@noy-db/hub 0.6.0-pre.0 → 0.6.0-pre.2

package/dist/session/index.js

@@ -17,14 +17,14 @@ import {
   NO_SESSION
 } from "../chunk-VKQCVU2Z.js";
 import "../chunk-ZJADGNYF.js";
-import "../chunk-FY343IZR.js";
-import "../chunk-NQRJ5AJO.js";
+import "../chunk-VN45YLWM.js";
+import "../chunk-NWCGDAV6.js";
 import "../chunk-HXGUIPQB.js";
 import "../chunk-AR2JDFAE.js";
 import "../chunk-747LRSOO.js";
 import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
 import "../chunk-VCETL77O.js";
-import "../chunk-24ZLWWEO.js";
+import "../chunk-W5W6KHN2.js";
 import {
   SessionExpiredError,
   SessionNotFoundError,

package/dist/{signer-7KHD4OL2.js → signer-AGALOXOO.js}

@@ -4,15 +4,15 @@ import {
   SIGNER_RECORD_ID,
   loadOrCreateSigner,
   loadSigner
-} from "./chunk-ZWMO5GL5.js";
-import "./chunk-FY343IZR.js";
-import "./chunk-NQRJ5AJO.js";
+} from "./chunk-GASWQ3XG.js";
+import "./chunk-VN45YLWM.js";
+import "./chunk-NWCGDAV6.js";
 import "./chunk-HXGUIPQB.js";
 import "./chunk-AR2JDFAE.js";
 import "./chunk-747LRSOO.js";
 import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
 import "./chunk-VCETL77O.js";
-import "./chunk-24ZLWWEO.js";
+import "./chunk-W5W6KHN2.js";
 import "./chunk-HNGSV2YC.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {
@@ -22,4 +22,4 @@ export {
   loadOrCreateSigner,
   loadSigner
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=signer-7KHD4OL2.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=signer-AGALOXOO.js.map

package/dist/snapshots/index.js

@@ -4,16 +4,16 @@ import {
 import {
   readPod,
   writePod
-} from "../chunk-EK7DT5BT.js";
-import "../chunk-CYQOUTMY.js";
-import "../chunk-FY343IZR.js";
-import "../chunk-NQRJ5AJO.js";
+} from "../chunk-VOQW5LAM.js";
+import "../chunk-SZ2K3MHL.js";
+import "../chunk-VN45YLWM.js";
+import "../chunk-NWCGDAV6.js";
 import "../chunk-HXGUIPQB.js";
 import "../chunk-AR2JDFAE.js";
 import "../chunk-747LRSOO.js";
 import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
 import "../chunk-VCETL77O.js";
-import "../chunk-24ZLWWEO.js";
+import "../chunk-W5W6KHN2.js";
 import {
   SnapshotNotFoundError
 } from "../chunk-HNGSV2YC.js";

package/dist/{stale-K734VACF.js → stale-ZWXSOWJI.js}

@@ -6,16 +6,16 @@ import {
   isMVStale,
   markMVStale,
   resolveStaleMVOnRead
-} from "./chunk-3UK6STWO.js";
+} from "./chunk-26JMGSSC.js";
 import "./chunk-5D2ALSM5.js";
-import "./chunk-FY343IZR.js";
-import "./chunk-NQRJ5AJO.js";
+import "./chunk-VN45YLWM.js";
+import "./chunk-NWCGDAV6.js";
 import "./chunk-HXGUIPQB.js";
 import "./chunk-AR2JDFAE.js";
 import "./chunk-747LRSOO.js";
 import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
 import "./chunk-VCETL77O.js";
-import "./chunk-24ZLWWEO.js";
+import "./chunk-W5W6KHN2.js";
 import "./chunk-HNGSV2YC.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {
@@ -27,4 +27,4 @@ export {
   markMVStale,
   resolveStaleMVOnRead
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=stale-K734VACF.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=stale-ZWXSOWJI.js.map

package/dist/{storage-4H2GF6RQ.js → storage-N7LB275C.js}

@@ -3,15 +3,15 @@ import {
   loadPersistedSchema,
   loadPersistedSchemaEntry,
   savePersistedSchema
-} from "./chunk-V5C5NNBR.js";
-import "./chunk-FY343IZR.js";
-import "./chunk-NQRJ5AJO.js";
+} from "./chunk-4MC5JRRX.js";
+import "./chunk-VN45YLWM.js";
+import "./chunk-NWCGDAV6.js";
 import "./chunk-HXGUIPQB.js";
 import "./chunk-AR2JDFAE.js";
 import "./chunk-747LRSOO.js";
 import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
 import "./chunk-VCETL77O.js";
-import "./chunk-24ZLWWEO.js";
+import "./chunk-W5W6KHN2.js";
 import "./chunk-HNGSV2YC.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {
@@ -20,4 +20,4 @@ export {
   loadPersistedSchemaEntry,
   savePersistedSchema
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=storage-4H2GF6RQ.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=storage-N7LB275C.js.map

package/dist/{store-coordination-provider-4SKLSFUG.js → store-coordination-provider-PB6QZ57W.js}

