@noy-db/hub 0.3.0-pre.1 → 0.3.0-pre.3

package/dist/{chunk-GYGWYIOZ.js.map → chunk-6I2YPLAG.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-commit/sequence/strategy.ts","../src/with-commit/sequence/index.ts","../src/with-commit/sequence/active.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Sequence capability strategy — the single on-demand factory the vault routes\n * `vault.sequence()` through to build its atomic-CAS {@link SequenceStore}. The\n * active engine ({@link withSequence}) constructs the real store (kept out of\n * the floor bundle — the store class is reached only via the opt-in\n * `active.ts` chunk); {@link NO_SEQUENCE} throws. The vault always assembles the\n * per-call {@link SequenceStoreOptions} and delegates here, so an un-opted-in\n * caller hits `NO_SEQUENCE`'s throw at `vault.sequence()`.\n *\n * Note: `vault.sequence()` is synchronous, so the factory is a plain (sync)\n * constructor — the engine is tree-shaken by reachability (only `withSequence()`\n * pulls `active.ts`, which statically imports the store), not by a dynamic\n * import. Deferred-numbering series (`withDeferredNumbering`) are a distinct\n * capability and are NOT routed through this strategy.\n * @internal\n */\nimport type { SequenceStore, SequenceStoreOptions } from './index.js'\nimport { SequenceNotEnabledError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\nexport interface SequenceStrategy {\n  createStore(opts: SequenceStoreOptions): SequenceStore\n}\n\n/**\n * No-op stub — the floor default. The capability factory throws\n * {@link SequenceNotEnabledError}; opt in with `sequenceStrategy: withSequence()`\n * in createNoydb. @internal\n */\nexport const NO_SEQUENCE: SequenceStrategy = {\n  createStore(): SequenceStore {\n    throw new SequenceNotEnabledError()\n  },\n}\n","/**\n * Atomic sequence primitive — online-coordinated gap-free numbering.\n *\n * `vault.sequence('invoice-2026').next()` returns 1, 2, 3, … with no\n * gaps and no duplicates, even under concurrent callers. Each named\n * sequence is an independent counter record at `_sequences/<name>`,\n * incremented with an optimistic compare-and-swap retry loop — the same\n * proven pattern as the ledger head (`history/ledger/store.ts`).\n *\n * **Explicitly online-only.** Gap-free numbering requires single-authority\n * serialization, which an offline / non-CAS store cannot provide. `next()`\n * throws {@link SequenceOfflineError} unless the backing store advertises\n * `capabilities.casAtomic`. This is a deliberate, honest wall — an offline\n * writer cannot safely allocate a global sequence number.\n *\n * Note on \"gap-free\": the *sequence* is gap-free (each `next()` yields a\n * unique, +1 value). If a caller discards a value without using it, that\n * is a gap in *usage*, not in the sequence — assign each `next()` result\n * to its record in the same operation.\n */\n\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { encrypt, openEnvelopeJson, type EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { ConflictError, SequenceContentionError, SequenceOfflineError, ValidationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n// Capability opt-in seam (S4): `vault.sequence()` builds its CAS store through\n// the sequenceStrategy, so it throws SequenceNotEnabledError unless opted in.\nexport { withSequence } from './active.js'\nexport { NO_SEQUENCE, type SequenceStrategy } from './strategy.js'\nexport { SequenceNotEnabledError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\nexport const SEQUENCE_COLLECTION = '_sequences'\n// A sequence is a single hot CAS row — higher contention than a ledger\n// append. A larger budget + jittered backoff absorbs moderate concurrency;\n// a genuine burst beyond this surfaces SequenceContentionError so the\n// caller can retry / queue (the honest online-only contract).\nconst MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS = 16\n\ninterface SequenceState {\n  value: number\n}\n\n/** Options for `SequenceHandle.next`. Deferred-numbering series use `for`; the CAS counter ignores all of these. */\nexport interface NextOptions {\n  /** Deferred mode: the record id to number. Ignored by the CAS counter. */\n  readonly for?: string\n  /** Deferred mode: reject after this many ms if still unsealed (reserved; not yet enforced in this slice). */\n  readonly timeoutMs?: number\n}\n\n/**\n * Partitioning for a CAS sequence. A partitioned sequence is an\n * independent counter scoped to one tuple of values — e.g.\n * `sequence('invoice', { partition: [2026, 'EU'] })` numbers EU-2026 invoices\n * separately from `[2026, 'US']` and from the bare `invoice` series.\n *\n * Partition components are URI-encoded (so `/`, null bytes and other\n * separators in a value can never collide with the structural separators) and\n * `'/'`-joined, then appended to the series with a null-byte (`\\x00`)\n * separator. The null byte is illegal in a plain series name, which guarantees\n * a partitioned key is always disjoint from any unpartitioned series.\n */\nexport interface SequenceOptions {\n  /** Partition tuple. Each component is URI-encoded and `'/'`-joined. */\n  readonly partition?: readonly (string | number)[]\n  /**\n   * Render template for the serial string. When set, `vault.sequence`\n   * returns a {@link FormattedSequenceHandle} whose `next()` resolves to\n   * `{ serial, formatted }`. Tokens:\n   * - `{seq}` — the allocated integer\n   * - `{seq:0N}` — zero-padded to width N (e.g. `{seq:04}` → `0001`)\n   * - `{partition.i}` — the i-th `partition` component (original value)\n   *\n   * Any other token, or a `{partition.i}` index beyond the supplied\n   * `partition`, throws `ValidationError` at `vault.sequence()` construction.\n   * Per-partition reset is inherent: a new partition tuple starts at 1.\n   */\n  readonly format?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * A formatted sequence handle. Identical to {@link SequenceHandle}\n * except `next()` also returns the rendered `formatted` string. `peek()` /\n * `seedTo()` operate on the underlying integer counter, unchanged.\n */\nexport interface FormattedSequenceHandle {\n  /** Allocate the next value and return it with its rendered serial string. */\n  next(opts?: NextOptions): Promise<{ serial: number; formatted: string }>\n  /** Read the current integer value without allocating. Returns 0 if never used. */\n  peek(): Promise<number>\n  /** Set-if-greater on the underlying integer counter. See {@link SequenceHandle.seedTo}. */\n  seedTo(n: number): Promise<void>\n}\n\n// Matches a single `{...}` token with no nested braces.\nconst SEQ_FORMAT_TOKEN = /\\{([^{}]*)\\}/g\nconst SEQ_PAD_TOKEN = /^seq:0(\\d+)$/\nconst SEQ_PARTITION_TOKEN = /^partition\\.(\\d+)$/\n\n/**\n * Validate a sequence `format` against the supplied partition and return a\n * pure `(serial) => string` renderer. Eager validation: every token is\n * checked now, so a bad pattern throws `ValidationError` at construction —\n * never at `next()` time.\n */\nexport function compileSequenceFormat(\n  format: string,\n  series: string,\n  partition: readonly (string | number)[] | undefined,\n): (serial: number) => string {\n  const parts = partition ?? []\n  for (const m of format.matchAll(SEQ_FORMAT_TOKEN)) {\n    const token = m[1] ?? ''\n    if (token === 'seq') continue\n    if (SEQ_PAD_TOKEN.test(token)) continue\n    const partMatch = SEQ_PARTITION_TOKEN.exec(token)\n    if (partMatch) {\n      const idx = Number(partMatch[1])\n      if (idx >= parts.length) {\n        throw new ValidationError(\n          `sequence(\"${series}\"): format token \"{${token}}\" references partition index ${idx}, ` +\n            `but only ${parts.length} partition component(s) were supplied.`,\n        )\n      }\n      continue\n    }\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      `sequence(\"${series}\"): format contains unknown token \"{${token}}\". ` +\n        `Accepted tokens: {seq}, {seq:0N}, {partition.i}.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return (serial: number): string =>\n    format.replace(SEQ_FORMAT_TOKEN, (full, token: string) => {\n      if (token === 'seq') return String(serial)\n      const padMatch = SEQ_PAD_TOKEN.exec(token)\n      if (padMatch) return String(serial).padStart(Number(padMatch[1]), '0')\n      const partMatch = SEQ_PARTITION_TOKEN.exec(token)\n      if (partMatch) return String(parts[Number(partMatch[1])])\n      return full // unreachable — validated above\n    })\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the CAS storage key for a (series, partition) pair.\n *\n * With no partition the key is `series` verbatim. With a partition the key is\n * `${series}\\x00${parts}` where `parts` is each component passed through\n * `encodeURIComponent(String(part))` and `'/'`-joined. The null-byte separator\n * is illegal in a plain series name, so partitioned keys never collide with\n * unpartitioned ones; URI-encoding keeps any component containing `/` distinct\n * from a multi-component partition.\n *\n * @throws {ValidationError} if any partition component is empty after `String()`\n *   or is a non-finite number (`NaN`, `±Infinity`).\n */\nexport function resolveSequenceKey(series: string, opts?: SequenceOptions): string {\n  const partition = opts?.partition\n  if (!partition || partition.length === 0) return series\n  const parts = partition.map((p) => {\n    if (typeof p === 'number' && !Number.isFinite(p)) {\n      throw new ValidationError(`sequence partition component must be a finite number, got ${p}`)\n    }\n    const s = String(p)\n    if (s === '') {\n      throw new ValidationError('sequence partition component must not be empty')\n    }\n    return encodeURIComponent(s)\n  })\n  return `${series}\\x00${parts.join('/')}`\n}\n\nexport interface SequenceHandle {\n  /** Atomically allocate and return the next value (1, 2, 3, …). Deferred series resolve at the next pass. */\n  next(opts?: NextOptions): Promise<number>\n  /** Read the current value without allocating. Returns 0 if never used. */\n  peek(): Promise<number>\n  /**\n   * Set-if-greater: advance the counter to at least `n`. A no-op if the\n   * current value is already `>= n` (so it never rewinds), and `seedTo(0)` is\n   * a no-op. Idempotent and CAS-safe under concurrent `next()` / `seedTo()`.\n   *\n   * Use after a bundle / CSV import to fast-forward the counter past the\n   * highest imported serial, so subsequent `next()` calls cannot re-use a\n   * number that is already on a record.\n   *\n   * Online-only: throws {@link SequenceOfflineError} on a non-CAS store.\n   */\n  seedTo(n: number): Promise<void>\n}\n\nasync function sleepBackoff(attempt: number): Promise<void> {\n  // Exponential backoff with full jitter to break the thundering herd\n  // when many writers contend on the same counter row.