@noy-db/hub 0.3.0-pre.3 → 0.3.0-pre.5

package/dist/{chunk-5ZPWVNL3.js → chunk-S2WKOCTU.js}

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 function withCargo() {
   return {
     async extractPartition(vault, opts) {
-      const { extractPartitionCore } = await import("./extract-partition-52LX6RQH.js");
+      const { extractPartitionCore } = await import("./extract-partition-6JGY3KYR.js");
       return extractPartitionCore(vault, opts);
     }
   };
@@ -11,4 +11,4 @@ function withCargo() {
 export {
   withCargo
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-5ZPWVNL3.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-S2WKOCTU.js.map

package/dist/chunk-SAJJWVNQ.js

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+import {
+  canonicalize,
+  derivePersistedSchema
+} from "./chunk-ULIHDPKL.js";
+import {
+  loadPersistedSchemaEntry,
+  savePersistedSchema
+} from "./chunk-TL7QR5T6.js";
+import {
+  ConflictError
+} from "./chunk-U23JUUPX.js";
+
+// src/with-shape/schema-update/delta.ts
+function computeSchemaDelta(stored, fresh, collection) {
+  const a = stored;
+  const b = fresh;
+  const aProps = a.properties ?? {};
+  const bProps = b.properties ?? {};
+  const aReq = new Set(a.required ?? []);
+  const bReq = new Set(b.required ?? []);
+  const aKeys = Object.keys(aProps);
+  const bKeys = Object.keys(bProps);
+  const added = bKeys.filter((k) => !(k in aProps));
+  const removed = aKeys.filter((k) => !(k in bProps));
+  const changed = [];
+  for (const k of bKeys) {
+    if (!(k in aProps)) continue;
+    const shapeChanged = canonicalize(aProps[k]) !== canonicalize(bProps[k]);
+    const requiredChanged = aReq.has(k) !== bReq.has(k);
+    if (shapeChanged || requiredChanged) {
+      changed.push({ field: k, requiredChanged, shapeChanged });
+    }
+  }
+  let kind;
+  if (added.length === 0 && removed.length === 0 && changed.length === 0) {
+    kind = "none";
+  } else if (removed.length === 0 && changed.length === 0 && added.every((k) => !bReq.has(k))) {
+    kind = "additive";
+  } else {
+    kind = "non-additive";
+  }
+  return { collection, kind, added, removed, changed };
+}
+
+// src/with-shape/schema-update/dispatch.ts
+async function evaluateStrategies(delta, strategies, ctx) {
+  for (const strategy of strategies) {
+    const decision = await strategy.onSchemaDelta(delta, ctx);
+    if (decision.action !== "allow") return decision;
+  }
+  return { action: "allow" };
+}
+
+// src/with-shape/persisted-schemas/register.ts
+var MAX_SCHEMA_CAS_RETRIES = 5;
+async function persistSchemaIfNeeded(opts) {
+  const fresh = await derivePersistedSchema(opts.validator);
+  for (let attempt = 0; ; attempt++) {
+    const { version, payload: stored } = await loadPersistedSchemaEntry(
+      opts.store,
+      opts.vault,
+      opts.collectionName,
+      opts.dek
+    );
+    if (stored && isEquivalent(stored, fresh)) {
+      return { written: false, skipped: true, envelope: stored, decision: { action: "allow" } };
+    }
+    let decision = { action: "allow" };
+    const strategies = opts.strategies ?? [];
+    if (stored && strategies.length > 0 && stored.kind === fresh.kind && isPlainObject(stored.jsonSchema) && isPlainObject(fresh.jsonSchema)) {
+      const delta = computeSchemaDelta(stored.jsonSchema, fresh.jsonSchema, opts.collectionName);
+      decision = await evaluateStrategies(delta, strategies, { collection: opts.collectionName });
+    }
+    if (decision.action !== "allow") {
+      return { written: false, skipped: false, envelope: stored ?? fresh, decision };
+    }
+    const toSave = stored?.classified !== void 0 ? { ...fresh, classified: stored.classified } : fresh;
+    try {
+      await savePersistedSchema(opts.store, opts.vault, opts.collectionName, opts.dek, toSave, version);
+      return { written: true, skipped: false, envelope: toSave, decision };
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (err instanceof ConflictError && attempt < MAX_SCHEMA_CAS_RETRIES) continue;
+      throw err;
+    }
+  }
+}
+async function persistClassifiedMarker(opts) {
+  for (let attempt = 0; ; attempt++) {
+    const { version, payload: stored } = await loadPersistedSchemaEntry(
+      opts.store,
+      opts.vault,
+      opts.collectionName,
+      opts.dek
+    );
+    if (stored?.classified !== void 0 && markersEqual(stored.classified, opts.marker)) return;
+    const payload = stored !== void 0 ? { ...stored, classified: opts.marker } : {
+      _noydb_schema: 1,
+      kind: "Unknown",
+      jsonSchema: null,
+      hash: null,
+      derivedAt: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
+      classified: opts.marker
+    };
+    try {
+      await savePersistedSchema(opts.store, opts.vault, opts.collectionName, opts.dek, payload, version);
+      return;
+    } catch (err) {
+      if (err instanceof ConflictError && attempt < MAX_SCHEMA_CAS_RETRIES) continue;
+      throw err;
+    }
+  }
+}
+function markersEqual(a, b) {
+  return sameSet(a.digestOnly, b.digestOnly) && sameSet(a.equatable, b.equatable);
+}
+function sameSet(a, b) {
+  if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
+  const s = new Set(a);
+  return b.every((x) => s.has(x));
+}
+function isPlainObject(v) {
+  return typeof v === "object" && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);
+}
+function isEquivalent(a, b) {
+  if (a.kind !== b.kind) return false;
+  if (a.hash && b.hash) return a.hash === b.hash;
+  if (a.hash === null && b.hash === null) return true;
+  return false;
+}
+
+export {
+  persistSchemaIfNeeded,
+  persistClassifiedMarker
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-SAJJWVNQ.js.map

