@noy-db/hub 0.2.0-pre.9 → 0.3.0-pre.10

package/dist/chunk-UN4FVIBH.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-party/team/deed.ts","../src/with-party/custody/liberate.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * FR-6 — Deed: sealed / hidden-owner provisioning.\n *\n * A **Deed** is a vault owned by a *latent* principal who never\n * authenticates. The owner credential (the random passphrase that\n * derives `KEK_owner`) is minted machine-side and sealed under a\n * **non-firm** {@link SealingKeyProvider} — that sealing boundary is\n * the cryptographic *inalienability anchor*: whoever holds the\n * provider (the client / their KMS) is the only party that can ever\n * re-derive `KEK_owner`. A firm-side custodian operates the vault\n * fully but can never reach the owner key — there is deliberately NO\n * firm-controlled fallback.\n *\n * Provisioning reuses the managed-mode seam:\n *   - {@link resolveManagedSecret} mints + seals + persists the random\n *     passphrase at `_meta/sealed-passphrase` (and unseals it on every\n *     subsequent open through the same provider).\n *   - {@link createOwnerKeyring} derives `KEK_owner` from that\n *     passphrase and writes the `_keyring/<ownerUserId>` file.\n *\n * On top of that, a Deed writes a `_meta/deed` **marker**. The marker\n * is PLAINTEXT metadata — it records WHO the latent owner is and WHICH\n * sealing boundary protects them, so it must be readable without\n * unlocking the vault (a custodian or auditor inspecting the vault must\n * be able to see \"this is a Deed vault, owner = X, sealed under Y\"\n * without any key). The marker itself is therefore never sealed; only\n * the owner *credential* is.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { UnlockedKeyring } from './keyring.js'\nimport { createOwnerKeyring } from './keyring.js'\nimport type { SealingKeyProvider } from './managed-passphrase.js'\nimport { resolveManagedSecret } from './managed-passphrase.js'\n\n/** Reserved id for the Deed marker under `_meta`. */\nexport const DEED_RECORD_ID = 'deed' as const\n\n/**\n * Plaintext metadata recording a vault's latent-owner Deed. Persisted\n * at `_meta/deed`. Readable without unlocking the vault by design — it\n * carries no secret material, only the identity of the latent owner\n * and the sealing boundary that anchors inalienability.\n */\nexport interface DeedMarker {\n  /** The latent owner principal — the user id of the `_keyring/<id>` owner file. */\n  readonly ownerUserId: string\n  /**\n   * The `SealingKeyProvider.id` the owner credential is sealed under.\n   * The inalienability anchor: only the holder of this (non-firm)\n   * provider can re-derive `KEK_owner`. Audit metadata — never secret.\n   */\n  readonly sealedUnder: string\n  /** Always `true` for a Deed — the owner never authenticates interactively. */\n  readonly latent: true\n  /** ISO-8601 timestamp the Deed was issued. */\n  readonly issuedAt: string\n  /**\n   * ISO-8601 timestamp the vault was liberated (a new owner claimed it\n   * via the audited Liberate ceremony), if any. Absent until liberation.\n   */\n  readonly liberatedAt?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * Wire-format payload stored inside the `_meta/deed` envelope. Carries\n * a magic marker for forensics + the {@link DeedMarker} fields. JSON,\n * AES-GCM bypassed (the marker is plaintext metadata by design).\n */\ninterface DeedEnvelopePayload extends DeedMarker {\n  readonly _noydb_deed: 1\n}\n\n/**\n * Provision a Deed: a latent owner whose credential is sealed under\n * `sealing` (a NON-firm provider). Mints + seals the owner passphrase\n * via {@link resolveManagedSecret}, derives the owner keyring via\n * {@link createOwnerKeyring}, then writes the plaintext `_meta/deed`\n * marker. Returns the unlocked owner keyring.\n *\n * The returned keyring is the only in-memory window onto `KEK_owner`\n * for this call; the persistent re-entry point is the sealing provider\n * (re-run {@link resolveManagedSecret} with the same provider to\n * re-resolve the passphrase, then {@link createOwnerKeyring}/load to\n * unlock — no interactive passphrase is ever required).\n *\n * There is deliberately no firm-controlled fallback: the marker's\n * `sealedUnder` is the single cryptographic anchor of ownership.\n */\nexport async function createDeedOwner(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  ownerUserId: string,\n  sealing: SealingKeyProvider,\n): Promise<UnlockedKeyring> {\n  // 1. Mint + seal + persist the random owner passphrase under the\n  //    non-firm provider (writes _meta/sealed-passphrase).