@noy-db/hub 0.10.0-pre.1 → 0.10.0-pre.2

package/dist/chunk-NH2UOV3B.js

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-// src/capsule/plumbing/kofn.ts
-function evaluateKofN(results, min) {
-  if (!Number.isInteger(min) || min < 1 || min > results.length) {
-    throw new Error(
-      `evaluateKofN: min ${min} out of range 1..${results.length} \u2014 caller bug (matchGroup validates bounds up front, before any PBKDF2)`
-    );
-  }
-  let count = 0;
-  for (const r of results) {
-    if (r) count += 1;
-  }
-  return count >= min;
-}
-
-export {
-  evaluateKofN
-};
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-NH2UOV3B.js.map

package/dist/chunk-NH2UOV3B.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/capsule/plumbing/kofn.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * k-of-n aggregate for matchGroup (§3). Deliberately a full scan that\n * never breaks: per-member results must never influence control flow in\n * a way an observer could time or decompose. Returns ONLY the aggregate.\n * @module\n */\nexport function evaluateKofN(results: readonly boolean[], min: number): boolean {\n  if (!Number.isInteger(min) || min < 1 || min > results.length) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `evaluateKofN: min ${min} out of range 1..${results.length} — caller bug ` +\n      `(matchGroup validates bounds up front, before any PBKDF2)`,\n    )\n  }\n  let count = 0\n  for (const r of results) {\n    if (r) count += 1 // no short-circuit — collect, never break\n  }\n  return count >= min\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAMO,SAAS,aAAa,SAA6B,KAAsB;AAC9E,MAAI,CAAC,OAAO,UAAU,GAAG,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ,QAAQ;AAC7D,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,qBAAqB,GAAG,oBAAoB,QAAQ,MAAM;AAAA,IAE5D;AAAA,EACF;AACA,MAAI,QAAQ;AACZ,aAAW,KAAK,SAAS;AACvB,QAAI,EAAG,UAAS;AAAA,EAClB;AACA,SAAO,SAAS;AAClB;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-OJAFKGI7.js

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-import {
-  NoydbError
-} from "./chunk-JGYCKX56.js";
-
-// src/capsule/contract.ts
-function assertCapsuleSupports(caps, group, requirer) {
-  if (!caps.has(group)) throw new CapsuleNotSupportedError(group, requirer);
-}
-var CapsuleNotSupportedError = class extends NoydbError {
-  constructor(group, requirer) {
-    super(
-      "CAPSULE_NOT_SUPPORTED",
-      `Capsule does not support the "${group}" group, which "${requirer}" requires. An exclave capsule refuses "authenticate" and "seal" by design \u2014 services that need them cannot be used with it. Check capabilities().`
-    );
-    this.group = group;
-    this.requirer = requirer;
-    this.name = "CapsuleNotSupportedError";
-  }
-  group;
-  requirer;
-};
-
-export {
-  assertCapsuleSupports,
-  CapsuleNotSupportedError
-};
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-OJAFKGI7.js.map

package/dist/chunk-OJAFKGI7.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/capsule/contract.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The capsule seam (capsule seam spec, Section 2).\n *\n * A capsule is hub's crypto interior behind one contract. `enclave-aes` is the\n * default and ships INSIDE hub, so `npm install @noy-db/hub` alone is a working\n * noy-db. An alternative binds at BUILD TIME through hub's `imports` map —\n * deliberately not at runtime: a `createNoydb({ capsule })` option would be a\n * hot-swap surface, and a build condition lives in build config where the\n * shipped bundle stays auditable (`npm ls` tells an auditor whether a build is\n * plaintext-at-rest).\n *\n * ⛔ `CapsuleKey` is OPAQUE outside `capsule/`. Never construct, inspect or\n * serialise one; only pass it between contract functions. A fork may define it\n * as something that is not a `CryptoKey` at all — hardware-backed,\n * post-quantum, or null for a capsule that does no encryption.\n */\nimport { NoydbError } from '../kernel/errors.js'\nimport type { VdigFieldPolicy } from '../kernel/types.js'\n\n/** Opaque key at the capsule seam. `CryptoKey` in the reference capsule. */\nexport type CapsuleKey = CryptoKey\n\n/** Opaque asymmetric pair at the capsule seam. */\nexport type CapsuleKeyPair = CryptoKeyPair\n\n/**\n * The groups a capsule may support. A capsule declares its set via\n * `capabilities()`; a service needing a group asserts at `createNoydb()`.\n *\n * `authenticate` and `seal` are what an `enclave-*` MUST support and an\n * `exclave-*` MUST refuse. That prefix rule is asserted by the conformance\n * suite from the package name, which is what makes the prefix a trust posture\n * rather than a naming convention.\n */\nexport type CapsuleGroup =\n  | 'authenticate'\n  | 'seal'\n  | 'cipher'\n  | 'digest'\n  | 'sign'\n  | 'codec'\n  | 'sealing'\n  | 'deterministic'\n  | 'classify'\n  // ⭐ ADDED 2026-09-16 (core#42). `wrapCek` / `unwrapCek` are real primitives\n  // a capsule may refuse independently, and the conformance kit has carried a\n  // live refusal test for them under this name since it shipped — but no\n  // member of this union covered them, so the refusal could not be NAMED.\n  // Found when `EnclaveNotSupportedError` turned out to accept it while this\n  // union did not: three vocabularies disagreed, and this one was the one\n  // missing a group rather than the error inventing one.\n  | 'per-record-keys'\n\n/**\n * Thrown at `createNoydb()` when a service needs a group the bound capsule\n * does not support.\n *\n * ⚠️ Never thrown on first write, and never discovered by try/catch probing: a\n * consumer learns at startup or not at all. A capability discovered mid-write\n * is a half-built vault.\n */\n/**\n * Refuse at CONSTRUCTION when a service needs a capsule group the bound\n * capsule lacks.\n *\n * ⛔ At startup or not at all. A capability discovered on first write is a\n * half-built vault: some records sealed, a service silently inert, and a\n * consumer who cannot tell a missing capability from a bug. `capabilities()`\n * is a set, so this is a membership test — never a try/catch probe against the\n * primitive itself, which would make \"unsupported\" and \"broken\" the same\n * observation.\n *\n * Lives on the CONTRACT, not in the kernel: it depends on nothing but the\n * declared set, and every capsule's consumers need the same assertion.\n *\n * ⚠️ Per-service wiring is deliberately NOT done yet. `enclave-aes` supports\n * every group, so every call site would be unreachable code behind an\n * untestable branch. It lands in Stage C with `exclave-plain`, which is the\n * first capsule that refuses anything. Until then this is exercised against a\n * stub set — see `__tests__/capsule-capabilities.test.ts`.\n */\nexport function assertCapsuleSupports(\n  caps: ReadonlySet<CapsuleGroup>,\n  group: CapsuleGroup,\n  requirer: string,\n): void {\n  if (!caps.has(group)) throw new CapsuleNotSupportedError(group, requirer)\n}\n\nexport class CapsuleNotSupportedError extends NoydbError {\n  constructor(readonly group: CapsuleGroup, readonly requirer: string) {\n    super(\n      'CAPSULE_NOT_SUPPORTED',\n      `Capsule does not support the \"${group}\" group, which \"${requirer}\" requires. ` +\n      `An exclave capsule refuses \"authenticate\" and \"seal\" by design — services ` +\n      `that need them cannot be used with it. Check capabilities().`,\n    )\n    this.name = 'CapsuleNotSupportedError'\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * The 13 cipher primitives the shared plumbing needs — the ENTIRE surface a\n * capsule must actually implement.\n *\n * ⭐ This is the measurement that shaped Stage C. `enclave-aes` is ~4,200\n * lines, but only ~1,200 of them touch `crypto.subtle`; the other ~3,000 are\n * envelope assembly, record-identity AAD, tombstones and the record codec —\n * plumbing that is IDENTICAL for every capsule because it encodes hub's\n * envelope format, not anyone's cipher. `makeCapsule()` binds that plumbing to\n * these primitives, so a second capsule writes ~400 lines instead of ~3,400\n * and the format lives in exactly one place.\n *\n * The alternative — copying the plumbing into each capsule — was rejected for\n * a specific reason: nothing would fail when the two copies drifted. A change\n * to the tombstone shape or the AAD would have to be made twice, and the\n * second miss surfaces as an envelope that one capsule writes and the other\n * cannot read.