainResult.divergedAt}: ` +\n        `expected prevHash \"${chainResult.expected}\" but found \"${chainResult.actual}\".`,\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Step 2: data envelope cross-check. Walk every entry in the\n  // ledger and, for the LATEST `put` per (collection, id), recompute\n  // the data envelope's payloadHash and compare. Earlier puts of the\n  // same id are skipped because the data collection only holds the\n  // current version — historical envelopes live in the deltas\n  // collection (which is itself protected by the chain).\n  // Reuse the ledger we already resolved in step 1.\n  const allEntries = await ledgerForVerify.loadAllEntries()\n\n  // Find the latest non-delete entry per (collection, id). Walk\n  // the entries in reverse so we hit the latest first; mark each\n  // (collection, id) as seen and skip subsequent entries.\n  const seen = new Set<string>()\n  const latest = new Map<\n    string,\n    { collection: string; id: string; expectedHash: string }\n  >()\n  for (let i = allEntries.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n    const entry = allEntries[i]\n    if (!entry) continue\n    // Amendment entries are multi-record audit entries whose\n    // `collection` and `id` are empty strings — building a `\"/\"`\n    // key here would mark that synthetic slot as seen and falsely\n    // trip the data check on a record that never existed. Skip\n    // them BEFORE the key/seen bookkeeping so they neither\n    // tombstone real entries nor enter the latest map.\n    if (entry.op === 'amendment' || entry.op === 'lifecycle') continue\n    const key = `${entry.collection}/${entry.id}`\n    if (seen.has(key)) continue\n    seen.add(key)\n    // For deletes the data collection should NOT have the record,\n    // so we skip — there's nothing to cross-check. Marking the key\n    // as seen above ensures any earlier `put` of the same id is\n    // also skipped (the record was subsequently deleted).\n    if (entry.op === 'delete') continue\n    latest.set(key, {\n      collection: entry.collection,\n      id: entry.id,\n      expectedHash: entry.payloadHash,\n    })\n  }\n\n  for (const { collection, id, expectedHash } of latest.values()) {\n    const envelope = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, collection, id)\n    if (!envelope) {\n      return {\n        ok: false,\n        kind: 'data',\n        collection,\n        id,\n        message:\n          `Ledger expects data record \"${collection}/${id}\" to exist, ` +\n          `but the adapter has no envelope for it.`,\n      }\n    }\n    const actualHash = await ctx.envelopePayloadHash(envelope)\n    if (actualHash !== expectedHash) {\n      return {\n        ok: false,\n        kind: 'data',\n        collection,\n        id,\n        message:\n          `Data envelope \"${collection}/${id}\" has been tampered with: ` +\n          `expected payloadHash \"${expectedHash}\", got \"${actualHash}\".`,\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    ok: true,\n    head: chainResult.head,\n    length: chainResult.length,\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Plaintext per-collection export, built on the vault's `exportStream`. Forces\n * collection granularity (record-by-record output makes no sense in a single\n * string) and merges dictionary snapshots across collections.\n */\nexport async function exportVaultJSON(ctx: BackupContext, opts: ExportStreamOptions = {}): Promise<string> {\n  // Force per-collection granularity regardless of caller setting:\n  // record-by-record output doesn't make sense in a single string.\n  const collections: Record<\n    string,\n    {\n      schema: null\n      refs: Record<string, { target: string; mode: 'strict' | 'warn' | 'cascade' }>\n      records: unknown[]\n    }\n  > = {}\n  let ledgerHead: ExportChunk['ledgerHead'] | undefined\n  // Merged dictionary snapshot across all collections.\n  // Only populated when `resolveLabels` is not set.\n  const allDictionaries: Record<\n    string, // collection name\n    Record<string, Record<string, Record<string, string>>>\n  > = {}\n\n  for await (const chunk of ctx.exportStream({\n    granularity: 'collection',\n    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+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-pod/backup.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Vault backup / restore / integrity.\n *\n * Holds `dump()` (verifiable encrypted JSON backup, including the blob\n * collections so blob \"covers\" travel in the bundle), `load()` (restore +\n * post-load integrity gate), `verifyBackupIntegrity()` (chain + data-envelope\n * cross-check), and `exportJSON()` (plaintext per-collection export, built on\n * the vault's `exportStream`). Behaviour is byte-identical to the inline\n * `Vault` methods these functions replaced — every dependency the moving code\n * touched on `this.*` arrives via {@link BackupContext}. `Vault` keeps the\n * public methods as thin delegators.\n *\n * Internal — reached through `vault.dump()` / `vault.load()` / etc.\n */\nimport { NOYDB_BACKUP_VERSION } from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport { BackupLedgerError, BackupCorruptedError } from '../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { LEDGER_COLLECTION, LEDGER_DELTAS_COLLECTION } from '../with-commit/history/ledger/constants.js'\nimport { SCHEMAS_COLLECTION } from '../with-shape/persisted-schemas/storage.js'\nimport { SEQUENCE_COLLECTION } from '../with-commit/sequence/index.js'\nimport { MANIFEST_COLLECTION } from '../with-shape/manifest/reserved-collections.js'\n// #1025 — imported from the dependency-light `window.ts`, not `periods.ts`: that\n// module exists precisely so a consumer can name the period collections without\n// dragging the ledger hash-chain machinery (`sha256Hex`/`canonicalJson`) into a\n// bundle that opted out of the periods service. Same reason the sync engine's\n// period-scoped pull imports it.