@noxsoft/anima 2.0.2 → 2.0.4

package/dist/audit-C-UJhfdv.js

@@ -0,0 +1,2401 @@
+import { g as resolveStateDir, m as resolveOAuthDir, o as resolveConfigPath } from "./paths-BMuHNFxg.js";
+import { l as normalizeAgentId } from "./session-key-DxcgHezu.js";
+import { n as runExec } from "./exec-mhSykkaa.js";
+import { c as resolveDefaultAgentId, s as resolveAgentWorkspaceDir } from "./agent-scope-CPphqq-U.js";
+import { t as formatCliCommand } from "./command-format-CVL4K5cj.js";
+import { D as INCLUDE_KEY, O as MAX_INCLUDE_DEPTH, r as createConfigIO } from "./config-DaqbUdkI.js";
+import { a as MANIFEST_KEY, l as normalizePluginsConfig } from "./manifest-registry-kHX_MFa1.js";
+import { n as formatErrorMessage } from "./errors-Cojm0Kl7.js";
+import { _ as resolveToolProfilePolicy, c as resolveSandboxConfigForAgent, u as resolveSandboxToolPolicyForAgent } from "./sandbox-DBSiVHt_.js";
+import { i as resolveGatewayAuth } from "./auth-BNZsOHGF.js";
+import { a as resolveProfile, i as resolveBrowserConfig, m as resolveBrowserControlAuth } from "./server-context-C0xZbYhg.js";
+import { i as loadWorkspaceSkillEntries } from "./skills-DV4zKdCx.js";
+import { h as GATEWAY_CLIENT_NAMES, m as GATEWAY_CLIENT_MODES } from "./message-channel-D_jIO87f.js";
+import { n as listChannelPlugins, r as normalizeChannelId } from "./plugins-DhcGAPDB.js";
+import { i as readChannelAllowFromStore } from "./pairing-store-BsXzUDPv.js";
+import { t as GatewayClient } from "./client-LRKFjo4A.js";
+import { t as buildGatewayConnectionDetails } from "./call-BYDpTVCZ.js";
+import { n as isToolAllowedByPolicies } from "./pi-tools.policy-Csmla32P.js";
+import { n as DEFAULT_GATEWAY_HTTP_TOOL_DENY } from "./dangerous-tools-DGTtJ_JR.js";
+import { t as resolveChannelDefaultAccountId } from "./helpers-DpEB9Mh0.js";
+import { n as extensionUsesSkippedScannerPath, r as isPathInside, t as scanDirectoryWithSummary } from "./skill-scanner-o6NgVMD9.js";
+import { t as inferParamBFromIdOrName } from "./model-param-b-DW9f0NN8.js";
+import os from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import JSON5 from "json5";
+import * as fs$1 from "node:fs/promises";
+import fs from "node:fs/promises";
+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
+
+//#region src/gateway/probe.ts
+async function probeGateway(opts) {
+	const startedAt = Date.now();
+	const instanceId = randomUUID();
+	let connectLatencyMs = null;
+	let connectError = null;
+	let close = null;
+	return await new Promise((resolve) => {
+		let settled = false;
+		const settle = (result) => {
+			if (settled) return;
+			settled = true;
+			clearTimeout(timer);
+			client.stop();
+			resolve({
+				url: opts.url,
+				...result
+			});
+		};
+		const client = new GatewayClient({
+			url: opts.url,
+			token: opts.auth?.token,
+			password: opts.auth?.password,
+			clientName: GATEWAY_CLIENT_NAMES.CLI,
+			clientVersion: "dev",
+			mode: GATEWAY_CLIENT_MODES.PROBE,
+			instanceId,
+			onConnectError: (err) => {
+				connectError = formatErrorMessage(err);
+			},
+			onClose: (code, reason) => {
+				close = {
+					code,
+					reason
+				};
+			},
+			onHelloOk: async () => {
+				connectLatencyMs = Date.now() - startedAt;
+				try {
+					const [health, status, presence, configSnapshot] = await Promise.all([
+						client.request("health"),
+						client.request("status"),
+						client.request("system-presence"),
+						client.request("config.get", {})
+					]);
+					settle({
+						ok: true,
+						connectLatencyMs,
+						error: null,
+						close,
+						health,
+						status,
+						presence: Array.isArray(presence) ? presence : null,
+						configSnapshot
+					});
+				} catch (err) {
+					settle({
+						ok: false,
+						connectLatencyMs,
+						error: formatErrorMessage(err),
+						close,
+						health: null,
+						status: null,
+						presence: null,
+						configSnapshot: null
+					});
+				}
+			}
+		});
+		const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+			settle({
+				ok: false,
+				connectLatencyMs,
+				error: connectError ? `connect failed: ${connectError}` : "timeout",
+				close,
+				health: null,
+				status: null,
+				presence: null,
+				configSnapshot: null
+			});
+		}, Math.max(250, opts.timeoutMs));
+		client.start();
+	});
+}
+
+//#endregion
+//#region src/gateway/node-command-policy.ts
+const CANVAS_COMMANDS = [
+	"canvas.present",
+	"canvas.hide",
+	"canvas.navigate",
+	"canvas.eval",
+	"canvas.snapshot",
+	"canvas.a2ui.push",
+	"canvas.a2ui.pushJSONL",
+	"canvas.a2ui.reset"
+];
+const CAMERA_COMMANDS = ["camera.list"];
+const CAMERA_DANGEROUS_COMMANDS = ["camera.snap", "camera.clip"];
+const SCREEN_DANGEROUS_COMMANDS = ["screen.record"];
+const LOCATION_COMMANDS = ["location.get"];
+const DEVICE_COMMANDS = ["device.info", "device.status"];
+const CONTACTS_COMMANDS = ["contacts.search"];
+const CONTACTS_DANGEROUS_COMMANDS = ["contacts.add"];
+const CALENDAR_COMMANDS = ["calendar.events"];
+const CALENDAR_DANGEROUS_COMMANDS = ["calendar.add"];
+const REMINDERS_COMMANDS = ["reminders.list"];
+const REMINDERS_DANGEROUS_COMMANDS = ["reminders.add"];
+const PHOTOS_COMMANDS = ["photos.latest"];
+const MOTION_COMMANDS = ["motion.activity", "motion.pedometer"];
+const SMS_DANGEROUS_COMMANDS = ["sms.send"];
+const IOS_SYSTEM_COMMANDS = ["system.notify"];
+const SYSTEM_COMMANDS = [
+	"system.run",
+	"system.which",
+	"system.notify",
+	"browser.proxy"
+];
+const DEFAULT_DANGEROUS_NODE_COMMANDS = [
+	...CAMERA_DANGEROUS_COMMANDS,
+	...SCREEN_DANGEROUS_COMMANDS,
+	...CONTACTS_DANGEROUS_COMMANDS,
+	...CALENDAR_DANGEROUS_COMMANDS,
+	...REMINDERS_DANGEROUS_COMMANDS,
+	...SMS_DANGEROUS_COMMANDS
+];
+const PLATFORM_DEFAULTS = {
+	ios: [
+		...CANVAS_COMMANDS,
+		...CAMERA_COMMANDS,
+		...LOCATION_COMMANDS,
+		...DEVICE_COMMANDS,
+		...CONTACTS_COMMANDS,
+		...CALENDAR_COMMANDS,
+		...REMINDERS_COMMANDS,
+		...PHOTOS_COMMANDS,
+		...MOTION_COMMANDS,
+		...IOS_SYSTEM_COMMANDS
+	],
+	android: [
+		...CANVAS_COMMANDS,
+		...CAMERA_COMMANDS,
+		...LOCATION_COMMANDS,
+		...DEVICE_COMMANDS,
+		...CONTACTS_COMMANDS,
+		...CALENDAR_COMMANDS,
+		...REMINDERS_COMMANDS,
+		...PHOTOS_COMMANDS,
+		...MOTION_COMMANDS
+	],
+	macos: [
+		...CANVAS_COMMANDS,
+		...CAMERA_COMMANDS,
+		...LOCATION_COMMANDS,
+		...DEVICE_COMMANDS,
+		...CONTACTS_COMMANDS,
+		...CALENDAR_COMMANDS,
+		...REMINDERS_COMMANDS,
+		...PHOTOS_COMMANDS,
+		...MOTION_COMMANDS,
+		...SYSTEM_COMMANDS
+	],
+	linux: [...SYSTEM_COMMANDS],
+	windows: [...SYSTEM_COMMANDS],
+	unknown: [
+		...CANVAS_COMMANDS,
+		...CAMERA_COMMANDS,
+		...LOCATION_COMMANDS,
+		...SYSTEM_COMMANDS
+	]
+};
+function normalizePlatformId(platform, deviceFamily) {
+	const raw = (platform ?? "").trim().toLowerCase();
+	if (raw.startsWith("ios")) return "ios";
+	if (raw.startsWith("android")) return "android";
+	if (raw.startsWith("mac")) return "macos";
+	if (raw.startsWith("darwin")) return "macos";
+	if (raw.startsWith("win")) return "windows";
+	if (raw.startsWith("linux")) return "linux";
+	const family = (deviceFamily ?? "").trim().toLowerCase();
+	if (family.includes("iphone") || family.includes("ipad") || family.includes("ios")) return "ios";
+	if (family.includes("android")) return "android";
+	if (family.includes("mac")) return "macos";
+	if (family.includes("windows")) return "windows";
+	if (family.includes("linux")) return "linux";
+	return "unknown";
+}
+function resolveNodeCommandAllowlist(cfg, node) {
+	const base = PLATFORM_DEFAULTS[normalizePlatformId(node?.platform, node?.deviceFamily)] ?? PLATFORM_DEFAULTS.unknown;
+	const extra = cfg.gateway?.nodes?.allowCommands ?? [];
+	const deny = new Set(cfg.gateway?.nodes?.denyCommands ?? []);
+	const allow = new Set([...base, ...extra].map((cmd) => cmd.trim()).filter(Boolean));
+	for (const blocked of deny) {
+		const trimmed = blocked.trim();
+		if (trimmed) allow.delete(trimmed);
+	}
+	return allow;
+}
+function isNodeCommandAllowed(params) {
+	const command = params.command.trim();
+	if (!command) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: "command required"
+	};
+	if (!params.allowlist.has(command)) return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: "command not allowlisted"
+	};
+	if (Array.isArray(params.declaredCommands) && params.declaredCommands.length > 0) {
+		if (!params.declaredCommands.includes(command)) return {
+			ok: false,
+			reason: "command not declared by node"
+		};
+	} else return {
+		ok: false,
+		reason: "node did not declare commands"
+	};
+	return { ok: true };
+}
+
+//#endregion
+//#region src/gateway/probe-auth.ts
+function resolveGatewayProbeAuth(params) {
+	const env = params.env ?? process.env;
+	const authToken = params.cfg.gateway?.auth?.token;
+	const authPassword = params.cfg.gateway?.auth?.password;
+	const remote = params.cfg.gateway?.remote;
+	return {
+		token: params.mode === "remote" ? typeof remote?.token === "string" && remote.token.trim() ? remote.token.trim() : void 0 : env.ANIMA_GATEWAY_TOKEN?.trim() || (typeof authToken === "string" && authToken.trim() ? authToken.trim() : void 0),
+		password: env.ANIMA_GATEWAY_PASSWORD?.trim() || (params.mode === "remote" ? typeof remote?.password === "string" && remote.password.trim() ? remote.password.trim() : void 0 : typeof authPassword === "string" && authPassword.trim() ? authPassword.trim() : void 0)
+	};
+}
+
+//#endregion
+//#region src/config/commands.ts
+function resolveAutoDefault(providerId) {
+	const id = normalizeChannelId(providerId);
+	if (!id) return false;
+	if (id === "discord" || id === "telegram") return true;
+	if (id === "slack") return false;
+	return false;
+}
+function resolveNativeSkillsEnabled(params) {
+	const { providerId, providerSetting, globalSetting } = params;
+	const setting = providerSetting === void 0 ? globalSetting : providerSetting;
+	if (setting === true) return true;
+	if (setting === false) return false;
+	return resolveAutoDefault(providerId);
+}
+function resolveNativeCommandsEnabled(params) {
+	const { providerId, providerSetting, globalSetting } = params;
+	const setting = providerSetting === void 0 ? globalSetting : providerSetting;
+	if (setting === true) return true;
+	if (setting === false) return false;
+	return resolveAutoDefault(providerId);
+}
+
+//#endregion
+//#region src/security/audit-channel.ts
+function normalizeAllowFromList$1(list) {
+	if (!Array.isArray(list)) return [];
+	return list.map((v) => String(v).trim()).filter(Boolean);
+}
+function normalizeTelegramAllowFromEntry(raw) {
+	return (typeof raw === "string" ? raw : typeof raw === "number" ? String(raw) : "").trim().replace(/^(telegram|tg):/i, "").trim();
+}
+function isNumericTelegramUserId(raw) {
+	return /^\d+$/.test(raw);
+}
+function classifyChannelWarningSeverity(message) {
+	const s = message.toLowerCase();
+	if (s.includes("dms: open") || s.includes("grouppolicy=\"open\"") || s.includes("dmpolicy=\"open\"")) return "critical";
+	if (s.includes("allows any") || s.includes("anyone can dm") || s.includes("public")) return "critical";
+	if (s.includes("locked") || s.includes("disabled")) return "info";
+	return "warn";
+}
+async function collectChannelSecurityFindings(params) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const coerceNativeSetting = (value) => {
+		if (value === true) return true;
+		if (value === false) return false;
+		if (value === "auto") return "auto";
+	};
+	const warnDmPolicy = async (input) => {
+		const policyPath = input.policyPath ?? `${input.allowFromPath}policy`;
+		const configAllowFrom = normalizeAllowFromList$1(input.allowFrom);
+		const hasWildcard = configAllowFrom.includes("*");
+		const dmScope = params.cfg.session?.dmScope ?? "main";
+		const storeAllowFrom = await readChannelAllowFromStore(input.provider).catch(() => []);
+		const normalizeEntry = input.normalizeEntry ?? ((value) => value);
+		const normalizedCfg = configAllowFrom.filter((value) => value !== "*").map((value) => normalizeEntry(value)).map((value) => value.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+		const normalizedStore = storeAllowFrom.map((value) => normalizeEntry(value)).map((value) => value.trim()).filter(Boolean);
+		const allowCount = Array.from(new Set([...normalizedCfg, ...normalizedStore])).length;
+		const isMultiUserDm = hasWildcard || allowCount > 1;
+		if (input.dmPolicy === "open") {
+			const allowFromKey = `${input.allowFromPath}allowFrom`;
+			findings.push({
+				checkId: `channels.${input.provider}.dm.open`,
+				severity: "critical",
+				title: `${input.label} DMs are open`,
+				detail: `${policyPath}="open" allows anyone to DM the bot.`,
+				remediation: `Use pairing/allowlist; if you really need open DMs, ensure ${allowFromKey} includes "*".`
+			});
+			if (!hasWildcard) findings.push({
+				checkId: `channels.${input.provider}.dm.open_invalid`,
+				severity: "warn",
+				title: `${input.label} DM config looks inconsistent`,
+				detail: `"open" requires ${allowFromKey} to include "*".`
+			});
+		}
+		if (input.dmPolicy === "disabled") {
+			findings.push({
+				checkId: `channels.${input.provider}.dm.disabled`,
+				severity: "info",
+				title: `${input.label} DMs are disabled`,
+				detail: `${policyPath}="disabled" ignores inbound DMs.`
+			});
+			return;
+		}
+		if (dmScope === "main" && isMultiUserDm) findings.push({
+			checkId: `channels.${input.provider}.dm.scope_main_multiuser`,
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: `${input.label} DMs share the main session`,
+			detail: "Multiple DM senders currently share the main session, which can leak context across users.",
+			remediation: "Run: " + formatCliCommand("anima config set session.dmScope \"per-channel-peer\"") + " (or \"per-account-channel-peer\" for multi-account channels) to isolate DM sessions per sender."
