@noy-db/hub 0.6.0 → 0.7.0-pre.1

package/dist/{chunk-S2I5MYSA.js → chunk-Z2WK53N6.js}

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 import {
   buildRecordEnvelope
-} from "./chunk-FX3UIDCS.js";
+} from "./chunk-N4CNVSUF.js";
 
 // src/with-party/team/managed-secret.ts
-var MemorySealingKeyProvider = class {
+var MemorySealer = class {
   id;
   fingerprint;
   keyBytes;
@@ -25,29 +25,56 @@ var MemorySealingKeyProvider = class {
       this.keyBytes[i] = this.fingerprint[i % 4] ^ i * 17;
     }
   }
+  /**
+   * Deterministic 4-byte integrity tag over the ciphertext, keyed by the
+   * same derived bytes. NOT a MAC and not forgery-resistant — a real
+   * provider authenticates with its backend. It exists because the contract
+   * says `unseal` MUST throw on tamper, and a double that silently returns
+   * corrupted bytes is not modelling the contract it stands in for. Without
+   * it, every managed-mode test ran against a provider that could not fail
+   * the way a real one must (found by @noy-db/test-sealer-conformance).
+   */
+  tag(cipher) {
+    let a = 2654435769;
+    for (let i = 0; i < cipher.length; i++) {
+      a = (a ^ (cipher[i] ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16])) * 16777619 >>> 0;
+    }
+    return new Uint8Array([a >>> 24 & 255, a >>> 16 & 255, a >>> 8 & 255, a & 255]);
+  }
   async seal(secret) {
-    const out = new Uint8Array(4 + secret.length);
-    out.set(this.fingerprint, 0);
+    const cipher = new Uint8Array(secret.length);
     for (let i = 0; i < secret.length; i++) {
-      out[4 + i] = secret[i] ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16];
+      cipher[i] = secret[i] ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16];
     }
+    const out = new Uint8Array(8 + secret.length);
+    out.set(this.fingerprint, 0);
+    out.set(this.tag(cipher), 4);
+    out.set(cipher, 8);
     return out;
   }
   async unseal(sealed) {
-    if (sealed.length < 4) {
-      throw new Error("MemorySealingKeyProvider: sealed input too short");
+    if (sealed.length < 8) {
+      throw new Error("MemorySealer: sealed input too short");
     }
     for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
       if (sealed[i] !== this.fingerprint[i]) {
         throw new Error(
-          `MemorySealingKeyProvider("${this.id}"): provider-id mismatch on unseal (sealed bytes were produced by a different provider)`
+          `MemorySealer("${this.id}"): provider-id mismatch on unseal (sealed bytes were produced by a different provider)`
+        );
+      }
+    }
+    const cipher = sealed.subarray(8);
+    const expected = this.tag(cipher);
+    for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+      if (sealed[4 + i] !== expected[i]) {
+        throw new Error(
+          `MemorySealer("${this.id}"): integrity check failed on unseal (the sealed bytes were modified after sealing)`
         );
       }
     }
-    const body = sealed.subarray(4);
-    const out = new Uint8Array(body.length);
-    for (let i = 0; i < body.length; i++) {
-      out[i] = body[i] ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16];
+    const out = new Uint8Array(cipher.length);
+    for (let i = 0; i < cipher.length; i++) {
+      out[i] = cipher[i] ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16];
     }
     return out;
   }
@@ -199,7 +226,7 @@ async function resolveManagedSecret(store, vault, provider) {
   if (existing) {
     if (existing.providerId !== provider.id) {
       throw new Error(
-        `Managed-mode vault "${vault}" was sealed under provider id "${existing.providerId}" but the current SealingKeyProvider is "${provider.id}". Pass the same provider that originally enrolled the vault, or treat this as a fresh enrollment and clear \`_meta/sealed-secret\` first.`
+        `Managed-mode vault "${vault}" was sealed under provider id "${existing.providerId}" but the current NoydbSealer is "${provider.id}". Pass the same provider that originally enrolled the vault, or treat this as a fresh enrollment and clear \`_meta/sealed-secret\` first.`
       );
     }
     const plaintext = await provider.unseal(existing.sealed);
@@ -213,7 +240,7 @@ async function resolveManagedSecret(store, vault, provider) {
 }
 
 export {
-  MemorySealingKeyProvider,
+  MemorySealer,
   sealRsaOaepTlv,
   parseRsaOaepTlv,
   aesGcmOpen,
@@ -224,4 +251,4 @@ export {
   loadSealedSecret,
   resolveManagedSecret
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-S2I5MYSA.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-Z2WK53N6.js.map