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 import {
   loadFence,
   saveFence
-} from "./chunk-MVOWXQHN.js";
+} from "./chunk-TOAIYQJR.js";
 import {
   NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION
-} from "./chunk-24ZLWWEO.js";
+} from "./chunk-W5W6KHN2.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 
 // src/with-shape/schema-update/client-registry.ts
@@ -139,4 +139,4 @@ function unref(timer) {
 export {
   StoreCoordinationProvider
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=store-coordination-provider-4SKLSFUG.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=store-coordination-provider-PB6QZ57W.js.map

package/dist/sync/index.js

@@ -2,19 +2,19 @@ import {
   PresenceHandle,
   SyncEngine,
   SyncTransaction
-} from "../chunk-TFZ7LLOQ.js";
+} from "../chunk-EDXAQ6JI.js";
 import {
   NO_SYNC
 } from "../chunk-55LKVALY.js";
 import "../chunk-JXIDGFKS.js";
-import "../chunk-FY343IZR.js";
-import "../chunk-NQRJ5AJO.js";
+import "../chunk-VN45YLWM.js";
+import "../chunk-NWCGDAV6.js";
 import "../chunk-HXGUIPQB.js";
 import "../chunk-AR2JDFAE.js";
 import "../chunk-747LRSOO.js";
 import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
 import "../chunk-VCETL77O.js";
-import "../chunk-24ZLWWEO.js";
+import "../chunk-W5W6KHN2.js";
 import "../chunk-HNGSV2YC.js";
 import "../chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 

package/dist/team/index.js

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import {
   MemoryDeviceSealProvider,
   beginEchoUnlock,
   withTeam
-} from "../chunk-46V67XP5.js";
+} from "../chunk-WQDTCJ6W.js";
 import {
   NO_TEAM,
   burnPaperRecoveryEntry,
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ import {
   unwrapMagicLinkGrant,
   updateAuthenticator,
   writeMagicLinkGrant
-} from "../chunk-DPJTDNUF.js";
-import "../chunk-NVU7ZMPN.js";
+} from "../chunk-VRA4Q7DA.js";
+import "../chunk-PJNTR2NV.js";
 import {
   buildEchoBlock,
   buildRecipientKeyringFile,
@@ -53,17 +53,17 @@ import {
   updateKeyringIdentity,
   verifyPrompt,
   verifyTypedEcho
-} from "../chunk-RLWY6Z44.js";
-import "../chunk-27TCYH6G.js";
+} from "../chunk-ERB6NDDW.js";
+import "../chunk-UIBGXRDD.js";
 import "../chunk-AHLJSVRL.js";
-import "../chunk-FY343IZR.js";
-import "../chunk-NQRJ5AJO.js";
+import "../chunk-VN45YLWM.js";
+import "../chunk-NWCGDAV6.js";
 import "../chunk-HXGUIPQB.js";
 import "../chunk-AR2JDFAE.js";
 import "../chunk-747LRSOO.js";
 import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
 import "../chunk-VCETL77O.js";
-import "../chunk-24ZLWWEO.js";
+import "../chunk-W5W6KHN2.js";
 import {
   TeamNotEnabledError
 } from "../chunk-HNGSV2YC.js";

package/dist/tiers/index.js

@@ -11,16 +11,16 @@ import {
   putAtTier,
   syncDerivedOutputs,
   withTiers
-} from "../chunk-PGAPBZEK.js";
+} from "../chunk-C2OOEM57.js";
 import "../chunk-AHLJSVRL.js";
-import "../chunk-FY343IZR.js";
-import "../chunk-NQRJ5AJO.js";
+import "../chunk-VN45YLWM.js";
+import "../chunk-NWCGDAV6.js";
 import "../chunk-HXGUIPQB.js";
 import "../chunk-AR2JDFAE.js";
 import "../chunk-747LRSOO.js";
 import "../chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
 import "../chunk-VCETL77O.js";
-import "../chunk-24ZLWWEO.js";
+import "../chunk-W5W6KHN2.js";
 import {
   TiersNotEnabledError
 } from "../chunk-HNGSV2YC.js";

package/dist/via/classified/descriptor.d.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /**
  * Classified fields — behavioral sensitive-field descriptors (stage 1).
- * Design: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-04-classified-fields-design.md
+ * Design: design-history/2026-07-04-classified-fields-design.md
  * Law: open on write, declarative on read — read-side behavior is this
  * closed vocabulary; there are no read-side callbacks.
  * @module