+		});
+	};
+	for (const plugin of params.plugins) {
+		if (!plugin.security) continue;
+		const accountIds = plugin.config.listAccountIds(params.cfg);
+		const defaultAccountId = resolveChannelDefaultAccountId({
+			plugin,
+			cfg: params.cfg,
+			accountIds
+		});
+		const account = plugin.config.resolveAccount(params.cfg, defaultAccountId);
+		if (!(plugin.config.isEnabled ? plugin.config.isEnabled(account, params.cfg) : true)) continue;
+		if (!(plugin.config.isConfigured ? await plugin.config.isConfigured(account, params.cfg) : true)) continue;
+		if (plugin.id === "discord") {
+			const discordCfg = account?.config ?? {};
+			const nativeEnabled = resolveNativeCommandsEnabled({
+				providerId: "discord",
+				providerSetting: coerceNativeSetting(discordCfg.commands?.native),
+				globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.native
+			});
+			const nativeSkillsEnabled = resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
+				providerId: "discord",
+				providerSetting: coerceNativeSetting(discordCfg.commands?.nativeSkills),
+				globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills
+			});
+			if (nativeEnabled || nativeSkillsEnabled) {
+				const defaultGroupPolicy = params.cfg.channels?.defaults?.groupPolicy;
+				const groupPolicy = discordCfg.groupPolicy ?? defaultGroupPolicy ?? "allowlist";
+				const guildEntries = discordCfg.guilds ?? {};
+				const guildsConfigured = Object.keys(guildEntries).length > 0;
+				const hasAnyUserAllowlist = Object.values(guildEntries).some((guild) => {
+					if (!guild || typeof guild !== "object") return false;
+					const g = guild;
+					if (Array.isArray(g.users) && g.users.length > 0) return true;
+					const channels = g.channels;
+					if (!channels || typeof channels !== "object") return false;
+					return Object.values(channels).some((channel) => {
+						if (!channel || typeof channel !== "object") return false;
+						const c = channel;
+						return Array.isArray(c.users) && c.users.length > 0;
+					});
+				});
+				const dmAllowFromRaw = discordCfg.dm?.allowFrom;
+				const dmAllowFrom = Array.isArray(dmAllowFromRaw) ? dmAllowFromRaw : [];
+				const storeAllowFrom = await readChannelAllowFromStore("discord").catch(() => []);
+				const ownerAllowFromConfigured = normalizeAllowFromList$1([...dmAllowFrom, ...storeAllowFrom]).length > 0;
+				const useAccessGroups = params.cfg.commands?.useAccessGroups !== false;
+				if (!useAccessGroups && groupPolicy !== "disabled" && guildsConfigured && !hasAnyUserAllowlist) findings.push({
+					checkId: "channels.discord.commands.native.unrestricted",
+					severity: "critical",
+					title: "Discord slash commands are unrestricted",
+					detail: "commands.useAccessGroups=false disables sender allowlists for Discord slash commands unless a per-guild/channel users allowlist is configured; with no users allowlist, any user in allowed guild channels can invoke /… commands.",
+					remediation: "Set commands.useAccessGroups=true (recommended), or configure channels.discord.guilds.<id>.users (or channels.discord.guilds.<id>.channels.<channel>.users)."
+				});
+				else if (useAccessGroups && groupPolicy !== "disabled" && guildsConfigured && !ownerAllowFromConfigured && !hasAnyUserAllowlist) findings.push({
+					checkId: "channels.discord.commands.native.no_allowlists",
+					severity: "warn",
+					title: "Discord slash commands have no allowlists",
+					detail: "Discord slash commands are enabled, but neither an owner allowFrom list nor any per-guild/channel users allowlist is configured; /… commands will be rejected for everyone.",
+					remediation: "Add your user id to channels.discord.allowFrom (or approve yourself via pairing), or configure channels.discord.guilds.<id>.users."
+				});
+			}
+		}
+		if (plugin.id === "slack") {
+			const slackCfg = account?.config ?? {};
+			const nativeEnabled = resolveNativeCommandsEnabled({
+				providerId: "slack",
+				providerSetting: coerceNativeSetting(slackCfg.commands?.native),
+				globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.native
+			});
+			const nativeSkillsEnabled = resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
+				providerId: "slack",
+				providerSetting: coerceNativeSetting(slackCfg.commands?.nativeSkills),
+				globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills
+			});
+			if (nativeEnabled || nativeSkillsEnabled || slackCfg.slashCommand?.enabled === true) if (!(params.cfg.commands?.useAccessGroups !== false)) findings.push({
+				checkId: "channels.slack.commands.slash.useAccessGroups_off",
+				severity: "critical",
+				title: "Slack slash commands bypass access groups",
+				detail: "Slack slash/native commands are enabled while commands.useAccessGroups=false; this can allow unrestricted /… command execution from channels/users you didn't explicitly authorize.",
+				remediation: "Set commands.useAccessGroups=true (recommended)."
+			});
+			else {
+				const allowFromRaw = account?.config?.allowFrom;
+				const legacyAllowFromRaw = account?.dm?.allowFrom;
+				const allowFrom = Array.isArray(allowFromRaw) ? allowFromRaw : Array.isArray(legacyAllowFromRaw) ? legacyAllowFromRaw : [];
+				const storeAllowFrom = await readChannelAllowFromStore("slack").catch(() => []);
+				const ownerAllowFromConfigured = normalizeAllowFromList$1([...allowFrom, ...storeAllowFrom]).length > 0;
+				const channels = slackCfg.channels ?? {};
+				const hasAnyChannelUsersAllowlist = Object.values(channels).some((value) => {
+					if (!value || typeof value !== "object") return false;
+					const channel = value;
+					return Array.isArray(channel.users) && channel.users.length > 0;
+				});
+				if (!ownerAllowFromConfigured && !hasAnyChannelUsersAllowlist) findings.push({
+					checkId: "channels.slack.commands.slash.no_allowlists",
+					severity: "warn",
+					title: "Slack slash commands have no allowlists",
+					detail: "Slack slash/native commands are enabled, but neither an owner allowFrom list nor any channels.<id>.users allowlist is configured; /… commands will be rejected for everyone.",
+					remediation: "Approve yourself via pairing (recommended), or set channels.slack.allowFrom and/or channels.slack.channels.<id>.users."
+				});
+			}
+		}
+		const dmPolicy = plugin.security.resolveDmPolicy?.({
+			cfg: params.cfg,
+			accountId: defaultAccountId,
+			account
+		});
+		if (dmPolicy) await warnDmPolicy({
+			label: plugin.meta.label ?? plugin.id,
+			provider: plugin.id,
+			dmPolicy: dmPolicy.policy,
+			allowFrom: dmPolicy.allowFrom,
+			policyPath: dmPolicy.policyPath,
+			allowFromPath: dmPolicy.allowFromPath,
+			normalizeEntry: dmPolicy.normalizeEntry
+		});
+		if (plugin.security.collectWarnings) {
+			const warnings = await plugin.security.collectWarnings({
+				cfg: params.cfg,
+				accountId: defaultAccountId,
+				account
+			});
+			for (const message of warnings ?? []) {
+				const trimmed = String(message).trim();
+				if (!trimmed) continue;
+				findings.push({
+					checkId: `channels.${plugin.id}.warning.${findings.length + 1}`,
+					severity: classifyChannelWarningSeverity(trimmed),
+					title: `${plugin.meta.label ?? plugin.id} security warning`,
+					detail: trimmed.replace(/^-\s*/, "")
+				});
+			}
+		}
+		if (plugin.id === "telegram") {
+			if (!(params.cfg.commands?.text !== false)) continue;
+			const telegramCfg = account?.config ?? {};
+			const defaultGroupPolicy = params.cfg.channels?.defaults?.groupPolicy;
+			const groupPolicy = telegramCfg.groupPolicy ?? defaultGroupPolicy ?? "allowlist";
+			const groups = telegramCfg.groups;
+			const groupsConfigured = Boolean(groups) && Object.keys(groups ?? {}).length > 0;
+			if (!(groupPolicy === "open" || groupPolicy === "allowlist" && groupsConfigured)) continue;
+			const storeAllowFrom = await readChannelAllowFromStore("telegram").catch(() => []);
+			const storeHasWildcard = storeAllowFrom.some((v) => String(v).trim() === "*");
+			const invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+			for (const entry of storeAllowFrom) {
+				const normalized = normalizeTelegramAllowFromEntry(entry);
+				if (!normalized || normalized === "*") continue;
+				if (!isNumericTelegramUserId(normalized)) invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries.add(normalized);
+			}
+			const groupAllowFrom = Array.isArray(telegramCfg.groupAllowFrom) ? telegramCfg.groupAllowFrom : [];
+			const groupAllowFromHasWildcard = groupAllowFrom.some((v) => String(v).trim() === "*");
+			for (const entry of groupAllowFrom) {
+				const normalized = normalizeTelegramAllowFromEntry(entry);
+				if (!normalized || normalized === "*") continue;
+				if (!isNumericTelegramUserId(normalized)) invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries.add(normalized);
+			}
+			const dmAllowFrom = Array.isArray(telegramCfg.allowFrom) ? telegramCfg.allowFrom : [];
+			for (const entry of dmAllowFrom) {
+				const normalized = normalizeTelegramAllowFromEntry(entry);
+				if (!normalized || normalized === "*") continue;
+				if (!isNumericTelegramUserId(normalized)) invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries.add(normalized);
+			}
+			const anyGroupOverride = Boolean(groups && Object.values(groups).some((value) => {
+				if (!value || typeof value !== "object") return false;
+				const group = value;
+				const allowFrom = Array.isArray(group.allowFrom) ? group.allowFrom : [];
+				if (allowFrom.length > 0) {
+					for (const entry of allowFrom) {
+						const normalized = normalizeTelegramAllowFromEntry(entry);
+						if (!normalized || normalized === "*") continue;
+						if (!isNumericTelegramUserId(normalized)) invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries.add(normalized);
+					}
+					return true;
+				}
+				const topics = group.topics;
+				if (!topics || typeof topics !== "object") return false;
+				return Object.values(topics).some((topicValue) => {
+					if (!topicValue || typeof topicValue !== "object") return false;
+					const topic = topicValue;
+					const topicAllow = Array.isArray(topic.allowFrom) ? topic.allowFrom : [];
+					for (const entry of topicAllow) {
+						const normalized = normalizeTelegramAllowFromEntry(entry);
+						if (!normalized || normalized === "*") continue;
+						if (!isNumericTelegramUserId(normalized)) invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries.add(normalized);
+					}
+					return topicAllow.length > 0;
+				});
+			}));
+			const hasAnySenderAllowlist = storeAllowFrom.length > 0 || groupAllowFrom.length > 0 || anyGroupOverride;
+			if (invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries.size > 0) {
+				const examples = Array.from(invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries).slice(0, 5);
+				const more = invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries.size > examples.length ? ` (+${invalidTelegramAllowFromEntries.size - examples.length} more)` : "";
+				findings.push({
+					checkId: "channels.telegram.allowFrom.invalid_entries",
+					severity: "warn",
+					title: "Telegram allowlist contains non-numeric entries",
+					detail: `Telegram sender authorization requires numeric Telegram user IDs. Found non-numeric allowFrom entries: ${examples.join(", ")}${more}.`,
+					remediation: "Replace @username entries with numeric Telegram user IDs (use onboarding to resolve), then re-run the audit."
+				});
+			}
+			if (storeHasWildcard || groupAllowFromHasWildcard) {
+				findings.push({
+					checkId: "channels.telegram.groups.allowFrom.wildcard",
+					severity: "critical",
+					title: "Telegram group allowlist contains wildcard",
+					detail: "Telegram group sender allowlist contains \"*\", which allows any group member to run /… commands and control directives.",
+					remediation: "Remove \"*\" from channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom and pairing store; prefer explicit numeric Telegram user IDs."