\n *\n * ⚠️ Declared with PROPERTY syntax (`encrypt: (…) => …`), never method\n * shorthand. Two reasons, both measured. TypeScript checks method shorthand\n * BIVARIANTLY, so a capsule whose `encrypt` took the wrong number of arguments\n * would satisfy a shorthand declaration and fail only at a call site — the\n * exact hole #16 fell through. And `@typescript-eslint/unbound-method` refuses\n * to let a shorthand method be destructured off the object, which is precisely\n * how the plumbing consumes these.\n *\n * ⚠️ Every primitive here is `async` except `bufferToBase64`, including ones a\n * plaintext capsule answers instantly. That is deliberate: a capsule that\n * needs real asynchrony (hardware-backed keys, a remote KMS) must be\n * expressible without changing this type, and a synchronous implementation\n * loses nothing by returning a resolved promise.\n */\nexport interface CapsulePrimitives<K = CapsuleKey> {\n  encrypt: (plaintext: string, key: K, aad?: Uint8Array) => Promise<{ iv: string; data: string }>\n  decrypt: (iv: string, data: string, key: K, aad?: Uint8Array) => Promise<string>\n  encryptBytesWithAAD: (bytes: Uint8Array, key: K, aad: Uint8Array) => Promise<{ iv: string; data: string }>\n  decryptBytesWithAAD: (iv: string, data: string, key: K, aad: Uint8Array) => Promise<Uint8Array>\n  /** Same plaintext + key + context ⇒ same ciphertext. Refused by a capsule without the group. */\n  encryptDeterministic: (plaintext: string, key: K, context: string) => Promise<{ iv: string; data: string }>\n  /** ⚠️ ONE argument. The AES capsule derives the CONTEXT into the IV, not the key\n   *  (`encryptDeterministic` calls `deriveDeterministicIV(dek, context, plaintext)`),\n   *  so a `(dek, context)` signature here would have been a plausible-looking lie\n   *  that only the call sites caught. */\n  deriveDeterministicKey: (dek: K) => Promise<K>\n  deriveSealedFieldKey: (dek: K, collectionName: string, field: string) => Promise<K>\n  deriveSealedFieldKeyFromCek: (cek: K, collectionName: string, field: string) => Promise<K>\n  generateDEK: () => Promise<K>\n  wrapCek: (cek: K, dek: K) => Promise<string>\n  unwrapCek: (wrapped: string, dek: K) => Promise<K>\n  /** Accepts `ArrayBuffer` too — the AES capsule's callers pass raw `subtle` output. */\n  bufferToBase64: (buffer: ArrayBuffer | Uint8Array) => string\n\n  // ─── optional group: classify ──────────────────────────────────────\n  //\n  // The record codec reaches into exactly two cipher-bound classify functions\n  // (plus `normalizeForVerify`, which is pure and lives in the plumbing). They\n  // sit here rather than in a separate object because the codec calls them the\n  // same way it calls `encrypt` — and a capsule that refuses the `classify`\n  // group implements them as a throw, which is the refusal the group means.\n  mintVdigSlot: (\n    value: string,\n    policy: VdigFieldPolicy,\n    prevBlob: string | undefined,\n    cek: K,\n    collection: string,\n    id: string,\n    field: string,\n  ) => Promise<string>\n  mintBidxTag: (normalized: string, dek: K, collection: string, field: string) => Promise<string>\n  /** The vdig payload is sealed under a capsule-derived slot key, so open/seal\n   *  are the capsule's, not the plumbing's. `rotateRecordCek` needs both to\n   *  carry a classified slot across a key rotation. */\n  openVdigPayload: (blob: string, cek: K, collection: string, id: string, field: string) => Promise<VdigPayload>\n  sealVdigPayload: (payload: VdigPayload, cek: K, collection: string, id: string, field: string) => Promise<string>\n}\n\n/** The classified verify-digest payload, at the seam because both the capsule\n *  and the plumbing name it. Structural, not the capsule's own type. */\nexport interface VdigDigestEntry {\n  readonly salt: string\n  readonly hash: string\n}\n\nexport interface VdigPayload {\n  readonly v: 1\n  readonly alg: 'PBKDF2-SHA256'\n  readonly iter: number\n  readonly cur: VdigDigestEntry & { readonly at: string }\n  readonly ring?: readonly VdigDigestEntry[]\n}\n\n\n// ─── what an alternative capsule builds on ─────────────────────────\n//\n// `@noy-db/hub/capsule` is the subpath an out-of-tree capsule installs, so the\n// shared halves have to be reachable from it: `makeCapsule()` binds hub's\n// envelope plumbing to a cipher, and the `digest` group is identical for every\n// capsule by design. Without these, an alternative capsule would have to\n// re-implement ~3,400 lines it does not own — and drift from them silently.\nexport { makeCapsule } from './plumbing/index.js'\nexport type { Capsule, RecordCodec } from './plumbing/index.js'\nexport {\n  sha256Hex,\n  sha256Bytes,\n  hmacSha256Hex,\n  hmacSignHex,\n  hkdfAesGcmKey,\n  deriveBlobAddressKey,\n  derivePresenceKey,\n  derivePresenceTagKey,\n  generateIV,\n  generateSalt,\n  generateRecoverySecret,\n  bufferToBase64,\n  base64ToBuffer,\n  encodeEchoParts,\n  KEY_BITS,\n} from './plumbing/digest.js'\nexport type { EchoSecretParts } from './plumbing/digest.js'\nexport {\n  buildRecordAad,\n  recordAadFor,\n  buildRecordEnvelope,\n  buildTombstone,\n  isTombstone,\n  isTombstoneShape,\n  buildDeleteMarker,\n  isDeleteMarker,\n  requireSealedBody,\n  sealedBodyArgs,\n  envelopeBodySize,\n  hasPerRecordKey,\n  envelopeBodyForHash,\n  hasSealedBody,\n  normalizeForVerify,\n  parseSealedSlot,\n} from './plumbing/index.js'\nexport type { RecordIdentity, RecordRef } from './plumbing/index.js'\nexport { buildSealedRecordEnvelope } from './plumbing/record-envelope.js'\nexport { generateSigningKeyPair, signBytes, verifyBytes } from './plumbing/sign.js'\nexport { ctEqualTags } from './plumbing/ct-equal.js'\nexport { evaluateKofN } from './plumbing/kofn.js'\n"],"mappings":";;;;;AAiFO,SAAS,sBACd,MACA,OACA,UACM;AACN,MAAI,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,EAAG,OAAM,IAAI,yBAAyB,OAAO,QAAQ;AAC1E;AAEO,IAAM,2BAAN,cAAuC,WAAW;AAAA,EACvD,YAAqB,OAA8B,UAAkB;AACnE;AAAA,MACE;AAAA,MACA,iCAAiC,KAAK,mBAAmB,QAAQ;AAAA,IAGnE;AANmB;AAA8B;AAOjD,SAAK,OAAO;AAAA,EACd;AAAA,EARqB;AAAA,EAA8B;AASrD;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-PVBKEBJU.js

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-import {
-  CURRENT_COST_BYTE,
-  iterationsForCostByte,
-  mintAt
-} from "./chunk-RQLCOSEJ.js";
-import {
-  normalizeForVerify
-} from "./chunk-6Y3UJT5H.js";
-
-// src/capsule/enclave-aes/classify/find.ts
-async function computeBidxTarget(candidate, normalize, dek, collection, field, costByte) {
-  const resolvedCostByte = costByte ?? CURRENT_COST_BYTE;
-  const iters = iterationsForCostByte(resolvedCostByte);
-  if (iters === null) return null;
-  const normalized = normalizeForVerify(normalize, candidate);
-  return mintAt(normalized, dek, collection, field, resolvedCostByte);
-}
-
-export {
-  computeBidxTarget
-};
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-PVBKEBJU.js.map

package/dist/chunk-PVBKEBJU.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/capsule/enclave-aes/classify/find.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Query-side blind-index target derivation for classified `equatable`\n * fields (stage 2). `computeBidxTarget` normalizes a caller-supplied\n * candidate and mints it into the same 33-byte `_bidx` tag shape produced by\n * `mintBidxTag` (`bidx.ts`), so a caller can string-compare the result\n * against a stored tag to answer \"does this candidate match?\" without ever\n * decrypting or dictionary-attacking the field.\n *\n * Discriminator-scan contract (Oracle #4): a scanning caller reads each\n * stored tag's leading cost-byte discriminator and derives the target tag\n * **once per distinct discriminator present** — never per-record. `find.ts`\n * itself only computes a single target for a single requested `costByte`;\n * the batching-by-discriminator behavior belongs to the scanner\n * (`findByDigest`, a later task), which calls this function once per\n * distinct discriminator it encounters at step 2 of its scan.\n *\n * An unrecognized `costByte` (unknown or legacy tier not yet supported) is a\n * cheap `null` non-match — `computeBidxTarget` never runs PBKDF2 at a wrong\n * iteration tier just to produce a target that could not possibly match.\n * A legacy tag of a KNOWN older tier remains matchable today by passing that\n * tier's `costByte` explicitly (v1-only today: `CURRENT_COST_BYTE` is the\n * only recognized tier, so this is a future-proofing hook, not live behavior\n * yet).