package/dist/{walk-MQHYNDLZ.js → walk-OCUHCYJ6.js}

@@ -1,21 +1,21 @@
 import {
   dumpVaultSchema
-} from "./chunk-MJWCLSQL.js";
+} from "./chunk-P7OG2ETF.js";
 import "./chunk-KHKKD62N.js";
-import "./chunk-2LGDCNFJ.js";
+import "./chunk-Z45YRGFO.js";
 import "./chunk-Y2NBBT6K.js";
-import "./chunk-V5C5NNBR.js";
-import "./chunk-FY343IZR.js";
-import "./chunk-NQRJ5AJO.js";
+import "./chunk-4MC5JRRX.js";
+import "./chunk-VN45YLWM.js";
+import "./chunk-NWCGDAV6.js";
 import "./chunk-HXGUIPQB.js";
 import "./chunk-AR2JDFAE.js";
 import "./chunk-747LRSOO.js";
 import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
 import "./chunk-VCETL77O.js";
-import "./chunk-24ZLWWEO.js";
+import "./chunk-W5W6KHN2.js";
 import "./chunk-HNGSV2YC.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {
   dumpVaultSchema
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=walk-MQHYNDLZ.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=walk-OCUHCYJ6.js.map

package/dist/with-audit/attestation/index.d.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * @category capability
  * Document attestation — issue side. Mint a signed, per-field commitment
  * for a record and emit a QR credential verifiable offline via
- * `@noy-db/attestation`. See docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-29-attestation-core-and-issue-design.md.
+ * `@noy-db/attestation`. See design-history/2026-05-29-attestation-core-and-issue-design.md.
  */
 export { withAttestation } from './active.js';
 export { NO_ATTESTATION, type AttestationStrategy } from './strategy.js';

package/dist/with-audit/guards/with-guard.d.ts

@@ -10,6 +10,6 @@ import type { GuardSpec, GuardStrategy } from './types.js';
  *
  * Pass the returned handle to `createNoydb({ strategies: [...] })`.
  *
- * @see docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-18-guards-design.md
+ * @see design-history/2026-05-18-guards-design.md
  */
 export declare function withGuard<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(strategy: GuardSpec<T>): GuardStrategy<T>;

package/dist/with-cargo/index.d.ts

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
  * distributed query, addressing, and change-observation. It consolidates the
  * runtime floor formerly published as `/kernel` plus the orchestration delta.
  *
- * See docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-01-noydb-architecture-lexicon.md.
+ * See docs/foundations/architecture-lexicon.md.
  *
  * @packageDocumentation
  */

package/dist/with-commit/history/ledger/entry.d.ts

@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ export interface LedgerEntry {
      * the role of the actor, the (collection, id, vBefore, vAfter) tuple
      * for every record touched, and which guard invariants passed.
      *
-     * See docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-18-guards-design.md.
+     * See design-history/2026-05-18-guards-design.md.
      */
     readonly amendment?: {
         readonly reason: string;

package/dist/with-commit/numbering/descriptor.d.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /**
  * @category capability
  * Deferred-numbering config descriptor. See
- * docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-08-sealed-numbering-and-store-clock-design.md.
+ * design-history/2026-06-08-sealed-numbering-and-store-clock-design.md.
  */
 /** A registered deferred-numbering series. */
 export interface DeferredNumberingConfig {

package/dist/with-formula/derivations/with-derivation.d.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,6 @@ import type { DerivationSpec, DerivationStrategy } from './types.js';
  * plaintext after DEK unwrap. Outputs are encrypted with the same DEK
  * as the source and written via the standard `Collection.put` path.
  *
- * See docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-01-dim14-derivation-v1-design.md.
+ * See design-history/2026-05-01-dim14-derivation-v1-design.md.
  */
 export declare function withDerivation<TSource extends Record<string, unknown>, TOutputs extends Record<string, Record<string, unknown> | ReadonlyArray<Record<string, unknown>>>>(spec: DerivationSpec<TSource, TOutputs>): DerivationStrategy;

package/dist/with-formula/materialized-views/with-materialized-view.d.ts

@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ import type { MaterializedViewSpec, MaterializedViewStrategy } from './types.js'
  * The three modes are mutually exclusive — exactly one of `query` /
  * `unionSources` / `projection` must be set at registration time.
  *
- * See docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-20-dim14-mv-v2-design.md (single-source v2),
- * docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-21-dim14-mv-multikey-and-union.md (UNION),
- * and docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-25-join-projection-mv-design.md (projection).
+ * See design-history/2026-05-20-dim14-mv-v2-design.md (single-source v2),
+ * design-history/2026-05-21-dim14-mv-multikey-and-union.md (UNION),
+ * and design-history/2026-07-25-join-projection-mv-design.md (projection).
  */
 export declare function withMaterializedView<TRow extends Record<string, unknown>>(spec: MaterializedViewSpec<TRow>): MaterializedViewStrategy;

package/dist/with-formula/overlay-views/with-overlayed-view.d.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,6 @@ import type { OverlayedViewSpec, OverlayedViewStrategy } from './types.js';
  * a user-writable overlay so consumers can express operator-editable
  * lifecycles as one declarative block.
  *
- * See docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-20-dim14-mv-v2-design.md.
+ * See design-history/2026-05-20-dim14-mv-v2-design.md.
  */
 export declare function withOverlayedView(spec: OverlayedViewSpec): OverlayedViewStrategy;