package/dist/chunk-Z2WK53N6.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-party/team/managed-secret.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Managed-secret mode — rubber-hose-resistant vaults.\n *\n * A vault mode where the secret is machine-generated and never\n * exposed to the user, sealed under a developer-provided\n * {@link NoydbSealer} (macOS Keychain, Windows Credential\n * Manager, libsecret, AWS KMS, …). The user has no secret to give\n * up to coercion — they can't reveal what they don't know.\n *\n * ## Components in this file\n *\n *   - {@link NoydbSealer} — the interface concrete providers\n *     implement. Provider implementations live OUTSIDE hub (per-\n *     platform packages).\n *   - {@link MemorySealer} — in-memory test provider; uses\n *     a deterministic per-instance \"key\" so two providers with\n *     different ids cannot unseal each other's outputs.\n *   - {@link RecipientHint} — public material a sender uses to seal\n *     plaintext for a specific recipient; published by\n *     {@link RecipientSealer.publishRecipientHint} and transported\n *     out-of-band to the sender before bundle writes.\n *   - {@link RecipientSealer} — interface for asymmetric/granted\n *     providers that support recipient-target sealing (RSA-OAEP,\n *     cloud-KMS asymmetric, etc.); distinct from self-only\n *     {@link NoydbSealer} (macOS Keychain, WebAuthn-PRF).\n *   - {@link MemoryRecipientSealer} — in-process reference\n *     implementation of both `RecipientSealer` and\n *     `NoydbSealer` using real WebCrypto RSA-OAEP + AES-GCM;\n *     safe for tests and same-process sender/recipient scenarios.\n *   - {@link loadSealedSecret} / {@link saveSealedSecret} —\n *     plaintext envelope storage at `_meta/sealed-secret`.\n *     Mirrors the `_meta/handle` and `_meta/public-envelope` AES-\n *     GCM-bypassed patterns. The sealing layer (provider's job)\n *     is the security boundary; hub doesn't have a key to encrypt\n *     with at this layer — that's the whole point of the design.\n *   - {@link resolveManagedSecret} — orchestrates the \"generate +\n *     seal + persist on first open; unseal on reopen\" flow.\n *     Returns the plaintext secret string that the rest of the\n *     `createNoydb` keyring path consumes.\n *\n * Deferred to follow-ups:\n *   - Block `rotate-secret` policy gate under managed mode.\n *   - Mandatory strong-recovery enforcement.\n *   - Recovery flow under managed mode (generates fresh sealed phrase).\n *\n * @see https://github.com/vLannaAi/noy-db-docs/blob/main/content/docs/services/session-tiers.md → Managed-secret mode\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { buildRecordEnvelope } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore, RecipientSealer } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\n/**\n * The contract concrete providers (per-platform key stores) implement\n * to seal and unseal a hub-generated random secret. The plaintext\n * secret NEVER leaves hub-controlled memory in unsealed form —\n * the provider receives the bytes, returns opaque sealed bytes, and\n * later reverses the operation. Hub treats the sealed bytes as\n * fully opaque.\n *\n * Implementations live OUTSIDE `@noy-db/hub` (separate packages\n * per the issue's \"Concrete providers (live outside hub)\" note):\n *\n * | Platform | Package (TBD) | Backing |\n * |---|---|---|\n * | macOS | `@noy-db/seal-macos-keychain` | Security.framework |\n * | Windows | `@noy-db/seal-wincred` | Credential Manager |\n * | Linux | `@noy-db/seal-libsecret` | libsecret / secret-service |\n * | Cloud / server | `@noy-db/seal-aws-kms` | AWS KMS Decrypt |\n */\nexport interface NoydbSealer {\n  /**\n   * Non-sensitive identifier disclosed in the persisted envelope.\n   * Surfaced to consumers via `loadSealedSecret().providerId` so\n   * a vault opened with the wrong provider class can detect the\n   * mismatch and surface a clear error. NOT secret — fine to log.\n   *\n   * Suggested format: `<family>:<scope>` — e.g. `macos-keychain:com.acme.app`,\n   * `aws-kms:arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123:key/abc`. The hub never\n   * parses this; it's purely audit metadata.\n   */\n  readonly id: string\n\n  /** Seal raw secret bytes. Output bytes are opaque to hub. */\n  seal(secret: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>\n\n  /**\n   * Reverse {@link seal}. MUST throw on tamper, wrong-provider, or\n   * any other failure — hub treats a thrown error as \"this provider\n   * cannot unlock this vault\" and surfaces it to the caller.\n   */\n  unseal(sealed: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array>\n}\n\n/**\n * In-memory test provider. NOT secure — uses a deterministic\n * per-instance \"key\" (16-byte SHA-256 of `id`) XOR'd over the\n * secret plus a 4-byte provider-id fingerprint prefix. The XOR is\n * sufficient to make different `id` values produce mutually-unsealable\n * outputs (the contract tests for that), but offers ZERO real\n * confidentiality — never use outside tests.\n *\n * Replace with a real platform provider in production.\n */\nexport class MemorySealer implements NoydbSealer {\n  readonly id: string\n  private readonly fingerprint: Uint8Array\n  private readonly keyBytes: Uint8Array\n\n  constructor(opts: { id: string }) {\n    this.id = opts.id\n    // Deterministic 4-byte fingerprint of the provider id, prepended\n    // to every sealed output so we can detect \"wrong provider\" at\n    // unseal time without leaking anything sensitive about either\n    // provider's actual key material.