package/dist/chunk-SAJJWVNQ.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-shape/schema-update/delta.ts","../src/with-shape/schema-update/dispatch.ts","../src/with-shape/persisted-schemas/register.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Classify the difference between two derived JSON Schemas.\n *\n * v1 ruleset — top-level object properties + required-ness:\n *   - additive  ⇔ only new OPTIONAL properties (no removals, no changed\n *                 properties, no new required field, no required-ness flip)\n *   - non-additive ⇔ any removal, any shape/type change, any required-ness\n *                 flip, or a new REQUIRED property\n * Deeper rules (nested objects, union widening, type narrowing) are\n * deferred. Callers only invoke this with two object schemas.\n */\nimport { canonicalize } from '../persisted-schemas/canonicalize.js'\nimport type { SchemaDelta, FieldChange } from './types.js'\n\ninterface ObjectSchema {\n  readonly properties?: Record<string, unknown>\n  readonly required?: readonly string[]\n}\n\nexport function computeSchemaDelta(\n  stored: object,\n  fresh: object,\n  collection: string,\n): SchemaDelta {\n  const a = stored as ObjectSchema\n  const b = fresh as ObjectSchema\n  const aProps = a.properties ?? {}\n  const bProps = b.properties ?? {}\n  const aReq = new Set(a.required ?? [])\n  const bReq = new Set(b.required ?? [])\n\n  const aKeys = Object.keys(aProps)\n  const bKeys = Object.keys(bProps)\n\n  const added = bKeys.filter(k => !(k in aProps))\n  const removed = aKeys.filter(k => !(k in bProps))\n\n  const changed: FieldChange[] = []\n  for (const k of bKeys) {\n    if (!(k in aProps)) continue\n    const shapeChanged = canonicalize(aProps[k]) !== canonicalize(bProps[k])\n    const requiredChanged = aReq.has(k) !== bReq.has(k)\n    if (shapeChanged || requiredChanged) {\n      changed.push({ field: k, requiredChanged, shapeChanged })\n    }\n  }\n\n  let kind: SchemaDelta['kind']\n  if (added.length === 0 && removed.length === 0 && changed.length === 0) {\n    kind = 'none'\n  } else if (\n    removed.length === 0 &&\n    changed.length === 0 &&\n    added.every(k => !bReq.has(k))\n  ) {\n    kind = 'additive'\n  } else {\n    kind = 'non-additive'\n  }\n\n  return { collection, kind, added, removed, changed }\n}\n","/** Ordered strategy evaluation: first non-`allow` decision wins. */\nimport type { SchemaDelta, SchemaUpdateStrategy, UpdateContext, UpdateDecision } from './types.js'\n\nexport async function evaluateStrategies(\n  delta: SchemaDelta,\n  strategies: readonly SchemaUpdateStrategy[],\n  ctx: UpdateContext,\n): Promise<UpdateDecision> {\n  for (const strategy of strategies) {\n    const decision = await strategy.onSchemaDelta(delta, ctx)\n    if (decision.action !== 'allow') return decision\n  }\n  return { action: 'allow' }\n}\n","/**\n * Orchestrate the derive → hash → skip-or-write cycle for a collection's\n * persisted JSON Schema. Called by the Vault at collection-registration\n * time when the developer opts in via `collection({ persistJsonSchema:\n * true })`.\n *\n * Skip semantics:\n *\n *   - Zod validators: skip when the new hash equals the stored hash.\n *   - Non-Zod (stub envelopes have hash=null): skip when the stored\n *     envelope's `kind` matches the freshly-detected kind (since there's\n *     no body to compare yet — a kind change is the only signal).\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { derivePersistedSchema } from './derive.js'\nimport { loadPersistedSchemaEntry, savePersistedSchema } from './storage.js'\nimport { computeSchemaDelta } from '../schema-update/delta.js'\nimport { evaluateStrategies } from '../schema-update/dispatch.js'\nimport { ConflictError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport type { SchemaUpdateStrategy, UpdateDecision } from '../schema-update/types.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore, ClassifiedMarker } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { PersistedSchemaEnvelope } from './types.js'\nimport type { EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\n\n/**\n * Max optimistic-CAS retries for the shared `_schemas/<collection>` record\n * (#583). Only two writers ever contend (the JSON-Schema writer and the\n * classified-marker writer), so one retry suffices; the headroom covers a\n * pathological re-order. Exhausting it rethrows the {@link ConflictError}\n * rather than silently losing a write.\n */\nconst MAX_SCHEMA_CAS_RETRIES = 5\n\nexport interface PersistSchemaResult {\n  /** True when a fresh envelope was written to storage. */\n  readonly written: boolean\n  /** True when an existing envelope matched and the write was skipped. */\n  readonly skipped: boolean\n  /** The envelope that was either written or matched. */\n  readonly envelope: PersistedSchemaEnvelope\n  /** The update-strategy decision, present when strategies ran. */\n  readonly decision?: UpdateDecision\n}\n\nexport async function persistSchemaIfNeeded(opts: {\n  readonly store: NoydbStore\n  readonly vault: string\n  readonly collectionName: string\n  readonly validator: unknown\n  readonly dek: EnclaveKey\n  readonly strategies?: readonly SchemaUpdateStrategy[]\n}): Promise<PersistSchemaResult> {\n  const fresh = await derivePersistedSchema(opts.validator)\n\n  // The `_schemas/<collection>` record is shared with the classified-marker\n  // writer, so a plain load→save loses whichever writer put first (#583). Read\n  // the version at load time and CAS on it; on conflict re-read (picking up the\n  // other writer's field), re-evaluate, and retry.\n  for (let attempt = 0; ; attempt++) {\n    const { version, payload: stored } = await loadPersistedSchemaEntry(\n      opts.store, opts.vault, opts.collectionName, opts.dek,\n    )\n\n    if (stored && isEquivalent(stored, fresh)) {\n      return { written: false, skipped: true, envelope: stored, decision: { action: 'allow' } }\n    }\n\n    // Changed (or first registration). Run update strategies only when we\n    // have a comparable JSON-Schema baseline and strategies were registered.\n    let decision: UpdateDecision = { action: 'allow' }\n    const strategies = opts.strategies ?? []\n    if (\n      stored &&\n      strategies.length > 0 &&\n      stored.kind === fresh.kind &&\n      isPlainObject(stored.jsonSchema) &&\n      isPlainObject(fresh.jsonSchema)\n    ) {\n      const delta = computeSchemaDelta(stored.jsonSchema, fresh.jsonSchema, opts.collectionName)\n      decision = await evaluateStrategies(delta, strategies, { collection: opts.collectionName })\n    }\n\n    if (decision.action !== 'allow') {\n      // reject (or cutover): do NOT overwrite the baseline — the\n      // old schema stays the source of truth until the change is resolved.\n      return { written: false, skipped: false, envelope: stored ?? fresh, decision }\n    }\n\n    // Preserve a previously-persisted classified marker (C-A / R10) — the schema\n    // derivation knows nothing about it, so a naive overwrite here would drop the\n    // config-drift guard's cross-session signal.\n    const toSave: PersistedSchemaEnvelope =\n      stored?.classified !== undefined ? { ...fresh, classified: stored.classified } : fresh\n    try {\n      await savePersistedSchema(opts.store, opts.vault, opts.collectionName, opts.dek, toSave, version)\n      return { written: true, skipped: false, envelope: toSave, decision }\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (err instanceof ConflictError && attempt < MAX_SCHEMA_CAS_RETRIES) continue\n      throw err\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Persist (or refresh) the C-A / R10 classified marker into the collection's\n * `_schemas/<collection>` record, preserving any existing derived JSON-Schema\n * body. Idempotent — a no-op when an equivalent marker is already stored.\n * Independent of `persistJsonSchema`: called on the first classified write so a\n * later naive handle can detect the drift cross-session.\n */\nexport async function persistClassifiedMarker(opts: {\n  readonly store: NoydbStore\n  readonly vault: string\n  readonly collectionName: string\n  readonly dek: EnclaveKey\n  readonly marker: ClassifiedMarker\n}): Promise<void> {\n  // Shares the `_schemas/<collection>` record with the JSON-Schema writer;\n  // CAS on the loaded version so a concurrent schema (re)registration can't\n  // silently drop the marker (and vice-versa) — see #583.\n  for (let attempt = 0; ; attempt++) {\n    const { version, payload: stored } = await loadPersistedSchemaEntry(\n      opts.store, opts.vault, opts.collectionName, opts.dek,\n    )\n    if (stored?.classified !== undefined && markersEqual(stored.classified, opts.marker)) return\n    const payload: PersistedSchemaEnvelope =\n      stored !== undefined\n        ? { ...stored, classified: opts.marker }\n        : {\n            _noydb_schema: 1,\n            kind: 'Unknown',\n            jsonSchema: null,\n            hash: null,\n            derivedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n            classified: opts.marker,\n          }\n    try {\n      await savePersistedSchema(opts.store, opts.vault, opts.collectionName, opts.dek, payload, version)\n      return\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (err instanceof ConflictError && attempt < MAX_SCHEMA_CAS_RETRIES) continue\n      throw err\n    }\n  }\n}\n\nfunction markersEqual(a: ClassifiedMarker, b: ClassifiedMarker): boolean {\n  return sameSet(a.digestOnly, b.digestOnly) && sameSet(a.equatable, b.equatable)\n}\n\nfunction sameSet(a: readonly string[], b: readonly string[]): boolean {\n  if (a.length !== b.length) return false\n  const s = new Set(a)\n  return b.every((x) => s.has(x))\n}\n\nfunction isPlainObject(v: unknown): v is object {\n  return typeof v === 'object' && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v)\n}\n\nfunction isEquivalent(a: PersistedSchemaEnvelope, b: PersistedSchemaEnvelope): boolean {\n  if (a.kind !== b.kind) return false\n  // Zod path: real hashes — compare directly.\n  if (a.hash && b.hash) return a.hash === b.hash\n  // Stub path: both have hash=null. 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package/dist/{chunk-VHEEU4ZO.js → chunk-SW56GSYC.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   ConflictError,
   PodVersionConflictError
-} from "./chunk-BLZRNHMG.js";
+} from "./chunk-U23JUUPX.js";
 