\nimport {\n  PERIODS_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_FREEZES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_ARCHIVES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_TARGET_PURGES_COLLECTION,\n  PERIOD_REOPENS_COLLECTION,\n} from '../with-audit/periods/window.js'\nimport type {\n  NoydbStore,\n  EncryptedEnvelope,\n  VaultBackup,\n  VaultSnapshot,\n  ExportStreamOptions,\n  ExportChunk,\n} from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { LedgerStore } from '../with-commit/history/ledger/store.js'\nimport { buildRecordEnvelope } from '../kernel/enclave/index.js'\n\n/** Everything the moving backup methods touched on the vault's `this.*`. */\nexport interface BackupContext {\n  /** The ciphertext store. */\n  readonly adapter: NoydbStore\n  /** Vault namespace name. */\n  readonly vault: string\n  /** The invoking keyring's user id (read fresh per call). */\n  userId(): string\n  /** The vault's ledger store, or null when history is off. */\n  getLedgerOrNull(): LedgerStore | null\n  /** Recompute an envelope's `payloadHash` (bound `historyStrategy.envelopePayloadHash`). */\n  envelopePayloadHash(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope): Promise<string>\n  /**\n   * Refresh the in-memory keyring from the freshly-loaded keyring file and\n   * rebuild the DEK resolver. No-op when the vault has no `reloadKeyring`\n   * callback (plaintext vaults / test constructions).\n   */\n  reloadKeyringAndRebuildDEK(): Promise<void>\n  /** Clear the vault's collection cache (post-load). */\n  clearCollectionCache(): void\n  /** Reset the ledger store so the next `ledger()` rebuilds its head cache. */\n  resetLedgerStore(): void\n  /** The vault's decrypt+ACL export stream (used by `exportJSON`). */\n  exportStream(opts: ExportStreamOptions): AsyncIterableIterator<ExportChunk>\n}\n\n/** Result of {@link verifyBackupIntegrity}. */\nexport type VerifyBackupResult =\n  | { readonly ok: true; readonly head: string; readonly length: number }\n  | {\n      readonly ok: false\n      readonly kind: 'chain'\n      readonly divergedAt: number\n      readonly message: string\n    }\n  | {\n      readonly ok: false\n      readonly kind: 'data'\n      readonly collection: string\n      readonly id: string\n      readonly message: string\n    }\n\n/**\n * Dump vault as a verifiable encrypted JSON backup string.\n *\n * backups embed the current ledger head and the full `_ledger` +\n * `_ledger_deltas` internal collections so the receiver can run\n * `verifyBackupIntegrity()` after `load()` and detect any tampering between\n * dump and restore. Backups produced without a ledger skip the integrity check\n * with a warning — both modes round-trip cleanly.\n */\nexport async function dumpVault(ctx: BackupContext): Promise<string> {\n  const snapshot = await ctx.adapter.loadAll(ctx.vault)\n\n  // Load keyrings (separate path because loadAll filters them out\n  // along with all other underscore-prefixed internal collections).\n  const keyringIds = await ctx.adapter.list(ctx.vault, '_keyring')\n  const keyrings: Record<string, unknown> = {}\n  for (const keyringId of keyringIds) {\n    const envelope = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, '_keyring', keyringId)\n    if (envelope) {\n      keyrings[keyringId] = JSON.parse(envelope._data)\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Load the ledger entries + deltas so the receiver can replay\n  // the chain after restore. Without this, `load()` would have an\n  // empty ledger and `verifyBackupIntegrity()` would have nothing\n  // to compare against.\n  //\n  // Also enumerate the blob collections so blob content (\"covers\")\n  // travels in the bundle (the blob DEK already travels in `_keyring`).\n  // Literals are inlined (not imported from blobs/blob-set.ts) to keep\n  // the blob runtime out of this kernel hot path — they mirror\n  // BLOB_INDEX/CHUNKS/EVICTION_AUDIT_COLLECTION and SLOTS/VERSIONS_PREFIX.\n  // The collect-loop skips empty ids, so this no-ops without blobs.\n  const internalSnapshot: VaultSnapshot = {}\n  const internalNames = [\n    LEDGER_COLLECTION, LEDGER_DELTAS_COLLECTION, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION, SEQUENCE_COLLECTION,\n    MANIFEST_COLLECTION, // #941: the pod's manifest-set record(s) travel in the bundle too\n    // #1025: the accounting-period close state + its companions. The bundle is\n    // the backup/restore path, so without these a restore discarded the\n    // hash-chained evidence that a month was ever closed — the artifact\n    // `closePeriod` exists to produce — and dropped the write gate with it, so\n    // the restored vault silently accepted back-dated writes into a sealed\n    // month. The companions matter as much as the close: a bounded reopen\n    // window (`reopenPeriod({ until })`) is state a restore must not lose.\n    PERIODS_COLLECTION,\n    PERIOD_REOPENS_COLLECTION,\n    PERIOD_FREEZES_COLLECTION,\n    PERIOD_ARCHIVES_COLLECTION,\n    PERIOD_TARGET_PURGES_COLLECTION,\n    '_history', // full-snapshot version history — so history()/getVersion()/diff() survive the bundle\n    '_blob_index', '_blob_chunks', '_blob_eviction_audit',\n    // #753 spec §7 Q3: `_blob_intent` markers travel too — restoring mid-op\n    // state (a blob row without its marker) would reproduce the ambiguity\n    // the journal exists to prevent. Note: `_mv_stale` does NOT travel\n    // today (a pre-existing, separate gap) — observed here, tracked on\n    // #761, not fixed in this pass.