@noy-db/hub 0.6.0-pre.22 → 0.6.0-pre.24

package/dist/chunk-D7STIWJO.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/enclave/crypto.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Cryptographic primitives — thin wrappers around the Web Crypto API.\n *\n * ## Design principle\n *\n * **Zero npm crypto dependencies.** Every operation uses `globalThis.crypto.subtle`,\n * which is available natively in Node.js ≥ 18, all modern browsers, and\n * Deno/Bun. This avoids supply-chain risk from third-party crypto packages and\n * ensures the library stays auditable.\n *\n * ## Algorithms\n *\n * | Use case | Algorithm | Parameters |\n * |----------|-----------|------------|\n * | Key derivation | PBKDF2-SHA256 | 600,000 iterations, 32-byte salt |\n * | Record encryption | AES-256-GCM | 12-byte random IV per operation |\n * | DEK wrapping | AES-KW (RFC 3394) | 256-bit KEK |\n * | Binary encrypt | AES-256-GCM | same as record encryption |\n * | Integrity | HMAC-SHA256 | for presence channels |\n * | Content hash | SHA-256 | for ledger and bundle integrity |\n *\n * ## Key lifecycle\n *\n * ```\n * secret + salt\n *   └─► deriveKey()       → KEK (CryptoKey, extractable: false)\n *         └─► wrapKey()   → wrapped DEK bytes  [stored in keyring]\n *         └─► unwrapKey() → DEK (CryptoKey)    [memory only during session]\n *               └─► encrypt() / decrypt()       → ciphertext / plaintext\n * ```\n *\n * IVs are generated fresh by {@link generateIV} on every encrypt call.\n * Reusing an IV with the same key would break GCM's authentication guarantee —\n * this function should be the only place IVs are produced.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { DecryptionError, InvalidKeyError, TamperedError, ValidationError } from '../errors.js'\n\n/**\n * **EnclaveKey** — the opaque key type at the enclave seam.\n *\n * In noy-db's reference enclave this is `CryptoKey` (the Web Crypto API's\n * key handle). A fork's enclave redefines this alias to its own key\n * representation (e.g. `type EnclaveKey = null` for a keyless HSM-backed\n * fork) — outside `kernel/enclave/**`, every consumer must treat it as\n * opaque: never construct, inspect, or serialize it directly, only pass it\n * between barrel functions (`encrypt`/`decrypt`/`wrapKey`/`unwrapKey`/…).\n */\nexport type EnclaveKey = CryptoKey\n\nconst PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 600_000\nconst SALT_BYTES = 32\nconst IV_BYTES = 12\nconst KEY_BITS = 256\n\nconst subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle\n\n// ─── Key Derivation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Derive a KEK from a secret and salt using PBKDF2-SHA256. */\nexport async function deriveKey(\n  secret: string,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return deriveKekFromMaterial(new TextEncoder().encode(secret), salt)\n}\n\n/**\n * Shared PBKDF2 → AES-KW derivation core. `material` is the raw\n * pre-KDF input bytes (a UTF-8 phrase for standard mode, an\n * AG-1-encoded 3-part structure for echo mode).\n */\nasync function deriveKekFromMaterial(\n  material: Uint8Array,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey('raw', material as BufferSource, 'PBKDF2', false, ['deriveKey'])\n  return subtle.deriveKey(\n    { name: 'PBKDF2', salt: salt as BufferSource, iterations: PBKDF2_ITERATIONS, hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    keyMaterial,\n    { name: 'AES-KW', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'],\n  )\n}\n\n/** One three-part echo secret: prompt (typed) → echo (revealed) → key (typed). */\nexport interface EchoSecretParts {\n  readonly prompt: string\n  readonly echo: string\n  readonly key: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Domain context for the AG-1 encoding. The leading `0xFF` is the load-bearing\n * byte: it is not a legal UTF-8 lead byte, so `TextEncoder` can never emit it —\n * no string's UTF-8 encoding can equal an AG-1 encoding, whatever the string.\n */\nconst ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT = new Uint8Array([0xff, ...new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-echo-secret-v1')])\n\n/**\n * AG-1 encoding: domain context + 4-byte big-endian length prefix per\n * part. Two independent guarantees make a single typed string unable to\n * derive an echo vault's KEK (spec AG-1):\n *\n *   1. The `0xFF` context prefix — UTF-8 never produces that byte, so the\n *      encoding is provably not the encoding of ANY string (not merely of\n *      no separator-joined form).\n *   2. Structural length prefixes — part boundaries are key material, so\n *      re-splitting the same characters changes the derived KEK.\n *\n * @throws ValidationError when any part is not a string — the single\n * chokepoint every echo KEK derivation and block mint passes through, so a\n * malformed parts object cannot be `TextEncoder`-coerced into key material.\n */\nexport function encodeEchoParts(parts: EchoSecretParts): Uint8Array {\n  for (const name of ['prompt', 'echo', 'key'] as const) {\n    if (typeof parts?.[name] !== 'string') {\n      throw new ValidationError('echo secret parts must be three strings: prompt, echo, key')\n    }\n  }\n  const enc = new TextEncoder()\n  const segments = [parts.prompt, parts.echo, parts.key].map((p) => enc.encode(p))\n  const total = ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT.length + segments.reduce((n, s) => n + 4 + s.length, 0)\n  const out = new Uint8Array(total)\n  out.set(ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT, 0)\n  let offset = ECHO_KDF_CONTEXT.length\n  for (const s of segments) {\n    new DataView(out.buffer).setUint32(offset, s.length, false)\n    out.set(s, offset + 4)\n    offset += 4 + s.length\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/** Derive the tier-1 KEK from a 3-part echo secret (spec: KEK from ALL parts). */\nexport async function deriveEchoKey(\n  parts: EchoSecretParts,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return deriveKekFromMaterial(encodeEchoParts(parts), salt)\n}\n\n/**\n * Which AES algorithm/usage a {@link deriveSecretKey} result is for:\n * `'aes-kw'` mints a key-wrapping key (`wrapKey`/`unwrapKey`, e.g. for\n * KEK derivation); `'aes-gcm'` mints a direct encrypt/decrypt key (e.g.\n * for the wrap-DEKs primitive in `with-party/team/wrapped-deks.ts`).\n */\nexport type SecretKeyUsage = 'aes-kw' | 'aes-gcm'\n\n/**\n * Derive a non-extractable AES key from a secret/credential and salt\n * via PBKDF2-SHA256, generalizing {@link deriveKey}'s AES-KW derivation to\n * also cover AES-GCM-usage keys. Callers pin their own `iterations` and\n * `keyUsage` so an existing call site's exact parameters (and thus its\n * derived-key bytes) are preserved verbatim when migrated onto this\n * shared primitive — this is call-site consolidation, not a KDF change.\n */\nexport async function deriveSecretKey(\n  secret: string,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n  params: { iterations: number; keyUsage: SecretKeyUsage },\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    new TextEncoder().encode(secret),\n    'PBKDF2',\n    false,\n    ['deriveKey'],\n  )\n\n  return params.keyUsage === 'aes-gcm'\n    ? subtle.deriveKey(\n        {\n          name: 'PBKDF2',\n          salt: salt as BufferSource,\n          iterations: params.iterations,\n          hash: 'SHA-256',\n        },\n        keyMaterial,\n        { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n        false,\n        ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n      )\n    : subtle.deriveKey(\n        {\n          name: 'PBKDF2',\n          salt: salt as BufferSource,\n          iterations: params.iterations,\n          hash: 'SHA-256',\n        },\n        keyMaterial,\n        { name: 'AES-KW', length: KEY_BITS },\n        false,\n        ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'],\n      )\n}\n\n// ─── DEK Generation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Generate a random AES-256-GCM data encryption key. */\nexport async function generateDEK(): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return subtle.generateKey(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    true, // extractable — needed for AES-KW wrapping\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Key Wrapping ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Wrap (encrypt) a DEK with a KEK using AES-KW. Returns base64 string. */\nexport async function wrapKey(dek: CryptoKey, kek: CryptoKey): Promise<string> {\n  const wrapped = await subtle.wrapKey('raw', dek, kek, 'AES-KW')\n  return bufferToBase64(wrapped)\n}\n\n/** Unwrap (decrypt) a DEK from base64 string using a KEK. */\nexport async function unwrapKey(\n  wrappedBase64: string,\n  kek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  try {\n    return await subtle.unwrapKey(\n      'raw',\n      base64ToBuffer(wrappedBase64) as BufferSource,\n      kek,\n      'AES-KW',\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new InvalidKeyError()\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Per-record CEK wrapping ───────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive a **dedicated** AES-KW wrapping key from a collection/tier DEK via\n * HKDF-SHA256, used to wrap/unwrap a per-record CEK.\n *\n * The collection/tier DEKs are AES-256-**GCM** keys (usages\n * `encrypt`/`decrypt`) and cannot themselves act as an AES-KW KEK. We do NOT\n * re-import the raw DEK bytes directly as an AES-KW key — that would reuse one\n * key across two primitives (AES-GCM for `_det`/presence, AES-KW for CEK\n * wrapping), violating key separation. Instead we HKDF-derive a domain-\n * separated KW key (salt `noydb-cek-wrap`), exactly as `derivePresenceKey`\n * derives a separate presence key. The derivation is deterministic, so\n * wrapping the same CEK under the same DEK always yields identical ciphertext\n * — which is what lets an update reuse a record's stable CEK and produce a\n * byte-identical `_cek`. The KW key is independent of the DEK's GCM key.\n *\n * The DEK must be extractable (it is — `generateDEK`/`unwrapKey` mint\n * extractable keys).\n */\nasync function asKwKey(dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-cek-wrap')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode('v1')\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', bits, 'AES-KW', false, ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'])\n}\n\n/**\n * AES-KW-wrap a per-record CEK under a collection/tier DEK. Returns base64.\n * Deterministic over `(cek, dek)`.\n */\nexport async function wrapCek(cek: CryptoKey, dek: CryptoKey): Promise<string> {\n  const kw = await asKwKey(dek)\n  const wrapped = await subtle.wrapKey('raw', cek, kw, 'AES-KW')\n  return bufferToBase64(wrapped)\n}\n\n/**\n * Unwrap a per-record CEK from base64 under a collection/tier DEK. Throws\n * `InvalidKeyError` if the wrapped bytes do not authenticate under the DEK.\n */\nexport async function unwrapCek(wrappedBase64: string, dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const kw = await asKwKey(dek)\n  try {\n    return await subtle.unwrapKey(\n      'raw',\n      base64ToBuffer(wrappedBase64) as BufferSource,\n      kw,\n      'AES-KW',\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new InvalidKeyError()\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Import a raw 32-byte AES-256-GCM record CEK (e.g. from a sealed-CEK\n * delivery binding). Non-extractable, decrypt-only — the imported key is\n * used solely to open the record's `_iv`/`_data` body under `decrypt()`.\n */\nexport async function importCek(rawKey: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', rawKey as BufferSource, { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS }, false, ['decrypt'])\n}\n\n// ─── Encrypt / Decrypt ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface EncryptResult {\n  iv: string   // base64\n  data: string // base64\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt plaintext JSON string with AES-256-GCM. Fresh IV per call.\n *\n * `aad` binds the record's identity into the auth tag (#1041) — see\n * `record-aad.ts` for what is bound and why `_v` is not. A body sealed with\n * AAD can only be opened by a reader supplying the identical bytes, which is\n * what stops an untrusted store from relocating or re-tiering an envelope.\n *\n * Optional **only while the call-site sweep is in progress**. It becomes\n * mandatory once every `encrypt`/`decrypt` pair supplies it, at which point\n * the format version bumps and the reader rejects anything unbound. Until\n * then an omitted `aad` reproduces the previous, unauthenticated behaviour.\n */\nexport async function encrypt(\n  plaintext: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad?: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext)\n\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    {\n      name: 'AES-GCM',\n      iv: iv as BufferSource,\n      ...(aad !== undefined && { additionalData: aad as BufferSource }),\n    },\n    dek,\n    encoded,\n  )\n\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext. Throws on wrong key or tampered data.\n *\n * `aad` must be byte-identical to what {@link encrypt} was given, or the auth\n * tag fails and this throws `TamperedError` (#1041). Note the asymmetry that\n * makes this useful: a mismatched identity is indistinguishable from a\n * corrupted body, so relocation fails **closed** rather than returning a\n * plausible record in the wrong place.\n */\nexport async function decrypt(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad?: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      {\n        name: 'AES-GCM',\n        iv: iv as BufferSource,\n        ...(aad !== undefined && { additionalData: aad as BufferSource }),\n      },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError(...(await classifyTagFailure(iv, ciphertext, dek, aad)))\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n\n/**\n * Distinguish a FORMAT TRANSITION from an attack, when the enclave can (#1103).\n *\n * ## The problem\n *\n * Since #1041 switched identity AAD on, one `TamperedError` covers at least\n * four situations: legitimate pre-binding data, a store that reconstructs an\n * envelope and drops a bound field, a CEK/rotation mismatch, and actual\n * tampering. `SECURITY.md` and the subsystem docs teach the LAST reading — so a\n * user who upgrades, hits this on their own honest data, and consults the docs\n * is told their store has been compromised.\n *\n * That is a false positive on the product's central security claim, and the\n * cost is not merely a confusing message: **a tamper alarm that cries wolf is\n * one users learn to ignore.**\n *\n * ## Why the probe is sound, and why it is NOT a downgrade\n *\n * A body sealed before #1041 carries no AAD, so it opens under an empty one.\n * Retrying that way is **positive evidence** of the legacy format rather than a\n * guess: forging a body that decrypts under this DEK requires the DEK, and an\n * untrusted store does not hold one.\n *\n * ⚠️ **Classification ONLY — the plaintext is discarded and the caller still\n * throws.** That is the entire safety argument: the outcome is identical either\n * way, so this cannot become the lenient path #1041 exists to remove. A variant\n * that RETURNED the retry's plaintext would be exactly the accept-without-AAD\n * downgrade the binding was built to prevent. Do not \"optimise\" it into one.\n *\n * Note what the honest message concedes: pre-#1041 data had no authenticated\n * metadata, so a legacy record that was ALSO tampered with reads as legacy.\n * That is not a weakening — it is an accurate statement about data that\n * genuinely never carried a binding.\n */\nasync function classifyTagFailure(\n  iv: Uint8Array,\n  ciphertext: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array | undefined,\n): Promise<[] | [string, 'unbound-legacy-format']> {\n  // Only meaningful when AAD was supplied: with none there is no second\n  // interpretation to test, and the failure is a plain tag mismatch.\n  if (aad === undefined) return []\n  try {\n    await subtle.decrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource }, dek, ciphertext as BufferSource)\n  } catch {\n    return [] // no benign explanation — the security alert stands\n  }\n  return [\n    'This record was sealed BEFORE record-identity binding (#1041) and cannot be read by this ' +\n    'version. Its body decrypts correctly under the record key, so this is a data-format ' +\n    'transition, not tampering — but it also means the record predates authenticated metadata. ' +\n    'There is no migration path; see noy-db #1100.',\n    'unbound-legacy-format',\n  ]\n}\n\n// ─── Binary Encrypt / Decrypt ────────\n\n/**\n * Encrypt raw bytes with AES-256-GCM using a fresh random IV.\n * Used by the attachment store so binary blobs avoid double base64 encoding\n * (the existing `encrypt()` function calls `TextEncoder` on a string — here\n * we pass the `Uint8Array` directly to `subtle.encrypt`).