@noy-db/hub 0.7.0-pre.1 → 0.7.0-pre.10

package/dist/{chunk-LF6DMX4C.js → chunk-NMDMSHBF.js}

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 import {
   buildRecordEnvelope
-} from "./chunk-N4CNVSUF.js";
+} from "./chunk-4RUFYGWG.js";
 import {
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
+} from "./chunk-SW4TOSJL.js";
 
 // src/with-party/directory/cover/custom.ts
 var CUSTOM_KEY_PATTERN = /^[a-z0-9]+([.-][a-z0-9]+)+$/i;
@@ -230,4 +230,4 @@ export {
   resolveLocale,
   pickLocale
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-LF6DMX4C.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NMDMSHBF.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-H3VG6XBC.js → chunk-NUXTUGAD.js}

@@ -1,46 +1,47 @@
 import {
   walkClosure
-} from "./chunk-OWLVBOWO.js";
+} from "./chunk-7XT7KZTN.js";
 import {
   resolveManagedSecret
-} from "./chunk-Z2WK53N6.js";
+} from "./chunk-JUBWUJY5.js";
 import {
   parseExtractedPartitionBody,
   readPod,
   readPodHeader
-} from "./chunk-6FOGTKBY.js";
+} from "./chunk-RCONOOVF.js";
 import {
   createOwnerKeyring,
   mintRosterTag,
+  nextRosterEpoch,
   requireRosterKey
-} from "./chunk-5W7YXFV5.js";
+} from "./chunk-XJTGBHK6.js";
 import {
   LedgerStore
-} from "./chunk-IESNYJXZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-OKCQNMO6.js";
 import {
   LEDGER_COLLECTION
 } from "./chunk-I7FD46FF.js";
 import {
   openEnvelopeJson
-} from "./chunk-2LPVI4PX.js";
+} from "./chunk-DOPZWTMJ.js";
 import {
   buildRecordEnvelope
-} from "./chunk-N4CNVSUF.js";
+} from "./chunk-4RUFYGWG.js";
 import {
   base64ToBuffer,
   wrapKey
-} from "./chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
+} from "./chunk-USKHHOIV.js";
 import {
   AdoptionStateError,
   TransferSealError,
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
+} from "./chunk-SW4TOSJL.js";
 
 // src/with-cargo/active.ts
 function withCargo() {
   return {
     async extractPartition(vault, opts) {
-      const { extractPartitionCore } = await import("./extract-partition-UPOVITFI.js");
+      const { extractPartitionCore } = await import("./extract-partition-YJFL5OKK.js");
       return extractPartitionCore(vault, opts);
     }
   };
@@ -226,8 +227,9 @@ async function createOwnerOnAdoptedPartition(store, vaultName, opts) {
       mergedDeks[collection] = await wrapKey(dek, kek);
     }
     const merged = { ...keyringFile, deks: mergedDeks };
+    const withEpoch = { ...merged, roster_epoch: nextRosterEpoch(keyringFile.roster_epoch) };
     const rosterKey = requireRosterKey(unlocked, "adoptPartition");
-    const mergedFile = { ...merged, roster_tag: await mintRosterTag(merged, rosterKey) };
+    const mergedFile = { ...withEpoch, roster_tag: await mintRosterTag(withEpoch, rosterKey) };
     await store.put(vaultName, "_keyring", userId, { ...env, _data: JSON.stringify(mergedFile) });
   }
   const ledgerDek = partitionDeks.get(LEDGER_COLLECTION);
@@ -250,7 +252,7 @@ async function createOwnerOnAdoptedPartition(store, vaultName, opts) {
     }
   }
   if (isManaged(opts)) {
-    const { createNoydb } = await import("./noydb-4VV2ZGLZ.js");
+    const { createNoydb } = await import("./noydb-ZUS5XAFT.js");
     const db = await createNoydb({
       store,
       user: userId,
@@ -305,4 +307,4 @@ export {
   withCargo,
   describeExtraction
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-H3VG6XBC.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NUXTUGAD.js.map