\n  const ceil = Math.min(2 ** attempt, 32)\n  const ms = Math.floor(Math.random() * ceil)\n  await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms))\n}\n\n/** Per-call context the vault assembles to build a {@link SequenceStore}. */\nexport interface SequenceStoreOptions {\n  adapter: NoydbStore\n  vault: string\n  encrypted: boolean\n  getDEK: (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  actor: string\n}\n\nexport class SequenceStore {\n  private readonly adapter: NoydbStore\n  private readonly vault: string\n  private readonly encrypted: boolean\n  private readonly getDEK: (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  private readonly actor: string\n  /**\n   * Memoized DEK promise. The `_sequences` collection DEK is created on\n   * first access; without sharing one promise, a burst of concurrent\n   * `next()` calls would each trigger DEK creation and diverge (one\n   * writer's ciphertext unreadable by another). One shared promise → one\n   * DEK.\n   */\n  private dekPromise: Promise<EnclaveKey> | null = null\n\n  constructor(opts: SequenceStoreOptions) {\n    this.adapter = opts.adapter\n    this.vault = opts.vault\n    this.encrypted = opts.encrypted\n    this.getDEK = opts.getDEK\n    this.actor = opts.actor\n  }\n\n  /** A handle bound to one sequence name. */\n  handle(name: string): SequenceHandle {\n    return {\n      next: () => this.next(name),\n      peek: () => this.peek(name),\n      seedTo: (n) => this.seedTo(name, n),\n    }\n  }\n\n  private assertOnline(): void {\n    if (this.adapter.capabilities?.casAtomic !== true) {\n      throw new SequenceOfflineError()\n    }\n  }\n\n  private dek(): Promise<EnclaveKey> {\n    if (!this.dekPromise) this.dekPromise = this.getDEK(SEQUENCE_COLLECTION)\n    return this.dekPromise\n  }\n\n  private async read(name: string): Promise<{ env: EncryptedEnvelope | null; value: number }> {\n    const env = await this.adapter.get(this.vault, SEQUENCE_COLLECTION, name)\n    if (!env) return { env: null, value: 0 }\n    const json = this.encrypted ? await openEnvelopeJson(env, await this.dek()) : env._data\n    const state = JSON.parse(json) as SequenceState\n    return { env, value: state.value }\n  }\n\n  private async encryptState(state: SequenceState, version: number): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope> {\n    const json = JSON.stringify(state)\n    if (!this.encrypted) {\n      return { _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION, _v: version, _ts: new Date().toISOString(), _iv: '', _data: json, _by: this.actor }\n    }\n    const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, await this.dek())\n    return { _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION, _v: version, _ts: new Date().toISOString(), _iv: iv, _data: data, _by: this.actor }\n  }\n\n  async peek(name: string): Promise<number> {\n    return (await this.read(name)).value\n  }\n\n  async next(name: string): Promise<number> {\n    this.assertOnline()\n    let lastConflict: ConflictError | undefined\n    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS; attempt++) {\n      const { env, value } = await this.read(name)\n      const nextValue = value + 1\n      const expectedVersion = env?._v ?? 0 // 0 ≡ \"must not yet exist\" (create)\n      const envelope = await this.encryptState({ value: nextValue }, expectedVersion + 1)\n      try {\n        await this.adapter.put(this.vault, SEQUENCE_COLLECTION, name, envelope, expectedVersion)\n        return nextValue\n      } catch (err) {\n        if (err instanceof ConflictError) {\n          lastConflict = err\n          if (attempt < MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS - 1) await sleepBackoff(attempt)\n          continue\n        }\n        throw err\n      }\n    }\n    void lastConflict\n    throw new SequenceContentionError(name, MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS)\n  }\n\n  async seedTo(name: string, n: number): Promise<void> {\n    this.assertOnline()\n    if (n <= 0) return // set-if-greater: 0 (and any non-positive seed) is a no-op\n    let lastConflict: ConflictError | undefined\n    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS; attempt++) {\n      const { env, value } = await this.read(name)\n      if (value >= n) return // already at or past the floor — no write, idempotent\n      const expectedVersion = env?._v ?? 0 // 0 ≡ \"must not yet exist\" (create)\n      const envelope = await this.encryptState({ value: n }, expectedVersion + 1)\n      try {\n        await this.adapter.put(this.vault, SEQUENCE_COLLECTION, name, envelope, expectedVersion)\n        return\n      } catch (err) {\n        if (err instanceof ConflictError) {\n          lastConflict = err\n          if (attempt < MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS - 1) await sleepBackoff(attempt)\n          continue\n        }\n        throw err\n      }\n    }\n    void lastConflict\n    throw new SequenceContentionError(name, MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS)\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Enable the atomic-sequence capability.\n * Pass to `createNoydb({ sequenceStrategy: withSequence() })` to make\n * `vault.sequence('name').next()` / `.peek()` / `.seedTo()` live. 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+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-commit/sequence/strategy.ts","../src/with-commit/sequence/index.ts","../src/with-commit/sequence/active.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Sequence capability strategy — the single on-demand factory the vault routes\n * `vault.sequence()` through to build its atomic-CAS {@link SequenceStore}. The\n * active engine ({@link withSequence}) constructs the real store (kept out of\n * the floor bundle — the store class is reached only via the opt-in\n * `active.ts` chunk); {@link NO_SEQUENCE} throws. The vault always assembles the\n * per-call {@link SequenceStoreOptions} and delegates here, so an un-opted-in\n * caller hits `NO_SEQUENCE`'s throw at `vault.sequence()`.\n *\n * Note: `vault.sequence()` is synchronous, so the factory is a plain (sync)\n * constructor — the engine is tree-shaken by reachability (only `withSequence()`\n * pulls `active.ts`, which statically imports the store), not by a dynamic\n * import. Deferred-numbering series (`withDeferredNumbering`) are a distinct\n * capability and are NOT routed through this strategy.\n * @internal\n */\nimport type { SequenceStore, SequenceStoreOptions } from './index.js'\nimport { SequenceNotEnabledError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\nexport interface SequenceStrategy {\n  createStore(opts: SequenceStoreOptions): SequenceStore\n}\n\n/**\n * No-op stub — the floor default. The capability factory throws\n * {@link SequenceNotEnabledError}; opt in with `sequenceStrategy: withSequence()`\n * in createNoydb. @internal\n */\nexport const NO_SEQUENCE: SequenceStrategy = {\n  createStore(): SequenceStore {\n    throw new SequenceNotEnabledError()\n  },\n}\n","/**\n * Atomic sequence primitive — online-coordinated gap-free numbering.\n *\n * `vault.sequence('invoice-2026').next()` returns 1, 2, 3, … with no\n * gaps and no duplicates, even under concurrent callers. Each named\n * sequence is an independent counter record at `_sequences/<name>`,\n * incremented with an optimistic compare-and-swap retry loop — the same\n * proven pattern as the ledger head (`history/ledger/store.ts`).\n *\n * **Explicitly online-only.** Gap-free numbering requires single-authority\n * serialization, which an offline / non-CAS store cannot provide. `next()`\n * throws {@link SequenceOfflineError} unless the backing store advertises\n * `capabilities.casAtomic`. This is a deliberate, honest wall — an offline\n * writer cannot safely allocate a global sequence number.\n *\n * Note on \"gap-free\": the *sequence* is gap-free (each `next()` yields a\n * unique, +1 value). If a caller discards a value without using it, that\n * is a gap in *usage*, not in the sequence — assign each `next()` result\n * to its record in the same operation.\n */\n\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { encrypt, openEnvelopeJson, type EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { ConflictError, SequenceContentionError, SequenceOfflineError, ValidationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n// Capability opt-in seam (S4): `vault.sequence()` builds its CAS store through\n// the sequenceStrategy, so it throws SequenceNotEnabledError unless opted in.\nexport { withSequence } from './active.js'\nexport { NO_SEQUENCE, type SequenceStrategy } from './strategy.js'\nexport { SequenceNotEnabledError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\nexport const SEQUENCE_COLLECTION = '_sequences'\n// A sequence is a single hot CAS row — higher contention than a ledger\n// append. A larger budget + jittered backoff absorbs moderate concurrency;\n// a genuine burst beyond this surfaces SequenceContentionError so the\n// caller can retry / queue (the honest online-only contract).\nconst MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS = 16\n\ninterface SequenceState {\n  value: number\n}\n\n/** Options for `SequenceHandle.next`. Deferred-numbering series use `for`; the CAS counter ignores all of these. */\nexport interface NextOptions {\n  /** Deferred mode: the record id to number. Ignored by the CAS counter. */\n  readonly for?: string\n  /** Deferred mode: reject after this many ms if still unsealed (reserved; not yet enforced in this slice). */\n  readonly timeoutMs?: number\n}\n\n/**\n * Partitioning for a CAS sequence. A partitioned sequence is an\n * independent counter scoped to one tuple of values — e.g.\n * `sequence('invoice', { partition: [2026, 'EU'] })` numbers EU-2026 invoices\n * separately from `[2026, 'US']` and from the bare `invoice` series.\n *\n * Partition components are URI-encoded (so `/`, null bytes and other\n * separators in a value can never collide with the structural separators) and\n * `'/'`-joined, then appended to the series with a null-byte (`\\x00`)\n * separator. The null byte is illegal in a plain series name, which guarantees\n * a partitioned key is always disjoint from any unpartitioned series.\n */\nexport interface SequenceOptions {\n  /** Partition tuple. Each component is URI-encoded and `'/'`-joined. */\n  readonly partition?: readonly (string | number)[]\n  /**\n   * Render template for the serial string. When set, `vault.sequence`\n   * returns a {@link FormattedSequenceHandle} whose `next()` resolves to\n   * `{ serial, formatted }`. Tokens:\n   * - `{seq}` — the allocated integer\n   * - `{seq:0N}` — zero-padded to width N (e.g. `{seq:04}` → `0001`)\n   * - `{partition.i}` — the i-th `partition` component (original value)\n   *\n   * Any other token, or a `{partition.i}` index beyond the supplied\n   * `partition`, throws `ValidationError` at `vault.sequence()` construction.\n   * Per-partition reset is inherent: a new partition tuple starts at 1.\n   */\n  readonly format?