+				});
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (!hasAnySenderAllowlist) {
+				const providerSetting = telegramCfg.commands?.nativeSkills;
+				const skillsEnabled = resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
+					providerId: "telegram",
+					providerSetting,
+					globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills
+				});
+				findings.push({
+					checkId: "channels.telegram.groups.allowFrom.missing",
+					severity: "critical",
+					title: "Telegram group commands have no sender allowlist",
+					detail: `Telegram group access is enabled but no sender allowlist is configured; this allows any group member to invoke /… commands` + (skillsEnabled ? " (including skill commands)." : "."),
+					remediation: "Approve yourself via pairing (recommended), or set channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom (or per-group groups.<id>.allowFrom)."
+				});
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return findings;
+}
+
+//#endregion
+//#region src/security/audit-extra.sync.ts
+const SMALL_MODEL_PARAM_B_MAX = 300;
+function summarizeGroupPolicy(cfg) {
+	const channels = cfg.channels;
+	if (!channels || typeof channels !== "object") return {
+		open: 0,
+		allowlist: 0,
+		other: 0
+	};
+	let open = 0;
+	let allowlist = 0;
+	let other = 0;
+	for (const value of Object.values(channels)) {
+		if (!value || typeof value !== "object") continue;
+		const policy = value.groupPolicy;
+		if (policy === "open") open += 1;
+		else if (policy === "allowlist") allowlist += 1;
+		else other += 1;
+	}
+	return {
+		open,
+		allowlist,
+		other
+	};
+}
+function isProbablySyncedPath(p) {
+	const s = p.toLowerCase();
+	return s.includes("icloud") || s.includes("dropbox") || s.includes("google drive") || s.includes("googledrive") || s.includes("onedrive");
+}
+function looksLikeEnvRef(value) {
+	const v = value.trim();
+	return v.startsWith("${") && v.endsWith("}");
+}
+function isGatewayRemotelyExposed(cfg) {
+	if ((typeof cfg.gateway?.bind === "string" ? cfg.gateway.bind : "loopback") !== "loopback") return true;
+	const tailscaleMode = cfg.gateway?.tailscale?.mode ?? "off";
+	return tailscaleMode === "serve" || tailscaleMode === "funnel";
+}
+function addModel(models, raw, source) {
+	if (typeof raw !== "string") return;
+	const id = raw.trim();
+	if (!id) return;
+	models.push({
+		id,
+		source
+	});
+}
+function collectModels(cfg) {
+	const out = [];
+	addModel(out, cfg.agents?.defaults?.model?.primary, "agents.defaults.model.primary");
+	for (const f of cfg.agents?.defaults?.model?.fallbacks ?? []) addModel(out, f, "agents.defaults.model.fallbacks");
+	addModel(out, cfg.agents?.defaults?.imageModel?.primary, "agents.defaults.imageModel.primary");
+	for (const f of cfg.agents?.defaults?.imageModel?.fallbacks ?? []) addModel(out, f, "agents.defaults.imageModel.fallbacks");
+	const list = Array.isArray(cfg.agents?.list) ? cfg.agents?.list : [];
+	for (const agent of list ?? []) {
+		if (!agent || typeof agent !== "object") continue;
+		const id = typeof agent.id === "string" ? agent.id : "";
+		const model = agent.model;
+		if (typeof model === "string") addModel(out, model, `agents.list.${id}.model`);
+		else if (model && typeof model === "object") {
+			addModel(out, model.primary, `agents.list.${id}.model.primary`);
+			const fallbacks = model.fallbacks;
+			if (Array.isArray(fallbacks)) for (const f of fallbacks) addModel(out, f, `agents.list.${id}.model.fallbacks`);
+		}
+	}
+	return out;
+}
+const LEGACY_MODEL_PATTERNS = [
+	{
+		id: "openai.gpt35",
+		re: /\bgpt-3\.5\b/i,
+		label: "GPT-3.5 family"
+	},
+	{
+		id: "anthropic.claude2",
+		re: /\bclaude-(instant|2)\b/i,
+		label: "Claude 2/Instant family"
+	},
+	{
+		id: "openai.gpt4_legacy",
+		re: /\bgpt-4-(0314|0613)\b/i,
+		label: "Legacy GPT-4 snapshots"
+	}
+];
+const WEAK_TIER_MODEL_PATTERNS = [{
+	id: "anthropic.haiku",
+	re: /\bhaiku\b/i,
+	label: "Haiku tier (smaller model)"
+}];
+function isGptModel(id) {
+	return /\bgpt-/i.test(id);
+}
+function isGpt5OrHigher(id) {
+	return /\bgpt-5(?:\b|[.-])/i.test(id);
+}
+function isClaudeModel(id) {
+	return /\bclaude-/i.test(id);
+}
+function isClaude45OrHigher(id) {
+	return /\bclaude-[^\s/]*?(?:-4-?(?:[5-9]|[1-9]\d)\b|4\.(?:[5-9]|[1-9]\d)\b|-[5-9](?:\b|[.-]))/i.test(id);
+}
+function extractAgentIdFromSource(source) {
+	return source.match(/^agents\.list\.([^.]*)\./)?.[1] ?? null;
+}
+function unionAllow$1(base, extra) {
+	if (!Array.isArray(extra) || extra.length === 0) return base;
+	if (!Array.isArray(base) || base.length === 0) return Array.from(new Set(["*", ...extra]));
+	return Array.from(new Set([...base, ...extra]));
+}
+function pickToolPolicy$1(config) {
+	if (!config) return null;
+	const allow = Array.isArray(config.allow) ? unionAllow$1(config.allow, config.alsoAllow) : Array.isArray(config.alsoAllow) && config.alsoAllow.length > 0 ? unionAllow$1(void 0, config.alsoAllow) : void 0;
+	const deny = Array.isArray(config.deny) ? config.deny : void 0;
+	if (!allow && !deny) return null;
+	return {
+		allow,
+		deny
+	};
+}
+function hasConfiguredDockerConfig(docker) {
+	if (!docker || typeof docker !== "object") return false;
+	return Object.values(docker).some((value) => value !== void 0);
+}
+function normalizeNodeCommand(value) {
+	return typeof value === "string" ? value.trim() : "";
+}
+function listKnownNodeCommands(cfg) {
+	const baseCfg = {
+		...cfg,
+		gateway: {
+			...cfg.gateway,
+			nodes: {
+				...cfg.gateway?.nodes,
+				denyCommands: []
+			}
+		}
+	};
+	const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+	for (const platform of [
+		"ios",
+		"android",
+		"macos",
+		"linux",
+		"windows",
+		"unknown"
+	]) {
+		const allow = resolveNodeCommandAllowlist(baseCfg, { platform });
+		for (const cmd of allow) {
+			const normalized = normalizeNodeCommand(cmd);
+			if (normalized) out.add(normalized);
+		}
+	}
+	return out;
+}
+function looksLikeNodeCommandPattern(value) {
+	if (!value) return false;
+	if (/[?*[\]{}(),|]/.test(value)) return true;
+	if (value.startsWith("/") || value.endsWith("/") || value.startsWith("^") || value.endsWith("$")) return true;
+	return /\s/.test(value) || value.includes("group:");
+}
+function resolveToolPolicies$1(params) {
+	const policies = [];
+	const profilePolicy = resolveToolProfilePolicy(params.agentTools?.profile ?? params.cfg.tools?.profile);
+	if (profilePolicy) policies.push(profilePolicy);
+	const globalPolicy = pickToolPolicy$1(params.cfg.tools ?? void 0);
+	if (globalPolicy) policies.push(globalPolicy);
+	const agentPolicy = pickToolPolicy$1(params.agentTools);
+	if (agentPolicy) policies.push(agentPolicy);
+	if (params.sandboxMode === "all") {
+		const sandboxPolicy = resolveSandboxToolPolicyForAgent(params.cfg, params.agentId ?? void 0);
+		policies.push(sandboxPolicy);
+	}
+	return policies;
+}
+function hasWebSearchKey(cfg, env) {
+	const search = cfg.tools?.web?.search;
+	return Boolean(search?.apiKey || search?.perplexity?.apiKey || env.BRAVE_API_KEY || env.PERPLEXITY_API_KEY || env.OPENROUTER_API_KEY);
+}
+function isWebSearchEnabled(cfg, env) {
+	const enabled = cfg.tools?.web?.search?.enabled;
+	if (enabled === false) return false;
+	if (enabled === true) return true;
+	return hasWebSearchKey(cfg, env);
+}
+function isWebFetchEnabled(cfg) {
+	if (cfg.tools?.web?.fetch?.enabled === false) return false;
+	return true;
+}
+function isBrowserEnabled(cfg) {
+	try {
+		return resolveBrowserConfig(cfg.browser, cfg).enabled;
+	} catch {
+		return true;
+	}
+}
+function listGroupPolicyOpen(cfg) {
+	const out = [];
+	const channels = cfg.channels;
+	if (!channels || typeof channels !== "object") return out;
+	for (const [channelId, value] of Object.entries(channels)) {
+		if (!value || typeof value !== "object") continue;
+		const section = value;
+		if (section.groupPolicy === "open") out.push(`channels.${channelId}.groupPolicy`);
+		const accounts = section.accounts;
+		if (accounts && typeof accounts === "object") for (const [accountId, accountVal] of Object.entries(accounts)) {
+			if (!accountVal || typeof accountVal !== "object") continue;
+			if (accountVal.groupPolicy === "open") out.push(`channels.${channelId}.accounts.${accountId}.groupPolicy`);
+		}
+	}
+	return out;
+}
+function collectAttackSurfaceSummaryFindings(cfg) {
+	const group = summarizeGroupPolicy(cfg);
+	const elevated = cfg.tools?.elevated?.enabled !== false;
+	const webhooksEnabled = cfg.hooks?.enabled === true;
+	const internalHooksEnabled = cfg.hooks?.internal?.enabled === true;
+	const browserEnabled = cfg.browser?.enabled ?? true;
+	return [{
+		checkId: "summary.attack_surface",
+		severity: "info",
+		title: "Attack surface summary",
+		detail: `groups: open=${group.open}, allowlist=${group.allowlist}\ntools.elevated: ${elevated ? "enabled" : "disabled"}\nhooks.webhooks: ${webhooksEnabled ? "enabled" : "disabled"}\nhooks.internal: ${internalHooksEnabled ? "enabled" : "disabled"}\nbrowser control: ${browserEnabled ? "enabled" : "disabled"}`
+	}];
+}
+function collectSyncedFolderFindings(params) {
+	const findings = [];
+	if (isProbablySyncedPath(params.stateDir) || isProbablySyncedPath(params.configPath)) findings.push({
+		checkId: "fs.synced_dir",
+		severity: "warn",
+		title: "State/config path looks like a synced folder",
+		detail: `stateDir=${params.stateDir}, configPath=${params.configPath}. Synced folders (iCloud/Dropbox/OneDrive/Google Drive) can leak tokens and transcripts onto other devices.`,
+		remediation: `Keep ANIMA_STATE_DIR on a local-only volume and re-run "${formatCliCommand("anima security audit --fix")}".`
+	});
+	return findings;
+}
+function collectSecretsInConfigFindings(cfg) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const password = typeof cfg.gateway?.auth?.password === "string" ? cfg.gateway.auth.password.trim() : "";
+	if (password && !looksLikeEnvRef(password)) findings.push({
+		checkId: "config.secrets.gateway_password_in_config",
+		severity: "warn",
+		title: "Gateway password is stored in config",
+		detail: "gateway.auth.password is set in the config file; prefer environment variables for secrets when possible.",
+		remediation: "Prefer ANIMA_GATEWAY_PASSWORD (env) and remove gateway.auth.password from disk."
+	});
+	const hooksToken = typeof cfg.hooks?.token === "string" ? cfg.hooks.token.trim() : "";
+	if (cfg.hooks?.enabled === true && hooksToken && !looksLikeEnvRef(hooksToken)) findings.push({
+		checkId: "config.secrets.hooks_token_in_config",
+		severity: "info",
+		title: "Hooks token is stored in config",
+		detail: "hooks.token is set in the config file; keep config perms tight and treat it like an API secret."
+	});
+	return findings;
+}
+function collectHooksHardeningFindings(cfg, env = process.env) {
+	const findings = [];
+	if (cfg.hooks?.enabled !== true) return findings;
+	const token = typeof cfg.hooks?.token === "string" ? cfg.hooks.token.trim() : "";
+	if (token && token.length < 24) findings.push({
+		checkId: "hooks.token_too_short",
+		severity: "warn",
+		title: "Hooks token looks short",
+		detail: `hooks.token is ${token.length} chars; prefer a long random token.`
+	});
+	const gatewayAuth = resolveGatewayAuth({
+		authConfig: cfg.gateway?.auth,
+		tailscaleMode: cfg.gateway?.tailscale?.mode ?? "off",
+		env
+	});
+	const animaGatewayToken = typeof env.ANIMA_GATEWAY_TOKEN === "string" && env.ANIMA_GATEWAY_TOKEN.trim() ? env.ANIMA_GATEWAY_TOKEN.trim() : null;
+	const gatewayToken = gatewayAuth.mode === "token" && typeof gatewayAuth.token === "string" && gatewayAuth.token.trim() ? gatewayAuth.token.trim() : animaGatewayToken ? animaGatewayToken : null;
+	if (token && gatewayToken && token === gatewayToken) findings.push({
+		checkId: "hooks.token_reuse_gateway_token",
+		severity: "warn",
+		title: "Hooks token reuses the Gateway token",
+		detail: "hooks.token matches gateway.auth token; compromise of hooks expands blast radius to the Gateway API.",
+		remediation: "Use a separate hooks.token dedicated to hook ingress."