package/dist/chunk-NUXTUGAD.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-cargo/active.ts","../src/with-cargo/describe-extraction.ts","../src/with-cargo/adopt-partition.ts","../src/with-cargo/decrypt-partition.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Enable the cargo (partition extraction) capability.\n * Pass to `createNoydb({ cargoStrategy: withCargo() })` to make the source-side\n * `extractPartition(vault, ...)` free function live. The extraction crypto\n * engine is dynamically imported here, so it stays out of the floor bundle\n * until opted in. The recipient-side `adoptPartition` /\n * `decryptExtractedPartition` free functions — and `diffVault` (shared\n * import/merge infra) — are ungated and unaffected.\n */\nimport type { CargoStrategy } from './strategy.js'\n\nexport function withCargo(): CargoStrategy {\n  return {\n    async extractPartition(vault, opts) {\n      const { extractPartitionCore } = await import('./extract-partition.js')\n      return extractPartitionCore(vault, opts)\n    },\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Partition-extraction dry-run. Read-only preview of what an\n * `extractPartition` would move: record counts, byte totals, and the\n * timestamp span per collection — computed from raw encrypted\n * envelopes WITHOUT decrypting them. Writes nothing, mutates nothing.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { Vault } from '../kernel/vault.js'\nimport { walkClosure, type WalkClosureOptions, type DanglingRefNotice } from './walk-closure.js'\n\nexport interface ExtractionPreview {\n  readonly totalRecords: number\n  /** Sum of serialized encrypted-envelope sizes (bytes). */\n  readonly totalBytes: number\n  readonly byCollection: ReadonlyArray<{\n    readonly name: string\n    readonly recordCount: number\n    readonly bytes: number\n    /** Earliest envelope `_ts` in this collection (lexicographic). */\n    readonly oldestTs?: string\n    readonly newestTs?: string\n  }>\n  readonly graph: { readonly depth: number; readonly cyclesDetected: boolean }\n  /** Records the walk reached but whose envelope couldn't be read. */\n  readonly inaccessible: ReadonlyArray<{ readonly collection: string; readonly id: string }>\n  /**\n   * #772: outbound FK edges whose referenced parent was excluded from the\n   * closure (missing, or tier-elevated and therefore invisible) — mirrors\n   * `ExtractPartitionResult.danglingRefs` (#759) so a preview/extract pair\n   * gives the SAME signal. A parent excluded this way never appears in\n   * `byCollection` at all; this is the only preview-time indicator.\n   */\n  readonly danglingRefs: ReadonlyArray<DanglingRefNotice>\n}\n\nexport async function describeExtraction(\n  vault: Vault,\n  opts: WalkClosureOptions,\n): Promise<ExtractionPreview> {\n  const { closure, graph, danglingRefs } = await walkClosure(vault, opts)\n\n  const { name: vaultName, adapter } = vault._introspectState()\n  const encoder = new TextEncoder()\n\n  const byCollection: Array<{\n    name: string; recordCount: number; bytes: number; oldestTs?: string; newestTs?: string\n  }> = []\n  const inaccessible: Array<{ collection: string; id: string }> = []\n  let totalBytes = 0\n  let totalRecords = 0\n\n  for (const [collectionName, ids] of closure) {\n    let bytes = 0\n    let oldestTs: string | undefined\n    let newestTs: string | undefined\n    let recordCount = 0\n\n    for (const id of ids) {\n      const env = await adapter.get(vaultName, collectionName, id)\n      if (!env) {\n        // Walk reached it (via decrypted list) but the raw store read\n        // returned nothing — surface rather than miscount.\n        inaccessible.push({ collection: collectionName, id })\n        continue\n      }\n      recordCount++\n      bytes += encoder.encode(JSON.stringify(env)).length\n      const ts = env._ts\n      if (oldestTs === undefined || ts < oldestTs) oldestTs = ts\n      if (newestTs === undefined || ts > newestTs) newestTs = ts\n    }\n\n    byCollection.push({\n      name: collectionName,\n      recordCount,\n      bytes,\n      // Spread conditionally — exactOptionalPropertyTypes forbids an\n      // explicit `undefined` on an optional property.\n      ...(oldestTs !== undefined ? { oldestTs } : {}),\n      ...(newestTs !== undefined ? { newestTs } : {}),\n    })\n    totalBytes += bytes\n    totalRecords += recordCount\n  }\n\n  byCollection.sort((a, b) => a.name.localeCompare(b.name))\n\n  return Object.freeze({\n    totalRecords,\n    totalBytes,\n    byCollection,\n    graph,\n    inaccessible,\n    danglingRefs,\n  })\n}\n","/**\n * Partition adoption. Recipient side: verify an extracted bundle,\n * validate the transfer key, import the re-keyed collections into a\n * destination store, and record an `_meta/adoption` marker. The bundle\n * stays UNOWNED after adoption — `createOwnerOnAdoptedPartition`\n * mints the owner; the transfer seal is then destroyed.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport { base64ToBuffer, wrapKey, type EnclaveKey } from '../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { TransferSealError, AdoptionStateError, ValidationError } from '../kernel/errors.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore, VaultSnapshot, KeyringFile } from '../kernel/types.js'\nimport { createOwnerKeyring, requireRosterKey } from '../with-party/team/keyring.js'\nimport { mintRosterTag } from '../with-party/team/roster-tag.js' // #1115\nimport { nextRosterEpoch } from '../with-party/team/roster-epoch.js' // #1097\nimport { resolveManagedSecret } from '../with-party/team/managed-secret.js'\nimport type { NoydbSealer } from '../with-party/team/managed-secret.js'\nimport type { NoydbShamir } from '../with-party/team/noydb-shamir.js'\nimport type { RecoveryEnrollmentInput } from '../with-party/team/rotate-recover.js'\nimport { LedgerStore } from '../with-commit/history/ledger/store.js'\nimport { LEDGER_COLLECTION } from '../with-commit/history/ledger/constants.js'\nimport type { TransferSealPayload } from '../with-pod/pod.js'\nimport { readPodHeader, readPod, parseExtractedPartitionBody } from '../with-pod/pod.js'\nimport { buildRecordEnvelope } from '../kernel/enclave/index.js'\n\n/**\n * Reverse of `sealDeks`. Imports the transfer key, decrypts the\n * sealed `{ collection: base64(rawDEK) }` map (layout iv(12)‖ct‖tag), and\n * re-imports each DEK as an AES-GCM key. Throws `TransferSealError` on a\n * wrong key (AES-GCM auth-tag failure) or malformed payload.\n */\nexport async function unsealDeks(\n  seal: TransferSealPayload,\n  transferKey: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Map<string, EnclaveKey>> {\n  if (transferKey.byteLength !== 32) {\n    throw new TransferSealError(\n      `transfer key must be 32 bytes, got ${transferKey.byteLength}.`,\n    )\n  }\n  const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', transferKey as BufferSource, 'AES-GCM', false, ['decrypt'])\n  const raw = base64ToBuffer(seal.payload)\n  let plaintext: ArrayBuffer\n  try {\n    plaintext = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: raw.slice(0, 12) as BufferSource },\n      key,\n      raw.slice(12) as BufferSource,\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new TransferSealError(\n      'transfer seal could not be opened — wrong transfer key (AES-GCM authentication failed).',\n    )\n  }\n  let dekMap: Record<string, string>\n  try {\n    dekMap = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext)) as Record<string, string>\n  } catch {\n    throw new TransferSealError('transfer seal payload is not valid JSON after decryption.')\n  }\n  const deks = new Map<string, EnclaveKey>()\n  for (const [collection, b64] of Object.entries(dekMap)) {\n    // Extractable: the recipient must be able to re-wrap these under their\n    // own KEK (AES-KW) at owner-creation. Matches generateDEK.\n    const dek = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', base64ToBuffer(b64) as BufferSource, 'AES-GCM', true, ['encrypt', 'decrypt'])\n    deks.set(collection, dek)\n  }\n  return deks\n}\n\nexport interface AdoptPartitionOptions {\n  readonly transferKey: Uint8Array\n  readonly destinationStore: NoydbStore\n  readonly vaultName: string\n}\n\nexport interface AdoptPartitionResult {\n  readonly vaultName: string\n  readonly needsOwner: true\n  readonly sealId: string\n}\n\nexport async function adoptPartition(\n  bundleBytes: Uint8Array,\n  opts: AdoptPartitionOptions,\n): Promise<AdoptPartitionResult> {\n  const { transferKey, destinationStore, vaultName } = opts\n\n  const header = readPodHeader(bundleBytes)\n  if (header.bundleKind !== 'extracted-partition' || header.transferSeal === undefined) {\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      'adoptPartition requires an extracted-partition bundle with a transfer seal. '\n      + 'For ordinary backups use readPod + vault.load.',\n    )\n  }\n\n  const { dumpJson } = await readPod(bundleBytes)\n  const { dump, seal } = parseExtractedPartitionBody(dumpJson)\n\n  // Validate the transfer key by unsealing in memory; throws\n  // TransferSealError on mismatch. DEKs are discarded here — they stay\n  // sealed at rest (in _meta/adoption) until owner-creation wraps them under the\n  // recipient's KEK.\n  await unsealDeks(seal, transferKey)\n\n  // Single-occupancy per vaultName: an `_meta/adoption` marker already present\n  // means this slot holds a partition (adopted-and-unowned, or already owned).\n  // saveAll below would overwrite its data and replace the marker, stranding the\n  // prior adoption's transfer seal. Refuse regardless of sealId — re-adopting the\n  // SAME bundle is a redundant call, and adopting a DIFFERENT bundle here would\n  // clobber the existing partition. Either way, pick a fresh vaultName.\n  const existing = await destinationStore.get(vaultName, '_meta', 'adoption')\n  if (existing) {\n    const prior = JSON.parse(existing._data) as { sealId?: string }\n    if (prior.sealId === seal.sealId) {\n      throw new AdoptionStateError(\n        `partition (sealId ${seal.sealId}) is already adopted into vault \"${vaultName}\".`,\n      )\n    }\n    throw new AdoptionStateError(\n      `vault \"${vaultName}\" already holds an adopted partition (sealId ${prior.sealId}); `\n      + `adopting a different partition (sealId ${seal.sealId}) here would overwrite it. `\n      + `Adopt into a fresh vaultName instead.`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  // The marker-only check above misses a worse case: a vaultName already in use\n  // by an ORDINARY vault (createNoydb + openVault) carries no `_meta/adoption`,\n  // yet `saveAll` below is destructive on SQL adapters (`DELETE FROM ... WHERE\n  // vault = ?` followed by upsert) and would wipe the legitimate keyring +\n  // data. Refuse adoption into ANY occupied slot — a fresh vaultName is the\n  // documented precondition.\n  const existingKeyring = await destinationStore.list(vaultName, '_keyring')\n  if (existingKeyring.length > 0) {\n    throw new AdoptionStateError(\n      `vault \"${vaultName}\" already holds a keyring (an unrelated owner exists at this slot); `\n      + `adoptPartition requires a fresh vaultName to avoid destructive saveAll on SQL adapters.`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  const backup = JSON.parse(dump) as { collections: VaultSnapshot; _internal?: VaultSnapshot }\n  await destinationStore.saveAll(vaultName, backup.collections)\n\n  // Import carried internal collections (e.g. _schemas from carrySchemas).\n  // saveAll only writes data collections; _internal is written per-record.\n  if (backup._internal) {\n    for (const [collection, records] of Object.entries(backup._internal)) {\n      for (const [id, envelope] of Object.entries(records)) {\n        await destinationStore.put(vaultName, collection, id, envelope)\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  const adoptedAt = new Date().toISOString()\n  const adoption = { sealId: seal.sealId, adoptedAt, needsOwner: true as const, transferSeal: seal }\n  await destinationStore.put(vaultName, '_meta', 'adoption',\n    buildRecordEnvelope({ collection: '_meta', id: 'adoption', version: 1 },\n      { ts: adoptedAt, iv: '', data: JSON.stringify(adoption) }))\n\n  return { vaultName, needsOwner: true, sealId: seal.sealId }\n}\n\nexport interface CreateOwnerResult {\n  readonly vaultName: string\n  readonly userId: string\n}\n\n/** Standard-mode owner: recipient supplies the secret. */\nexport interface CreateOwnerStandardOptions {\n  readonly userId: string\n  readonly secret: string\n  readonly transferKey: Uint8Array\n}\n\n/**\n * Managed-mode owner: the secret is minted + sealed under\n * a `NoydbSealer` (e.g. an `at-*` OS keychain) so the partition\n * auto-unlocks on the recipient's device. Managed mode mandates a strong\n * (Shamir) recovery profile at creation, which needs the\n * `shamirRecovery` provider injected.