@noy-db/hub 0.2.0-pre.3 → 0.2.0-pre.31

package/dist/chunk-XAYDHD2O.js

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+import {
+  IllegalTransitionError,
+  RecordLockedError,
+  ValidationError
+} from "./chunk-JZ5DS4DP.js";
+
+// src/guards/with-guard.ts
+function withGuard(strategy) {
+  if (!strategy.collection || strategy.collection.length === 0) {
+    throw new ValidationError("withGuard: collection name is required");
+  }
+  return {
+    __noydb_strategy: "guard",
+    spec: strategy
+  };
+}
+
+// src/guards/immutable-guard.ts
+function recordId(record) {
+  const id = record?.id;
+  return typeof id === "string" ? id : "";
+}
+function immutableGuard(config) {
+  const { collection, after, appendOnly, amendmentRoles, amendmentInvariant } = config;
+  if (appendOnly && after !== void 0) {
+    throw new ValidationError("immutableGuard: `after` and `appendOnly` are mutually exclusive");
+  }
+  if (!appendOnly && after === void 0) {
+    throw new ValidationError("immutableGuard: provide `after` or `appendOnly: true`");
+  }
+  const isImmutable = appendOnly ? () => true : after;
+  const reason = appendOnly ? "append-only collection" : "record is immutable after issue";
+  const spec = {
+    collection,
+    // Block updates to an already-immutable record. Inserts (existing
+    // null) and the transition write that first makes the record
+    // immutable are allowed — `after` reads the prior state.
+    check: (incoming, ctx) => {
+      if (ctx.existing !== null && isImmutable(ctx.existing)) {
+        throw new RecordLockedError(collection, recordId(incoming), reason);
+      }
+    },
+    // Block deletes of an immutable record.
+    onDelete: (existing) => {
+      if (isImmutable(existing)) {
+        throw new RecordLockedError(collection, recordId(existing), reason);
+      }
+    },
+    // The authorized override: inside an amendment transaction the
+    // check/onDelete are skipped and the change is ledgered. By default
+    // there is no extra invariant — the amendment itself is the
+    // sanctioned exception. Callers may supply `amendmentInvariant` to
+    // keep a constraint inviolable even under amendment (e.g. forbid
+    // deletes, or preserve a cross-record sum); a throw reverts the
+    // amendment and surfaces as `InvariantError`.
+    amendment: {
+      roles: amendmentRoles ?? ["admin", "owner"],
+      invariant: amendmentInvariant ?? (() => {
+      })
+    }
+  };
+  return withGuard(spec);
+}
+
+// src/guards/transition-guard.ts
+function recordId2(record) {
+  const id = record?.id;
+  return typeof id === "string" ? id : "";
+}
+function stateOf(record, field) {
+  const v = record[field];
+  return typeof v === "string" ? v : String(v);
+}
+function transitionGuard(config) {
+  const { collection, field, transitions, initial, amendmentRoles, amendmentInvariant } = config;
+  const allowIdempotent = config.allowIdempotent ?? true;
+  if (!field) {
+    throw new ValidationError("transitionGuard: `field` is required");
+  }
+  if (transitions === void 0 || typeof transitions !== "object") {
+    throw new ValidationError("transitionGuard: `transitions` must be a state\u2192states map");
+  }
+  const spec = {
+    collection,
+    check: (incoming, ctx) => {
+      const rec = incoming;
+      const to = stateOf(rec, field);
+      if (ctx.existing === null) {
+        if (initial !== void 0 && !initial.includes(to)) {
+          throw new IllegalTransitionError(collection, recordId2(rec), "(none)", to);
+        }
+        return;
+      }
+      const from = stateOf(ctx.existing, field);
+      if (from === to) {
+        if (allowIdempotent) return;
+        throw new IllegalTransitionError(collection, recordId2(rec), from, to);
+      }
+      const allowed = transitions[from] ?? [];
+      if (!allowed.includes(to)) {
+        throw new IllegalTransitionError(collection, recordId2(rec), from, to);
+      }
+    },
+    // The authorized override: inside an amendment transaction the check
+    // is skipped and the change is ledgered. By default no extra invariant
+    // — the amendment itself is the sanctioned exception. Callers may
+    // supply `amendmentInvariant` to keep a constraint inviolable even
+    // under amendment; a throw reverts the amendment as `InvariantError`.
+    amendment: {
+      roles: amendmentRoles ?? ["admin", "owner"],
+      invariant: amendmentInvariant ?? (() => {
+      })
+    }
+  };
+  return withGuard(spec);
+}
+
+export {
+  withGuard,
+  immutableGuard,
+  transitionGuard
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-XAYDHD2O.js.map

package/dist/chunk-XAYDHD2O.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/guards/with-guard.ts","../src/guards/immutable-guard.ts","../src/guards/transition-guard.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { ValidationError } from '../errors.js'\nimport type { GuardStrategy, GuardStrategyHandle } from './types.js'\n\n/**\n * Register a guard for a collection. Guards run on every `put()` /\n * `delete()` for the named collection (after permissions, before\n * encryption) and may:\n *\n *   - `check` — block writes by throwing (typically `RecordLockedError`)\n *   - `frozenFields` — freeze specific fields once a condition is true\n *   - `amendment` — declare an authorized-override path with invariant\n *\n * Pass the returned handle to `createNoydb({ strategies: [...] })`.\n *\n * @see docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-18-guards-design.md\n */\nexport function withGuard<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(\n  strategy: GuardStrategy<T>,\n): GuardStrategyHandle<T> {\n  if (!strategy.collection || strategy.collection.length === 0) {\n    throw new ValidationError('withGuard: collection name is required')\n  }\n  return {\n    __noydb_strategy: 'guard',\n    spec: strategy,\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * `immutableGuard` — declarative WORM / append-only sugar over the guard\n * subsystem.\n *\n * Issued fiscal documents (invoices, DDTs) must be immutable after issue.\n * That is expressible today with a hand-rolled `withGuard` (block on\n * `check`/`onDelete`, allow an admin `amendment`), but the boilerplate is\n * repetitive and easy to get subtly wrong. `immutableGuard` generates\n * exactly that guard from a declarative config, reusing the guard\n * machinery wholesale — `check`/`onDelete` rejection, the ledgered\n * `amendment` override, and composition with `periods`/`history`.\n *\n * ```ts\n * createNoydb({ guardStrategies: [\n *   immutableGuard({\n *     collection: 'invoices',\n *     after: (r) => r.status === 'issued',   // immutable once issued\n *   }),\n * ] })\n * ```\n *\n * A record is mutable until `after(record)` holds; from then on, updates\n * and deletes throw `RecordLockedError` unless performed inside an\n * `amendment` transaction by an authorized role (the override is\n * ledgered by the guard amendment mechanism). `appendOnly: true` is\n * shorthand for `after: () => true` — immutable from creation.