\n */\nexport async function encryptBytes(\n  data: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n    dek,\n    data as unknown as BufferSource,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext back to raw bytes.\n * Counterpart to `encryptBytes`. Throws `TamperedError` on auth-tag failure.\n */\nexport async function decryptBytes(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new Uint8Array(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * SHA-256 hex digest of raw bytes. Used to derive content-addressed\n * eTags for blob deduplication. Computed on plaintext bytes\n * before compression and encryption so the eTag identifies content, not\n * ciphertext, and survives re-encryption (key rotation, re-upload).\n */\nexport async function sha256Hex(data: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  const hash = await subtle.digest('SHA-256', data as unknown as BufferSource)\n  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(hash))\n    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))\n    .join('')\n}\n\n// ─── HMAC-SHA-256 ─────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Compute HMAC-SHA-256(key, data) and return hex string.\n *\n * Used to derive content-addressed eTags that are opaque to the store:\n * ```\n * eTag = hmacSha256Hex(blobDEK, plaintext)\n * ```\n *\n * Unlike a plain SHA-256, the HMAC is keyed by the vault-shared `_blob` DEK,\n * so an attacker with store access cannot pre-compute eTags for known files.\n * Deduplication still works within a vault (same key + same content = same eTag).\n */\n/**\n * Derive the blob CONTENT-ADDRESSING key for one tier (#1126).\n *\n * The blob eTag is an HMAC over the plaintext. It used to be keyed by the\n * `_blob` DEK — the very key `rotateKeys` replaces — so after any rotation\n * `HMAC(live DEK, plaintext) !== storedETag` for every blob written before it,\n * permanently. `decryptResponse()` checks that unconditionally, so the\n * presigned-URL read path raised `TamperedError` on legitimate data forever;\n * dedup also split, minting a second address for identical bytes.\n *\n * The fix is a `root` that rotation never touches (`_blob_addr`, refused by\n * `rotateKeys` exactly as `_roster` is). Rotation then re-keys chunk BODIES\n * while every address stays stable, which is what makes the AAD\n * `{eTag}:{i}:{count}` and every `_blob_index` / `_blob_slots_*` /\n * `_blob_versions_*` row survive it untouched.\n *\n * **Derived PER TIER, deliberately.** A single vault-wide address would make an\n * elevated blob and a tier-0 blob with identical content share an eTag,\n * leaking equality across a boundary the tier system exists to enforce — and\n * `rehomeForTier` re-addresses on a tier move precisely because the address is\n * tier-scoped today. Domain separation keeps that property while removing the\n * rotation coupling: the two are independent axes, and only one of them was\n * ever meant to change the address.\n *\n * Same HKDF idiom as `asKwKey`, with its own salt so the addressing key can\n * never coincide with a wrapping or encryption key.\n */\nexport async function deriveBlobAddressKey(root: CryptoKey, tier: number): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawRoot = await subtle.exportKey('raw', root)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawRoot, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-blob-address')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(`tier:${tier}`)\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits({ name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info }, hkdfKey, KEY_BITS)\n  // Imported as AES-GCM only because `hmacSha256Hex` re-exports raw and\n  // re-imports as HMAC; the algorithm tag here is a carrier, never used to\n  // encrypt anything.\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', bits, { name: 'AES-GCM' }, true, ['encrypt', 'decrypt'])\n}\n\nexport async function hmacSha256Hex(key: CryptoKey, data: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  // Export AES-GCM DEK raw bytes → import as HMAC key\n  const rawKey = await subtle.exportKey('raw', key)\n  const hmacKey = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    rawKey,\n    { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    false,\n    ['sign'],\n  )\n  const sig = await subtle.sign('HMAC', hmacKey, data as unknown as BufferSource)\n  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(sig))\n    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))\n    .join('')\n}\n\n// ─── AAD-aware Binary Encrypt / Decrypt ──\n\n/**\n * Encrypt raw bytes with AES-256-GCM using Additional Authenticated Data.\n *\n * The AAD binds each chunk to its parent blob and position, preventing\n * chunk reorder, substitution, and truncation attacks:\n * ```\n * AAD = UTF-8(\"{eTag}:{chunkIndex}:{chunkCount}\")\n * ```\n *\n * The AAD is NOT stored — the reader reconstructs it from `BlobObject`\n * metadata and passes it to `decryptBytesWithAAD`.\n */\nexport async function encryptBytesWithAAD(\n  data: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    {\n      name: 'AES-GCM',\n      iv: iv as BufferSource,\n      additionalData: aad as BufferSource,\n    },\n    dek,\n    data as unknown as BufferSource,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext with AAD verification.\n *\n * If the AAD does not match the one used at encryption time (e.g. because\n * a chunk was reordered or substituted from another blob), the GCM auth\n * tag fails and this throws `TamperedError`.\n */\nexport async function decryptBytesWithAAD(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      {\n        name: 'AES-GCM',\n        iv: iv as BufferSource,\n        additionalData: aad as BufferSource,\n      },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new Uint8Array(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Presence Key Derivation ──────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive an AES-256-GCM presence key from a collection DEK using HKDF-SHA256.\n *\n * The presence key is domain-separated from the data DEK by the fixed salt\n * `'noydb-presence'` and the `info` = collection name. This means:\n *  - The adapter never sees the presence key.\n *  - Presence payloads rotate automatically when the collection DEK is rotated.\n *  - Revoked users cannot derive the new presence key after a DEK rotation.\n *\n * @param dek            The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Used as the HKDF `info` parameter for domain separation.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key suitable for presence payload encryption.\n */\nexport async function derivePresenceKey(dek: CryptoKey, collectionName: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  // Step 1: export DEK raw bytes\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n\n  // Step 2: import as HKDF key material\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    rawDek,\n    'HKDF',\n    false,\n    ['deriveBits'],\n  )\n\n  // Step 3: derive 256 bits with salt='noydb-presence' and info=collectionName\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-presence')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(collectionName)\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n\n  // Step 4: import derived bits as AES-GCM key\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Sealed Field Key Derivation ──────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive a **per-field** AES-256-GCM key from a collection DEK using\n * HKDF-SHA256, used to encrypt a single sensitive field into its own\n * `_sealed[field]` envelope slot (structural group-encryption).\n *\n * Domain-separated from the data DEK (and from the presence/deterministic\n * channels) by the fixed salt `'noydb-sealed'` and an `info` of\n * `JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed', collectionName, field])`. The JSON-array\n * encoding is injective — each element is separately quoted/escaped — so\n * collection `a/sealed/b` + field `c` cannot collide with collection `a` +\n * field `b/sealed/c`. Each sensitive field gets a **distinct** key, so a\n * `_sealed[a]` ciphertext does not authenticate under field `b`'s key —\n * sealed fields are cryptographically isolated from one another. The\n * collection name keeps the same field name in two collections from sharing a\n * key, mirroring how `derivePresenceKey` / `encryptDeterministic` domain-separate.\n *\n * @param dek            The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Part of the HKDF `info` for domain separation.\n * @param field          Sensitive field name — the rest of the `info`.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key for that field's sealed slot.\n */\nexport async function deriveSealedFieldKey(\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  collectionName: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-sealed')\n  // JSON-array encoding is injective: each element is separately quoted/\n  // escaped, so collection `a/sealed/b` + field `c` cannot collide with\n  // collection `a` + field `b/sealed/c`.\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed', collectionName, field]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive a per-record sealed-field key from the record's **per-record CEK**\n * rather than the collection DEK. Same HKDF construction as\n * {@link deriveSealedFieldKey} but with salt `'noydb-sealed-cek'` (distinct\n * from `'noydb-sealed'`), so a CEK-derived key can never collide with a\n * DEK-derived one for the same `{collection, field}`.\n *\n * The point: the sealed ciphertext's only key now flows from the record's CEK.\n * Dropping the record's wrapped `_cek` (crypto-shred / `forget`) makes the key\n * — and thus `_sealed[field]` — unrecoverable, giving sealed fields the same\n * erasure guarantee `_data` already has. The CEK must be extractable (it is —\n * `unwrapCek`/`generateDEK` mint extractable keys).\n *\n * @param cek            The record's AES-256-GCM CEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Part of the HKDF `info` for domain separation.\n * @param field          Sensitive field name — the rest of the `info`.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key for that field's sealed slot.\n */\nexport async function deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek(\n  cek: CryptoKey,\n  collectionName: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawCek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', cek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawCek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-sealed-cek')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed-cek', collectionName, field]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Deterministic Encryption ────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive the collection's **dedicated deterministic-index key** from its DEK\n * via HKDF-SHA256 (L-1, #554).\n *\n * `_det` slots previously encrypted under the raw collection DEK — the same\n * key `_data` uses with a *randomized*-IV regime while `_det` uses a\n * *deterministic*-IV regime. Two IV regimes on one key is avoidable hygiene\n * debt (~2^-96 theoretical collision), so the deterministic index now gets its\n * own HKDF-separated key: salt `'noydb-det'`, info\n * `JSON.stringify(['noydb-det'])` (the injective JSON-array domain tag, same\n * convention as {@link deriveSealedFieldKey}). Per-field separation still\n * comes from the `'<collection>/<field>'` context inside\n * {@link encryptDeterministic}, exactly as before.\n *\n * The derived key stays **DEK-derived (collection-level)** on purpose: `_det`\n * is carried verbatim through per-record CEK rotation (see\n * `record-keys/sealing.ts`), so its key must not depend on the CEK. It rotates\n * with the collection DEK, like the presence key.\n *\n * The key is minted **extractable** — {@link encryptDeterministic} derives its\n * per-value IV via HKDF over the raw key bytes (an `exportKey` under the\n * hood), which a non-extractable key would forbid. Same in-memory posture as\n * the DEK itself (`generateDEK` mints extractable keys).\n *\n * @param dek The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @returns A dedicated AES-256-GCM key for the `_det` deterministic index.\n */\nexport async function deriveDeterministicKey(dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-det')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-det']))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    true,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive a deterministic 12-byte IV from `{ DEK, context, plaintext }`\n * via HKDF-SHA256. Given the same three inputs, the IV is identical, so\n * `encryptDeterministic` produces the same ciphertext on every call —\n * which is precisely what enables blind equality search on encrypted\n * fields.\n *\n * **The side channel this opens.** Two records whose field value is the\n * same produce the same ciphertext. An observer with store access can\n * therefore tell which records share a value — not *what* the value is,\n * but the equivalence class. This is the well-known trade-off of\n * deterministic encryption and is why the feature is strictly opt-in\n * per field, guarded by `acknowledgeDeterministicRisk: true` at\n * collection creation.\n *\n * The context string MUST include the collection name and field name,\n * so:\n *   - The same plaintext in two different fields encrypts differently\n *     (no cross-field equality leak).\n *   - The same plaintext in two different collections (different DEKs)\n *     encrypts differently by virtue of the key, even before HKDF\n *     domain separation kicks in.\n */\nasync function deriveDeterministicIV(\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  context: string,\n  plaintext: string,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-deterministic-v1')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(`${context}\\x00${plaintext}`)\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    IV_BYTES * 8,\n  )\n  return new Uint8Array(bits)\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt a plaintext string with AES-256-GCM and a deterministic,\n * HKDF-derived IV.\n *\n * The same `{ dek, context, plaintext }` triple always produces the\n * same `{ iv, data }` — call this twice and you can string-compare the\n * ciphertexts to check equality of the inputs without decrypting them.\n *\n * @param context  Domain-separation string — by convention\n *                 `'<collection>/<field>'`. Different contexts encrypt\n *                 the same plaintext to different ciphertexts, so\n *                 `email` in collection `users` does not collide with\n *                 `email` in collection `customers`.\n */\nexport async function encryptDeterministic(\n  plaintext: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  context: string,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = await deriveDeterministicIV(dek, context, plaintext)\n  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext)\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n    dek,\n    encoded,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Counterpart to {@link encryptDeterministic}. The IV is stored\n * alongside the ciphertext (exactly like the randomized path), so\n * decrypt uses the stored IV and verifies the GCM auth tag — a tampered\n * ciphertext throws `TamperedError` just like randomized AES-GCM.\n */\nexport async function decryptDeterministic(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<string> {\n  return decrypt(ivBase64, dataBase64, dek)\n}\n\n// ─── Random Generation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Generate a random 12-byte IV for AES-GCM. */\nexport function generateIV(): Uint8Array {\n  return globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(IV_BYTES))\n}\n\n/** Generate a random 32-byte salt for PBKDF2. */\nexport function generateSalt(): Uint8Array {\n  return globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(SALT_BYTES))\n}\n\n// ─── Base64 Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport function bufferToBase64(buffer: ArrayBuffer | Uint8Array): string {\n  const bytes = buffer instanceof Uint8Array ? buffer : new Uint8Array(buffer)\n  let binary = ''\n  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) {\n    binary += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]!)\n  }\n  return btoa(binary)\n}\n\nexport function base64ToBuffer(base64: string): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> {\n  const binary = atob(base64)\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length)\n  for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) {\n    bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i)\n  }\n  return 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package/dist/{chunk-VMYXYFPX.js → chunk-DBPQUICN.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   LookupHandle
-} from "./chunk-2DFE4TUE.js";
+} from "./chunk-HUDP5NSI.js";
 