\n */\nexport interface CreateOwnerManagedOptions {\n  readonly userId: string\n  readonly secretMode: 'managed'\n  readonly sealingKey: NoydbSealer\n  readonly recovery: ReadonlyArray<RecoveryEnrollmentInput>\n  readonly shamirRecovery: NoydbShamir\n  readonly transferKey: Uint8Array\n}\n\nexport type CreateOwnerOptions = CreateOwnerStandardOptions | CreateOwnerManagedOptions\n\nfunction isManaged(o: CreateOwnerOptions): o is CreateOwnerManagedOptions {\n  return 'secretMode' in o && o.secretMode === 'managed'\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint the first owner keyring on an adopted-but-unowned partition,\n * then destroy the transfer seal.\n *\n * Standard mode: the recipient supplies a secret. Managed mode: the\n * secret is minted + sealed under a `NoydbSealer` and a strong\n * (Shamir) recovery profile is enrolled — orchestrated via the existing\n * `openVaultAndEnrollRecovery` ceremony.\n *\n * Either way, reuses `createOwnerKeyring` to derive the KEK + write the base\n * keyring, then wraps the partition's DEKs (recovered from the seal) under that\n * KEK and re-persists the merged keyring file.\n *\n * Idempotent under retry: the seal is destroyed LAST (Stage D), after the\n * keyring (Stage A), the ledger transition (Stage B), and — in managed mode —\n * strong-recovery enrollment (Stage C). A failure in the fallible enrollment\n * step leaves the seal intact, and re-running with the same `userId` +\n * `transferKey` resumes from the first incomplete stage. (Multi-profile recovery\n * arrays may re-enroll an already-enrolled profile on retry; managed mode's\n * mandated single Shamir profile does not.)\n */\nexport async function createOwnerOnAdoptedPartition(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vaultName: string,\n  opts: CreateOwnerOptions,\n): Promise<CreateOwnerResult> {\n  const { userId, transferKey } = opts\n\n  // Managed mode requires a strong (Shamir) recovery profile, validated BEFORE\n  // any disk write — same gate as createNoydb.\n  if (isManaged(opts) && !opts.recovery.some((r) => r.profile === 'shamir')) {\n    throw new AdoptionStateError(\n      'managed-mode adoption requires at least one strong (shamir) recovery profile in '\n      + '`recovery` — paper alone is not strong when there is no user secret to fall back on.',\n    )\n  }\n\n  // 1. Verify adopted-unowned state.\n  const adoptionEnv = await store.get(vaultName, '_meta', 'adoption')\n  if (!adoptionEnv) {\n    throw new AdoptionStateError(\n      `vault \"${vaultName}\" is not an adopted partition (no _meta/adoption). `\n      + `createOwnerOnAdoptedPartition only applies to vaults created via adoptPartition.`,\n    )\n  }\n  const adoption = JSON.parse(adoptionEnv._data) as {\n    sealId: string; adoptedAt: string; needsOwner?: boolean\n    consumedAt?: string; transferSeal?: TransferSealPayload\n  }\n  if (adoption.consumedAt !== undefined || adoption.transferSeal === undefined) {\n    throw new AdoptionStateError(\n      `vault \"${vaultName}\" already has an owner (transfer seal consumed at ${adoption.consumedAt}).`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  // 2. Recover the partition DEKs from the seal (throws on wrong key) BEFORE\n  //    writing any keyring, so a bad transfer key leaves no trace. Always\n  //    validated, including when resuming a partial prior call.\n  const partitionDeks = await unsealDeks(adoption.transferSeal, transferKey)\n\n  // The ceremony below is split into stages so a failure in the fallible\n  // managed-enrollment step (network/provider outage) leaves the call RETRYABLE\n  // — the seal is destroyed only once everything durable is in place. Each stage\n  // detects its own prior completion rather than relying on a single resume bit.\n\n  // A keyring present for a DIFFERENT user (with the seal still unconsumed) is a\n  // genuine second-owner attempt — refuse it. A same-user keyring is a resumed\n  // partial call and is handled by the stage checks below.\n  const existingKeyring = await store.get(vaultName, '_keyring', userId)\n  const otherOwners = (await store.list(vaultName, '_keyring')).filter((u) => u !== userId)\n  if (otherOwners.length > 0) {\n    throw new AdoptionStateError(\n      `vault \"${vaultName}\" already has a keyring for a different owner; cannot create owner \"${userId}\".`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  // Stage A — mint the owner keyring + merge the partition DEKs. Considered done\n  // only when the keyring already holds every partition DEK. createOwnerKeyring\n  // overwrites (fresh KEK + fresh _users DEK), so re-running is safe ONLY while\n  // no recovery has been enrolled yet — guaranteed here because enrollment\n  // (Stage C) runs strictly after Stage A completes.\n  const partitionCollections = [...partitionDeks.keys()]\n  const priorDeks = existingKeyring ? (JSON.parse(existingKeyring._data) as KeyringFile).deks : {}\n  const ownerMinted = existingKeyring !== null && partitionCollections.every((c) => c in priorDeks)\n  if (!ownerMinted) {\n    // Resolve the owner secret. Managed mode mints a random secret, seals\n    // it under the provider, and persists _meta/sealed-secret (so the\n    // partition auto-unlocks on the recipient's device); standard mode uses the\n    // caller's secret. Idempotent under retry — resolveManagedSecret's reopen\n    // arm reuses an already-sealed secret.\n    const secret = isManaged(opts)\n      ? await resolveManagedSecret(store, vaultName, opts.sealingKey)\n      : opts.secret\n\n    // Mint the owner keyring (KEK + _users DEK + canary, written to disk).\n    const unlocked = await createOwnerKeyring(store, vaultName, { userId: userId, secret: secret })\n\n    // Merge the partition DEKs (wrapped under the new KEK) into the keyring.\n    const env = await store.get(vaultName, '_keyring', userId)\n    if (!env) throw new AdoptionStateError(`keyring write for \"${userId}\" did not persist`)\n    const keyringFile = JSON.parse(env._data) as KeyringFile\n    const kek = unlocked.kek\n    if (!kek) throw new AdoptionStateError(`owner keyring for \"${userId}\" has no KEK to wrap partition DEKs under`)\n    const mergedDeks: Record<string, string> = { ...keyringFile.deks }\n    for (const [collection, dek] of partitionDeks) {\n      mergedDeks[collection] = await wrapKey(dek, kek)\n    }\n    // #1115 — RESTAMP. The roster tag now covers the DEK key SET, and this merge\n    // is precisely a change to that set: adoption joins the partition's\n    // collections to a keyring `createOwnerKeyring` stamped moments earlier\n    // without them. Writing the merged file under the old tag would leave every\n    // adopted vault failing `roster-tag-mismatch` on its first open.\n    //\n    // The roster key is the one just minted for this NEW vault — unlike\n    // `liberateVault`, which joins an EXISTING vault and must keep the\n    // incumbent key so co-members can still verify each other.\n    const merged: KeyringFile = { ...keyringFile, deks: mergedDeks }\n    // #1097 — stamped BEFORE the tag is minted, so it lands inside the\n    // authenticated canonical and a store can neither edit nor strip it.\n    const withEpoch = { ...merged, roster_epoch: nextRosterEpoch(keyringFile.roster_epoch) }\n    const rosterKey = requireRosterKey(unlocked, 'adoptPartition')\n    const mergedFile: KeyringFile = { ...withEpoch, roster_tag: await mintRosterTag(withEpoch, rosterKey) }\n    await store.put(vaultName, '_keyring', userId, { ...env, _data: JSON.stringify(mergedFile) })\n  }\n\n  // Stage B — record the ownership transition on the carried\n  // audit chain (carryLedger sealed the _ledger DEK). No-op without that DEK.\n  // Idempotent: appended only if the closing `transfer-seal-consumed` entry is\n  // absent, so a retry does not duplicate the pair.\n  const ledgerDek = partitionDeks.get(LEDGER_COLLECTION)\n  if (ledgerDek) {\n    const ledger = new LedgerStore({\n      adapter: store,\n      vault: vaultName,\n      encrypted: true,\n      getDEK: async () => ledgerDek,\n      actor: userId,\n    })\n    const creationReason = `creation-of-new-owner:${userId}`\n    const consumedReason = `transfer-seal-consumed:${adoption.sealId}`\n    // Gate each append on its own presence — a crash or store error strictly\n    // between the two adjacent puts would otherwise re-append the first one\n    // on retry. The pair is the audit record, not a single transaction.\n    const recordedReasons = new Set((await ledger.loadAllEntries()).map((e) => e.reason))\n    if (!recordedReasons.has(creationReason)) {\n      await ledger.append({ op: 'lifecycle', collection: '', id: '', version: 0, actor: '', payloadHash: '', reason: creationReason })\n    }\n    if (!recordedReasons.has(consumedReason)) {\n      await ledger.append({ op: 'lifecycle', collection: '', id: '', version: 0, actor: '', payloadHash: '', reason: consumedReason })\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Stage C — Managed mode: enroll the mandatory strong recovery\n  //    by orchestrating the existing public ceremony. The partition is\n  //    now a managed-mode vault on disk (sealed secret + keyring), so we\n  //    open it as a normal client and let openVaultAndEnrollRecovery do the\n  //    gate-bypass + enroll + re-assert. Dynamic import keeps the Noydb class\n  //    out of the @noy-db/hub/cargo static graph. Runs BEFORE seal destruction\n  //    so a failure here leaves the seal intact and the call retryable.\n  if (isManaged(opts)) {\n    const { createNoydb } = await import('../kernel/noydb.js')\n    const db = await createNoydb({\n      store,\n      user: userId,\n      secretMode: 'managed',\n      sealingKey: opts.sealingKey,\n      shamirRecovery: opts.shamirRecovery,\n    })\n    await db.team.openVaultAndEnrollRecovery(vaultName, { recovery: opts.recovery })\n  }\n\n  // Stage D — Destroy the transfer seal LAST — the commit point. Everything\n  //    above is either idempotent or resumable, so the seal is only consumed\n  //    once the owner keyring (and, in managed mode, strong recovery) is\n  //    durably in place. Retain sealId + consumedAt for audit.\n  const consumed = { sealId: adoption.sealId, adoptedAt: adoption.adoptedAt, consumedAt: new Date().toISOString() }\n  await store.put(vaultName, '_meta', 'adoption', { ...adoptionEnv, _data: JSON.stringify(consumed) })\n\n  return { vaultName, userId }\n}\n","/**\n * Read-side counterpart to `extractPartition`: decrypt an\n * extracted-partition bundle's records to plaintext using its transfer\n * key, WITHOUT adopting it into a vault. Used by an outward\n * orchestration layer's reconcile/merge and field-authority flows to\n * compare incoming records against a receiver. 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Throws if the bundle isn't an\n * extracted-partition or the transfer key is wrong.\n */\nexport async function decryptExtractedPartition(\n  bundleBytes: Uint8Array,\n  transferKey: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Record<string, DecryptedRecord[]>> {\n  const header = readPodHeader(bundleBytes)\n  if (header.bundleKind !== 'extracted-partition' || header.transferSeal === undefined) {\n    throw new Error('decryptExtractedPartition: bundle is not an extracted-partition.')\n  }\n  const { dumpJson } = await readPod(bundleBytes)\n  const { dump, seal } = parseExtractedPartitionBody(dumpJson)\n  const deks = await unsealDeks(seal, transferKey) // throws TransferSealError on wrong key\n  const backup = JSON.parse(dump) as { collections: Record<string, Record<string, EncryptedEnvelope>> }\n  const out: Record<string, DecryptedRecord[]> = {}\n  for (const [collection, byId] of Object.entries(backup.collections)) {\n    const dek = deks.get(collection)\n    if (dek === undefined) continue // no DEK sealed for this collection — skip\n    const recs: DecryptedRecord[] = []\n    for (const [id, env] of Object.entries(byId)) {\n      const plaintext = await openEnvelopeJson({ collection, id }, env, dek)\n      const body = JSON.parse(plaintext) as Record<string, unknown>\n      recs.push({\n        id,\n        record: { ...body, id },\n        ts: env._ts,\n        version: env._v,\n        ...(env._source !== undefined ? { source: env._source } : {}),\n        ...(env._sourceTs !== undefined ? { sourceTs: env._sourceTs } : {}),\n      })\n    }\n    out[collection] = recs\n  }\n  return 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package/dist/{chunk-225O5CXQ.js → chunk-O3SNM66K.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   DerivationCapExceededError,
   DerivationOutputShapeError
-} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
+} from "./chunk-SW4TOSJL.js";
 