 // src/with-pod/pod-store.ts
 var BUNDLE_STORE_VERSION = 1;
@@ -152,4 +152,4 @@ export {
   wrapBundleStore,
   createBundleStore
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VHEEU4ZO.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-SW56GSYC.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-46YGCU6Z.js → chunk-T2EGAXPM.js}

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import {
   IllegalTransitionError,
   RecordLockedError,
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-BLZRNHMG.js";
+} from "./chunk-U23JUUPX.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/guards/with-guard.ts
 function withGuard(strategy) {
@@ -120,4 +120,4 @@ export {
   immutableGuard,
   transitionGuard
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-46YGCU6Z.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-T2EGAXPM.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-LES2Z7B4.js → chunk-T45LAT2Y.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION
-} from "./chunk-OCDUQUAP.js";
+} from "./chunk-LN22XH4B.js";
 
 // src/with-party/policy/storage.ts
 var META_COLLECTION = "_meta";
@@ -39,4 +39,4 @@ export {
   loadVaultPolicy,
   saveVaultPolicy
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-LES2Z7B4.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-T45LAT2Y.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-4NMFWOS2.js → chunk-T65UZXR6.js}

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import {
   ConflictError,
   InvariantError,
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-BLZRNHMG.js";
+} from "./chunk-U23JUUPX.js";
 
 // src/with-commit/tx/transaction.ts
 var TxContext = class {
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ async function runTransaction(db, fn, options, txInvariants) {
     db._clearActiveTxContext(ctx);
   }
   if (ctx._amendment) {
-    const { GuardExecutor } = await import("./executor-IKT47SH2.js");
+    const { GuardExecutor } = await import("./executor-DJHNSTIR.js");
     try {
       for (const [vaultName, v] of ctx._amendmentVaults) {
         const registry = v._getGuardRegistry();
@@ -352,4 +352,4 @@ export {
   runTransaction,
   revertExecuted
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-4NMFWOS2.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-T65UZXR6.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-2N4MUSF3.js → chunk-TB5RNNJ4.js}

@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
 import {
   openEnvelopeJson
-} from "./chunk-5EZAJEES.js";
-import {
-  encrypt
-} from "./chunk-L4IRFTIF.js";
+} from "./chunk-OVO2RZAE.js";
 import {
   NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION
-} from "./chunk-OCDUQUAP.js";
+} from "./chunk-LN22XH4B.js";
+import {
+  encrypt
+} from "./chunk-TLJOJBZD.js";
 import {
   ConflictError,
   USER_ENVELOPE_COLLECTION,
   USER_ENVELOPE_MAX_BYTES,
   UserEnvelopeOversizedError
-} from "./chunk-BLZRNHMG.js";
+} from "./chunk-U23JUUPX.js";
 
 // src/with-party/directory/storage.ts
 var META_COLLECTION = "_meta";
@@ -147,4 +147,4 @@ export {
   deleteUserEnvelope,
   listUserEnvelopeIds
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-2N4MUSF3.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-TB5RNNJ4.js.map

package/dist/chunk-TCIUO62Z.js

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+import {
+  decrypt,
+  deriveSealedFieldKey,
+  deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek
+} from "./chunk-TLJOJBZD.js";
+
+// src/kernel/enclave/record-keys/sealed-slot.ts
+function parseSealedSlot(blob) {
+  const sep = blob.indexOf(":");
+  return { iv: blob.slice(0, sep), data: blob.slice(sep + 1) };
+}
+async function dualReadSealedSlot(blob, field, collection, cek, dek) {
+  const { iv, data } = parseSealedSlot(blob);
+  if (cek !== void 0) {
+    try {
+      const fieldKey2 = await deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek(cek, collection, field);
+      return await decrypt(iv, data, fieldKey2);
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
+  const fieldKey = await deriveSealedFieldKey(dek, collection, field);
+  return decrypt(iv, data, fieldKey);
+}
+
+export {
+  parseSealedSlot,
+  dualReadSealedSlot
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-TCIUO62Z.js.map