package/dist/with-party/custody/index.d.ts

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
  * vault instance (and thus no custody namespace) yet — it stays the exported
  * `team/deed.ts` function.
  *
- * @see docs/superpowers/specs/2026-06-17-fr6-deed-custodian-liberate-design.md
+ * @see design-history/2026-06-17-fr6-deed-custodian-liberate-design.md
  * @module
  */
 import type { GrantOptions, RevokeOptions, FactorProofBundle } from '../../kernel/types.js';

package/dist/with-party/directory/user-envelope/index.d.ts

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  * `UserEnvelopeOversizedError` live in the kernel spine
  * (`kernel/types.ts` / `kernel/constants.ts` / `kernel/errors.ts`).
  *
- * @see docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-05-user-envelope-design.md
+ * @see design-history/2026-05-05-user-envelope-design.md
  *
  * @module
  */

package/dist/with-party/directory/user-envelope/storage.d.ts

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  * (`vault.user.*`) sits on top of this; permission gates, own-only
  * write enforcement, and presence-channel propagation live there.
  *
- * @see docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-05-user-envelope-design.md
+ * @see design-history/2026-05-05-user-envelope-design.md
  *
  * @module
  */

package/dist/with-party/team/echo-ceremony.d.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /**
  * `beginEchoUnlock` — the interactive ceremony API (spec
- * docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md, #940, Task 6).
+ * design-history/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md, #940, Task 6).
  *
  * Split out of `echo-secret.ts` (which owns only the block builders +
  * verifiers) because this module orchestrates BOTH `echo-secret.ts`
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ export interface EchoCeremony {
      * TYPE it.
      *
      * Conforming-player contract (spec
-     * docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md, "Ceremony"):
+     * design-history/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md, "Ceremony"):
      * when the owner does NOT recognize the revealed echo, the player MUST show
      * a hard phishing warning — do not continue, open the official app, rotate
      * the secret immediately — MUST NOT offer any skip or
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ export interface EchoCeremony {
  * cannot be resolved — sealed reveal under a foreign device).
  *
  * Conforming-player contract (spec
- * docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md): an owner who does
+ * design-history/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md): an owner who does
  * not recognize `ceremony.reveal` is looking at a phish. The player MUST then
  * show a hard warning (stop, open the official app, rotate the secret now),
  * MUST NOT offer a skip / "verification unavailable" fallback or any

package/dist/with-party/team/echo-secret.d.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /**
  * Echo-block builders + verifiers (spec
- * docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md, #940).
+ * design-history/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md, #940).
  *
  * Builds and verifies the on-keyring {@link KeyringEchoBlock} declaration
  * for the 3-part echo ceremony (prompt → echo → key). This module owns:
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
  * offline brute-force oracles for anyone holding the keyring file (600K
  * PBKDF2 per guess), and the `sealed` reveal blob is unpadded so its length
  * discloses the echo's UTF-8 byte length — see the threat model in
- * `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md`.
+ * `design-history/2026-08-02-echo-secret-design.md`.
  *
  * @module
  */

package/dist/with-shape/introspection/index.d.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * {@link VaultSchemaSnapshot} describing the vault's shape and (optional)
  * stats. Consumed by `noydb describe` for human-readable audit output.
  *
- * @see docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-22-schema-dump-design.md
+ * @see design-history/2026-05-22-schema-dump-design.md
  *
  * @module
  */

package/dist/with-shape/introspection/types.d.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * by `vault.dumpSchema()`. Consumed by the upcoming `noydb describe`
  * CLI to emit human-readable YAML/JSON audit output.
  *
- * @see docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-22-schema-dump-design.md
+ * @see design-history/2026-05-22-schema-dump-design.md
  *
  * @module
  */

package/dist/with-shape/persisted-schemas/derive.d.ts

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  * hub never statically imports zod. Other validator families write a stub
  * envelope flagging the kind.
  *
- * @see docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-22-schema-dump-design.md
+ * @see design-history/2026-05-22-schema-dump-design.md
  *
  * @module
  */

package/dist/with-shape/persisted-schemas/index.d.ts

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  * Standard Schema validators (Valibot, ArkType, Effect Schema) write a
  * stub envelope flagging the kind without a JSON Schema body.
  *
- * @see docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-22-schema-dump-design.md
+ * @see design-history/2026-05-22-schema-dump-design.md
  *
  * @module
  */

package/dist/with-shape/persisted-schemas/types.d.ts

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  * collection's records. Auditors who can unlock the collection's data can
  * also read its schema; nothing more.
  *
- * @see docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-22-schema-dump-design.md
+ * @see design-history/2026-05-22-schema-dump-design.md
  *
  * @module
  */