\n  const passphrase = await resolveManagedSecret(store, vault, sealing)\n\n  // 2. Derive KEK_owner from the (never-human-seen) passphrase and\n  //    write the owner keyring file.\n  const keyring = await createOwnerKeyring(store, vault, ownerUserId, passphrase)\n\n  // 3. Write the plaintext Deed marker. NOT sealed — it is audit\n  //    metadata that must be readable without unlocking.\n  await saveDeedMarker(store, vault, {\n    ownerUserId,\n    sealedUnder: sealing.id,\n    latent: true,\n    issuedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n  })\n\n  return keyring\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the {@link DeedMarker} from `_meta/deed`, or `null` if the vault\n * has no Deed marker (i.e. it is not a Deed vault). Plaintext read — no\n * unlocking required.\n */\nexport async function loadDeedMarker(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<DeedMarker | null> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, '_meta', DEED_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!envelope) return null\n  let payload: unknown\n  try {\n    payload = JSON.parse(envelope._data)\n  } catch {\n    return null\n  }\n  if (typeof payload !== 'object' || payload === null) return null\n  const r = payload as Record<string, unknown>\n  if (r._noydb_deed !== 1) return null\n  if (\n    typeof r.ownerUserId !== 'string'\n    || typeof r.sealedUnder !== 'string'\n    || r.latent !== true\n    || typeof r.issuedAt !== 'string'\n  ) {\n    return null\n  }\n  const marker: DeedMarker = {\n    ownerUserId: r.ownerUserId,\n    sealedUnder: r.sealedUnder,\n    latent: true,\n    issuedAt: r.issuedAt,\n    ...(typeof r.liberatedAt === 'string' ? { liberatedAt: r.liberatedAt } : {}),\n  }\n  return marker\n}\n\n/** Whether `vault` carries a Deed marker (a sealed/latent owner). */\nexport async function isDeedVault(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  return (await loadDeedMarker(store, vault)) !== null\n}\n\n/**\n * Persist a {@link DeedMarker} at `_meta/deed`. Mirrors\n * `saveSealedPassphrase`'s envelope shape: a standard\n * {@link EncryptedEnvelope} with AES-GCM bypassed (`_iv: ''`), the\n * payload stored as plaintext JSON in `_data`. The marker is metadata,\n * not a secret — sealing it would defeat its purpose (auditors /\n * custodians must read it without a key).\n *\n * @internal — used by `createDeedOwner` and (later) the Liberate\n * ceremony to stamp `liberatedAt`.\n */\nexport async function saveDeedMarker(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  marker: DeedMarker,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const persisted: DeedEnvelopePayload = { _noydb_deed: 1, ...marker }\n  const prior = await store.get(vault, '_meta', DEED_RECORD_ID)\n  const env: EncryptedEnvelope = {\n    _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n    _v: (prior?._v ?? 0) + 1,\n    _ts: new Date().toISOString(),\n    // AES-GCM bypassed — the marker is plaintext audit metadata.\n    _iv: '',\n    _data: JSON.stringify(persisted),\n  }\n  await store.put(vault, '_meta', DEED_RECORD_ID, env)\n}\n","/**\n * `liberateVault` — the audited claim of ownership over a\n * sealed-owner (Deed) vault. The inverse of withdrawal.\n *\n * A **Deed** vault's owner credential is sealed under a non-firm provider, so\n * the firm-side **custodian** (which holds every collection DEK and operates\n * the vault fully) can never reach `KEK_owner`. Liberation is the ONLY route\n * by which a custodian assumes ownership, and it is deliberately a manual,\n * audited ceremony:\n *\n *   1. gate `'liberate-vault'` (fail-closed)\n *   2. caller MUST be the `custodian` (the de-facto authority holding the DEKs)\n *   3. freeze a PRE-liberation EVIDENCE snapshot (hash-pinned in the ledger) —\n *      but PRESERVE the live data for the new owner (see the freeze decision\n *      below)\n *   4. mint a NEW owner keyring re-wrapping the incumbent DEKs under the new\n *      owner's KEK\n *   5. lifecycle ledger `liberation-claimed:<newOwnerId>:<legalBasis>`\n *   6. stamp the `_meta/deed` marker with `liberatedAt`\n *\n * ## Security: the inalienability floor\n *\n * Liberation **mints a new owner from the custodian's DEKs** — it does NOT\n * unseal the original sealed owner. The old sealed-owner credential is left\n * untouched and ORPHANED (its `_keyring/<id>` file remains, its KEK is still\n * sealed under the non-firm provider), never impersonated. The new owner is a\n * DISTINCT principal under a fresh KEK derived from `newOwnerPassphrase`. This\n * preserves the inalienability floor: the act of claiming ownership is itself\n * auditable and produces a different principal, rather than silently assuming\n * the latent owner's identity.