\n    '_blob_intent',\n    // #769: `_blob_slots_<c>` envelopes travel verbatim (raw ciphertext,\n    // same DEK, same vault) — including any `SlotRecord.pendingRelease`\n    // resume breadcrumb they carry. This is INTENTIONALLY the opposite of\n    // `extract-partition`'s `reKeyBlobs`, which STRIPS `pendingRelease`:\n    // a full-vault backup restores into the SAME vault it was taken from,\n    // so a breadcrumb taken mid-rehome (together with its `_blob_intent`\n    // marker, carried above) is resumable on restore — carry-and-resume is\n    // correct here. A partition extraction crosses vaults: the breadcrumb's\n    // old eTag may not exist in the destination, so it must be stripped\n    // there instead. Asymmetry: backup = same-vault-resumable = carry;\n    // partition = cross-vault = strip-breadcrumb-carry-marker.\n    ...Object.keys(snapshot).flatMap((c) => [`_blob_slots_${c}`, `_blob_versions_${c}`]),\n  ]\n  for (const internalName of internalNames) {\n    const ids = await ctx.adapter.list(ctx.vault, internalName)\n    if (ids.length === 0) continue\n    const records: Record<string, EncryptedEnvelope> = {}\n    for (const id of ids) {\n      const envelope = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, internalName, id)\n      if (envelope) records[id] = envelope\n    }\n    internalSnapshot[internalName] = records\n  }\n\n  // Embed the ledger head if there's a chain. An empty ledger\n  // (fresh vault) leaves `ledgerHead` undefined, which\n  // load() treats the same as a legacy backup (no integrity\n  // check, console warning). 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After loading, runs\n * `verifyBackupIntegrity()` to confirm the hash chain, the embedded head, and\n * every data envelope's payload hash. Legacy backups (no `ledgerHead`) load\n * with a console warning and skip the integrity check.\n */\nexport async function loadVault(ctx: BackupContext, backupJson: string): Promise<void> {\n  const backup = JSON.parse(backupJson) as VaultBackup\n\n  // 1. Restore data collections.\n  await ctx.adapter.saveAll(ctx.vault, backup.collections)\n\n  // 2. Restore keyrings.\n  for (const [userId, keyringFile] of Object.entries(backup.keyrings)) {\n    const envelope = buildRecordEnvelope({ collection: '_keyring', id: userId, version: 1 },\n      { iv: '', data: JSON.stringify(keyringFile) })\n    await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, '_keyring', userId, envelope)\n  }\n\n  // 3. Restore internal collections (`_ledger`, `_ledger_deltas`).\n  //    Required so verifyBackupIntegrity has the chain to walk.\n  if (backup._internal) {\n    for (const [internalName, records] of Object.entries(backup._internal)) {\n      for (const [id, envelope] of Object.entries(records)) {\n        await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, internalName, id, envelope)\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  // 4. Refresh the in-memory keyring from the freshly-loaded\n  //    keyring file. Without this, the Vault's getDEK\n  //    closure still holds the OLD session's DEKs, and every\n  //    decrypt of a loaded ledger entry / data envelope fails\n  //    with TamperedError because the DEK doesn't match the\n  //    ciphertext that was encrypted with the SOURCE user's DEK.\n  //    Skipped for plaintext vaults and for tests that\n  //    construct Vault without a reloadKeyring callback.\n  await ctx.reloadKeyringAndRebuildDEK()\n\n  // 5. Clear collection cache + reset the ledger store so the\n  //    next ledger() call rebuilds its head cache from the\n  //    freshly-loaded entries.\n  ctx.clearCollectionCache()\n  ctx.resetLedgerStore()\n\n  // 5. Run the verification gate. Legacy backups (no ledgerHead)\n  //    skip this with a one-line warning so existing consumers can\n  //    still read them while migrating.\n  if (!backup.ledgerHead) {\n    console.warn(\n      `[noy-db] Loaded a legacy backup with no ledgerHead — ` +\n      `verifiable-backup integrity check skipped. ` +\n      `Re-export with a ledger-aware build to get tamper detection.`,\n    )\n    return\n  }\n\n  const result = await verifyBackupIntegrity(ctx)\n  if (!result.ok) {\n    // Surface the most specific error class we can. The result\n    // shape carries enough info for callers to inspect.\n    if (result.kind === 'data') {\n      throw new BackupCorruptedError(\n        result.collection,\n        result.id,\n        result.message,\n      )\n    }\n    throw new BackupLedgerError(result.message, result.divergedAt)\n  }\n\n  // 6. Cross-check: the freshly-verified head must match the\n  //    value embedded at dump time. A mismatch means someone\n  //    truncated or extended the chain after dump.\n  if (result.head !== backup.ledgerHead.hash) {\n    throw new BackupLedgerError(\n      `Backup ledger head mismatch: embedded \"${backup.ledgerHead.hash}\" ` +\n      `but reconstructed \"${result.head}\".`,\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * End-to-end backup integrity check: `ledger.verify()` (hash chain) plus a data\n * envelope cross-check (every current record's `_data` hash must match the\n * latest `put` entry's `payloadHash`). Returns a discriminated union so callers\n * can distinguish chain vs data failures.\n */\nexport async function verifyBackupIntegrity(ctx: BackupContext): Promise<VerifyBackupResult> {\n  // Step 1: chain verification. Without the history strategy there\n  // is no ledger; an unaudited backup verifies trivially as `ok`\n  // because there's nothing to diverge from.\n  const ledgerForVerify = ctx.getLedgerOrNull()\n  if (!ledgerForVerify) {\n    return { ok: true, head: '', length: 0 }\n  }\n  const chainResult = await ledgerForVerify.verify()\n  if (!chainResult.ok) {\n    return {\n      ok: false,\n      kind: 'chain',\n      divergedAt: chainResult.divergedAt,\n      message:\n        `Ledger chain diverged at index ${chainResult.divergedAt}: ` +\n        `expected prevHash \"${chainResult.expected}\" but found \"${chainResult.actual}\".