package/dist/{withdraw-accessible-JSDQHXHE.js → withdraw-accessible-QQNWM5BO.js}

@@ -4,18 +4,18 @@ import {
   freezeSnapshotOnly,
   randomId,
   withdrawAccessibleData
-} from "./chunk-JSRU5W2M.js";
-import "./chunk-4MQDV3HZ.js";
-import "./chunk-EK7DT5BT.js";
-import "./chunk-CYQOUTMY.js";
-import "./chunk-FY343IZR.js";
-import "./chunk-NQRJ5AJO.js";
+} from "./chunk-EP7VPR7Y.js";
+import "./chunk-52QYGZHH.js";
+import "./chunk-VOQW5LAM.js";
+import "./chunk-SZ2K3MHL.js";
+import "./chunk-VN45YLWM.js";
+import "./chunk-NWCGDAV6.js";
 import "./chunk-HXGUIPQB.js";
 import "./chunk-AR2JDFAE.js";
 import "./chunk-747LRSOO.js";
 import "./chunk-LP7BEXCT.js";
 import "./chunk-VCETL77O.js";
-import "./chunk-24ZLWWEO.js";
+import "./chunk-W5W6KHN2.js";
 import "./chunk-HNGSV2YC.js";
 import "./chunk-PZ5AY32C.js";
 export {
@@ -25,4 +25,4 @@ export {
   randomId,
   withdrawAccessibleData
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=withdraw-accessible-JSDQHXHE.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=withdraw-accessible-QQNWM5BO.js.map

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@noy-db/hub",
-  "version": "0.6.0-pre.0",
+  "version": "0.6.0-pre.2",
   "description": "Zero-knowledge, offline-first, encrypted document store — core library with AES-256-GCM, PBKDF2, multi-user keyring, and sync engine",
   "license": "MIT",
   "author": "vLannaAi <vicio@lanna.ai>",
@@ -208,14 +208,14 @@
     "node": ">=22.0.0"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@noy-db/attestation": "0.6.0-pre.0"
+    "@noy-db/attestation": "0.6.0-pre.2"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@types/node": "^22.0.0",
     "esbuild": "^0.25.0",
     "zod": "^4.0.0",
     "zod-to-json-schema": "^3.25.2",
-    "@noy-db/on-shamir": "0.6.0-pre.0"
+    "@noy-db/on-shamir": "0.6.0-pre.2"
   },
   "peerDependencies": {
     "zod-to-json-schema": "^3.25.0"