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * A formatted sequence handle. Identical to {@link SequenceHandle}\n * except `next()` also returns the rendered `formatted` string. `peek()` /\n * `seedTo()` operate on the underlying integer counter, unchanged.\n */\nexport interface FormattedSequenceHandle {\n  /** Allocate the next value and return it with its rendered serial string. */\n  next(opts?: NextOptions): Promise<{ serial: number; formatted: string }>\n  /** Read the current integer value without allocating. Returns 0 if never used. */\n  peek(): Promise<number>\n  /** Set-if-greater on the underlying integer counter. See {@link SequenceHandle.seedTo}. */\n  seedTo(n: number): Promise<void>\n}\n\n// Matches a single `{...}` token with no nested braces.\nconst SEQ_FORMAT_TOKEN = /\\{([^{}]*)\\}/g\nconst SEQ_PAD_TOKEN = /^seq:0(\\d+)$/\nconst SEQ_PARTITION_TOKEN = /^partition\\.(\\d+)$/\n\n/**\n * Validate a sequence `format` against the supplied partition and return a\n * pure `(serial) => string` renderer. Eager validation: every token is\n * checked now, so a bad pattern throws `ValidationError` at construction —\n * never at `next()` time.\n */\nexport function compileSequenceFormat(\n  format: string,\n  series: string,\n  partition: readonly (string | number)[] | undefined,\n): (serial: number) => string {\n  const parts = partition ?? []\n  for (const m of format.matchAll(SEQ_FORMAT_TOKEN)) {\n    const token = m[1] ?? ''\n    if (token === 'seq') continue\n    if (SEQ_PAD_TOKEN.test(token)) continue\n    const partMatch = SEQ_PARTITION_TOKEN.exec(token)\n    if (partMatch) {\n      const idx = Number(partMatch[1])\n      if (idx >= parts.length) {\n        throw new ValidationError(\n          `sequence(\"${series}\"): format token \"{${token}}\" references partition index ${idx}, ` +\n            `but only ${parts.length} partition component(s) were supplied.`,\n        )\n      }\n      continue\n    }\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      `sequence(\"${series}\"): format contains unknown token \"{${token}}\". ` +\n        `Accepted tokens: {seq}, {seq:0N}, {partition.i}.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return (serial: number): string =>\n    format.replace(SEQ_FORMAT_TOKEN, (full, token: string) => {\n      if (token === 'seq') return String(serial)\n      const padMatch = SEQ_PAD_TOKEN.exec(token)\n      if (padMatch) return String(serial).padStart(Number(padMatch[1]), '0')\n      const partMatch = SEQ_PARTITION_TOKEN.exec(token)\n      if (partMatch) return String(parts[Number(partMatch[1])])\n      return full // unreachable — validated above\n    })\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the CAS storage key for a (series, partition) pair.\n *\n * With no partition the key is `series` verbatim. With a partition the key is\n * `${series}\\x00${parts}` where `parts` is each component passed through\n * `encodeURIComponent(String(part))` and `'/'`-joined. The null-byte separator\n * is illegal in a plain series name, so partitioned keys never collide with\n * unpartitioned ones; URI-encoding keeps any component containing `/` distinct\n * from a multi-component partition.\n *\n * @throws {ValidationError} if any partition component is empty after `String()`\n *   or is a non-finite number (`NaN`, `±Infinity`).\n */\nexport function resolveSequenceKey(series: string, opts?: SequenceOptions): string {\n  const partition = opts?.partition\n  if (!partition || partition.length === 0) return series\n  const parts = partition.map((p) => {\n    if (typeof p === 'number' && !Number.isFinite(p)) {\n      throw new ValidationError(`sequence partition component must be a finite number, got ${p}`)\n    }\n    const s = String(p)\n    if (s === '') {\n      throw new ValidationError('sequence partition component must not be empty')\n    }\n    return encodeURIComponent(s)\n  })\n  return `${series}\\x00${parts.join('/')}`\n}\n\nexport interface SequenceHandle {\n  /** Atomically allocate and return the next value (1, 2, 3, …). Deferred series resolve at the next pass. */\n  next(opts?: NextOptions): Promise<number>\n  /** Read the current value without allocating. Returns 0 if never used. */\n  peek(): Promise<number>\n  /**\n   * Set-if-greater: advance the counter to at least `n`. A no-op if the\n   * current value is already `>= n` (so it never rewinds), and `seedTo(0)` is\n   * a no-op. Idempotent and CAS-safe under concurrent `next()` / `seedTo()`.\n   *\n   * Use after a bundle / CSV import to fast-forward the counter past the\n   * highest imported serial, so subsequent `next()` calls cannot re-use a\n   * number that is already on a record.\n   *\n   * Online-only: throws {@link SequenceOfflineError} on a non-CAS store.\n   */\n  seedTo(n: number): Promise<void>\n}\n\nasync function sleepBackoff(attempt: number): Promise<void> {\n  // Exponential backoff with full jitter to break the thundering herd\n  // when many writers contend on the same counter row.\n  const ceil = Math.min(2 ** attempt, 32)\n  const ms = Math.floor(Math.random() * ceil)\n  await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms))\n}\n\n/** Per-call context the vault assembles to build a {@link SequenceStore}. */\nexport interface SequenceStoreOptions {\n  adapter: NoydbStore\n  vault: string\n  encrypted: boolean\n  getDEK: (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  actor: string\n}\n\nexport class SequenceStore {\n  private readonly adapter: NoydbStore\n  private readonly vault: string\n  private readonly encrypted: boolean\n  private readonly getDEK: (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  private readonly actor: string\n  /**\n   * Memoized DEK promise. The `_sequences` collection DEK is created on\n   * first access; without sharing one promise, a burst of concurrent\n   * `next()` calls would each trigger DEK creation and diverge (one\n   * writer's ciphertext unreadable by another). One shared promise → one\n   * DEK.\n   */\n  private dekPromise: Promise<EnclaveKey> | null = null\n\n  constructor(opts: SequenceStoreOptions) {\n    this.adapter = opts.adapter\n    this.vault = opts.vault\n    this.encrypted = opts.encrypted\n    this.getDEK = opts.getDEK\n    this.actor = opts.actor\n  }\n\n  /** A handle bound to one sequence name. */\n  handle(name: string): SequenceHandle {\n    return {\n      next: () => this.next(name),\n      peek: () => this.peek(name),\n      seedTo: (n) => this.seedTo(name, n),\n    }\n  }\n\n  private assertOnline(): void {\n    if (this.adapter.capabilities?.casAtomic !== true) {\n      throw new SequenceOfflineError()\n    }\n  }\n\n  private dek(): Promise<EnclaveKey> {\n    if (!this.dekPromise) this.dekPromise = this.getDEK(SEQUENCE_COLLECTION)\n    return this.dekPromise\n  }\n\n  private async read(name: string): Promise<{ env: EncryptedEnvelope | null; value: number }> {\n    const env = await this.adapter.get(this.vault, SEQUENCE_COLLECTION, name)\n    if (!env) return { env: null, value: 0 }\n    const json = this.encrypted ? await openEnvelopeJson(env, await this.dek()) : env._data\n    const state = JSON.parse(json) as SequenceState\n    return { env, value: state.value }\n  }\n\n  private async encryptState(state: SequenceState, version: number): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope> {\n    const json = JSON.stringify(state)\n    if (!this.encrypted) {\n      return { _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION, _v: version, _ts: new Date().toISOString(), _iv: '', _data: json, _by: this.actor }\n    }\n    const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, await this.dek())\n    return { _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION, _v: version, _ts: new Date().toISOString(), _iv: iv, _data: data, _by: this.actor }\n  }\n\n  async peek(name: string): Promise<number> {\n    return (await this.read(name)).value\n  }\n\n  async next(name: string): Promise<number> {\n    this.assertOnline()\n    let lastConflict: ConflictError | undefined\n    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS; attempt++) {\n      const { env, value } = await this.read(name)\n      const nextValue = value + 1\n      const expectedVersion = env?._v ?? 0 // 0 ≡ \"must not yet exist\" (create)\n      const envelope = await this.encryptState({ value: nextValue }, expectedVersion + 1)\n      try {\n        await this.adapter.put(this.vault, SEQUENCE_COLLECTION, name, envelope, expectedVersion)\n        return nextValue\n      } catch (err) {\n        if (err instanceof ConflictError) {\n          lastConflict = err\n          if (attempt < MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS - 1) await sleepBackoff(attempt)\n          continue\n        }\n        throw err\n      }\n    }\n    void lastConflict\n    throw new SequenceContentionError(name, MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS)\n  }\n\n  async seedTo(name: string, n: number): Promise<void> {\n    this.assertOnline()\n    if (n <= 0) return // set-if-greater: 0 (and any non-positive seed) is a no-op\n    let lastConflict: ConflictError | undefined\n    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS; attempt++) {\n      const { env, value } = await this.read(name)\n      if (value >= n) return // already at or past the floor — no write, idempotent\n      const expectedVersion = env?._v ?? 0 // 0 ≡ \"must not yet exist\" (create)\n      const envelope = await this.encryptState({ value: n }, expectedVersion + 1)\n      try {\n        await this.adapter.put(this.vault, SEQUENCE_COLLECTION, name, envelope, expectedVersion)\n        return\n      } catch (err) {\n        if (err instanceof ConflictError) {\n          lastConflict = err\n          if (attempt < MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS - 1) await sleepBackoff(attempt)\n          continue\n        }\n        throw err\n      }\n    }\n    void lastConflict\n    throw new SequenceContentionError(name, MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS)\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Enable the atomic-sequence capability.\n * Pass to `createNoydb({ sequenceStrategy: withSequence() })` to make\n * `vault.sequence('name').next()` / `.peek()` / `.seedTo()` live. 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package/dist/{chunk-SRB2XEWB.js → chunk-6OQ7NKMZ.js}

@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
+import {
+  openEnvelopeJson
+} from "./chunk-5EZAJEES.js";
 import {
   encrypt,
   hmacSha256Hex,
-  openEnvelopeJson,
   sha256Hex
-} from "./chunk-5O3AOPDT.js";
+} from "./chunk-L4IRFTIF.js";
 import {
   NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION
-} from "./chunk-5TDJ56JE.js";
+} from "./chunk-OCDUQUAP.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/forget/strategy.ts
 var NO_FORGET = { subjects: {} };
@@ -145,4 +147,4 @@ export {
   coerceSubjectId,
   readDottedPath
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-SRB2XEWB.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-6OQ7NKMZ.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-SRB2XEWB.js.map → chunk-6OQ7NKMZ.js.map}