package/dist/chunk-TCIUO62Z.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/enclave/record-keys/sealed-slot.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Sealed-slot (`iv:data`) parsing + the CEK/DEK dual-read, factored out so the\n * three callers that decrypt a `_sealed[field]` slot share ONE implementation\n * with no coupling between them:\n *\n *   - {@link RecordCodec.unsealField} / `classifySealedShred` (read + classify),\n *   - `record-keys/sealing.ts:rotateRecordCek` (re-seal under a new CEK).\n *\n * These are pure helpers over an explicit `(cek, dek)` pair — NOT a context\n * object — so `sealing.ts` (which holds only the DEK) can import them without\n * pulling in the whole codec, avoiding a codec↔sealing dependency cycle.\n */\nimport { decrypt, deriveSealedFieldKey, deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek } from '../crypto.js'\n\n/** Parse an `iv:data` sealed slot (split on the FIRST `:`). */\nexport function parseSealedSlot(blob: string): { iv: string; data: string } {\n  const sep = blob.indexOf(':')\n  return { iv: blob.slice(0, sep), data: blob.slice(sep + 1) }\n}\n\n/**\n * Dual-read: decrypt a sealed slot trying the CEK-derived field key first,\n * falling back to the collection-DEK field key. Legacy records\n * (even ones whose body is CEK-encrypted) are sealed under the collection-DEK\n * key; current writes seal under the per-record CEK. Try the CEK key first; on\n * its AES-GCM auth failure, fall back to the DEK key. Throws only if BOTH fail.\n * Returns the plaintext string (callers `JSON.parse` as needed).\n */\nexport async function dualReadSealedSlot(\n  blob: string,\n  field: string,\n  collection: string,\n  cek: CryptoKey | undefined,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const { iv, data } = parseSealedSlot(blob)\n  if (cek !== undefined) {\n    try {\n      const fieldKey = await deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek(cek, collection, field)\n      return await decrypt(iv, data, fieldKey)\n    } catch {\n      // fall through to the legacy collection-DEK derivation\n    }\n  }\n  const fieldKey = await deriveSealedFieldKey(dek, collection, field)\n  return decrypt(iv, data, fieldKey)\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;AAeO,SAAS,gBAAgB,MAA4C;AAC1E,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC5B,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,GAAG,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;AAC7D;AAUA,eAAsB,mBACpB,MACA,OACA,YACA,KACA,KACiB;AACjB,QAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,gBAAgB,IAAI;AACzC,MAAI,QAAQ,QAAW;AACrB,QAAI;AACF,YAAMA,YAAW,MAAM,4BAA4B,KAAK,YAAY,KAAK;AACzE,aAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAMA,SAAQ;AAAA,IACzC,QAAQ;AAAA,IAER;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,qBAAqB,KAAK,YAAY,KAAK;AAClE,SAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ;AACnC;","names":["fieldKey"]}

package/dist/chunk-THNJ3IKU.js

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+import {
+  buildLazyCache
+} from "./chunk-NO272T7Q.js";
+
+// src/with-store/lazy/active.ts
+function withLazy() {
+  return {
+    createCache(collection, cache) {
+      return buildLazyCache(collection, cache);
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+export {
+  withLazy
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-THNJ3IKU.js.map

package/dist/chunk-THNJ3IKU.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-store/lazy/active.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Enable the lazy service (#267 Track A tail — lazy-mode promoted out of\n * `routing` into its own opt-in service).\n *\n * Pass to `createNoydb({ lazyStrategy: withLazy() })` to explicitly opt\n * into lazy mode's bounded-LRU working set for collections declared with\n * `prefetch: false` + a `cache` budget. Behavior is identical to the\n * deprecated implicit path (which warns once and will be removed at 1.0) —\n * opting in is the forward-stable spelling and the catalog's contract.\n */\nimport type { LazyStrategy } from './strategy.js'\nimport { buildLazyCache } from './strategy.js'\n\nexport function withLazy(): LazyStrategy {\n  return {\n    createCache(collection, cache) {\n      return buildLazyCache(collection, cache)\n    },\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAaO,SAAS,WAAyB;AACvC,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,YAAY,YAAY,OAAO;AAC7B,aAAO,eAAe,YAAY,KAAK;AAAA,IACzC;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-U6OM4E67.js → chunk-TL7QR5T6.js}

@@ -1,44 +1,49 @@
 import {
   openEnvelopeJson
-} from "./chunk-5EZAJEES.js";
-import {
-  encrypt
-} from "./chunk-L4IRFTIF.js";
+} from "./chunk-OVO2RZAE.js";
 import {
   NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION
-} from "./chunk-OCDUQUAP.js";
+} from "./chunk-LN22XH4B.js";
+import {
+  encrypt
+} from "./chunk-TLJOJBZD.js";
 
 // src/with-shape/persisted-schemas/storage.ts
 var SCHEMAS_COLLECTION = "_schemas";
-async function loadPersistedSchema(store, vault, collection, dek) {
+async function loadPersistedSchemaEntry(store, vault, collection, dek) {
   const envelope = await store.get(vault, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION, collection);
-  if (!envelope) return void 0;
+  if (!envelope) return { version: 0, payload: void 0 };
+  const version = envelope._v;
   try {
     const plaintext = await openEnvelopeJson(envelope, dek);
     const parsed = JSON.parse(plaintext);
-    if (parsed._noydb_schema !== 1) return void 0;
-    return parsed;
+    if (parsed._noydb_schema !== 1) return { version, payload: void 0 };
+    return { version, payload: parsed };
   } catch {
-    return void 0;
+    return { version, payload: void 0 };
   }
 }
-async function savePersistedSchema(store, vault, collection, dek, payload) {
+async function loadPersistedSchema(store, vault, collection, dek) {
+  return (await loadPersistedSchemaEntry(store, vault, collection, dek)).payload;
+}
+async function savePersistedSchema(store, vault, collection, dek, payload, expectedVersion) {
   const json = JSON.stringify(payload);
   const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, dek);
-  const prior = await store.get(vault, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION, collection);
+  const baseVersion = expectedVersion ?? (await store.get(vault, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION, collection))?._v ?? 0;
   const env = {
     _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,
-    _v: (prior?._v ?? 0) + 1,
+    _v: baseVersion + 1,
     _ts: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
     _iv: iv,
     _data: data
   };
-  await store.put(vault, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION, collection, env);
+  await store.put(vault, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION, collection, env, expectedVersion);
 }
 
 export {
   SCHEMAS_COLLECTION,
+  loadPersistedSchemaEntry,
   loadPersistedSchema,
   savePersistedSchema
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-U6OM4E67.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-TL7QR5T6.js.map