 // src/via/lookup/active.ts
 function withLookup() {
@@ -33,4 +33,4 @@ function withLookup() {
 export {
   withLookup
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VMYXYFPX.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-DBPQUICN.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-3TWEXEKX.js → chunk-DL7NXFAY.js}

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import {
 import {
   FieldNotQueryableError,
   IndexRequiredError
-} from "./chunk-PKUJ3JLQ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5OFC3QYL.js";
 
 // src/with-lookup/indexing/strategy.ts
 var NO_INDEXING = {
@@ -534,4 +534,4 @@ export {
   PersistedCollectionIndex,
   LazyQuery
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-3TWEXEKX.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-DL7NXFAY.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-2VMCJUK6.js → chunk-DM2BZDNV.js}

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 import {
   pickLocale
-} from "./chunk-HRSEAGLI.js";
+} from "./chunk-TTGZ6KGY.js";
 import {
   sha256Hex
-} from "./chunk-O5QXH7U7.js";
+} from "./chunk-D7STIWJO.js";
 import {
   PodIntegrityError,
   PodSealMismatchError,
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-PKUJ3JLQ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5OFC3QYL.js";
 
 // src/with-pod/format.ts
 var NOYDB_POD_MAGIC = new Uint8Array([78, 68, 66, 49]);
@@ -812,7 +812,7 @@ async function applySatelliteLivenessFilter(vault, dumpJson) {
   if (!backup.collections || typeof backup.collections !== "object") return dumpJson;
   if (typeof vault._introspectState !== "function") return dumpJson;
   const { adapter, name, getDEK } = vault._introspectState();
-  const { liveBaseIdSetsForBundle } = await import("./dead-filter-56AYTNAO.js");
+  const { liveBaseIdSetsForBundle } = await import("./dead-filter-CCLDPNTJ.js");
   const satLive = await liveBaseIdSetsForBundle(adapter, name, Object.keys(backup.collections), getDEK);
   if (satLive.size === 0) return dumpJson;
   const next = {};
@@ -1059,4 +1059,4 @@ export {
   readPodRedirect,
   readPod
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-2VMCJUK6.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-DM2BZDNV.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-FFSQFH6D.js → chunk-DNKVKO7K.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   buildRecordEnvelope
-} from "./chunk-PENPHA45.js";
+} from "./chunk-FX3UIDCS.js";
 
 // src/with-shape/schema-update/fence.ts
 var FENCE_RECORD_ID = "schema-fence";
@@ -36,4 +36,4 @@ export {
   loadFence,
   saveFence
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-FFSQFH6D.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-DNKVKO7K.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-IPA6ODWG.js → chunk-E2LYQUB7.js}