\n */\n\nimport { withGuard } from './with-guard.js'\nimport type { GuardStrategy, GuardStrategyHandle, GuardContext, GuardChange } from './types.js'\nimport { RecordLockedError, ValidationError } from '../errors.js'\n\nexport interface ImmutableGuardConfig<T extends Record<string, unknown>> {\n  /** The collection to make WORM. */\n  collection: string\n  /**\n   * A record becomes immutable once this predicate holds. Evaluated on\n   * the *existing* (already-persisted) record, so the write that first\n   * makes it true is still allowed; subsequent writes are blocked.\n   * Mutually exclusive with `appendOnly`.\n   */\n  after?: (record: T) => boolean\n  /** Shorthand for `after: () => true` — immutable from creation. */\n  appendOnly?: boolean\n  /** Roles permitted to override via an amendment transaction. Default `['admin', 'owner']`. */\n  amendmentRoles?: ReadonlyArray<'admin' | 'owner'>\n  /**\n   * Optional set-level invariant run over the amendment change-set after\n   * the writes execute. Signature matches `GuardStrategy.amendment.invariant`\n   * exactly: it receives every {before, after} pair touching this\n   * collection in the amendment plus the guard context; throwing reverts\n   * the whole amendment and surfaces as `InvariantError`.\n   *\n   * Use this to keep a constraint inviolable EVEN under amendment — e.g.\n   * forbid deleting an issued document by re-throwing on any\n   * `before !== null && after === null` change, or assert a cross-record\n   * sum is preserved. When omitted the amendment is unconditionally\n   * allowed (the amendment itself is the sanctioned, ledgered override) —\n   * this is the backward-compatible default.\n   */\n  amendmentInvariant?: (\n    changes: ReadonlyArray<GuardChange<T>>,\n    ctx: GuardContext<T>,\n  ) => Promise<void> | void\n}\n\nfunction recordId(record: Record<string, unknown> | null): string {\n  const id = record?.id\n  return typeof id === 'string' ? id : ''\n}\n\n/**\n * Build an immutability guard. Pass the returned handle to\n * `createNoydb({ guardStrategies: [...] })`.\n */\nexport function immutableGuard<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(\n  config: ImmutableGuardConfig<T>,\n): GuardStrategyHandle<T> {\n  const { collection, after, appendOnly, amendmentRoles, amendmentInvariant } = config\n  if (appendOnly && after !== undefined) {\n    throw new ValidationError('immutableGuard: `after` and `appendOnly` are mutually exclusive')\n  }\n  if (!appendOnly && after === undefined) {\n    throw new ValidationError('immutableGuard: provide `after` or `appendOnly: true`')\n  }\n\n  const isImmutable: (record: T) => boolean = appendOnly ? () => true : after!\n  const reason = appendOnly ? 'append-only collection' : 'record is immutable after issue'\n\n  const spec: GuardStrategy<T> = {\n    collection,\n    // Block updates to an already-immutable record. Inserts (existing\n    // null) and the transition write that first makes the record\n    // immutable are allowed — `after` reads the prior state.\n    check: (incoming: T, ctx: GuardContext<T>) => {\n      if (ctx.existing !== null && isImmutable(ctx.existing)) {\n        throw new RecordLockedError(collection, recordId(incoming as Record<string, unknown>), reason)\n      }\n    },\n    // Block deletes of an immutable record.\n    onDelete: (existing: T) => {\n      if (isImmutable(existing)) {\n        throw new RecordLockedError(collection, recordId(existing as Record<string, unknown>), reason)\n      }\n    },\n    // The authorized override: inside an amendment transaction the\n    // check/onDelete are skipped and the change is ledgered. By default\n    // there is no extra invariant — the amendment itself is the\n    // sanctioned exception. Callers may supply `amendmentInvariant` to\n    // keep a constraint inviolable even under amendment (e.g. forbid\n    // deletes, or preserve a cross-record sum); a throw reverts the\n    // amendment and surfaces as `InvariantError`.\n    amendment: {\n      roles: amendmentRoles ?? ['admin', 'owner'],\n      invariant: amendmentInvariant ?? (() => {\n        /* allow — the amendment is the override, and is ledgered */\n      }),\n    },\n  }\n\n  return withGuard<T>(spec)\n}\n","/**\n * `transitionGuard` — declarative state-machine sugar over the guard\n * subsystem.\n *\n * Any record with a lifecycle field (invoice `status`, order state,\n * ticket workflow, subscription phase) needs transition validation: a\n * write may only move the field along a declared arc. That is expressible\n * with a hand-rolled `withGuard({ check })`, but every consumer\n * re-implements the same graph lookup + error. `transitionGuard`\n * generates exactly that guard from a state graph, reusing the guard\n * machinery wholesale — `check` rejection, the ledgered `amendment`\n * override, and composition with `periods`/`history`.\n *\n * It generalizes {@link immutableGuard}: WORM is the special case \"every\n * state has no outgoing arcs\", i.e. `transitions` mapping each state to `[]`.\n *\n * ```ts\n * createNoydb({ guardStrategies: [\n *   transitionGuard<Sale>({\n *     collection: 'sales', field: 'status',\n *     transitions: {                          // absence of an arc = forbidden\n *       draft: ['to_verify', 'cancelled'],\n *       to_verify: ['proforma', 'draft', 'cancelled'],\n *       proforma: ['invoiced', 'cancelled'],\n *       invoiced: ['paid'], paid: [], cancelled: [],\n *     },\n *     initial: ['draft', 'to_verify'],        // allowed status on insert\n *   }),\n * ] })\n * ```\n *\n * Semantics:\n * - **Insert** (`ctx.existing === null`): `incoming[field]` must be in\n *   `initial`. When `initial` is omitted, any value is allowed on insert.\n * - **Update**: the arc `(existing[field] → incoming[field])` must be\n *   listed in `transitions[from]`, else `IllegalTransitionError`. A\n *   same-value write (`from === to`) is allowed when `allowIdempotent`\n *   (default `true`) — so writes that touch other fields without moving\n *   state pass.\n * - **Override**: inside an `amendment` transaction by an authorized role\n *   the check is skipped and the change is ledgered (mirrors every guard).\n *\n * The status graph is caller-supplied data — no UI, no domain logic.\n */\n\nimport { withGuard } from './with-guard.js'\nimport type { GuardStrategy, GuardStrategyHandle, GuardContext, GuardChange } from './types.js'\nimport { IllegalTransitionError, ValidationError } from '../errors.js'\n\nexport interface TransitionGuardConfig<T extends Record<string, unknown>> {\n  /** The collection whose state field is governed. */\n  collection: string\n  /** The state field on the record (e.g. `'status'`). */\n  field: keyof T & string\n  /**\n   * The transition graph: each state maps to the states it may move to.\n   * A state absent from the map (or mapped to `[]`) is terminal — no\n   * outgoing arc, so any non-idempotent write from it is rejected.\n   */\n  transitions: Readonly<Record<string, readonly string[]>>\n  /**\n   * States allowed as the initial value on insert (`existing === null`).\n   * Omit to allow any value on insert.\n   */\n  initial?: readonly string[]\n  /**\n   * Allow a same-value write (`from === to`) on update. Default `true` —\n   * lets a put that changes other fields, but not the state, through.