@noy-db/hub 0.6.0-pre.20 → 0.6.0-pre.21

package/dist/{stale-PQYPVCER.js → stale-NI7SAXAZ.js}

@@ -6,17 +6,17 @@ import {
   isMVStale,
   markMVStale,
   resolveStaleMVOnRead
-} from "./chunk-OIIAXFKM.js";
+} from "./chunk-EES37S2V.js";
 import "./chunk-5D2ALSM5.js";
-import "./chunk-D5UDZANO.js";
-import "./chunk-ZVAFJQZB.js";
-import "./chunk-OQLYMBJI.js";
-import "./chunk-DJ23QZIN.js";
-import "./chunk-SFD2LL7G.js";
+import "./chunk-OHOKBMTM.js";
+import "./chunk-PENPHA45.js";
+import "./chunk-GQXFOAYZ.js";
+import "./chunk-KV6JM2IA.js";
+import "./chunk-TMBSPLUG.js";
 import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
-import "./chunk-VJ4B3ZXY.js";
-import "./chunk-3Y4OFWQJ.js";
-import "./chunk-P7L3OQLL.js";
+import "./chunk-AU3AUJIZ.js";
+import "./chunk-IGNJOJEP.js";
+import "./chunk-CWM4GQD2.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {
   MV_STALE_COLLECTION,
@@ -27,4 +27,4 @@ export {
   markMVStale,
   resolveStaleMVOnRead
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=stale-PQYPVCER.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=stale-NI7SAXAZ.js.map

package/dist/storage-3VNGSHXS.js

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+import {
+  SCHEMAS_COLLECTION,
+  loadPersistedSchema,
+  loadPersistedSchemaEntry,
+  savePersistedSchema
+} from "./chunk-6WO62AJW.js";
+import "./chunk-OHOKBMTM.js";
+import "./chunk-PENPHA45.js";
+import "./chunk-GQXFOAYZ.js";
+import "./chunk-KV6JM2IA.js";
+import "./chunk-TMBSPLUG.js";
+import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
+import "./chunk-AU3AUJIZ.js";
+import "./chunk-IGNJOJEP.js";
+import "./chunk-CWM4GQD2.js";
+import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
+export {
+  SCHEMAS_COLLECTION,
+  loadPersistedSchema,
+  loadPersistedSchemaEntry,
+  savePersistedSchema
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=storage-3VNGSHXS.js.map

package/dist/{store-coordination-provider-TFHZLKHG.js → store-coordination-provider-TYKNR3OU.js}

@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
 import {
   loadFence,
   saveFence
-} from "./chunk-HJRTFXAA.js";
-import "./chunk-D5UDZANO.js";
+} from "./chunk-FFSQFH6D.js";
+import "./chunk-OHOKBMTM.js";
 import {
   buildRecordEnvelope
-} from "./chunk-ZVAFJQZB.js";
-import "./chunk-OQLYMBJI.js";
-import "./chunk-DJ23QZIN.js";
-import "./chunk-SFD2LL7G.js";
+} from "./chunk-PENPHA45.js";
+import "./chunk-GQXFOAYZ.js";
+import "./chunk-KV6JM2IA.js";
+import "./chunk-TMBSPLUG.js";
 import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
-import "./chunk-VJ4B3ZXY.js";
-import "./chunk-3Y4OFWQJ.js";
-import "./chunk-P7L3OQLL.js";
+import "./chunk-AU3AUJIZ.js";
+import "./chunk-IGNJOJEP.js";
+import "./chunk-CWM4GQD2.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/with-shape/schema-update/client-registry.ts
@@ -145,4 +145,4 @@ function unref(timer) {
 export {
   StoreCoordinationProvider
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=store-coordination-provider-TFHZLKHG.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=store-coordination-provider-TYKNR3OU.js.map