 // src/with-formula/derivations/executor.ts
 var DerivationExecutor = {
@@ -121,4 +121,4 @@ var DerivationExecutor = {
 export {
   DerivationExecutor
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-225O5CXQ.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-O3SNM66K.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-YCSM3GZU.js → chunk-OEJ4R52I.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   NonAdditiveSchemaChangeError,
   SchemaLockedError
-} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
+} from "./chunk-SW4TOSJL.js";
 
 // src/with-shape/schema-update/strategies.ts
 function blindUpdate() {
@@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ export {
   lockSchema,
   coordinatedCutover
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-YCSM3GZU.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-OEJ4R52I.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-IESNYJXZ.js → chunk-OKCQNMO6.js}

@@ -7,21 +7,21 @@ import {
   hashEntry,
   paddedIndex,
   sha256Hex
-} from "./chunk-RC4BROYR.js";
+} from "./chunk-JRWLUWDM.js";
 import {
   buildRecordAad,
   openEnvelopeJson
-} from "./chunk-2LPVI4PX.js";
+} from "./chunk-DOPZWTMJ.js";
 import {
   buildRecordEnvelope
-} from "./chunk-N4CNVSUF.js";
+} from "./chunk-4RUFYGWG.js";
 import {
   encrypt
-} from "./chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
+} from "./chunk-USKHHOIV.js";
 import {
   LedgerContentionError,
   isConflictError
-} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
+} from "./chunk-SW4TOSJL.js";
 
 // src/with-commit/history/ledger/patch.ts
 function computePatch(prev, next) {
@@ -699,4 +699,4 @@ export {
   applyPatch,
   LedgerStore
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IESNYJXZ.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-OKCQNMO6.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-H36KSN6X.js → chunk-OLUTCM23.js}

@@ -7,27 +7,27 @@ import {
   PERIOD_FREEZES_COLLECTION,
   PERIOD_TARGET_PURGES_COLLECTION,
   periodExclusiveUpperBound
-} from "./chunk-Z7ZXZL6Y.js";
+} from "./chunk-Q2ZN5DWZ.js";
 import {
   envelopeBodySize
-} from "./chunk-2LPVI4PX.js";
+} from "./chunk-DOPZWTMJ.js";
 import {
   buildRecordEnvelope,
   isDeleteMarker,
   isTombstoneShape
-} from "./chunk-N4CNVSUF.js";
+} from "./chunk-4RUFYGWG.js";
 import {
   decrypt,
   derivePresenceKey,
   encrypt
-} from "./chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
+} from "./chunk-USKHHOIV.js";
 import {
   NOYDB_SYNC_VERSION
-} from "./chunk-RK7N4OQ5.js";
+} from "./chunk-N4CHCXDL.js";
 import {
   ValidationError,
   isConflictError
-} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
+} from "./chunk-SW4TOSJL.js";
 
 // src/with-sync/presence.ts
 var subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle;
@@ -1213,4 +1213,4 @@ export {
   SyncEngine,
   SyncTransaction
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-H36KSN6X.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-OLUTCM23.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-RDHUZ674.js → chunk-OQDHIAR2.js}

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 import {
   ViaGraph
-} from "./chunk-5263OEM3.js";
+} from "./chunk-XJP66QEN.js";
 import {
   sha256Hex
-} from "./chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
+} from "./chunk-USKHHOIV.js";
 import {
   DerivationCycleError,
   DuplicateBehaviorNameError
-} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
+} from "./chunk-SW4TOSJL.js";
 
 // src/with-formula/derivations/strategy-hash.ts
 async function computeStrategyHash(source, outputKeys, derive, sources) {
@@ -172,4 +172,4 @@ var DerivationRegistry = class {
 export {
   DerivationRegistry
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-RDHUZ674.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-OQDHIAR2.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-KN4W2OQ4.js → chunk-OXZSMX2H.js}

@@ -1,24 +1,25 @@
 import {
   freezeSnapshotOnly
-} from "./chunk-H7HP56F6.js";
+} from "./chunk-5EC7X5QA.js";
 import {
   resolveManagedSecret
-} from "./chunk-Z2WK53N6.js";
+} from "./chunk-JUBWUJY5.js";
 import {
   assertRosterTagValid,
   createOwnerKeyring,
   mintRosterTag,
+  nextRosterEpoch,
   requireRosterKey
-} from "./chunk-5W7YXFV5.js";
+} from "./chunk-XJTGBHK6.js";
 import {
   buildRecordEnvelope
-} from "./chunk-N4CNVSUF.js";
+} from "./chunk-4RUFYGWG.js";
 import {
   wrapKey
-} from "./chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
+} from "./chunk-USKHHOIV.js";
 import {
   PermissionDeniedError
-} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
+} from "./chunk-SW4TOSJL.js";
 