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-audit/forget/strategy.ts","../src/with-audit/forget/subject-index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `withForgetCascade` — declaration surface for GDPR right-to-erasure via\n * per-record CEK crypto-shred.\n *\n * This file holds only the *declaration* shape and the disabled sentinel.\n * The actual erasure machinery lives in:\n *   - `subject-index.ts` — the encrypted `_subject_index` reserved collection\n *   - `vault.ts` `forget()` — the per-record tombstone + ledger flow\n *   - `collection.ts` `_writeTombstone` — the envelope rewrite\n *\n * A `ForgetStrategy` declares which collections carry erasable subject data\n * and the (dotted-path) field on each record that names the data subject.\n * Declaring a collection here ALSO forces `perRecordKeys: true` for it (a\n * shred can only erase a record whose body is keyed off a per-record CEK),\n * so adopters opt into the CEK foundation transitively.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { LedgerEntry } from '../../with-commit/history/ledger/entry.js'\n\n/**\n * User-supplied declaration passed to {@link withForgetCascade}. Maps a\n * collection name to the record field (dotted path supported, e.g.\n * `'billing.buyerId'`) that identifies the data subject for erasure.\n *\n * ```ts\n * withForgetCascade({ subjects: { invoices: 'buyerId', contacts: 'id' } })\n * ```\n */\nexport interface SubjectDeclaration {\n  readonly subjects: Record<string, string>\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolved forget strategy threaded through Noydb → every Vault. Carries\n * the same `subjects` map the user declared. `NO_FORGET` (empty map) is the\n * off-by-default sentinel; `vault.forget()` throws\n * `ForgetStrategyNotConfiguredError` when the map is empty.\n */\nexport interface ForgetStrategy {\n  /** Collection → subject-field (dotted path). Empty under `NO_FORGET`. */\n  readonly subjects: Readonly<Record<string, string>>\n}\n\n/**\n * Disabled sentinel — no collections declare a subject field. `vault.forget()`\n * refuses with `ForgetStrategyNotConfiguredError`; no write hooks register; no\n * collection is forced into `perRecordKeys`. Non-adopters pay nothing.\n */\nexport const NO_FORGET: ForgetStrategy = { subjects: {} }\n\n// The `withForgetCascade` factory lives in `active.ts` (canonical\n// strategy.ts/active.ts/index.ts split); this file holds only the\n// declaration shape + disabled sentinel.\n\n/**\n * The outcome of a `vault.forget(subjectId)` call.\n *\n * `unmigratedRecords` lists `collection:id` pairs that were tombstoned but\n * whose body had NOT been migrated to a per-record CEK at shred time (legacy\n * body still under the shared collection DEK). Those records are tombstoned\n * (live envelope + history stripped) but their pre-shred ciphertext, if it\n * leaked into a backup before migration, remains decryptable under the\n * collection DEK — so erasure-completeness is NOT guaranteed for them. Run\n * the per-record-CEK migration pass, then re-forget, to close the gap.\n *\n * Blob attachments: a shredded record's **erasable** blobs (on a\n * `perRecordKeys` collection) are crypto-shredded inline — `blobsShredded`\n * counts those taken to refCount 0 (BlobObject deleted → chunks permanently\n * undecryptable), `blobsRetainedShared` counts those still referenced by\n * another record (shared content legitimately persists for its other owner).\n * `blobResidueCollections` now lists only collections with blobs that could\n * NOT be crypto-shredded: **legacy** blobs (no per-blob `_cek`, chunks under\n * the shared `_blob` DEK — migrate them), or a session without the blob\n * service loaded. An all-erasable subject yields an empty residue list.\n */\nexport interface ForgetResult {\n  /** The subject id passed to `forget()`. Echoed for caller convenience. */\n  readonly subject: string\n  /** Count of live records rewritten to a tombstone. */\n  readonly recordsShredded: number\n  /** Count of `_history` envelopes tombstoned across all shredded records. */\n  readonly historyVersionsShredded: number\n  /** Distinct collections that had at least one record shredded. */\n  readonly collections: readonly string[]\n  /** `collection:id` pairs shredded while still un-migrated (see type docs). */\n  readonly unmigratedRecords: readonly string[]\n  /** Count of erasable blobs crypto-shredded (refCount → 0, BlobObject deleted). */\n  readonly blobsShredded: number\n  /** Count of erasable blobs retained because still referenced elsewhere (shared). */\n  readonly blobsRetainedShared: number\n  /** Collections with blobs that could NOT be crypto-shredded — legacy (no `_cek`) or blobs disabled (see type docs). */\n  readonly blobResidueCollections: readonly string[]\n  /**\n   * Count of persisted `_idx/<field>/<recordId>` index side-cars hard-deleted\n   * across the shredded records. These live under the retained\n   * collection DEK, so crypto-shred alone would leave the indexed field VALUES\n   * readable — `forget()` must delete them.\n   */\n  readonly indexPostingsPurged: number\n  /**\n   * `collection:id:field` entries whose persisted `_idx` side-car could NOT be\n   * deleted — index residue that still leaks the indexed value under the\n   * retained collection DEK. Non-empty means erasure is INCOMPLETE: retry, or\n   * purge the side-car out of band.\n   */\n  readonly indexResidue: readonly string[]\n  /**\n   * Count of `_sealed[field]` slots dropped from the live store across the\n   * shredded records. For slots written under `sensitive` +\n   * `perRecordKeys` (the current path), the key derives off the per-record CEK,\n   * so tombstoning the record — which drops `_cek` and `_sealed` — also\n   * crypto-shreds the value. A legacy slot (written before per-record CEKs) keys\n   * off the collection DEK instead, so dropping it removes it from the live store but a\n   * pre-forget backup remains recoverable by a DEK holder (same caveat `_data`\n   * carries); migrate by re-`put`ting before forgetting for full crypto-shred.\n   */\n  readonly sealedFieldsShredded: number\n  /** Count of `_sealed_cek` host-delivery envelopes deleted (#H-1). A record sealed to an\n   * at-* host via sealRecordToHost persists its raw CEK there; forget() must destroy them. */\n  readonly sealedCekEnvelopesPurged: number\n  /** `collection:id` whose `_sealed_cek` purge failed (residue — the host-recoverable CEK may survive). */\n  readonly sealedCekResidue: readonly string[]\n  /** `collection:id:field` sealed slots that were DEK-derived (legacy, written before per-record CEKs) and thus NOT crypto-shredded\n   * by dropping `_cek` — the collection DEK is retained, so synced/backup copies stay decryptable (#M-1). */\n  readonly sealedResidue: readonly string[]\n  /** The single `op:'forget'` ledger entry appended for this erasure. */\n  readonly ledgerEntry: LedgerEntry\n}\n","/**\n * The encrypted subject index.\n *\n * GDPR crypto-shred needs to answer \"which records belong to data subject\n * X?\" portably (the index must travel with the vault/bundle) WITHOUT leaking\n * subject-equivalence to the store. The rejected alternative — an unencrypted\n * subject tag in envelope metadata — would let anyone with store access see\n * which records share a subject. Instead we keep a reserved `_subject_index`\n * collection, encrypted under its OWN DEK (`getDEK('_subject_index')`):\n *\n *   - record id  = `HMAC-SHA256(indexDEK, subjectId)` (M-2). A bare\n *     `sha256Hex(subjectId)` would be offline-computable: an attacker with\n *     store access and a candidate list (emails / customer ids are low-entropy)\n *     could dictionary the hash to confirm \"subject X is present here.\" Keying\n *     the id with the vault-only index DEK removes that capability — without the\n *     DEK the id cannot be derived. (Legacy entries written before M-2 used the\n *     bare sha256 id; the read/remove paths dual-look-up both forms.)\n *   - record body = AES-GCM(JSON `{ r: [{ collection, id }], p }`) under the\n *     index DEK, where `p` pads the plaintext to a bucketed length so the\n *     ciphertext `_data` length does not leak the approximate record count.\n *     Legacy bodies were a bare `[{ collection, id }]` array; reads accept both.\n *\n * ## Concurrency (RISK #3 — known v1 limitation)\n *\n * `addSubjectRef` / `removeSubjectRef` are read-modify-write with no CAS. The\n * design assumes a SINGLE WRITER (the noy-db single-process write model). Two\n * concurrent writers racing on the SAME subject can lose an entry (last-write\n * wins on the ref list). This is documented, not fixed in v1:\n * `rebuildSubjectIndex` performs a full scan to recover a correct index from\n * the canonical records, so a lost ref is recoverable. A CAS-backed index is\n * deferred to a later slice.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport { encrypt, openEnvelopeJson, hmacSha256Hex, sha256Hex, type EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\n/** Reserved collection holding the encrypted subject → records index. */\nexport const SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION = '_subject_index'\n\n/**\n * Bucket (bytes) the encrypted ref-list plaintext is padded up to, so the\n * ciphertext `_data` length leaks only `count` rounded up to a bucket — not the\n * exact record count. 256 keeps small subjects (the common case) indistinguishable.\n */\nconst REF_LIST_BUCKET = 256\n\n/** A single record reference held in a subject's index entry. */\nexport interface SubjectRef {\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly id: string\n}\n\ntype GetDEK = (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n\n/** SHA-256 hex of a UTF-8 string. The LEGACY (pre-M-2) subject-index key. */\nasync function sha256HexString(input: string): Promise<string> {\n  return sha256Hex(new TextEncoder().encode(input))\n}\n\n/**\n * The subject-index record id(s) to consult for a subject, most-current first.\n *\n * - Encrypted vault: the PRIMARY id is `HMAC-SHA256(indexDEK, subjectId)` (M-2)\n *   — not offline-computable. The LEGACY `sha256Hex(subjectId)` id is also\n *   returned so reads/removes still find entries written before M-2 (dual-lookup).\n * - Plaintext/debug vault: no DEK to key with, so the only id is the legacy\n *   sha256 form (unchanged behaviour — plaintext mode is not zero-knowledge anyway).\n */\nasync function subjectKeys(getDEK: GetDEK, encrypted: boolean, subjectId: string): Promise<string[]> {\n  const legacy = await sha256HexString(subjectId)\n  if (!encrypted) return [legacy]\n  const dek = await getDEK(SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION)\n  const keyed = await hmacSha256Hex(dek, new TextEncoder().encode(subjectId))\n  return keyed === legacy ? [keyed] : [keyed, legacy]\n}\n\n/** The id new writes land under (keyed when encrypted, else legacy sha256). */\nasync function primarySubjectKey(getDEK: GetDEK, encrypted: boolean, subjectId: string): Promise<string> {\n  return (await subjectKeys(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId))[0]!