\n *\n * ## Freeze decision: snapshot-only, not freeze-and-delete\n *\n * `freezeAndDeleteClosure` (withdraw-accessible.ts) writes a hash-pinned\n * snapshot and THEN delete-closures the live records — correct for a\n * destructive withdrawal, WRONG for liberation. Liberation transfers\n * operational continuity; it must leave the live data intact for the new\n * owner. We therefore call the snapshot-only core `freezeSnapshotOnly`\n * (factored out of that module; the freeze-AND-delete withdrawal path is\n * unchanged) to pin the evidence snapshot while preserving the records.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { Vault } from '../../kernel/vault.js'\nimport type { FactorProofBundle, KeyringFile } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { PermissionDeniedError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\nimport { wrapKey } from '../../kernel/enclave/index.js'\nimport { createOwnerKeyring } from '../team/keyring.js'\nimport type { FrozenSnapshotRef } from '../../with-audit/portability/withdraw-accessible.js'\nimport { freezeSnapshotOnly } from '../../with-audit/portability/withdraw-accessible.js'\nimport { loadDeedMarker, saveDeedMarker } from '../team/deed.js'\n\nexport interface LiberateOptions {\n  /** The id of the new owner principal the custodian mints by claiming ownership. */\n  readonly newOwnerId: string\n  /** The passphrase that derives the new owner's KEK (the DEKs are re-wrapped under it). */\n  readonly newOwnerPassphrase: string\n  /** Legal/contractual basis recorded in the audit (e.g. 'contractual-handover'). */\n  readonly legalBasis: string\n  readonly factors?: FactorProofBundle\n}\n\nexport interface LiberateResult {\n  /** The hash-pinned pre-liberation evidence snapshot. */\n  readonly snapshot: FrozenSnapshotRef\n}\n\n/**\n * Audited claim of ownership over a sealed-owner vault by its custodian. See\n * the module doc for the full ceremony + security rationale.\n */\nexport async function liberateVault(\n  vault: Vault,\n  opts: LiberateOptions,\n): Promise<LiberateResult> {\n  // 1. gate — fail-closed `liberate-vault`.\n  await vault.noydb.checkGate(vault.name, 'liberate-vault', opts.factors)\n\n  // 2. caller must be the custodian (the de-facto authority holding the DEKs).\n  const { name: vaultName, adapter, keyring } = vault._introspectState()\n  if (keyring.role !== 'custodian') {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      'liberation is claimed only by the custodian (the de-facto authority holding the DEKs)',\n    )\n  }\n\n  // Refuse to clobber an existing principal: the new owner must be a FRESH id.\n  // (Checked before any side effect so a colliding id never leaves a half-run\n  //  ceremony — no orphan snapshot, no partial keyring overwrite.)\n  const existing = await adapter.get(vaultName, '_keyring', opts.newOwnerId)\n  if (existing) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `liberateVault: newOwnerId \"${opts.newOwnerId}\" already exists as a principal; choose a fresh id (liberation mints a distinct owner, it never overwrites an existing keyring)`,\n    )\n  }\n\n  // 3. Pre-liberation EVIDENCE snapshot of every operational collection —\n  //    snapshot-only (live data preserved for the new owner; liberation\n  //    transfers operational continuity, it does not erase).\n  const collections = await listOperationalCollections(vault)\n  const snapshot = await freezeSnapshotOnly(vault, collections, { actorUserId: keyring.userId })\n\n  // 4. Mint a NEW owner keyring, re-wrapping the incumbent DEKs under the new\n  //    owner's fresh KEK. The old sealed owner is NOT unsealed — a DISTINCT\n  //    principal is minted and the original owner credential is left orphaned\n  //    (inalienability floor). Mirrors adopt-partition.ts's DEK re-wrap.\n  const newOwner = await createOwnerKeyring(adapter, vaultName, opts.newOwnerId, opts.newOwnerPassphrase)\n  if (!newOwner.kek) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(\n      `new owner keyring for \"${opts.newOwnerId}\" has no KEK to re-wrap the incumbent DEKs under`,\n    )\n  }\n  const env = await adapter.get(vaultName, '_keyring', opts.newOwnerId)\n  if (!env) {\n    throw new PermissionDeniedError(`new owner keyring for \"${opts.newOwnerId}\" did not persist`)\n  }\n  const keyringFile = JSON.parse(env._data) as KeyringFile\n  const mergedDeks: Record<string, string> = { ...keyringFile.deks }\n  for (const [collection, dek] of keyring.deks) {\n    mergedDeks[collection] = await wrapKey(dek, newOwner.kek)\n  }\n  const mergedFile: KeyringFile = { ...keyringFile, deks: mergedDeks }\n  await adapter.put(vaultName, '_keyring', opts.newOwnerId, { ...env, _data: JSON.stringify(mergedFile) })\n\n  // 5. Lifecycle ledger audit (no-op if the history strategy is absent).