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 import {
   installViaBinder
-} from "./chunk-7JOXCSDU.js";
+} from "./chunk-6PLCNLBC.js";
 import {
   SealedHandle
-} from "./chunk-IGNJOJEP.js";
+} from "./chunk-UJ4Z67UQ.js";
 import {
   ClassifiedConfigError,
   ClassifiedNotEnabledError
-} from "./chunk-PKUJ3JLQ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5OFC3QYL.js";
 
 // src/via/classified/descriptor.ts
 function isClassifiedFieldSpec(x) {
@@ -262,4 +262,4 @@ export {
   enforceClassifiedWrite,
   NO_CLASSIFIED
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-IPA6ODWG.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-E2LYQUB7.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-ANYVM4SX.js → chunk-ENTVT7PF.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   OverlayIdMismatchError
-} from "./chunk-PKUJ3JLQ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5OFC3QYL.js";
 
 // src/with-formula/overlay-views/virtual-collection.ts
 var OverlayedCollection = class {
@@ -206,4 +206,4 @@ var OverlayedCollection = class {
 export {
   OverlayedCollection
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ANYVM4SX.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ENTVT7PF.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-M3FKPVOU.js → chunk-ESP4K32V.js}

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 import {
   loadVaultPolicy,
   saveVaultPolicy
-} from "./chunk-3ENNPCIW.js";
+} from "./chunk-ZY6P7M52.js";
 import {
   PolicyDeniedError,
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-PKUJ3JLQ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5OFC3QYL.js";
 
 // src/with-party/policy/presets.ts
 var PERSONAL_POLICY = Object.freeze({
@@ -364,4 +364,4 @@ export {
   describeGate,
   createNoydbPolicy
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-M3FKPVOU.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ESP4K32V.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-A66LJYFG.js → chunk-FEWCVAFV.js}

@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
 import {
   sha256Hex
-} from "./chunk-O5QXH7U7.js";
+} from "./chunk-D7STIWJO.js";
 import {
-  MaterializedViewSourceUnknownError
-} from "./chunk-PKUJ3JLQ.js";
+  MaterializedViewConfigError,
+  MaterializedViewSourceUnknownError,
+  RefNotDeclaredError
+} from "./chunk-5OFC3QYL.js";
 
 // src/with-formula/materialized-views/dependency-analyzer.ts
 function analyzeDependencies(query) {
@@ -63,9 +65,10 @@ function summarizeUnionPlan(spec) {
 }
 function summarizeProjectionPlan(spec) {
   const projection = spec.projection;
-  const legs = projection.joins.map(
-    (leg) => "collect" in leg ? `collect:${leg.collect}.${leg.on}\u2192${leg.as}` : `field:${leg.field}\u2192${leg.as}`
-  ).sort();
+  const legs = projection.joins.map((leg) => {
+    const at = leg.from !== void 0 ? `@${leg.from}` : "";
+    return "collect" in leg ? `collect${at}:${leg.collect}.${leg.on}\u2192${leg.as}` : `field${at}:${leg.field}\u2192${leg.as}`;
+  }).sort();
   const body = JSON.stringify({ source: projection.source, legs });
   return `projection(${body})${summarizeGroupingTail(spec)}`;
 }
@@ -105,6 +108,44 @@ function canonicalizeQueryPlan(plan) {
   });
 }
 
+// src/with-formula/materialized-views/projection-legs.ts
+function isCollectLeg(leg) {
+  return "collect" in leg;
+}
+function validateProjectionLegs(mvName, projection) {
+  const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  for (const leg of projection.joins) {
+    if (leg.from !== void 0) {
+      const parent = seen.get(leg.from);
+      if (!parent) {
+        throw new MaterializedViewConfigError(
+          `"${mvName}": projection leg "${leg.as}" declares from: "${leg.from}", which is not an alias declared EARLIER in \`joins\`. A leg may only attach to the primary row or to a preceding leg \u2014 that ordering rule is what makes a cycle impossible. Known so far: ${[...seen.keys()].map((a) => `"${a}"`).join(", ") || "(none)"}`
+        );
+      }
+      if (isCollectLeg(parent)) {
+        throw new MaterializedViewConfigError(
+          `"${mvName}": projection leg "${leg.as}" declares from: "${leg.from}", but "${leg.from}" is a collect leg and holds an ARRAY of rows, not one record. A leg can only hang off a forward leg (record | null). Attach it to the primary row instead, or collect the far side directly if its ref() reaches "${projection.source}".`
+        );
+      }
+    }
+    seen.set(leg.as, leg);
+  }
+}
+function resolveLegOwner(leg, joins, source, resolveRef) {
+  if (leg.from === void 0) return source;
+  const parent = joins.find((l) => l.as === leg.from);
+  if (!parent) return null;
+  if (isCollectLeg(parent)) return parent.collect;
+  const parentOwner = resolveLegOwner(parent, joins, source, resolveRef);
+  if (parentOwner === null) return null;
+  return resolveRef(parentOwner, parent.field)?.target ?? null;
+}
+function resolveForwardLegTarget(leg, joins, source, resolveRef) {
+  const owner = resolveLegOwner(leg, joins, source, resolveRef);
+  if (owner === null) return null;
+  return resolveRef(owner, leg.field)?.target ?? null;
+}
+
 // src/with-formula/materialized-views/registry.ts
 var WHOLE_RECORD = "*";
 var MaterializedViewRegistry = class {
@@ -126,6 +167,33 @@ var MaterializedViewRegistry = class {
    * target has resolved (see `_resolvePendingForwardDeps`).
    */
   _pendingForwardDeps = [];
+  /**
+   * Query-form strategies whose `query()` callback could not be planned at
+   * registration time because a `.join()` names a field whose `ref()` is not
+   * declared YET (#1139).
+   *
+   * Registration runs inside `openVault()`; a collection's refs can only be
+   * declared afterwards, so for a query-form MV that joins a declared FK there
+   * is NO call ordering the consumer can choose — the plan is simply built too
+   * early. Rather than failing the vault open, the strategy is parked here and
+   * replanned from {@link resolvePendingPlans}, which every write dispatch and
+   * `vault.refreshView()` call runs first. This is the query-form counterpart
+   * of `_pendingForwardDeps`, one level up: that defers a leg's TARGET, this
+   * defers the whole plan.
+   *
+   * Only `RefNotDeclaredError` parks a strategy. Every other planning failure
+   * still throws out of `openVault()` exactly as before, so a typo'd source or
+   * a malformed spec keeps its loud, early error.
+   *
+   * A parked strategy is invisible until it resolves: it contributes no
+   * `_bySource` entries and no cycle-detection edges (same caveat as a
+   * late-resolved forward target — `edges()` runs once at vault open). It also
+   * cannot be dispatched, which is why {@link hasPendingPlans} forces the
+   * conservative branch in `Collection._txAtomicSafe`: the atomic write path
+   * skips MV dispatch, and skipping it here would mean the write that was
+   * supposed to trigger the first replan is the one that gets missed.
+   */
+  _pendingPlans = [];
   /**
    * Register an MV. Invokes `spec.query()` once at registration time to
    * read the plan + join context; the resulting `Query<T>` is discarded
@@ -152,13 +220,20 @@ var MaterializedViewRegistry = class {
       const projection = spec.projection;
       dependencies = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([projection.source]);
       for (const leg of projection.joins) {
-        if ("collect" in leg) dependencies.add(leg.collect);
-        else pendingForwardFields.push(leg.field);
+        if (isCollectLeg(leg)) dependencies.add(leg.collect);
+        else pendingForwardFields.push(leg.as);
       }
       if (spec.sources) for (const s of spec.sources) dependencies.add(s);
       queryPlanSummary = summarizeProjectionPlan(spec);
     } else {
-      const q = spec.query(dbForQuery);
+      let q;
+      try {
+        q = spec.query(dbForQuery);
+      } catch (e) {
+        if (!(e instanceof RefNotDeclaredError)) throw e;
+        this._pendingPlans.push({ spec, db, ...options !== void 0 ? { options } : {} });
+        return;
+      }
       qAny = q;
       isQuery = typeof qAny._plan === "function";
       if (isQuery) {
@@ -206,15 +281,51 @@ var MaterializedViewRegistry = class {
     }
     if (pendingForwardFields.length > 0) {
       const refRegistry = db.refRegistry;
-      const source = spec.projection.source;
+      const projectionSpec = spec.projection;
+      const resolveRef = (c, f) => refRegistry?.getOutbound(c)[f] ?? null;
       this._pendingForwardDeps.push({
         reg,
-        fields: new Set(pendingForwardFields),
-        resolveTarget: (field) => refRegistry?.getOutbound(source)[field]?.target ?? null
+        aliases: new Set(pendingForwardFields),
+        resolveTarget: (alias) => {
+          const leg = projectionSpec.joins.find((l) => l.as === alias);
+          if (!leg || isCollectLeg(leg)) return null;
+          return resolveForwardLegTarget(leg, projectionSpec.joins, projectionSpec.source, resolveRef);
+        }
       });
       this._resolvePendingForwardDeps();
     }
   }
+  /**
+   * `true` while any query-form strategy is still unplanned (#1139). Read by
+   * `Collection._txAtomicSafe`, which must refuse the atomic write path while
+   * this holds — see the `_pendingPlans` doc comment for why.
+   */
+  hasPendingPlans() {
+    return this._pendingPlans.length > 0;
+  }
+  /**
+   * Replan every parked query-form strategy (#1139). Called at the head of both
+   * write dispatchers and of `vault.refreshView()`, so a strategy resolves on the
+   * first write or refresh after its source collection's refs are declared —
+   * which is the earliest moment it could produce a correct plan, and strictly
+   * before the first moment it could have any output to produce.
+   *
+   * Each entry is handed straight back to {@link register}, so a strategy that
+   * is STILL unplannable simply re-parks itself and the next dispatch tries
+   * again. Idempotent and cheap: the array empties as strategies resolve, and
+   * both callers skip the await entirely once it is empty.
+   *
+   * A late-resolved strategy does NOT retro-feed `edges()` — the unified cycle
+   * pass runs once at vault open, before refs exist. Same caveat, and the same
+   * reason, as a late-resolved forward-leg target.
+   */
+  async resolvePendingPlans() {
+    if (this._pendingPlans.length === 0) return;
+    const parked = this._pendingPlans.splice(0);
+    for (const entry of parked) {
+      await this.register(entry.spec, entry.db, entry.options);
+    }
+  }
   /** All MVs that depend on `source`, in registration order. */
   mvsForSource(source) {
     if (this._pendingForwardDeps.length > 0) this._resolvePendingForwardDeps();
@@ -237,17 +348,17 @@ var MaterializedViewRegistry = class {
   _resolvePendingForwardDeps() {
     for (let i = this._pendingForwardDeps.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
       const entry = this._pendingForwardDeps[i];
-      for (const field of [...entry.fields]) {
-        const target = entry.resolveTarget(field);
+      for (const alias of [...entry.aliases]) {
+        const target = entry.resolveTarget(alias);
         if (target === null) continue;
-        entry.fields.delete(field);
+        entry.aliases.delete(alias);
         if (entry.reg.dependencies.has(target)) continue;
         entry.reg.dependencies.add(target);
         const arr = this._bySource.get(target);
         if (arr) arr.push(entry.reg);
         else this._bySource.set(target, [entry.reg]);
       }
-      if (entry.fields.size === 0) this._pendingForwardDeps.splice(i, 1);
+      if (entry.aliases.size === 0) this._pendingForwardDeps.splice(i, 1);
     }
   }
   /** Single MV by name, or `undefined`. */
@@ -366,7 +477,10 @@ export {
   summarizeQueryPlan,
   computeQueryHash,
   canonicalizeQueryPlan,
+  isCollectLeg,
+  validateProjectionLegs,
+  resolveLegOwner,
   MaterializedViewRegistry,
   wrapDbWithPredicates
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-A66LJYFG.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-FEWCVAFV.js.map