+	});
+	if ((typeof cfg.hooks?.path === "string" ? cfg.hooks.path.trim() : "") === "/") findings.push({
+		checkId: "hooks.path_root",
+		severity: "critical",
+		title: "Hooks base path is '/'",
+		detail: "hooks.path='/' would shadow other HTTP endpoints and is unsafe.",
+		remediation: "Use a dedicated path like '/hooks'."
+	});
+	const allowRequestSessionKey = cfg.hooks?.allowRequestSessionKey === true;
+	const defaultSessionKey = typeof cfg.hooks?.defaultSessionKey === "string" ? cfg.hooks.defaultSessionKey.trim() : "";
+	const allowedPrefixes = Array.isArray(cfg.hooks?.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes) ? cfg.hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes.map((prefix) => prefix.trim()).filter((prefix) => prefix.length > 0) : [];
+	const remoteExposure = isGatewayRemotelyExposed(cfg);
+	if (!defaultSessionKey) findings.push({
+		checkId: "hooks.default_session_key_unset",
+		severity: "warn",
+		title: "hooks.defaultSessionKey is not configured",
+		detail: "Hook agent runs without explicit sessionKey use generated per-request keys. Set hooks.defaultSessionKey to keep hook ingress scoped to a known session.",
+		remediation: "Set hooks.defaultSessionKey (for example, \"hook:ingress\")."
+	});
+	if (allowRequestSessionKey) findings.push({
+		checkId: "hooks.request_session_key_enabled",
+		severity: remoteExposure ? "critical" : "warn",
+		title: "External hook payloads may override sessionKey",
+		detail: "hooks.allowRequestSessionKey=true allows `/hooks/agent` callers to choose the session key. Treat hook token holders as full-trust unless you also restrict prefixes.",
+		remediation: "Set hooks.allowRequestSessionKey=false (recommended) or constrain hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes."
+	});
+	if (allowRequestSessionKey && allowedPrefixes.length === 0) findings.push({
+		checkId: "hooks.request_session_key_prefixes_missing",
+		severity: remoteExposure ? "critical" : "warn",
+		title: "Request sessionKey override is enabled without prefix restrictions",
+		detail: "hooks.allowRequestSessionKey=true and hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes is unset/empty, so request payloads can target arbitrary session key shapes.",
+		remediation: "Set hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes (for example, [\"hook:\"]) or disable request overrides."
+	});
+	return findings;
+}
+function collectGatewayHttpSessionKeyOverrideFindings(cfg) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const chatCompletionsEnabled = cfg.gateway?.http?.endpoints?.chatCompletions?.enabled === true;
+	const responsesEnabled = cfg.gateway?.http?.endpoints?.responses?.enabled === true;
+	if (!chatCompletionsEnabled && !responsesEnabled) return findings;
+	const enabledEndpoints = [chatCompletionsEnabled ? "/v1/chat/completions" : null, responsesEnabled ? "/v1/responses" : null].filter((entry) => Boolean(entry));
+	findings.push({
+		checkId: "gateway.http.session_key_override_enabled",
+		severity: "info",
+		title: "HTTP API session-key override is enabled",
+		detail: `${enabledEndpoints.join(", ")} accept x-anima-session-key for per-request session routing. Treat API credential holders as trusted principals.`
+	});
+	return findings;
+}
+function collectSandboxDockerNoopFindings(cfg) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const configuredPaths = [];
+	const agents = Array.isArray(cfg.agents?.list) ? cfg.agents.list : [];
+	const defaultsSandbox = cfg.agents?.defaults?.sandbox;
+	const hasDefaultDocker = hasConfiguredDockerConfig(defaultsSandbox?.docker);
+	const defaultMode = defaultsSandbox?.mode ?? "off";
+	const hasAnySandboxEnabledAgent = agents.some((entry) => {
+		if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object" || typeof entry.id !== "string") return false;
+		return resolveSandboxConfigForAgent(cfg, entry.id).mode !== "off";
+	});
+	if (hasDefaultDocker && defaultMode === "off" && !hasAnySandboxEnabledAgent) configuredPaths.push("agents.defaults.sandbox.docker");
+	for (const entry of agents) {
+		if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object" || typeof entry.id !== "string") continue;
+		if (!hasConfiguredDockerConfig(entry.sandbox?.docker)) continue;
+		if (resolveSandboxConfigForAgent(cfg, entry.id).mode === "off") configuredPaths.push(`agents.list.${entry.id}.sandbox.docker`);
+	}
+	if (configuredPaths.length === 0) return findings;
+	findings.push({
+		checkId: "sandbox.docker_config_mode_off",
+		severity: "warn",
+		title: "Sandbox docker settings configured while sandbox mode is off",
+		detail: "These docker settings will not take effect until sandbox mode is enabled:\n" + configuredPaths.map((entry) => `- ${entry}`).join("\n"),
+		remediation: "Enable sandbox mode (`agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"non-main\"` or `\"all\"`) where needed, or remove unused docker settings."
+	});
+	return findings;
+}
+function collectNodeDenyCommandPatternFindings(cfg) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const denyListRaw = cfg.gateway?.nodes?.denyCommands;
+	if (!Array.isArray(denyListRaw) || denyListRaw.length === 0) return findings;
+	const denyList = denyListRaw.map(normalizeNodeCommand).filter(Boolean);
+	if (denyList.length === 0) return findings;
+	const knownCommands = listKnownNodeCommands(cfg);
+	const patternLike = denyList.filter((entry) => looksLikeNodeCommandPattern(entry));
+	const unknownExact = denyList.filter((entry) => !looksLikeNodeCommandPattern(entry) && !knownCommands.has(entry));
+	if (patternLike.length === 0 && unknownExact.length === 0) return findings;
+	const detailParts = [];
+	if (patternLike.length > 0) detailParts.push(`Pattern-like entries (not supported by exact matching): ${patternLike.join(", ")}`);
+	if (unknownExact.length > 0) detailParts.push(`Unknown command names (not in defaults/allowCommands): ${unknownExact.join(", ")}`);
+	const examples = Array.from(knownCommands).slice(0, 8);
+	findings.push({
+		checkId: "gateway.nodes.deny_commands_ineffective",
+		severity: "warn",
+		title: "Some gateway.nodes.denyCommands entries are ineffective",
+		detail: "gateway.nodes.denyCommands uses exact command-name matching only.\n" + detailParts.map((entry) => `- ${entry}`).join("\n"),
+		remediation: `Use exact command names (for example: ${examples.join(", ")}). If you need broader restrictions, remove risky commands from allowCommands/default workflows.`
+	});
+	return findings;
+}
+function collectMinimalProfileOverrideFindings(cfg) {
+	const findings = [];
+	if (cfg.tools?.profile !== "minimal") return findings;
+	const overrides = (cfg.agents?.list ?? []).filter((entry) => {
+		return Boolean(entry && typeof entry === "object" && typeof entry.id === "string" && entry.tools?.profile && entry.tools.profile !== "minimal");
+	}).map((entry) => `${entry.id}=${entry.tools?.profile}`);
+	if (overrides.length === 0) return findings;
+	findings.push({
+		checkId: "tools.profile_minimal_overridden",
+		severity: "warn",
+		title: "Global tools.profile=minimal is overridden by agent profiles",
+		detail: "Global minimal profile is set, but these agent profiles take precedence:\n" + overrides.map((entry) => `- agents.list.${entry}`).join("\n"),
+		remediation: "Set those agents to `tools.profile=\"minimal\"` (or remove the agent override) if you want minimal tools enforced globally."
+	});
+	return findings;
+}
+function collectModelHygieneFindings(cfg) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const models = collectModels(cfg);
+	if (models.length === 0) return findings;
+	const weakMatches = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	const addWeakMatch = (model, source, reason) => {
+		const key = `${model}@@${source}`;
+		const existing = weakMatches.get(key);
+		if (!existing) {
+			weakMatches.set(key, {
+				model,
+				source,
+				reasons: [reason]
+			});
+			return;
+		}
+		if (!existing.reasons.includes(reason)) existing.reasons.push(reason);
+	};
+	for (const entry of models) {
+		for (const pat of WEAK_TIER_MODEL_PATTERNS) if (pat.re.test(entry.id)) {
+			addWeakMatch(entry.id, entry.source, pat.label);
+			break;
+		}
+		if (isGptModel(entry.id) && !isGpt5OrHigher(entry.id)) addWeakMatch(entry.id, entry.source, "Below GPT-5 family");
+		if (isClaudeModel(entry.id) && !isClaude45OrHigher(entry.id)) addWeakMatch(entry.id, entry.source, "Below Claude 4.5");
+	}
+	const matches = [];
+	for (const entry of models) for (const pat of LEGACY_MODEL_PATTERNS) if (pat.re.test(entry.id)) {
+		matches.push({
+			model: entry.id,
+			source: entry.source,
+			reason: pat.label
+		});
+		break;
+	}
+	if (matches.length > 0) {
+		const lines = matches.slice(0, 12).map((m) => `- ${m.model} (${m.reason}) @ ${m.source}`).join("\n");
+		const more = matches.length > 12 ? `\n…${matches.length - 12} more` : "";
+		findings.push({
+			checkId: "models.legacy",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Some configured models look legacy",
+			detail: "Older/legacy models can be less robust against prompt injection and tool misuse.\n" + lines + more,
+			remediation: "Prefer modern, instruction-hardened models for any bot that can run tools."
+		});
+	}
+	if (weakMatches.size > 0) {
+		const lines = Array.from(weakMatches.values()).slice(0, 12).map((m) => `- ${m.model} (${m.reasons.join("; ")}) @ ${m.source}`).join("\n");
+		const more = weakMatches.size > 12 ? `\n…${weakMatches.size - 12} more` : "";
+		findings.push({
+			checkId: "models.weak_tier",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Some configured models are below recommended tiers",
+			detail: "Smaller/older models are generally more susceptible to prompt injection and tool misuse.\n" + lines + more,
+			remediation: "Use the latest, top-tier model for any bot with tools or untrusted inboxes. Avoid Haiku tiers; prefer GPT-5+ and Claude 4.5+."
+		});
+	}
+	return findings;
+}
+function collectSmallModelRiskFindings(params) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const models = collectModels(params.cfg).filter((entry) => !entry.source.includes("imageModel"));
+	if (models.length === 0) return findings;
+	const smallModels = models.map((entry) => {
+		const paramB = inferParamBFromIdOrName(entry.id);
+		if (!paramB || paramB > SMALL_MODEL_PARAM_B_MAX) return null;
+		return {
+			...entry,
+			paramB
+		};
+	}).filter((entry) => Boolean(entry));
+	if (smallModels.length === 0) return findings;
+	let hasUnsafe = false;
+	const modelLines = [];
+	const exposureSet = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+	for (const entry of smallModels) {
+		const agentId = extractAgentIdFromSource(entry.source);
+		const sandboxMode = resolveSandboxConfigForAgent(params.cfg, agentId ?? void 0).mode;
+		const agentTools = agentId && params.cfg.agents?.list ? params.cfg.agents.list.find((agent) => agent?.id === agentId)?.tools : void 0;
+		const policies = resolveToolPolicies$1({
+			cfg: params.cfg,
+			agentTools,
+			sandboxMode,
+			agentId
+		});
+		const exposed = [];
+		if (isWebSearchEnabled(params.cfg, params.env)) {
+			if (isToolAllowedByPolicies("web_search", policies)) exposed.push("web_search");
+		}
+		if (isWebFetchEnabled(params.cfg)) {
+			if (isToolAllowedByPolicies("web_fetch", policies)) exposed.push("web_fetch");
+		}
+		if (isBrowserEnabled(params.cfg)) {
+			if (isToolAllowedByPolicies("browser", policies)) exposed.push("browser");
+		}
+		for (const tool of exposed) exposureSet.add(tool);
+		const sandboxLabel = sandboxMode === "all" ? "sandbox=all" : `sandbox=${sandboxMode}`;
+		const exposureLabel = exposed.length > 0 ? ` web=[${exposed.join(", ")}]` : " web=[off]";
+		const safe = sandboxMode === "all" && exposed.length === 0;
+		if (!safe) hasUnsafe = true;
+		const statusLabel = safe ? "ok" : "unsafe";
+		modelLines.push(`- ${entry.id} (${entry.paramB}B) @ ${entry.source} (${statusLabel}; ${sandboxLabel};${exposureLabel})`);
+	}
+	const exposureList = Array.from(exposureSet);
+	const exposureDetail = exposureList.length > 0 ? `Uncontrolled input tools allowed: ${exposureList.join(", ")}.` : "No web/browser tools detected for these models.";
+	findings.push({
+		checkId: "models.small_params",
+		severity: hasUnsafe ? "critical" : "info",
+		title: "Small models require sandboxing and web tools disabled",
+		detail: `Small models (<=${SMALL_MODEL_PARAM_B_MAX}B params) detected:\n` + modelLines.join("\n") + `\n` + exposureDetail + "\nSmall models are not recommended for untrusted inputs.",
+		remediation: "If you must use small models, enable sandboxing for all sessions (agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\") and disable web_search/web_fetch/browser (tools.deny=[\"group:web\",\"browser\"])."