\n   */\n  allowIdempotent?: boolean\n  /** Roles permitted to override via an amendment transaction. Default `['admin', 'owner']`. */\n  amendmentRoles?: ReadonlyArray<'admin' | 'owner'>\n  /**\n   * Optional set-level invariant run over the amendment change-set after\n   * the writes execute. Signature matches `GuardStrategy.amendment.invariant`\n   * exactly. When omitted the amendment is unconditionally allowed (the\n   * amendment itself is the sanctioned, ledgered override) — the\n   * backward-compatible default. Mirrors {@link immutableGuard}.\n   */\n  amendmentInvariant?: (\n    changes: ReadonlyArray<GuardChange<T>>,\n    ctx: GuardContext<T>,\n  ) => Promise<void> | void\n}\n\nfunction recordId(record: Record<string, unknown> | null): string {\n  const id = record?.id\n  return typeof id === 'string' ? id : ''\n}\n\nfunction stateOf(record: Record<string, unknown>, field: string): string {\n  const v = record[field]\n  return typeof v === 'string' ? v : String(v)\n}\n\n/**\n * Build a state-machine transition guard. Pass the returned handle to\n * `createNoydb({ guardStrategies: [...] })`.\n */\nexport function transitionGuard<T extends Record<string, unknown>>(\n  config: TransitionGuardConfig<T>,\n): GuardStrategyHandle<T> {\n  const { collection, field, transitions, initial, amendmentRoles, amendmentInvariant } = config\n  const allowIdempotent = config.allowIdempotent ?? true\n\n  if (!field) {\n    throw new ValidationError('transitionGuard: `field` is required')\n  }\n  if (transitions === undefined || typeof transitions !== 'object') {\n    throw new ValidationError('transitionGuard: `transitions` must be a state→states map')\n  }\n\n  const spec: GuardStrategy<T> = {\n    collection,\n    check: (incoming: T, ctx: GuardContext<T>) => {\n      const rec = incoming as Record<string, unknown>\n      const to = stateOf(rec, field)\n\n      // Insert — gate on the allowed initial set (any value if unset).\n      if (ctx.existing === null) {\n        if (initial !== undefined && !initial.includes(to)) {\n          throw new IllegalTransitionError(collection, recordId(rec), '(none)', to)\n        }\n        return\n      }\n\n      // Update — the arc (from → to) must be a declared edge.\n      const from = stateOf(ctx.existing as Record<string, unknown>, field)\n      if (from === to) {\n        if (allowIdempotent) return\n        throw new IllegalTransitionError(collection, recordId(rec), from, to)\n      }\n      const allowed = transitions[from] ?? []\n      if (!allowed.includes(to)) {\n        throw new IllegalTransitionError(collection, recordId(rec), from, to)\n      }\n    },\n    // The authorized override: inside an amendment transaction the check\n    // is skipped and the change is ledgered. By default no extra invariant\n    // — the amendment itself is the sanctioned exception. Callers may\n    // supply `amendmentInvariant` to keep a constraint inviolable even\n    // under amendment; a throw reverts the amendment as `InvariantError`.\n    amendment: {\n      roles: amendmentRoles ?? ['admin', 'owner'],\n      invariant: amendmentInvariant ?? (() => {\n        /* allow — the amendment is the override, and is ledgered */\n      }),\n    },\n  }\n\n  return withGuard<T>(spec)\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;AAgBO,SAAS,UACd,UACwB;AACxB,MAAI,CAAC,SAAS,cAAc,SAAS,WAAW,WAAW,GAAG;AAC5D,UAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,wCAAwC;AAAA,EACpE;AACA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,kBAAkB;AAAA,IAClB,MAAM;AAAA,EACR;AACF;;;ACwCA,SAAS,SAAS,QAAgD;AAChE,QAAM,KAAK,QAAQ;AACnB,SAAO,OAAO,OAAO,WAAW,KAAK;AACvC;AAMO,SAAS,eACd,QACwB;AACxB,QAAM,EAAE,YAAY,OAAO,YAAY,gBAAgB,mBAAmB,IAAI;AAC9E,MAAI,cAAc,UAAU,QAAW;AACrC,UAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,iEAAiE;AAAA,EAC7F;AACA,MAAI,CAAC,cAAc,UAAU,QAAW;AACtC,UAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,uDAAuD;AAAA,EACnF;AAEA,QAAM,cAAsC,aAAa,MAAM,OAAO;AACtE,QAAM,SAAS,aAAa,2BAA2B;AAEvD,QAAM,OAAyB;AAAA,IAC7B;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAIA,OAAO,CAAC,UAAa,QAAyB;AAC5C,UAAI,IAAI,aAAa,QAAQ,YAAY,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG;AACtD,cAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,YAAY,SAAS,QAAmC,GAAG,MAAM;AAAA,MAC/F;AAAA,IACF;AAAA;AAAA,IAEA,UAAU,CAAC,aAAgB;AACzB,UAAI,YAAY,QAAQ,GAAG;AACzB,cAAM,IAAI,kBAAkB,YAAY,SAAS,QAAmC,GAAG,MAAM;AAAA,MAC/F;AAAA,IACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAQA,WAAW;AAAA,MACT,OAAO,kBAAkB,CAAC,SAAS,OAAO;AAAA,MAC1C,WAAW,uBAAuB,MAAM;AAAA,MAExC;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO,UAAa,IAAI;AAC1B;;;ACpCA,SAASA,UAAS,QAAgD;AAChE,QAAM,KAAK,QAAQ;AACnB,SAAO,OAAO,OAAO,WAAW,KAAK;AACvC;AAEA,SAAS,QAAQ,QAAiC,OAAuB;AACvE,QAAM,IAAI,OAAO,KAAK;AACtB,SAAO,OAAO,MAAM,WAAW,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC;AAC7C;AAMO,SAAS,gBACd,QACwB;AACxB,QAAM,EAAE,YAAY,OAAO,aAAa,SAAS,gBAAgB,mBAAmB,IAAI;AACxF,QAAM,kBAAkB,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAElD,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO;AACV,UAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,sCAAsC;AAAA,EAClE;AACA,MAAI,gBAAgB,UAAa,OAAO,gBAAgB,UAAU;AAChE,UAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,gEAA2D;AAAA,EACvF;AAEA,QAAM,OAAyB;AAAA,IAC7B;AAAA,IACA,OAAO,CAAC,UAAa,QAAyB;AAC5C,YAAM,MAAM;AACZ,YAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK;AAG7B,UAAI,IAAI,aAAa,MAAM;AACzB,YAAI,YAAY,UAAa,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG;AAClD,gBAAM,IAAI,uBAAuB,YAAYA,UAAS,GAAG,GAAG,UAAU,EAAE;AAAA,QAC1E;AACA;AAAA,MACF;AAGA,YAAM,OAAO,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAqC,KAAK;AACnE,UAAI,SAAS,IAAI;AACf,YAAI,gBAAiB;AACrB,cAAM,IAAI,uBAAuB,YAAYA,UAAS,GAAG,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,MACtE;AACA,YAAM,UAAU,YAAY,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC;AACtC,UAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG;AACzB,cAAM,IAAI,uBAAuB,YAAYA,UAAS,GAAG,GAAG,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,MACtE;AAAA,IACF;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,IAMA,WAAW;AAAA,MACT,OAAO,kBAAkB,CAAC,SAAS,OAAO;AAAA,MAC1C,WAAW,uBAAuB,MAAM;AAAA,MAExC;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO,UAAa,IAAI;AAC1B;","names":["recordId"]}

package/dist/{chunk-LOL725S4.js → chunk-XYW2CSCI.js}

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 import {
   NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION
-} from "./chunk-FXQYZNOW.js";
+} from "./chunk-A7DNZVAV.js";
 import {
   encrypt
-} from "./chunk-UOF74WQY.js";
+} from "./chunk-E2MDPPOC.js";
 
 // src/blobs/export-blobs.ts
 var ExportBlobsAbortedError = class extends Error {
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ async function runCompaction(ctx, options = {}) {
   let evicted = 0;
   let records = 0;
   let auditEntries = 0;
+  let held = 0;
   let collectionsWithPolicy = 0;
   outer: for (const collectionName of allCollections) {
     if (collectionName.startsWith("_")) continue;
@@ -141,6 +142,10 @@ async function runCompaction(ctx, options = {}) {
         if (!policy) continue;
         const reason = evaluatePolicy(policy, record, slot, now);
         if (!reason) continue;
+        if (isHeld(policy, record, now)) {
+          held += 1;
+          continue;
+        }
         if (!dryRun) {