 // src/with-party/team/deed.ts
 var DEED_RECORD_ID = "deed";
@@ -107,7 +108,8 @@ async function liberateVault(vault, opts) {
   }
   const rosterKey = requireRosterKey(keyring, "liberateVault");
   const merged = { ...keyringFile, deks: mergedDeks };
-  const mergedFile = { ...merged, roster_tag: await mintRosterTag(merged, rosterKey) };
+  const withEpoch = { ...merged, roster_epoch: nextRosterEpoch(keyringFile.roster_epoch) };
+  const mergedFile = { ...withEpoch, roster_tag: await mintRosterTag(withEpoch, rosterKey) };
   await adapter.put(vaultName, "_keyring", opts.newOwnerId, { ...env, _data: JSON.stringify(mergedFile) });
   await vault._getLedgerOrNull()?.append({
     op: "lifecycle",
@@ -135,4 +137,4 @@ export {
   isDeedVault,
   liberateVault
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-KN4W2OQ4.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-OXZSMX2H.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-KN4W2OQ4.js.map → chunk-OXZSMX2H.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-party/team/deed.ts","../src/with-party/custody/liberate.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * FR-6 — Deed: sealed / hidden-owner provisioning.\n *\n * A **Deed** is a vault owned by a *latent* principal who never\n * authenticates. The owner credential (the random secret that\n * derives `KEK_owner`) is minted machine-side and sealed under a\n * **non-firm** {@link NoydbSealer} — that sealing boundary is\n * the cryptographic *inalienability anchor*: whoever holds the\n * provider (the client / their KMS) is the only party that can ever\n * re-derive `KEK_owner`. A firm-side custodian operates the vault\n * fully but can never reach the owner key — there is deliberately NO\n * firm-controlled fallback.\n *\n * Provisioning reuses the managed-mode seam:\n *   - {@link resolveManagedSecret} mints + seals + persists the random\n *     secret at `_meta/sealed-secret` (and unseals it on every\n *     subsequent open through the same provider).\n *   - {@link createOwnerKeyring} derives `KEK_owner` from that\n *     secret and writes the `_keyring/<ownerUserId>` file.\n *\n * On top of that, a Deed writes a `_meta/deed` **marker**. The marker\n * is PLAINTEXT metadata — it records WHO the latent owner is and WHICH\n * sealing boundary protects them, so it must be readable without\n * unlocking the vault (a custodian or auditor inspecting the vault must\n * be able to see \"this is a Deed vault, owner = X, sealed under Y\"\n * without any key). The marker itself is therefore never sealed; only\n * the owner *credential* is.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { buildRecordEnvelope } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring } from './keyring.js'\nimport { createOwnerKeyring } from './keyring.js'\nimport type { NoydbSealer } from './managed-secret.js'\nimport { resolveManagedSecret } from './managed-secret.js'\n\n/** Reserved id for the Deed marker under `_meta`. */\nexport const DEED_RECORD_ID = 'deed' as const\n\n/**\n * Plaintext metadata recording a vault's latent-owner Deed. Persisted\n * at `_meta/deed`. Readable without unlocking the vault by design — it\n * carries no secret material, only the identity of the latent owner\n * and the sealing boundary that anchors inalienability.\n */\nexport interface DeedMarker {\n  /** The latent owner principal — the user id of the `_keyring/<id>` owner file. */\n  readonly ownerUserId: string\n  /**\n   * The `NoydbSealer.id` the owner credential is sealed under.\n   * The inalienability anchor: only the holder of this (non-firm)\n   * provider can re-derive `KEK_owner`. Audit metadata — never secret.\n   */\n  readonly sealedUnder: string\n  /** Always `true` for a Deed — the owner never authenticates interactively. */\n  readonly latent: true\n  /** ISO-8601 timestamp the Deed was issued. */\n  readonly issuedAt: string\n  /**\n   * ISO-8601 timestamp the vault was liberated (a new owner claimed it\n   * via the audited Liberate ceremony), if any. Absent until liberation.\n   */\n  readonly liberatedAt?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Wire-format payload stored inside the `_meta/deed` envelope. Carries\n * a magic marker for forensics + the {@link DeedMarker} fields. JSON,\n * AES-GCM bypassed (the marker is plaintext metadata by design).\n */\ninterface DeedEnvelopePayload extends DeedMarker {\n  readonly _noydb_deed: 1\n}\n\n/**\n * Provision a Deed: a latent owner whose credential is sealed under\n * `sealing` (a NON-firm provider). Mints + seals the owner secret\n * via {@link resolveManagedSecret}, derives the owner keyring via\n * {@link createOwnerKeyring}, then writes the plaintext `_meta/deed`\n * marker. Returns the unlocked owner keyring.\n *\n * The returned keyring is the only in-memory window onto `KEK_owner`\n * for this call; the persistent re-entry point is the sealing provider\n * (re-run {@link resolveManagedSecret} with the same provider to\n * re-resolve the secret, then {@link createOwnerKeyring}/load to\n * unlock — no interactive secret is ever required).\n *\n * There is deliberately no firm-controlled fallback: the marker's\n * `sealedUnder` is the single cryptographic anchor of ownership.\n */\nexport async function createDeedOwner(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  ownerUserId: string,\n  sealing: NoydbSealer,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  // 1. Mint + seal + persist the random owner secret under the\n  //    non-firm provider (writes _meta/sealed-secret).\n  const secret = await resolveManagedSecret(store, vault, sealing)\n\n  // 2. Derive KEK_owner from the (never-human-seen) secret and\n  //    write the owner keyring file.\n  const keyring = await createOwnerKeyring(store, vault, { userId: ownerUserId, secret: secret })\n\n  // 3. Write the plaintext Deed marker. NOT sealed — it is audit\n  //    metadata that must be readable without unlocking.\n  await saveDeedMarker(store, vault, {\n    ownerUserId,\n    sealedUnder: sealing.id,\n    latent: true,\n    issuedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n  })\n\n  return keyring\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the {@link DeedMarker} from `_meta/deed`, or `null` if the vault\n * has no Deed marker (i.e. it is not a Deed vault). Plaintext read — no\n * unlocking required.\n */\nexport async function loadDeedMarker(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<DeedMarker | null> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, '_meta', DEED_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!envelope) return null\n  let payload: unknown\n  try {\n    payload = JSON.parse(envelope._data)\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n  if (typeof payload !== 'object' || payload === null) return null\n  const r = payload as Record<string, unknown>\n  if (r._noydb_deed !== 1) return null\n  if (\n    typeof r.ownerUserId !== 'string'\n    || typeof r.sealedUnder !== 'string'\n    || r.latent !== true\n    || typeof r.issuedAt !== 'string'\n  ) {\n    return null\n  }\n  const marker: DeedMarker = {\n    ownerUserId: r.ownerUserId,\n    sealedUnder: r.sealedUnder,\n    latent: true,\n    issuedAt: r.issuedAt,\n    ...(typeof r.liberatedAt === 'string' ? { liberatedAt: r.liberatedAt } : {}),\n  }\n  return marker\n}\n\n/** Whether `vault` carries a Deed marker (a sealed/latent owner). */\nexport async function isDeedVault(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  return (await loadDeedMarker(store, vault)) !== null\n}\n\n/**\n * Persist a {@link DeedMarker} at `_meta/deed`. Mirrors\n * `saveSealedSecret`'s envelope shape: a standard\n * {@link EncryptedEnvelope} with AES-GCM bypassed (`_iv: ''`), the\n * payload stored as plaintext JSON in `_data`. The marker is metadata,\n * not a secret — sealing it would defeat its purpose (auditors /\n * custodians must read it without a key).\n *\n * @internal — used by `createDeedOwner` and (later) the Liberate\n * ceremony to stamp `liberatedAt`.\n */\nexport async function saveDeedMarker(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  marker: DeedMarker,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const persisted: DeedEnvelopePayload = { _noydb_deed: 1, ...marker }\n  const prior = await store.get(vault, '_meta', DEED_RECORD_ID)\n  const env = buildRecordEnvelope(\n    { collection: '_meta', id: DEED_RECORD_ID, version: (prior?._v ?? 0) + 1 },\n    // AES-GCM bypassed — the marker is plaintext audit metadata.\n    { iv: '', data: JSON.stringify(persisted) },\n  )\n  await store.put(vault, '_meta', DEED_RECORD_ID, env)\n}\n","/**\n * `liberateVault` — the audited claim of ownership over a\n * sealed-owner (Deed) vault. The inverse of withdrawal.\n *\n * A **Deed** vault's owner credential is sealed under a non-firm provider, so\n * the firm-side **custodian** (which holds every collection DEK and operates\n * the vault fully) can never reach `KEK_owner`. Liberation is the ONLY route\n * by which a custodian assumes ownership, and it is deliberately a manual,\n * audited ceremony:\n *\n *   1. gate `'liberate-vault'` (fail-closed)\n *   2. caller MUST be the `custodian` (the de-facto authority holding the DEKs)\n *   3. freeze a PRE-liberation EVIDENCE snapshot (hash-pinned in the ledger) —\n *      but PRESERVE the live data for the new owner (see the freeze decision\n *      below)\n *   4. mint a NEW owner keyring re-wrapping the incumbent DEKs under the new\n *      owner's KEK\n *   5. lifecycle ledger `liberation-claimed:<newOwnerId>:<legalBasis>`\n *   6. stamp the `_meta/deed` marker with `liberatedAt`\n *\n * ## Security: the inalienability floor\n *\n * Liberation **mints a new owner from the custodian's DEKs** — it does NOT\n * unseal the original sealed owner. The old sealed-owner credential is left\n * untouched and ORPHANED (its `_keyring/<id>` file remains, its KEK is still\n * sealed under the non-firm provider), never impersonated. The new owner is a\n * DISTINCT principal under a fresh KEK derived from `newOwnerSecret`. This\n * preserves the inalienability floor: the act of claiming ownership is itself\n * auditable and produces a different principal, rather than silently assuming\n * the latent owner's identity.\n *\n * ## Freeze decision: snapshot-only, not freeze-and-delete\n *\n * `freezeAndDeleteClosure` (withdraw-accessible.ts) writes a hash-pinned\n * snapshot and THEN delete-closures the live records — correct for a\n * destructive withdrawal, WRONG for liberation. Liberation transfers\n * operational continuity; it must leave the live data intact for the new\n * owner. We therefore call the snapshot-only core `freezeSnapshotOnly`\n * (factored out of that module; the freeze-AND-delete withdrawal path is\n * unchanged) to pin the evidence snapshot while preserving the records.