\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { EnclaveKey } from '../crypto.js'\nimport { mintAt, iterationsForCostByte, CURRENT_COST_BYTE } from './bidx.js'\nimport { normalizeForVerify, type VerifyNormalizeMode } from '../../plumbing/normalize.js'\n\n/**\n * Normalize `candidate` and mint it into a blind-index target tag at\n * `costByte` (default {@link CURRENT_COST_BYTE}), for string-comparison\n * against a stored `_bidx` tag. Returns `null` when `costByte` is not a\n * recognized discriminator — no PBKDF2 is attempted at an unknown/wrong\n * tier (Oracle #4).\n */\nexport async function computeBidxTarget(\n  candidate: string,\n  normalize: VerifyNormalizeMode,\n  dek: EnclaveKey,\n  collection: string,\n  field: string,\n  costByte?: number,\n): Promise<string | null> {\n  const resolvedCostByte = costByte ?? CURRENT_COST_BYTE\n  const iters = iterationsForCostByte(resolvedCostByte)\n  if (iters === null) return null\n  const normalized = normalizeForVerify(normalize, candidate)\n  return mintAt(normalized, dek, collection, field, resolvedCostByte)\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;AAqCA,eAAsB,kBACpB,WACA,WACA,KACA,YACA,OACA,UACwB;AACxB,QAAM,mBAAmB,YAAY;AACrC,QAAM,QAAQ,sBAAsB,gBAAgB;AACpD,MAAI,UAAU,KAAM,QAAO;AAC3B,QAAM,aAAa,mBAAmB,WAAW,SAAS;AAC1D,SAAO,OAAO,YAAY,KAAK,YAAY,OAAO,gBAAgB;AACpE;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-RQLCOSEJ.js

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-import {
-  bufferToBase64
-} from "./chunk-6Y3UJT5H.js";
-
-// src/capsule/enclave-aes/classify/digest.ts
-var subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle;
-var VDIG_ITERATIONS = 6e5;
-async function pbkdf2VerifyDigest(value, salt, iterations) {
-  const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey(
-    "raw",
-    new TextEncoder().encode(value),
-    "PBKDF2",
-    false,
-    ["deriveBits"]
-  );
-  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(
-    { name: "PBKDF2", salt, iterations, hash: "SHA-256" },
-    keyMaterial,
-    256
-  );
-  return new Uint8Array(bits);
-}
-
-// src/capsule/enclave-aes/classify/bidx.ts
-var subtle2 = globalThis.crypto.subtle;
-var CLASSIFY_INDEX_KEY_DOMAIN = "noydb-classify-index-v1";
-var CLASSIFY_INDEX_SALT_DOMAIN = "noydb-classify-index-salt-v1";
-var COST_BYTE_V1 = 1;
-var CURRENT_COST_BYTE = COST_BYTE_V1;
-function iterationsForCostByte(b) {
-  if (b === COST_BYTE_V1) return VDIG_ITERATIONS;
-  return null;
-}
-async function deriveClassifyIndexKey(dek, collection, field) {
-  const rawDek = await subtle2.exportKey("raw", dek);
-  const hkdfKey = await subtle2.importKey("raw", rawDek, "HKDF", false, ["deriveBits"]);
-  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode(CLASSIFY_INDEX_KEY_DOMAIN);
-  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify([CLASSIFY_INDEX_KEY_DOMAIN, collection, field]));
-  const bits = await subtle2.deriveBits({ name: "HKDF", hash: "SHA-256", salt, info }, hkdfKey, 256);
-  return subtle2.importKey("raw", bits, { name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" }, false, ["sign"]);
-}
-async function deriveClassifyIndexSalt(dek, collection, field) {
-  const rawDek = await subtle2.exportKey("raw", dek);
-  const hkdfKey = await subtle2.importKey("raw", rawDek, "HKDF", false, ["deriveBits"]);
-  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode(CLASSIFY_INDEX_SALT_DOMAIN);
-  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify([CLASSIFY_INDEX_SALT_DOMAIN, collection, field]));
-  const bits = await subtle2.deriveBits({ name: "HKDF", hash: "SHA-256", salt, info }, hkdfKey, 256);
-  return new Uint8Array(bits);
-}
-async function mintAt(normalized, dek, collection, field, costByte) {
-  const iterations = iterationsForCostByte(costByte);
-  if (iterations == null) {
-    throw new Error(`bidx: unknown cost byte 0x${costByte.toString(16)}`);
-  }
-  const saltCf = await deriveClassifyIndexSalt(dek, collection, field);
-  const inner = await pbkdf2VerifyDigest(normalized, saltCf, iterations);
-  const kIdx = await deriveClassifyIndexKey(dek, collection, field);
-  const mac = await subtle2.sign("HMAC", kIdx, inner);
-  const tag = new Uint8Array(1 + 32);
-  tag[0] = costByte;
-  tag.set(new Uint8Array(mac), 1);
-  return bufferToBase64(tag);
-}
-async function mintBidxTag(normalized, dek, collection, field) {
-  return mintAt(normalized, dek, collection, field, CURRENT_COST_BYTE);
-}
-
-export {
-  VDIG_ITERATIONS,
-  pbkdf2VerifyDigest,
-  CURRENT_COST_BYTE,
-  iterationsForCostByte,
-  deriveClassifyIndexKey,
-  deriveClassifyIndexSalt,
-  mintAt,
-  mintBidxTag
-};
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-RQLCOSEJ.js.map

package/dist/chunk-RQLCOSEJ.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/capsule/enclave-aes/classify/digest.ts","../src/capsule/enclave-aes/classify/bidx.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Verify-digest primitive for classified `digest-only` fields (stage 2).\n * PBKDF2-SHA256 → fixed 32-byte digest. The digest NEVER leaves the enclave\n * in recoverable form — it is sealed into the `_vdig` envelope slot (vdig.ts)\n * or compared in-enclave (verify.ts). @module\n */\nconst subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle\n\n/** Family KDF constant — matches crypto.ts PBKDF2_ITERATIONS (600K). */\nexport const VDIG_ITERATIONS = 600_000\n\n/**\n * Digest a (pre-normalized) candidate/value to exactly 32 bytes.\n * PBKDF2-SHA256 with a per-record per-write random salt (§2): verify\n * digests are non-equatable by construction.\n */\nexport async function pbkdf2VerifyDigest(\n  value: string,\n  salt: Uint8Array,\n  iterations: number,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const keyMaterial = await subtle.importKey(\n    'raw',\n    new TextEncoder().encode(value),\n    'PBKDF2',\n    false,\n    ['deriveBits'],\n  )\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits(\n    { name: 'PBKDF2', salt: salt as BufferSource, iterations, hash: 'SHA-256' },\n    keyMaterial,\n    256,\n  )\n  return new Uint8Array(bits)\n}\n","/**\n * Blind-index slow-tag primitive for classified `equatable` fields (stage 2).\n *\n * `mintBidxTag` mints a deterministic, key-and-cost-gated tag —\n * `COST_BYTE ‖ HMAC-SHA256(K_idx, PBKDF2-SHA256(normalized, salt_cf))` — that\n * lets `find.ts` do blind equality lookup over an otherwise-opaque field\n * without ever storing the plaintext or a fast dictionary-crackable digest.\n *\n * Rationale (M-2/I3, spec §4/Crypto #1):\n *  - The outer HMAC is **keyed** by `K_idx`, a DEK-derived key never seen by\n *    the store. A key-less adversary (store access only) cannot mint a\n *    candidate tag to test against the index at all — the HMAC blocks the\n *    classic \"key-less dictionary attack\" a plain digest would invite.\n *  - The inner `pbkdf2VerifyDigest` (stage-2, `digest.ts`) reuses the\n *    existing 600K-iteration cost floor, so even a **DEK holder** who can\n *    compute `K_idx` still pays the PBKDF2 cost per guess — minting is not\n *    free just because you crossed the door.\n *  - Neither control is the real security boundary: the DOOR (who is ever\n *    handed the DEK to begin with) is. These two costs only shape the\n *    economics for whoever is already inside; they do not substitute for\n *    access control.\n *\n * `K_idx` and `salt_cf` are separate HKDF derivations off the same DEK\n * (L-1, #554 precedent: dedicated keys from day one, no shared/legacy form) —\n * sign-key hygiene, not `HMAC(K_idx, const)`. Both derivations are\n * domain-separated per `(collection, field)` so a tag cannot be replayed\n * across fields or collections (join-attack separation).\n *\n * `CURRENT_COST_BYTE` is a 1-byte discriminator prefixed onto every tag so a\n * future iteration-tier bump can mint new tags while old ones still parse:\n * an unknown discriminator is a cheap, immediate non-match instead of a\n * PBKDF2 run at the wrong iteration count.\n *\n * @module\n */\nimport type { EnclaveKey } from '../crypto.js'\nimport { bufferToBase64 } from '../../plumbing/digest.js'\nimport { pbkdf2VerifyDigest, VDIG_ITERATIONS } from './digest.js'\n\nconst subtle = globalThis.crypto.subtle\n\n/** HKDF salt domain for the `K_idx` (blind-index HMAC key) derivation. */\nexport const CLASSIFY_INDEX_KEY_DOMAIN = 'noydb-classify-index-v1'\n\n/** HKDF salt domain for the `salt_cf` (per collection/field PBKDF2 salt) derivation. */\nexport const CLASSIFY_INDEX_SALT_DOMAIN = 'noydb-classify-index-salt-v1'\n\n/** Cost-byte discriminator: version 1, iteration-tier 600K. */\nexport const COST_BYTE_V1 = 0x01\n/** The cost byte new tags are minted at. */\nexport const CURRENT_COST_BYTE = COST_BYTE_V1\n\n/**\n * Map a tag's cost-byte discriminator to its PBKDF2 iteration count.