package/dist/sync/index.js

@@ -2,20 +2,20 @@ import {
   PresenceHandle,
   SyncEngine,
   SyncTransaction
-} from "../chunk-32O2N2CH.js";
+} from "../chunk-4N5Q23KV.js";
 import {
   NO_SYNC
 } from "../chunk-T7IR4N2S.js";
-import "../chunk-HTHRCGWP.js";
-import "../chunk-D5UDZANO.js";
-import "../chunk-ZVAFJQZB.js";
-import "../chunk-OQLYMBJI.js";
-import "../chunk-DJ23QZIN.js";
-import "../chunk-SFD2LL7G.js";
+import "../chunk-A4TOGAUW.js";
+import "../chunk-OHOKBMTM.js";
+import "../chunk-PENPHA45.js";
+import "../chunk-GQXFOAYZ.js";
+import "../chunk-KV6JM2IA.js";
+import "../chunk-TMBSPLUG.js";
 import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
-import "../chunk-VJ4B3ZXY.js";
-import "../chunk-3Y4OFWQJ.js";
-import "../chunk-P7L3OQLL.js";
+import "../chunk-AU3AUJIZ.js";
+import "../chunk-IGNJOJEP.js";
+import "../chunk-CWM4GQD2.js";
 import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/with-sync/active.ts

package/dist/team/index.js

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import {
   MemoryDeviceSealProvider,
   beginEchoUnlock,
   withTeam
-} from "../chunk-VEX2BQVX.js";
+} from "../chunk-45YHJ3GV.js";
 import {
   NO_TEAM,
   burnPaperRecoveryEntry,
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ import {
   unwrapMagicLinkGrant,
   updateAuthenticator,
   writeMagicLinkGrant
-} from "../chunk-F5AJZC3U.js";
-import "../chunk-DKYEVHZH.js";
+} from "../chunk-NCCEDL2K.js";
+import "../chunk-3ENNPCIW.js";
 import {
   buildEchoBlock,
   buildRecipientKeyringFile,
@@ -53,21 +53,21 @@ import {
   updateKeyringIdentity,
   verifyPrompt,
   verifyTypedEcho
-} from "../chunk-RKDH6L53.js";
-import "../chunk-JHO6FGZX.js";
-import "../chunk-HTMQBBF3.js";
-import "../chunk-47ZFULEZ.js";
-import "../chunk-D5UDZANO.js";
-import "../chunk-ZVAFJQZB.js";
-import "../chunk-OQLYMBJI.js";
-import "../chunk-DJ23QZIN.js";
-import "../chunk-SFD2LL7G.js";
+} from "../chunk-CAGI4LLJ.js";
+import "../chunk-LX46B56Q.js";
+import "../chunk-NW4TY6VC.js";
+import "../chunk-PPCOKVFA.js";
+import "../chunk-OHOKBMTM.js";
+import "../chunk-PENPHA45.js";
+import "../chunk-GQXFOAYZ.js";
+import "../chunk-KV6JM2IA.js";
+import "../chunk-TMBSPLUG.js";
 import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
-import "../chunk-VJ4B3ZXY.js";
-import "../chunk-3Y4OFWQJ.js";
+import "../chunk-AU3AUJIZ.js";
+import "../chunk-IGNJOJEP.js";
 import {
   TeamNotEnabledError
-} from "../chunk-P7L3OQLL.js";
+} from "../chunk-CWM4GQD2.js";
 import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {
   MemoryDeviceSealProvider,

package/dist/tiers/index.js

@@ -11,20 +11,20 @@ import {
   putAtTier,
   syncDerivedOutputs,
   withTiers
-} from "../chunk-6S466CMQ.js";
-import "../chunk-HTMQBBF3.js";
-import "../chunk-47ZFULEZ.js";
-import "../chunk-D5UDZANO.js";
-import "../chunk-ZVAFJQZB.js";
-import "../chunk-OQLYMBJI.js";
-import "../chunk-DJ23QZIN.js";
-import "../chunk-SFD2LL7G.js";
+} from "../chunk-4YL2LMXK.js";
+import "../chunk-NW4TY6VC.js";
+import "../chunk-PPCOKVFA.js";
+import "../chunk-OHOKBMTM.js";
+import "../chunk-PENPHA45.js";
+import "../chunk-GQXFOAYZ.js";
+import "../chunk-KV6JM2IA.js";
+import "../chunk-TMBSPLUG.js";
 import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
-import "../chunk-VJ4B3ZXY.js";
-import "../chunk-3Y4OFWQJ.js";
+import "../chunk-AU3AUJIZ.js";
+import "../chunk-IGNJOJEP.js";
 import {
   TiersNotEnabledError
-} from "../chunk-P7L3OQLL.js";
+} from "../chunk-CWM4GQD2.js";
 import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {
   NO_TIERS,

package/dist/to/index.js

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import {
   PodVersionConflictError,
   StoreCapabilityError,
   UnknownStoreKindError
-} from "../chunk-P7L3OQLL.js";
+} from "../chunk-CWM4GQD2.js";
 import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/port/to/locator.ts