\n    const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(opts.id)\n    let h = 0\n    for (let i = 0; i < encoded.length; i++) {\n      h = (h * 31 + encoded[i]!) >>> 0\n    }\n    this.fingerprint = new Uint8Array([\n      (h >>> 24) & 0xff, (h >>> 16) & 0xff, (h >>> 8) & 0xff, h & 0xff,\n    ])\n    // Deterministic 16-byte \"key\" derived from the id by repeating\n    // the fingerprint with offsets. Good enough for the XOR-stream\n    // test cipher; never confuse this with real key derivation.\n    this.keyBytes = new Uint8Array(16)\n    for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) {\n      this.keyBytes[i] = this.fingerprint[i % 4]! ^ (i * 17)\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Deterministic 4-byte integrity tag over the ciphertext, keyed by the\n   * same derived bytes. NOT a MAC and not forgery-resistant — a real\n   * provider authenticates with its backend. It exists because the contract\n   * says `unseal` MUST throw on tamper, and a double that silently returns\n   * corrupted bytes is not modelling the contract it stands in for. Without\n   * it, every managed-mode test ran against a provider that could not fail\n   * the way a real one must (found by @noy-db/test-sealer-conformance).\n   */\n  private tag(cipher: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {\n    let a = 0x9e3779b9\n    for (let i = 0; i < cipher.length; i++) {\n      a = ((a ^ (cipher[i]! ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16]!)) * 0x01000193) >>> 0\n    }\n    return new Uint8Array([(a >>> 24) & 0xff, (a >>> 16) & 0xff, (a >>> 8) & 0xff, a & 0xff])\n  }\n\n  async seal(secret: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const cipher = new Uint8Array(secret.length)\n    for (let i = 0; i < secret.length; i++) {\n      cipher[i] = secret[i]! ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16]!\n    }\n    const out = new Uint8Array(8 + secret.length)\n    out.set(this.fingerprint, 0)\n    out.set(this.tag(cipher), 4)\n    out.set(cipher, 8)\n    return out\n  }\n\n  async unseal(sealed: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    if (sealed.length < 8) {\n      throw new Error('MemorySealer: sealed input too short')\n    }\n    for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {\n      if (sealed[i] !== this.fingerprint[i]) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `MemorySealer(\"${this.id}\"): provider-id mismatch on unseal `\n          + '(sealed bytes were produced by a different provider)',\n        )\n      }\n    }\n    const cipher = sealed.subarray(8)\n    const expected = this.tag(cipher)\n    for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {\n      if (sealed[4 + i] !== expected[i]) {\n        throw new Error(\n          `MemorySealer(\"${this.id}\"): integrity check failed on unseal `\n          + '(the sealed bytes were modified after sealing)',\n        )\n      }\n    }\n    const out = new Uint8Array(cipher.length)\n    for (let i = 0; i < cipher.length; i++) {\n      out[i] = cipher[i]! ^ this.keyBytes[i % 16]!\n    }\n    return out\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Public material a sender uses to seal-for-this-recipient. Published by\n * a recipient's RecipientSealer; transported to the sender out-of-band\n * (email, S3, in-app message). The sender obtains the hint, supplies it\n * to writePod's sealedCredentials.perUser[userId].hint, and the\n * hub seals each user's credential against it. Per foundation §11.4.\n */\nexport type RecipientHint = {\n  readonly v: 1\n  /** Recipient's provider id; matches the SealedAutoUnlockEntry.pid they'll unseal under. */\n  readonly pid: string\n  /** Algorithm the sender uses to produce the seal. Slice 1 ships RSA-OAEP-SHA256 only. */\n  readonly alg: 'rsa-oaep-sha256'\n  /** Public material — alg-specific. For 'rsa-oaep-sha256': { publicKeyPem: string }. */\n  readonly material: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>\n}\n\n// Hoisted to kernel/types.ts (C3 — enclave self-containment: sealing.ts\n// consumes this as a spine-owned contract type). Re-exported here so existing\n// importers of this module are unaffected.\nexport type { RecipientSealer } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\n/**\n * Shared RSA-OAEP-SHA256 + AES-GCM seal in the canonical recipient-target\n * TLV wire format. Mints a fresh 32-byte CEK, AES-GCM-encrypts `plaintext`\n * under it, RSA-OAEP-SHA256-wraps the CEK to `publicKeyPem`, and packs:\n *\n *   byte  0       : version (0x01)\n *   bytes 1..256  : RSA-OAEP-wrapped CEK (fixed 256 bytes at RSA-2048)\n *   bytes 257..268: AES-GCM IV (12 bytes)\n *   bytes 269..   : AES-GCM ciphertext ‖ 16-byte tag\n *\n * This is the single source of truth for the wire format — both\n * {@link MemoryRecipientSealer} and external sealers (e.g. `@noy-db/at-aws-kms`'s\n * asymmetric-KMS recipient sealer) call it so a blob sealed by one unseals\n * by the other. WebCrypto RSA-OAEP/SHA-256 here is wire-compatible with\n * AWS KMS `RSAES_OAEP_SHA_256` (both RSAES-OAEP, SHA-256 hash, MGF1-SHA256,\n * empty label).\n *\n * @public — re-exported from the hub barrel for external sealer packages.\n */\nexport async function sealRsaOaepTlv(plaintext: Uint8Array, publicKeyPem: string): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  // Parse PEM → SPKI bytes.\n  const b64 = publicKeyPem.replace(/-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----/, '').replace(/-----END PUBLIC KEY-----/, '').replace(/\\s+/g, '')\n  const spki = base64ToBytes(b64)\n  const recipientPub = await crypto.subtle.importKey(\n    'spki', spki as BufferSource,\n    { name: 'RSA-OAEP', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    false, ['encrypt'],\n  )\n  // Mint fresh CEK + IV, AES-GCM encrypt plaintext.\n  const cekBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(32))\n  const cek = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', cekBytes as BufferSource, 'AES-GCM', false, ['encrypt'])\n  const iv = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(12))\n  const ct = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.encrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource }, cek, plaintext as BufferSource))\n  // RSA-OAEP-wrap the CEK bytes.