package/dist/chunk-24UICKTB.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-commit/history/ledger/entry.ts","../src/with-commit/history/ledger/hash.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Ledger entry shape + canonical JSON + sha256 helpers.\n *\n * This file holds the PURE primitives used by the hash-chained ledger:\n * the entry type, the deterministic (sort-stable) JSON encoder, and\n * the sha256 hasher that produces `prevHash` and `ledger.head()`.\n *\n * Everything here is validator-free and side-effect free — the only\n * runtime dep is Web Crypto's `subtle.digest` for the sha256 call,\n * which we already use for every other hashing operation in the core.\n *\n * The hash chain property works like this:\n *\n *   hash(entry[i])       = sha256(canonicalJSON(entry[i]))\n *   entry[i+1].prevHash  = hash(entry[i])\n *\n * Any modification to `entry[i]` (field values, field order, whitespace)\n * produces a different `hash(entry[i])`, which means `entry[i+1]`'s\n * stored `prevHash` no longer matches the recomputed hash, which means\n * `verify()` returns `{ ok: false, divergedAt: i + 1 }`. The chain is\n * append-only and tamper-evident without external anchoring.\n */\n\n/**\n * A single ledger entry in its plaintext form — what gets serialized,\n * hashed, and then encrypted with the ledger DEK before being written\n * to the `_ledger/` adapter collection.\n *\n * ## Why hash the ciphertext, not the plaintext?\n *\n * `payloadHash` is the sha256 of the record's ENCRYPTED envelope bytes,\n * not its plaintext. This matters:\n *\n *   1. **Zero-knowledge preserved.** A user (or a third party) can\n *      verify the ledger against the stored envelopes without any\n *      decryption keys. The adapter layer already holds only\n *      ciphertext, so hashing the ciphertext keeps the ledger at the\n *      same privacy level as the adapter.\n *\n *   2. **Determinism.** Plaintext → ciphertext is randomized by the\n *      fresh per-write IV, so `hash(plaintext)` would need extra\n *      normalization. `hash(ciphertext)` is already deterministic and\n *      unique per write.\n *\n *   3. **Detection property.** If an attacker modifies even one byte of\n *      the stored ciphertext (trying to flip a record), the hash\n *      changes, the ledger's recorded `payloadHash` no longer matches,\n *      and a data-integrity check fails. We don't do that check in\n *      `verify()` today, but the\n *      hook is there for a future `verifyIntegrity()` follow-up.\n *\n * Fields marked `op`, `collection`, `id`, `version`, `ts`, `actor` are\n * plaintext METADATA about the operation — NOT the record itself. The\n * entry is still encrypted at rest via the ledger DEK, but adapters\n * could theoretically infer operation patterns from the sizes and\n * timestamps. This is an accepted trade-off for the tamper-evidence\n * property; full ORAM-level privacy is out of scope for noy-db.\n */\nimport { sha256Hex as sha256HexBytes } from '../../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\n\nexport interface LedgerEntry {\n  /**\n   * Zero-based sequential position of this entry in the chain. The\n   * canonical adapter key is this number zero-padded to 10 digits\n   * (`\"0000000001\"`) so lexicographic ordering matches numeric order.\n   */\n  readonly index: number\n\n  /**\n   * Hex-encoded sha256 of the canonical JSON of the PREVIOUS entry.\n   * The genesis entry (index 0) has `prevHash === ''` — the first\n   * entry in a fresh vault has nothing to point back to.\n   */\n  readonly prevHash: string\n\n  /**\n   * Which kind of mutation this entry records. only supports\n   * data operations (`put`, `delete`, `amendment`). Access-control\n   * operations (`grant`, `revoke`, `rotate`) will be added in a\n   * follow-up once the keyring write path is instrumented — that's\n   * tracked in the epic issue.\n   *\n   * `'amendment'` is the multi-record audit entry written by the\n   * guards service when an admin/owner uses `withTransactions(...)`\n   * to repair a constraint-violating state. See `amendment` field\n   * below for the structured payload.\n   *\n   * `'lifecycle'` records a non-data audit event (e.g. partition\n   * handover) — `collection`/`id` are empty and the event detail\n   * lives in `reason` (e.g. `'partition-handed-over:<sealId>'`). Like\n   * `amendment`, it carries no data envelope, so `verifyBackupIntegrity`\n   * skips it in the data cross-check (it still participates in the\n   * tamper-evident chain).\n   *\n   * `'forget'` is the single summary entry written by `vault.forget()`\n   * (GDPR crypto-shred). `collection`/`id` are empty and `version`\n   * is 0 — a forget is not scoped to one record. `payloadHash` carries\n   * `sha256Hex(subjectId)` so the ledger PROVES \"subject X existed and\n   * was erased on date D\" without retaining the subject id or any\n   * plaintext; `reason` holds a JSON summary of the shred counts. Like\n   * `amendment`/`lifecycle` it carries no data envelope and is skipped\n   * by the reconstruct walker (it still participates in the chain, so\n   * `verify()` passes after a shred).\n   */\n  readonly op: 'put' | 'delete' | 'amendment' | 'lifecycle' | 'migration' | 'forget'\n\n  /** The collection the mutation targeted. */\n  readonly collection: string\n\n  /** The record id the mutation targeted. */\n  readonly id: string\n\n  /**\n   * The record version AFTER this mutation. For `put` this is the\n   * newly assigned version; for `delete` this is the version that\n   * was deleted (the last version visible to reads).\n   */\n  readonly version: number\n\n  /** ISO timestamp of the mutation. */\n  readonly ts: string\n\n  /** User id of the actor who performed the mutation. */\n  readonly actor: string\n\n  /**\n   * Hex-encoded sha256 over the encrypted envelope's `_data` field, plus its\n   * sealed-field ciphertext map (`_sealed`) when the record carries one —\n   * so the ledger attests to both the open body and every sealed\n   * value. A record with no `_sealed` hashes `_data` alone.