package/dist/transactions/index.js

@@ -3,16 +3,16 @@ import {
   TxContext,
   TxVault,
   runTransaction
-} from "../chunk-GT72D4FO.js";
+} from "../chunk-2LFOMUEA.js";
 import {
   lazy
 } from "../chunk-5D2ALSM5.js";
 import "../chunk-4AOERLTV.js";
-import "../chunk-P7L3OQLL.js";
+import "../chunk-CWM4GQD2.js";
 import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/with-commit/tx/dry-run.ts
-var loadGuardExecutor = lazy(() => import("../executor-LJSMZ4IB.js"));
+var loadGuardExecutor = lazy(() => import("../executor-DVJAWN3B.js"));
 var SEP = " ";
 var keyOf = (op) => `${op.vaultName}${SEP}${op.collectionName}${SEP}${op.id}`;
 async function runDryRun(db, fn) {

package/dist/util/index.js

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import {
 } from "../chunk-PY4KJPYU.js";
 import {
   FilenameSanitizationError
-} from "../chunk-P7L3OQLL.js";
+} from "../chunk-CWM4GQD2.js";
 import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/kernel/util/sanitize-filename.ts

package/dist/vault-head/index.js

@@ -6,19 +6,19 @@ import {
 import {
   buildRecordAad,
   openEnvelopeJson
-} from "../chunk-D5UDZANO.js";
+} from "../chunk-OHOKBMTM.js";
 import {
   buildRecordEnvelope
-} from "../chunk-ZVAFJQZB.js";
-import "../chunk-OQLYMBJI.js";
-import "../chunk-DJ23QZIN.js";
-import "../chunk-SFD2LL7G.js";
+} from "../chunk-PENPHA45.js";
+import "../chunk-GQXFOAYZ.js";
+import "../chunk-KV6JM2IA.js";
+import "../chunk-TMBSPLUG.js";
 import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
 import {
   encrypt
-} from "../chunk-VJ4B3ZXY.js";
-import "../chunk-3Y4OFWQJ.js";
-import "../chunk-P7L3OQLL.js";
+} from "../chunk-AU3AUJIZ.js";
+import "../chunk-IGNJOJEP.js";
+import "../chunk-CWM4GQD2.js";
 import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/with-commit/vault-head/head.ts

package/dist/{verify-J6DEOXP3.js → verify-6J2YLKSO.js}

@@ -2,10 +2,10 @@ import {
   blindedEqual,
   evaluateKofN,
   openVdigPayload
-} from "./chunk-OQLYMBJI.js";
+} from "./chunk-GQXFOAYZ.js";
 import {
   dualReadSealedSlot
-} from "./chunk-DJ23QZIN.js";
+} from "./chunk-KV6JM2IA.js";
 import {
   VDIG_ITERATIONS,
   normalizeForVerify,
@@ -14,11 +14,11 @@ import {
 import {
   base64ToBuffer,
   generateSalt
-} from "./chunk-VJ4B3ZXY.js";
+} from "./chunk-AU3AUJIZ.js";
 import {
   ClassifiedConfigError,
   ClassifiedVerifyError
-} from "./chunk-P7L3OQLL.js";
+} from "./chunk-CWM4GQD2.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/kernel/enclave/classify/verify.ts
@@ -137,4 +137,4 @@ export {
   verifyDigestField,
   verifyTextField
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=verify-J6DEOXP3.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=verify-6J2YLKSO.js.map

package/dist/walk-WRA7RAPY.js

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+import {
+  dumpVaultSchema
+} from "./chunk-DXKLLKME.js";
+import "./chunk-KHKKD62N.js";
+import "./chunk-ONVD6GBY.js";
+import "./chunk-Y2NBBT6K.js";
+import "./chunk-6WO62AJW.js";
+import "./chunk-OHOKBMTM.js";
+import "./chunk-PENPHA45.js";
+import "./chunk-GQXFOAYZ.js";
+import "./chunk-KV6JM2IA.js";
+import "./chunk-TMBSPLUG.js";
+import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
+import "./chunk-AU3AUJIZ.js";
+import "./chunk-IGNJOJEP.js";
+import "./chunk-CWM4GQD2.js";
+import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
+export {
+  dumpVaultSchema
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=walk-WRA7RAPY.js.map