`,\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Step 2: data envelope cross-check. Walk every entry in the\n  // ledger and, for the LATEST `put` per (collection, id), recompute\n  // the data envelope's payloadHash and compare. Earlier puts of the\n  // same id are skipped because the data collection only holds the\n  // current version — historical envelopes live in the deltas\n  // collection (which is itself protected by the chain).\n  // Reuse the ledger we already resolved in step 1.\n  const allEntries = await ledgerForVerify.loadAllEntries()\n\n  // Find the latest non-delete entry per (collection, id). Walk\n  // the entries in reverse so we hit the latest first; mark each\n  // (collection, id) as seen and skip subsequent entries.\n  const seen = new Set<string>()\n  const latest = new Map<\n    string,\n    { collection: string; id: string; expectedHash: string }\n  >()\n  for (let i = allEntries.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n    const entry = allEntries[i]\n    if (!entry) continue\n    // Amendment entries are multi-record audit entries whose\n    // `collection` and `id` are empty strings — building a `\"/\"`\n    // key here would mark that synthetic slot as seen and falsely\n    // trip the data check on a record that never existed. Skip\n    // them BEFORE the key/seen bookkeeping so they neither\n    // tombstone real entries nor enter the latest map.\n    if (entry.op === 'amendment' || entry.op === 'lifecycle') continue\n    const key = `${entry.collection}/${entry.id}`\n    if (seen.has(key)) continue\n    seen.add(key)\n    // For deletes the data collection should NOT have the record,\n    // so we skip — there's nothing to cross-check. Marking the key\n    // as seen above ensures any earlier `put` of the same id is\n    // also skipped (the record was subsequently deleted).\n    if (entry.op === 'delete') continue\n    latest.set(key, {\n      collection: entry.collection,\n      id: entry.id,\n      expectedHash: entry.payloadHash,\n    })\n  }\n\n  for (const { collection, id, expectedHash } of latest.values()) {\n    const envelope = await ctx.adapter.get(ctx.vault, collection, id)\n    if (!envelope) {\n      return {\n        ok: false,\n        kind: 'data',\n        collection,\n        id,\n        message:\n          `Ledger expects data record \"${collection}/${id}\" to exist, ` +\n          `but the adapter has no envelope for it.`,\n      }\n    }\n    const actualHash = await ctx.envelopePayloadHash(envelope)\n    if (actualHash !== expectedHash) {\n      return {\n        ok: false,\n        kind: 'data',\n        collection,\n        id,\n        message:\n          `Data envelope \"${collection}/${id}\" has been tampered with: ` +\n          `expected payloadHash \"${expectedHash}\", got \"${actualHash}\".`,\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    ok: true,\n    head: chainResult.head,\n    length: chainResult.length,\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Plaintext per-collection export, built on the vault's `exportStream`. Forces\n * collection granularity (record-by-record output makes no sense in a single\n * string) and merges dictionary snapshots across collections.\n */\nexport async function exportVaultJSON(ctx: BackupContext, opts: ExportStreamOptions = {}): Promise<string> {\n  // Force per-collection granularity regardless of caller setting:\n  // record-by-record output doesn't make sense in a single string.\n  const collections: Record<\n    string,\n    {\n      schema: null\n      refs: Record<string, { target: string; mode: 'strict' | 'warn' | 'cascade' }>\n      records: unknown[]\n    }\n  > = {}\n  let ledgerHead: ExportChunk['ledgerHead'] | undefined\n  // Merged dictionary snapshot across all collections.\n  // Only populated when `resolveLabels` is not set.\n  const allDictionaries: Record<\n    string, // collection name\n    Record<string, Record<string, Record<string, string>>>\n  > = {}\n\n  for await (const chunk of ctx.exportStream({\n    granularity: 'collection',\n    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package/dist/blobs/index.js

@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ import "../chunk-N4CHCXDL.js";
 import {
   BlobOfflineError
 } from "../chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
-import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/via/blob/active.ts
 function withBlobs(options = {}) {

package/dist/blobs/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/via/blob/active.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Active blob strategy factory. Calling `blobs()` returns a\n * `BlobsStrategy` whose `openSlot` constructs a real `BlobSet` bound\n * to the caller's record. The returned strategy is passed into\n * `createNoydb({ blobsStrategy: blobs() })` to light up the\n * `collection.blob(id)` path.\n *\n * This module is only reachable through the `@noy-db/hub/blobs`\n * subpath — a consumer that never imports the subpath ships none of\n * this (ESM tree-shaking + hub's `\"sideEffects\": false`).\n */\n\nimport { BlobSet } from '../../with-shape/blobs/blob-set.js'\nimport type { BlobsStrategy } from '../../port/with/blob-strategy.js'\nimport { createBlobPinCache } from '../../with-shape/blobs/blob-pinning.js'\nimport type { BlobPinStore } from '../../with-shape/blobs/blob-pinning.js'\n\n/** Options for {@link withBlobs} (#808). */\nexport interface WithBlobsOptions {\n  /**\n   * Device-local backend for the offline-pin registry + external side-cache\n   * (`collection.blob(id).pin()`, the `cacheBudget` LRU stamps). Default:\n   * in-memory — pins then last one app session. Supply a durable,\n   * DEVICE-LOCAL store (IndexedDB-backed on the web; it must never sync) to\n   * keep pins across restarts. See `BlobPinStore`'s doc for the posture.