           await ctx.deleteSlot(collectionName, recordId, slot.name);
           await writeAuditEntry(ctx, {
@@ -165,9 +170,32 @@ async function runCompaction(ctx, options = {}) {
     records,
     collections: collectionsWithPolicy,
     auditEntries,
+    held,
     byCollection
   };
 }
+function isHeld(policy, record, now) {
+  if (policy.legalHold) {
+    try {
+      if (policy.legalHold(record)) return true;
+    } catch {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  if (policy.retainUntil) {
+    try {
+      const until = policy.retainUntil(record);
+      if (until !== null && until !== void 0) {
+        const t = until instanceof Date ? until.getTime() : typeof until === "number" ? until : Date.parse(String(until));
+        if (!Number.isFinite(t)) return true;
+        if (t > now.getTime()) return true;
+      }
+    } catch {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
 function evaluatePolicy(policy, record, slot, now) {
   let ttlTriggered = false;
   let predicateTriggered = false;
@@ -230,4 +258,4 @@ export {
   BLOB_EVICTION_AUDIT_COLLECTION,
   runCompaction
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-LOL725S4.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-XYW2CSCI.js.map

package/dist/chunk-XYW2CSCI.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/blobs/export-blobs.ts","../src/blobs/blob-compaction.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * `vault.exportBlobs()` — bulk blob extraction primitive.\n *\n * Async-iterable handle over every blob attached to records in a\n * vault, optionally filtered by collection allowlist and per-record\n * predicate. Emits tuples of `{ blobId, recordRef, bytes, meta }` so\n * the consumer can pipe into any sink (zip stream, S3 multipart, USB\n * copy, cold-storage tape) without pulling the whole export into\n * memory.\n *\n * ## Auth + audit\n *\n * - Capability check runs **once** at handle creation via\n *   `Vault.assertCanExport('plaintext', 'blob')`. An operator whose\n *   keyring lacks that bit fails before a single byte of ciphertext\n *   is decrypted.\n * - Audit entry lands in `_export_audit` at handle creation: the\n *   actor, start timestamp, target collections, predicate presence,\n *   and batch mechanism. **No content hashes** — per the spec\n *   non-correlation invariant.\n *\n * ## Abort + resume\n *\n * - `handle.abort()` flips the internal signal; the next iteration\n *   boundary throws `AbortError`. Consumers already in `for await`\n *   can catch and exit cleanly.\n * - Restart after a partial failure with `{ afterBlobId }` — the\n *   iterator skips tuples up to (and including) that blob id before\n *   yielding again. Combined with a blob-count ceiling it supports\n *   idempotent batch re-runs.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { Collection } from '../collection.js'\nimport type { SlotInfo } from '../types.js'\n\n// ─── Types ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface ExportBlobsOptions {\n  /**\n   * Collection allowlist. Omit to export blobs from every collection\n   * the caller has read access to.\n   */\n  readonly collections?: readonly string[]\n  /**\n   * Per-record predicate. Called on the decrypted record BEFORE any\n   * blob bytes are read for that record — returning false skips the\n   * record and all its slots without touching their chunks.\n   */\n  readonly where?: (record: unknown, context: { collection: string; id: string }) => boolean\n  /**\n   * Resume after a specific blob id. The iterator skips tuples up to\n   * and including this id, then yields. Format of the id is the same\n   * as `ExportedBlob.blobId` (the HMAC-keyed eTag).\n   */\n  readonly afterBlobId?: string\n  /**\n   * External abort signal. When fired, the next iterator tick throws\n   * `ExportBlobsAbortedError`. Honored alongside `handle.abort()`.\n   */\n  readonly signal?: AbortSignal\n}\n\nexport interface ExportedBlob {\n  /** Opaque blob identifier — HMAC-keyed eTag, stable across vaults. */\n  readonly blobId: string\n  /** Where this blob came from in the vault. */\n  readonly recordRef: {\n    readonly collection: string\n    readonly id: string\n    readonly slot: string\n  }\n  /** Decrypted plaintext bytes. */\n  readonly bytes: Uint8Array\n  /** Best-effort metadata (from the blob slot record). */\n  readonly meta: {\n    readonly size: number\n    /**\n     * User-visible filename stored on the slot. Often equal to the\n     * slot name; differs when the caller supplied an explicit\n     * `filename` to `BlobSet.put()`.\n     */\n    readonly filename: string\n    readonly mimeType?: string\n    readonly createdAt?: string\n  }\n}\n\nexport interface ExportBlobsHandle extends AsyncIterable<ExportedBlob> {\n  /** Abort the export. Safe to call multiple times. */\n  abort(): void\n  /** True once `abort()` has fired or the external signal aborted. */\n  readonly aborted: boolean\n}\n\nexport class ExportBlobsAbortedError extends Error {\n  constructor(reason: string) {\n    super(`exportBlobs aborted: ${reason}`)\n    this.name = 'ExportBlobsAbortedError'\n  }\n}\n\n// ─── Audit ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport const EXPORT_AUDIT_COLLECTION = '_export_audit'\n\nexport interface ExportBlobsAuditEntry {\n  readonly id: string\n  readonly mechanism: 'exportBlobs'\n  readonly actor: string\n  readonly startedAt: string\n  readonly collections: readonly string[] | null\n  readonly predicate: boolean\n  readonly afterBlobId: string | null\n}\n\n// ─── Implementation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n/**\n * Build the handle. Factored out of `Vault.exportBlobs` so the\n * implementation can be unit-tested without going through the\n * compartment lifecycle.\n */\nexport function createExportBlobsHandle(\n  actor: string,\n  listAccessibleCollections: () => Promise<string[]>,\n  getCollection: <T>(name: string) => Collection<T>,\n  writeAudit: (entry: ExportBlobsAuditEntry) => Promise<void>,\n  options: ExportBlobsOptions,\n): ExportBlobsHandle {\n  let aborted = false\n\n  const abort = (): void => {\n    aborted = true\n  }\n\n  if (options.signal) {\n    if (options.signal.aborted) aborted = true\n    options.signal.addEventListener('abort', () => { aborted = true })\n  }\n\n  function assertLive(): void {\n    if (aborted) throw new ExportBlobsAbortedError('aborted by caller')\n  }\n\n  const allowlist = options.collections ? new Set(options.collections) : null\n\n  // Write the audit entry BEFORE the first yield so a blocked\n  // iteration still leaves an audit trail that the export started.\n  let auditPromise: Promise<void> | null = null\n  function writeAuditOnce(): Promise<void> {\n    if (!auditPromise) {\n      auditPromise = writeAudit({\n        id: generateBatchId(),\n        mechanism: 'exportBlobs',\n        actor,\n        startedAt: new Date().toISOString(),\n        collections: options.collections ?? null,\n        predicate: Boolean(options.where),\n        afterBlobId: options.afterBlobId ?? null,\n      })\n    }\n    return auditPromise\n  }\n\n  async function* generate(): AsyncGenerator<ExportedBlob> {\n    await writeAuditOnce()\n    assertLive()\n\n    // Resolve target collections lazily — also keeps the call async.