package/dist/with-party/team/keyring.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import type { NoydbStore, KeyringFile, KeyringAuthenticator, Role, Permissions, GrantOptions, RevokeOptions, UpdateUserOptions, UserInfo, EncryptedEnvelope, ExportCapability, ExportFormat, ImportCapability, VaultPolicyOnDisk, UserEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js';
 import { type EnclaveKey, type EchoSecretParts } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js';
+import type { KeyringTamperedReason } from '../../kernel/errors.js';
 import { type SecretPolicy, type EchoSecretPolicy } from '../../kernel/validation.js';
 import type { DeviceSealProvider } from './device-seal.js';
 /** In-memory representation of an unlocked keyring. */
@@ -77,6 +78,23 @@ export interface UnlockedKeyring {
 }
 /** Mint a fresh wrapped-canary string. Deterministic for a given KEK. */
 export declare function mintKeyringCanary(kek: EnclaveKey): Promise<string>;
+/**
+ * The vault roster key held by this keyring, or `null` when the keyring
+ * carries none.
+ *
+ * Null is expected on the resume-style paths (`kek: null` sessions, tier-3
+ * PIN resume, plaintext mode) — none of which may write a keyring file.
+ * Every stamping site null-guards this exactly as it guards `kek`: minting a
+ * file without a verifiable `roster_tag` would be worse than refusing, since
+ * it is indistinguishable on the next load from a store having stripped it.
+ */
+export declare function rosterKeyOf(keyring: UnlockedKeyring): EnclaveKey | null;
+/**
+ * Shared wording for the stamping-site guards — mirrors the `kek` guard's shape.
+ * Exported so every roster-stamping site in the hub raises ONE error with one
+ * wording, rather than each hand-copying it (`peer-recover`, `liberate`).
+ */
+export declare function requireRosterKey(keyring: UnlockedKeyring, fn: string): EnclaveKey;
 /** Options for {@link loadKeyring} (#846b). */
 export interface LoadKeyringOptions {
     /** The user whose keyring to unlock. */
@@ -173,6 +191,100 @@ export declare function createOwnerKeyring(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, opt
 export declare function grant(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, options: GrantOptions): Promise<void>;
 /** Revoke a user's access. Optionally rotate keys for affected collections. */
 export declare function revoke(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, options: RevokeOptions): Promise<void>;
+/** What {@link verifyRoster} found. */
+export interface RosterVerifyResult {
+    /**
+     * How many `_keyring` files were examined.
+     *
+     * Reported first, and deliberately: "nothing unverified" is equally true of a
+     * sweep that examined nothing, and a roster check that silently covered zero
+     * members would look identical to a healthy vault. Same lesson as the vault
+     * head's `no-expectations` verdict (#1101).
+     */
+    readonly checked: number;
+    /** The files that failed authentication, and why. */
+    readonly unverified: ReadonlyArray<{
+        readonly userId: string;
+        readonly reason: KeyringTamperedReason;
+    }>;
+}
+export declare function verifyRoster(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring): Promise<RosterVerifyResult>;
+/** What {@link quarantineKeyring} did. */
+export interface QuarantineResult {
+    readonly userId: string;
+    /** Why the file could not be authenticated — the justification for removing it. */
+    readonly reason: KeyringTamperedReason;
+    /** Collections re-keyed as part of the removal. */
+    readonly rotated: readonly string[];
+    /**
+     * (member, collection) pairs whose access the rotation dropped — the OTHER
+     * members, who must be re-granted.
+     *
+     * Passed through from `rotateKeys` rather than discarded, because a
+     * quarantine rotates broadly (see the scope note on the function) and so
+     * de-provisions more people than the one being removed. An operator who is
+     * not told this discovers it as unrelated `NoAccessError`s later.
+     */
+    readonly needsRegrant: RotateResult['needsRegrant'];
+    /**
+     * OTHER members whose own files also failed authentication, found while
+     * rotating. One forged file is rarely the only one, and the operator is
+     * already holding the tool for them.
+     */
+    readonly alsoUnverified: RotateResult['unverified'];
+}
+/**