package/dist/chunk-TL7QR5T6.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-shape/persisted-schemas/storage.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Read / write the per-collection persisted-schema envelope. Mirrors the\n * standard noy-db record envelope shape and is **AES-GCM encrypted with\n * the collection's DEK** — the schema body (field names, enum values,\n * constraints) is sensitive metadata, so it gets the same encryption\n * envelope as the records it describes.\n *\n * Storage layout:\n *\n *   <vault>/_schemas/<collection>   →   EncryptedEnvelope\n *\n * The DEK passed to {@link savePersistedSchema} / {@link loadPersistedSchema}\n * is the same key the collection uses for its records.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { encrypt, openEnvelopeJson, type EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { PersistedSchemaEnvelope } from './types.js'\n\n/** Reserved collection name where persisted schemas live. */\nexport const SCHEMAS_COLLECTION = '_schemas' as const\n\n/**\n * A decrypted persisted-schema read paired with the wrapping envelope's\n * `_v`. The version is the optimistic-concurrency token: pass it back to\n * {@link savePersistedSchema} as `expectedVersion` to make the write a CAS\n * that rejects a stale put (see #583 — the `_schemas` record is shared by\n * the JSON-Schema writer and the classified-marker writer).\n */\nexport interface PersistedSchemaEntry {\n  /** Wrapping envelope `_v` (0 when no record exists yet). */\n  readonly version: number\n  /** Decrypted payload, or `undefined` when absent/corrupt/wrong-DEK. */\n  readonly payload: PersistedSchemaEnvelope | undefined\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the persisted-schema envelope for one collection together with its\n * wrapping `_v`. The version reflects the raw stored envelope even when the\n * payload cannot be decrypted/parsed (so a CAS still guards a corrupt record\n * rather than silently clobbering it).\n */\nexport async function loadPersistedSchemaEntry(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  collection: string,\n  dek: EnclaveKey,\n): Promise<PersistedSchemaEntry> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION, collection)\n  if (!envelope) return { version: 0, payload: undefined }\n  const version = envelope._v\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await openEnvelopeJson(envelope, dek)\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(plaintext) as PersistedSchemaEnvelope\n    if (parsed._noydb_schema !== 1) return { version, payload: undefined }\n    return { version, payload: parsed }\n  } catch {\n    return { version, payload: undefined }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Read and decrypt the persisted-schema envelope for one collection.\n * Returns `undefined` when no envelope has been written or when decryption\n * fails (e.g. wrong DEK passed). Tolerates corrupted records — JSON parse\n * failures surface as `undefined`, mirroring `_meta/handle`'s contract.\n */\nexport async function loadPersistedSchema(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  collection: string,\n  dek: EnclaveKey,\n): Promise<PersistedSchemaEnvelope | undefined> {\n  return (await loadPersistedSchemaEntry(store, vault, collection, dek)).payload\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt and persist a schema envelope for one collection. Always\n * overwrites any prior write (callers gate on hash equality before calling\n * to avoid no-op writes).\n *\n * Pass `expectedVersion` — the `version` from {@link loadPersistedSchemaEntry}\n * captured at load time — to make the write an optimistic CAS: on a store with\n * `casAtomic`, `store.put` throws {@link ConflictError} when the record was\n * bumped concurrently, so a lost update on the shared `_schemas` record is\n * rejected instead of silently clobbering the other writer's field (#583).\n * When omitted, keeps the legacy unconditional last-writer-wins behaviour.\n */\nexport async function savePersistedSchema(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  collection: string,\n  dek: EnclaveKey,\n  payload: PersistedSchemaEnvelope,\n  expectedVersion?: number,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const json = JSON.stringify(payload)\n  const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, dek)\n  const baseVersion = expectedVersion ?? (await store.get(vault, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION, collection))?._v ?? 0\n  const env: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n    _v: baseVersion + 1,\n    _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n    _iv: iv,\n    _data: data,\n  }\n  await store.put(vault, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION, collection, env, expectedVersion)\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;AAuBO,IAAM,qBAAqB;AAsBlC,eAAsB,yBACpB,OACA,OACA,YACA,KAC+B;AAC/B,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,oBAAoB,UAAU;AACtE,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,SAAS,OAAU;AACvD,QAAM,UAAU,SAAS;AACzB,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,iBAAiB,UAAU,GAAG;AACtD,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS;AACnC,QAAI,OAAO,kBAAkB,EAAG,QAAO,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS,OAAU;AACrE,WAAO,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO;AAAA,EACpC,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS,OAAU;AAAA,EACvC;AACF;AAQA,eAAsB,oBACpB,OACA,OACA,YACA,KAC8C;AAC9C,UAAQ,MAAM,yBAAyB,OAAO,OAAO,YAAY,GAAG,GAAG;AACzE;AAcA,eAAsB,oBACpB,OACA,OACA,YACA,KACA,SACA,iBACe;AACf,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,OAAO;AACnC,QAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG;AAC5C,QAAM,cAAc,oBAAoB,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,oBAAoB,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM;AACvG,QAAM,MAAyB;AAAA,IAC7B,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,IAAI,cAAc;AAAA,IAClB,MAAK,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAC5B,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,OAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,oBAAoB,YAAY,KAAK,eAAe;AAC7E;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-L4IRFTIF.js → chunk-TLJOJBZD.js}

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import {
   DecryptionError,
   InvalidKeyError,
   TamperedError
-} from "./chunk-BLZRNHMG.js";
+} from "./chunk-U23JUUPX.js";
 
 // src/kernel/enclave/crypto.ts
 var PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 6e5;
@@ -373,24 +373,6 @@ function base64ToBuffer(base64) {
   return bytes;
 }
 
-// src/kernel/enclave/record-keys/sealed-slot.ts
-function parseSealedSlot(blob) {
-  const sep = blob.indexOf(":");
-  return { iv: blob.slice(0, sep), data: blob.slice(sep + 1) };
-}
-async function dualReadSealedSlot(blob, field, collection, cek, dek) {
-  const { iv, data } = parseSealedSlot(blob);
-  if (cek !== void 0) {
-    try {
-      const fieldKey2 = await deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek(cek, collection, field);
-      return await decrypt(iv, data, fieldKey2);
-    } catch {
-    }
-  }
-  const fieldKey = await deriveSealedFieldKey(dek, collection, field);
-  return decrypt(iv, data, fieldKey);
-}
-
 export {
   deriveKey,
   derivePassphraseKey,
@@ -417,8 +399,6 @@ export {
   generateIV,
   generateSalt,
   bufferToBase64,
-  base64ToBuffer,
-  parseSealedSlot,
-  dualReadSealedSlot
+  base64ToBuffer
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-L4IRFTIF.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-TLJOJBZD.js.map