\n  await vault._getLedgerOrNull()?.append({\n    op: 'lifecycle', collection: '', id: '', version: 0, actor: opts.newOwnerId, payloadHash: '',\n    reason: `liberation-claimed:${opts.newOwnerId}:${opts.legalBasis}`,\n  })\n\n  // 6. Stamp the Deed marker with `liberatedAt` (if a marker exists).\n  const marker = await loadDeedMarker(adapter, vaultName)\n  if (marker) {\n    await saveDeedMarker(adapter, vaultName, { ...marker, liberatedAt: new Date().toISOString() })\n  }\n\n  return { snapshot }\n}\n\n/**\n * Enumerate the vault's operational (user-facing) collections — those carried\n * by the caller's keyring DEK map, minus the reserved internal collections\n * (`_*`). These are the collections frozen into the evidence snapshot.\n */\nasync function listOperationalCollections(vault: Vault): Promise<readonly string[]> {\n  const { keyring } = vault._introspectState()\n  return [...keyring.deks.keys()].filter((c) => !c.startsWith('_'))\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAuCO,IAAM,iBAAiB;AAqD9B,eAAsB,gBACpB,OACA,OACA,aACA,SAC0B;AAG1B,QAAM,aAAa,MAAM,qBAAqB,OAAO,OAAO,OAAO;AAInE,QAAM,UAAU,MAAM,mBAAmB,OAAO,OAAO,aAAa,UAAU;AAI9E,QAAM,eAAe,OAAO,OAAO;AAAA,IACjC;AAAA,IACA,aAAa,QAAQ;AAAA,IACrB,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,WAAU,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,EACnC,CAAC;AAED,SAAO;AACT;AAOA,eAAsB,eACpB,OACA,OAC4B;AAC5B,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,cAAc;AAC/D,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI;AACF,cAAU,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,KAAK;AAAA,EACrC,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,YAAY,YAAY,YAAY,KAAM,QAAO;AAC5D,QAAM,IAAI;AACV,MAAI,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAG,QAAO;AAChC,MACE,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,YACtB,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,YACzB,EAAE,WAAW,QACb,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,UACzB;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACA,QAAM,SAAqB;AAAA,IACzB,aAAa,EAAE;AAAA,IACf,aAAa,EAAE;AAAA,IACf,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,UAAU,EAAE;AAAA,IACZ,GAAI,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB,WAAW,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,YAAY,IAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EAC5E;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGA,eAAsB,YACpB,OACA,OACkB;AAClB,SAAQ,MAAM,eAAe,OAAO,KAAK,MAAO;AAClD;AAaA,eAAsB,eACpB,OACA,OACA,QACe;AACf,QAAM,YAAiC,EAAE,aAAa,GAAG,GAAG,OAAO;AACnE,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,cAAc;AAC5D,QAAM,MAAyB;AAAA,IAC7B,QAAQ;AAAA,IACR,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,IACvB,MAAK,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA;AAAA,IAE5B,KAAK;AAAA,IACL,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,SAAS;AAAA,EACjC;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,SAAS,gBAAgB,GAAG;AACrD;;;ACvHA,eAAsB,cACpB,OACA,MACyB;AAEzB,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,MAAM,MAAM,kBAAkB,KAAK,OAAO;AAGtE,QAAM,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,iBAAiB;AACrE,MAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,aAAa;AAChC,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW,YAAY,KAAK,UAAU;AACzE,MAAI,UAAU;AACZ,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,8BAA8B,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,IAC/C;AAAA,EACF;AAKA,QAAM,cAAc,MAAM,2BAA2B,KAAK;AAC1D,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,mBAAmB,OAAO,aAAa,EAAE,aAAa,QAAQ,OAAO,CAAC;AAM7F,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,mBAAmB,SAAS,WAAW,KAAK,YAAY,KAAK,kBAAkB;AACtG,MAAI,CAAC,SAAS,KAAK;AACjB,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,0BAA0B,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,IAC3C;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW,YAAY,KAAK,UAAU;AACpE,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK;AACR,UAAM,IAAI,sBAAsB,0BAA0B,KAAK,UAAU,mBAAmB;AAAA,EAC9F;AACA,QAAM,cAAc,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK;AACxC,QAAM,aAAqC,EAAE,GAAG,YAAY,KAAK;AACjE,aAAW,CAAC,YAAY,GAAG,KAAK,QAAQ,MAAM;AAC5C,eAAW,UAAU,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,SAAS,GAAG;AAAA,EAC1D;AACA,QAAM,aAA0B,EAAE,GAAG,aAAa,MAAM,WAAW;AACnE,QAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,WAAW,YAAY,KAAK,YAAY,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;AAGvG,QAAM,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,OAAO;AAAA,IACrC,IAAI;AAAA,IAAa,YAAY;AAAA,IAAI,IAAI;AAAA,IAAI,SAAS;AAAA,IAAG,OAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IAAY,aAAa;AAAA,IAC1F,QAAQ,sBAAsB,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI,KAAK,UAAU;AAAA,EAClE,CAAC;AAGD,QAAM,SAAS,MAAM,eAAe,SAAS,SAAS;AACtD,MAAI,QAAQ;AACV,UAAM,eAAe,SAAS,WAAW,EAAE,GAAG,QAAQ,cAAa,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,EAC/F;AAEA,SAAO,EAAE,SAAS;AACpB;AAOA,eAAe,2BAA2B,OAA0C;AAClF,QAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,iBAAiB;AAC3C,SAAO,CAAC,GAAG,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,WAAW,GAAG,CAAC;AAClE;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-VEAVKDDB.js