+ * Remove a `_keyring` file that cannot be authenticated, and re-key behind it
+ * (#1121).
+ *
+ * ## Why this is not a flag on `revoke`
+ *
+ * `revoke` reads the target's own `role` to decide whether the caller may
+ * revoke them, so it cannot act on a file it will not trust — which left a
+ * forged file removable only by editing the store by hand. Relaxing `revoke`
+ * conditionally would grow the safe path a parameter that turns it into the
+ * dangerous one; ADR 0003's standing rule is that if the implementation needs
+ * to weaken a guard, the design is wrong. This is a separate operation with its
+ * own contract, so `revoke`'s invariant stays absolute and the dangerous act is
+ * named at the call site rather than hidden in an option bag.
+ *
+ * ## The two properties that keep it from being a backdoor
+ *
+ * 1. **It refuses a file that verifies.** Otherwise it would delete any keyring
+ *    while ignoring `canRevoke` — including an owner's, which `revoke` protects
+ *    unconditionally.
+ * 2. **Because of (1) it can safely ignore the claimed `role` — and it must.**
+ *    `canRevoke` refuses any target whose role reads `owner`, so a store that
+ *    forged `"role":"owner"` onto its victim would otherwise make them
+ *    permanently unremovable. Consulting the forged field is exactly the
+ *    mistake this operation exists to avoid.
+ *
+ * Owner-only: the narrowest role that can always act, and quarantine
+ * deliberately consumes NO field of the file it is removing.
+ *
+ * ## Why it rotates, and why the scope comes from the CALLER
+ *
+ * Deleting the file is not a revocation — the store may decline the delete, and
+ * the member may already hold unwrapped DEKs. So this rotates, exactly as
+ * `revoke` does. The scope is every collection the CALLER holds, not the
+ * target's DEK map: that map is unauthenticated (#1115), so deriving the scope
+ * from it would let the store choose which collections survive a quarantine.
+ *
+ * ⚠️ **That is the security-correct scope, and it is NOT free.** An earlier
+ * draft of this comment called over-rotating "the safe direction"; a review
+ * probe disproved it. Rotation re-keys `store.list(vault, <name>)` plus the
+ * derived refs `rotateKeys` knows about, so a DEK slot whose ciphertext lives
+ * under a *different* collection name — `_blob`, whose data sits in
+ * `_blob_index`/`_blob_chunks`, and the `collection#tier` slots — is re-keyed
+ * without its data being re-encrypted, and that data then fails to open. That
+ * gap belongs to `rotateKeys` (it is reachable through an ordinary `revoke` of
+ * a whole-vault grantee, with no quarantine involved) and is filed as #1122,
+ * but a quarantine takes the maximal scope *unconditionally*, so it meets the
+ * gap every time rather than occasionally. Until that is fixed, treat a
+ * quarantine as an emergency operation with a real blast radius, and read
+ * `needsRegrant` afterwards.
+ */
+export declare function quarantineKeyring(store: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, userId: string): Promise<QuarantineResult>;
 /**
  * Mutate `role`, `displayName`, and/or `permissions` on an existing
  * keyring. Pure plaintext-header rewrite — no DEK rewrap, no KEK
@@ -222,6 +334,26 @@ export interface RotateResult {
         readonly userId: string;
         readonly collection: string;
     }>;
+    /**
+     * Members skipped because their `_keyring` file failed roster verification
+     * (#1114).
+     *
+     * Rotation hands a member re-wrapped DEKs, so skipping one gives them
+     * **less**, never more: the file is left untouched and its wrappings for the
+     * rotated collections go stale. That is the same fail-closed end state as
+     * `needsRegrant`, but it needs a different remedy and so gets a different
+     * field — a `needsRegrant` entry is fixed by `grant()`, whereas one of these
+     * is a file that no longer authenticates and cannot be repaired by granting
+     * over it.
+     *
+     * Before this existed, one such file threw and took `revoke` and
+     * `rotateKeys` down vault-wide — the two operations most needed when a
+     * roster is suspect.
+     */
+    readonly unverified: ReadonlyArray<{
+        readonly userId: string;
+        readonly reason: KeyringTamperedReason;
+    }>;
 }
 /** Options for {@link rotateKeys} (#846b — was a bare `string[]`). */
 export interface RotateKeysOptions {