\n  const wrapped = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.encrypt({ name: 'RSA-OAEP' }, recipientPub, cekBytes as BufferSource))\n  cekBytes.fill(0)\n  if (wrapped.length !== 256) {\n    throw new Error(`sealRsaOaepTlv: expected 256-byte RSA-OAEP wrap, got ${wrapped.length}`)\n  }\n  // TLV layout.\n  const out = new Uint8Array(1 + 256 + 12 + ct.length)\n  out[0] = 0x01\n  out.set(wrapped, 1)\n  out.set(iv, 1 + 256)\n  out.set(ct, 1 + 256 + 12)\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a {@link sealRsaOaepTlv} blob into its three segments without\n * decrypting. The `wrapped` CEK is RSA-OAEP-SHA256 ciphertext over a\n * 32-byte CEK — the unwrap step is pluggable: {@link MemoryRecipientSealer}\n * decrypts it with a local RSA private key; `@noy-db/at-aws-kms` hands it to\n * KMS `Decrypt`. After unwrapping, pass the CEK + `iv` + `ct` to\n * {@link aesGcmOpen}.\n *\n * @public — re-exported from the hub barrel for external sealer packages.\n */\nexport function parseRsaOaepTlv(bytes: Uint8Array): { wrapped: Uint8Array; iv: Uint8Array; ct: Uint8Array } {\n  if (bytes.length < 1 + 256 + 12 + 16) {\n    throw new Error('parseRsaOaepTlv: sealed input too short')\n  }\n  if (bytes[0] !== 0x01) {\n    throw new Error(`parseRsaOaepTlv: unknown TLV version ${bytes[0]}`)\n  }\n  return {\n    wrapped: bytes.subarray(1, 1 + 256),\n    iv: bytes.subarray(1 + 256, 1 + 256 + 12),\n    ct: bytes.subarray(1 + 256 + 12),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * AES-GCM-decrypt the `ct` segment of a {@link parseRsaOaepTlv} result under\n * the unwrapped 32-byte CEK and its `iv`. Throws on a bad tag (tamper) — the\n * same authenticated-decryption guarantee the TLV relies on.\n *\n * @public — re-exported from the hub barrel for external sealer packages.\n */\nexport async function aesGcmOpen(cekBytes: Uint8Array, iv: Uint8Array, ct: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const cek = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', cekBytes as BufferSource, 'AES-GCM', false, ['decrypt'])\n  return new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.decrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource }, cek, ct as BufferSource))\n}\n\n/**\n * Reference implementation of `RecipientSealer` + `NoydbSealer`.\n * Uses WebCrypto RSA-OAEP-SHA256 (2048-bit) to wrap a fresh 32-byte\n * AES-GCM CEK, AES-GCM-encrypts plaintext under it, and packs the\n * result into a self-describing TLV:\n *\n *   byte  0       : version (0x01)\n *   bytes 1..256  : RSA-OAEP-wrapped CEK (fixed 256 bytes at RSA-2048)\n *   bytes 257..268: AES-GCM IV (12 bytes)\n *   bytes 269..   : AES-GCM ciphertext ‖ 16-byte tag\n *\n * Implements BOTH interfaces. `seal(plaintext)` (self-target) is just\n * `sealForRecipient(plaintext, this own hint)` — same TLV. Convenient\n * for tests where one provider plays both ends. Real cloud providers\n * (`at-aws-kms`, etc.) will pick their own internal layouts; the only\n * contract is round-trip identity.\n *\n * SAFE for production within its scope — the cryptography is real\n * (RSA-OAEP + AES-GCM via WebCrypto), but the keypair lives in-process\n * and is regenerated on every construction. Not suitable as a managed\n * keychain; use it for tests and for shipping bundles where the\n * recipient instance lives in the same process as the sender (rare).\n */\nexport class MemoryRecipientSealer implements NoydbSealer, RecipientSealer {\n  readonly id: string\n  private readonly keypair: Promise<CryptoKeyPair>\n\n  constructor(opts: { id: string }) {\n    this.id = opts.id\n    this.keypair = crypto.subtle.generateKey(\n      { name: 'RSA-OAEP', modulusLength: 2048, publicExponent: new Uint8Array([1, 0, 1]), hash: 'SHA-256' },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  }\n\n  async publishRecipientHint(): Promise<RecipientHint> {\n    const { publicKey } = await this.keypair\n    const spki = await crypto.subtle.exportKey('spki', publicKey)\n    const pem = '-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\\n'\n      + bytesToBase64(new Uint8Array(spki)).match(/.{1,64}/g)!.join('\\n')\n      + '\\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\\n'\n    return { v: 1, pid: this.id, alg: 'rsa-oaep-sha256', material: { publicKeyPem: pem } }\n  }\n\n  async sealForRecipient(plaintext: Uint8Array, hint: RecipientHint): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    if (hint.v !== 1) {\n      throw new Error(`MemoryRecipientSealer.sealForRecipient: unsupported hint.v ${String(hint.v)} (expected 1)`)\n    }\n    if (hint.alg !== 'rsa-oaep-sha256') {\n      throw new Error(`MemoryRecipientSealer.sealForRecipient: unsupported hint.alg '${String(hint.alg)}' (expected 'rsa-oaep-sha256')`)\n    }\n    const pem = hint.material['publicKeyPem']\n    if (typeof pem !== 'string') {\n      throw new Error('MemoryRecipientSealer.sealForRecipient: hint.material.publicKeyPem missing or not a string')\n    }\n    return sealRsaOaepTlv(plaintext, pem)\n  }\n\n  async seal(plaintext: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const hint = await this.publishRecipientHint()\n    return this.sealForRecipient(plaintext, hint)\n  }\n\n  async unseal(bytes: Uint8Array): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n    const { wrapped, iv, ct } = parseRsaOaepTlv(bytes)\n    const { privateKey } = await this.keypair\n    // Local RSA-OAEP-SHA256 unwrap of the CEK — the pluggable step external\n    // sealers replace with KMS Decrypt.