+	});
+	return findings;
+}
+function collectExposureMatrixFindings(cfg) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const openGroups = listGroupPolicyOpen(cfg);
+	if (openGroups.length === 0) return findings;
+	if (cfg.tools?.elevated?.enabled !== false) findings.push({
+		checkId: "security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated",
+		severity: "critical",
+		title: "Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled",
+		detail: `Found groupPolicy="open" at:\n${openGroups.map((p) => `- ${p}`).join("\n")}\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.`,
+		remediation: `Set groupPolicy="allowlist" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight.`
+	});
+	return findings;
+}
+
+//#endregion
+//#region src/config/includes-scan.ts
+function listDirectIncludes(parsed) {
+	const out = [];
+	const visit = (value) => {
+		if (!value) return;
+		if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+			for (const item of value) visit(item);
+			return;
+		}
+		if (typeof value !== "object") return;
+		const rec = value;
+		const includeVal = rec[INCLUDE_KEY];
+		if (typeof includeVal === "string") out.push(includeVal);
+		else if (Array.isArray(includeVal)) {
+			for (const item of includeVal) if (typeof item === "string") out.push(item);
+		}
+		for (const v of Object.values(rec)) visit(v);
+	};
+	visit(parsed);
+	return out;
+}
+function resolveIncludePath(baseConfigPath, includePath) {
+	return path.normalize(path.isAbsolute(includePath) ? includePath : path.resolve(path.dirname(baseConfigPath), includePath));
+}
+async function collectIncludePathsRecursive(params) {
+	const visited = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+	const result = [];
+	const walk = async (basePath, parsed, depth) => {
+		if (depth > MAX_INCLUDE_DEPTH) return;
+		for (const raw of listDirectIncludes(parsed)) {
+			const resolved = resolveIncludePath(basePath, raw);
+			if (visited.has(resolved)) continue;
+			visited.add(resolved);
+			result.push(resolved);
+			const rawText = await fs$1.readFile(resolved, "utf-8").catch(() => null);
+			if (!rawText) continue;
+			const nestedParsed = (() => {
+				try {
+					return JSON5.parse(rawText);
+				} catch {
+					return null;
+				}
+			})();
+			if (nestedParsed) await walk(resolved, nestedParsed, depth + 1);
+		}
+	};
+	await walk(params.configPath, params.parsed, 0);
+	return result;
+}
+
+//#endregion
+//#region src/security/windows-acl.ts
+const INHERIT_FLAGS = new Set([
+	"I",
+	"OI",
+	"CI",
+	"IO",
+	"NP"
+]);
+const WORLD_PRINCIPALS = new Set([
+	"everyone",
+	"users",
+	"builtin\\users",
+	"authenticated users",
+	"nt authority\\authenticated users"
+]);
+const TRUSTED_BASE = new Set([
+	"nt authority\\system",
+	"system",
+	"builtin\\administrators",
+	"creator owner"
+]);
+const WORLD_SUFFIXES = ["\\users", "\\authenticated users"];
+const TRUSTED_SUFFIXES = ["\\administrators", "\\system"];
+const normalize = (value) => value.trim().toLowerCase();
+function resolveWindowsUserPrincipal(env) {
+	const username = env?.USERNAME?.trim() || os.userInfo().username?.trim();
+	if (!username) return null;
+	const domain = env?.USERDOMAIN?.trim();
+	return domain ? `${domain}\\${username}` : username;
+}
+function buildTrustedPrincipals(env) {
+	const trusted = new Set(TRUSTED_BASE);
+	const principal = resolveWindowsUserPrincipal(env);
+	if (principal) {
+		trusted.add(normalize(principal));
+		const userOnly = principal.split("\\").at(-1);
+		if (userOnly) trusted.add(normalize(userOnly));
+	}
+	return trusted;
+}
+function classifyPrincipal(principal, env) {
+	const normalized = normalize(principal);
+	if (buildTrustedPrincipals(env).has(normalized) || TRUSTED_SUFFIXES.some((s) => normalized.endsWith(s))) return "trusted";
+	if (WORLD_PRINCIPALS.has(normalized) || WORLD_SUFFIXES.some((s) => normalized.endsWith(s))) return "world";
+	return "group";
+}
+function rightsFromTokens(tokens) {
+	const upper = tokens.join("").toUpperCase();
+	const canWrite = upper.includes("F") || upper.includes("M") || upper.includes("W") || upper.includes("D");
+	return {
+		canRead: upper.includes("F") || upper.includes("M") || upper.includes("R"),
+		canWrite
+	};
+}
+function parseIcaclsOutput(output, targetPath) {
+	const entries = [];
+	const normalizedTarget = targetPath.trim();
+	const lowerTarget = normalizedTarget.toLowerCase();
+	const quotedTarget = `"${normalizedTarget}"`;
+	const quotedLower = quotedTarget.toLowerCase();
+	for (const rawLine of output.split(/\r?\n/)) {
+		const line = rawLine.trimEnd();
+		if (!line.trim()) continue;
+		const trimmed = line.trim();
+		const lower = trimmed.toLowerCase();
+		if (lower.startsWith("successfully processed") || lower.startsWith("processed") || lower.startsWith("failed processing") || lower.startsWith("no mapping between account names")) continue;
+		let entry = trimmed;
+		if (lower.startsWith(lowerTarget)) entry = trimmed.slice(normalizedTarget.length).trim();
+		else if (lower.startsWith(quotedLower)) entry = trimmed.slice(quotedTarget.length).trim();
+		if (!entry) continue;
+		const idx = entry.indexOf(":");
+		if (idx === -1) continue;
+		const principal = entry.slice(0, idx).trim();
+		const rawRights = entry.slice(idx + 1).trim();
+		const tokens = rawRights.match(/\(([^)]+)\)/g)?.map((token) => token.slice(1, -1).trim()).filter(Boolean) ?? [];
+		if (tokens.some((token) => token.toUpperCase() === "DENY")) continue;
+		const rights = tokens.filter((token) => !INHERIT_FLAGS.has(token.toUpperCase()));
+		if (rights.length === 0) continue;
+		const { canRead, canWrite } = rightsFromTokens(rights);
+		entries.push({
+			principal,
+			rights,
+			rawRights,
+			canRead,
+			canWrite
+		});
+	}
+	return entries;
+}
+function summarizeWindowsAcl(entries, env) {
+	const trusted = [];
+	const untrustedWorld = [];
+	const untrustedGroup = [];
+	for (const entry of entries) {
+		const classification = classifyPrincipal(entry.principal, env);
+		if (classification === "trusted") trusted.push(entry);
+		else if (classification === "world") untrustedWorld.push(entry);
+		else untrustedGroup.push(entry);
+	}
+	return {
+		trusted,
+		untrustedWorld,
+		untrustedGroup
+	};
+}
+async function inspectWindowsAcl(targetPath, opts) {
+	const exec = opts?.exec ?? runExec;
+	try {
+		const { stdout, stderr } = await exec("icacls", [targetPath]);
+		const entries = parseIcaclsOutput(`${stdout}\n${stderr}`.trim(), targetPath);
+		const { trusted, untrustedWorld, untrustedGroup } = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries, opts?.env);
+		return {
+			ok: true,
+			entries,
+			trusted,
+			untrustedWorld,
+			untrustedGroup
+		};
+	} catch (err) {
+		return {
+			ok: false,
+			entries: [],
+			trusted: [],
+			untrustedWorld: [],
+			untrustedGroup: [],
+			error: String(err)
+		};
+	}
+}
+function formatWindowsAclSummary(summary) {
+	if (!summary.ok) return "unknown";
+	const untrusted = [...summary.untrustedWorld, ...summary.untrustedGroup];
+	if (untrusted.length === 0) return "trusted-only";
+	return untrusted.map((entry) => `${entry.principal}:${entry.rawRights}`).join(", ");
+}
+function formatIcaclsResetCommand(targetPath, opts) {
+	const user = resolveWindowsUserPrincipal(opts.env) ?? "%USERNAME%";
+	const grant = opts.isDir ? "(OI)(CI)F" : "F";
+	return `icacls "${targetPath}" /inheritance:r /grant:r "${user}:${grant}" /grant:r "SYSTEM:${grant}"`;
+}
+function createIcaclsResetCommand(targetPath, opts) {
+	const user = resolveWindowsUserPrincipal(opts.env);
+	if (!user) return null;
+	const grant = opts.isDir ? "(OI)(CI)F" : "F";
+	return {
+		command: "icacls",
+		args: [
+			targetPath,
+			"/inheritance:r",
+			"/grant:r",
+			`${user}:${grant}`,
+			"/grant:r",
+			`SYSTEM:${grant}`
+		],
+		display: formatIcaclsResetCommand(targetPath, opts)
+	};
+}
+
+//#endregion
+//#region src/security/audit-fs.ts
+async function safeStat(targetPath) {
+	try {
+		const lst = await fs.lstat(targetPath);
+		return {
+			ok: true,
+			isSymlink: lst.isSymbolicLink(),
+			isDir: lst.isDirectory(),
+			mode: typeof lst.mode === "number" ? lst.mode : null,
+			uid: typeof lst.uid === "number" ? lst.uid : null,
+			gid: typeof lst.gid === "number" ? lst.gid : null
+		};
+	} catch (err) {
+		return {
+			ok: false,
+			isSymlink: false,
+			isDir: false,
+			mode: null,
+			uid: null,
+			gid: null,
+			error: String(err)
+		};
+	}
+}
+async function inspectPathPermissions(targetPath, opts) {
+	const st = await safeStat(targetPath);
+	if (!st.ok) return {
+		ok: false,
+		isSymlink: false,
+		isDir: false,
+		mode: null,
+		bits: null,
+		source: "unknown",
+		worldWritable: false,
+		groupWritable: false,
+		worldReadable: false,
+		groupReadable: false,
+		error: st.error
+	};
+	const bits = modeBits(st.mode);
+	if ((opts?.platform ?? process.platform) === "win32") {
+		const acl = await inspectWindowsAcl(targetPath, {
+			env: opts?.env,
+			exec: opts?.exec
+		});
+		if (!acl.ok) return {
+			ok: true,
+			isSymlink: st.isSymlink,
+			isDir: st.isDir,
+			mode: st.mode,
+			bits,
+			source: "unknown",
+			worldWritable: false,
+			groupWritable: false,
+			worldReadable: false,
+			groupReadable: false,
+			error: acl.error
+		};
+		return {
+			ok: true,
+			isSymlink: st.isSymlink,
+			isDir: st.isDir,
+			mode: st.mode,
+			bits,
+			source: "windows-acl",
+			worldWritable: acl.untrustedWorld.some((entry) => entry.canWrite),
+			groupWritable: acl.untrustedGroup.some((entry) => entry.canWrite),
+			worldReadable: acl.untrustedWorld.some((entry) => entry.canRead),
+			groupReadable: acl.untrustedGroup.some((entry) => entry.canRead),
+			aclSummary: formatWindowsAclSummary(acl)
+		};
+	}
+	return {
+		ok: true,
+		isSymlink: st.isSymlink,
+		isDir: st.isDir,
+		mode: st.mode,
+		bits,
+		source: "posix",
+		worldWritable: isWorldWritable(bits),
+		groupWritable: isGroupWritable(bits),
+		worldReadable: isWorldReadable(bits),
+		groupReadable: isGroupReadable(bits)
+	};
+}
+function formatPermissionDetail(targetPath, perms) {
+	if (perms.source === "windows-acl") return `${targetPath} acl=${perms.aclSummary ?? "unknown"}`;
+	return `${targetPath} mode=${formatOctal(perms.bits)}`;
+}
+function formatPermissionRemediation(params) {
+	if (params.perms.source === "windows-acl") return formatIcaclsResetCommand(params.targetPath, {
+		isDir: params.isDir,
+		env: params.env
+	});
+	return `chmod ${params.posixMode.toString(8).padStart(3, "0")} ${params.targetPath}`;
+}
+function modeBits(mode) {
+	if (mode == null) return null;
+	return mode & 511;
+}
+function formatOctal(bits) {
+	if (bits == null) return "unknown";
+	return bits.toString(8).padStart(3, "0");
+}
+function isWorldWritable(bits) {
+	if (bits == null) return false;
+	return (bits & 2) !== 0;
+}
+function isGroupWritable(bits) {
+	if (bits == null) return false;
+	return (bits & 16) !== 0;
+}
+function isWorldReadable(bits) {
+	if (bits == null) return false;
+	return (bits & 4) !== 0;
+}
+function isGroupReadable(bits) {
+	if (bits == null) return false;
+	return (bits & 32) !== 0;
+}
+
+//#endregion
+//#region src/security/audit-extra.async.ts
+/**
+* Asynchronous security audit collector functions.
+*
+* These functions perform I/O (filesystem, config reads) to detect security issues.