package/dist/with-party/team/noydb-facade.d.ts

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
  * Internal service — reached through `noydb.team.rotateSecret(...)` etc.
  */
 import type { NoydbOptions, NoydbStore, KeyringAuthenticator } from '../../kernel/types.js';
-import type { RotateResult, RotateKeysOptions } from './keyring.js';
+import type { RotateResult, RotateKeysOptions, RosterVerifyResult, QuarantineResult } from './keyring.js';
 import { type RotateSecretInput, type RecoverSecretInput, type RecoverSecretResult, type RotateRecoveryOptions, type RotateRecoveryResult, type EnrollRecoveryResult, type RecoveryEnrollmentInput, type RecoveryProof } from './rotate-recover.js';
 import { type RecoverUserOptions } from './peer-recover.js';
 import { type PaperRecoveryEntry, type ShamirRecoveryEntry } from './recovery.js';
@@ -74,6 +74,10 @@ export declare class TeamFacade {
     runRevoke(engine: (adapter: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, options: RevokeOptions) => Promise<void>, vault: string, options: RevokeOptions, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<void>;
     /** Gate + run a `rotateKeys` engine. See `Noydb.rotate` for the public contract. */
     runRotate(engine: (store: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, opts: RotateKeysOptions) => Promise<RotateResult>, vault: string, collections: string[]): Promise<RotateResult>;
+    /** Gate + run the `verifyRoster` engine (#1121). See `Noydb.verifyRoster`. */
+    runVerifyRoster(engine: (store: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring) => Promise<RosterVerifyResult>, vault: string): Promise<RosterVerifyResult>;
+    /** Gate + run the `quarantineKeyring` engine (#1121). See `Noydb.quarantineKeyring`. */
+    runQuarantine(engine: (store: NoydbStore, vault: string, callerKeyring: UnlockedKeyring, userId: string) => Promise<QuarantineResult>, vault: string, userId: string, factors?: FactorProofBundle): Promise<QuarantineResult>;
     /**
      * Add a tier-2 authenticator slot to the calling user's keyring.
      * Each slot independently wraps the SAME KEK under a method-specific