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+import {
+  NoydbError
+} from "./chunk-S7VFUQM2.js";
+
+// src/kernel/via/index.ts
+var binders = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+function installViaBinder(brand, binder) {
+  if (!binders.has(brand)) binders.set(brand, binder);
+}
+function isViaInstalled(brand) {
+  return binders.has(brand);
+}
+function viaBinder(brand) {
+  const b = binders.get(brand);
+  if (!b) {
+    throw new NoydbError(
+      "VIA_NOT_LINKED",
+      `via feature "${brand}" requires descriptors created via its declaration factory from @noy-db/hub`
+    );
+  }
+  return b;
+}
+
+export {
+  installViaBinder,
+  isViaInstalled,
+  viaBinder
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VEAVKDDB.js.map

package/dist/chunk-VEAVKDDB.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/via/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["// kernel/via/index.ts — the ONLY kernel-resident via surface.\nimport { NoydbError } from '../errors.js'\nimport type { EncryptedEnvelope } from '../types.js'\n\n/** Awaitable type for potentially async results. */\ntype Awaitable<T> = T | Promise<T>\n\n/** Declared security posture — a property the kernel enforces (enforcement activates in phases B/C). */\nexport interface ViaPosture {\n  readonly encryptedAtRest: 'envelope' | 'sealed'\n  readonly queryable: 'none' | 'det-exact' | 'ordered' | 'full'\n  readonly exportable: boolean\n  readonly forgettable: boolean\n}\n\n/** Opaque marker every feature descriptor extends; the kernel never sees concrete descriptor types. */\nexport interface ViaDescriptor { readonly _viaBrand: string }\n\n/** Per-call write context (A: minimal; B/C extend). */\nexport interface ViaWriteCtx {\n  readonly id: string\n  /** Owning vault name (event payload identity — e.g. i18n:script-violation). */\n  readonly vault: string\n  /** Prior stored record (decoded), lazily resolved. Null when creating. */\n  readonly prior: () => Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null>\n  /** Typed event emission (e.g. i18n:script-violation). */\n  readonly emit: (event: string, payload: unknown) => void\n}\n\n/** Per-call read context — mirrors LocaleReadOptions loosely; features narrow. */\nexport interface ViaReadCtx {\n  readonly locale?: unknown\n  readonly fallback?: unknown\n  readonly layer: string\n}\n\n/** One sealed slot's ciphertext — matches the existing `iv:data` sealed map entries (seam map §2 step 2). */\nexport interface SealedSlotRef { readonly iv: string; readonly data: string }\n\n/**\n * A scoped crypto capability handed to a `via` feature's `encodeAtRest`/\n * `decodeAtRest`/`erase` hooks — never the keyring, never the enclave.\n * `sealedSlots` is pre-bound to one `(collection, recordId)`; `reservedEnvelopes`\n * is a whole-envelope encrypt/decrypt door scoped to collection names under a\n * declared prefix (e.g. `_dict_`).\n */\nexport interface ViaCryptoCtx {\n  readonly sealedSlots: {\n    seal(field: string, plaintext: unknown): Promise<SealedSlotRef>\n    unseal(field: string, ref: SealedSlotRef): Promise<unknown>\n    delete(field: string): Promise<void>\n  }\n  reservedEnvelopes(prefix: string): {\n    encrypt(collection: string, json: string, v: number): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope>\n    decrypt(collection: string, env: EncryptedEnvelope): Promise<string>\n  }\n}\n\n/** Per-call erase context — `forget()`'s per-ref participation door (phase C). */\nexport interface ViaEraseCtx { readonly id: string; readonly vault: string; readonly live: unknown /* EncryptedEnvelope */; readonly crypto: ViaCryptoCtx }\n/**\n * What an `erase` hook reports back to `forget()`'s summary ledger entry.\n * `retainedShared` is additive (#629 Task 10) — content NOT erased because\n * still referenced by another live record (blob's shared-chunk dual\n * accounting, `shredAllForRecord()`'s `retainedShared` count). Absent/0 for\n * bindings with no such concept (a sealed field is never \"shared\").