\n    const cekBytes = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.decrypt({ name: 'RSA-OAEP' }, privateKey, wrapped as BufferSource))\n    const pt = await aesGcmOpen(cekBytes, iv, ct)\n    cekBytes.fill(0)\n    return pt\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Persisted envelope ────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Reserved id for the managed-secret envelope under `_meta`. */\nexport const SEALED_SECRET_RECORD_ID = 'sealed-secret' as const\n\n/** Plaintext payload stored inside the `_meta/sealed-secret` envelope. */\nexport interface SealedSecret {\n  readonly _noydb_sealed: 1\n  readonly providerId: string\n  /** Sealed bytes. Base64-encoded on the wire; decoded on load. */\n  readonly sealed: Uint8Array\n}\n\n/**\n * Wire-format envelope persisted at `_meta/sealed-secret` for\n * managed-mode vaults. The provider produces raw sealed bytes via\n * {@link NoydbSealer.seal}; this wrapper carries the dispatch\n * metadata hub needs to pick the right provider on the unseal path.\n *\n * Stability boundary: once shipped, the wire format only grows by\n * adding optional fields. See the at-* sealing dimension foundation\n * doc, §11.9.1.\n *\n * v1 shape (this release): `{ v: 1, _noydb_sealed: 1, pid, payload }`.\n *\n * Legacy shape (earlier releases): `{ _noydb_sealed: 1, providerId, sealed }`\n * — accepted on read for backwards compatibility; never produced on\n * write going forward.\n */\nexport interface SealedEnvelope {\n  /** Envelope schema version. v1 is the current shape. */\n  readonly v: 1\n  /** Magic marker for forensics + legacy-shape detection. */\n  readonly _noydb_sealed: 1\n  /** Matches the producing provider's `.id`. Dispatch key on unseal. */\n  readonly pid: string\n  /** Sealed bytes from the provider, base64-encoded on the wire. */\n  readonly payload: string\n}\n\nfunction bytesToBase64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\n  let binary = ''\n  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) binary += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]!)\n  return btoa(binary)\n}\n\nfunction base64ToBytes(b64: string): Uint8Array {\n  const binary = atob(b64)\n  const out = new Uint8Array(binary.length)\n  for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) out[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i)\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Parse a `_meta/sealed-secret` `_data` JSON string into the\n * in-memory {@link SealedSecret} representation. Accepts both:\n *\n *   1. v1 wire format `{ v: 1, _noydb_sealed: 1, pid, payload }` —\n *      the current shape.\n *   2. Legacy wire format `{ _noydb_sealed: 1, providerId, sealed }` —\n *      read-only; never written\n *      going forward.\n *\n * Returns `undefined` for any input that doesn't match either shape,\n * so callers can fall back to \"no managed-mode envelope present.\"\n *\n * @internal — exported only for the migration safety-net test suite.\n */\nexport function parseSealedEnvelope(raw: unknown): SealedSecret | undefined {\n  if (typeof raw !== 'object' || raw === null) return undefined\n  const r = raw as Record<string, unknown>\n  if (r._noydb_sealed !== 1) return undefined\n\n  // v1 shape — preferred.\n  if (\n    r.v === 1\n    && typeof r.pid === 'string'\n    && typeof r.payload === 'string'\n  ) {\n    return {\n      _noydb_sealed: 1,\n      providerId: r.pid,\n      sealed: base64ToBytes(r.payload),\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Legacy shape — earlier releases. 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Two paths:\n *\n *   1. **First open (no envelope persisted):** generate a 256-bit random\n *      via `crypto.getRandomValues`, base64-encode for use as a\n *      secret string, seal the underlying bytes under the\n *      provider, persist `_meta/sealed-secret`, return the\n *      base64 string.\n *\n *   2. **Reopen (envelope exists):** read + unseal + decode → return.\n *      A different provider whose `seal` output disagrees on the\n *      stored bytes throws here, surfaced as a clear error.\n *\n * The returned string is the same shape that `secret:` would take in\n * standard mode — the rest of the keyring path consumes it\n * unchanged.\n *\n * @internal — called from `createNoydb` / `getKeyringInternal`.\n */\nexport async function resolveManagedSecret(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  provider: NoydbSealer,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const existing = await loadSealedSecret(store, vault)\n  if (existing) {\n    if (existing.providerId !== provider.id) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `Managed-mode vault \"${vault}\" was sealed under provider id `\n        + `\"${existing.providerId}\" but the current NoydbSealer is `\n        + `\"${provider.id}\". Pass the same provider that originally enrolled `\n        + 'the vault, or treat this as a fresh enrollment and clear '\n        + '`_meta/sealed-secret` first.',\n      )\n    }\n    const plaintext = await provider.unseal(existing.sealed)\n    return bytesToBase64(plaintext)\n  }\n\n  // First open: mint a 256-bit random, seal, persist.\n  const random = new Uint8Array(32)\n  globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(random)\n  const sealed = await provider.seal(random)\n  await saveSealedSecret(store, vault, { providerId: provider.id, sealed })\n  return 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package/dist/{chunk-5O5ZSW7N.js → chunk-Z7ZXZL6Y.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
+} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/periods/window.ts
 var PERIODS_COLLECTION = "_periods";
@@ -23,4 +23,4 @@ export {
   PERIOD_REOPENS_COLLECTION,
   periodExclusiveUpperBound
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-5O5ZSW7N.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-Z7ZXZL6Y.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-2ZCWHCLF.js → chunk-ZO252Q5S.js}