+*/
+function expandTilde(p, env) {
+	if (!p.startsWith("~")) return p;
+	const home = typeof env.HOME === "string" && env.HOME.trim() ? env.HOME.trim() : null;
+	if (!home) return null;
+	if (p === "~") return home;
+	if (p.startsWith("~/") || p.startsWith("~\\")) return path.join(home, p.slice(2));
+	return null;
+}
+async function readPluginManifestExtensions(pluginPath) {
+	const manifestPath = path.join(pluginPath, "package.json");
+	const raw = await fs.readFile(manifestPath, "utf-8").catch(() => "");
+	if (!raw.trim()) return [];
+	const extensions = JSON.parse(raw)?.[MANIFEST_KEY]?.extensions;
+	if (!Array.isArray(extensions)) return [];
+	return extensions.map((entry) => typeof entry === "string" ? entry.trim() : "").filter(Boolean);
+}
+function listWorkspaceDirs(cfg) {
+	const dirs = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+	const list = cfg.agents?.list;
+	if (Array.isArray(list)) {
+		for (const entry of list) if (entry && typeof entry === "object" && typeof entry.id === "string") dirs.add(resolveAgentWorkspaceDir(cfg, entry.id));
+	}
+	dirs.add(resolveAgentWorkspaceDir(cfg, resolveDefaultAgentId(cfg)));
+	return [...dirs];
+}
+function formatCodeSafetyDetails(findings, rootDir) {
+	return findings.map((finding) => {
+		const relPath = path.relative(rootDir, finding.file);
+		const normalizedPath = (relPath && relPath !== "." && !relPath.startsWith("..") ? relPath : path.basename(finding.file)).replaceAll("\\", "/");
+		return `  - [${finding.ruleId}] ${finding.message} (${normalizedPath}:${finding.line})`;
+	}).join("\n");
+}
+function unionAllow(base, extra) {
+	if (!Array.isArray(extra) || extra.length === 0) return base;
+	if (!Array.isArray(base) || base.length === 0) return Array.from(new Set(["*", ...extra]));
+	return Array.from(new Set([...base, ...extra]));
+}
+function pickToolPolicy(config) {
+	if (!config) return;
+	const allow = Array.isArray(config.allow) ? unionAllow(config.allow, config.alsoAllow) : Array.isArray(config.alsoAllow) && config.alsoAllow.length > 0 ? unionAllow(void 0, config.alsoAllow) : void 0;
+	const deny = Array.isArray(config.deny) ? config.deny : void 0;
+	if (!allow && !deny) return;
+	return {
+		allow,
+		deny
+	};
+}
+function resolveToolPolicies(params) {
+	const policies = [
+		resolveToolProfilePolicy(params.agentTools?.profile ?? params.cfg.tools?.profile),
+		pickToolPolicy(params.cfg.tools ?? void 0),
+		pickToolPolicy(params.agentTools)
+	];
+	if (params.sandboxMode === "all") policies.push(resolveSandboxToolPolicyForAgent(params.cfg, params.agentId ?? void 0));
+	return policies;
+}
+function normalizePluginIdSet(entries) {
+	return new Set(entries.map((entry) => entry.trim().toLowerCase()).filter(Boolean));
+}
+function resolveEnabledExtensionPluginIds(params) {
+	const normalized = normalizePluginsConfig(params.cfg.plugins);
+	if (!normalized.enabled) return [];
+	const allowSet = normalizePluginIdSet(normalized.allow);
+	const denySet = normalizePluginIdSet(normalized.deny);
+	const entryById = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	for (const [id, entry] of Object.entries(normalized.entries)) entryById.set(id.trim().toLowerCase(), entry);
+	const enabled = [];
+	for (const id of params.pluginDirs) {
+		const normalizedId = id.trim().toLowerCase();
+		if (!normalizedId) continue;
+		if (denySet.has(normalizedId)) continue;
+		if (allowSet.size > 0 && !allowSet.has(normalizedId)) continue;
+		if (entryById.get(normalizedId)?.enabled === false) continue;
+		enabled.push(normalizedId);
+	}
+	return enabled;
+}
+function collectAllowEntries(config) {
+	const out = [];
+	if (Array.isArray(config?.allow)) out.push(...config.allow);
+	if (Array.isArray(config?.alsoAllow)) out.push(...config.alsoAllow);
+	return out.map((entry) => entry.trim().toLowerCase()).filter(Boolean);
+}
+function hasExplicitPluginAllow(params) {
+	return params.allowEntries.some((entry) => entry === "group:plugins" || params.enabledPluginIds.has(entry));
+}
+function hasProviderPluginAllow(params) {
+	if (!params.byProvider) return false;
+	for (const policy of Object.values(params.byProvider)) if (hasExplicitPluginAllow({
+		allowEntries: collectAllowEntries(policy),
+		enabledPluginIds: params.enabledPluginIds
+	})) return true;
+	return false;
+}
+async function collectPluginsTrustFindings(params) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const extensionsDir = path.join(params.stateDir, "extensions");
+	const st = await safeStat(extensionsDir);
+	if (!st.ok || !st.isDir) return findings;
+	const pluginDirs = (await fs.readdir(extensionsDir, { withFileTypes: true }).catch(() => [])).filter((e) => e.isDirectory()).map((e) => e.name).filter(Boolean);
+	if (pluginDirs.length === 0) return findings;
+	const allow = params.cfg.plugins?.allow;
+	if (!(Array.isArray(allow) && allow.length > 0)) {
+		const hasString = (value) => typeof value === "string" && value.trim().length > 0;
+		const hasAccountStringKey = (account, key) => Boolean(account && typeof account === "object" && hasString(account[key]));
+		const discordConfigured = hasString(params.cfg.channels?.discord?.token) || Boolean(params.cfg.channels?.discord?.accounts && Object.values(params.cfg.channels.discord.accounts).some((a) => hasAccountStringKey(a, "token"))) || hasString(process.env.DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN);
+		const telegramConfigured = hasString(params.cfg.channels?.telegram?.botToken) || hasString(params.cfg.channels?.telegram?.tokenFile) || Boolean(params.cfg.channels?.telegram?.accounts && Object.values(params.cfg.channels.telegram.accounts).some((a) => hasAccountStringKey(a, "botToken") || hasAccountStringKey(a, "tokenFile"))) || hasString(process.env.TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN);
+		const slackConfigured = hasString(params.cfg.channels?.slack?.botToken) || hasString(params.cfg.channels?.slack?.appToken) || Boolean(params.cfg.channels?.slack?.accounts && Object.values(params.cfg.channels.slack.accounts).some((a) => hasAccountStringKey(a, "botToken") || hasAccountStringKey(a, "appToken"))) || hasString(process.env.SLACK_BOT_TOKEN) || hasString(process.env.SLACK_APP_TOKEN);
+		const skillCommandsLikelyExposed = discordConfigured && resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
+			providerId: "discord",
+			providerSetting: params.cfg.channels?.discord?.commands?.nativeSkills,
+			globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills
+		}) || telegramConfigured && resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
+			providerId: "telegram",
+			providerSetting: params.cfg.channels?.telegram?.commands?.nativeSkills,
+			globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills
+		}) || slackConfigured && resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
+			providerId: "slack",
+			providerSetting: params.cfg.channels?.slack?.commands?.nativeSkills,
+			globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills
+		});
+		findings.push({
+			checkId: "plugins.extensions_no_allowlist",
+			severity: skillCommandsLikelyExposed ? "critical" : "warn",
+			title: "Extensions exist but plugins.allow is not set",
+			detail: `Found ${pluginDirs.length} extension(s) under ${extensionsDir}. Without plugins.allow, any discovered plugin id may load (depending on config and plugin behavior).` + (skillCommandsLikelyExposed ? "\nNative skill commands are enabled on at least one configured chat surface; treat unpinned/unallowlisted extensions as high risk." : ""),
+			remediation: "Set plugins.allow to an explicit list of plugin ids you trust."
+		});
+	}
+	const enabledExtensionPluginIds = resolveEnabledExtensionPluginIds({
+		cfg: params.cfg,
+		pluginDirs
+	});
+	if (enabledExtensionPluginIds.length > 0) {
+		const enabledPluginSet = new Set(enabledExtensionPluginIds);
+		const contexts = [{ label: "default" }];
+		for (const entry of params.cfg.agents?.list ?? []) {
+			if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object" || typeof entry.id !== "string") continue;
+			contexts.push({
+				label: `agents.list.${entry.id}`,
+				agentId: entry.id,
+				tools: entry.tools
+			});
+		}
+		const permissiveContexts = [];
+		for (const context of contexts) {
+			const profile = context.tools?.profile ?? params.cfg.tools?.profile;
+			const restrictiveProfile = Boolean(resolveToolProfilePolicy(profile));
+			const sandboxMode = resolveSandboxConfigForAgent(params.cfg, context.agentId).mode;
+			const broadPolicy = isToolAllowedByPolicies("__anima_plugin_probe__", resolveToolPolicies({
+				cfg: params.cfg,
+				agentTools: context.tools,
+				sandboxMode,
+				agentId: context.agentId
+			}));
+			const explicitPluginAllow = !restrictiveProfile && (hasExplicitPluginAllow({
+				allowEntries: collectAllowEntries(params.cfg.tools),
+				enabledPluginIds: enabledPluginSet
+			}) || hasProviderPluginAllow({
+				byProvider: params.cfg.tools?.byProvider,
+				enabledPluginIds: enabledPluginSet
+			}) || hasExplicitPluginAllow({
+				allowEntries: collectAllowEntries(context.tools),
+				enabledPluginIds: enabledPluginSet
+			}) || hasProviderPluginAllow({
+				byProvider: context.tools?.byProvider,
+				enabledPluginIds: enabledPluginSet
+			}));
+			if (broadPolicy || explicitPluginAllow) permissiveContexts.push(context.label);
+		}
+		if (permissiveContexts.length > 0) findings.push({
+			checkId: "plugins.tools_reachable_permissive_policy",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Extension plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy",
+			detail: `Enabled extension plugins: ${enabledExtensionPluginIds.join(", ")}.\nPermissive tool policy contexts:\n${permissiveContexts.map((entry) => `- ${entry}`).join("\n")}`,
+			remediation: "Use restrictive profiles (`minimal`/`coding`) or explicit tool allowlists that exclude plugin tools for agents handling untrusted input."
+		});
+	}
+	return findings;
+}
+async function collectIncludeFilePermFindings(params) {
+	const findings = [];
+	if (!params.configSnapshot.exists) return findings;
+	const configPath = params.configSnapshot.path;
+	const includePaths = await collectIncludePathsRecursive({
+		configPath,
+		parsed: params.configSnapshot.parsed
+	});
+	if (includePaths.length === 0) return findings;
+	for (const p of includePaths) {
+		const perms = await inspectPathPermissions(p, {
+			env: params.env,
+			platform: params.platform,
+			exec: params.execIcacls
+		});
+		if (!perms.ok) continue;
+		if (perms.worldWritable || perms.groupWritable) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.config_include.perms_writable",
+			severity: "critical",
+			title: "Config include file is writable by others",
+			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(p, perms)}; another user could influence your effective config.`,
+			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+				targetPath: p,
+				perms,
+				isDir: false,
+				posixMode: 384,
+				env: params.env
+			})
+		});
+		else if (perms.worldReadable) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.config_include.perms_world_readable",
+			severity: "critical",
+			title: "Config include file is world-readable",
+			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(p, perms)}; include files can contain tokens and private settings.`,
+			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+				targetPath: p,
+				perms,
+				isDir: false,
+				posixMode: 384,
+				env: params.env
+			})
+		});
+		else if (perms.groupReadable) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.config_include.perms_group_readable",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Config include file is group-readable",
+			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(p, perms)}; include files can contain tokens and private settings.`,
+			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+				targetPath: p,
+				perms,
+				isDir: false,
+				posixMode: 384,
+				env: params.env
+			})
+		});
+	}
+	return findings;
+}
+async function collectStateDeepFilesystemFindings(params) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const oauthDir = resolveOAuthDir(params.env, params.stateDir);
+	const oauthPerms = await inspectPathPermissions(oauthDir, {
+		env: params.env,
+		platform: params.platform,
+		exec: params.execIcacls
+	});
+	if (oauthPerms.ok && oauthPerms.isDir) {
+		if (oauthPerms.worldWritable || oauthPerms.groupWritable) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.credentials_dir.perms_writable",
+			severity: "critical",
+			title: "Credentials dir is writable by others",
+			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(oauthDir, oauthPerms)}; another user could drop/modify credential files.`,
+			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+				targetPath: oauthDir,
+				perms: oauthPerms,
+				isDir: true,
+				posixMode: 448,
+				env: params.env
+			})
+		});
+		else if (oauthPerms.groupReadable || oauthPerms.worldReadable) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.credentials_dir.perms_readable",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Credentials dir is readable by others",
+			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(oauthDir, oauthPerms)}; credentials and allowlists can be sensitive.`,
+			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+				targetPath: oauthDir,
+				perms: oauthPerms,
+				isDir: true,
+				posixMode: 448,
+				env: params.env
+			})
+		});
+	}
+	const agentIds = Array.isArray(params.cfg.agents?.list) ? params.cfg.agents?.list.map((a) => a && typeof a === "object" && typeof a.id === "string" ? a.id.trim() : "").filter(Boolean) : [];
+	const defaultAgentId = resolveDefaultAgentId(params.cfg);
+	const ids = Array.from(new Set([defaultAgentId, ...agentIds])).map((id) => normalizeAgentId(id));
+	for (const agentId of ids) {
+		const agentDir = path.join(params.stateDir, "agents", agentId, "agent");
+		const authPath = path.join(agentDir, "auth-profiles.json");
+		const authPerms = await inspectPathPermissions(authPath, {
+			env: params.env,
+			platform: params.platform,
+			exec: params.execIcacls
+		});
+		if (authPerms.ok) {
+			if (authPerms.worldWritable || authPerms.groupWritable) findings.push({
+				checkId: "fs.auth_profiles.perms_writable",
+				severity: "critical",
+				title: "auth-profiles.json is writable by others",
+				detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(authPath, authPerms)}; another user could inject credentials.`,
+				remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+					targetPath: authPath,
+					perms: authPerms,
+					isDir: false,
+					posixMode: 384,
+					env: params.env
+				})
+			});
+			else if (authPerms.worldReadable || authPerms.groupReadable) findings.push({
+				checkId: "fs.auth_profiles.perms_readable",
+				severity: "warn",
+				title: "auth-profiles.json is readable by others",
+				detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(authPath, authPerms)}; auth-profiles.json contains API keys and OAuth tokens.`,
+				remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+					targetPath: authPath,
+					perms: authPerms,
+					isDir: false,
+					posixMode: 384,
+					env: params.env
+				})
+			});
+		}
+		const storePath = path.join(params.stateDir, "agents", agentId, "sessions", "sessions.json");
+		const storePerms = await inspectPathPermissions(storePath, {
+			env: params.env,
+			platform: params.platform,
+			exec: params.execIcacls
+		});
+		if (storePerms.ok) {
+			if (storePerms.worldReadable || storePerms.groupReadable) findings.push({
+				checkId: "fs.sessions_store.perms_readable",
+				severity: "warn",
+				title: "sessions.json is readable by others",
+				detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(storePath, storePerms)}; routing and transcript metadata can be sensitive.`,
+				remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+					targetPath: storePath,
+					perms: storePerms,
+					isDir: false,
+					posixMode: 384,
+					env: params.env
+				})
+			});
+		}
+	}
+	const logFile = typeof params.cfg.logging?.file === "string" ? params.cfg.logging.file.trim() : "";
+	if (logFile) {
+		const expanded = logFile.startsWith("~") ? expandTilde(logFile, params.env) : logFile;
+		if (expanded) {
+			const logPath = path.resolve(expanded);
+			const logPerms = await inspectPathPermissions(logPath, {
+				env: params.env,
+				platform: params.platform,
+				exec: params.execIcacls
+			});
+			if (logPerms.ok) {
+				if (logPerms.worldReadable || logPerms.groupReadable) findings.push({
+					checkId: "fs.log_file.perms_readable",
+					severity: "warn",
+					title: "Log file is readable by others",
+					detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(logPath, logPerms)}; logs can contain private messages and tool output.`,
+					remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+						targetPath: logPath,
+						perms: logPerms,
+						isDir: false,
+						posixMode: 384,
+						env: params.env
+					})
+				});
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return findings;
+}
+async function readConfigSnapshotForAudit(params) {
+	return await createConfigIO({
+		env: params.env,
+		configPath: params.configPath
+	}).readConfigFileSnapshot();
+}
+async function collectPluginsCodeSafetyFindings(params) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const extensionsDir = path.join(params.stateDir, "extensions");
+	const st = await safeStat(extensionsDir);
+	if (!st.ok || !st.isDir) return findings;
+	const pluginDirs = (await fs.readdir(extensionsDir, { withFileTypes: true }).catch((err) => {
+		findings.push({
+			checkId: "plugins.code_safety.scan_failed",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Plugin extensions directory scan failed",
+			detail: `Static code scan could not list extensions directory: ${String(err)}`,
+			remediation: "Check file permissions and plugin layout, then rerun `anima security audit --deep`."