\n}\n\n/** Parse a stored ref-list body: new padded `{ r, p }` wrapper OR legacy bare array. */\nfunction parseRefs(json: string): SubjectRef[] {\n  const parsed = JSON.parse(json) as SubjectRef[] | { r: SubjectRef[] }\n  return Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.r\n}\n\n/** Serialize + pad the ref list to a bucket boundary (encrypted vaults only). */\nfunction serializeRefs(refs: SubjectRef[]): string {\n  const base = JSON.stringify({ r: refs, p: '' })\n  const pad = Math.ceil(base.length / REF_LIST_BUCKET) * REF_LIST_BUCKET - base.length\n  return JSON.stringify({ r: refs, p: ' '.repeat(pad) })\n}\n\n/** Read + decrypt the ref list at a SINGLE index key. Returns `[]` when absent. */\nasync function readRefs(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  key: string,\n): Promise<SubjectRef[]> {\n  const env = await adapter.get(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, key)\n  if (!env || !env._data) return []\n  if (!encrypted) return parseRefs(env._data)\n  const dek = await getDEK(SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION)\n  const json = await openEnvelopeJson(env, dek)\n  return parseRefs(json)\n}\n\n/** Encrypt + write a ref list for a subject under its derived key. */\nasync function writeRefs(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  key: string,\n  refs: SubjectRef[],\n): Promise<void> {\n  let env: EncryptedEnvelope\n  if (!encrypted) {\n    // Plaintext/debug vault: keep the legacy bare-array form (no padding needed).\n    env = { _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION, _v: 1, _ts: new Date().toISOString(), _iv: '', _data: JSON.stringify(refs) }\n  } else {\n    const dek = await getDEK(SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION)\n    const { iv, data } = await encrypt(serializeRefs(refs), dek)\n    env = { _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION, _v: 1, _ts: new Date().toISOString(), _iv: iv, _data: data }\n  }\n  await adapter.put(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, key, env)\n}\n\n/**\n * Add a `{ collection, id }` ref to a subject's index entry (idempotent —\n * a duplicate ref is not appended). Read-modify-write; see the concurrency\n * note in the module docstring.\n */\nexport async function addSubjectRef(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  subjectId: string,\n  ref: SubjectRef,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const key = await primarySubjectKey(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId)\n  const refs = await readRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key)\n  if (refs.some((r) => r.collection === ref.collection && r.id === ref.id)) return\n  refs.push(ref)\n  await writeRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key, refs)\n}\n\n/**\n * Remove a `{ collection, id }` ref from a subject's index entry. When the\n * last ref is removed the (now empty) entry is deleted so the store holds no\n * residual key for an erased subject.\n */\nexport async function removeSubjectRef(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  subjectId: string,\n  ref: SubjectRef,\n): Promise<void> {\n  // Dual-lookup: drop the ref from BOTH the keyed (M-2) and the legacy sha256\n  // entry, so a pre-M-2 subject is still fully erased.\n  for (const key of await subjectKeys(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId)) {\n    const refs = await readRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key)\n    const next = refs.filter((r) => !(r.collection === ref.collection && r.id === ref.id))\n    if (next.length === refs.length) continue\n    if (next.length === 0) {\n      await adapter.delete(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, key)\n    } else {\n      await writeRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key, next)\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Look up every record ref for a subject. Returns `[]` when none exist. Unions\n * the keyed (M-2) and legacy sha256 entries (dual-lookup), deduplicated, so a\n * subject indexed before M-2 is still fully found.\n */\nexport async function lookupSubject(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  subjectId: string,\n): Promise<SubjectRef[]> {\n  const keys = await subjectKeys(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId)\n  const seen = new Set<string>()\n  const out: SubjectRef[] = []\n  for (const key of keys) {\n    for (const ref of await readRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key)) {\n      const dedup = `${ref.collection}\\u0000${ref.id}`\n      if (seen.has(dedup)) continue\n      seen.add(dedup)\n      out.push(ref)\n    }\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Rebuild the entire subject index from the canonical records (the recovery\n * path for the documented read-modify-write race). Scans each declared\n * collection, reads `record[subjectField]` (dotted path), and rewrites the\n * index from scratch. Tombstoned (already-shredded) records contribute no\n * ref — their body is gone, so they cannot be re-indexed.\n *\n * `decodeRecord` decrypts an envelope to a plain object (or returns null for\n * a tombstone / unreadable record); supplied by the caller so this module\n * stays free of Collection internals.\n */\nexport async function rebuildSubjectIndex(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  subjects: Readonly<Record<string, string>>,\n  decodeRecord: (collection: string, id: string, env: EncryptedEnvelope) => Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null>,\n): Promise<number> {\n  // Drop every existing index entry first so removed refs don't linger.\n  const existing = await adapter.list(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION)\n  for (const k of existing) {\n    await adapter.delete(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, k)\n  }\n\n  // subjectId → refs, accumulated across all declared collections.\n  const bySubject = new Map<string, SubjectRef[]>()\n  for (const [collection, field] of Object.entries(subjects)) {\n    const ids = await adapter.list(vault, collection)\n    for (const id of ids) {\n      if (id.startsWith('_')) continue\n      const env = await adapter.get(vault, collection, id)\n      if (!env || !env._data) continue // missing or tombstone\n      const record = await decodeRecord(collection, id, env)\n      if (record === null) continue\n      const subjectValue = readDottedPath(record, field)\n      if (subjectValue === undefined || subjectValue === null) continue\n      const subjectId = coerceSubjectId(subjectValue)\n      const list = bySubject.get(subjectId) ?? []\n      list.push({ collection, id })\n      bySubject.set(subjectId, list)\n    }\n  }\n\n  let entries = 0\n  for (const [subjectId, refs] of bySubject) {\n    const key = await primarySubjectKey(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId)\n    await writeRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key, refs)\n    entries++\n  }\n  return entries\n}\n\n/**\n * Coerce a read subject-field value to a stable string id. Primitives use\n * their natural string form; objects/arrays are JSON-stringified so structural\n * subjects still get a deterministic key (avoids the `[object Object]` trap).\n */\nexport function coerceSubjectId(value: unknown): string {\n  if (typeof value === 'string') return value\n  if (typeof value === 'number' || typeof value === 'boolean' || typeof value === 'bigint') {\n    return String(value)\n  }\n  return JSON.stringify(value)\n}\n\n/** Read a (possibly dotted) field path from a plain record. */\nexport function readDottedPath(record: Record<string, unknown>, field: string): unknown {\n  if (!field.includes('.')) return record[field]\n  let cursor: unknown = record\n  for (const segment of field.split('.')) {\n    if (cursor === null || cursor === undefined) return undefined\n    cursor = (cursor as Record<string, unknown>)[segment]\n  }\n  return cursor\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;AAiDO,IAAM,YAA4B,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE;;;ACVjD,IAAM,2BAA2B;AAOxC,IAAM,kBAAkB;AAWxB,eAAe,gBAAgB,OAAgC;AAC7D,SAAO,UAAU,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AAClD;AAWA,eAAe,YAAY,QAAgB,WAAoB,WAAsC;AACnG,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,gBAAgB,SAAS;AAC9C,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO,CAAC,MAAM;AAC9B,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,wBAAwB;AACjD,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AAC1E,SAAO,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,MAAM;AACpD;AAGA,eAAe,kBAAkB,QAAgB,WAAoB,WAAoC;AACvG,UAAQ,MAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG,CAAC;AAC5D;AAGA,SAAS,UAAU,MAA4B;AAC7C,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAC9B,SAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,OAAO;AACjD;AAGA,SAAS,cAAc,MAA4B;AACjD,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC;AAC9C,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,eAAe,IAAI,kBAAkB,KAAK;AAC9E,SAAO,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AACvD;AAGA,eAAe,SACb,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,KACuB;AACvB,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,0BAA0B,GAAG;AAClE,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,MAAO,QAAO,CAAC;AAChC,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO,UAAU,IAAI,KAAK;AAC1C,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,wBAAwB;AACjD,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK,GAAG;AAC5C,SAAO,UAAU,IAAI;AACvB;AAGA,eAAe,UACb,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,KACA,MACe;AACf,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW;AAEd,UAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,sBAAsB,IAAI,GAAG,MAAK,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,EACnH,OAAO;AACL,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,wBAAwB;AACjD,UAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,cAAc,IAAI,GAAG,GAAG;AAC3D,UAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,sBAAsB,IAAI,GAAG,MAAK,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,EACnG;AACA,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,0BAA0B,KAAK,GAAG;AAC7D;AAOA,eAAsB,cACpB,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,WACA,KACe;AACf,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,kBAAkB,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS;AAChE,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG;AAClE,MAAI,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,IAAI,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,EAAE,EAAG;AAC1E,OAAK,KAAK,GAAG;AACb,QAAM,UAAU,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI;AAC9D;AAOA,eAAsB,iBACpB,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,WACA,KACe;AAGf,aAAW,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG;AACjE,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG;AAClE,UAAM,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,eAAe,IAAI,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,GAAG;AACrF,QAAI,KAAK,WAAW,KAAK,OAAQ;AACjC,QAAI,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG;AACrB,YAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO,0BAA0B,GAAG;AAAA,IAC3D,OAAO;AACL,YAAM,UAAU,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,IAC9D;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAOA,eAAsB,cACpB,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,WACuB;AACvB,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS;AAC3D,QAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAAY;AAC7B,QAAM,MAAoB,CAAC;AAC3B,aAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AACtB,eAAW,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG,GAAG;AACxE,YAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,UAAU,KAAS,IAAI,EAAE;AAC9C,UAAI,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,EAAG;AACrB,WAAK,IAAI,KAAK;AACd,UAAI,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,IACd;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAaA,eAAsB,oBACpB,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,UACA,cACiB;AAEjB,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,wBAAwB;AACnE,aAAW,KAAK,UAAU;AACxB,UAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAAA,EACzD;AAGA,QAAM,YAAY,oBAAI,IAA0B;AAChD,aAAW,CAAC,YAAY,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC1D,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,UAAU;AAChD,eAAW,MAAM,KAAK;AACpB,UAAI,GAAG,WAAW,GAAG,EAAG;AACxB,YAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,YAAY,EAAE;AACnD,UAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,MAAO;AACxB,YAAM,SAAS,MAAM,aAAa,YAAY,IAAI,GAAG;AACrD,UAAI,WAAW,KAAM;AACrB,YAAM,eAAe,eAAe,QAAQ,KAAK;AACjD,UAAI,iBAAiB,UAAa,iBAAiB,KAAM;AACzD,YAAM,YAAY,gBAAgB,YAAY;AAC9C,YAAM,OAAO,UAAU,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC;AAC1C,WAAK,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,GAAG,CAAC;AAC5B,gBAAU,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,IAC/B;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,aAAW,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,KAAK,WAAW;AACzC,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,kBAAkB,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS;AAChE,UAAM,UAAU,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI;AAC5D;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAOO,SAAS,gBAAgB,OAAwB;AACtD,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,SAAU,QAAO;AACtC,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY,OAAO,UAAU,aAAa,OAAO,UAAU,UAAU;AACxF,WAAO,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,EACrB;AACA,SAAO,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK;AAC7B;AAGO,SAAS,eAAe,QAAiC,OAAwB;AACtF,MAAI,CAAC,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,EAAG,QAAO,OAAO,KAAK;AAC7C,MAAI,SAAkB;AACtB,aAAW,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG;AACtC,QAAI,WAAW,QAAQ,WAAW,OAAW,QAAO;AACpD,aAAU,OAAmC,OAAO;AAAA,EACtD;AACA,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-audit/forget/strategy.ts","../src/with-audit/forget/subject-index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `withForgetCascade` — declaration surface for GDPR right-to-erasure via\n * per-record CEK crypto-shred.\n *\n * This file holds only the *declaration* shape and the disabled sentinel.\n * The actual erasure machinery lives in:\n *   - `subject-index.ts` — the encrypted `_subject_index` reserved collection\n *   - `vault.ts` `forget()` — the per-record tombstone + ledger flow\n *   - `collection.ts` `_writeTombstone` — the envelope rewrite\n *\n * A `ForgetStrategy` declares which collections carry erasable subject data\n * and the (dotted-path) field on each record that names the data subject.\n * Declaring a collection here ALSO forces `perRecordKeys: true` for it (a\n * shred can only erase a record whose body is keyed off a per-record CEK),\n * so adopters opt into the CEK foundation transitively.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { LedgerEntry } from '../../with-commit/history/ledger/entry.js'\n\n/**\n * User-supplied declaration passed to {@link withForgetCascade}. Maps a\n * collection name to the record field (dotted path supported, e.g.\n * `'billing.buyerId'`) that identifies the data subject for erasure.\n *\n * ```ts\n * withForgetCascade({ subjects: { invoices: 'buyerId', contacts: 'id' } })\n * ```\n */\nexport interface SubjectDeclaration {\n  readonly subjects: Record<string, string>\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolved forget strategy threaded through Noydb → every Vault. Carries\n * the same `subjects` map the user declared. `NO_FORGET` (empty map) is the\n * off-by-default sentinel; `vault.forget()` throws\n * `ForgetStrategyNotConfiguredError` when the map is empty.\n */\nexport interface ForgetStrategy {\n  /** Collection → subject-field (dotted path). Empty under `NO_FORGET`. */\n  readonly subjects: Readonly<Record<string, string>>\n}\n\n/**\n * Disabled sentinel — no collections declare a subject field. `vault.forget()`\n * refuses with `ForgetStrategyNotConfiguredError`; no write hooks register; no\n * collection is forced into `perRecordKeys`. Non-adopters pay nothing.\n */\nexport const NO_FORGET: ForgetStrategy = { subjects: {} }\n\n// The `withForgetCascade` factory lives in `active.ts` (canonical\n// strategy.ts/active.ts/index.ts split); this file holds only the\n// declaration shape + disabled sentinel.\n\n/**\n * The outcome of a `vault.forget(subjectId)` call.\n *\n * `unmigratedRecords` lists `collection:id` pairs that were tombstoned but\n * whose body had NOT been migrated to a per-record CEK at shred time (legacy\n * body still under the shared collection DEK). Those records are tombstoned\n * (live envelope + history stripped) but their pre-shred ciphertext, if it\n * leaked into a backup before migration, remains decryptable under the\n * collection DEK — so erasure-completeness is NOT guaranteed for them. Run\n * the per-record-CEK migration pass, then re-forget, to close the gap.\n *\n * Blob attachments: a shredded record's **erasable** blobs (on a\n * `perRecordKeys` collection) are crypto-shredded inline — `blobsShredded`\n * counts those taken to refCount 0 (BlobObject deleted → chunks permanently\n * undecryptable), `blobsRetainedShared` counts those still referenced by\n * another record (shared content legitimately persists for its other owner).\n * `blobResidueCollections` now lists only collections with blobs that could\n * NOT be crypto-shredded: **legacy** blobs (no per-blob `_cek`, chunks under\n * the shared `_blob` DEK — migrate them), or a session without the blob\n * service loaded. An all-erasable subject yields an empty residue list.\n */\nexport interface ForgetResult {\n  /** The subject id passed to `forget()`. Echoed for caller convenience. */\n  readonly subject: string\n  /** Count of live records rewritten to a tombstone. */\n  readonly recordsShredded: number\n  /** Count of `_history` envelopes tombstoned across all shredded records. */\n  readonly historyVersionsShredded: number\n  /** Distinct collections that had at least one record shredded. */\n  readonly collections: readonly string[]\n  /** `collection:id` pairs shredded while still un-migrated (see type docs). */\n  readonly unmigratedRecords: readonly string[]\n  /** Count of erasable blobs crypto-shredded (refCount → 0, BlobObject deleted). */\n  readonly blobsShredded: number\n  /** Count of erasable blobs retained because still referenced elsewhere (shared). */\n  readonly blobsRetainedShared: number\n  /** Collections with blobs that could NOT be crypto-shredded — legacy (no `_cek`) or blobs disabled (see type docs). */\n  readonly blobResidueCollections: readonly string[]\n  /**\n   * Count of persisted `_idx/<field>/<recordId>` index side-cars hard-deleted\n   * across the shredded records. These live under the retained\n   * collection DEK, so crypto-shred alone would leave the indexed field VALUES\n   * readable — `forget()` must delete them.\n   */\n  readonly indexPostingsPurged: number\n  /**\n   * `collection:id:field` entries whose persisted `_idx` side-car could NOT be\n   * deleted — index residue that still leaks the indexed value under the\n   * retained collection DEK. Non-empty means erasure is INCOMPLETE: retry, or\n   * purge the side-car out of band.\n   */\n  readonly indexResidue: readonly string[]\n  /**\n   * Count of `_sealed[field]` slots dropped from the live store across the\n   * shredded records. For slots written under `sensitive` +\n   * `perRecordKeys` (the current path), the key derives off the per-record CEK,\n   * so tombstoning the record — which drops `_cek` and `_sealed` — also\n   * crypto-shreds the value. A legacy slot (written before per-record CEKs) keys\n   * off the collection DEK instead, so dropping it removes it from the live store but a\n   * pre-forget backup remains recoverable by a DEK holder (same caveat `_data`\n   * carries); migrate by re-`put`ting before forgetting for full crypto-shred.\n   */\n  readonly sealedFieldsShredded: number\n  /** Count of `_sealed_cek` host-delivery envelopes deleted (#H-1). A record sealed to an\n   * at-* host via sealRecordToHost persists its raw CEK there; forget() must destroy them. */\n  readonly sealedCekEnvelopesPurged: number\n  /** `collection:id` whose `_sealed_cek` purge failed (residue — the host-recoverable CEK may survive). */\n  readonly sealedCekResidue: readonly string[]\n  /** `collection:id:field` sealed slots that were DEK-derived (legacy, written before per-record CEKs) and thus NOT crypto-shredded\n   * by dropping `_cek` — the collection DEK is retained, so synced/backup copies stay decryptable (#M-1). */\n  readonly sealedResidue: readonly string[]\n  /** The single `op:'forget'` ledger entry appended for this erasure. */\n  readonly ledgerEntry: LedgerEntry\n}\n","/**\n * The encrypted subject index.\n *\n * GDPR crypto-shred needs to answer \"which records belong to data subject\n * X?\" portably (the index must travel with the vault/bundle) WITHOUT leaking\n * subject-equivalence to the store. The rejected alternative — an unencrypted\n * subject tag in envelope metadata — would let anyone with store access see\n * which records share a subject. Instead we keep a reserved `_subject_index`\n * collection, encrypted under its OWN DEK (`getDEK('_subject_index')`):\n *\n *   - record id  = `HMAC-SHA256(indexDEK, subjectId)` (M-2). A bare\n *     `sha256Hex(subjectId)` would be offline-computable: an attacker with\n *     store access and a candidate list (emails / customer ids are low-entropy)\n *     could dictionary the hash to confirm \"subject X is present here.\" Keying\n *     the id with the vault-only index DEK removes that capability — without the\n *     DEK the id cannot be derived. (Legacy entries written before M-2 used the\n *     bare sha256 id; the read/remove paths dual-look-up both forms.)