\n   */\n  readonly pinStore?: BlobPinStore\n}\n\n/**\n * Build a default `BlobsStrategy` ready to pass into `createNoydb`.\n *\n * Named `withBlobs` (plugin-pattern canonical) rather than `blobs` to\n * avoid shadowing the very common local idiom\n * `const blobs = invoices.blob(id)` in user code.\n *\n * One `withBlobs()` instance owns one device-local pin registry + KPI\n * counter set (#808) — treat it as \"this device's\" blob service.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * import { createNoydb } from '@noy-db/hub'\n * import { withBlobs } from '@noy-db/hub/blobs'\n *\n * const db = await createNoydb({\n *   store, user, secret,\n *   blobsStrategy: withBlobs(),\n * })\n *\n * // Now live — delegates to BlobSet.\n * const vault = await db.openVault('acme')\n * await vault.collection('invoices').blob('inv-1').put('receipt.pdf', bytes)\n * ```\n */\nexport function withBlobs(options: WithBlobsOptions = {}): BlobsStrategy {\n  const pinCache = createBlobPinCache(options.pinStore)\n  return {\n    openSlot(args) {\n      return new BlobSet({ ...args, pinCache })\n    },\n    cacheStats() {\n      return { ...pinCache.stats }\n    },\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAsDO,SAAS,UAAU,UAA4B,CAAC,GAAkB;AACvE,QAAM,WAAW,mBAAmB,QAAQ,QAAQ;AACpD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,SAAS,MAAM;AACb,aAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,IAC1C;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AACX,aAAO,EAAE,GAAG,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,IAC7B;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/via/blob/active.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Active blob strategy factory. Calling `blobs()` returns a\n * `BlobsStrategy` whose `openSlot` constructs a real `BlobSet` bound\n * to the caller's record. The returned strategy is passed into\n * `createNoydb({ blobsStrategy: blobs() })` to light up the\n * `collection.blob(id)` path.\n *\n * This module is only reachable through the `@noy-db/hub/blobs`\n * subpath — a consumer that never imports the subpath ships none of\n * this (ESM tree-shaking + hub's `\"sideEffects\": false`).\n */\n\nimport { BlobSet } from '../../with-shape/blobs/blob-set.js'\nimport type { BlobsStrategy } from '../../port/with/blob-strategy.js'\nimport { createBlobPinCache } from '../../with-shape/blobs/blob-pinning.js'\nimport type { BlobPinStore } from '../../with-shape/blobs/blob-pinning.js'\n\n/** Options for {@link withBlobs} (#808). */\nexport interface WithBlobsOptions {\n  /**\n   * Device-local backend for the offline-pin registry + external side-cache\n   * (`collection.blob(id).pin()`, the `cacheBudget` LRU stamps). Default:\n   * in-memory — pins then last one app session. Supply a durable,\n   * DEVICE-LOCAL store (IndexedDB-backed on the web; it must never sync) to\n   * keep pins across restarts. See `BlobPinStore`'s doc for the posture.\n   */\n  readonly pinStore?: BlobPinStore\n}\n\n/**\n * Build a default `BlobsStrategy` ready to pass into `createNoydb`.\n *\n * Named `withBlobs` (plugin-pattern canonical) rather than `blobs` to\n * avoid shadowing the very common local idiom\n * `const blobs = invoices.blob(id)` in user code.\n *\n * One `withBlobs()` instance owns one device-local pin registry + KPI\n * counter set (#808) — treat it as \"this device's\" blob service.\n *\n * @example\n * ```ts\n * import { createNoydb } from '@noy-db/hub'\n * import { withBlobs } from '@noy-db/hub/blobs'\n *\n * const db = await createNoydb({\n *   store, user, secret,\n *   blobsStrategy: withBlobs(),\n * })\n *\n * // Now live — delegates to BlobSet.\n * const vault = await db.openVault('acme')\n * await vault.collection('invoices').blob('inv-1').put('receipt.pdf', bytes)\n * ```\n */\nexport function withBlobs(options: WithBlobsOptions = {}): BlobsStrategy {\n  const pinCache = createBlobPinCache(options.pinStore)\n  return {\n    openSlot(args) {\n      return new BlobSet({ ...args, pinCache })\n    },\n    cacheStats() {\n      return { ...pinCache.stats }\n    },\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAsDO,SAAS,UAAU,UAA4B,CAAC,GAAkB;AACvE,QAAM,WAAW,mBAAmB,QAAQ,QAAQ;AACpD,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,SAAS,MAAM;AACb,aAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AAAA,IAC1C;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AACX,aAAO,EAAE,GAAG,SAAS,MAAM;AAAA,IAC7B;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/broker/index.js

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import {
   BrokerNotEnabledError,
   BrokerProofError
 } from "../chunk-7O3Y4PPD.js";
-import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/with-party/broker/active.ts
 var DEFAULT_SKEW_MS = 6e4;
@@ -30,7 +29,7 @@ function withBroker(config) {
   const cache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
   return {
     async enroll(ctx) {
-      const { enrollSeed } = await import("../seed-3RXT4VGN.js");
+      const { enrollSeed } = await import("../seed-UYR6YG3V.js");
       return enrollSeed({ ...ctx, config });
     },
     async rotate(ctx) {
@@ -39,7 +38,7 @@ function withBroker(config) {
       const inFlight = scoped.map(([, e]) => e.inFlight).filter((p) => p !== void 0);
       await Promise.allSettled(inFlight);
       for (const [key] of scoped) cache.delete(key);
-      const { rotateSeed } = await import("../seed-3RXT4VGN.js");
+      const { rotateSeed } = await import("../seed-UYR6YG3V.js");
       return rotateSeed({ ...ctx, config });
     },
     credentialSource(ctx, profile) {
@@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ function withBroker(config) {