\n */\nexport interface ViaEraseReport { readonly shredded: number; readonly residue: readonly unknown[]; readonly retainedShared?: number }\n\n/**\n * A feature bound to one collection's declared config. Record-grain hooks —\n * every hook receives the whole record (matches the real engine signatures,\n * e.g. quantizeMoneyFields(record, moneyFields)). All hooks optional;\n * absent = passthrough. Query-participation hooks are SYNC (#553).\n */\nexport interface ViaBinding {\n  readonly brand: string\n  readonly posture: ViaPosture\n  /** Declared dependencies (field paths / cross-record specs). MANDATORY for any future\n   *  derive-bearing binding — phase C validates well-formedness (strings, non-empty,\n   *  reference declared fields) and graph-registers a derived edge for each covered\n   *  field at declare time, right after `compileViaBindings` builds the bindings\n   *  (unknown source field throws `ValidationError`). See\n   *  `kernel/collection-config.ts`'s `resolveViaBindingDepsEdges`. */\n  readonly deps?: readonly string[]\n  /** Collection-name prefixes this binding's `reservedEnvelopes` capability may address (e.g. `_dict_`). */\n  readonly reservedPrefixes?: readonly string[]\n  /**\n   * Does this binding own `field`? Backs `ViaPipeline.postureFor` (#629 Task\n   * 8's posture consumer) — a passive coverage check, independent of\n   * `buildClause`/`compareForOrder` (which some bindings, e.g. classified and\n   * blob, never define). SYNC, no side effects.\n   *\n   * Contract (documentation only — not enforced at runtime, future work):\n   * any binding declaring a non-default posture value — `queryable: 'none'`\n   * (#629 Task 8) or `exportable: false` (#629 Task 9's `redactForExport`)\n   * — MUST implement `covers()`. `postureFor`'s consumers only engage for\n   * fields a binding actively claims via `covers()`; a binding that omits\n   * it would silently fall through to the generic (unrefused/unredacted)\n   * path instead.\n   */\n  covers?(field: string): boolean\n  // NOTE: phase C adds a `derive` hook ADDITIVELY — do not stub it now.\n  // ── write pipeline ──\n  /** Refuse a write before crypto runs (classified step-3 slot: storage:'never' rejection + validators). Throws to refuse. */\n  enforceWrite?(record: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: ViaWriteCtx): void | Promise<void>\n  /** First pipeline stage (money canonicalizeIncomingMoney). SYNC. */\n  ingest?(record: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown>\n  /** Decode STORED form to canonical for internal boundaries (gates, derivations, patch bases). SYNC. */\n  canonicalizeStored?(record: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown>\n  /** Post-validation write encoding (money quantize; i18n translate→script→validate→densify). May be async. */\n  encodeWrite?(record: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: ViaWriteCtx): Awaitable<Record<string, unknown>>\n  /** Final write-pipeline stage: seal/encrypt declared fields via `crypto` before the envelope body is built (classified step-2 slot). */\n  encodeAtRest?(record: Record<string, unknown>, crypto: ViaCryptoCtx): Promise<{ record: Record<string, unknown>; sealed?: Record<string, SealedSlotRef> }>\n  // ── read pipeline ──\n  /** First read-pipeline stage: unseal/decrypt declared fields via `crypto` before `present` runs (classified sealed-handle slot). */\n  decodeAtRest?(record: Record<string, unknown>, sealed: Record<string, SealedSlotRef>, crypto: ViaCryptoCtx, opts: { asHandles: boolean }): Promise<Record<string, unknown>>\n  /** Read-time presentation (money decode+virtuals; i18n locale/labels/strip). May be async. */\n  present?(record: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: ViaReadCtx): Awaitable<Record<string, unknown>>\n  /**\n   * Late read-time presentation (#669) — runs AFTER every binding's `present()` in the\n   * money+computed present-order segment (`ViaPipeline`'s `_presentOrder`, `kernel/via/\n   * pipeline.ts`), BEFORE the \"everything else\" segment (i18n/lookup dressing, taint\n   * redaction) runs. Exists for a binding that needs to react to a virtual computed\n   * field's fresh OWN-field output before anything dresses it (money's MAJOR-UNITS\n   * quantize-and-present for a field that is BOTH money AND `mode:'virtual'` computed) —\n   * `present()` alone can't express \"run after computed for THESE fields only, before\n   * computed for all others\", since it's a per-BINDING fold, not per-field. Folded over\n   * `bindings` in declaration order (mirrors every other per-binding fold), so lookup/\n   * i18n dressing and taint/redaction (both in the \"everything else\" segment) still see\n   * the already-dressed value.\n   */\n  presentLate?