\n    const allCollections = await listAccessibleCollections()\n    const targets = allCollections.filter(name => {\n      if (name.startsWith('_')) return false\n      if (allowlist && !allowlist.has(name)) return false\n      return true\n    })\n\n    let resumeCursorHit = options.afterBlobId === undefined\n\n    for (const collectionName of targets) {\n      if (aborted) return\n\n      const coll = getCollection<Record<string, unknown>>(collectionName)\n      const records = await coll.list().catch(() => [])\n      for (const record of records) {\n        if (aborted) return\n        assertLive()\n\n        const idField = (record as { id?: unknown }).id\n        if (typeof idField !== 'string') continue\n\n        if (options.where && !options.where(record, { collection: collectionName, id: idField })) continue\n\n        const blobSet = coll.blob(idField)\n        const slots = await blobSet.list().catch(() => [] as SlotInfo[])\n        for (const slot of slots) {\n          if (aborted) return\n\n          if (!resumeCursorHit) {\n            if (slot.eTag === options.afterBlobId) {\n              resumeCursorHit = true\n            }\n            continue\n          }\n\n          const bytes = await blobSet.get(slot.name)\n          if (!bytes) continue\n\n          const item: ExportedBlob = {\n            blobId: slot.eTag,\n            recordRef: { collection: collectionName, id: idField, slot: slot.name },\n            bytes,\n            meta: {\n              size: slot.size,\n              filename: slot.filename,\n              ...(slot.mimeType !== undefined && { mimeType: slot.mimeType }),\n              ...(slot.uploadedAt !== undefined && { createdAt: slot.uploadedAt }),\n            },\n          }\n          yield item\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  const handle: ExportBlobsHandle = {\n    abort,\n    get aborted() { return aborted },\n    [Symbol.asyncIterator]: () => generate(),\n  }\n  return handle\n}\n\n// ─── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nfunction generateBatchId(): string {\n  // 16 bytes of crypto randomness, URL-safe base64, no padding.\n  const raw = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16))\n  let s = ''\n  for (const b of raw) s += b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')\n  return `batch-${Date.now().toString(36)}-${s.slice(0, 12)}`\n}\n","/**\n * Blob retention + compaction.\n *\n * Declarative per-collection / per-slot eviction policy. Two\n * triggers:\n *\n *   - **`retainDays`** — age-based TTL. A slot uploaded more than N\n *     days ago is evicted.\n *   - **`evictWhen(record)`** — predicate over the **decrypted**\n *     record. Lets consumers express \"the image is safe to drop once\n *     the structured invoice has been reviewed and confirmed.\"\n *\n * Either trigger (or both) causes the slot to evict. Eviction removes\n * the slot entry from `_blob_slots_{collection}`, decrements the\n * blob's refCount (so unreferenced chunks can be GC'd by the next\n * sweep), and writes one entry to the `_blob_eviction_audit`\n * collection for tamper-evident record-keeping.\n *\n * The audit entry carries the eTag of the evicted blob (opaque HMAC\n * of plaintext under the vault's `_blob` DEK) — no plaintext leakage,\n * per the SPEC non-correlation invariant. Consumers reconstructing\n * \"what used to be attached\" can look up the audit entry by record\n * id.\n *\n * Compaction is **consumer-scheduled** — noy-db never runs a\n * background daemon. Call `vault.compact()` whenever your workflow\n * allows (cron, manual \"tidy\" button, cold-storage export prep, …).\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope, SlotInfo } from '../types.js'\nimport { NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION } from '../types.js'\nimport { encrypt } from '../crypto.js'\n\n// ─── Config types ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface BlobFieldPolicy<T = unknown> {\n  /**\n   * Age-based TTL in days. A slot whose `uploadedAt` is older than\n   * `now - retainDays × 86400s` evicts on the next `vault.compact()`.\n   * Omit to disable age-based eviction.\n   */\n  readonly retainDays?: number\n  /**\n   * Predicate evaluated against the decrypted record. When it returns\n   * `true`, every matching slot on that record evicts. Omit to\n   * disable predicate-based eviction.\n   */\n  readonly evictWhen?: (record: T) => boolean\n  /**\n   * **Legal hold.** When this predicate returns `true`, the slot is\n   * never evicted — `retainDays`/`evictWhen` are overridden. Use for a\n   * litigation / audit hold on a fiscal document: the blob stays until\n   * the predicate returns `false` (the hold is released). Fail-closed:\n   * if the predicate throws, the slot is treated as held.\n   */\n  readonly legalHold?: (record: T) => boolean\n  /**\n   * **Period-bound retention.** Returns the date (Date / ISO string /\n   * epoch ms) until which the slot must be retained — typically derived\n   * from the record's fiscal period (e.g. period end + 10 years). While\n   * `now < retainUntil`, the slot is never evicted, regardless of\n   * `retainDays`. Return `null`/`undefined` to impose no floor.\n   * Fail-closed: a throwing function holds the slot.\n   */\n  readonly retainUntil?: (record: T) => Date | string | number | null | undefined\n  /**\n   * **External projection.** When `true`, this field's bytes are stored in the\n   * vault's `ObjectProjection` (`createNoydb({ objectStore })`) as a single raw,\n   * **unencrypted** object — servable directly from S3/CDN and processable by\n   * native tooling — instead of the encrypted-chunk path. The encrypted slot\n   * record remains the catalog (anchoring invariant). Requires an `objectStore`;\n   * **outside the zero-knowledge guarantee** — use only for assets meant to\n   * leave the vault. See the as-aws-s3 design spec.\n   */\n  readonly external?: boolean\n  /**\n   * For an `external` field: make the object world-readable (CDN origin) rather\n   * than presigned-only. Default `false` (presigned). Ignored unless `external`.\n   */\n  readonly public?: boolean\n  /**\n   * For an `external` field: how to stamp a **backlink** (this record's\n   * vault/collection/id/field) onto the object's metadata — the self-describing\n   * \"secondary store\" that powers reconcile / DR / import re-pairing.\n   * - `'opaque-token'` (default): a random id; preserves the opaque-bucket\n   *   property (no names leak); the token is also recorded on the slot.\n   * - `'encrypted'`: the reference encrypted under the blob DEK (ZK-preserving;\n   *   falls back to `'opaque-token'` on a plaintext vault).\n   * - `'plain'`: the reference in cleartext metadata — **leaks structure** to\n   *   bucket readers; only for non-sensitive deployments.\n   * - `'none'`: no backlink.