package/dist/chunk-FEWCVAFV.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-formula/materialized-views/dependency-analyzer.ts","../src/with-formula/materialized-views/query-hash.ts","../src/with-formula/materialized-views/projection-legs.ts","../src/with-formula/materialized-views/registry.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import type { Query, QueryPlan } from '../../kernel/query/builder.js'\nimport type { JoinContext } from '../../kernel/query/join.js'\nimport type { MaterializedViewSpec } from './types.js'\n\n/**\n * Walks a `Query<T>` plan and returns the set of source collection\n * names that any source-write should trigger a refresh on.\n *\n * Handles:\n *   - root collection (the one the query was built from)\n *   - FK join targets (`.join(field, { as })`)\n *\n * Also handles:\n *   - cross-join targets (`.crossJoin(target, { as })`) — v3\n *\n * Deferred:\n *   - `.wherePredicate(name)` — v2 predicate primitive\n *   - Overlay-name expansion to {base, overlay}\n *\n * The set is materialized at MV registration time. The MV registry\n * uses it to (a) dispatch `onSourceWrite` only to MVs that actually\n * care, and (b) contribute edges to the shared cycle-detection graph.\n */\n// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\nexport function analyzeDependencies(query: Query<any>): Set<string> {\n  const deps = new Set<string>()\n  const plan = query._plan()\n  const ctx = query._joinContext()\n\n  // The root collection is always a dependency.\n  if (ctx?.leftCollection) {\n    deps.add(ctx.leftCollection)\n  }\n\n  // FK join targets contribute additional sources.\n  for (const leg of plan.joins) {\n    deps.add(leg.target)\n  }\n\n  // Cross-join targets are also dependency sources — writes to either side\n  // must trigger MV refresh. Symmetric with FK-join target handling above.\n  for (const clause of plan.clauses) {\n    if (clause.type === 'crossJoin') {\n      deps.add(clause.target)\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Sub-plans inside OR clauses can carry nested joins. Walk them.\n  // (Today only top-level `.join()` populates `plan.joins`, but the\n  // OR-group machinery permits sub-plans, so we recurse defensively.)\n  walkClausesForJoins(plan, deps, ctx)\n\n  return deps\n}\n\nfunction walkClausesForJoins(\n  plan: QueryPlan,\n  deps: Set<string>,\n  ctx: JoinContext | undefined,\n): void {\n  void ctx\n  // Today `plan.joins` carries all join legs at top level. Sub-plans\n  // inside OR groups don't currently support nested joins, so the loop\n  // below is a no-op safety net for future builder extensions.\n  for (const clause of plan.clauses) {\n    if (clause.type === 'group') {\n      // Group clauses don't (yet) carry their own joins; this is a\n      // forward-compat anchor for when OR-groups support nested\n      // sources.\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Convenience: produce a stable string summary of the query plan\n * suitable for `queryHash` derivation. Captures everything the\n * dependency analyzer reads + the where/orderBy/limit/offset\n * structure that affects materialized rows.\n *\n * `joinContext` is intentionally NOT included — the join-resolution\n * function references would defeat hash determinism. The set of join\n * TARGETS (collection names) IS included via the plan.joins legs.\n */\n// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\nexport function summarizeQueryPlan(query: Query<any>): string {\n  const plan = query._plan()\n  const ctx = query._joinContext()\n  return JSON.stringify({\n    root: ctx?.leftCollection ?? null,\n    clauses: plan.clauses.map(c => {\n      if (c.type === 'crossJoin') {\n        return {\n          type: 'crossJoin',\n          target: c.target,\n          as: c.as,\n          // Inline on: callback: use sentinel — drift detection disabled for this MV\n          onPredicateName: c.onPredicateName ?? (c.on ? '[inline]' : null),\n          maxRows: c.maxRows ?? null,\n          // `outer` changes the row set, so it is part of the plan's identity\n          // for drift detection, not decoration (#1130).\n          outer: c.outer ?? false,\n        }\n      }\n      return c\n    }),\n    orderBy: plan.orderBy,\n    limit: plan.limit ?? null,\n    offset: plan.offset,\n    joins: plan.joins.map(j => ({ field: j.field, as: j.as, target: j.target, mode: j.mode })),\n  })\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonical string description of a UNION MV's plan, used as input to\n * `computeQueryHash`.\n *\n * Asymmetry note:\n *   - Arm collection names are NOT sorted. Declaration order is\n *     semantically meaningful for the dedup-only UNION path —\n *     `materializeUnionResult` iterates `spec.unionSources` in\n *     declaration order and keeps the first-seen row per composite key\n *     (tie-break precedence). If we sorted arms here, a consumer who\n *     reordered `unionSources` to change precedence would compute the\n *     same `queryHash`, refresh would be a no-op, and stale MV rows\n *     would persist. Hashing in declaration order makes any reorder\n *     trigger a refresh.\n *   - `groupBy` fields ARE sorted. Multi-key groupBy buckets are\n *     commutative (`canonicalGroupKey` produces the same composite key\n *     regardless of field order in the input spec).\n *   - `aggregate` keys ARE sorted. Reducer-spec keys are independent\n *     of each other — order of declaration doesn't change output.\n *\n * Per-arm `map` functions are NOT fingerprinted; consumers must bump\n * the MV's `name` (or rely on application-level cache busting) when\n * `map` semantics change non-equivalently.\n */\nexport function summarizeUnionPlan<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(\n  spec: MaterializedViewSpec<T>,\n): string {\n  return `union(${summarizeUnionArms(spec)})${summarizeGroupingTail(spec)}`\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonical string description of a projection MV's plan (#810), used\n * as input to `computeQueryHash`.\n *\n * Leg descriptors ARE sorted (contrast with UNION arm order): every\n * leg attaches under a distinct `as` alias, forward legs are\n * one-to-one attachments and collect legs are independent\n * hash-grouped passes, so declaration order never changes the\n * materialized rows — a pure reorder must NOT force a refresh.\n * `from` (#1140) constrains the legal orderings (a leg must follow the\n * alias it attaches to) without making order meaningful: each descriptor\n * carries its own `@alias`, and aliases are unique, so the sorted set\n * still determines the leg graph exactly.\n *\n * The projection `map` is NOT fingerprinted (identical limitation as\n * the UNION arm `map`); consumers must bump the MV's `name` when\n * `map` semantics change non-equivalently.\n */\nexport function summarizeProjectionPlan<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(\n  spec: MaterializedViewSpec<T>,\n): string {\n  const projection = spec.projection!\n  const legs = projection.joins\n    .map(leg => {\n      // #1140 — `from` changes which rows a leg attaches to, so it is part of\n      // the plan's identity. Omitting it would let two structurally different\n      // projections share a queryHash and silently skip a refresh.\n      const at = leg.from !== undefined ? `@${leg.from}` : ''\n      return 'collect' in leg\n        ? `collect${at}:${leg.collect}.${leg.on}→${leg.as}`\n        : `field${at}:${leg.field}→${leg.as}`\n    })\n    .sort()\n  const body = JSON.stringify({ source: projection.source, legs })\n  return `projection(${body})${summarizeGroupingTail(spec)}`\n}\n\n/** Arm descriptors for `summarizeUnionPlan` — declaration order preserved (see its doc). */\nfunction summarizeUnionArms<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(\n  spec: MaterializedViewSpec<T>,\n): string {\n  return (spec.unionSources ?? [])\n    .map(s => {\n      // Fold each arm's join legs into the summary so adding or\n      // reordering joins (which changes the materialized rows) bumps\n      // queryHash. Leg order is declaration-significant (legs chain), so\n      // it is NOT sorted — same rationale as arm declaration order.\n      const joins = s.join?.length\n        ? `[${s.join.map(j => `${j.field}→${j.as}`).join(';')}]`\n        : ''\n      return `${s.collection}${joins}`\n    })\n    .join(',')\n}\n\n/**\n * Shared `|groupBy(…)|aggregate(…)|money(…)` tail for the UNION and\n * projection summaries — both feed the same post-map grouping pipeline,\n * so the same spec fields fold into both hashes with the same rules.\n */\nfunction summarizeGroupingTail<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(\n  spec: MaterializedViewSpec<T>,\n): string {\n  const groupBy: string = Array.isArray(spec.groupBy)\n    ? [...spec.groupBy].sort().join(',')\n    : typeof spec.groupBy === 'string'\n      ? spec.groupBy\n      : ''\n  const aggKeys = spec.aggregate ? Object.keys(spec.aggregate).sort().join(',') : ''\n  // `moneyFields` changes reducer semantics (float → exact BigInt), so\n  // declaring / removing / re-keying it must bump queryHash. Keys are\n  // sorted — they're independent of each other (one descriptor per\n  // output field), same rationale as aggregate keys.\n  const moneyKeys = spec.moneyFields ? Object.keys(spec.moneyFields).sort().join(',') : ''\n  return `|groupBy(${groupBy})|aggregate(${aggKeys})|money(${moneyKeys})`\n}\n","/**\n * Deterministic hash of a materialized view strategy's \"shape\": MV\n * name + canonical query-plan summary + sorted dependency-set.\n *\n * Used to detect strategy drift: a row whose `_materializedFrom.queryHash`\n * doesn't match the current strategy is considered stale.\n *\n * Web Crypto SHA-256 — no extra deps. Mirrors the v1\n * `computeStrategyHash` pattern.\n */\nimport { sha256Hex } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\n\nexport async function computeQueryHash(\n  mvName: string,\n  /**\n   * Source-collection set the query depends on. Sorted before\n   * canonicalization so set iteration order doesn't affect the hash.\n   */\n  dependencies: ReadonlySet<string>,\n  /**\n   * Stringified query-plan summary. The caller produces this from the\n   * `Query<T>` builder — concretely: a JSON serialization of clauses +\n   * orderBy + limit + offset + joins. Function bodies inside\n   * `wherePredicate` are NOT included here (those carry their own\n   * `predicateHash` to be folded in by a later sub-issue).\n   */\n  queryPlanSummary: string,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const canonical = JSON.stringify({\n    mvName,\n    dependencies: [...dependencies].sort(),\n    queryPlanSummary,\n  })\n  const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(canonical)\n  return sha256Hex(bytes)\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonicalize a query plan for hashing. Walks the plan structure\n * with sorted keys so insertion order doesn't perturb the result.