(record: Record<string, unknown>, ctx: ViaReadCtx): Awaitable<Record<string, unknown>>\n  // ── query participation (ALL SYNC — #553) ──\n  /** Returns an opaque clause payload when this binding covers `field`, else undefined. */\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-redundant-type-constituents\n  buildClause?(field: string, op: string, value: unknown): unknown | undefined\n  /** Evaluate a payload produced by buildClause against a raw stored value. */\n  evaluateClause?(actual: unknown, op: string, payload: unknown): boolean\n  /**\n   * Optional: the STORED-form operand for a direct secondary-index probe\n   * against a payload produced by `buildClause` (#625) — lets\n   * `candidateRecords()` (`query/builder.ts`) hit `CollectionIndexes.\n   * lookupEqual`/`lookupIn` for `==`/`in` clauses instead of falling back\n   * to a linear scan + per-record `evaluateClause`. Returning `undefined`\n   * means \"no sound probe for this op/payload\" (e.g. a comparison whose\n   * stored form isn't a single index-bucketable value, or an op the index\n   * can't serve) — the caller falls back to the scan. A binding that\n   * never implements this hook always falls back, unchanged from before\n   * this hook existed.\n   */\n  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-redundant-type-constituents\n  indexProbe?(op: string, payload: unknown): unknown | undefined\n  /**\n   * Optional: canonicalize a raw STORED field value into the bucket key an\n   * eager index should use (#672) — lets `CollectionIndexes` group a\n   * pre-declaration / non-canonical stored value (e.g. a money field's\n   * leftover `'0100'` written before its `money()` declaration) under the\n   * SAME key a canonical write produces (`'100'`), so the index-probe fast\n   * path (`indexProbe` above) and the fallback scan (`evaluateClause`)\n   * agree on which records match. `undefined` means \"not mine / can't\n   * canonicalize this value\" — the caller buckets the raw stringified\n   * value, unchanged from before this hook existed. MUST agree with what\n   * this binding's own `evaluateClause`/`indexProbe` treat as equal, or\n   * the fast path and the scan will disagree.\n   */\n  canonicalizeIndexKey?(field: string, rawValue: unknown): string | undefined\n  /** Decode a raw stored record for query/scan results and callback views ('raw' — no virtuals). */\n  decodeResults?(record: unknown): unknown\n  /** Exact ordering for a covered field; undefined when the field is not covered. */\n  compareForOrder?(field: string, a: unknown, b: unknown): number | undefined\n  /**\n   * Per-key, PER-CALL-locale label resolution for `orderBy(field, dir,\n   * { by: 'label' })` (#650 Task 7) — the sibling `compareForOrder` above\n   * structurally cannot serve, since it carries no locale parameter.\n   * `locale` is the query's per-call locale (`undefined` for a locale-less\n   * query — a binding may fall back to its own descriptor-level default,\n   * mirroring `present`'s displayLocale hinge). `undefined` return = this\n   * binding doesn't resolve a label for `key` at `field` — caller falls\n   * back to the raw stored value, same graceful-degrade discipline every\n   * other via query hook uses. SYNC (#553 — query participation).\n   */\n  resolveOrderLabel?(field: string, key: string, locale: string | undefined): string | undefined\n  /** Rewrite an aggregate spec (money exact reducers). */\n  wrapReducers?(spec: unknown): unknown\n  // ── forget participation ──\n  /** `forget()`'s per-ref erasure door — shred/report this binding's residue for one record (classified/blob forget participation). */\n  erase?(ctx: ViaEraseCtx): Promise<ViaEraseReport>\n  // ── introspection ──\n  describeFragment?(): Record<string, unknown>\n}\n\n/** Binder: constructs a binding from a collection's declared config. Installed by the feature's declaration factory. */\nexport type ViaBinder = (config: unknown) => ViaBinding\n\nconst binders = new Map<string, ViaBinder>()\n\n/** @internal — called (idempotently, first-wins) by a feature's declaration factory, e.g. money(). */\nexport function installViaBinder(brand: string, binder: ViaBinder): void {\n  if (!binders.has(brand)) binders.set(brand, binder)\n}\n\n/** @internal — registry presence check. Used by tests (mirrors isMoneyEngineInstalled) and by vault's i18n validator delegators as a no-i18n-ever-declared fast path. */\nexport function isViaInstalled(brand: string): boolean {\n  return binders.has(brand)\n}\n\n/** @internal — resolve a binder; throws when the declaration factory never ran (hand-rolled descriptors). */\nexport function viaBinder(brand: string): ViaBinder {\n  const b = binders.get(brand)\n  if (!b) {\n    throw new NoydbError(\n      