@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
 import {
   ATTESTATIONS_COLLECTION,
   loadOrCreateSigner
-} from "./chunk-2J5IT37K.js";
+} from "./chunk-3L2MVE36.js";
 import {
   generateULID
 } from "./chunk-4AOERLTV.js";
 import {
   buildRecordAad
-} from "./chunk-CXPOG3ZY.js";
+} from "./chunk-2LPVI4PX.js";
 import {
   buildRecordEnvelope
-} from "./chunk-FX3UIDCS.js";
+} from "./chunk-N4CNVSUF.js";
 import {
   encrypt
-} from "./chunk-ONPVHX2Y.js";
+} from "./chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
 import {
   AttestationError
-} from "./chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
+} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/attestation/issue.ts
 import {
@@ -63,4 +63,4 @@ async function issueAttestationCore(ctx, args) {
 export {
   issueAttestationCore
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-2ZCWHCLF.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZO252Q5S.js.map

package/dist/classified/index.js

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import {
   classified,
   luhnCheck,
   withClassified
-} from "../chunk-RDB66EKD.js";
+} from "../chunk-YMLQBZFJ.js";
 import {
   ClassifiedNeverStoredError,
   ClassifiedValidationError,
@@ -11,15 +11,15 @@ import {
   isClassifiedFieldSpec,
   isClassifiedGroup,
   resolveClassifiedFields
-} from "../chunk-AJGGBXWA.js";
-import "../chunk-C3XWJCG7.js";
-import "../chunk-UJ4Z67UQ.js";
+} from "../chunk-GK4DRVUD.js";
+import "../chunk-XDVVBETV.js";
+import "../chunk-RK7N4OQ5.js";
 import {
   ClassifiedConfigError,
   ClassifiedRevealError,
   ClassifiedRotationError,
   ClassifiedVerifyError
-} from "../chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
+} from "../chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
 import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {
   ClassifiedConfigError,

package/dist/{classified-marker-AZDSDG6V.js → classified-marker-BSQHU4JT.js}

@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@ function markerForFields(vdigFields) {
 async function persistClassifiedMarkerForFields(store, vault, collectionName, vdigFields, dek) {
   const marker = markerForFields(vdigFields);
   if (marker === null) return;
-  const { persistClassifiedMarker } = await import("./register-JBOEHTVX.js");
+  const { persistClassifiedMarker } = await import("./register-6TCBR6XD.js");
   await persistClassifiedMarker({ store, vault, collectionName, dek, marker });
 }
 async function readClassifiedMarkerDigestOnly(store, vault, collectionName, dek) {
-  const { loadPersistedSchema } = await import("./storage-WSF7ZKTL.js");
+  const { loadPersistedSchema } = await import("./storage-ZXUT476I.js");
   const persisted = await loadPersistedSchema(store, vault, collectionName, dek);
   return persisted?.classified?.digestOnly ?? [];
 }
@@ -25,4 +25,4 @@ export {
   persistClassifiedMarkerForFields,
   readClassifiedMarkerDigestOnly
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=classified-marker-AZDSDG6V.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=classified-marker-BSQHU4JT.js.map

package/dist/collection-facade-LG3NYZVB.js

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+import {
+  buildPersistedIndexCallbacks,
+  buildRetrievalDocs,
+  embedOnWrite,
+  flushIndex,
+  hasIndexedBlobFields,
+  rebuildEmbeddings,
+  retrieve,
+  search,
+  similarTo,
+  syncTierSearch,
+  warmIndex
+} from "./chunk-L6GTLZRK.js";
+import "./chunk-S35S77YU.js";
+import "./chunk-AURFOK3D.js";
+import "./chunk-2GXEQUEX.js";
+import "./chunk-57JTHWLQ.js";
+import "./chunk-X67FCULK.js";
+import "./chunk-XDVVBETV.js";
+import "./chunk-RC4BROYR.js";
+import "./chunk-POS53FG6.js";
+import "./chunk-2LPVI4PX.js";
+import "./chunk-N4CNVSUF.js";
+import "./chunk-FOG7YEJP.js";
+import "./chunk-KDJGJR7F.js";
+import "./chunk-LKFKXS5K.js";
+import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
+import "./chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
+import "./chunk-RK7N4OQ5.js";
+import "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
+import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
+export {
+  buildPersistedIndexCallbacks,
+  buildRetrievalDocs,
+  embedOnWrite,
+  flushIndex,
+  hasIndexedBlobFields,
+  rebuildEmbeddings,
+  retrieve,
+  search,
+  similarTo,
+  syncTierSearch,
+  warmIndex
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=collection-facade-LG3NYZVB.js.map