\n * Lives here rather than in `query/builder.ts` to keep that module\n * stable across MV-specific evolutions.\n *\n * @internal exported for testing\n */\nexport function canonicalizeQueryPlan(plan: unknown): string {\n  return JSON.stringify(plan, (_key, value) => {\n    if (value && typeof value === 'object' && !Array.isArray(value)) {\n      const sorted: Record<string, unknown> = {}\n      for (const k of Object.keys(value as Record<string, unknown>).sort()) {\n        sorted[k] = (value as Record<string, unknown>)[k]\n      }\n      return sorted\n    }\n    return value\n  })\n}\n","/**\n * Projection-leg topology (#810, extended by #1140).\n *\n * A projection MV's legs originally all attached to the PRIMARY row: a forward\n * leg named an FK field on `projection.source`, and a reverse `collect` leg's\n * `on` field had to `ref()` the source itself. Anything two FKs away was\n * therefore inexpressible — `bill → entity → client` has no leg shape, because\n * the bill has no `clientId` and `clients.entityId` refs `entities`, not\n * `bills`.\n *\n * `from` closes that: a leg may attach to a previously-declared ALIAS instead of\n * to the primary row. This module owns the two questions that follow from it —\n * *is this leg graph well-formed?* and *which collection does a leg's rows come\n * from?* — so neither the registry nor the executor has to re-derive them.\n *\n * **Why cycles are impossible by construction, and there is no depth cap.**\n * `from` may only name an alias declared EARLIER in `joins`. A leg can therefore\n * never reach forward, the graph is a forest rooted at the primary row, and its\n * depth is bounded by the number of legs. Validation refuses an unknown or\n * not-yet-declared alias, which is the same check.\n */\n\nimport { MaterializedViewConfigError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport type { ProjectionJoinLeg, ProjectionSpec } from './types.js'\n\n/** Reverse (one-to-many) leg — discriminated on `collect`, as the type is. */\nexport function isCollectLeg(\n  leg: ProjectionJoinLeg,\n): leg is Extract<ProjectionJoinLeg, { collect: string }> {\n  return 'collect' in leg\n}\n\n/**\n * Refuse a malformed leg graph where `withMaterializedView()` checks the rest of\n * the leg shape — at spec CONSTRUCTION, not at vault open and not at first\n * materialization. Alias wiring is pure configuration: it needs no refs, no\n * records and no store, so the earliest failure is the best one.\n * (Ref EXISTENCE still resolves at first materialization, unchanged — refs\n * cannot exist until after `openVault()` returns.)\n */\nexport function validateProjectionLegs<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(\n  mvName: string,\n  projection: ProjectionSpec<T>,\n): void {\n  // Non-empty and unique `as` are already refused by `withMaterializedView()`\n  // itself, earlier and with its own message — not re-checked here. This\n  // function owns the `from` wiring and nothing else.\n  const seen = new Map<string, ProjectionJoinLeg>()\n  for (const leg of projection.joins) {\n    if (leg.from !== undefined) {\n      const parent = seen.get(leg.from)\n      if (!parent) {\n        throw new MaterializedViewConfigError(\n          `\"${mvName}\": projection leg \"${leg.as}\" declares from: \"${leg.from}\", which is not an ` +\n            `alias declared EARLIER in \\`joins\\`. A leg may only attach to the primary row or to a ` +\n            `preceding leg — that ordering rule is what makes a cycle impossible. Known so far: ` +\n            `${[...seen.keys()].map(a => `\"${a}\"`).join(', ') || '(none)'}`,\n        )\n      }\n      if (isCollectLeg(parent)) {\n        throw new MaterializedViewConfigError(\n          `\"${mvName}\": projection leg \"${leg.as}\" declares from: \"${leg.from}\", but \"${leg.from}\" ` +\n            `is a collect leg and holds an ARRAY of rows, not one record. A leg can only hang off a ` +\n            `forward leg (record | null). Attach it to the primary row instead, or collect the ` +\n            `far side directly if its ref() reaches \"${projection.source}\".`,\n        )\n      }\n    }\n    seen.set(leg.as, leg)\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * The collection a leg's rows come from — the primary source for a root leg, the\n * `from` leg's own target otherwise.\n *\n * Returns `null` when a forward `ref()` somewhere along the chain is not\n * declared yet, which at registration time is the normal case rather than an\n * error: refs are declared after `openVault()` returns, so the registry retries\n * this on every dispatch until it resolves (`_pendingForwardDeps`).\n *\n * `resolveRef` is passed in rather than imported so this module stays free of\n * vault wiring — the registry hands it the ref registry's `getOutbound`, the\n * executor hands it a join context lookup. Both answer the same question.\n */\nexport type RefLookup = (collection: string, field: string) => { target: string } | null\n\nexport function resolveLegOwner(\n  leg: ProjectionJoinLeg,\n  joins: ReadonlyArray<ProjectionJoinLeg>,\n  source: string,\n  resolveRef: RefLookup,\n): string | null {\n  if (leg.from === undefined) return source\n  const parent = joins.find(l => l.as === leg.from)\n  if (!parent) return null // refused by validateProjectionLegs; defensive here\n  if (isCollectLeg(parent)) return parent.collect // refused too, same reason\n  const parentOwner = resolveLegOwner(parent, joins, source, resolveRef)\n  if (parentOwner === null) return null\n  return resolveRef(parentOwner, parent.field)?.target ?? null\n}\n\n/**\n * The collection a FORWARD leg resolves INTO — i.e. its dependency. `null` while\n * any ref in the chain (including this leg's own) is still undeclared.\n */\nexport function resolveForwardLegTarget(\n  leg: Extract<ProjectionJoinLeg, { field: string }>,\n  joins: ReadonlyArray<ProjectionJoinLeg>,\n  source: string,\n  resolveRef: RefLookup,\n): string | null {\n  const owner = resolveLegOwner(leg, joins, source, resolveRef)\n  if (owner === null) return null\n  return resolveRef(owner, leg.field)?.target ?? null\n}\n","import { MaterializedViewSourceUnknownError, RefNotDeclaredError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport type { ViaGraph, FieldRef, EdgeKind, Grain } from '../../kernel/via/graph.js'\nimport type { Clause, FieldClause } from '../../kernel/query/predicate.js'\nimport type { DeclaredPredicate } from '../../kernel/query/builder.js'\nimport { analyzeDependencies, summarizeQueryPlan, summarizeUnionPlan, summarizeProjectionPlan } from './dependency-analyzer.js'\nimport { computeQueryHash } from './query-hash.js'\nimport { isCollectLeg, resolveForwardLegTarget } from './projection-legs.js'\nimport type { MaterializedViewSpec, MVQueryContext } from './types.js'\n\n/**\n * Whole-record artifact-grain field marker (#638 Task 2) — MUST match\n * `derivations/registry.ts`'s and `vault.ts`'s overlay-edge marker so\n * cross-registry edges (a derivation feeding an MV, or vice versa) resolve\n * to the SAME graph node. See that file's `WHOLE_RECORD` doc comment.\n */\nconst WHOLE_RECORD = '*'\n\n/**\n * One registered MV strategy alongside its derived metadata. Stored\n * type-erased on `TRow` so the registry can hold heterogeneous MVs.\n */\nexport interface RegisteredMV {\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n  readonly spec: MaterializedViewSpec<any>\n  /** Output collection name (`spec.output?.collection ?? spec.name`). */\n  readonly outputCollection: string\n  /** Set of source collections; populated at registration via the analyzer. */\n  readonly dependencies: ReadonlySet<string>\n  /** Canonical `queryHash` — `_materializedFrom.queryHash` for every emitted row. */\n  readonly queryHash: string\n  /**\n   * Top-level FieldClauses on the partition field, captured at\n   * registration time. Used by the cycle detector to resolve\n   * same-collection-as-source edges via the partition-discriminator\n   * check. Empty when `spec.output?.partition` is undefined.\n   */\n  readonly partitionClauses: readonly FieldClause[]\n  /**\n   * #638 Task 2 — `'record'` for a row-per-source-row Query<T> or\n   * `unionSources` MV, `'aggregate'` for a `.groupBy().aggregate()` MV\n   * (the shape that requires explicit `sources`, since the dependency\n   * analyzer can't walk an aggregate plan). Feeds `edges()`'s grain.\n   */\n  readonly grain: Grain\n}\n\n/**\n * Vault-internal registry of MV strategies. Owned by `Vault`; not\n * exported. Parallel to v1's `DerivationRegistry`; the two graphs share\n * a single cycle-detection pass at vault open (see `validate`).\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport class MaterializedViewRegistry {\n  /** Keyed by `spec.name`. */\n  private readonly _byName = new Map<string, RegisteredMV>()\n  /** Keyed by dependency source-collection → MVs that depend on it. */\n  private readonly _bySource = new Map<string, RegisteredMV[]>()\n  /**\n   * Projection MVs (#810) whose forward-leg ref() targets could not be\n   * resolved at registration time. A forward leg names only the FK\n   * FIELD; its dependency is the field's ref() TARGET, declared on the\n   * source collection — but registration runs at vault open, BEFORE\n   * user code declares collections (and their refs). Constructing the\n   * source collection here to look them up would be worse: a later\n   * `vault.collection(source, { refs })` call only registers refs on a\n   * cache miss, so an early construction would silently drop them.\n   * Instead each entry carries a non-constructive ref-registry probe;\n   * `mvsForSource` retries on every dispatch until every forward\n   * target has resolved (see `_resolvePendingForwardDeps`).\n   */\n  private readonly _pendingForwardDeps: Array<{\n    reg: RegisteredMV\n    /** Forward-leg ALIASES still awaiting resolution (#1140 — a leg is identified\n     *  by its alias, not its field: with `from`, two legs may name the same FK\n     *  field on different collections). */\n    aliases: Set<string>\n    resolveTarget: (alias: string) => string | null\n  }> = []\n\n  /**\n   * Query-form strategies whose `query()` callback could not be planned at\n   * registration time because a `.join()` names a field whose `ref()` is not\n   * declared YET (#1139).