\n   * For `put`, this is the hash of the new ciphertext. For `delete`,\n   * it's the hash of the last visible ciphertext at deletion time, or the empty\n   * string if nothing was there to delete. Hashing the ciphertext (not the\n   * plaintext) preserves zero-knowledge — see the file docstring. The exact\n   * recipe lives in `envelopePayloadHash` (`hash.ts`).\n   */\n  readonly payloadHash: string\n\n  /**\n   * Optional human-readable tag describing why this mutation happened.\n   * Threaded through `collection.put(_, _, { reason })`. Common\n   * values include `'import:csv'`, `'import:json'`, `'import:xlsx'` from\n   * `as-*` ImportPlan.apply(), but consumers can use any string for\n   * domain-specific audit filtering. Auto-strip via `canonicalJson` —\n   * absent on the wire, never serialized as `null`.\n   *\n   * Audit consumers filter: `entries.filter(e => e.reason?.startsWith('import:'))`.\n   */\n  readonly reason?: string\n\n  /**\n   * Optional hex-encoded sha256 of the encrypted JSON Patch delta\n   * blob stored alongside this entry in `_ledger_deltas/`. Present\n   * only for `put` operations that had a previous version — the\n   * genesis put of a new record, and every `delete`, leave this\n   * field undefined.\n   *\n   * The delta payload itself lives in a sibling internal collection\n   * (`_ledger_deltas/<paddedIndex>`) and is encrypted with the\n   * ledger DEK. Callers use `ledger.loadDelta(index)` to decrypt and\n   * deserialize it when reconstructing a historical version.\n   *\n   * Why optional instead of always-present: the first put of a\n   * record has no previous version to diff against, so storing an\n   * empty patch would be noise. For deletes there's no \"next\" state\n   * to describe with a delta. Both cases set this field to undefined.\n   *\n   * Note: the canonical-JSON hasher treats `undefined` as invalid\n   * (it's one of the guard rails), so on the wire this field is\n   * either `{ deltaHash: '<hex>' }` or absent from the JSON\n   * entirely — never `{ deltaHash: undefined }`.\n   */\n  readonly deltaHash?: string\n\n  /**\n   * Present only when `op === 'amendment'`. Records the human reason,\n   * the role of the actor, the (collection, id, vBefore, vAfter) tuple\n   * for every record touched, and which guard invariants passed.\n   *\n   * See docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-18-guards-design.md.\n   */\n  readonly amendment?: {\n    readonly reason: string\n    readonly role: 'admin' | 'owner'\n    readonly changes: ReadonlyArray<{\n      readonly collection: string\n      readonly id: string\n      readonly vBefore: number\n      readonly vAfter: number\n    }>\n    readonly invariantsPassed: ReadonlyArray<string>\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Canonical (sort-stable) JSON encoder.\n *\n * This function is the load-bearing primitive of the hash chain:\n * `sha256(canonicalJSON(entry))` must produce the same hex string\n * every time, on every machine, for the same logical entry — otherwise\n * `verify()` would return `{ ok: false }` on cross-platform reads.\n *\n * JavaScript's `JSON.stringify` is almost canonical, but NOT quite:\n * it preserves the insertion order of object keys, which means\n * `{a:1,b:2}` and `{b:2,a:1}` serialize differently. We fix this by\n * recursively walking objects and sorting their keys before\n * concatenation.\n *\n * Arrays keep their original order (reordering them would change\n * semantics). Numbers, strings, booleans, and `null` use the default\n * JSON encoding. `undefined` and functions are rejected — ledger\n * entries are plain data, and silently dropping `undefined` would\n * break the \"same input → same hash\" property if a caller forgot to\n * omit a field.\n *\n * Performance: one pass per nesting level; O(n log n) for key sorting\n * at each object. Entries are small (< 1 KB) so this is negligible\n * compared to the sha256 call.\n */\nexport function canonicalJson(value: unknown): string {\n  if (value === null) return 'null'\n  if (typeof value === 'boolean') return value ? 'true' : 'false'\n  if (typeof value === 'number') {\n    if (!Number.isFinite(value)) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `canonicalJson: refusing to encode non-finite number ${String(value)}`,\n      )\n    }\n    return JSON.stringify(value)\n  }\n  if (typeof value === 'string') return JSON.stringify(value)\n  if (typeof value === 'bigint') {\n    throw new Error('canonicalJson: BigInt is not JSON-serializable')\n  }\n  if (typeof value === 'undefined' || typeof value === 'function') {\n    throw new Error(\n      `canonicalJson: refusing to encode ${typeof value} — include all fields explicitly`,\n    )\n  }\n  if (Array.isArray(value)) {\n    return '[' + value.map((v) => canonicalJson(v)).join(',') + ']'\n  }\n  if (typeof value === 'object') {\n    const obj = value as Record<string, unknown>\n    const keys = Object.keys(obj).sort()\n    const parts: string[] = []\n    for (const key of keys) {\n      parts.push(JSON.stringify(key) + ':' + canonicalJson(obj[key]))\n    }\n    return '{' + parts.join(',') + '}'\n  }\n  throw new Error(`canonicalJson: unexpected value type: ${typeof value}`)\n}\n\n/**\n * Compute a hex-encoded sha256 of a string via Web Crypto's subtle API.\n *\n * We use hex (not base64) for hashes because hex is case-insensitive,\n * fixed-length (64 chars), and easier to compare visually in debug\n * output. Base64 would save a few bytes in storage but every encrypted\n * ledger entry is already much larger than the hash itself.\n */\nexport async function sha256Hex(input: string): Promise<string> {\n  return sha256HexBytes(new TextEncoder().encode(input))\n}\n\n/**\n * Compute the canonical hash of a ledger entry. Short wrapper around\n * `canonicalJson` + `sha256Hex`; callers use this instead of composing\n * the two functions every time, so any future change to the hashing\n * pipeline (e.g., adding a domain-separation prefix) lives in one place.\n */\nexport async function hashEntry(entry: LedgerEntry): Promise<string> {\n  return sha256Hex(canonicalJson(entry))\n}\n\n/**\n * Pad an index to the canonical 10-digit form used as the adapter key.