+		});
+		return [];
+	})).filter((e) => e.isDirectory()).map((e) => e.name);
+	for (const pluginName of pluginDirs) {
+		const pluginPath = path.join(extensionsDir, pluginName);
+		const extensionEntries = await readPluginManifestExtensions(pluginPath).catch(() => []);
+		const forcedScanEntries = [];
+		const escapedEntries = [];
+		for (const entry of extensionEntries) {
+			const resolvedEntry = path.resolve(pluginPath, entry);
+			if (!isPathInside(pluginPath, resolvedEntry)) {
+				escapedEntries.push(entry);
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (extensionUsesSkippedScannerPath(entry)) findings.push({
+				checkId: "plugins.code_safety.entry_path",
+				severity: "warn",
+				title: `Plugin "${pluginName}" entry path is hidden or node_modules`,
+				detail: `Extension entry "${entry}" points to a hidden or node_modules path. Deep code scan will cover this entry explicitly, but review this path choice carefully.`,
+				remediation: "Prefer extension entrypoints under normal source paths like dist/ or src/."
+			});
+			forcedScanEntries.push(resolvedEntry);
+		}
+		if (escapedEntries.length > 0) findings.push({
+			checkId: "plugins.code_safety.entry_escape",
+			severity: "critical",
+			title: `Plugin "${pluginName}" has extension entry path traversal`,
+			detail: `Found extension entries that escape the plugin directory:\n${escapedEntries.map((entry) => `  - ${entry}`).join("\n")}`,
+			remediation: "Update the plugin manifest so all anima.extensions entries stay inside the plugin directory."
+		});
+		const summary = await scanDirectoryWithSummary(pluginPath, { includeFiles: forcedScanEntries }).catch((err) => {
+			findings.push({
+				checkId: "plugins.code_safety.scan_failed",
+				severity: "warn",
+				title: `Plugin "${pluginName}" code scan failed`,
+				detail: `Static code scan could not complete: ${String(err)}`,
+				remediation: "Check file permissions and plugin layout, then rerun `anima security audit --deep`."
+			});
+			return null;
+		});
+		if (!summary) continue;
+		if (summary.critical > 0) {
+			const details = formatCodeSafetyDetails(summary.findings.filter((f) => f.severity === "critical"), pluginPath);
+			findings.push({
+				checkId: "plugins.code_safety",
+				severity: "critical",
+				title: `Plugin "${pluginName}" contains dangerous code patterns`,
+				detail: `Found ${summary.critical} critical issue(s) in ${summary.scannedFiles} scanned file(s):\n${details}`,
+				remediation: "Review the plugin source code carefully before use. If untrusted, remove the plugin from your Anima extensions state directory."
+			});
+		} else if (summary.warn > 0) {
+			const details = formatCodeSafetyDetails(summary.findings.filter((f) => f.severity === "warn"), pluginPath);
+			findings.push({
+				checkId: "plugins.code_safety",
+				severity: "warn",
+				title: `Plugin "${pluginName}" contains suspicious code patterns`,
+				detail: `Found ${summary.warn} warning(s) in ${summary.scannedFiles} scanned file(s):\n${details}`,
+				remediation: `Review the flagged code to ensure it is intentional and safe.`
+			});
+		}
+	}
+	return findings;
+}
+async function collectInstalledSkillsCodeSafetyFindings(params) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const pluginExtensionsDir = path.join(params.stateDir, "extensions");
+	const scannedSkillDirs = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+	const workspaceDirs = listWorkspaceDirs(params.cfg);
+	for (const workspaceDir of workspaceDirs) {
+		const entries = loadWorkspaceSkillEntries(workspaceDir, { config: params.cfg });
+		for (const entry of entries) {
+			if (entry.skill.source === "anima-bundled") continue;
+			const skillDir = path.resolve(entry.skill.baseDir);
+			if (isPathInside(pluginExtensionsDir, skillDir)) continue;
+			if (scannedSkillDirs.has(skillDir)) continue;
+			scannedSkillDirs.add(skillDir);
+			const skillName = entry.skill.name;
+			const summary = await scanDirectoryWithSummary(skillDir).catch((err) => {
+				findings.push({
+					checkId: "skills.code_safety.scan_failed",
+					severity: "warn",
+					title: `Skill "${skillName}" code scan failed`,
+					detail: `Static code scan could not complete for ${skillDir}: ${String(err)}`,
+					remediation: "Check file permissions and skill layout, then rerun `anima security audit --deep`."
+				});
+				return null;
+			});
+			if (!summary) continue;
+			if (summary.critical > 0) {
+				const details = formatCodeSafetyDetails(summary.findings.filter((finding) => finding.severity === "critical"), skillDir);
+				findings.push({
+					checkId: "skills.code_safety",
+					severity: "critical",
+					title: `Skill "${skillName}" contains dangerous code patterns`,
+					detail: `Found ${summary.critical} critical issue(s) in ${summary.scannedFiles} scanned file(s) under ${skillDir}:\n${details}`,
+					remediation: `Review the skill source code before use. If untrusted, remove "${skillDir}".`
+				});
+			} else if (summary.warn > 0) {
+				const details = formatCodeSafetyDetails(summary.findings.filter((finding) => finding.severity === "warn"), skillDir);
+				findings.push({
+					checkId: "skills.code_safety",
+					severity: "warn",
+					title: `Skill "${skillName}" contains suspicious code patterns`,
+					detail: `Found ${summary.warn} warning(s) in ${summary.scannedFiles} scanned file(s) under ${skillDir}:\n${details}`,
+					remediation: "Review flagged lines to ensure the behavior is intentional and safe."
+				});
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return findings;
+}
+
+//#endregion
+//#region src/security/audit.ts
+function countBySeverity(findings) {
+	let critical = 0;
+	let warn = 0;
+	let info = 0;
+	for (const f of findings) if (f.severity === "critical") critical += 1;
+	else if (f.severity === "warn") warn += 1;
+	else info += 1;
+	return {
+		critical,
+		warn,
+		info
+	};
+}
+function normalizeAllowFromList(list) {
+	if (!Array.isArray(list)) return [];
+	return list.map((v) => String(v).trim()).filter(Boolean);
+}
+async function collectFilesystemFindings(params) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const stateDirPerms = await inspectPathPermissions(params.stateDir, {
+		env: params.env,
+		platform: params.platform,
+		exec: params.execIcacls
+	});
+	if (stateDirPerms.ok) {
+		if (stateDirPerms.isSymlink) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.state_dir.symlink",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "State dir is a symlink",
+			detail: `${params.stateDir} is a symlink; treat this as an extra trust boundary.`
+		});
+		if (stateDirPerms.worldWritable) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.state_dir.perms_world_writable",
+			severity: "critical",
+			title: "State dir is world-writable",
+			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(params.stateDir, stateDirPerms)}; other users can write into your Anima state.`,
+			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+				targetPath: params.stateDir,
+				perms: stateDirPerms,
+				isDir: true,
+				posixMode: 448,
+				env: params.env
+			})
+		});
+		else if (stateDirPerms.groupWritable) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.state_dir.perms_group_writable",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "State dir is group-writable",
+			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(params.stateDir, stateDirPerms)}; group users can write into your Anima state.`,
+			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+				targetPath: params.stateDir,
+				perms: stateDirPerms,
+				isDir: true,
+				posixMode: 448,
+				env: params.env
+			})
+		});
+		else if (stateDirPerms.groupReadable || stateDirPerms.worldReadable) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.state_dir.perms_readable",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "State dir is readable by others",
+			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(params.stateDir, stateDirPerms)}; consider restricting to 700.`,
+			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+				targetPath: params.stateDir,
+				perms: stateDirPerms,
+				isDir: true,
+				posixMode: 448,
+				env: params.env
+			})
+		});
+	}
+	const configPerms = await inspectPathPermissions(params.configPath, {
+		env: params.env,
+		platform: params.platform,
+		exec: params.execIcacls
+	});
+	if (configPerms.ok) {
+		if (configPerms.isSymlink) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.config.symlink",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Config file is a symlink",
+			detail: `${params.configPath} is a symlink; make sure you trust its target.`
+		});
+		if (configPerms.worldWritable || configPerms.groupWritable) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.config.perms_writable",
+			severity: "critical",
+			title: "Config file is writable by others",
+			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(params.configPath, configPerms)}; another user could change gateway/auth/tool policies.`,
+			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+				targetPath: params.configPath,
+				perms: configPerms,
+				isDir: false,
+				posixMode: 384,
+				env: params.env
+			})
+		});
+		else if (configPerms.worldReadable) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.config.perms_world_readable",
+			severity: "critical",
+			title: "Config file is world-readable",
+			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(params.configPath, configPerms)}; config can contain tokens and private settings.`,
+			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+				targetPath: params.configPath,
+				perms: configPerms,
+				isDir: false,
+				posixMode: 384,
+				env: params.env
+			})
+		});
+		else if (configPerms.groupReadable) findings.push({
+			checkId: "fs.config.perms_group_readable",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Config file is group-readable",
+			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(params.configPath, configPerms)}; config can contain tokens and private settings.`,
+			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
+				targetPath: params.configPath,
+				perms: configPerms,
+				isDir: false,
+				posixMode: 384,
+				env: params.env
+			})
+		});
+	}
+	return findings;
+}
+function collectGatewayConfigFindings(cfg, env) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const bind = typeof cfg.gateway?.bind === "string" ? cfg.gateway.bind : "loopback";
+	const tailscaleMode = cfg.gateway?.tailscale?.mode ?? "off";
+	const auth = resolveGatewayAuth({
+		authConfig: cfg.gateway?.auth,
+		tailscaleMode,
+		env
+	});
+	const controlUiEnabled = cfg.gateway?.controlUi?.enabled !== false;
+	const trustedProxies = Array.isArray(cfg.gateway?.trustedProxies) ? cfg.gateway.trustedProxies : [];
+	const hasToken = typeof auth.token === "string" && auth.token.trim().length > 0;
+	const hasPassword = typeof auth.password === "string" && auth.password.trim().length > 0;
+	const hasSharedSecret = auth.mode === "token" && hasToken || auth.mode === "password" && hasPassword;
+	const hasTailscaleAuth = auth.allowTailscale && tailscaleMode === "serve";
+	const hasGatewayAuth = hasSharedSecret || hasTailscaleAuth;
+	const gatewayToolsAllowRaw = Array.isArray(cfg.gateway?.tools?.allow) ? cfg.gateway?.tools?.allow : [];
+	const gatewayToolsAllow = new Set(gatewayToolsAllowRaw.map((v) => typeof v === "string" ? v.trim().toLowerCase() : "").filter(Boolean));
+	const reenabledOverHttp = DEFAULT_GATEWAY_HTTP_TOOL_DENY.filter((name) => gatewayToolsAllow.has(name));
+	if (reenabledOverHttp.length > 0) {
+		const extraRisk = bind !== "loopback" || tailscaleMode === "funnel";
+		findings.push({
+			checkId: "gateway.tools_invoke_http.dangerous_allow",
+			severity: extraRisk ? "critical" : "warn",
+			title: "Gateway HTTP /tools/invoke re-enables dangerous tools",
+			detail: `gateway.tools.allow includes ${reenabledOverHttp.join(", ")} which removes them from the default HTTP deny list. This can allow remote session spawning / control-plane actions via HTTP and increases RCE blast radius if the gateway is reachable.`,
+			remediation: "Remove these entries from gateway.tools.allow (recommended). If you keep them enabled, keep gateway.bind loopback-only (or tailnet-only), restrict network exposure, and treat the gateway token/password as full-admin."
+		});
+	}
+	if (bind !== "loopback" && !hasSharedSecret && auth.mode !== "trusted-proxy") findings.push({
+		checkId: "gateway.bind_no_auth",
+		severity: "critical",
+		title: "Gateway binds beyond loopback without auth",
+		detail: `gateway.bind="${bind}" but no gateway.auth token/password is configured.`,
+		remediation: `Set gateway.auth (token recommended) or bind to loopback.`
+	});
+	if (bind === "loopback" && controlUiEnabled && trustedProxies.length === 0) findings.push({
+		checkId: "gateway.trusted_proxies_missing",
+		severity: "warn",
+		title: "Reverse proxy headers are not trusted",
+		detail: "gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.",
+		remediation: "Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only."