\n *   - record body = AES-GCM(JSON `{ r: [{ collection, id }], p }`) under the\n *     index DEK, where `p` pads the plaintext to a bucketed length so the\n *     ciphertext `_data` length does not leak the approximate record count.\n *     Legacy bodies were a bare `[{ collection, id }]` array; reads accept both.\n *\n * ## Concurrency (RISK #3 — known v1 limitation)\n *\n * `addSubjectRef` / `removeSubjectRef` are read-modify-write with no CAS. The\n * design assumes a SINGLE WRITER (the noy-db single-process write model). Two\n * concurrent writers racing on the SAME subject can lose an entry (last-write\n * wins on the ref list). This is documented, not fixed in v1:\n * `rebuildSubjectIndex` performs a full scan to recover a correct index from\n * the canonical records, so a lost ref is recoverable. A CAS-backed index is\n * deferred to a later slice.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport { encrypt, openEnvelopeJson, hmacSha256Hex, sha256Hex, type EnclaveKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\n\n/** Reserved collection holding the encrypted subject → records index. */\nexport const SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION = '_subject_index'\n\n/**\n * Bucket (bytes) the encrypted ref-list plaintext is padded up to, so the\n * ciphertext `_data` length leaks only `count` rounded up to a bucket — not the\n * exact record count. 256 keeps small subjects (the common case) indistinguishable.\n */\nconst REF_LIST_BUCKET = 256\n\n/** A single record reference held in a subject's index entry. */\nexport interface SubjectRef {\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly id: string\n}\n\ntype GetDEK = (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n\n/** SHA-256 hex of a UTF-8 string. The LEGACY (pre-M-2) subject-index key. */\nasync function sha256HexString(input: string): Promise<string> {\n  return sha256Hex(new TextEncoder().encode(input))\n}\n\n/**\n * The subject-index record id(s) to consult for a subject, most-current first.\n *\n * - Encrypted vault: the PRIMARY id is `HMAC-SHA256(indexDEK, subjectId)` (M-2)\n *   — not offline-computable. The LEGACY `sha256Hex(subjectId)` id is also\n *   returned so reads/removes still find entries written before M-2 (dual-lookup).\n * - Plaintext/debug vault: no DEK to key with, so the only id is the legacy\n *   sha256 form (unchanged behaviour — plaintext mode is not zero-knowledge anyway).\n */\nasync function subjectKeys(getDEK: GetDEK, encrypted: boolean, subjectId: string): Promise<string[]> {\n  const legacy = await sha256HexString(subjectId)\n  if (!encrypted) return [legacy]\n  const dek = await getDEK(SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION)\n  const keyed = await hmacSha256Hex(dek, new TextEncoder().encode(subjectId))\n  return keyed === legacy ? [keyed] : [keyed, legacy]\n}\n\n/** The id new writes land under (keyed when encrypted, else legacy sha256). */\nasync function primarySubjectKey(getDEK: GetDEK, encrypted: boolean, subjectId: string): Promise<string> {\n  return (await subjectKeys(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId))[0]!\n}\n\n/** Parse a stored ref-list body: new padded `{ r, p }` wrapper OR legacy bare array. */\nfunction parseRefs(json: string): SubjectRef[] {\n  const parsed = JSON.parse(json) as SubjectRef[] | { r: SubjectRef[] }\n  return Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : parsed.r\n}\n\n/** Serialize + pad the ref list to a bucket boundary (encrypted vaults only). */\nfunction serializeRefs(refs: SubjectRef[]): string {\n  const base = JSON.stringify({ r: refs, p: '' })\n  const pad = Math.ceil(base.length / REF_LIST_BUCKET) * REF_LIST_BUCKET - base.length\n  return JSON.stringify({ r: refs, p: ' '.repeat(pad) })\n}\n\n/** Read + decrypt the ref list at a SINGLE index key. Returns `[]` when absent. */\nasync function readRefs(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  key: string,\n): Promise<SubjectRef[]> {\n  const env = await adapter.get(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, key)\n  if (!env || !env._data) return []\n  if (!encrypted) return parseRefs(env._data)\n  const dek = await getDEK(SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION)\n  const json = await openEnvelopeJson(env, dek)\n  return parseRefs(json)\n}\n\n/** Encrypt + write a ref list for a subject under its derived key. */\nasync function writeRefs(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  key: string,\n  refs: SubjectRef[],\n): Promise<void> {\n  let env: EncryptedEnvelope\n  if (!encrypted) {\n    // Plaintext/debug vault: keep the legacy bare-array form (no padding needed).\n    env = { _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION, _v: 1, _ts: new Date().toISOString(), _iv: '', _data: JSON.stringify(refs) }\n  } else {\n    const dek = await getDEK(SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION)\n    const { iv, data } = await encrypt(serializeRefs(refs), dek)\n    env = { _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION, _v: 1, _ts: new Date().toISOString(), _iv: iv, _data: data }\n  }\n  await adapter.put(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, key, env)\n}\n\n/**\n * Add a `{ collection, id }` ref to a subject's index entry (idempotent —\n * a duplicate ref is not appended). Read-modify-write; see the concurrency\n * note in the module docstring.\n */\nexport async function addSubjectRef(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  subjectId: string,\n  ref: SubjectRef,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const key = await primarySubjectKey(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId)\n  const refs = await readRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key)\n  if (refs.some((r) => r.collection === ref.collection && r.id === ref.id)) return\n  refs.push(ref)\n  await writeRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key, refs)\n}\n\n/**\n * Remove a `{ collection, id }` ref from a subject's index entry. When the\n * last ref is removed the (now empty) entry is deleted so the store holds no\n * residual key for an erased subject.\n */\nexport async function removeSubjectRef(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  subjectId: string,\n  ref: SubjectRef,\n): Promise<void> {\n  // Dual-lookup: drop the ref from BOTH the keyed (M-2) and the legacy sha256\n  // entry, so a pre-M-2 subject is still fully erased.\n  for (const key of await subjectKeys(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId)) {\n    const refs = await readRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key)\n    const next = refs.filter((r) => !(r.collection === ref.collection && r.id === ref.id))\n    if (next.length === refs.length) continue\n    if (next.length === 0) {\n      await adapter.delete(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, key)\n    } else {\n      await writeRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key, next)\n    }\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Look up every record ref for a subject. Returns `[]` when none exist. Unions\n * the keyed (M-2) and legacy sha256 entries (dual-lookup), deduplicated, so a\n * subject indexed before M-2 is still fully found.\n */\nexport async function lookupSubject(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  subjectId: string,\n): Promise<SubjectRef[]> {\n  const keys = await subjectKeys(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId)\n  const seen = new Set<string>()\n  const out: SubjectRef[] = []\n  for (const key of keys) {\n    for (const ref of await readRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key)) {\n      const dedup = `${ref.collection}\\u0000${ref.id}`\n      if (seen.has(dedup)) continue\n      seen.add(dedup)\n      out.push(ref)\n    }\n  }\n  return out\n}\n\n/**\n * Rebuild the entire subject index from the canonical records (the recovery\n * path for the documented read-modify-write race). Scans each declared\n * collection, reads `record[subjectField]` (dotted path), and rewrites the\n * index from scratch. Tombstoned (already-shredded) records contribute no\n * ref — their body is gone, so they cannot be re-indexed.\n *\n * `decodeRecord` decrypts an envelope to a plain object (or returns null for\n * a tombstone / unreadable record); supplied by the caller so this module\n * stays free of Collection internals.\n */\nexport async function rebuildSubjectIndex(\n  adapter: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetDEK,\n  encrypted: boolean,\n  subjects: Readonly<Record<string, string>>,\n  decodeRecord: (collection: string, id: string, env: EncryptedEnvelope) => Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null>,\n): Promise<number> {\n  // Drop every existing index entry first so removed refs don't linger.\n  const existing = await adapter.list(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION)\n  for (const k of existing) {\n    await adapter.delete(vault, SUBJECT_INDEX_COLLECTION, k)\n  }\n\n  // subjectId → refs, accumulated across all declared collections.\n  const bySubject = new Map<string, SubjectRef[]>()\n  for (const [collection, field] of Object.entries(subjects)) {\n    const ids = await adapter.list(vault, collection)\n    for (const id of ids) {\n      if (id.startsWith('_')) continue\n      const env = await adapter.get(vault, collection, id)\n      if (!env || !env._data) continue // missing or tombstone\n      const record = await decodeRecord(collection, id, env)\n      if (record === null) continue\n      const subjectValue = readDottedPath(record, field)\n      if (subjectValue === undefined || subjectValue === null) continue\n      const subjectId = coerceSubjectId(subjectValue)\n      const list = bySubject.get(subjectId) ?? []\n      list.push({ collection, id })\n      bySubject.set(subjectId, list)\n    }\n  }\n\n  let entries = 0\n  for (const [subjectId, refs] of bySubject) {\n    const key = await primarySubjectKey(getDEK, encrypted, subjectId)\n    await writeRefs(adapter, vault, getDEK, encrypted, key, refs)\n    entries++\n  }\n  return entries\n}\n\n/**\n * Coerce a read subject-field value to a stable string id. Primitives use\n * their natural string form; objects/arrays are JSON-stringified so structural\n * subjects still get a deterministic key (avoids the `[object Object]` trap).