package/dist/{computed-VG2PCM4L.js → computed-ASBNTLOK.js}

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 import {
   ComputedFieldError,
   evalComputedFields
-} from "./chunk-36CEG6CM.js";
-import "./chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
+} from "./chunk-7LYUJNU3.js";
+import "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {
   ComputedFieldError,
   evalComputedFields
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=computed-VG2PCM4L.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=computed-ASBNTLOK.js.map

package/dist/consent/index.js

@@ -2,20 +2,20 @@ import {
   CONSENT_AUDIT_COLLECTION,
   loadConsentEntries,
   writeConsentEntry
-} from "../chunk-LUYPYCHY.js";
+} from "../chunk-MTBXJAS4.js";
 import {
   NO_CONSENT
 } from "../chunk-PEOZ34EM.js";
 import "../chunk-4AOERLTV.js";
-import "../chunk-CXPOG3ZY.js";
-import "../chunk-FX3UIDCS.js";
-import "../chunk-CKKN25P2.js";
-import "../chunk-7Q3RHOA5.js";
-import "../chunk-4K6BIMLF.js";
+import "../chunk-2LPVI4PX.js";
+import "../chunk-N4CNVSUF.js";
+import "../chunk-FOG7YEJP.js";
+import "../chunk-KDJGJR7F.js";
+import "../chunk-LKFKXS5K.js";
 import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
-import "../chunk-ONPVHX2Y.js";
-import "../chunk-UJ4Z67UQ.js";
-import "../chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
+import "../chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
+import "../chunk-RK7N4OQ5.js";
+import "../chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
 import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/consent/active.ts

package/dist/cover/index.js

@@ -14,16 +14,16 @@ import {
   saveCover,
   validateCoverInput,
   validateCoverSize
-} from "../chunk-2ZT4INZ4.js";
-import "../chunk-CXPOG3ZY.js";
-import "../chunk-FX3UIDCS.js";
-import "../chunk-CKKN25P2.js";
-import "../chunk-7Q3RHOA5.js";
-import "../chunk-4K6BIMLF.js";
+} from "../chunk-LF6DMX4C.js";
+import "../chunk-2LPVI4PX.js";
+import "../chunk-N4CNVSUF.js";
+import "../chunk-FOG7YEJP.js";
+import "../chunk-KDJGJR7F.js";
+import "../chunk-LKFKXS5K.js";
 import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
-import "../chunk-ONPVHX2Y.js";
-import "../chunk-UJ4Z67UQ.js";
-import "../chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
+import "../chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
+import "../chunk-RK7N4OQ5.js";
+import "../chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
 import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {
   COVER_FIELDS,

package/dist/custody/index.js

@@ -2,21 +2,21 @@ import {
   CustodyApi,
   NO_CUSTODY,
   withCustody
-} from "../chunk-HWI7GHJZ.js";
-import "../chunk-J6I5VR6P.js";
-import "../chunk-ZJUZOJVW.js";
-import "../chunk-D2YFQ7XG.js";
-import "../chunk-CXPOG3ZY.js";
-import "../chunk-FX3UIDCS.js";
-import "../chunk-CKKN25P2.js";
-import "../chunk-7Q3RHOA5.js";
-import "../chunk-4K6BIMLF.js";
+} from "../chunk-J4UJ5FRV.js";
+import "../chunk-5W7YXFV5.js";
+import "../chunk-DFAUMLD7.js";
+import "../chunk-POS53FG6.js";
+import "../chunk-2LPVI4PX.js";
+import "../chunk-N4CNVSUF.js";
+import "../chunk-FOG7YEJP.js";
+import "../chunk-KDJGJR7F.js";
+import "../chunk-LKFKXS5K.js";
 import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
-import "../chunk-ONPVHX2Y.js";
-import "../chunk-UJ4Z67UQ.js";
+import "../chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
+import "../chunk-RK7N4OQ5.js";
 import {
   CustodyNotEnabledError
-} from "../chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
+} from "../chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
 import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {
   CustodyApi,

package/dist/{dead-filter-JNQNB3TA.js → dead-filter-QKU56XTQ.js}

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/with-shape/satellites/dead-filter.ts
 async function liveBaseIdSetsForBundle(store, vaultName, collectionNames, getDEK) {
-  const { loadPersistedSchema } = await import("./storage-WSF7ZKTL.js");
+  const { loadPersistedSchema } = await import("./storage-ZXUT476I.js");
   const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
   for (const name of collectionNames) {
     if (name.startsWith("_")) continue;
@@ -25,4 +25,4 @@ async function liveBaseIdSetsForBundle(store, vaultName, collectionNames, getDEK
 export {
   liveBaseIdSetsForBundle
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=dead-filter-JNQNB3TA.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=dead-filter-QKU56XTQ.js.map

package/dist/debug/index.js

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   DebugPlaintextError,
   DebugReservedFieldError
-} from "../chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
+} from "../chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
 import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/kernel/debug.ts