\n   */\n  readonly backlink?: 'opaque-token' | 'encrypted' | 'plain' | 'none'\n}\n\nexport type BlobFieldsConfig<T = unknown> = Record<string, BlobFieldPolicy<T>>\n\n// ─── Audit collection ──────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport const BLOB_EVICTION_AUDIT_COLLECTION = '_blob_eviction_audit'\n\nexport interface BlobEvictionEntry {\n  readonly id: string\n  readonly collection: string\n  readonly recordId: string\n  readonly slotName: string\n  readonly blobHash: string\n  readonly reason: 'ttl' | 'predicate' | 'both'\n  readonly evictedAt: string\n  readonly actor: string\n}\n\n// ─── Compaction result ──────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface CompactionResult {\n  /** Number of blob slots evicted across all collections. */\n  readonly evicted: number\n  /** Number of records touched (iterated + policy checked). */\n  readonly records: number\n  /** Number of collections with `blobFields` configured. */\n  readonly collections: number\n  /** Number of audit entries written. Equal to `evicted`. */\n  readonly auditEntries: number\n  /**\n   * Number of slots that would have evicted (TTL/predicate triggered)\n   * but were retained by a `legalHold` or `retainUntil` floor.\n   */\n  readonly held: number\n  /** Per-collection breakdown for diagnostics. */\n  readonly byCollection: Record<string, { records: number; evicted: number }>\n}\n\n// ─── Core ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface CompactRunOptions {\n  /** Override \"now\" for deterministic testing. */\n  readonly now?: Date\n  /**\n   * Stop after this many evictions. Useful for capped batches / cron\n   * jobs that need to fit in a time window. `undefined` = unbounded.\n   */\n  readonly maxEvictions?: number\n  /**\n   * Dry-run — evaluate policies and return the counts, but do NOT\n   * delete slots or write audit entries. Lets a consumer preview\n   * what would happen.\n   */\n  readonly dryRun?: boolean\n}\n\nexport interface CompactionContext {\n  readonly adapter: NoydbStore\n  readonly vault: string\n  readonly actor: string\n  readonly encrypted: boolean\n  readonly getDEK: (collection: string) => Promise<CryptoKey>\n  /**\n   * Resolve a collection's declared `blobFields` config. Returns an\n   * empty map for collections without the config — the walk skips\n   * those.\n   */\n  readonly getBlobFields: <T>(collection: string) => BlobFieldsConfig<T> | null\n  /** List collection names in the vault. */\n  readonly listCollections: () => Promise<string[]>\n  /** List record ids in a collection. */\n  readonly listRecords: (collection: string) => Promise<string[]>\n  /** Decrypt and return the record. Null when absent. */\n  readonly getRecord: <T>(collection: string, id: string) => Promise<T | null>\n  /** Return the BlobSet-like handle for a record's slots. */\n  readonly listSlots: (collection: string, id: string) => Promise<SlotInfo[]>\n  /** Delete a slot and decrement its blob's refCount. */\n  readonly deleteSlot: (collection: string, id: string, slotName: string) => Promise<void>\n}\n\nexport async function runCompaction(\n  ctx: CompactionContext,\n  options: CompactRunOptions = {},\n): Promise<CompactionResult> {\n  const now = options.now ?? new Date()\n  const maxEvictions = options.maxEvictions ?? Infinity\n  const dryRun = options.dryRun === true\n\n  const allCollections = await ctx.listCollections()\n  const byCollection: Record<string, { records: number; evicted: number }> = {}\n  let evicted = 0\n  let records = 0\n  let auditEntries = 0\n  let held = 0\n  let collectionsWithPolicy = 0\n\n  outer: for (const collectionName of allCollections) {\n    if (collectionName.startsWith('_')) continue\n    const config = ctx.getBlobFields(collectionName)\n    if (!config) continue\n    const configuredSlots = Object.keys(config)\n    if (configuredSlots.length === 0) continue\n    collectionsWithPolicy += 1\n    byCollection[collectionName] = { records: 0, evicted: 0 }\n\n    const ids = await ctx.listRecords(collectionName)\n    for (const recordId of ids) {\n      if (evicted >= maxEvictions) break outer\n\n      const record = await ctx.getRecord(collectionName, recordId).catch(() => null)\n      if (record === null) continue\n      records += 1\n      byCollection[collectionName].records += 1\n\n      const slots = await ctx.listSlots(collectionName, recordId).catch(() => [])\n      for (const slot of slots) {\n        if (evicted >= maxEvictions) break outer\n        const policy = config[slot.name]\n        if (!policy) continue\n\n        const reason = evaluatePolicy(policy, record, slot, now)\n        if (!reason) continue\n\n        // Retention floor: a legal hold or period-bound retainUntil\n        // blocks an otherwise-due eviction. Counted, never evicted.\n        if (isHeld(policy, record, now)) {\n          held += 1\n          continue\n        }\n\n        if (!dryRun) {\n          await ctx.deleteSlot(collectionName, recordId, slot.name)\n          await writeAuditEntry(ctx, {\n            id: generateEvictionId(collectionName, recordId, slot.name),\n            collection: collectionName,\n            recordId,\n            slotName: slot.name,\n            blobHash: slot.eTag,\n            reason,\n            evictedAt: now.toISOString(),\n            actor: ctx.actor,\n          })\n          auditEntries += 1\n        }\n        evicted += 1\n        byCollection[collectionName].evicted += 1\n      }\n    }\n  }\n\n  return {\n    evicted,\n    records,\n    collections: collectionsWithPolicy,\n    auditEntries,\n    held,\n    byCollection,\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Whether a retention floor (legal hold or period-bound `retainUntil`)\n * currently blocks eviction of this record's slots. Fail-closed: a\n * throwing predicate holds the slot.\n */\nfunction isHeld<T>(policy: BlobFieldPolicy<T>, record: T, now: Date): boolean {\n  if (policy.legalHold) {\n    try {\n      if (policy.legalHold(record)) return true\n    } catch {\n      return true\n    }\n  }\n  if (policy.retainUntil) {\n    try {\n      const until = policy.retainUntil(record)\n      if (until !== null && until !== undefined) {\n        const t = until instanceof Date ? until.getTime() : typeof until === 'number' ? until : Date.parse(String(until))\n        if (!Number.isFinite(t)) return true   // fail-closed: unparseable retainUntil holds the slot\n        if (t > now.getTime()) return true\n      }\n    } catch {\n      return true\n    }\n  }\n  return false\n}\n\nfunction evaluatePolicy<T>(\n  policy: BlobFieldPolicy<T>,\n  record: T,\n  slot: SlotInfo,\n  now: Date,\n): 'ttl' | 'predicate' | 'both' | null {\n  let ttlTriggered = false\n  let predicateTriggered = false\n\n  if (policy.retainDays !== undefined && policy.retainDays > 0) {\n    const uploadedAt = Date.parse(slot.uploadedAt)\n    if (Number.isFinite(uploadedAt)) {\n      const ageMs = now.getTime() - uploadedAt\n      const limitMs = policy.retainDays * 86_400_000\n      if (ageMs > limitMs) ttlTriggered = true\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (policy.evictWhen) {\n    try {\n      if (policy.evictWhen(record)) predicateTriggered = true\n    } catch {\n      // Predicate error → do NOT evict. Fail closed.