\n * Ten digits is enough for ~10 billion ledger entries per vault\n * — far beyond any realistic use case, but cheap enough that the extra\n * digits don't hurt storage.\n */\nexport function paddedIndex(index: number): string {\n  return String(index).padStart(10, '0')\n}\n\n/** Parse a padded adapter key back into a number. Returns NaN on malformed input. */\nexport function parseIndex(key: string): number {\n  return Number.parseInt(key, 10)\n}\n","/**\n * Envelope payload hash — pinned in its own leaf module so consumers\n * (DictionaryHandle, the active history strategy) can import it\n * without dragging in the `LedgerStore` class.\n *\n * see `constants.ts` for the broader rationale.\n *\n * @internal\n */\n\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { sha256Hex } from './entry.js'\nimport { envelopeBodyForHash } from '../../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\n\n/**\n * Compute the `payloadHash` value for an encrypted envelope. Used by\n * `LedgerStore.append` for both put (hash the new envelope) and\n * delete (hash the previous envelope) paths, and by\n * `DictionaryHandle` so its ledger entries match the same contract.\n *\n * Hashes the open `_data` ciphertext, plus the sealed-field ciphertext\n * map (`_sealed`) when a record carries one — so the ledger attests to\n * both the open body AND every sealed value … and the verify-digest\n * ciphertext map (`_vdig`), each bound only when present — the `_vdig`\n * binding is the temporal-rollback detector for the C1 splice class.\n * `rotateRecordCek` rewrites `_vdig` with no ledger entry, the same\n * pre-existing rotation property `_sealed`/`_cek` already have\n * (`verifyBackupIntegrity` flags rotated records until re-anchored).\n *\n * Returns the empty string when there is no envelope (delete of a\n * never-existed record). The empty string tolerated by the ledger\n * entry's `payloadHash` field as the canonical \"nothing here\" value.\n */\nexport async function envelopePayloadHash(\n  envelope: EncryptedEnvelope | null,\n): Promise<string> {\n  if (!envelope) return ''\n  // Back-compat: a record with NO sealed fields hashes as sha256 of\n  // `_data` alone — so every pre-existing ledger entry\n  // and every non-sealed backup verifies byte-identically. A record WITH\n  // `_sealed` widens the hash to also bind the sealed-field ciphertext, so the\n  // ledger attests to sealed-value tamper/erasure (a dropped or swapped\n  // `_sealed[field]` now diverges `verifyBackupIntegrity`'s data cross-check).\n  // `envelopeBodyForHash` (the enclave barrel's C1 protected-body access\n  // contract) derives this exact string — see its own doc for the\n  // canonicalization recipe (sorted keys, independent of `_sealed`'s\n  // field-insertion / store-serialization order).\n  //\n  // `_cek` is deliberately NOT bound: a tampered wrapped-CEK already self-\n  // detects (it fails to unwrap), and `rotateRecordCek` rewrites `_cek` with no\n  // ledger entry — binding it would make every legitimate rotation fail verify.\n  //\n  // RESIDUAL: a backup containing sealed records created BEFORE this change\n  // stored `payloadHash` over `_data` only, so it will fail the data cross-check\n  // and must be re-anchored (re-`put`/re-baseline). Sealed fields are new, so\n  // this is expected to affect ~no real vault.\n  //\n  // The two branches are NOT domain-separated — D1 pins the no-`_sealed` branch\n  // to exactly `sha256(_data)`, so it cannot carry a discriminator tag. An actor\n  // with raw-store write access could therefore set a non-sealed record's `_data`\n  // equal to the canonical-JSON string below and collide a sealed record's hash —\n  // but doing so overwrites `_data` itself, which then no longer GCM-decrypts, so\n  // it only suppresses the verify signal on an already-destroyed record; it cannot\n  // silently erase one sealed field while leaving the record readable.\n  return sha256Hex(envelopeBodyForHash(envelope))\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;AA2NO,SAAS,cAAc,OAAwB;AACpD,MAAI,UAAU,KAAM,QAAO;AAC3B,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,UAAW,QAAO,QAAQ,SAAS;AACxD,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,UAAU;AAC7B,QAAI,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG;AAC3B,YAAM,IAAI;AAAA,QACR,uDAAuD,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,MACtE;AAAA,IACF;AACA,WAAO,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,EAC7B;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,SAAU,QAAO,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK;AAC1D,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,UAAU;AAC7B,UAAM,IAAI,MAAM,gDAAgD;AAAA,EAClE;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,eAAe,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY;AAC/D,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,qCAAqC,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACnD;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,GAAG;AACxB,WAAO,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI;AAAA,EAC9D;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,UAAU;AAC7B,UAAM,MAAM;AACZ,UAAM,OAAO,OAAO,KAAK,GAAG,EAAE,KAAK;AACnC,UAAM,QAAkB,CAAC;AACzB,eAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AACtB,YAAM,KAAK,KAAK,UAAU,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM,cAAc,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;AAAA,IAChE;AACA,WAAO,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI;AAAA,EACjC;AACA,QAAM,IAAI,MAAM,yCAAyC,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE;AACzE;AAUA,eAAsBA,WAAU,OAAgC;AAC9D,SAAO,UAAe,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AACvD;AAQA,eAAsB,UAAU,OAAqC;AACnE,SAAOA,WAAU,cAAc,KAAK,CAAC;AACvC;AAQO,SAAS,YAAY,OAAuB;AACjD,SAAO,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG;AACvC;AAGO,SAAS,WAAW,KAAqB;AAC9C,SAAO,OAAO,SAAS,KAAK,EAAE;AAChC;;;AChQA,eAAsB,oBACpB,UACiB;AACjB,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AA4BtB,SAAOC,WAAU,oBAAoB,QAAQ,CAAC;AAChD;","names":["sha256Hex","sha256Hex"]}