         const skewMs = config.skewMs ?? DEFAULT_SKEW_MS;
         const capturedEntry = entry;
         const inFlight = (async () => {
-          const { mintStoreCredentials } = await import("../seed-3RXT4VGN.js");
+          const { mintStoreCredentials } = await import("../seed-UYR6YG3V.js");
           const creds = await mintStoreCredentials({ ...ctx, config }, profile);
           capturedEntry.cached = { creds, validUntil: cacheFloor(creds, skewMs) };
           return creds;

package/dist/broker/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/with-party/broker/active.ts","../../src/with-party/broker/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Enable the credential-broker capability (#479, spec §5).\n *\n * Pass to `createNoydb({ brokerStrategy: withBroker(config) })` to make\n * `vault.broker()` live. Each method dynamic-imports the seed lifecycle\n * engine (`./seed.js`) — mirroring `via/classified/active.ts`'s per-method\n * dynamic-import seam — so `with-party/broker/seed.ts` (the heavy module:\n * the CAS enrol, quiesce-then-swap rotate, and the challenge/response round\n * trip) is reachable only through the `@noy-db/hub/broker` subpath and\n * never enters the single-user floor bundle.\n *\n * The single-flight, per-vault-per-profile refresh cache (H-6/I6) lives\n * HERE, in this factory's closure — shared across every `credentialSource(profile)`\n * call for this one broker instance (in turn shared across every vault of a\n * `createNoydb()` instance — `vault.broker()` passes the SAME `BrokerStrategy`\n * for all of them), so `rotate()` can quiesce it (await any in-flight\n * round-trip, then drop it) before the seed swap. The cache key is\n * `${vault}\\0${profile}` — keyed by vault FIRST, or two vaults sharing this\n * one strategy would collide and hand vault-B a cached credential minted\n * (and STS-scoped) for vault-A.\n */\nimport type { BrokerStrategy, BrokerConfig, BrokerCtx } from '../../port/with/broker-strategy.js'\nimport type { StoreCredentials, StoreCredentialSource } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\nconst DEFAULT_SKEW_MS = 60_000\n/** Floor under the skew-adjusted boundary so a sub-skew credential TTL\n *  doesn't collapse to \"already expired\" and thrash re-proving every call (I6b). */\nconst MIN_CACHE_MS = 1_000\n\ninterface CacheEntry {\n  cached?: { creds: StoreCredentials; validUntil: number } | undefined\n  inFlight?: Promise<StoreCredentials> | undefined\n}\n\nfunction cacheFloor(creds: StoreCredentials, skewMs: number): number {\n  const expiresAtMs = creds.expiresAt ? Date.parse(creds.expiresAt) : Date.now() + skewMs * 2\n  return Math.max(expiresAtMs - skewMs, Date.now() + MIN_CACHE_MS)\n}\n\nexport function withBroker(config: BrokerConfig): BrokerStrategy {\n  const cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>()\n\n  return {\n    async enroll(ctx) {\n      const { enrollSeed } = await import('./seed.js')\n      return enrollSeed({ ...ctx, config })\n    },\n    async rotate(ctx) {\n      // Quiesce (I5): let any in-flight round-trip finish (it may still be\n      // proving under the pre-rotation seed) before the local record is\n      // overwritten, then drop the cache — scoped to THIS vault's entries\n      // only (`${ctx.vault}\\0`-prefixed keys). A global cache.clear() here\n      // would blow away every OTHER vault's cache on this shared strategy\n      // too — same root cause as the cross-vault read collision this fixes.\n      const vaultPrefix = `${ctx.vault}\\0`\n      const scoped = [...cache.entries()].filter(([key]) => key.startsWith(vaultPrefix))\n      const inFlight = scoped.map(([, e]) => e.inFlight).filter((p): p is Promise<StoreCredentials> => p !== undefined)\n      await Promise.allSettled(inFlight)\n      for (const [key] of scoped) cache.delete(key)\n      const { rotateSeed } = await import('./seed.js')\n      return rotateSeed({ ...ctx, config })\n    },\n    credentialSource(ctx: BrokerCtx, profile?: string): StoreCredentialSource {\n      const key = `${ctx.vault}\\0${profile ?? ''}`\n      return async () => {\n        let entry = cache.get(key)\n        if (!entry) {\n          entry = {}\n          cache.set(key, entry)\n        }\n        const now = Date.now()\n        if (entry.cached && now < entry.cached.validUntil) return entry.cached.creds\n        if (entry.inFlight) return entry.inFlight\n\n        const skewMs = config.skewMs ?? DEFAULT_SKEW_MS\n        const capturedEntry = entry\n        const inFlight = (async () => {\n          const { mintStoreCredentials } = await import('./seed.js')\n          const creds = await mintStoreCredentials({ ...ctx, config }, profile)\n          capturedEntry.cached = { creds, validUntil: cacheFloor(creds, skewMs) }\n          return creds\n        })()\n        entry.inFlight = inFlight\n        try {\n          return await inFlight\n        } finally {\n          // Clear-on-settle (I6a): a rejected in-flight promise must never\n          // stay pinned in the cache, or every subsequent call would wedge\n          // on the same rejection instead of retrying.\n          capturedEntry.inFlight = undefined\n        }\n      }\n    },\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * `@noy-db/hub/broker` — subpath export for the credential-broker capability\n * (#479, credential-broker spec). Apps that never call `vault.broker()` can\n * exclude this subpath entirely: the floor default `NO_BROKER` throws, and\n * this module's real engine (`with-party/broker/{seed,active}.ts`) is only\n * ever reached through `withBroker()`'s dynamic imports, so it never enters\n * a floor bundle.\n *\n * Also re-exports the host-side helpers (`issueChallenge`, `verifyBrokerProof`)\n * from the enclave barrel, so a Lambda/Worker implementing the reference\n * broker host can import just this one subpath and get everything it\n * needs, `crypto.subtle`-only.