\n * An unrecognized discriminator returns `null` — a mismatched/legacy byte\n * is a cheap non-match, never a PBKDF2 run at the wrong tier.\n */\nexport function iterationsForCostByte(b: number): number | null {\n  if (b === COST_BYTE_V1) return VDIG_ITERATIONS\n  return null\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive the collection+field's dedicated blind-index HMAC key `K_idx` from\n * the DEK via HKDF-SHA256. Non-extractable, `sign`-only — it never leaves\n * this module in usable form.\n */\nexport async function deriveClassifyIndexKey(\n  dek: EnclaveKey,\n  collection: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<EnclaveKey> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode(CLASSIFY_INDEX_KEY_DOMAIN)\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify([CLASSIFY_INDEX_KEY_DOMAIN, collection, field]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits({ name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info }, hkdfKey, 256)\n  return subtle.importKey('raw', bits, { name: 'HMAC', hash: 'SHA-256' }, false, ['sign'])\n}\n\n/**\n * Derive the collection+field's dedicated PBKDF2 salt `salt_cf` from the DEK\n * via a SEPARATE HKDF-deriveBits (distinct from {@link deriveClassifyIndexKey}\n * — sign-key hygiene, not `HMAC(K_idx, const)`). 32 raw bytes.\n */\nexport async function deriveClassifyIndexSalt(\n  dek: EnclaveKey,\n  collection: string,\n  field: string,\n): Promise<Uint8Array> {\n  const rawDek = await subtle.exportKey('raw', dek)\n  const hkdfKey = await subtle.importKey('raw', rawDek, 'HKDF', false, ['deriveBits'])\n  const salt = new TextEncoder().encode(CLASSIFY_INDEX_SALT_DOMAIN)\n  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify([CLASSIFY_INDEX_SALT_DOMAIN, collection, field]))\n  const bits = await subtle.deriveBits({ name: 'HKDF', hash: 'SHA-256', salt, info }, hkdfKey, 256)\n  return new Uint8Array(bits)\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a blind-index tag at a given cost byte:\n * `tag = base64(COST_BYTE ‖ HMAC(K_idx, PBKDF2(normalized, salt_cf, iterations-for(COST_BYTE))))`.\n * Factored out of {@link mintBidxTag} so `find.ts`'s `computeBidxTarget` can\n * reuse the same crypto at a caller-chosen cost byte (e.g. to evaluate a\n * legacy tier) without duplicating the derivation/digest/MAC pipeline.\n */\nexport async function mintAt(\n  normalized: string,\n  dek: EnclaveKey,\n  collection: string,\n  field: string,\n  costByte: number,\n): Promise<string> {\n  const iterations = iterationsForCostByte(costByte)\n  if (iterations == null) {\n    throw new Error(`bidx: unknown cost byte 0x${costByte.toString(16)}`)\n  }\n  const saltCf = await deriveClassifyIndexSalt(dek, collection, field)\n  const inner = await pbkdf2VerifyDigest(normalized, saltCf, iterations)\n  const kIdx = await deriveClassifyIndexKey(dek, collection, field)\n  const mac = await subtle.sign('HMAC', kIdx, inner as BufferSource)\n  const tag = new Uint8Array(1 + 32)\n  tag[0] = costByte\n  tag.set(new Uint8Array(mac), 1)\n  return bufferToBase64(tag)\n}\n\n/**\n * Mint a blind-index tag for an already-normalized value at\n * {@link CURRENT_COST_BYTE}. 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package/dist/chunk-T5EXREMW.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-shape/manifest/types.ts","../src/with-shape/manifest/storage.ts","../src/with-shape/manifest/derive.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The pod-wide **schema manifest** record type (#941).\n *\n * This is an INDEX, not a full-inline manifest: `SchemaManifest.collections`\n * carries per-collection *metadata* (generation / content hash / field ids),\n * never the JSON Schema body itself. The JSON Schema stays the source of\n * truth at `_schemas/<collection>`, encrypted under that collection's own\n * DEK (see `with-shape/persisted-schemas`). Inlining full schemas into one\n * pod-wide manifest record would either leak every collection's schema to a\n * principal scoped to a single collection, or force the manifest itself\n * onto a collection-DEK it has no business holding — the index preserves\n * per-collection DEK isolation while still giving a single place to answer\n * \"what schema generation is this pod at, and does collection X's stored\n * schema match its declared content hash.\"\n *\n * `aggregateHash` binds the whole per-collection index's content: it is\n * `sha256Hex(canonicalJson(collections))`, so any change to any collection's\n * entry (a new generation, a changed hash, added/renamed field ids) changes\n * `aggregateHash` too. Canonical JSON (sorted object keys, no whitespace)\n * makes the hash independent of the map's key insertion order.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\n/** Per-collection entry inside a {@link SchemaManifest}'s `collections` index. */\nexport interface SchemaManifestEntry {\n  /** The vault-wide schema-fence generation this collection's schema was last written at. */\n  readonly generation: number\n  /** SHA-256 (hex) of the collection's canonicalised JSON Schema (see `persisted-schemas/derive.ts`). */\n  readonly contentHash: string\n  /** Stable per-field ids (#946), keyed by the field's current name. Absent when the collection has none. */\n  readonly fieldIds?: Record<string, string>\n}\n\n/**\n * The pod-wide schema manifest — one record per pod, stored at\n * `_manifest/schema` (see `storage.ts`). An INDEX over the per-collection\n * `_schemas/<collection>` entries, not the schemas themselves.\n */\nexport interface SchemaManifest {\n  readonly v: 1\n  readonly kind: 'schema'\n  /** Pod-wide schema-fence generation (`FenceDoc.currentSchemaVersion`) as of this manifest's derivation. */\n  readonly generation: number\n  /** Per-collection index: collection name → its manifest entry. */\n  readonly collections: Record<string, SchemaManifestEntry>\n  /** `sha256Hex(canonicalJson(collections))` — the pod-wide content binding over the index. */\n  readonly aggregateHash: string\n}\n\n/** The record id the schema manifest is stored under inside `_manifest`. */\nexport const MANIFEST_SCHEMA_RECORD_ID = 'schema' as const\n","/**\n * Read / write the pod-wide `_manifest/schema` envelope.\n *\n * Mirrors `with-shape/persisted-schemas/storage.ts`'s shape: the same\n * standard noy-db record envelope, AES-GCM encrypted with a collection DEK\n * (here, the `_manifest` collection's own DEK — the manifest INDEX\n * discloses collection names + hashes + generations + field ids, metadata\n * rather than schema bodies, so it gets the same encryption grain as\n * `_schemas` itself).\n *\n * Storage layout:\n *\n *   <vault>/_manifest/schema   →   EncryptedEnvelope\n *\n * Unlike `persisted-schemas/storage.ts` (which takes an already-resolved\n * `EnclaveKey`), these functions take a `getDEK` resolver and call\n * `getDEK(MANIFEST_COLLECTION)` themselves — there is exactly one manifest\n * record per pod, so there is no per-collection DEK the caller needs to\n * pick; resolving it here keeps every manifest call-site symmetric.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport { buildSealedRecordEnvelope, openEnvelopeJson, writeEnvelopeBody, type EnclaveKey } from '../../capsule/index.js'\nimport { canonicalJson, sha256Hex } from '../../with-commit/history/ledger/index.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { MANIFEST_COLLECTION } from './reserved-collections.js'\nimport { MANIFEST_SCHEMA_RECORD_ID, type SchemaManifest, type SchemaManifestEntry } from './types.js'\n\n/** A resolver for a collection's DEK — the same shape as `Vault`'s internal `getDEK`. */\nexport type GetManifestDEK = (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n\n/**\n * A decrypted schema-manifest read paired with the wrapping envelope's `_v`\n * — the optimistic-concurrency token. Pass `version` back to\n * {@link saveSchemaManifest} (via `writeSchemaManifest`'s `expectedVersion`)\n * to make the write a strict CAS.