package/dist/{delegation-5F36DRDH.js → delegation-XWRPYODW.js}

@@ -1,30 +1,30 @@
-import "./chunk-3YGUHUJA.js";
+import "./chunk-HTGRQZFB.js";
 import {
   generateULID
 } from "./chunk-4AOERLTV.js";
 import {
   dekKey
-} from "./chunk-D2YFQ7XG.js";
+} from "./chunk-POS53FG6.js";
 import {
   buildRecordAad,
   openEnvelopeJson
-} from "./chunk-CXPOG3ZY.js";
+} from "./chunk-2LPVI4PX.js";
 import {
   buildRecordEnvelope
-} from "./chunk-FX3UIDCS.js";
-import "./chunk-CKKN25P2.js";
-import "./chunk-7Q3RHOA5.js";
-import "./chunk-4K6BIMLF.js";
+} from "./chunk-N4CNVSUF.js";
+import "./chunk-FOG7YEJP.js";
+import "./chunk-KDJGJR7F.js";
+import "./chunk-LKFKXS5K.js";
 import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
 import {
   encrypt,
   unwrapKey,
   wrapKey
-} from "./chunk-ONPVHX2Y.js";
-import "./chunk-UJ4Z67UQ.js";
+} from "./chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
+import "./chunk-RK7N4OQ5.js";
 import {
   DelegationTargetMissingError
-} from "./chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
+} from "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/with-party/team/delegation.ts
@@ -103,4 +103,4 @@ export {
   loadActiveDelegations,
   revokeDelegation
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=delegation-5F36DRDH.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=delegation-XWRPYODW.js.map

package/dist/derivations/index.js

@@ -1,29 +1,29 @@
 import {
   withDerivation,
   withRollup
-} from "../chunk-EHRIDNZX.js";
+} from "../chunk-YPSOHDNC.js";
 import {
   DerivationRegistry
-} from "../chunk-IWQPYT6S.js";
+} from "../chunk-RDHUZ674.js";
 import {
   DerivationExecutor
-} from "../chunk-JKATP6OE.js";
-import "../chunk-65JXA63J.js";
-import "../chunk-CXPOG3ZY.js";
-import "../chunk-FX3UIDCS.js";
-import "../chunk-CKKN25P2.js";
-import "../chunk-7Q3RHOA5.js";
-import "../chunk-4K6BIMLF.js";
+} from "../chunk-225O5CXQ.js";
+import "../chunk-5263OEM3.js";
+import "../chunk-2LPVI4PX.js";
+import "../chunk-N4CNVSUF.js";
+import "../chunk-FOG7YEJP.js";
+import "../chunk-KDJGJR7F.js";
+import "../chunk-LKFKXS5K.js";
 import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
-import "../chunk-ONPVHX2Y.js";
-import "../chunk-UJ4Z67UQ.js";
+import "../chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
+import "../chunk-RK7N4OQ5.js";
 import {
   DerivationCapExceededError,
   DerivationCycleError,
   DerivationDepthError,
   DerivationOutputShapeError,
   DerivationOutputUnknownError
-} from "../chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
+} from "../chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
 import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {
   DerivationCapExceededError,

package/dist/derive-CXHCY46K.js

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+import {
+  derivePersistedSchema,
+  isZod4Schema,
+  isZodSchema
+} from "./chunk-P6ASQOZR.js";
+import "./chunk-Y2NBBT6K.js";
+import "./chunk-2LPVI4PX.js";
+import "./chunk-N4CNVSUF.js";
+import "./chunk-FOG7YEJP.js";
+import "./chunk-KDJGJR7F.js";
+import "./chunk-LKFKXS5K.js";
+import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
+import "./chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
+import "./chunk-RK7N4OQ5.js";
+import "./chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
+import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
+export {
+  derivePersistedSchema,
+  isZod4Schema,
+  isZodSchema
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=derive-CXHCY46K.js.map

package/dist/directory/index.js

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import "../chunk-GJW4HX2O.js";
 import {
   UserApi
-} from "../chunk-JIHWBKMQ.js";
+} from "../chunk-DBNYPLWY.js";
 import {
   DIRECTORY_RECORD_ID,
   META_COLLECTION,
@@ -16,16 +16,16 @@ import {
   readUserVisibility,
   saveUserEnvelope,
   visibilityRecordId
-} from "../chunk-ZJUZOJVW.js";
-import "../chunk-CXPOG3ZY.js";
-import "../chunk-FX3UIDCS.js";
-import "../chunk-CKKN25P2.js";
-import "../chunk-7Q3RHOA5.js";
-import "../chunk-4K6BIMLF.js";
+} from "../chunk-DFAUMLD7.js";
+import "../chunk-2LPVI4PX.js";
+import "../chunk-N4CNVSUF.js";
+import "../chunk-FOG7YEJP.js";
+import "../chunk-KDJGJR7F.js";
+import "../chunk-LKFKXS5K.js";
 import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
-import "../chunk-ONPVHX2Y.js";
-import "../chunk-UJ4Z67UQ.js";
-import "../chunk-Z3BZXPRO.js";
+import "../chunk-W5LHQXZU.js";
+import "../chunk-RK7N4OQ5.js";
+import "../chunk-JBIV4FLR.js";
 import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {
   DIRECTORY_RECORD_ID,