'VIA_NOT_LINKED',\n      `via feature \"${brand}\" requires descriptors created via its declaration factory from @noy-db/hub`,\n    )\n  }\n  return b\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAmMA,IAAM,UAAU,oBAAI,IAAuB;AAGpC,SAAS,iBAAiB,OAAe,QAAyB;AACvE,MAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,EAAG,SAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,MAAM;AACpD;AAGO,SAAS,eAAe,OAAwB;AACrD,SAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK;AAC1B;AAGO,SAAS,UAAU,OAA0B;AAClD,QAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK;AAC3B,MAAI,CAAC,GAAG;AACN,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,MACA,gBAAgB,KAAK;AAAA,IACvB;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-VEPTFUJY.js

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+import {
+  decrypt,
+  deriveSealedFieldKey,
+  deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek
+} from "./chunk-3OPY6MK2.js";
+
+// src/kernel/enclave/record-keys/sealed-slot.ts
+function parseSealedSlot(blob) {
+  const sep = blob.indexOf(":");
+  return { iv: blob.slice(0, sep), data: blob.slice(sep + 1) };
+}
+async function dualReadSealedSlot(blob, field, collection, cek, dek) {
+  const { iv, data } = parseSealedSlot(blob);
+  if (cek !== void 0) {
+    try {
+      const fieldKey2 = await deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek(cek, collection, field);
+      return await decrypt(iv, data, fieldKey2);
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
+  const fieldKey = await deriveSealedFieldKey(dek, collection, field);
+  return decrypt(iv, data, fieldKey);
+}
+
+export {
+  parseSealedSlot,
+  dualReadSealedSlot
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-VEPTFUJY.js.map

package/dist/chunk-VEPTFUJY.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/kernel/enclave/record-keys/sealed-slot.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Sealed-slot (`iv:data`) parsing + the CEK/DEK dual-read, factored out so the\n * three callers that decrypt a `_sealed[field]` slot share ONE implementation\n * with no coupling between them:\n *\n *   - {@link RecordCodec.unsealField} / `classifySealedShred` (read + classify),\n *   - `record-keys/sealing.ts:rotateRecordCek` (re-seal under a new CEK).\n *\n * These are pure helpers over an explicit `(cek, dek)` pair — NOT a context\n * object — so `sealing.ts` (which holds only the DEK) can import them without\n * pulling in the whole codec, avoiding a codec↔sealing dependency cycle.\n */\nimport { decrypt, deriveSealedFieldKey, deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek } from '../crypto.js'\n\n/** Parse an `iv:data` sealed slot (split on the FIRST `:`). */\nexport function parseSealedSlot(blob: string): { iv: string; data: string } {\n  const sep = blob.indexOf(':')\n  return { iv: blob.slice(0, sep), data: blob.slice(sep + 1) }\n}\n\n/**\n * Dual-read: decrypt a sealed slot trying the CEK-derived field key first,\n * falling back to the collection-DEK field key. Legacy records\n * (even ones whose body is CEK-encrypted) are sealed under the collection-DEK\n * key; current writes seal under the per-record CEK. Try the CEK key first; on\n * its AES-GCM auth failure, fall back to the DEK key. Throws only if BOTH fail.\n * Returns the plaintext string (callers `JSON.parse` as needed).\n */\nexport async function dualReadSealedSlot(\n  blob: string,\n  field: string,\n  collection: string,\n  cek: CryptoKey | undefined,\n  dek: CryptoKey,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const { iv, data } = parseSealedSlot(blob)\n  if (cek !== undefined) {\n    try {\n      const fieldKey = await deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek(cek, collection, field)\n      return await decrypt(iv, data, fieldKey)\n    } catch {\n      // fall through to the legacy collection-DEK derivation\n    }\n  }\n  const fieldKey = await deriveSealedFieldKey(dek, collection, field)\n  return decrypt(iv, data, fieldKey)\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;AAeO,SAAS,gBAAgB,MAA4C;AAC1E,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,GAAG;AAC5B,SAAO,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,GAAG,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;AAC7D;AAUA,eAAsB,mBACpB,MACA,OACA,YACA,KACA,KACiB;AACjB,QAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,gBAAgB,IAAI;AACzC,MAAI,QAAQ,QAAW;AACrB,QAAI;AACF,YAAMA,YAAW,MAAM,4BAA4B,KAAK,YAAY,KAAK;AACzE,aAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAMA,SAAQ;AAAA,IACzC,QAAQ;AAAA,IAER;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,qBAAqB,KAAK,YAAY,KAAK;AAClE,SAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ;AACnC;","names":["fieldKey"]}