\n */\nexport interface LoadedSchemaManifest {\n  /** Wrapping envelope `_v`. */\n  readonly version: number\n  /** Decrypted schema manifest. */\n  readonly manifest: SchemaManifest\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the `_manifest/schema` envelope together with its wrapping `_v`.\n * Returns `undefined` when no manifest has ever been written, when the\n * envelope fails to decrypt (wrong DEK), or when it doesn't parse as a\n * `v: 1, kind: 'schema'` manifest.\n */\nexport async function loadSchemaManifestEntry(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  getDEK: GetManifestDEK,\n): Promise<LoadedSchemaManifest | undefined> {\n  const envelope = await store.get(vault, MANIFEST_COLLECTION, MANIFEST_SCHEMA_RECORD_ID)\n  if (!envelope) return undefined\n  const dek = await getDEK(MANIFEST_COLLECTION)\n  try {\n    const plaintext = await openEnvelopeJson({ collection: MANIFEST_COLLECTION, id: MANIFEST_SCHEMA_RECORD_ID }, envelope, dek)\n    const parsed = JSON.parse(plaintext) as SchemaManifest\n    if (parsed.v !== 1 || parsed.kind !== 'schema') return undefined\n    return { version: envelope._v, manifest: parsed }\n  } catch {\n    return undefined\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypt and persist the schema manifest as a strict CAS write:\n * `expectedVersion` must match the stored envelope's `_v` (0 when no\n * envelope exists yet) or `store.put` throws `ConflictError` — surfaced by\n * `writer.ts`'s `writeSchemaManifest` as `ManifestConflictError` rather than\n * retried.\n */\nexport async function saveSchemaManifest(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  manifest: SchemaManifest,\n  expectedVersion: number,\n  getDEK: GetManifestDEK,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const dek = await getDEK(MANIFEST_COLLECTION)\n  const json = JSON.stringify(manifest)\n  const env = await buildSealedRecordEnvelope(\n    { collection: MANIFEST_COLLECTION, id: MANIFEST_SCHEMA_RECORD_ID, version: expectedVersion + 1 },\n    (identity) => writeEnvelopeBody(identity, json, dek),\n    {},\n  )\n  await store.put(vault, MANIFEST_COLLECTION, MANIFEST_SCHEMA_RECORD_ID, env, expectedVersion)\n}\n\n/**\n * `sha256Hex(canonicalJson(collections))` — the pod-wide content binding\n * over a schema manifest's per-collection index. Canonical JSON sorts\n * object keys at every depth, so the result is independent of the map's\n * key insertion order. Shared by the writer's tests and (#941 Task 3) the\n * derivation path, so the hash is computed identically everywhere.\n */\nexport async function computeAggregateHash(\n  collections: Record<string, SchemaManifestEntry>,\n): Promise<string> {\n  return sha256Hex(canonicalJson(collections))\n}\n","/**\n * Derive the pod-wide {@link SchemaManifest} from the per-collection\n * `_schemas/<collection>` records — the source of truth (#941 Task 3).\n *\n * The manifest is an INDEX, never a cache with independent state: every\n * field in a {@link SchemaManifestEntry} is a direct projection of the\n * matching `PersistedSchemaEnvelope` (`hash` → `contentHash`, `fieldIds` →\n * `fieldIds`, `generation` → `generation`, falling back to the live fence's\n * `currentSchemaVersion` for a legacy pre-#946 envelope that never got a\n * generation stamp). Re-running this function against the same stored state\n * always produces the same manifest — that's what makes round-trip identity\n * (AC #2: dump → restore → re-derive matches the original) hold for free,\n * with no special-cased restore logic.\n *\n * A collection whose `_schemas/<collection>` envelope decrypts successfully\n * but has no derivable content (`hash === null` — a stub envelope for a\n * non-Zod validator) is legitimately omitted from the index: there is no\n * content hash to bind.\n *\n * ## Scoped principals: \"cannot decrypt\" is NOT \"doesn't exist\"\n *\n * A `_schemas/<collection>` envelope is encrypted under **that data\n * collection's own DEK** — the same key its records use — NOT a shared\n * `_schemas`-wide key. In a team vault, a collection-scoped grantee (e.g.\n * `grant(..., { role: 'operator', permissions: { invoices: 'rw' } })`) holds\n * only the DEKs their `permissions` name, plus every system-prefixed (`_*`)\n * collection's DEK — `_manifest` included, by `grant()`'s \"propagate system\n * collections to every role\" rule (`keyring.ts`). So a member scoped to\n * `invoices` CAN decrypt `_manifest/schema` (the pod-wide index) but CANNOT\n * decrypt a sibling's `_schemas/customers` envelope — even though that\n * envelope is right there in `store.list(vault, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION)`.\n *\n * `lookupDEK` (the {@link LookupDEK} passed in) reflects this: it returns\n * `undefined` for a collection name whose DEK the caller does not hold —\n * deliberately NEVER minting a fresh one (see the module doc on\n * `LookupDEK` for why). This function distinguishes that case\n * (`undecodableCollections`) from \"the schema envelope legitimately has no\n * derivable content\" (`hash === null`) — the caller (`sync.ts`) MUST treat\n * an incomplete view differently: writing a manifest derived from a\n * partial view would silently drop every collection this principal can't\n * see. See `sync.ts`'s module doc for how the sync path handles this.\n *\n * @module\n */\n\nimport type { EnclaveKey } from '../../capsule/index.js'\nimport { loadFence } from '../schema-update/fence.js'\nimport { loadPersistedSchema, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION } from '../persisted-schemas/storage.js'\nimport { computeAggregateHash } from './storage.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport type { SchemaManifest, SchemaManifestEntry } from './types.js'\n\n/**\n * A NON-MINTING DEK lookup: returns the collection's DEK if the caller\n * already holds it, `undefined` otherwise. Deliberately distinct from\n * `storage.ts`'s `GetManifestDEK` (which mints+persists a fresh DEK for an\n * absent collection — correct for a caller about to WRITE that collection,\n * e.g. `_manifest` itself). `deriveSchemaManifest` only ever READS sibling\n * collections it never created and has no business minting keys for — an\n * absent DEK here means \"not my collection to see,\" never \"new collection\n * that needs a key.\" Minting here would be worse than a no-op: it would\n * silently persist a garbage DEK into the caller's OWN `_keyring/<user>`\n * file (via `ensureCollectionDEK`'s `persistKeyring` side effect) that\n * still can't decrypt anything — see `sync.ts` / `with-pod/open.ts`'s\n * fix notes (#941 review).\n */\nexport type LookupDEK = (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey | undefined>\n\nexport interface DeriveSchemaManifestResult {\n  /** The derived manifest — an index over every collection this principal could decrypt. */\n  readonly manifest: SchemaManifest\n  /**\n   * Names present in `_schemas` (per `store.list`) whose envelope this\n   * principal could NOT decrypt — either no DEK held for that collection,\n   * or the DEK held failed to decrypt/parse it (treated the same: the\n   * caller cannot verify what's there, so it cannot safely be omitted or\n   * asserted). Empty for a principal with full visibility (typically the\n   * owner/admin/custodian). Non-empty means `manifest.collections` is\n   * DEFINITELY INCOMPLETE relative to the pod's true collection set —\n   * see `sync.ts` for why that must gate whether the manifest gets written.\n   */\n  readonly undecodableCollections: readonly string[]\n}\n\n/**\n * Read the fence generation + every `_schemas/<collection>` envelope this\n * principal can decrypt, and project them into a fresh {@link SchemaManifest}.\n * `lookupDEK` is called once per collection found under `_schemas` (never\n * mints — see {@link LookupDEK}). Names whose DEK isn't held, or whose\n * envelope fails to decrypt/parse despite holding a DEK, are reported via\n * `undecodableCollections` rather than silently dropped from the result.\n */\nexport async function deriveSchemaManifest(\n  store: NoydbStore,\n  vault: string,\n  lookupDEK: LookupDEK,\n): Promise<DeriveSchemaManifestResult> {\n  const fence = await loadFence(store, vault)\n  const collectionNames = await store.list(vault, SCHEMAS_COLLECTION)\n\n  const collections: Record<string, SchemaManifestEntry> = {}\n  const undecodableCollections: string[] = []\n  for (const name of collectionNames) {\n    const dek = await lookupDEK(name)\n    if (dek === undefined) {\n      undecodableCollections.push(name) // present in _schemas, but not decodable by this principal\n      continue\n    }\n\n    const payload = await loadPersistedSchema(store, vault, name, dek)\n    if (!payload) {\n      // Held a DEK but still couldn't decrypt/parse — cannot distinguish\n      // \"wrong key after all\" from real corruption from here; treat as\n      // undecodable (never silently drop) rather than \"no content.