\n   *\n   * Registration runs inside `openVault()`; a collection's refs can only be\n   * declared afterwards, so for a query-form MV that joins a declared FK there\n   * is NO call ordering the consumer can choose — the plan is simply built too\n   * early. Rather than failing the vault open, the strategy is parked here and\n   * replanned from {@link resolvePendingPlans}, which every write dispatch and\n   * `vault.refreshView()` call runs first. This is the query-form counterpart\n   * of `_pendingForwardDeps`, one level up: that defers a leg's TARGET, this\n   * defers the whole plan.\n   *\n   * Only `RefNotDeclaredError` parks a strategy. Every other planning failure\n   * still throws out of `openVault()` exactly as before, so a typo'd source or\n   * a malformed spec keeps its loud, early error.\n   *\n   * A parked strategy is invisible until it resolves: it contributes no\n   * `_bySource` entries and no cycle-detection edges (same caveat as a\n   * late-resolved forward target — `edges()` runs once at vault open). It also\n   * cannot be dispatched, which is why {@link hasPendingPlans} forces the\n   * conservative branch in `Collection._txAtomicSafe`: the atomic write path\n   * skips MV dispatch, and skipping it here would mean the write that was\n   * supposed to trigger the first replan is the one that gets missed.\n   */\n  private readonly _pendingPlans: Array<{\n    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n    spec: MaterializedViewSpec<any>\n    db: MVQueryContext\n    options?: { knownCollections?: (name: string) => boolean }\n  }> = []\n\n  /**\n   * Register an MV. Invokes `spec.query()` once at registration time to\n   * read the plan + join context; the resulting `Query<T>` is discarded\n   * after dependency extraction. `vault.collection(...)` must therefore\n   * be functional by the time this runs — typically wired from\n   * `Vault._initMaterializedViews` after collection bootstrap.\n   *\n   * Throws `MaterializedViewSourceUnknownError` if the analyzer\n   * surfaces a dependency the vault doesn't know about (when a\n   * `knownCollections` checker is supplied).\n   */\n  async register(\n    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n    spec: MaterializedViewSpec<any>,\n    db: MVQueryContext,\n    options?: { knownCollections?: (name: string) => boolean },\n  ): Promise<void> {\n    // Build a predicate-aware db wrapper. If `spec.predicates` is\n    // declared, the wrapper intercepts `.collection().query()` and\n    // attaches the predicates map to the resulting Query<T>. With no\n    // predicates declared, the wrapper is the original db unchanged.\n    const dbForQuery = spec.predicates ? wrapDbWithPredicates(db, spec.predicates) : db\n\n    // Invoke the query callback once to inspect its plan / dependencies.\n    // For Query<T> shapes the analyzer extracts deps + plan summary\n    // automatically. Reduction / GroupedReduction shapes don't\n    // expose the underlying Query, so the spec must declare `sources`\n    // explicitly. `partitionClauses` are only populated for Query<T>\n    // since same-collection-partition is a non-aggregate concern.\n    // UNION-form strategies: dependencies and plan summary come\n    // straight off the strategy — no `query` callback to introspect.\n    // The dependency-analyzer + summarizer are bypassed entirely; the\n    // executor handles materialization via `materializeUnionResult`.\n    let dependencies: Set<string>\n    let queryPlanSummary: string\n    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n    let qAny: any = null\n    let isQuery = false\n    // Projection-form (#810): forward legs whose ref() target wasn't\n    // resolvable at registration time — folded in lazily, see\n    // `_pendingForwardDeps`.\n    const pendingForwardFields: string[] = []\n    if (spec.unionSources) {\n      dependencies = new Set(spec.unionSources.map(s => s.collection))\n      // Per-arm joins resolve right-side collections that aren't among\n      // the arm `collection`s. The consumer lists those in `sources`;\n      // fold them into the dependency set so a write to a join-target\n      // collection triggers MV refresh (and contributes a cycle edge).\n      if (spec.sources) for (const s of spec.sources) dependencies.add(s)\n      queryPlanSummary = summarizeUnionPlan(spec)\n    } else if (spec.projection) {\n      // Projection-form (#810): dependencies are all AUTO — the primary\n      // source, every collect leg's collection (both literal names), and\n      // every forward leg's ref() target. Forward targets usually can't\n      // resolve yet (refs are declared after vault open) — those go\n      // through the pending-resolution path below. Explicit `sources`\n      // remains additive, same as the other two forms.\n      const projection = spec.projection\n      dependencies = new Set([projection.source])\n      for (const leg of projection.joins) {\n        // A collect leg's dependency is its literal collection name, whatever it\n        // attaches to — which is why `from` needs no new dependency machinery on\n        // that side. A forward leg's dependency is a ref() target, still unknown.\n        if (isCollectLeg(leg)) dependencies.add(leg.collect)\n        else pendingForwardFields.push(leg.as)\n      }\n      if (spec.sources) for (const s of spec.sources) dependencies.add(s)\n      queryPlanSummary = summarizeProjectionPlan(spec)\n    } else {\n      // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n      let q: any\n      try {\n        q = spec.query!(dbForQuery)\n      } catch (e) {\n        // #1139 — a join on a ref that is not declared YET. Park and replan;\n        // see `_pendingPlans`. Anything else is a real registration failure.\n        if (!(e instanceof RefNotDeclaredError)) throw e\n        this._pendingPlans.push({ spec, db, ...(options !== undefined ? { options } : {}) })\n        return\n      }\n      qAny = q // already `any` — see the declaration above\n      isQuery = typeof qAny._plan === 'function'\n      if (isQuery) {\n        // `q` is the `Query` arm of the union here (runtime-confirmed via\n        // `qAny._plan` above); reuse the already-`any` `qAny` the block uses\n        // for `_plan()` rather than re-narrowing.\n        dependencies = analyzeDependencies(qAny)\n        queryPlanSummary = summarizeQueryPlan(qAny)\n        // Fold `.wherePredicate(name, ctx)` references into the plan\n        // summary so predicate function or ctx changes (signalled by\n        // bumping `hash` or supplying a different ctx) propagate into\n        // `queryHash` and force refresh on next visit.\n        const predicateRefs = extractPredicateRefs(qAny._plan())\n        if (predicateRefs.length > 0) {\n          queryPlanSummary = JSON.stringify({ plan: queryPlanSummary, predicates: predicateRefs })\n        }\n        // If `sources` is ALSO declared, take the union (consumer's\n        // explicit list extends the auto-analyzed set).\n        if (spec.sources) for (const s of spec.sources) dependencies.add(s)\n      } else {\n        // Aggregate shape: require explicit `sources`.\n        if (!spec.sources || spec.sources.length === 0) {\n          throw new Error(\n            `withMaterializedView \"${spec.name}\": query() returned an aggregate ` +\n              `(Reduction or GroupedReduction) but no \\`sources\\` field is declared. ` +\n              `The dependency analyzer cannot walk through groupBy().aggregate() ` +\n              `back to the source — declare sources: [...] explicitly.`,\n          )\n        }\n        dependencies = new Set(spec.sources)\n        // Aggregate plans don't carry a chainable query plan for summary\n        // purposes; the dep-set + spec.name serve as the queryHash inputs.\n        queryPlanSummary = JSON.stringify({ aggregate: true, sources: [...spec.sources].sort() })\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Sanity-check declared dependencies against the vault's known\n    // collections. Optional — when the checker isn't supplied (test\n    // wiring, in-process composition) the registration succeeds and\n    // any typo surfaces at first onSourceWrite as a no-op.\n    if (options?.knownCollections) {\n      for (const dep of dependencies) {\n        if (!options.knownCollections(dep)) {\n          throw new MaterializedViewSourceUnknownError(spec.name, dep)\n        }\n      }\n    }\n\n    const outputCollection = spec.output?.collection ?? spec.name\n    const queryHash = await computeQueryHash(spec.name, dependencies, queryPlanSummary)\n    // For same-collection-as-source MVs, capture the where-clauses on\n    // the partition field so cycle detection can prove disjointness.\n    // Only applicable to Query<T> shapes — aggregate MVs don't carry\n    // a chainable plan to inspect (and same-collection aggregation\n    // doesn't make sense for same-collection aggregation).\n    const partitionClauses: FieldClause[] = []\n    const partitionField = spec.output?.partition?.field\n    if (partitionField !== undefined && isQuery) {\n      const plan = qAny._plan()\n      for (const clause of plan.clauses) {\n        if (isFieldClauseOnField(clause, partitionField)) partitionClauses.push(clause)\n      }\n    }\n    // #638 Task 2 — 'aggregate' only for the explicit-sources aggregate shape\n    // (groupBy().aggregate() with no chainable plan); a row-per-source-row\n    // Query<T>, unionSources, or projection MV is 'record'.\n    const grain: Grain = spec.unionSources || spec.projection || isQuery ? 'record' : 'aggregate'\n    const reg: RegisteredMV = { spec, outputCollection, dependencies, queryHash, partitionClauses, grain }\n\n    this._byName.set(spec.name, reg)\n    for (const dep of dependencies) {\n      const arr = this._bySource.get(dep)\n      if (arr) arr.push(reg)\n      else this._bySource.set(dep, [reg])\n    }\n    if (pendingForwardFields.length > 0) {\n      // Non-constructive ref-registry probe: the Vault (the real\n      // MVQueryContext) carries its RefRegistry as a private field,\n      // reachable structurally at runtime. Test stubs without one simply\n      // never resolve — forward deps then come only from explicit `sources`.\n      const refRegistry = (db as unknown as {\n        refRegistry?: { getOutbound(collection: string): Record<string, { target: string }> }\n      }).refRegistry\n      const projectionSpec = spec.projection!\n      const resolveRef = (c: string, f: string): { target: string } | null =>\n        refRegistry?.getOutbound(c)[f] ?? null\n      this._pendingForwardDeps.push({\n        reg,\n        aliases: new Set(pendingForwardFields),\n        resolveTarget: (alias) => {\n          const leg = projectionSpec.joins.find(l => l.as === alias)\n          if (!leg || isCollectLeg(leg)) return null\n          // Walks the `from` chain — every hop needs its own ref declared, so a\n          // two-hop leg simply resolves one dispatch later than a one-hop one.