\n    }\n  }\n\n  if (ttlTriggered && predicateTriggered) return 'both'\n  if (ttlTriggered) return 'ttl'\n  if (predicateTriggered) return 'predicate'\n  return null\n}\n\nfunction generateEvictionId(collection: string, recordId: string, slotName: string): string {\n  const rand = globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(8))\n  let suffix = ''\n  for (const b of rand) suffix += b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')\n  return `${collection}__${recordId}__${slotName}__${suffix}`\n}\n\nasync function writeAuditEntry(ctx: CompactionContext, entry: BlobEvictionEntry): Promise<void> {\n  const json = JSON.stringify(entry)\n  let envelope: EncryptedEnvelope\n  if (ctx.encrypted) {\n    const dek = await ctx.getDEK(BLOB_EVICTION_AUDIT_COLLECTION)\n    const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, dek)\n    envelope = {\n      _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n      _v: 1,\n      _ts: entry.evictedAt,\n      _iv: iv,\n      _data: data,\n      _by: entry.actor,\n    }\n  } else {\n    envelope = {\n      _noydb: NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,\n      _v: 1,\n      _ts: entry.evictedAt,\n      _iv: '',\n      _data: json,\n      _by: entry.actor,\n    }\n  }\n  await ctx.adapter.put(ctx.vault, BLOB_EVICTION_AUDIT_COLLECTION, entry.id, envelope)\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;AAgGO,IAAM,0BAAN,cAAsC,MAAM;AAAA,EACjD,YAAY,QAAgB;AAC1B,UAAM,wBAAwB,MAAM,EAAE;AACtC,SAAK,OAAO;AAAA,EACd;AACF;AAIO,IAAM,0BAA0B;AAmBhC,SAAS,wBACd,OACA,2BACA,eACA,YACA,SACmB;AACnB,MAAI,UAAU;AAEd,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAY;AACxB,cAAU;AAAA,EACZ;AAEA,MAAI,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAClB,QAAI,QAAQ,OAAO,QAAS,WAAU;AACtC,YAAQ,OAAO,iBAAiB,SAAS,MAAM;AAAE,gBAAU;AAAA,IAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EACnE;AAEA,WAAS,aAAmB;AAC1B,QAAI,QAAS,OAAM,IAAI,wBAAwB,mBAAmB;AAAA,EACpE;AAEA,QAAM,YAAY,QAAQ,cAAc,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,WAAW,IAAI;AAIvE,MAAI,eAAqC;AACzC,WAAS,iBAAgC;AACvC,QAAI,CAAC,cAAc;AACjB,qBAAe,WAAW;AAAA,QACxB,IAAI,gBAAgB;AAAA,QACpB,WAAW;AAAA,QACX;AAAA,QACA,YAAW,oBAAI,KAAK,GAAE,YAAY;AAAA,QAClC,aAAa,QAAQ,eAAe;AAAA,QACpC,WAAW,QAAQ,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,QAChC,aAAa,QAAQ,eAAe;AAAA,MACtC,CAAC;AAAA,IACH;AACA,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AAEA,kBAAgB,WAAyC;AACvD,UAAM,eAAe;AACrB,eAAW;AAGX,UAAM,iBAAiB,MAAM,0BAA0B;AACvD,UAAM,UAAU,eAAe,OAAO,UAAQ;AAC5C,UAAI,KAAK,WAAW,GAAG,EAAG,QAAO;AACjC,UAAI,aAAa,CAAC,UAAU,IAAI,IAAI,EAAG,QAAO;AAC9C,aAAO;AAAA,IACT,CAAC;AAED,QAAI,kBAAkB,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAE9C,eAAW,kBAAkB,SAAS;AACpC,UAAI,QAAS;AAEb,YAAM,OAAO,cAAuC,cAAc;AAClE,YAAM,UAAU,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AAChD,iBAAW,UAAU,SAAS;AAC5B,YAAI,QAAS;AACb,mBAAW;AAEX,cAAM,UAAW,OAA4B;AAC7C,YAAI,OAAO,YAAY,SAAU;AAEjC,YAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,EAAE,YAAY,gBAAgB,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAG;AAE1F,cAAM,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO;AACjC,cAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,CAAe;AAC/D,mBAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AACxB,cAAI,QAAS;AAEb,cAAI,CAAC,iBAAiB;AACpB,gBAAI,KAAK,SAAS,QAAQ,aAAa;AACrC,gCAAkB;AAAA,YACpB;AACA;AAAA,UACF;AAEA,gBAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI;AACzC,cAAI,CAAC,MAAO;AAEZ,gBAAM,OAAqB;AAAA,YACzB,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,YACb,WAAW,EAAE,YAAY,gBAAgB,IAAI,SAAS,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK;AAAA,YACtE;AAAA,YACA,MAAM;AAAA,cACJ,MAAM,KAAK;AAAA,cACX,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,cACf,GAAI,KAAK,aAAa,UAAa,EAAE,UAAU,KAAK,SAAS;AAAA,cAC7D,GAAI,KAAK,eAAe,UAAa,EAAE,WAAW,KAAK,WAAW;AAAA,YACpE;AAAA,UACF;AACA,gBAAM;AAAA,QACR;AAAA,MACF;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,QAAM,SAA4B;AAAA,IAChC;AAAA,IACA,IAAI,UAAU;AAAE,aAAO;AAAA,IAAQ;AAAA,IAC/B,CAAC,OAAO,aAAa,GAAG,MAAM,SAAS;AAAA,EACzC;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAIA,SAAS,kBAA0B;AAEjC,QAAM,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;AAChE,MAAI,IAAI;AACR,aAAW,KAAK,IAAK,MAAK,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,GAAG;AACxD,SAAO,SAAS,KAAK,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AAC3D;;;AC7IO,IAAM,iCAAiC;AA2E9C,eAAsB,cACpB,KACA,UAA6B,CAAC,GACH;AAC3B,QAAM,MAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,oBAAI,KAAK;AACpC,QAAM,eAAe,QAAQ,gBAAgB;AAC7C,QAAM,SAAS,QAAQ,WAAW;AAElC,QAAM,iBAAiB,MAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB;AACjD,QAAM,eAAqE,CAAC;AAC5E,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,MAAI,UAAU;AACd,MAAI,eAAe;AACnB,MAAI,OAAO;AACX,MAAI,wBAAwB;AAE5B,QAAO,YAAW,kBAAkB,gBAAgB;AAClD,QAAI,eAAe,WAAW,GAAG,EAAG;AACpC,UAAM,SAAS,IAAI,cAAc,cAAc;AAC/C,QAAI,CAAC,OAAQ;AACb,UAAM,kBAAkB,OAAO,KAAK,MAAM;AAC1C,QAAI,gBAAgB,WAAW,EAAG;AAClC,6BAAyB;AACzB,iBAAa,cAAc,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,SAAS,EAAE;AAExD,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,cAAc;AAChD,eAAW,YAAY,KAAK;AAC1B,UAAI,WAAW,aAAc,OAAM;AAEnC,YAAM,SAAS,MAAM,IAAI,UAAU,gBAAgB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI;AAC7E,UAAI,WAAW,KAAM;AACrB,iBAAW;AACX,mBAAa,cAAc,EAAE,WAAW;AAExC,YAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,IAAI,UAAU,gBAAgB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AAC1E,iBAAW,QAAQ,OAAO;AACxB,YAAI,WAAW,aAAc,OAAM;AACnC,cAAM,SAAS,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI;AAC/B,YAAI,CAAC,OAAQ;AAEb,cAAM,SAAS,eAAe,QAAQ,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG;AACvD,YAAI,CAAC,OAAQ;AAIb,YAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,QAAQ,GAAG,GAAG;AAC/B,kBAAQ;AACR;AAAA,QACF;AAEA,YAAI,CAAC,QAAQ;AACX,gBAAM,IAAI,WAAW,gBAAgB,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI;AACxD,gBAAM,gBAAgB,KAAK;AAAA,YACzB,IAAI,mBAAmB,gBAAgB,UAAU,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,YAC1D,YAAY;AAAA,YACZ;AAAA,YACA,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,YACf,UAAU,KAAK;AAAA,YACf;AAAA,YACA,WAAW,IAAI,YAAY;AAAA,YAC3B,OAAO,IAAI;AAAA,UACb,CAAC;AACD,0BAAgB;AAAA,QAClB;AACA,mBAAW;AACX,qBAAa,cAAc,EAAE,WAAW;AAAA,MAC1C;AAAA,IACF;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,aAAa;AAAA,IACb;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,EACF;AACF;AAOA,SAAS,OAAU,QAA4B,QAAW,KAAoB;AAC5E,MAAI,OAAO,WAAW;AACpB,QAAI;AACF,UAAI,OAAO,UAAU,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO;AAAA,IACvC,QAAQ;AACN,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,OAAO,aAAa;AACtB,QAAI;AACF,YAAM,QAAQ,OAAO,YAAY,MAAM;AACvC,UAAI,UAAU,QAAQ,UAAU,QAAW;AACzC,cAAM,IAAI,iBAAiB,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,UAAU,WAAW,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AAChH,YAAI,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,EAAG,QAAO;AAChC,YAAI,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,EAAG,QAAO;AAAA,MAChC;AAAA,IACF,QAAQ;AACN,aAAO;AAAA,IACT;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,eACP,QACA,QACA,MACA,KACqC;AACrC,MAAI,eAAe;AACnB,MAAI,qBAAqB;AAEzB,MAAI,OAAO,eAAe,UAAa,OAAO,aAAa,GAAG;AAC5D,UAAM,aAAa,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,UAAU;AAC7C,QAAI,OAAO,SAAS,UAAU,GAAG;AAC/B,YAAM,QAAQ,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI;AAC9B,YAAM,UAAU,OAAO,aAAa;AACpC,UAAI,QAAQ,QAAS,gBAAe;AAAA,IACtC;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,MAAI,OAAO,WAAW;AACpB,QAAI;AACF,UAAI,OAAO,UAAU,MAAM,EAAG,sBAAqB;AAAA,IACrD,QAAQ;AAAA,IAER;AAAA,EACF;AAEA,MAAI,gBAAgB,mBAAoB,QAAO;AAC/C,MAAI,aAAc,QAAO;AACzB,MAAI,mBAAoB,QAAO;AAC/B,SAAO;AACT;AAEA,SAAS,mBAAmB,YAAoB,UAAkB,UAA0B;AAC1F,QAAM,OAAO,WAAW,OAAO,gBAAgB,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;AAChE,MAAI,SAAS;AACb,aAAW,KAAK,KAAM,WAAU,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,GAAG,GAAG;AAC9D,SAAO,GAAG,UAAU,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM;AAC3D;AAEA,eAAe,gBAAgB,KAAwB,OAAyC;AAC9F,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK;AACjC,MAAI;AACJ,MAAI,IAAI,WAAW;AACjB,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,8BAA8B;AAC3D,UAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,GAAG;AAC5C,eAAW;AAAA,MACT,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,IAAI;AAAA,MACJ,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,MACX,KAAK;AAAA,MACL,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,IACb;AAAA,EACF,OAAO;AACL,eAAW;AAAA,MACT,QAAQ;AAAA,MACR,IAAI;AAAA,MACJ,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,MACX,KAAK;AAAA,MACL,OAAO;AAAA,MACP,KAAK,MAAM;AAAA,IACb;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,gCAAgC,MAAM,IAAI,QAAQ;AACrF;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-TLFUDXVV.js → chunk-ZCMOS4H2.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import {
   NOYDB_FORMAT_VERSION,
   NOYDB_KEYRING_VERSION
-} from "./chunk-FXQYZNOW.js";
+} from "./chunk-A7DNZVAV.js";
 import {
   base64ToBuffer,
   bufferToBase64,
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import {
   generateSalt,
   unwrapKey,
   wrapKey
-} from "./chunk-UOF74WQY.js";
+} from "./chunk-E2MDPPOC.js";
 import {
   ConflictError,
   DirectoryDisabledError,
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import {
   PermissionDeniedError,
   PrivilegeEscalationError,
   ValidationError
-} from "./chunk-YDLAFP36.js";
+} from "./chunk-JZ5DS4DP.js";
 
 // src/directory/storage.ts
 var META_COLLECTION = "_meta";
@@ -238,12 +238,14 @@ async function listUserEnvelopeIds(store, vault) {
 var ADMIN_GRANTABLE_TARGETS = ["operator", "viewer", "client", "admin"];
 function canGrant(callerRole, targetRole) {
   if (callerRole === "owner") return true;
+  if (callerRole === "custodian") return false;
   if (callerRole === "admin") return ADMIN_GRANTABLE_TARGETS.includes(targetRole);
   return false;
 }
 function canRevoke(callerRole, targetRole) {
   if (targetRole === "owner") return false;
   if (callerRole === "owner") return true;
+  if (callerRole === "custodian") return false;
   if (callerRole === "admin") return ADMIN_GRANTABLE_TARGETS.includes(targetRole);
   return false;
 }
@@ -340,6 +342,18 @@ async function loadKeyring(adapter, vault, userId, passphrase) {
     ...keyringFile.policy !== void 0 && { policy: keyringFile.policy }
   };
 }
+async function assertKeyringOpenAllowed(store, vault, userId, create) {
+  const keyringUsers = await store.list(vault, "_keyring");
+  if (keyringUsers.includes(userId)) return;
+  if (!create) {
+    throw new NoAccessError(`Vault "${vault}" not opened: create disabled and no keyring for "${userId}".`);
+  }
+  if (keyringUsers.length > 0) {
+    throw new NoAccessError(
+      `No keyring for user "${userId}" in vault "${vault}" (held by other principals) \u2014 refusing to self-provision.`
+    );
+  }
+}
 async function createOwnerKeyring(adapter, vault, userId, passphrase, passphraseOpts) {
   if (passphraseOpts?.validate && !passphraseOpts.allowWeakPassphrase) {
     assertStrongPassphrase(passphrase, passphraseOpts);
@@ -397,7 +411,7 @@ async function grant(adapter, vault, callerKeyring, options) {
       wrappedDeks[collName] = await wrapKey(dek, newKek);
     }
   }
-  if (options.role === "owner" || options.role === "admin" || options.role === "viewer") {
+  if (options.role === "owner" || options.role === "admin" || options.role === "custodian" || options.role === "viewer") {
     for (const [collName, dek] of callerKeyring.deks) {
       if (!(collName in wrappedDeks)) {
         wrappedDeks[collName] = await wrapKey(dek, newKek);
@@ -545,6 +559,11 @@ async function updateKeyringIdentity(adapter, vault, callerKeyring, options) {
   await writeKeyringFile(adapter, vault, options.userId, next);
 }
 async function rotateKeys(adapter, vault, callerKeyring, collections) {
+  if (callerKeyring.role === "custodian") {
+    throw new PermissionDeniedError(
+      "custodian cannot rotate keys (FR-6: re-key is an owner-only meta-capability; use the Deed owner)"
+    );
+  }
   const newDeks = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
   for (const collName of collections) {
     newDeks.set(collName, await generateDEK());
@@ -631,7 +650,7 @@ async function changeSecret(adapter, vault, keyring, newPassphrase, passphraseOp
     // Tier-2 slots are NOT preserved through `changeSecret` —
     // each slot wraps the OLD KEK, so the new keyring has no
     // authenticator slots until the user re-enrolls. The higher-level
-    // `db.rotatePassphrase()` (#10) preserves slots by rewrapping the
+    // `db.rotatePassphrase()` preserves slots by rewrapping the
     // KEK reference, not the KEK itself.
     authenticators: [],
     ...keyring.policy !== void 0 && { policy: keyring.policy }
@@ -654,7 +673,7 @@ async function buildRecipientKeyringFile(callerKeyring, recipient) {
       wrappedDeks[collName] = await wrapKey(dek, newKek);
     }
   }
-  if (role === "owner" || role === "admin" || role === "viewer") {
+  if (role === "owner" || role === "admin" || role === "custodian" || role === "viewer") {
     for (const [collName, dek] of callerKeyring.deks) {
       if (!(collName in wrappedDeks)) {
         wrappedDeks[collName] = await wrapKey(dek, newKek);
@@ -756,12 +775,13 @@ async function ensureCollectionDEK(adapter, vault, keyring) {
   };
 }
 function hasWritePermission(keyring, collectionName) {
-  if (keyring.role === "owner" || keyring.role === "admin") return true;
+  if (keyring.role === "owner" || keyring.role === "admin" || keyring.role === "custodian") return true;
   if (keyring.role === "viewer" || keyring.role === "client") return false;
   return keyring.permissions[collectionName] === "rw";
 }
 function hasAccess(keyring, collectionName) {
-  if (keyring.role === "owner" || keyring.role === "admin" || keyring.role === "viewer") return true;
+  if (keyring.role === "owner" || keyring.role === "admin" || keyring.role === "custodian" || keyring.role === "viewer")
+    return true;
   return collectionName in keyring.permissions;
 }
 async function persistKeyring(adapter, vault, keyring) {
@@ -827,7 +847,7 @@ function evaluateImportCapability(capability, _role, tier, format) {
   return capability?.bundle === true;
 }
 function resolvePermissions(role, explicit) {
-  if (role === "owner" || role === "admin" || role === "viewer") return {};
+  if (role === "owner" || role === "admin" || role === "custodian" || role === "viewer") return {};
   return explicit ?? {};
 }
 async function writeKeyringFile(adapter, vault, userId, keyringFile) {
@@ -863,6 +883,7 @@ export {
   listUserEnvelopeIds,
   mintKeyringCanary,
   loadKeyring,
+  assertKeyringOpenAllowed,
   createOwnerKeyring,
   grant,
   revoke,
@@ -881,4 +902,4 @@ export {
   hasImportCapability,
   evaluateImportCapability
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-TLFUDXVV.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-ZCMOS4H2.js.map