package/dist/chunk-TLJOJBZD.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/enclave/crypto.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Cryptographic primitives — thin wrappers around the Web Crypto API.\n *\n * ## Design principle\n *\n * **Zero npm crypto dependencies.** Every operation uses `globalThis.crypto.subtle`,\n * which is available natively in Node.js ≥ 18, all modern browsers, and\n * Deno/Bun. This avoids supply-chain risk from third-party crypto packages and\n * ensures the library stays auditable.\n *\n * ## Algorithms\n *\n * | Use case | Algorithm | Parameters |\n * |----------|-----------|------------|\n * | Key derivation | PBKDF2-SHA256 | 600,000 iterations, 32-byte salt |\n * | Record encryption | AES-256-GCM | 12-byte random IV per operation |\n * | DEK wrapping | AES-KW (RFC 3394) | 256-bit KEK |\n * | Binary encrypt | AES-256-GCM | same as record encryption |\n * | Integrity | HMAC-SHA256 | for presence channels |\n * | Content hash | SHA-256 | for ledger and bundle integrity |\n *\n * ## Key lifecycle\n *\n * ```\n * passphrase + salt\n *   └─► deriveKey()       → KEK (CryptoKey, extractable: false)\n *         └─► wrapKey()   → wrapped DEK bytes  [stored in keyring]\n *         └─► unwrapKey() → DEK (CryptoKey)    [memory only during session]\n *               └─► encrypt() / decrypt()       → ciphertext / plaintext\n * ```\n *\n * IVs are generated fresh by {@link generateIV} on every encrypt call.\n * Reusing an IV with the same key would break GCM's authentication guarantee —\n * this function should be the only place IVs are produced.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { DecryptionError, InvalidKeyError, TamperedError } from '../errors.js'\n\n/**\n * **EnclaveKey** — the opaque key type at the enclave seam.\n *\n * In noy-db's reference enclave this is `CryptoKey` (the Web Crypto API's\n * key handle). A fork's enclave redefines this alias to its own key\n * representation (e.g. `type EnclaveKey = null` for a keyless HSM-backed\n * fork) — outside `kernel/enclave/**`, every consumer must treat it as\n * opaque: never construct, inspect, or serialize it directly, only pass it\n * between barrel functions (`encrypt`/`decrypt`/`wrapKey`/`unwrapKey`/…).\n */\nexport type EnclaveKey = CryptoKey\n\nconst PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 600_000\nconst SALT_BYTES = 32\nconst IV_BYTES = 12\nconst KEY_BITS = 256\n\nconst subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle\n\n// ─── Key Derivation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Derive a KEK from a passphrase and salt using PBKDF2-SHA256. */\nexport async function deriveKey(\n  passphrase: string,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    new TextEncoder().encode(passphrase),\n    'PBKDF2',\n    false,\n    ['deriveKey'],\n  )\n\n  return subtle.deriveKey(\n    {\n      name: 'PBKDF2',\n      salt: salt as BufferSource,\n      iterations: PBKDF2_ITERATIONS,\n      hash: 'SHA-256',\n    },\n    keyMaterial,\n    { name: 'AES-KW', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Which AES algorithm/usage a {@link derivePassphraseKey} result is for:\n * `'aes-kw'` mints a key-wrapping key (`wrapKey`/`unwrapKey`, e.g. for\n * KEK derivation); `'aes-gcm'` mints a direct encrypt/decrypt key (e.g.\n * for the wrap-DEKs primitive in `with-party/team/wrapped-deks.ts`).\n */\nexport type PassphraseKeyUsage = 'aes-kw' | 'aes-gcm'\n\n/**\n * Derive a non-extractable AES key from a passphrase/credential and salt\n * via PBKDF2-SHA256, generalizing {@link deriveKey}'s AES-KW derivation to\n * also cover AES-GCM-usage keys. Callers pin their own `iterations` and\n * `keyUsage` so an existing call site's exact parameters (and thus its\n * derived-key bytes) are preserved verbatim when migrated onto this\n * shared primitive — this is call-site consolidation, not a KDF change.\n */\nexport async function derivePassphraseKey(\n  passphrase: string,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n  params: { iterations: number; keyUsage: PassphraseKeyUsage },\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    new TextEncoder().encode(passphrase),\n    'PBKDF2',\n    false,\n    ['deriveKey'],\n  )\n\n  return params.keyUsage === 'aes-gcm'\n    ? subtle.deriveKey(\n        {\n          name: 'PBKDF2',\n          salt: salt as BufferSource,\n          iterations: params.iterations,\n          hash: 'SHA-256',\n        },\n        keyMaterial,\n        { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n        false,\n        ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n      )\n    : subtle.deriveKey(\n        {\n          name: 'PBKDF2',\n          salt: salt as BufferSource,\n          iterations: params.iterations,\n          hash: 'SHA-256',\n        },\n        keyMaterial,\n        { name: 'AES-KW', length: KEY_BITS },\n        false,\n        ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'],\n      )\n}\n\n// ─── DEK Generation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Generate a random AES-256-GCM data encryption key. */\nexport async function generateDEK(): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return subtle.generateKey(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    true, // extractable — needed for AES-KW wrapping\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Key Wrapping ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Wrap (encrypt) a DEK with a KEK using AES-KW. Returns base64 string. */\nexport async function wrapKey(dek: CryptoKey, kek: CryptoKey): Promise<string> {\n  const wrapped = await subtle.wrapKey('raw', dek, kek, 'AES-KW')\n  return bufferToBase64(wrapped)\n}\n\n/** Unwrap (decrypt) a DEK from base64 string using a KEK. */\nexport async function unwrapKey(\n  wrappedBase64: string,\n  kek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  try {\n    return await subtle.unwrapKey(\n      'raw',\n      base64ToBuffer(wrappedBase64) as BufferSource,\n      kek,\n      'AES-KW',\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new InvalidKeyError()\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Per-record CEK wrapping ───────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive a **dedicated** AES-KW wrapping key from a collection/tier DEK via\n * HKDF-SHA256, used to wrap/unwrap a per-record CEK.\n *\n * The collection/tier DEKs are AES-256-**GCM** keys (usages\n * `encrypt`/`decrypt`) and cannot themselves act as an AES-KW KEK. We do NOT\n * re-import the raw DEK bytes directly as an AES-KW key — that would reuse one\n * key across two primitives (AES-GCM for `_det`/presence, AES-KW for CEK\n * wrapping), violating key separation. Instead we HKDF-derive a domain-\n * separated KW key (salt `noydb-cek-wrap`), exactly as `derivePresenceKey`\n * derives a separate presence key. The derivation is deterministic, so\n * wrapping the same CEK under the same DEK always yields identical ciphertext\n * — which is what lets an update reuse a record's stable CEK and produce a\n * byte-identical `_cek`. The KW key is independent of the DEK's GCM key.\n *\n * The DEK must be extractable (it is — `generateDEK`/`unwrapKey` mint\n * extractable keys).\n */\nasync function asKwKey(dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-cek-wrap')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode('v1')\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', bits, 'AES-KW', false, ['wrapKey', 'unwrapKey'])\n}\n\n/**\n * AES-KW-wrap a per-record CEK under a collection/tier DEK. Returns base64.\n * Deterministic over `(cek, dek)`.\n */\nexport async function wrapCek(cek: CryptoKey, dek: CryptoKey): Promise<string> {\n  const kw = await asKwKey(dek)\n  const wrapped = await subtle.wrapKey('raw', cek, kw, 'AES-KW')\n  return bufferToBase64(wrapped)\n}\n\n/**\n * Unwrap a per-record CEK from base64 under a collection/tier DEK. Throws\n * `InvalidKeyError` if the wrapped bytes do not authenticate under the DEK.\n */\nexport async function unwrapCek(wrappedBase64: string, dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const kw = await asKwKey(dek)\n  try {\n    return await subtle.unwrapKey(\n      'raw',\n      base64ToBuffer(wrappedBase64) as BufferSource,\n      kw,\n      'AES-KW',\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n      true,\n      ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n    )\n  } catch {\n    throw new InvalidKeyError()\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Import a raw 32-byte AES-256-GCM record CEK (e.g. from a sealed-CEK\n * delivery binding). Non-extractable, decrypt-only — the imported key is\n * used solely to open the record's `_iv`/`_data` body under `decrypt()`.