\n          return resolveForwardLegTarget(leg, projectionSpec.joins, projectionSpec.source, resolveRef)\n        },\n      })\n      // Immediate attempt — covers refs already declared by the time\n      // this MV registers (re-registration flows, test wiring).\n      this._resolvePendingForwardDeps()\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * `true` while any query-form strategy is still unplanned (#1139). Read by\n   * `Collection._txAtomicSafe`, which must refuse the atomic write path while\n   * this holds — see the `_pendingPlans` doc comment for why.\n   */\n  hasPendingPlans(): boolean {\n    return this._pendingPlans.length > 0\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Replan every parked query-form strategy (#1139). Called at the head of both\n   * write dispatchers and of `vault.refreshView()`, so a strategy resolves on the\n   * first write or refresh after its source collection's refs are declared —\n   * which is the earliest moment it could produce a correct plan, and strictly\n   * before the first moment it could have any output to produce.\n   *\n   * Each entry is handed straight back to {@link register}, so a strategy that\n   * is STILL unplannable simply re-parks itself and the next dispatch tries\n   * again. Idempotent and cheap: the array empties as strategies resolve, and\n   * both callers skip the await entirely once it is empty.\n   *\n   * A late-resolved strategy does NOT retro-feed `edges()` — the unified cycle\n   * pass runs once at vault open, before refs exist. Same caveat, and the same\n   * reason, as a late-resolved forward-leg target.\n   */\n  async resolvePendingPlans(): Promise<void> {\n    if (this._pendingPlans.length === 0) return\n    // Splice first: `register` re-parks anything still unplannable, and reading\n    // a live array it is concurrently pushing to would loop.\n    const parked = this._pendingPlans.splice(0)\n    for (const entry of parked) {\n      await this.register(entry.spec, entry.db, entry.options)\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** All MVs that depend on `source`, in registration order. */\n  mvsForSource(source: string): ReadonlyArray<RegisteredMV> {\n    if (this._pendingForwardDeps.length > 0) this._resolvePendingForwardDeps()\n    return this._bySource.get(source) ?? []\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Retry ref() resolution for every pending projection forward leg\n   * (#810). A field resolves once its source collection's refs have\n   * been declared; the target then folds into the owning MV's\n   * dependency set and `_bySource`, so subsequent writes to it\n   * dispatch a refresh. Idempotent and cheap — the pending list\n   * empties as fields resolve, and `mvsForSource` skips the call\n   * entirely once it's empty.\n   *\n   * Late-resolved targets do NOT retro-feed `edges()` — the cycle\n   * pass runs once at vault open, before refs exist. A cycle routed\n   * exclusively through a forward leg is therefore not detected at\n   * open (collect + source edges, the literal names, are).\n   */\n  private _resolvePendingForwardDeps(): void {\n    for (let i = this._pendingForwardDeps.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {\n      const entry = this._pendingForwardDeps[i]!\n      for (const alias of [...entry.aliases]) {\n        const target = entry.resolveTarget(alias)\n        if (target === null) continue\n        entry.aliases.delete(alias)\n        if (entry.reg.dependencies.has(target)) continue\n        // `dependencies` is declared ReadonlySet for consumers; the\n        // registry owns the underlying Set and is the one writer.\n        ;(entry.reg.dependencies as Set<string>).add(target)\n        const arr = this._bySource.get(target)\n        if (arr) arr.push(entry.reg)\n        else this._bySource.set(target, [entry.reg])\n      }\n      if (entry.aliases.size === 0) this._pendingForwardDeps.splice(i, 1)\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Single MV by name, or `undefined`. */\n  byName(name: string): RegisteredMV | undefined {\n    return this._byName.get(name)\n  }\n\n  /** Iterate over every registered MV. */\n  all(): ReadonlyArray<RegisteredMV> {\n    return [...this._byName.values()]\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Graph edges for #638 Task 2: one `'mv'` edge per registered MV — target\n   * = the output collection (a `WHOLE_RECORD` artifact node), sources =\n   * every dependency (also `WHOLE_RECORD` nodes). Same-collection edges\n   * (`dep === outputCollection`) are skipped IFF the MV declares an\n   * `output.partition` discriminator AND the query has a where-clause that\n   * provably excludes the partition value (`partitionDisjoint`) — the SAME\n   * condition the old local DFS used. Grain comes from the registration-time\n   * `RegisteredMV.grain`.\n   */\n  edges(): ReadonlyArray<{ readonly target: FieldRef; readonly sources: readonly FieldRef[]; readonly kind: EdgeKind; readonly grain: Grain }> {\n    const out: Array<{ target: FieldRef; sources: FieldRef[]; kind: EdgeKind; grain: Grain }> = []\n    for (const reg of this._byName.values()) {\n      const sources: FieldRef[] = []\n      for (const dep of reg.dependencies) {\n        if (dep === reg.outputCollection && partitionDisjoint(reg)) continue\n        sources.push({ collection: dep, field: WHOLE_RECORD })\n      }\n      if (sources.length === 0) continue\n      out.push({ target: { collection: reg.outputCollection, field: WHOLE_RECORD }, sources, kind: 'mv', grain: reg.grain })\n    }\n    return out\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Cycle detection, delegated to `ViaGraph.assertAcyclic()` (#638 Task 2 —\n   * retires the local DFS). `graph` is the caller's shared per-vault graph,\n   * ALREADY carrying this registry's `edges()` AND `DerivationRegistry`'s\n   * (registered by the caller — see `Vault._initMaterializedViews`, which\n   * runs after `_initDerivations`, so a pure-derivation cycle already threw\n   * `DerivationCycleError` there; any cycle surfacing here necessarily\n   * touches an MV edge). Throws `MaterializedViewCycleError` — SAME class as\n   * before.\n   */\n  validate(graph: ViaGraph): void {\n    graph.assertAcyclic()\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Type guard: is the clause a top-level `FieldClause` on the given\n * field? Used by the partition-disjoint check.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nfunction isFieldClauseOnField(clause: Clause, field: string): clause is FieldClause {\n  return clause.type === 'field' && clause.field === field\n}\n\n/**\n * Wrap an `MVQueryContext` so its `.collection().query()` returns a\n * Query<T> with the MV's declared predicates attached. Bare Queries\n * (outside of any MV) don't gain `.wherePredicate()` — only Queries\n * obtained through this wrapped db do.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nexport function wrapDbWithPredicates(\n  db: MVQueryContext,\n  predicates: NonNullable<MaterializedViewSpec<Record<string, unknown>>['predicates']>,\n): MVQueryContext {\n  // Build the predicate map once — the fn signature in the MV spec\n  // is row-typed but the QueryBuilder casts to unknown, so we widen\n  // here for the Map.\n  const map = new Map<string, DeclaredPredicate>()\n  for (const [name, decl] of Object.entries(predicates)) {\n    map.set(name, {\n      hash: decl.hash,\n      fn: decl.fn as (record: unknown, ctx?: unknown) => boolean,\n    })\n  }\n  return {\n    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n    collection<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(name: string): any {\n      const c = db.collection<T>(name)\n      // Return an object that delegates everything to `c` but\n      // overrides `.query()` to attach predicates via the new\n      // `Query._withPredicates()` accessor.\n      return new Proxy(c, {\n        get(target, prop, receiver) {\n          if (prop === 'query') {\n            return (...args: unknown[]) => {\n              // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any\n              const q = (target.query as any)(...args)\n              // For non-aggregate Query<T>, attach predicates. For\n              // legacy predicate-arg overload that returns T[] (sync\n              // filter), pass through unchanged.\n               \n              if (q && typeof q._withPredicates === 'function') {\n                return q._withPredicates(map)\n              }\n              return q\n            }\n          }\n          return Reflect.get(target, prop, receiver)\n        },\n      })\n    },\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Walk a QueryPlan's clauses and collect predicate-reference markers\n * for `queryHash` derivation. Returns a sorted array (deterministic\n * order) of `{ name, predicateHash, ctxHash }` tuples — these are the\n * hashable identity of each `.wherePredicate()` call site.\n *\n * @internal\n */\nfunction extractPredicateRefs(\n  plan: { clauses: readonly Clause[] },\n): Array<{ name: string; predicateHash: string; ctxHash: string }> {\n  const refs: Array<{ name: string; predicateHash: string; ctxHash: string }> = []\n  const walk = (clauses: readonly Clause[]): void => {\n    for (const c of clauses) {\n      if (c.type === 'wherePredicate') {\n        refs.push({ name: c.name, predicateHash: c.predicateHash, ctxHash: c.ctxHash })\n      } else if (c.type === 'group') {\n        walk(c.clauses)\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  walk(plan.clauses)\n  // Stable-sort by (name, predicateHash, ctxHash) — same predicate\n  // appearing twice with different ctx hashes both flow through.\n  refs.sort((a, b) => {\n    if (a.name !== b.name) return a.name < b.name ? -1 : 1\n    if (a.predicateHash !== 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package/dist/{chunk-H27DIXOV.js → chunk-FJGNYSB3.js}

@@ -7,21 +7,21 @@ import {
   hashEntry,
   paddedIndex,
   sha256Hex
-} from "./chunk-47F6AI2K.js";
+} from "./chunk-GU5XWSH4.js";
 import {
   buildRecordAad,
   openEnvelopeJson
-} from "./chunk-DIVPOJPV.js";
+} from "./chunk-43FOH2OK.js";
 import {
   buildRecordEnvelope
-} from "./chunk-PENPHA45.js";
+} from "./chunk-FX3UIDCS.js";
 import {
   encrypt
-} from "./chunk-O5QXH7U7.js";
+} from "./chunk-D7STIWJO.js";
 import {
   LedgerContentionError,
   isConflictError
-} from "./chunk-PKUJ3JLQ.js";
+} from "./chunk-5OFC3QYL.js";
 
 // src/with-commit/history/ledger/patch.ts
 function computePatch(prev, next) {
@@ -699,4 +699,4 @@ export {
   applyPatch,
   LedgerStore
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-H27DIXOV.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-FJGNYSB3.js.map