\"\n      undecodableCollections.push(name)\n      continue\n    }\n    if (payload.hash === null) continue // legitimately no derivable content (stub envelope)\n\n    const entry: SchemaManifestEntry = {\n      generation: payload.generation ?? fence.currentSchemaVersion,\n      contentHash: payload.hash,\n    }\n    collections[name] = payload.fieldIds !== undefined ? { ...entry, fieldIds: payload.fieldIds } : entry\n  }\n\n  const aggregateHash = await computeAggregateHash(collections)\n  const manifest: SchemaManifest = { v: 1, kind: 'schema', generation: fence.currentSchemaVersion, collections, aggregateHash }\n  return { manifest, undecodableCollections }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAmDO,IAAM,4BAA4B;;;ACAzC,eAAsB,wBACpB,OACA,OACA,QAC2C;AAC3C,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,qBAAqB,yBAAyB;AACtF,MAAI,CAAC,SAAU,QAAO;AACtB,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAC5C,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,YAAY,MAAM,iBAAiB,EAAE,YAAY,qBAAqB,IAAI,0BAA0B,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG;AAC1H,UAAM,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS;AACnC,QAAI,OAAO,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS,SAAU,QAAO;AACvD,WAAO,EAAE,SAAS,SAAS,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO;AAAA,EAClD,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AASA,eAAsB,mBACpB,OACA,OACA,UACA,iBACA,QACe;AACf,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,mBAAmB;AAC5C,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,QAAQ;AACpC,QAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,IAChB,EAAE,YAAY,qBAAqB,IAAI,2BAA2B,SAAS,kBAAkB,EAAE;AAAA,IAC/F,CAAC,aAAa,kBAAkB,UAAU,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,IACnD,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACA,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,qBAAqB,2BAA2B,KAAK,eAAe;AAC7F;AASA,eAAsB,qBACpB,aACiB;AACjB,SAAO,UAAU,cAAc,WAAW,CAAC;AAC7C;;;ACZA,eAAsB,qBACpB,OACA,OACA,WACqC;AACrC,QAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,UAAU,OAAO,KAAK;AAC1C,QAAM,kBAAkB,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,kBAAkB;AAElE,QAAM,cAAmD,CAAC;AAC1D,QAAM,yBAAmC,CAAC;AAC1C,aAAW,QAAQ,iBAAiB;AAClC,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,UAAU,IAAI;AAChC,QAAI,QAAQ,QAAW;AACrB,6BAAuB,KAAK,IAAI;AAChC;AAAA,IACF;AAEA,UAAM,UAAU,MAAM,oBAAoB,OAAO,OAAO,MAAM,GAAG;AACjE,QAAI,CAAC,SAAS;AAIZ,6BAAuB,KAAK,IAAI;AAChC;AAAA,IACF;AACA,QAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,KAAM;AAE3B,UAAM,QAA6B;AAAA,MACjC,YAAY,QAAQ,cAAc,MAAM;AAAA,MACxC,aAAa,QAAQ;AAAA,IACvB;AACA,gBAAY,IAAI,IAAI,QAAQ,aAAa,SAAY,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO,UAAU,QAAQ,SAAS,IAAI;AAAA,EAClG;AAEA,QAAM,gBAAgB,MAAM,qBAAqB,WAAW;AAC5D,QAAM,WAA2B,EAAE,GAAG,GAAG,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,MAAM,sBAAsB,aAAa,cAAc;AAC5H,SAAO,EAAE,UAAU,uBAAuB;AAC5C;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-VPG2UJYR.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/with-commit/sequence/active.ts","../src/with-commit/sequence/strategy.ts","../src/with-commit/sequence/index.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Enable the atomic-sequence capability.\n * Pass to `createNoydb({ sequenceStrategy: withSequence() })` to make\n * `vault.sequence('name').next()` / `.peek()` / `.seedTo()` live. The\n * {@link SequenceStore} CAS engine is statically imported here, so it is pulled\n * into the bundle only when `withSequence()` is referenced (the floor never\n * imports it).\n */\nimport type { SequenceStrategy } from './strategy.js'\nimport { SequenceStore } from './index.js'\n\nexport function withSequence(): SequenceStrategy {\n  return {\n    createStore(opts) {\n      return new SequenceStore(opts)\n    },\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Sequence capability strategy — the single on-demand factory the vault routes\n * `vault.sequence()` through to build its atomic-CAS {@link SequenceStore}. The\n * active engine ({@link withSequence}) constructs the real store (kept out of\n * the floor bundle — the store class is reached only via the opt-in\n * `active.ts` chunk); {@link NO_SEQUENCE} throws. The vault always assembles the\n * per-call {@link SequenceStoreOptions} and delegates here, so an un-opted-in\n * caller hits `NO_SEQUENCE`'s throw at `vault.sequence()`.\n *\n * Note: `vault.sequence()` is synchronous, so the factory is a plain (sync)\n * constructor — the engine is tree-shaken by reachability (only `withSequence()`\n * pulls `active.ts`, which statically imports the store), not by a dynamic\n * import. Deferred-numbering series (`withDeferredNumbering`) are a distinct\n * capability and are NOT routed through this strategy.\n * @internal\n */\nimport type { SequenceStore, SequenceStoreOptions } from './index.js'\nimport { SequenceNotEnabledError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\nexport interface SequenceStrategy {\n  createStore(opts: SequenceStoreOptions): SequenceStore\n}\n\n/**\n * No-op stub — the floor default. The capability factory throws\n * {@link SequenceNotEnabledError}; opt in with `sequenceStrategy: withSequence()`\n * in createNoydb. @internal\n */\nexport const NO_SEQUENCE: SequenceStrategy = {\n  createStore(): SequenceStore {\n    throw new SequenceNotEnabledError()\n  },\n}\n","/**\n * Atomic sequence primitive — online-coordinated gap-free numbering.\n *\n * `vault.sequence('invoice-2026').next()` returns 1, 2, 3, … with no\n * gaps and no duplicates, even under concurrent callers. Each named\n * sequence is an independent counter record at `_sequences/<name>`,\n * incremented with an optimistic compare-and-swap retry loop — the same\n * proven pattern as the ledger head (`history/ledger/store.ts`).\n *\n * **Explicitly online-only.** Gap-free numbering requires single-authority\n * serialization, which an offline / non-CAS store cannot provide. `next()`\n * throws {@link SequenceOfflineError} unless the backing store advertises\n * `capabilities.casAtomic`. This is a deliberate, honest wall — an offline\n * writer cannot safely allocate a global sequence number.\n *\n * Note on \"gap-free\": the *sequence* is gap-free (each `next()` yields a\n * unique, +1 value). If a caller discards a value without using it, that\n * is a gap in *usage*, not in the sequence — assign each `next()` result\n * to its record in the same operation.\n */\n\nimport { buildRecordAad, buildRecordEnvelope } from '../../capsule/index.js'\nimport type { NoydbStore, EncryptedEnvelope } from '../../kernel/types.js'\nimport { encrypt, openEnvelopeJson, type EnclaveKey } from '../../capsule/index.js'\nimport type { ConflictError} from '../../kernel/errors.js';\nimport { isConflictError, SequenceContentionError, SequenceOfflineError, ValidationError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\n// Capability opt-in seam (S4): `vault.sequence()` builds its CAS store through\n// the sequenceStrategy, so it throws SequenceNotEnabledError unless opted in.\nexport { withSequence } from './active.js'\nexport { NO_SEQUENCE, type SequenceStrategy } from './strategy.js'\nexport { SequenceNotEnabledError } from '../../kernel/errors.js'\n\nexport const SEQUENCE_COLLECTION = '_sequences'\n// A sequence is a single hot CAS row — higher contention than a ledger\n// append. A larger budget + jittered backoff absorbs moderate concurrency;\n// a genuine burst beyond this surfaces SequenceContentionError so the\n// caller can retry / queue (the honest online-only contract).\nconst MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS = 16\n\ninterface SequenceState {\n  value: number\n}\n\n/** Options for `SequenceHandle.next`. Deferred-numbering series use `for`; the CAS counter ignores all of these. */\nexport interface NextOptions {\n  /** Deferred mode: the record id to number. Ignored by the CAS counter. */\n  readonly for?: string\n  /** Deferred mode: reject after this many ms if still unsealed (reserved; not yet enforced in this slice). */\n  readonly timeoutMs?: number\n}\n\n/**\n * Partitioning for a CAS sequence. A partitioned sequence is an\n * independent counter scoped to one tuple of values — e.g.