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { Vault } from '../../kernel/vault.js'\nimport type { FactorProofBundle, KeyringFile } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { PermissionDeniedError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { wrapKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { createOwnerKeyring, requireRosterKey } from '../team/keyring.js'\nimport { mintRosterTag, assertRosterTagValid } from '../team/roster-tag.js'\nimport type { FrozenSnapshotRef } from '../../with-audit/portability/withdraw-accessible.js'\nimport { freezeSnapshotOnly } from '../../with-audit/portability/withdraw-accessible.js'\nimport { loadDeedMarker, saveDeedMarker } from '../team/deed.js'\n\nexport interface LiberateOptions {\n  /** The id of the new owner principal the custodian mints by claiming ownership. */\n  readonly newOwnerId: string\n  /** The secret that derives the new owner's KEK (the DEKs are re-wrapped under it). */\n  readonly newOwnerSecret: string\n  /** Legal/contractual basis recorded in the audit (e.g. 'contractual-handover'). */\n  readonly legalBasis: string\n  readonly factors?: FactorProofBundle\n}\n\nexport interface LiberateResult {\n  /** The hash-pinned pre-liberation evidence snapshot. */\n  readonly snapshot: FrozenSnapshotRef\n}\n\n/**\n * Audited claim of ownership over a sealed-owner vault by its custodian. See\n * the module doc for the full ceremony + security rationale.\n */\nexport async function liberateVault(\n  vault: Vault,\n  opts: LiberateOptions,\n): Promise<LiberateResult> {\n  // 1. gate — fail-closed `liberate-vault`.\n  await vault.noydb.checkGate(vault.name, 'liberate-vault', opts.factors)\n\n  // 2. caller must be the custodian (the de-facto authority holding the DEKs).\n  const { name: vaultName, adapter, keyring } = vault._introspectState()\n  if (keyring.role !== 'custodian') {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      'liberation is claimed only by the custodian (the de-facto authority holding the DEKs)',\n    )\n  }\n\n  // Refuse to clobber an existing principal: the new owner must be a FRESH id.\n  // (Checked before any side effect so a colliding id never leaves a half-run\n  //  ceremony — no orphan snapshot, no partial keyring overwrite.)\n  const existing = await adapter.get(vaultName, '_keyring', opts.newOwnerId)\n  if (existing) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `liberateVault: newOwnerId \"${opts.newOwnerId}\" already exists as a principal; choose a fresh id (liberation mints a distinct owner, it never overwrites an existing keyring)`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  // 3. Pre-liberation EVIDENCE snapshot of every operational collection —\n  //    snapshot-only (live data preserved for the new owner; liberation\n  //    transfers operational continuity, it does not erase).\n  const collections = await listOperationalCollections(vault)\n  const snapshot = await freezeSnapshotOnly(vault, collections, { actorUserId: keyring.userId })\n\n  // 4. Mint a NEW owner keyring, re-wrapping the incumbent DEKs under the new\n  //    owner's fresh KEK. The old sealed owner is NOT unsealed — a DISTINCT\n  //    principal is minted and the original owner credential is left orphaned\n  //    (inalienability floor). Mirrors adopt-partition.ts's DEK re-wrap.\n  const newOwner = await createOwnerKeyring(adapter, vaultName, { userId: opts.newOwnerId, secret: opts.newOwnerSecret })\n  if (!newOwner.kek) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `new owner keyring for \"${opts.newOwnerId}\" has no KEK to re-wrap the incumbent DEKs under`,\n    )\n  }\n  const env = await adapter.get(vaultName, '_keyring', opts.newOwnerId)\n  if (!env) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(`new owner keyring for \"${opts.newOwnerId}\" did not persist`)\n  }\n  const keyringFile = JSON.parse(env._data) as KeyringFile\n  // #1096 — this is a read-BACK of the file `createOwnerKeyring` just wrote, and\n  // it is about to be edited and restamped, so the store gets a window to alter\n  // it in between. Verified against the NEW owner's own roster key, not the\n  // incumbent's: at this instant the file is still stamped under the fresh key\n  // minted above (the swap to the incumbent key happens below).\n  const mintedRosterKey = requireRosterKey(newOwner, 'liberateVault')\n  await assertRosterTagValid(keyringFile, mintedRosterKey, opts.newOwnerId)\n  const mergedDeks: Record<string, string> = { ...keyringFile.deks }\n  for (const [collection, dek] of keyring.deks) {\n    mergedDeks[collection] = await wrapKey(dek, newOwner.kek)\n  }\n  // #1096 — liberation joins a new owner to an EXISTING vault, so the vault's\n  // roster key must stay the incumbent one. `createOwnerKeyring` above minted a\n  // fresh roster key (correct for a new vault, wrong here), and the merge loop\n  // has just overwritten `_roster` with the incumbent's — so the tag it stamped\n  // no longer matches the key in the file. Restamp under the key that actually\n  // ends up persisted, or the new owner cannot open the vault they just claimed.\n  //\n  // Keeping the incumbent key is the substantive half: a fresh one would leave\n  // the new owner unable to verify any co-member's roster, and every co-member\n  // unable to verify theirs.\n  const rosterKey = requireRosterKey(keyring, 'liberateVault')\n  const merged: KeyringFile = { ...keyringFile, deks: mergedDeks }\n  const mergedFile: KeyringFile = { ...merged, roster_tag: await mintRosterTag(merged, rosterKey) }\n  await adapter.put(vaultName, '_keyring', opts.newOwnerId, { ...env, _data: JSON.stringify(mergedFile) })\n\n  // 5. Lifecycle ledger audit (no-op if the history strategy is absent).\n  await vault._getLedgerOrNull()?.append({\n    op: 'lifecycle', collection: '', id: '', version: 0, actor: opts.newOwnerId, payloadHash: '',\n    reason: `liberation-claimed:${opts.newOwnerId}:${opts.legalBasis}`,\n  })\n\n  // 6. 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-party/team/deed.ts","../src/with-party/custody/liberate.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * FR-6 — Deed: sealed / hidden-owner provisioning.\n *\n * A **Deed** is a vault owned by a *latent* principal who never\n * authenticates. The owner credential (the random secret that\n * derives `KEK_owner`) is minted machine-side and sealed under a\n * **non-firm** {@link NoydbSealer} — that sealing boundary is\n * the cryptographic *inalienability anchor*: whoever holds the\n * provider (the client / their KMS) is the only party that can ever\n * re-derive `KEK_owner`. A firm-side custodian operates the vault\n * fully but can never reach the owner key — there is deliberately NO\n * firm-controlled fallback.\n *\n * Provisioning reuses the managed-mode seam:\n *   - {@link resolveManagedSecret} mints + seals + persists the random\n *     secret at `_meta/sealed-secret` (and unseals it on every\n *     subsequent open through the same provider).\n *   - {@link createOwnerKeyring} derives `KEK_owner` from that\n *     secret and writes the `_keyring/<ownerUserId>` file.\n *\n * On top of that, a Deed writes a `_meta/deed` **marker**. The marker\n * is PLAINTEXT metadata — it records WHO the latent owner is and WHICH\n * sealing boundary protects them, so it must be readable without\n * unlocking the vault (a custodian or auditor inspecting the vault must\n * be able to see \"this is a Deed vault, owner = X, sealed under Y\"\n * without any key). The marker itself is therefore never sealed; only\n * the owner *credential* is.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { buildRecordEnvelope } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring } from './keyring.js'\nimport { createOwnerKeyring } from './keyring.js'\nimport type { NoydbSealer } from './managed-secret.js'\nimport { resolveManagedSecret } from './managed-secret.js'\n\n/** Reserved id for the Deed marker under `_meta`. */\nexport const DEED_RECORD_ID = 'deed' as const\n\n/**\n * Plaintext metadata recording a vault's latent-owner Deed. Persisted\n * at `_meta/deed`. Readable without unlocking the vault by design — it\n * carries no secret material, only the identity of the latent owner\n * and the sealing boundary that anchors inalienability.\n */\nexport interface DeedMarker {\n  /** The latent owner principal — the user id of the `_keyring/<id>` owner file. */\n  readonly ownerUserId: string\n  /**\n   * The `NoydbSealer.id` the owner credential is sealed under.\n   * The inalienability anchor: only the holder of this (non-firm)\n   * provider can re-derive `KEK_owner`. Audit metadata — never secret.\n   */\n  readonly sealedUnder: string\n  /** Always `true` for a Deed — the owner never authenticates interactively. */\n  readonly latent: true\n  /** ISO-8601 timestamp the Deed was issued. */\n  readonly issuedAt: string\n  /**\n   * ISO-8601 timestamp the vault was liberated (a new owner claimed it\n   * via the audited Liberate ceremony), if any. Absent until liberation.\n   */\n  readonly liberatedAt?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Wire-format payload stored inside the `_meta/deed` envelope. Carries\n * a magic marker for forensics + the {@link DeedMarker} fields. JSON,\n * AES-GCM bypassed (the marker is plaintext metadata by design).\n */\ninterface DeedEnvelopePayload extends DeedMarker {\n  readonly _noydb_deed: 1\n}\n\n/**\n * Provision a Deed: a latent owner whose credential is sealed under\n * `sealing` (a NON-firm provider). Mints + seals the owner secret\n * via {@link resolveManagedSecret}, derives the owner keyring via\n * {@link createOwnerKeyring}, then writes the plaintext `_meta/deed`\n * marker. Returns the unlocked owner keyring.\n *\n * The returned keyring is the only in-memory window onto `KEK_owner`\n * for this call; the persistent re-entry point is the sealing provider\n * (re-run {@link resolveManagedSecret} with the same provider to\n * re-resolve the secret, then {@link createOwnerKeyring}/load to\n * unlock — no interactive secret is ever required).\n *\n * There is deliberately no firm-controlled fallback: the marker's\n * `sealedUnder` is the single cryptographic anchor of ownership.\n */\nexport async function createDeedOwner(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  ownerUserId: string,\n  sealing: NoydbSealer,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  // 1. Mint + seal + persist the random owner secret under the\n  //    non-firm provider (writes _meta/sealed-secret).\n  const secret = await resolveManagedSecret(store, vault, sealing)\n\n  // 2. Derive KEK_owner from the (never-human-seen) secret and\n  //    write the owner keyring file.\n  const keyring = await createOwnerKeyring(store, vault, { userId: ownerUserId, secret: secret })\n\n  // 3. Write the plaintext Deed marker. NOT sealed — it is audit\n  //    metadata that must be readable without unlocking.\n  await saveDeedMarker(store, vault, {\n    ownerUserId,\n    sealedUnder: sealing.id,\n    latent: true,\n    issuedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n  })\n\n  return keyring\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the {@link DeedMarker} from `_meta/deed`, or `null` if the vault\n * has no Deed marker (i.e. it is not a Deed vault). Plaintext read — no\n * unlocking required.