package/dist/with-party/team/roster-tag.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/**
+ * #1096 — the authenticated half of a `_keyring` file's AUTHORITY.
+ *
+ * A `_keyring` file is stored plaintext (`_iv: ''`) so admins can edit a
+ * member's authority without holding that member's credential. That means
+ * `role`/`permissions` were authenticated by NOTHING — a hostile store could
+ * promote a viewer to admin by editing one word (proven in
+ * `__tests__/keyring-replay-escalation.test.ts`).
+ *
+ * The fix is a vault-wide ROSTER KEY, carried as a reserved DEK-map entry
+ * (`deks['_roster']`, see `ROSTER_KEY_ID`) so it reaches every member through
+ * the channels a DEK already travels — grant's `_`-prefix propagation,
+ * `persistKeyring`, the wrapped-DEKs recovery blob, `peer-recover`, pod
+ * recipient slots — and a `roster_tag`: AES-GCM of the canonical authority
+ * fields under that key. Every roster EDITOR holds the key (constraint:
+ * admins edit authority they don't hold the target's credential for) — which
+ * is what sets the bound below.
+ *
+ * `user_id` is inside the canonical string so a genuine tag cannot be
+ * transplanted onto another member's file.
+ *
+ * ## What "authority half" does NOT cover
+ *
+ * The canonical string is exactly {@link RosterAuthorityFields} — the fields a
+ * privilege decision reads. Other plaintext fields are deliberately excluded
+ * and REMAIN FORGEABLE by the store: `display_name` (cosmetic), `policy`
+ * (round-tripped, never enforced at v1.0), `echo` and `authenticators` (each
+ * authenticated by its own wrapped key material — a forged one fails to
+ * unlock rather than granting anything), plus `created_at` / `salt` /
+ * `_noydb_keyring`. Adding a field to the tag means adding it to
+ * `rosterCanonical`; nothing else here is a claim about it.
+ *
+ * ## The bound
+ *
+ * This stops the STORE, which holds no keys. It deliberately does NOT stop a
+ * malicious MEMBER: every roster editor must hold the roster key, so anyone
+ * who legitimately holds it can forge any authority field for any member.
+ * That bound must be stated in `SECURITY.md` (tracked as part of the #1096
+ * PR) — it is not written there yet.
+ */
+import type { KeyringFile } from '../../kernel/types.js';
+import type { EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js';
+export interface RosterTag {
+    readonly iv: string;
+    readonly data: string;
+}
+export type RosterAuthorityFields = Pick<KeyringFile, 'user_id' | 'role' | 'permissions' | 'granted_by' | 'expires_at' | 'export_capability' | 'import_capability'>;
+export declare function rosterCanonical(file: RosterAuthorityFields): string;
+export declare function mintRosterTag(file: RosterAuthorityFields, rosterKey: EnclaveKey): Promise<RosterTag>;
+/**
+ * false on decrypt failure OR canonical mismatch — never throws.
+ *
+ * `null` is accepted alongside `undefined` because the tag arrives from
+ * JSON a store controls: `"roster_tag": null` is a shape the type system
+ * says is impossible and the wire permits.
+ */
+export declare function verifyRosterTag(file: RosterAuthorityFields, tag: RosterTag | undefined | null, rosterKey: EnclaveKey): Promise<boolean>;
+/**
+ * #1096 — THE CHOKEPOINT. Verify a keyring file's plaintext AUTHORITY half
+ * against the roster key carried in its own, already-unwrapped, DEK set.
+ * Throws {@link KeyringTamperedError}; returns silently when the roster is
+ * authentic.
+ *
+ * **Every path that builds an `UnlockedKeyring` from a `KeyringFile` must call
+ * this — not just `loadKeyring`.** A tier-2 unlock that reconstructs
+ * `role`/`permissions` from the plaintext header without it accepts exactly
+ * the forgery tier-1 refuses, and the vault is only as strong as its weakest
+ * unlock path. That is not hypothetical: the wrap-DEKs password path shipped
+ * in this state until it was caught in review.
+ *
+ * Deliberately says nothing about the canary. The canary proves the KEK, and
+ * tier-2 paths have no KEK to prove — the roster key they hold comes from the
+ * slot's own wrapped-DEK blob, which is authenticated by its own AES-GCM tag.
+ * Callers that DO hold a KEK check the canary separately, before this.
+ *
+ * @param deks the caller's UNWRAPPED DEK set — a roster key here is proof of
+ *   possession, so this must never be handed a map built from unverified input.
+ */
+export declare function assertRosterAuthenticated(file: KeyringFile, deks: ReadonlyMap<string, EnclaveKey>, userId: string): Promise<void>;
+/**
+ * #1096 — VERIFY BEFORE YOU TRUST, and especially before you RESTAMP.
+ *
+ * The sibling of {@link assertRosterAuthenticated} for the other half of the
+ * problem. That one guards paths that *unlock* a keyring; this one guards paths
+ * that **read another member's file** — because the roster key is vault-wide, a
+ * caller holding it can verify any member's tag, not just their own.
+ *
+ * Every read-modify-write on a member's roster must call this **before** the
+ * modify. A flow that reads a forged file, edits one field and restamps does
+ * not merely tolerate the forgery — it **launders** it, converting a file
+ * `loadKeyring` refuses into one it accepts, under a genuine tag. `revoke`
+ * calls into such a flow unconditionally, so without this a single forged
+ * member plus any later revocation anywhere in the vault is a complete bypass.
+ *
+ * Fail-closed, deliberately: a forged member's file aborts the operation rather
+ * than being skipped. Skipping would complete the revoke while leaving the
+ * forgery in place, and an untrusted store can already refuse writes — so the
+ * availability it costs was never guaranteed, while the integrity it buys is
+ * the point of the mechanism.
+ */
+export declare function assertRosterTagValid(file: KeyringFile, rosterKey: EnclaveKey, userId: string): Promise<void>;

package/dist/with-shape/blobs/blob-set.d.ts

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ export declare const BLOB_COLLECTION = "_blob";
 /** Stores `BlobObject` metadata envelopes, keyed by eTag. */
 export declare const BLOB_INDEX_COLLECTION = "_blob_index";
 /**
- * Stores encrypted chunk envelopes, keyed by `{eTag}/{chunkIndex}`.
+ * Stores encrypted chunk envelopes, keyed by `{eTag}_{chunkIndex}`.
  * NOT loaded into the in-memory query layer. Fetched on demand by
  * `BlobSet.get()` / `BlobSet.response()`.
  */
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ export declare const DEFAULT_CHUNK_SIZE: number;
  *
  * ```
  * _blob_index/{eTag}                            BlobObject metadata (vault-shared DEK)
- * _blob_chunks/{eTag}/{chunkIndex}              Encrypted chunk data (vault-shared DEK + AAD)
+ * _blob_chunks/{eTag}_{chunkIndex}              Encrypted chunk data (vault-shared DEK + AAD)
  * _blob_slots_{collection}/{recordId}           Slot map (parent collection DEK)
  * _blob_versions_{collection}/{recordId}/{slot}/{label}  Published versions (parent collection DEK)
  * ```