\n */\n\n// ─── Capability opt-in seam ──────────────────────────────────\nexport { withBroker } from './active.js'\nexport {\n  NO_BROKER,\n  type BrokerStrategy,\n  type BrokerCtx,\n  type BrokerConfig,\n  type CredentialBrokerHandle,\n} from '../../port/with/broker-strategy.js'\nexport { BrokerNotEnabledError, BrokerEnrolmentError, BrokerProofError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n// ─── Host helpers (verify side — for a reference broker host) ───\nimport { issueChallenge as issueChallengeRaw, verifyBrokerProof } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport type { IssuedChallenge, VerifyBrokerProofArgs } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\n\n/**\n * Floor — a challenge TTL must survive network latency + clock drift\n * between host and client. The enclave's `issueChallenge` is deliberately\n * unclamped (a mechanical primitive, not a policy); this floor is host\n * POLICY, so it lives here in the party layer, not\n * `kernel/enclave/broker/proof.ts` (carried forward from Task 2's review,\n * I6b).\n */\nconst MIN_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS = 10_000\n/** Ceiling — spec §2 step 2: \"TTL ≤ 60 s\". */\nconst MAX_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS = 60_000\n\n/**\n * {@link issueChallengeRaw} (the enclave's mechanical primitive) with a\n * `[10s, 60s]` TTL clamp applied, so a reference host built on this barrel\n * gets a safe challenge TTL without having to know the bounds itself.\n */\nexport function issueChallenge(opts?: { ttlMs?: number }): IssuedChallenge {\n  const requested = opts?.ttlMs ?? 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/with-party/broker/active.ts","../../src/with-party/broker/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Enable the credential-broker capability (#479, spec §5).\n *\n * Pass to `createNoydb({ brokerStrategy: withBroker(config) })` to make\n * `vault.broker()` live. Each method dynamic-imports the seed lifecycle\n * engine (`./seed.js`) — mirroring `via/classified/active.ts`'s per-method\n * dynamic-import seam — so `with-party/broker/seed.ts` (the heavy module:\n * the CAS enrol, quiesce-then-swap rotate, and the challenge/response round\n * trip) is reachable only through the `@noy-db/hub/broker` subpath and\n * never enters the single-user floor bundle.\n *\n * The single-flight, per-vault-per-profile refresh cache (H-6/I6) lives\n * HERE, in this factory's closure — shared across every `credentialSource(profile)`\n * call for this one broker instance (in turn shared across every vault of a\n * `createNoydb()` instance — `vault.broker()` passes the SAME `BrokerStrategy`\n * for all of them), so `rotate()` can quiesce it (await any in-flight\n * round-trip, then drop it) before the seed swap. The cache key is\n * `${vault}\\0${profile}` — keyed by vault FIRST, or two vaults sharing this\n * one strategy would collide and hand vault-B a cached credential minted\n * (and STS-scoped) for vault-A.\n */\nimport type { BrokerStrategy, BrokerConfig, BrokerCtx } from '../../port/with/broker-strategy.js'\nimport type { StoreCredentials, StoreCredentialSource } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\nconst DEFAULT_SKEW_MS = 60_000\n/** Floor under the skew-adjusted boundary so a sub-skew credential TTL\n *  doesn't collapse to \"already expired\" and thrash re-proving every call (I6b). */\nconst MIN_CACHE_MS = 1_000\n\ninterface CacheEntry {\n  cached?: { creds: StoreCredentials; validUntil: number } | undefined\n  inFlight?: Promise<StoreCredentials> | undefined\n}\n\nfunction cacheFloor(creds: StoreCredentials, skewMs: number): number {\n  const expiresAtMs = creds.expiresAt ? Date.parse(creds.expiresAt) : Date.now() + skewMs * 2\n  return Math.max(expiresAtMs - skewMs, Date.now() + MIN_CACHE_MS)\n}\n\nexport function withBroker(config: BrokerConfig): BrokerStrategy {\n  const cache = new Map<string, CacheEntry>()\n\n  return {\n    async enroll(ctx) {\n      const { enrollSeed } = await import('./seed.js')\n      return enrollSeed({ ...ctx, config })\n    },\n    async rotate(ctx) {\n      // Quiesce (I5): let any in-flight round-trip finish (it may still be\n      // proving under the pre-rotation seed) before the local record is\n      // overwritten, then drop the cache — scoped to THIS vault's entries\n      // only (`${ctx.vault}\\0`-prefixed keys). A global cache.clear() here\n      // would blow away every OTHER vault's cache on this shared strategy\n      // too — same root cause as the cross-vault read collision this fixes.\n      const vaultPrefix = `${ctx.vault}\\0`\n      const scoped = [...cache.entries()].filter(([key]) => key.startsWith(vaultPrefix))\n      const inFlight = scoped.map(([, e]) => e.inFlight).filter((p): p is Promise<StoreCredentials> => p !== undefined)\n      await Promise.allSettled(inFlight)\n      for (const [key] of scoped) cache.delete(key)\n      const { rotateSeed } = await import('./seed.js')\n      return rotateSeed({ ...ctx, config })\n    },\n    credentialSource(ctx: BrokerCtx, profile?: string): StoreCredentialSource {\n      const key = `${ctx.vault}\\0${profile ?? ''}`\n      return async () => {\n        let entry = cache.get(key)\n        if (!entry) {\n          entry = {}\n          cache.set(key, entry)\n        }\n        const now = Date.now()\n        if (entry.cached && now < entry.cached.validUntil) return entry.cached.creds\n        if (entry.inFlight) return entry.inFlight\n\n        const skewMs = config.skewMs ?? DEFAULT_SKEW_MS\n        const capturedEntry = entry\n        const inFlight = (async () => {\n          const { mintStoreCredentials } = await import('./seed.js')\n          const creds = await mintStoreCredentials({ ...ctx, config }, profile)\n          capturedEntry.cached = { creds, validUntil: cacheFloor(creds, skewMs) }\n          return creds\n        })()\n        entry.inFlight = inFlight\n        try {\n          return await inFlight\n        } finally {\n          // Clear-on-settle (I6a): a rejected in-flight promise must never\n          // stay pinned in the cache, or every subsequent call would wedge\n          // on the same rejection instead of retrying.