\n */\nexport async function loadDeedMarker(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<DeedMarker | null> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, '_meta', DEED_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!envelope) return null\n  let payload: unknown\n  try {\n    payload = JSON.parse(envelope._data)\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n  if (typeof payload !== 'object' || payload === null) return null\n  const r = payload as Record<string, unknown>\n  if (r._noydb_deed !== 1) return null\n  if (\n    typeof r.ownerUserId !== 'string'\n    || typeof r.sealedUnder !== 'string'\n    || r.latent !== true\n    || typeof r.issuedAt !== 'string'\n  ) {\n    return null\n  }\n  const marker: DeedMarker = {\n    ownerUserId: r.ownerUserId,\n    sealedUnder: r.sealedUnder,\n    latent: true,\n    issuedAt: r.issuedAt,\n    ...(typeof r.liberatedAt === 'string' ? { liberatedAt: r.liberatedAt } : {}),\n  }\n  return marker\n}\n\n/** Whether `vault` carries a Deed marker (a sealed/latent owner). */\nexport async function isDeedVault(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  return (await loadDeedMarker(store, vault)) !== null\n}\n\n/**\n * Persist a {@link DeedMarker} at `_meta/deed`. Mirrors\n * `saveSealedSecret`'s envelope shape: a standard\n * {@link EncryptedEnvelope} with AES-GCM bypassed (`_iv: ''`), the\n * payload stored as plaintext JSON in `_data`. The marker is metadata,\n * not a secret — sealing it would defeat its purpose (auditors /\n * custodians must read it without a key).\n *\n * @internal — used by `createDeedOwner` and (later) the Liberate\n * ceremony to stamp `liberatedAt`.\n */\nexport async function saveDeedMarker(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  marker: DeedMarker,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const persisted: DeedEnvelopePayload = { _noydb_deed: 1, ...marker }\n  const prior = await store.get(vault, '_meta', DEED_RECORD_ID)\n  const env = buildRecordEnvelope(\n    { collection: '_meta', id: DEED_RECORD_ID, version: (prior?._v ?? 0) + 1 },\n    // AES-GCM bypassed — the marker is plaintext audit metadata.\n    { iv: '', data: JSON.stringify(persisted) },\n  )\n  await store.put(vault, '_meta', DEED_RECORD_ID, env)\n}\n","/**\n * `liberateVault` — the audited claim of ownership over a\n * sealed-owner (Deed) vault. The inverse of withdrawal.\n *\n * A **Deed** vault's owner credential is sealed under a non-firm provider, so\n * the firm-side **custodian** (which holds every collection DEK and operates\n * the vault fully) can never reach `KEK_owner`. Liberation is the ONLY route\n * by which a custodian assumes ownership, and it is deliberately a manual,\n * audited ceremony:\n *\n *   1. gate `'liberate-vault'` (fail-closed)\n *   2. caller MUST be the `custodian` (the de-facto authority holding the DEKs)\n *   3. freeze a PRE-liberation EVIDENCE snapshot (hash-pinned in the ledger) —\n *      but PRESERVE the live data for the new owner (see the freeze decision\n *      below)\n *   4. mint a NEW owner keyring re-wrapping the incumbent DEKs under the new\n *      owner's KEK\n *   5. lifecycle ledger `liberation-claimed:<newOwnerId>:<legalBasis>`\n *   6. stamp the `_meta/deed` marker with `liberatedAt`\n *\n * ## Security: the inalienability floor\n *\n * Liberation **mints a new owner from the custodian's DEKs** — it does NOT\n * unseal the original sealed owner. The old sealed-owner credential is left\n * untouched and ORPHANED (its `_keyring/<id>` file remains, its KEK is still\n * sealed under the non-firm provider), never impersonated. The new owner is a\n * DISTINCT principal under a fresh KEK derived from `newOwnerSecret`. This\n * preserves the inalienability floor: the act of claiming ownership is itself\n * auditable and produces a different principal, rather than silently assuming\n * the latent owner's identity.\n *\n * ## Freeze decision: snapshot-only, not freeze-and-delete\n *\n * `freezeAndDeleteClosure` (withdraw-accessible.ts) writes a hash-pinned\n * snapshot and THEN delete-closures the live records — correct for a\n * destructive withdrawal, WRONG for liberation. Liberation transfers\n * operational continuity; it must leave the live data intact for the new\n * owner. We therefore call the snapshot-only core `freezeSnapshotOnly`\n * (factored out of that module; the freeze-AND-delete withdrawal path is\n * unchanged) to pin the evidence snapshot while preserving the records.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { Vault } from '../../kernel/vault.js'\nimport type { FactorProofBundle, KeyringFile } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { PermissionDeniedError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { wrapKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { createOwnerKeyring, requireRosterKey } from '../team/keyring.js'\nimport { mintRosterTag, assertRosterTagValid } from '../team/roster-tag.js'\nimport { nextRosterEpoch } from '../team/roster-epoch.js'\nimport type { FrozenSnapshotRef } from '../../with-audit/portability/withdraw-accessible.js'\nimport { freezeSnapshotOnly } from '../../with-audit/portability/withdraw-accessible.js'\nimport { loadDeedMarker, saveDeedMarker } from '../team/deed.js'\n\nexport interface LiberateOptions {\n  /** The id of the new owner principal the custodian mints by claiming ownership. */\n  readonly newOwnerId: string\n  /** The secret that derives the new owner's KEK (the DEKs are re-wrapped under it). */\n  readonly newOwnerSecret: string\n  /** Legal/contractual basis recorded in the audit (e.g. 'contractual-handover'). */\n  readonly legalBasis: string\n  readonly factors?: FactorProofBundle\n}\n\nexport interface LiberateResult {\n  /** The hash-pinned pre-liberation evidence snapshot. */\n  readonly snapshot: FrozenSnapshotRef\n}\n\n/**\n * Audited claim of ownership over a sealed-owner vault by its custodian. See\n * the module doc for the full ceremony + security rationale.\n */\nexport async function liberateVault(\n  vault: Vault,\n  opts: LiberateOptions,\n): Promise<LiberateResult> {\n  // 1. gate — fail-closed `liberate-vault`.\n  await vault.noydb.checkGate(vault.name, 'liberate-vault', opts.factors)\n\n  // 2. caller must be the custodian (the de-facto authority holding the DEKs).\n  const { name: vaultName, adapter, keyring } = vault._introspectState()\n  if (keyring.role !== 'custodian') {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      'liberation is claimed only by the custodian (the de-facto authority holding the DEKs)',\n    )\n  }\n\n  // Refuse to clobber an existing principal: the new owner must be a FRESH id.\n  // (Checked before any side effect so a colliding id never leaves a half-run\n  //  ceremony — no orphan snapshot, no partial keyring overwrite.)\n  const existing = await adapter.get(vaultName, '_keyring', opts.newOwnerId)\n  if (existing) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `liberateVault: newOwnerId \"${opts.newOwnerId}\" already exists as a principal; choose a fresh id (liberation mints a distinct owner, it never overwrites an existing keyring)`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  // 3. Pre-liberation EVIDENCE snapshot of every operational collection —\n  //    snapshot-only (live data preserved for the new owner; liberation\n  //    transfers operational continuity, it does not erase).\n  const collections = await listOperationalCollections(vault)\n  const snapshot = await freezeSnapshotOnly(vault, collections, { actorUserId: keyring.userId })\n\n  // 4. Mint a NEW owner keyring, re-wrapping the incumbent DEKs under the new\n  //    owner's fresh KEK. The old sealed owner is NOT unsealed — a DISTINCT\n  //    principal is minted and the original owner credential is left orphaned\n  //    (inalienability floor). Mirrors adopt-partition.ts's DEK re-wrap.\n  const newOwner = await createOwnerKeyring(adapter, vaultName, { userId: opts.newOwnerId, secret: opts.newOwnerSecret })\n  if (!newOwner.kek) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `new owner keyring for \"${opts.newOwnerId}\" has no KEK to re-wrap the incumbent DEKs under`,\n    )\n  }\n  const env = await adapter.get(vaultName, '_keyring', opts.newOwnerId)\n  if (!env) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(`new owner keyring for \"${opts.newOwnerId}\" did not persist`)\n  }\n  const keyringFile = JSON.parse(env._data) as KeyringFile\n  // #1096 — this is a read-BACK of the file `createOwnerKeyring` just wrote, and\n  // it is about to be edited and restamped, so the store gets a window to alter\n  // it in between. Verified against the NEW owner's own roster key, not the\n  // incumbent's: at this instant the file is still stamped under the fresh key\n  // minted above (the swap to the incumbent key happens below).\n  const mintedRosterKey = requireRosterKey(newOwner, 'liberateVault')\n  await assertRosterTagValid(keyringFile, mintedRosterKey, opts.newOwnerId)\n  const mergedDeks: Record<string, string> = { ...keyringFile.deks }\n  for (const [collection, dek] of keyring.deks) {\n    mergedDeks[collection] = await wrapKey(dek, newOwner.kek)\n  }\n  // #1096 — liberation joins a new owner to an EXISTING vault, so the vault's\n  // roster key must stay the incumbent one. `createOwnerKeyring` above minted a\n  // fresh roster key (correct for a new vault, wrong here), and the merge loop\n  // has just overwritten `_roster` with the incumbent's — so the tag it stamped\n  // no longer matches the key in the file. Restamp under the key that actually\n  // ends up persisted, or the new owner cannot open the vault they just claimed.\n  //\n  // Keeping the incumbent key is the substantive half: a fresh one would leave\n  // the new owner unable to verify any co-member's roster, and every co-member\n  // unable to verify theirs.\n  const rosterKey = requireRosterKey(keyring, 'liberateVault')\n  const merged: KeyringFile = { ...keyringFile, deks: mergedDeks }\n  // #1097 — stamped BEFORE the tag is minted, so it lands inside the\n  // authenticated canonical and a store can neither edit nor strip it.\n  const withEpoch = { ...merged, roster_epoch: nextRosterEpoch(keyringFile.roster_epoch) }\n  const mergedFile: KeyringFile = { ...withEpoch, roster_tag: await mintRosterTag(withEpoch, rosterKey) }\n  await adapter.put(vaultName, '_keyring', opts.newOwnerId, { ...env, _data: JSON.stringify(mergedFile) })\n\n  // 5. 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package/dist/{chunk-DKWPJOYH.js → chunk-P22XPNFW.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   writePod
-} from "./chunk-6FOGTKBY.js";
+} from "./chunk-RCONOOVF.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/portability/export-accessible.ts
 function resolveAccessibleCollections(keyring, scope, writableOnly = false) {
@@ -42,4 +42,4 @@ export {
   buildAccessibleBundle,
   exportAccessibleData
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-DKWPJOYH.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-P22XPNFW.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-GK4DRVUD.js → chunk-P2RJAVMR.js}