\n */\nexport function coerceSubjectId(value: unknown): string {\n  if (typeof value === 'string') return value\n  if (typeof value === 'number' || typeof value === 'boolean' || typeof value === 'bigint') {\n    return String(value)\n  }\n  return JSON.stringify(value)\n}\n\n/** Read a (possibly dotted) field path from a plain record. */\nexport function readDottedPath(record: Record<string, unknown>, field: string): unknown {\n  if (!field.includes('.')) return record[field]\n  let cursor: unknown = record\n  for (const segment of field.split('.')) {\n    if (cursor === null || cursor === undefined) return undefined\n    cursor = (cursor as Record<string, unknown>)[segment]\n  }\n  return cursor\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;AAiDO,IAAM,YAA4B,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE;;;ACVjD,IAAM,2BAA2B;AAOxC,IAAM,kBAAkB;AAWxB,eAAe,gBAAgB,OAAgC;AAC7D,SAAO,UAAU,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AAClD;AAWA,eAAe,YAAY,QAAgB,WAAoB,WAAsC;AACnG,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,gBAAgB,SAAS;AAC9C,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO,CAAC,MAAM;AAC9B,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,wBAAwB;AACjD,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,cAAc,KAAK,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AAC1E,SAAO,UAAU,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,MAAM;AACpD;AAGA,eAAe,kBAAkB,QAAgB,WAAoB,WAAoC;AACvG,UAAQ,MAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG,CAAC;AAC5D;AAGA,SAAS,UAAU,MAA4B;AAC7C,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAC9B,SAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,OAAO;AACjD;AAGA,SAAS,cAAc,MAA4B;AACjD,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC;AAC9C,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS,eAAe,IAAI,kBAAkB,KAAK;AAC9E,SAAO,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AACvD;AAGA,eAAe,SACb,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,KACuB;AACvB,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,0BAA0B,GAAG;AAClE,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,MAAO,QAAO,CAAC;AAChC,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO,UAAU,IAAI,KAAK;AAC1C,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,wBAAwB;AACjD,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,iBAAiB,KAAK,GAAG;AAC5C,SAAO,UAAU,IAAI;AACvB;AAGA,eAAe,UACb,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,KACA,MACe;AACf,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,CAAC,WAAW;AAEd,UAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,sBAAsB,IAAI,GAAG,MAAK,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI,EAAE;AAAA,EACnH,OAAO;AACL,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,wBAAwB;AACjD,UAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,cAAc,IAAI,GAAG,GAAG;AAC3D,UAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,sBAAsB,IAAI,GAAG,MAAK,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY,GAAG,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,EACnG;AACA,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,0BAA0B,KAAK,GAAG;AAC7D;AAOA,eAAsB,cACpB,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,WACA,KACe;AACf,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,kBAAkB,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS;AAChE,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG;AAClE,MAAI,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,IAAI,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,EAAE,EAAG;AAC1E,OAAK,KAAK,GAAG;AACb,QAAM,UAAU,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI;AAC9D;AAOA,eAAsB,iBACpB,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,WACA,KACe;AAGf,aAAW,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS,GAAG;AACjE,UAAM,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG;AAClE,UAAM,OAAO,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,eAAe,IAAI,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,GAAG;AACrF,QAAI,KAAK,WAAW,KAAK,OAAQ;AACjC,QAAI,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG;AACrB,YAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO,0BAA0B,GAAG;AAAA,IAC3D,OAAO;AACL,YAAM,UAAU,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,IAC9D;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAOA,eAAsB,cACpB,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,WACuB;AACvB,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS;AAC3D,QAAM,OAAO,oBAAI,IAAY;AAC7B,QAAM,MAAoB,CAAC;AAC3B,aAAW,OAAO,MAAM;AACtB,eAAW,OAAO,MAAM,SAAS,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,GAAG,GAAG;AACxE,YAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,UAAU,KAAS,IAAI,EAAE;AAC9C,UAAI,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,EAAG;AACrB,WAAK,IAAI,KAAK;AACd,UAAI,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,IACd;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAaA,eAAsB,oBACpB,SACA,OACA,QACA,WACA,UACA,cACiB;AAEjB,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,wBAAwB;AACnE,aAAW,KAAK,UAAU;AACxB,UAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,OAAO,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAAA,EACzD;AAGA,QAAM,YAAY,oBAAI,IAA0B;AAChD,aAAW,CAAC,YAAY,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC1D,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,UAAU;AAChD,eAAW,MAAM,KAAK;AACpB,UAAI,GAAG,WAAW,GAAG,EAAG;AACxB,YAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,YAAY,EAAE;AACnD,UAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,MAAO;AACxB,YAAM,SAAS,MAAM,aAAa,YAAY,IAAI,GAAG;AACrD,UAAI,WAAW,KAAM;AACrB,YAAM,eAAe,eAAe,QAAQ,KAAK;AACjD,UAAI,iBAAiB,UAAa,iBAAiB,KAAM;AACzD,YAAM,YAAY,gBAAgB,YAAY;AAC9C,YAAM,OAAO,UAAU,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,CAAC;AAC1C,WAAK,KAAK,EAAE,YAAY,GAAG,CAAC;AAC5B,gBAAU,IAAI,WAAW,IAAI;AAAA,IAC/B;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,aAAW,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,KAAK,WAAW;AACzC,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,kBAAkB,QAAQ,WAAW,SAAS;AAChE,UAAM,UAAU,SAAS,OAAO,QAAQ,WAAW,KAAK,IAAI;AAC5D;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAOO,SAAS,gBAAgB,OAAwB;AACtD,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,SAAU,QAAO;AACtC,MAAI,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY,OAAO,UAAU,aAAa,OAAO,UAAU,UAAU;AACxF,WAAO,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,EACrB;AACA,SAAO,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK;AAC7B;AAGO,SAAS,eAAe,QAAiC,OAAwB;AACtF,MAAI,CAAC,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,EAAG,QAAO,OAAO,KAAK;AAC7C,MAAI,SAAkB;AACtB,aAAW,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG;AACtC,QAAI,WAAW,QAAQ,WAAW,OAAW,QAAO;AACpD,aAAU,OAAmC,OAAO;AAAA,EACtD;AACA,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-6RASM2J4.js

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+import {
+  NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION
+} from "./chunk-OCDUQUAP.js";
+
+// src/kernel/enclave/record-keys/tombstone.ts
+function isTombstone(envelope, encrypted) {
+  if (!encrypted) return false;
+  return !envelope._data && envelope._cek === void 0;
+}
+function buildTombstone(version, actor) {
+  return {
+    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,
+    _v: version,
+    _ts: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
+    _iv: "",
+    _data: "",
+    ...actor ? { _by: actor } : {}
+  };
+}
+
+export {
+  isTombstone,
+  buildTombstone
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-6RASM2J4.js.map

package/dist/chunk-6RASM2J4.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/enclave/record-keys/tombstone.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Tombstone shape + predicate for the per-record-key (CEK) layer.\n *\n * A *tombstone* is the residue a GDPR crypto-shred (`vault.forget()`)\n * leaves on disk: the live envelope rewritten to `{ _noydb, _v, _ts, _by,\n * _iv:'', _data:'' }`, dropping `_iv`/`_data`/`_cek`/`_det`. With the wrapped\n * per-record CEK gone, the body — and every history version under the same\n * CEK — is permanently undecryptable, while the record KEY survives so the\n * version counter and \"record existed and was erased\" persist for the audit\n * ledger.\n *\n * These two helpers are the pure, collection-independent core of that\n * contract: {@link buildTombstone} mints the shape, {@link isTombstone}\n * recognises it on the read path. The orchestration that *writes* a tombstone\n * (`_writeTombstone`) and drives `vault.forget()` lives with the collection /\n * vault; it calls into these.\n */\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION, type EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../types.js'\n\n/**\n * Is this envelope a crypto-shred tombstone?\n *\n * A tombstone carries no body (`_data` empty) and no wrapped CEK (`_cek`\n * absent) — decrypting it would call `decrypt('', '', dek)` → an AES-GCM\n * throw, so every read choke point must short-circuit to `null` instead.\n *\n * `encrypted` is the collection's encryption flag: on an unencrypted\n * collection there are no envelopes to shred, so nothing is ever a tombstone.\n * (Legacy migration envelopes carry non-empty `_iv`/`_data`, so they are not\n * tombstones and stay readable.)\n */\nexport function isTombstone(envelope: EncryptedEnvelope, encrypted: boolean): boolean {\n  if (!encrypted) return false\n  return !envelope._data && envelope._cek === undefined\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a tombstone envelope from a record's live version + actor.\n *\n * Keeps `_v` (the displaced version) so the counter is monotonic across the\n * shred, stamps a fresh `_ts`, and records `_by` when an actor is supplied.\n * Deliberately omits `_iv`/`_data`/`_cek`/`_det` — that omission *is* the\n * erasure.\n */\nexport function buildTombstone(version: number, actor: string): EncryptedEnvelope {\n  return {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n    _v: version,\n    _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n    _iv: '',\n    _data: '',\n    ...(actor ? { _by: actor } : {}),\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AA+BO,SAAS,YAAY,UAA6B,WAA6B;AACpF,MAAI,CAAC,UAAW,QAAO;AACvB,SAAO,CAAC,SAAS,SAAS,SAAS,SAAS;AAC9C;AAUO,SAAS,eAAe,SAAiB,OAAkC;AAChF,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,IAAI;AAAA,IACJ,MAAK,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,IAC5B,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,OAAO;AAAA,IACP,GAAI,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EAChC;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-5LUY7UTV.js → chunk-7IP75FP2.js}

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import {
   LocaleNotSpecifiedError,
   MissingTranslationError,
   ScriptViolationError
-} from "./chunk-ZYUC53LT.js";
+} from "./chunk-BLZRNHMG.js";
 
 // src/with-shape/i18n/policy.ts
 function resolvePolicy(onMissing, layer) {
@@ -377,4 +377,4 @@ export {
   applyI18nLocale,
   stripI18nFilled
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-5LUY7UTV.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-7IP75FP2.js.map

package/dist/{chunk-HCIPRAGS.js → chunk-7MHVHGQZ.js}

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   writePod
-} from "./chunk-FISN7WE4.js";
+} from "./chunk-3UDPDRUC.js";
 
 // src/with-audit/portability/export-accessible.ts
 function resolveAccessibleCollections(keyring, scope, writableOnly = false) {
@@ -42,4 +42,4 @@ export {
   buildAccessibleBundle,
   exportAccessibleData
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-HCIPRAGS.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-7MHVHGQZ.js.map