\n * `sequence('invoice', { partition: [2026, 'EU'] })` numbers EU-2026 invoices\n * separately from `[2026, 'US']` and from the bare `invoice` series.\n *\n * Partition components are URI-encoded (so `/`, null bytes and other\n * separators in a value can never collide with the structural separators) and\n * `'/'`-joined, then appended to the series with a null-byte (`\\x00`)\n * separator. The null byte is illegal in a plain series name, which guarantees\n * a partitioned key is always disjoint from any unpartitioned series.\n */\nexport interface SequenceOptions {\n  /** Partition tuple. Each component is URI-encoded and `'/'`-joined. */\n  readonly partition?: readonly (string | number)[]\n  /**\n   * Render template for the serial string. When set, `vault.sequence`\n   * returns a {@link FormattedSequenceHandle} whose `next()` resolves to\n   * `{ serial, formatted }`. Tokens:\n   * - `{seq}` — the allocated integer\n   * - `{seq:0N}` — zero-padded to width N (e.g. `{seq:04}` → `0001`)\n   * - `{partition.i}` — the i-th `partition` component (original value)\n   *\n   * Any other token, or a `{partition.i}` index beyond the supplied\n   * `partition`, throws `ValidationError` at `vault.sequence()` construction.\n   * Per-partition reset is inherent: a new partition tuple starts at 1.\n   */\n  readonly format?: string\n}\n\n/**\n * A formatted sequence handle. Identical to {@link SequenceHandle}\n * except `next()` also returns the rendered `formatted` string. `peek()` /\n * `seedTo()` operate on the underlying integer counter, unchanged.\n */\nexport interface FormattedSequenceHandle {\n  /** Allocate the next value and return it with its rendered serial string. */\n  next(opts?: NextOptions): Promise<{ serial: number; formatted: string }>\n  /** Read the current integer value without allocating. Returns 0 if never used. */\n  peek(): Promise<number>\n  /** Set-if-greater on the underlying integer counter. See {@link SequenceHandle.seedTo}. */\n  seedTo(n: number): Promise<void>\n}\n\n// Matches a single `{...}` token with no nested braces.\nconst SEQ_FORMAT_TOKEN = /\\{([^{}]*)\\}/g\nconst SEQ_PAD_TOKEN = /^seq:0(\\d+)$/\nconst SEQ_PARTITION_TOKEN = /^partition\\.(\\d+)$/\n\n/**\n * Validate a sequence `format` against the supplied partition and return a\n * pure `(serial) => string` renderer. Eager validation: every token is\n * checked now, so a bad pattern throws `ValidationError` at construction —\n * never at `next()` time.\n */\nexport function compileSequenceFormat(\n  format: string,\n  series: string,\n  partition: readonly (string | number)[] | undefined,\n): (serial: number) => string {\n  const parts = partition ?? []\n  for (const m of format.matchAll(SEQ_FORMAT_TOKEN)) {\n    const token = m[1] ?? ''\n    if (token === 'seq') continue\n    if (SEQ_PAD_TOKEN.test(token)) continue\n    const partMatch = SEQ_PARTITION_TOKEN.exec(token)\n    if (partMatch) {\n      const idx = Number(partMatch[1])\n      if (idx >= parts.length) {\n        throw new ValidationError(\n          `sequence(\"${series}\"): format token \"{${token}}\" references partition index ${idx}, ` +\n            `but only ${parts.length} partition component(s) were supplied.`,\n        )\n      }\n      continue\n    }\n    throw new ValidationError(\n      `sequence(\"${series}\"): format contains unknown token \"{${token}}\". ` +\n        `Accepted tokens: {seq}, {seq:0N}, {partition.i}.`,\n    )\n  }\n  return (serial: number): string =>\n    format.replace(SEQ_FORMAT_TOKEN, (full, token: string) => {\n      if (token === 'seq') return String(serial)\n      const padMatch = SEQ_PAD_TOKEN.exec(token)\n      if (padMatch) return String(serial).padStart(Number(padMatch[1]), '0')\n      const partMatch = SEQ_PARTITION_TOKEN.exec(token)\n      if (partMatch) return String(parts[Number(partMatch[1])])\n      return full // unreachable — validated above\n    })\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolve the CAS storage key for a (series, partition) pair.\n *\n * With no partition the key is `series` verbatim. With a partition the key is\n * `${series}\\x00${parts}` where `parts` is each component passed through\n * `encodeURIComponent(String(part))` and `'/'`-joined. The null-byte separator\n * is illegal in a plain series name, so partitioned keys never collide with\n * unpartitioned ones; URI-encoding keeps any component containing `/` distinct\n * from a multi-component partition.\n *\n * @throws {ValidationError} if any partition component is empty after `String()`\n *   or is a non-finite number (`NaN`, `±Infinity`).\n */\nexport function resolveSequenceKey(series: string, opts?: SequenceOptions): string {\n  const partition = opts?.partition\n  if (!partition || partition.length === 0) return series\n  const parts = partition.map((p) => {\n    if (typeof p === 'number' && !Number.isFinite(p)) {\n      throw new ValidationError(`sequence partition component must be a finite number, got ${p}`)\n    }\n    const s = String(p)\n    if (s === '') {\n      throw new ValidationError('sequence partition component must not be empty')\n    }\n    return encodeURIComponent(s)\n  })\n  return `${series}\\x00${parts.join('/')}`\n}\n\nexport interface SequenceHandle {\n  /** Atomically allocate and return the next value (1, 2, 3, …). Deferred series resolve at the next pass. */\n  next(opts?: NextOptions): Promise<number>\n  /** Read the current value without allocating. Returns 0 if never used. */\n  peek(): Promise<number>\n  /**\n   * Set-if-greater: advance the counter to at least `n`. A no-op if the\n   * current value is already `>= n` (so it never rewinds), and `seedTo(0)` is\n   * a no-op. Idempotent and CAS-safe under concurrent `next()` / `seedTo()`.\n   *\n   * Use after a bundle / CSV import to fast-forward the counter past the\n   * highest imported serial, so subsequent `next()` calls cannot re-use a\n   * number that is already on a record.\n   *\n   * Online-only: throws {@link SequenceOfflineError} on a non-CAS store.\n   */\n  seedTo(n: number): Promise<void>\n}\n\nasync function sleepBackoff(attempt: number): Promise<void> {\n  // Exponential backoff with full jitter to break the thundering herd\n  // when many writers contend on the same counter row.\n  const ceil = Math.min(2 ** attempt, 32)\n  const ms = Math.floor(Math.random() * ceil)\n  await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms))\n}\n\n/** Per-call context the vault assembles to build a {@link SequenceStore}. */\nexport interface SequenceStoreOptions {\n  adapter: NoydbStore\n  vault: string\n  encrypted: boolean\n  getDEK: (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  actor: string\n}\n\nexport class SequenceStore {\n  private readonly adapter: NoydbStore\n  private readonly vault: string\n  private readonly encrypted: boolean\n  private readonly getDEK: (collectionName: string) => Promise<EnclaveKey>\n  private readonly actor: string\n  /**\n   * Memoized DEK promise. The `_sequences` collection DEK is created on\n   * first access; without sharing one promise, a burst of concurrent\n   * `next()` calls would each trigger DEK creation and diverge (one\n   * writer's ciphertext unreadable by another). One shared promise → one\n   * DEK.\n   */\n  private dekPromise: Promise<EnclaveKey> | null = null\n\n  constructor(opts: SequenceStoreOptions) {\n    this.adapter = opts.adapter\n    this.vault = opts.vault\n    this.encrypted = opts.encrypted\n    this.getDEK = opts.getDEK\n    this.actor = opts.actor\n  }\n\n  /** A handle bound to one sequence name. */\n  handle(name: string): SequenceHandle {\n    return {\n      next: () => this.next(name),\n      peek: () => this.peek(name),\n      seedTo: (n) => this.seedTo(name, n),\n    }\n  }\n\n  private assertOnline(): void {\n    if (this.adapter.capabilities?.casAtomic !