\n */\nexport async function importCek(rawKey: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', rawKey as BufferSource, { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS }, false, ['decrypt'])\n}\n\n// ─── Encrypt / Decrypt ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface EncryptResult {\n  iv: string   // base64\n  data: string // base64\n}\n\n/** Encrypt plaintext JSON string with AES-256-GCM. Fresh IV per call. */\nexport async function encrypt(\n  plaintext: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext)\n\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n    dek,\n    encoded,\n  )\n\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/** Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext. Throws on wrong key or tampered data. */\nexport async function decrypt(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Binary Encrypt / Decrypt ────────\n\n/**\n * Encrypt raw bytes with AES-256-GCM using a fresh random IV.\n * Used by the attachment store so binary blobs avoid double base64 encoding\n * (the existing `encrypt()` function calls `TextEncoder` on a string — here\n * we pass the `Uint8Array` directly to `subtle.encrypt`).\n */\nexport async function encryptBytes(\n  data: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n    dek,\n    data as unknown as BufferSource,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext back to raw bytes.\n * Counterpart to `encryptBytes`. Throws `TamperedError` on auth-tag failure.\n */\nexport async function decryptBytes(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new Uint8Array(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * SHA-256 hex digest of raw bytes. Used to derive content-addressed\n * eTags for blob deduplication. Computed on plaintext bytes\n * before compression and encryption so the eTag identifies content, not\n * ciphertext, and survives re-encryption (key rotation, re-upload).\n */\nexport async function sha256Hex(data: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  const hash = await subtle.digest('SHA-256', data as unknown as BufferSource)\n  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(hash))\n    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))\n    .join('')\n}\n\n// ─── HMAC-SHA-256 ─────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Compute HMAC-SHA-256(key, data) and return hex string.\n *\n * Used to derive content-addressed eTags that are opaque to the store:\n * ```\n * eTag = hmacSha256Hex(blobDEK, plaintext)\n * ```\n *\n * Unlike a plain SHA-256, the HMAC is keyed by the vault-shared `_blob` DEK,\n * so an attacker with store access cannot pre-compute eTags for known files.\n * Deduplication still works within a vault (same key + same content = same eTag).\n */\nexport async function hmacSha256Hex(key: CryptoKey, data: Uint8Array): Promise<string> {\n  // Export AES-GCM DEK raw bytes → import as HMAC key\n  const rawKey = await subtle.exportKey('raw', key)\n  const hmacKey = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    rawKey,\n    { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    false,\n    ['sign'],\n  )\n  const sig = await subtle.sign('HMAC', hmacKey, data as unknown as BufferSource)\n  return Array.from(new Uint8Array(sig))\n    .map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'))\n    .join('')\n}\n\n// ─── AAD-aware Binary Encrypt / Decrypt ──\n\n/**\n * Encrypt raw bytes with AES-256-GCM using Additional Authenticated Data.\n *\n * The AAD binds each chunk to its parent blob and position, preventing\n * chunk reorder, substitution, and truncation attacks:\n * ```\n * AAD = UTF-8(\"{eTag}:{chunkIndex}:{chunkCount}\")\n * ```\n *\n * The AAD is NOT stored — the reader reconstructs it from `BlobObject`\n * metadata and passes it to `decryptBytesWithAAD`.\n */\nexport async function encryptBytesWithAAD(\n  data: Uint8Array,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = generateIV()\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    {\n      name: 'AES-GCM',\n      iv: iv as BufferSource,\n      additionalData: aad as BufferSource,\n    },\n    dek,\n    data as unknown as BufferSource,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Decrypt AES-256-GCM ciphertext with AAD verification.\n *\n * If the AAD does not match the one used at encryption time (e.g. because\n * a chunk was reordered or substituted from another blob), the GCM auth\n * tag fails and this throws `TamperedError`.\n */\nexport async function decryptBytesWithAAD(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  aad: Uint8Array,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const iv = base64ToBuffer(ivBase64)\n  const ciphertext = base64ToBuffer(dataBase64)\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await subtle.decrypt(\n      {\n        name: 'AES-GCM',\n        iv: iv as BufferSource,\n        additionalData: aad as BufferSource,\n      },\n      dek,\n      ciphertext as BufferSource,\n    )\n    return new Uint8Array(plaintext)\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (err instanceof Error && err.name === 'OperationError') {\n      throw new TamperedError()\n    }\n    throw new DecryptionError(\n      err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Decryption failed',\n    )\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Presence Key Derivation ──────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive an AES-256-GCM presence key from a collection DEK using HKDF-SHA256.\n *\n * The presence key is domain-separated from the data DEK by the fixed salt\n * `'noydb-presence'` and the `info` = collection name. This means:\n *  - The adapter never sees the presence key.\n *  - Presence payloads rotate automatically when the collection DEK is rotated.\n *  - Revoked users cannot derive the new presence key after a DEK rotation.\n *\n * @param dek            The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Used as the HKDF `info` parameter for domain separation.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key suitable for presence payload encryption.\n */\nexport async function derivePresenceKey(dek: CryptoKey, collectionName: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  // Step 1: export DEK raw bytes\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n\n  // Step 2: import as HKDF key material\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    rawDek,\n    'HKDF',\n    false,\n    ['deriveBits'],\n  )\n\n  // Step 3: derive 256 bits with salt='noydb-presence' and info=collectionName\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-presence')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(collectionName)\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n\n  // Step 4: import derived bits as AES-GCM key\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Sealed Field Key Derivation ──────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive a **per-field** AES-256-GCM key from a collection DEK using\n * HKDF-SHA256, used to encrypt a single sensitive field into its own\n * `_sealed[field]` envelope slot (structural group-encryption).\n *\n * Domain-separated from the data DEK (and from the presence/deterministic\n * channels) by the fixed salt `'noydb-sealed'` and an `info` of\n * `JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed', collectionName, field])`. The JSON-array\n * encoding is injective — each element is separately quoted/escaped — so\n * collection `a/sealed/b` + field `c` cannot collide with collection `a` +\n * field `b/sealed/c`. Each sensitive field gets a **distinct** key, so a\n * `_sealed[a]` ciphertext does not authenticate under field `b`'s key —\n * sealed fields are cryptographically isolated from one another. The\n * collection name keeps the same field name in two collections from sharing a\n * key, mirroring how `derivePresenceKey` / `encryptDeterministic` domain-separate.\n *\n * @param dek            The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Part of the HKDF `info` for domain separation.\n * @param field          Sensitive field name — the rest of the `info`.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key for that field's sealed slot.