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 import {
   installViaBinder
-} from "./chunk-XDVVBETV.js";
+} from "./chunk-YHIAWECL.js";
 import {
   SealedHandle
-} from "./chunk-RK7N4OQ5.js";
+} from "./chunk-N4CHCXDL.js";
 import {
   ClassifiedConfigError,
   ClassifiedNotEnabledError
-} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
+} from "./chunk-SW4TOSJL.js";
 
 // src/via/classified/descriptor.ts
 function isClassifiedFieldSpec(x) {
@@ -262,4 +262,4 @@ export {
   enforceClassifiedWrite,
   NO_CLASSIFIED
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-GK4DRVUD.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-P2RJAVMR.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-UCUALOSM.js → chunk-P7KJME6C.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   SealedRecordNotEnabledError
-} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
+} from "./chunk-SW4TOSJL.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/sealed-record/strategy.ts
 var NO_SEALED_RECORD = {
@@ -18,4 +18,4 @@ var NO_SEALED_RECORD = {
 export {
   NO_SEALED_RECORD
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-UCUALOSM.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-P7KJME6C.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-HM4JSXX2.js → chunk-PCIBCL26.js}

@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@ import {
 } from "./chunk-KHKKD62N.js";
 import {
   derivePersistedSchema
-} from "./chunk-P6ASQOZR.js";
+} from "./chunk-VT4DTCK5.js";
 import {
   loadPersistedSchema
-} from "./chunk-YXA2TCTZ.js";
+} from "./chunk-I5LSKXT6.js";
 
 // src/with-shape/introspection/walk.ts
 var INTERNAL_PREFIX = "_";
@@ -238,4 +238,4 @@ function summariseAggregateOp(value) {
 export {
   dumpVaultSchema
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-HM4JSXX2.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-PCIBCL26.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-4A4TYISP.js → chunk-PV7XXAXK.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   BrokerNotEnabledError
-} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
+} from "./chunk-SW4TOSJL.js";
 
 // src/port/with/broker-strategy.ts
 var NO_BROKER = {
@@ -27,4 +27,4 @@ export {
   NO_BROKER,
   buildCredentialBrokerHandle
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-4A4TYISP.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-PV7XXAXK.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-5AFMP532.js → chunk-Q2OAAREU.js}

@@ -1,20 +1,20 @@
 import {
   linkCollectionName,
   linkRowKey
-} from "./chunk-WLLUM35R.js";
+} from "./chunk-KQIDBIZL.js";
 import {
   buildRecordAad,
   openEnvelopeJson
-} from "./chunk-2LPVI4PX.js";
+} from "./chunk-DOPZWTMJ.js";
 import {
   buildRecordEnvelope
-} from "./chunk-N4CNVSUF.js";
+} from "./chunk-4RUFYGWG.js";
 import {
   encrypt
-} from "./chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
+} from "./chunk-USKHHOIV.js";
 import {
   NoydbError
-} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
+} from "./chunk-SW4TOSJL.js";
 
 // src/with-shape/links/link-set.ts
 var LinkSet = class {
@@ -130,4 +130,4 @@ export {
   LinkSet,
   LinkEndpointError
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-5AFMP532.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-Q2OAAREU.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-Z7ZXZL6Y.js → chunk-Q2ZN5DWZ.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
+} from "./chunk-SW4TOSJL.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/periods/window.ts
 var PERIODS_COLLECTION = "_periods";
@@ -23,4 +23,4 @@ export {
   PERIOD_REOPENS_COLLECTION,
   periodExclusiveUpperBound
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-Z7ZXZL6Y.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-Q2ZN5DWZ.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-L6GTLZRK.js → chunk-QJLOWGOU.js}

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import {
   buildStringFieldEntries,
   extractSnippet,
   searchScan
-} from "./chunk-S35S77YU.js";
+} from "./chunk-IAHDSFFA.js";
 import {
   fuseRetrieval
 } from "./chunk-AURFOK3D.js";
@@ -13,14 +13,14 @@ import {
   getAtPath,
   isStaticDictDescriptor,
   stripI18nFilled
-} from "./chunk-X67FCULK.js";
+} from "./chunk-DIVY2CJZ.js";
 import {
   liveRecordIsElevated
-} from "./chunk-POS53FG6.js";
+} from "./chunk-IZTU6RKH.js";
 import {
   EmbeddingDimMismatchError,
   EmbeddingModelMismatchError
-} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
+} from "./chunk-SW4TOSJL.js";
 
 // src/with-lookup/embeddings/cosine.ts
 function cosine(a, b) {
@@ -394,4 +394,4 @@ export {
   rebuildEmbeddings,
   syncTierSearch
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-L6GTLZRK.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-QJLOWGOU.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-7LYUJNU3.js → chunk-QOHGWFAW.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   NoydbError
-} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
+} from "./chunk-SW4TOSJL.js";
 
 // src/with-formula/computed/index.ts
 var ComputedFieldError = class extends NoydbError {
@@ -35,4 +35,4 @@ export {
   ComputedFieldError,
   evalComputedFields
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-7LYUJNU3.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-QOHGWFAW.js.map