== true) {\n      throw new SequenceOfflineError()\n    }\n  }\n\n  private dek(): Promise<EnclaveKey> {\n    if (!this.dekPromise) this.dekPromise = this.getDEK(SEQUENCE_COLLECTION)\n    return this.dekPromise\n  }\n\n  private async read(name: string): Promise<{ env: EncryptedEnvelope | null; value: number }> {\n    const env = await this.adapter.get(this.vault, SEQUENCE_COLLECTION, name)\n    if (!env) return { env: null, value: 0 }\n    const json = this.encrypted ? await openEnvelopeJson({ collection: SEQUENCE_COLLECTION, id: name }, env, await this.dek()) : (env._data ?? '')\n    const state = JSON.parse(json) as SequenceState\n    return { env, value: state.value }\n  }\n\n  private async encryptState(name: string, state: SequenceState, version: number): Promise<EncryptedEnvelope> {\n    const json = JSON.stringify(state)\n    if (!this.encrypted) {\n      return buildRecordEnvelope({ collection: SEQUENCE_COLLECTION, id: name, version }, { iv: '', data: json})\n    }\n    const identity = { collection: SEQUENCE_COLLECTION, id: name, version }\n    const { iv, data } = await encrypt(json, await this.dek(), buildRecordAad(identity))\n    return buildRecordEnvelope(identity, { iv, data})\n  }\n\n  async peek(name: string): Promise<number> {\n    return (await this.read(name)).value\n  }\n\n  async next(name: string): Promise<number> {\n    this.assertOnline()\n    let lastConflict: ConflictError | undefined\n    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS; attempt++) {\n      const { env, value } = await this.read(name)\n      const nextValue = value + 1\n      const expectedVersion = env?._v ?? 0 // 0 ≡ \"must not yet exist\" (create)\n      const envelope = await this.encryptState(name, { value: nextValue }, expectedVersion + 1)\n      try {\n        await this.adapter.put(this.vault, SEQUENCE_COLLECTION, name, envelope, expectedVersion)\n        return nextValue\n      } catch (err) {\n        if (isConflictError(err)) {\n          lastConflict = err\n          if (attempt < MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS - 1) await sleepBackoff(attempt)\n          continue\n        }\n        throw err\n      }\n    }\n    void lastConflict\n    throw new SequenceContentionError(name, MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS)\n  }\n\n  async seedTo(name: string, n: number): Promise<void> {\n    this.assertOnline()\n    if (n <= 0) return // set-if-greater: 0 (and any non-positive seed) is a no-op\n    let lastConflict: ConflictError | undefined\n    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS; attempt++) {\n      const { env, value } = await this.read(name)\n      if (value >= n) return // already at or past the floor — no write, idempotent\n      const expectedVersion = env?._v ?? 0 // 0 ≡ \"must not yet exist\" (create)\n      const envelope = await this.encryptState(name, { value: n }, expectedVersion + 1)\n      try {\n        await this.adapter.put(this.vault, SEQUENCE_COLLECTION, name, envelope, expectedVersion)\n        return\n      } catch (err) {\n        if (isConflictError(err)) {\n          lastConflict = err\n          if (attempt < MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS - 1) await sleepBackoff(attempt)\n          continue\n        }\n        throw err\n      }\n    }\n    void lastConflict\n    throw new SequenceContentionError(name, MAX_NEXT_ATTEMPTS)\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;;;;;;;;;AAWO,SAAS,eAAiC;AAC/C,SAAO;AAAA,IACL,YAAY,MAAM;AAChB,aAAO,IAAI,cAAc,IAAI;AAAA,IAC/B;AAAA,EACF;AACF;;;ACWO,IAAM,cAAgC;AAAA,EAC3C,cAA6B;AAC3B,UAAM,IAAI,wBAAwB;AAAA,EACpC;AACF;;;ACCO,IAAM,sBAAsB;AAKnC,IAAM,oBAAoB;AA2D1B,IAAM,mBAAmB;AACzB,IAAM,gBAAgB;AACtB,IAAM,sBAAsB;AAQrB,SAAS,sBACd,QACA,QACA,WAC4B;AAC5B,QAAM,QAAQ,aAAa,CAAC;AAC5B,aAAW,KAAK,OAAO,SAAS,gBAAgB,GAAG;AACjD,UAAM,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK;AACtB,QAAI,UAAU,MAAO;AACrB,QAAI,cAAc,KAAK,KAAK,EAAG;AAC/B,UAAM,YAAY,oBAAoB,KAAK,KAAK;AAChD,QAAI,WAAW;AACb,YAAM,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;AAC/B,UAAI,OAAO,MAAM,QAAQ;AACvB,cAAM,IAAI;AAAA,UACR,aAAa,MAAM,sBAAsB,KAAK,iCAAiC,GAAG,cACpE,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,QAC5B;AAAA,MACF;AACA;AAAA,IACF;AACA,UAAM,IAAI;AAAA,MACR,aAAa,MAAM,uCAAuC,KAAK;AAAA,IAEjE;AAAA,EACF;AACA,SAAO,CAAC,WACN,OAAO,QAAQ,kBAAkB,CAAC,MAAM,UAAkB;AACxD,QAAI,UAAU,MAAO,QAAO,OAAO,MAAM;AACzC,UAAM,WAAW,cAAc,KAAK,KAAK;AACzC,QAAI,SAAU,QAAO,OAAO,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,GAAG;AACrE,UAAM,YAAY,oBAAoB,KAAK,KAAK;AAChD,QAAI,UAAW,QAAO,OAAO,MAAM,OAAO,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACxD,WAAO;AAAA,EACT,CAAC;AACL;AAeO,SAAS,mBAAmB,QAAgB,MAAgC;AACjF,QAAM,YAAY,MAAM;AACxB,MAAI,CAAC,aAAa,UAAU,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO;AACjD,QAAM,QAAQ,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM;AACjC,QAAI,OAAO,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG;AAChD,YAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,6DAA6D,CAAC,EAAE;AAAA,IAC5F;AACA,UAAM,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC;AAClB,QAAI,MAAM,IAAI;AACZ,YAAM,IAAI,gBAAgB,gDAAgD;AAAA,IAC5E;AACA,WAAO,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAAA,EAC7B,CAAC;AACD,SAAO,GAAG,MAAM,KAAO,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC;AACxC;AAqBA,eAAe,aAAa,SAAgC;AAG1D,QAAM,OAAO,KAAK,IAAI,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE;AACtC,QAAM,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI;AAC1C,QAAM,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AAC5C;AAWO,IAAM,gBAAN,MAAoB;AAAA,EACR;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA;AAAA,EAQT,aAAyC;AAAA,EAEjD,YAAY,MAA4B;AACtC,SAAK,UAAU,KAAK;AACpB,SAAK,QAAQ,KAAK;AAClB,SAAK,YAAY,KAAK;AACtB,SAAK,SAAS,KAAK;AACnB,SAAK,QAAQ,KAAK;AAAA,EACpB;AAAA;AAAA,EAGA,OAAO,MAA8B;AACnC,WAAO;AAAA,MACL,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,MAC1B,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;AAAA,MAC1B,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;AAAA,IACpC;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEQ,eAAqB;AAC3B,QAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,cAAc,cAAc,MAAM;AACjD,YAAM,IAAI,qBAAqB;AAAA,IACjC;AAAA,EACF;AAAA,EAEQ,MAA2B;AACjC,QAAI,CAAC,KAAK,WAAY,MAAK,aAAa,KAAK,OAAO,mBAAmB;AACvE,WAAO,KAAK;AAAA,EACd;AAAA,EAEA,MAAc,KAAK,MAAyE;AAC1F,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,qBAAqB,IAAI;AACxE,QAAI,CAAC,IAAK,QAAO,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,EAAE;AACvC,UAAM,OAAO,KAAK,YAAY,MAAM,iBAAiB,EAAE,YAAY,qBAAqB,IAAI,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC,IAAK,IAAI,SAAS;AAC3I,UAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI;AAC7B,WAAO,EAAE,KAAK,OAAO,MAAM,MAAM;AAAA,EACnC;AAAA,EAEA,MAAc,aAAa,MAAc,OAAsB,SAA6C;AAC1G,UAAM,OAAO,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK;AACjC,QAAI,CAAC,KAAK,WAAW;AACnB,aAAO,oBAAoB,EAAE,YAAY,qBAAqB,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,MAAM,KAAI,CAAC;AAAA,IAC1G;AACA,UAAM,WAAW,EAAE,YAAY,qBAAqB,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ;AACtE,UAAM,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK,IAAI,MAAM,QAAQ,MAAM,MAAM,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,eAAe,QAAQ,CAAC;AACnF,WAAO,oBAAoB,UAAU,EAAE,IAAI,KAAI,CAAC;AAAA,EAClD;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,KAAK,MAA+B;AACxC,YAAQ,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG;AAAA,EACjC;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,KAAK,MAA+B;AACxC,SAAK,aAAa;AAClB,QAAI;AACJ,aAAS,UAAU,GAAG,UAAU,mBAAmB,WAAW;AAC5D,YAAM,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;AAC3C,YAAM,YAAY,QAAQ;AAC1B,YAAM,kBAAkB,KAAK,MAAM;AACnC,YAAM,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK,aAAa,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,UAAU,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC;AACxF,UAAI;AACF,cAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,qBAAqB,MAAM,UAAU,eAAe;AACvF,eAAO;AAAA,MACT,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,YAAI,gBAAgB,GAAG,GAAG;AACxB,yBAAe;AACf,cAAI,UAAU,oBAAoB,EAAG,OAAM,aAAa,OAAO;AAC/D;AAAA,QACF;AACA,cAAM;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IACF;AACA,SAAK;AACL,UAAM,IAAI,wBAAwB,MAAM,iBAAiB;AAAA,EAC3D;AAAA,EAEA,MAAM,OAAO,MAAc,GAA0B;AACnD,SAAK,aAAa;AAClB,QAAI,KAAK,EAAG;AACZ,QAAI;AACJ,aAAS,UAAU,GAAG,UAAU,mBAAmB,WAAW;AAC5D,YAAM,EAAE,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;AAC3C,UAAI,SAAS,EAAG;AAChB,YAAM,kBAAkB,KAAK,MAAM;AACnC,YAAM,WAAW,MAAM,KAAK,aAAa,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAChF,UAAI;AACF,cAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,qBAAqB,MAAM,UAAU,eAAe;AACvF;AAAA,MACF,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,YAAI,gBAAgB,GAAG,GAAG;AACxB,yBAAe;AACf,cAAI,UAAU,oBAAoB,EAAG,OAAM,aAAa,OAAO;AAC/D;AAAA,QACF;AACA,cAAM;AAAA,MACR;AAAA,IACF;AACA,SAAK;AACL,UAAM,IAAI,wBAAwB,MAAM,iBAAiB;AAAA,EAC3D;AACF;","names":[]}