\n */\nexport async function deriveSealedFieldKey(\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  collectionName: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-sealed')\n  // JSON-array encoding is injective: each element is separately quoted/\n  // escaped, so collection `a/sealed/b` + field `c` cannot collide with\n  // collection `a` + field `b/sealed/c`.\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed', collectionName, field]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive a per-record sealed-field key from the record's **per-record CEK**\n * rather than the collection DEK. Same HKDF construction as\n * {@link deriveSealedFieldKey} but with salt `'noydb-sealed-cek'` (distinct\n * from `'noydb-sealed'`), so a CEK-derived key can never collide with a\n * DEK-derived one for the same `{collection, field}`.\n *\n * The point: the sealed ciphertext's only key now flows from the record's CEK.\n * Dropping the record's wrapped `_cek` (crypto-shred / `forget`) makes the key\n * — and thus `_sealed[field]` — unrecoverable, giving sealed fields the same\n * erasure guarantee `_data` already has. The CEK must be extractable (it is —\n * `unwrapCek`/`generateDEK` mint extractable keys).\n *\n * @param cek            The record's AES-256-GCM CEK (extractable).\n * @param collectionName Part of the HKDF `info` for domain separation.\n * @param field          Sensitive field name — the rest of the `info`.\n * @returns A non-extractable AES-256-GCM key for that field's sealed slot.\n */\nexport async function deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek(\n  cek: CryptoKey,\n  collectionName: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawCek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', cek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawCek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-sealed-cek')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-sealed-cek', collectionName, field]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    false,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n// ─── Deterministic Encryption ────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Derive the collection's **dedicated deterministic-index key** from its DEK\n * via HKDF-SHA256 (L-1, #554).\n *\n * `_det` slots previously encrypted under the raw collection DEK — the same\n * key `_data` uses with a *randomized*-IV regime while `_det` uses a\n * *deterministic*-IV regime. Two IV regimes on one key is avoidable hygiene\n * debt (~2^-96 theoretical collision), so the deterministic index now gets its\n * own HKDF-separated key: salt `'noydb-det'`, info\n * `JSON.stringify(['noydb-det'])` (the injective JSON-array domain tag, same\n * convention as {@link deriveSealedFieldKey}). Per-field separation still\n * comes from the `'<collection>/<field>'` context inside\n * {@link encryptDeterministic}, exactly as before.\n *\n * The derived key stays **DEK-derived (collection-level)** on purpose: `_det`\n * is carried verbatim through per-record CEK rotation (see\n * `record-keys/sealing.ts`), so its key must not depend on the CEK. It rotates\n * with the collection DEK, like the presence key.\n *\n * The key is minted **extractable** — {@link encryptDeterministic} derives its\n * per-value IV via HKDF over the raw key bytes (an `exportKey` under the\n * hood), which a non-extractable key would forbid. Same in-memory posture as\n * the DEK itself (`generateDEK` mints extractable keys).\n *\n * @param dek The collection's AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable).\n * @returns A dedicated AES-256-GCM key for the `_det` deterministic index.\n */\nexport async function deriveDeterministicKey(dek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-det')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(['noydb-det']))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    KEY_BITS,\n  )\n  return subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    bits,\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },\n    true,\n    ['encrypt', 'decrypt'],\n  )\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive a deterministic 12-byte IV from `{ DEK, context, plaintext }`\n * via HKDF-SHA256. Given the same three inputs, the IV is identical, so\n * `encryptDeterministic` produces the same ciphertext on every call —\n * which is precisely what enables blind equality search on encrypted\n * fields.\n *\n * **The side channel this opens.** Two records whose field value is the\n * same produce the same ciphertext. An observer with store access can\n * therefore tell which records share a value — not *what* the value is,\n * but the equivalence class. This is the well-known trade-off of\n * deterministic encryption and is why the feature is strictly opt-in\n * per field, guarded by `acknowledgeDeterministicRisk: true` at\n * collection creation.\n *\n * The context string MUST include the collection name and field name,\n * so:\n *   - The same plaintext in two different fields encrypts differently\n *     (no cross-field equality leak).\n *   - The same plaintext in two different collections (different DEKs)\n *     encrypts differently by virtue of the key, even before HKDF\n *     domain separation kicks in.\n */\nasync function deriveDeterministicIV(\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  context: string,\n  plaintext: string,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode('noydb-deterministic-v1')\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(`${context}\\x00${plaintext}`)\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info },\n    hkdfKey,\n    IV_BYTES * 8,\n  )\n  return new Uint8Array(bits)\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt a plaintext string with AES-256-GCM and a deterministic,\n * HKDF-derived IV.\n *\n * The same `{ dek, context, plaintext }` triple always produces the\n * same `{ iv, data }` — call this twice and you can string-compare the\n * ciphertexts to check equality of the inputs without decrypting them.\n *\n * @param context  Domain-separation string — by convention\n *                 `'<collection>/<field>'`. Different contexts encrypt\n *                 the same plaintext to different ciphertexts, so\n *                 `email` in collection `users` does not collide with\n *                 `email` in collection `customers`.\n */\nexport async function encryptDeterministic(\n  plaintext: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n  context: string,\n): Promise<EncryptResult> {\n  const iv = await deriveDeterministicIV(dek, context, plaintext)\n  const encoded = new TextEncoder().encode(plaintext)\n  const ciphertext = await subtle.encrypt(\n    { name: 'AES-GCM', iv: iv as BufferSource },\n    dek,\n    encoded,\n  )\n  return {\n    iv: bufferToBase64(iv),\n    data: bufferToBase64(ciphertext),\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Counterpart to {@link encryptDeterministic}. The IV is stored\n * alongside the ciphertext (exactly like the randomized path), so\n * decrypt uses the stored IV and verifies the GCM auth tag — a tampered\n * ciphertext throws `TamperedError` just like randomized AES-GCM.\n */\nexport async function decryptDeterministic(\n  ivBase64: string,\n  dataBase64: string,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<string> {\n  return decrypt(ivBase64, dataBase64, dek)\n}\n\n// ─── Random Generation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/** Generate a random 12-byte IV for AES-GCM. */\nexport function generateIV(): Uint8Array {\n  return globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(IV_BYTES))\n}\n\n/** Generate a random 32-byte salt for PBKDF2. */\nexport function generateSalt(): Uint8Array {\n  return globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(SALT_BYTES))\n}\n\n// ─── Base64 Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport function bufferToBase64(buffer: ArrayBuffer | Uint8Array): string {\n  const bytes = buffer instanceof Uint8Array ? buffer : new Uint8Array(buffer)\n  let binary = ''\n  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) {\n    binary += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]!)\n  }\n  return btoa(binary)\n}\n\nexport function base64ToBuffer(base64: string): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> {\n  const binary = atob(base64)\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length)\n  for (let i = 0; i < binary.length; i++) {\n    bytes[i] = binary.charCodeAt(i)\n  }\n  return 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