\n          capturedEntry.inFlight = undefined\n        }\n      }\n    },\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * `@noy-db/hub/broker` — subpath export for the credential-broker capability\n * (#479, credential-broker spec). Apps that never call `vault.broker()` can\n * exclude this subpath entirely: the floor default `NO_BROKER` throws, and\n * this module's real engine (`with-party/broker/{seed,active}.ts`) is only\n * ever reached through `withBroker()`'s dynamic imports, so it never enters\n * a floor bundle.\n *\n * Also re-exports the host-side helpers (`issueChallenge`, `verifyBrokerProof`)\n * from the enclave barrel, so a Lambda/Worker implementing the reference\n * broker host can import just this one subpath and get everything it\n * needs, `crypto.subtle`-only.\n */\n\n// ─── Capability opt-in seam ──────────────────────────────────\nexport { withBroker } from './active.js'\nexport {\n  NO_BROKER,\n  type BrokerStrategy,\n  type BrokerCtx,\n  type BrokerConfig,\n  type CredentialBrokerHandle,\n} from '../../port/with/broker-strategy.js'\nexport { BrokerNotEnabledError, BrokerEnrolmentError, BrokerProofError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n// ─── Host helpers (verify side — for a reference broker host) ───\nimport { issueChallenge as issueChallengeRaw, verifyBrokerProof } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport type { IssuedChallenge, VerifyBrokerProofArgs } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\n\n/**\n * Floor — a challenge TTL must survive network latency + clock drift\n * between host and client. The enclave's `issueChallenge` is deliberately\n * unclamped (a mechanical primitive, not a policy); this floor is host\n * POLICY, so it lives here in the party layer, not\n * `kernel/enclave/broker/proof.ts` (carried forward from Task 2's review,\n * I6b).\n */\nconst MIN_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS = 10_000\n/** Ceiling — spec §2 step 2: \"TTL ≤ 60 s\". */\nconst MAX_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS = 60_000\n\n/**\n * {@link issueChallengeRaw} (the enclave's mechanical primitive) with a\n * `[10s, 60s]` TTL clamp applied, so a reference host built on this barrel\n * gets a safe challenge TTL without having to know the bounds itself.\n */\nexport function issueChallenge(opts?: { ttlMs?: number }): IssuedChallenge {\n  const requested = opts?.ttlMs ?? MAX_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS\n  const clamped = Math.min(Math.max(requested, MIN_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS), MAX_CHALLENGE_TTL_MS)\n  return issueChallengeRaw({ ttlMs: clamped })\n}\nexport { verifyBrokerProof }\nexport type { VerifyBrokerProofArgs }\n\n// #837 — issueChallenge's return type must be nameable from this entry.\nexport type { IssuedChallenge } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAwBA,IAAM,kBAAkB;AAGxB,IAAM,eAAe;AAOrB,SAAS,WAAW,OAAyB,QAAwB;AACnE,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,YAAY,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,SAAS;AAC1F,SAAO,KAAK,IAAI,cAAc,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,YAAY;AACjE;AAEO,SAAS,WAAW,QAAsC;AAC/D,QAAM,QAAQ,oBAAI,IAAwB;AAE1C,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK;AAChB,YAAM,EAAE,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,qBAAW;AAC/C,aAAO,WAAW,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;AAAA,IACtC;AAAA,IACA,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK;AAOhB,YAAM,cAAc,GAAG,IAAI,KAAK;AAChC,YAAM,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,WAAW,WAAW,CAAC;AACjF,YAAM,WAAW,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,MAAsC,MAAM,MAAS;AAChH,YAAM,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAQ;AACjC,iBAAW,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,OAAQ,OAAM,OAAO,GAAG;AAC5C,YAAM,EAAE,WAAW,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,qBAAW;AAC/C,aAAO,WAAW,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;AAAA,IACtC;AAAA,IACA,iBAAiB,KAAgB,SAAyC;AACxE,YAAM,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK,WAAW,EAAE;AAC1C,aAAO,YAAY;AACjB,YAAI,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG;AACzB,YAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AACV,kBAAQ,CAAC;AACT,gBAAM,IAAI,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,QACtB;AACA,cAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI;AACrB,YAAI,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,WAAY,QAAO,MAAM,OAAO;AACvE,YAAI,MAAM,SAAU,QAAO,MAAM;AAEjC,cAAM,SAAS,OAAO,UAAU;AAChC,cAAM,gBAAgB;AACtB,cAAM,YAAY,YAAY;AAC5B,gBAAM,EAAE,qBAAqB,IAAI,MAAM,OAAO,qBAAW;AACzD,gBAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,qBAAqB,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO;AACpE,wBAAc,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,YAAY,WAAW,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE;AACtE,iBAAO;AAAA,QACT,GAAG;AACH,cAAM,WAAW;AACjB,YAAI;AACF,iBAAO,MAAM;AAAA,QACf,UAAE;AAIA,wBAAc,WAAW;AAAA,QAC3B;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;ACzDA,IAAM,uBAAuB;AAE7B,IAAM,uBAAuB;AAOtB,SAASA,gBAAe,MAA4C;AACzE,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM,SAAS;AACjC,QAAM,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,WAAW,oBAAoB,GAAG,oBAAoB;AACxF,SAAO,eAAkB,EAAE,OAAO,QAAQ,CAAC;AAC7C;","names":["issueChallenge"]}