+	});
+	if (bind === "loopback" && controlUiEnabled && !hasGatewayAuth) findings.push({
+		checkId: "gateway.loopback_no_auth",
+		severity: "critical",
+		title: "Gateway auth missing on loopback",
+		detail: "gateway.bind is loopback but no gateway auth secret is configured. If the Control UI is exposed through a reverse proxy, unauthenticated access is possible.",
+		remediation: "Set gateway.auth (token recommended) or keep the Control UI local-only."
+	});
+	if (tailscaleMode === "funnel") findings.push({
+		checkId: "gateway.tailscale_funnel",
+		severity: "critical",
+		title: "Tailscale Funnel exposure enabled",
+		detail: `gateway.tailscale.mode="funnel" exposes the Gateway publicly; keep auth strict and treat it as internet-facing.`,
+		remediation: `Prefer tailscale.mode="serve" (tailnet-only) or set tailscale.mode="off".`
+	});
+	else if (tailscaleMode === "serve") findings.push({
+		checkId: "gateway.tailscale_serve",
+		severity: "info",
+		title: "Tailscale Serve exposure enabled",
+		detail: `gateway.tailscale.mode="serve" exposes the Gateway to your tailnet (loopback behind Tailscale).`
+	});
+	if (cfg.gateway?.controlUi?.allowInsecureAuth === true) findings.push({
+		checkId: "gateway.control_ui.insecure_auth",
+		severity: "critical",
+		title: "Control UI allows insecure HTTP auth",
+		detail: "gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth=true allows token-only auth over HTTP and skips device identity.",
+		remediation: "Disable it or switch to HTTPS (Tailscale Serve) or localhost."
+	});
+	if (cfg.gateway?.controlUi?.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth === true) findings.push({
+		checkId: "gateway.control_ui.device_auth_disabled",
+		severity: "critical",
+		title: "DANGEROUS: Control UI device auth disabled",
+		detail: "gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth=true disables device identity checks for the Control UI.",
+		remediation: "Disable it unless you are in a short-lived break-glass scenario."
+	});
+	const token = typeof auth.token === "string" && auth.token.trim().length > 0 ? auth.token.trim() : null;
+	if (auth.mode === "token" && token && token.length < 24) findings.push({
+		checkId: "gateway.token_too_short",
+		severity: "warn",
+		title: "Gateway token looks short",
+		detail: `gateway auth token is ${token.length} chars; prefer a long random token.`
+	});
+	if (auth.mode === "trusted-proxy") {
+		const trustedProxies = cfg.gateway?.trustedProxies ?? [];
+		const trustedProxyConfig = cfg.gateway?.auth?.trustedProxy;
+		findings.push({
+			checkId: "gateway.trusted_proxy_auth",
+			severity: "critical",
+			title: "Trusted-proxy auth mode enabled",
+			detail: "gateway.auth.mode=\"trusted-proxy\" delegates authentication to a reverse proxy. Ensure your proxy (Pomerium, Caddy, nginx) handles auth correctly and that gateway.trustedProxies only contains IPs of your actual proxy servers.",
+			remediation: "Verify: (1) Your proxy terminates TLS and authenticates users. (2) gateway.trustedProxies is restricted to proxy IPs only. (3) Direct access to the Gateway port is blocked by firewall. See /gateway/trusted-proxy-auth for setup guidance."
+		});
+		if (trustedProxies.length === 0) findings.push({
+			checkId: "gateway.trusted_proxy_no_proxies",
+			severity: "critical",
+			title: "Trusted-proxy auth enabled but no trusted proxies configured",
+			detail: "gateway.auth.mode=\"trusted-proxy\" but gateway.trustedProxies is empty. All requests will be rejected.",
+			remediation: "Set gateway.trustedProxies to the IP(s) of your reverse proxy."
+		});
+		if (!trustedProxyConfig?.userHeader) findings.push({
+			checkId: "gateway.trusted_proxy_no_user_header",
+			severity: "critical",
+			title: "Trusted-proxy auth missing userHeader config",
+			detail: "gateway.auth.mode=\"trusted-proxy\" but gateway.auth.trustedProxy.userHeader is not configured.",
+			remediation: "Set gateway.auth.trustedProxy.userHeader to the header name your proxy uses (e.g., \"x-forwarded-user\", \"x-pomerium-claim-email\")."
+		});
+		if ((trustedProxyConfig?.allowUsers ?? []).length === 0) findings.push({
+			checkId: "gateway.trusted_proxy_no_allowlist",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Trusted-proxy auth allows all authenticated users",
+			detail: "gateway.auth.trustedProxy.allowUsers is empty, so any user authenticated by your proxy can access the Gateway.",
+			remediation: "Consider setting gateway.auth.trustedProxy.allowUsers to restrict access to specific users (e.g., [\"nick@example.com\"])."
+		});
+	}
+	if (bind !== "loopback" && auth.mode !== "trusted-proxy" && !cfg.gateway?.auth?.rateLimit) findings.push({
+		checkId: "gateway.auth_no_rate_limit",
+		severity: "warn",
+		title: "No auth rate limiting configured",
+		detail: "gateway.bind is not loopback but no gateway.auth.rateLimit is configured. Without rate limiting, brute-force auth attacks are not mitigated.",
+		remediation: "Set gateway.auth.rateLimit (e.g. { maxAttempts: 10, windowMs: 60000, lockoutMs: 300000 })."
+	});
+	return findings;
+}
+function collectBrowserControlFindings(cfg, env) {
+	const findings = [];
+	let resolved;
+	try {
+		resolved = resolveBrowserConfig(cfg.browser, cfg);
+	} catch (err) {
+		findings.push({
+			checkId: "browser.control_invalid_config",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Browser control config looks invalid",
+			detail: String(err),
+			remediation: `Fix browser.cdpUrl in ${resolveConfigPath()} and re-run "${formatCliCommand("anima security audit --deep")}".`
+		});
+		return findings;
+	}
+	if (!resolved.enabled) return findings;
+	const browserAuth = resolveBrowserControlAuth(cfg, env);
+	if (!browserAuth.token && !browserAuth.password) findings.push({
+		checkId: "browser.control_no_auth",
+		severity: "critical",
+		title: "Browser control has no auth",
+		detail: "Browser control HTTP routes are enabled but no gateway.auth token/password is configured. Any local process (or SSRF to loopback) can call browser control endpoints.",
+		remediation: "Set gateway.auth.token (recommended) or gateway.auth.password so browser control HTTP routes require authentication. Restarting the gateway will auto-generate gateway.auth.token when browser control is enabled."
+	});
+	for (const name of Object.keys(resolved.profiles)) {
+		const profile = resolveProfile(resolved, name);
+		if (!profile || profile.cdpIsLoopback) continue;
+		let url;
+		try {
+			url = new URL(profile.cdpUrl);
+		} catch {
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (url.protocol === "http:") findings.push({
+			checkId: "browser.remote_cdp_http",
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Remote CDP uses HTTP",
+			detail: `browser profile "${name}" uses http CDP (${profile.cdpUrl}); this is OK only if it's tailnet-only or behind an encrypted tunnel.`,
+			remediation: `Prefer HTTPS/TLS or a tailnet-only endpoint for remote CDP.`
+		});
+	}
+	return findings;
+}
+function collectLoggingFindings(cfg) {
+	if (cfg.logging?.redactSensitive !== "off") return [];
+	return [{
+		checkId: "logging.redact_off",
+		severity: "warn",
+		title: "Tool summary redaction is disabled",
+		detail: `logging.redactSensitive="off" can leak secrets into logs and status output.`,
+		remediation: `Set logging.redactSensitive="tools".`
+	}];
+}
+function collectElevatedFindings(cfg) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const enabled = cfg.tools?.elevated?.enabled;
+	const allowFrom = cfg.tools?.elevated?.allowFrom ?? {};
+	const anyAllowFromKeys = Object.keys(allowFrom).length > 0;
+	if (enabled === false) return findings;
+	if (!anyAllowFromKeys) return findings;
+	for (const [provider, list] of Object.entries(allowFrom)) {
+		const normalized = normalizeAllowFromList(list);
+		if (normalized.includes("*")) findings.push({
+			checkId: `tools.elevated.allowFrom.${provider}.wildcard`,
+			severity: "critical",
+			title: "Elevated exec allowlist contains wildcard",
+			detail: `tools.elevated.allowFrom.${provider} includes "*" which effectively approves everyone on that channel for elevated mode.`
+		});
+		else if (normalized.length > 25) findings.push({
+			checkId: `tools.elevated.allowFrom.${provider}.large`,
+			severity: "warn",
+			title: "Elevated exec allowlist is large",
+			detail: `tools.elevated.allowFrom.${provider} has ${normalized.length} entries; consider tightening elevated access.`
+		});
+	}
+	return findings;
+}
+async function maybeProbeGateway(params) {
+	const url = buildGatewayConnectionDetails({ config: params.cfg }).url;
+	const isRemoteMode = params.cfg.gateway?.mode === "remote";
+	const remoteUrlRaw = typeof params.cfg.gateway?.remote?.url === "string" ? params.cfg.gateway.remote.url.trim() : "";
+	const auth = !isRemoteMode || isRemoteMode && !remoteUrlRaw ? resolveGatewayProbeAuth({
+		cfg: params.cfg,
+		mode: "local"
+	}) : resolveGatewayProbeAuth({
+		cfg: params.cfg,
+		mode: "remote"
+	});
+	const res = await params.probe({
+		url,
+		auth,
+		timeoutMs: params.timeoutMs
+	}).catch((err) => ({
+		ok: false,
+		url,
+		connectLatencyMs: null,
+		error: String(err),
+		close: null,
+		health: null,
+		status: null,
+		presence: null,
+		configSnapshot: null
+	}));
+	return { gateway: {
+		attempted: true,
+		url,
+		ok: res.ok,
+		error: res.ok ? null : res.error,
+		close: res.close ? {
+			code: res.close.code,
+			reason: res.close.reason
+		} : null
+	} };
+}
+async function runSecurityAudit(opts) {
+	const findings = [];
+	const cfg = opts.config;
+	const env = opts.env ?? process.env;
+	const platform = opts.platform ?? process.platform;
+	const execIcacls = opts.execIcacls;
+	const stateDir = opts.stateDir ?? resolveStateDir(env);
+	const configPath = opts.configPath ?? resolveConfigPath(env, stateDir);
+	findings.push(...collectAttackSurfaceSummaryFindings(cfg));
+	findings.push(...collectSyncedFolderFindings({
+		stateDir,
+		configPath
+	}));
+	findings.push(...collectGatewayConfigFindings(cfg, env));
+	findings.push(...collectBrowserControlFindings(cfg, env));
+	findings.push(...collectLoggingFindings(cfg));
+	findings.push(...collectElevatedFindings(cfg));
+	findings.push(...collectHooksHardeningFindings(cfg, env));
+	findings.push(...collectGatewayHttpSessionKeyOverrideFindings(cfg));
+	findings.push(...collectSandboxDockerNoopFindings(cfg));
+	findings.push(...collectNodeDenyCommandPatternFindings(cfg));
+	findings.push(...collectMinimalProfileOverrideFindings(cfg));
+	findings.push(...collectSecretsInConfigFindings(cfg));
+	findings.push(...collectModelHygieneFindings(cfg));
+	findings.push(...collectSmallModelRiskFindings({
+		cfg,
+		env
+	}));
+	findings.push(...collectExposureMatrixFindings(cfg));
+	const configSnapshot = opts.includeFilesystem !== false ? await readConfigSnapshotForAudit({
+		env,
+		configPath
+	}).catch(() => null) : null;
+	if (opts.includeFilesystem !== false) {
+		findings.push(...await collectFilesystemFindings({
+			stateDir,
+			configPath,
+			env,
+			platform,
+			execIcacls
+		}));
+		if (configSnapshot) findings.push(...await collectIncludeFilePermFindings({
+			configSnapshot,
+			env,
+			platform,
+			execIcacls
+		}));
+		findings.push(...await collectStateDeepFilesystemFindings({
+			cfg,
+			env,
+			stateDir,
+			platform,
+			execIcacls
+		}));
+		findings.push(...await collectPluginsTrustFindings({
+			cfg,
+			stateDir
+		}));
+		if (opts.deep === true) {
+			findings.push(...await collectPluginsCodeSafetyFindings({ stateDir }));
+			findings.push(...await collectInstalledSkillsCodeSafetyFindings({
+				cfg,
+				stateDir
+			}));
+		}
+	}
+	if (opts.includeChannelSecurity !== false) {
+		const plugins = opts.plugins ?? listChannelPlugins();
+		findings.push(...await collectChannelSecurityFindings({
+			cfg,
+			plugins
+		}));
+	}
+	const deep = opts.deep === true ? await maybeProbeGateway({
+		cfg,
+		timeoutMs: Math.max(250, opts.deepTimeoutMs ?? 5e3),
+		probe: opts.probeGatewayFn ?? probeGateway
+	}) : void 0;
+	if (deep?.gateway?.attempted && !deep.gateway.ok) findings.push({
+		checkId: "gateway.probe_failed",
+		severity: "warn",
+		title: "Gateway probe failed (deep)",
+		detail: deep.gateway.error ?? "gateway unreachable",
+		remediation: `Run "${formatCliCommand("anima status --all")}" to debug connectivity/auth, then re-run "${formatCliCommand("anima security audit --deep")}".`
+	});
+	const summary = countBySeverity(findings);
+	return {
+		ts: Date.now(),
+		summary,
+		findings,
+		deep
+	};
+}
+
+//#endregion
+export { resolveGatewayProbeAuth as a, probeGateway as c, collectIncludePathsRecursive as i, createIcaclsResetCommand as n, isNodeCommandAllowed as o, formatIcaclsResetCommand as r, resolveNodeCommandAllowlist as s, runSecurityAudit as t };