@nodetool-ai/websocket 0.7.0-rc.22 → 0.8.1

package/dist/server.js

@@ -6,49 +6,112 @@
  *      An HTTP→HTTPS redirect server starts on port 80 when TLS is active.
  * Connect the CLI with: npm run chat -- --url ws://localhost:7777/ws
  */
+import { startGenerationReconcileWorker, sweepInterruptedGenerations } from "@nodetool-ai/execution";
 import { join, resolve, dirname } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
 import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, readdirSync } from "node:fs";
 import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
 import { createServer as createHttpServer } from "node:http";
 import crypto from "node:crypto";
-import { createLogger, configureLogging, getDefaultDbPath } from "@nodetool-ai/config";
-import { NodeRegistry } from "@nodetool-ai/node-sdk";
-import { registerBaseNodes } from "@nodetool-ai/base-nodes";
-import { registerElevenLabsNodes } from "@nodetool-ai/elevenlabs-nodes";
-import { registerTransformersJsNodes } from "@nodetool-ai/transformers-js-nodes";
+import { createLogger, configureLogging, getDefaultDbPath, getPostgresDatabaseUrl, loadEnvironment } from "@nodetool-ai/config";
 import { registerTransformersJsProvider } from "@nodetool-ai/transformers-js-provider";
-import { registerFalNodes } from "@nodetool-ai/fal-nodes";
-import { registerKieNodes } from "@nodetool-ai/kie-nodes";
-import { registerReplicateNodes } from "@nodetool-ai/replicate-nodes";
-import { initTelemetry, setSecretResolver, PythonStdioBridge } from "@nodetool-ai/runtime";
-import { initMasterKey } from "@nodetool-ai/security";
-import { initDb, getSecret } from "@nodetool-ai/models";
-import { GoogleSearchTool, GoogleNewsTool, GoogleImagesTool, GoogleGroundedSearchTool, GoogleImageGenerationTool, OpenAIWebSearchTool, OpenAIImageGenerationTool, OpenAITextToSpeechTool, BrowserTool, ScreenshotTool, HttpRequestTool, CalculatorTool, RunCodeTool, StatisticsTool, GeometryTool, ConversionTool, SearchEmailTool, ArchiveEmailTool, AddLabelToEmailTool, DataForSEOSearchTool, DataForSEONewsTool, DataForSEOImagesTool } from "@nodetool-ai/agents";
-import { registerPythonProviders } from "./models-api.js";
+import { setCodeNodeAgentsModule } from "@nodetool-ai/base-nodes";
+import * as agentsModule from "@nodetool-ai/agents";
+import { bootstrapNodeRegistry, mergePythonBridgeMetadata } from "./node-registry-setup.js";
+import { corsOriginDelegate } from "./cors.js";
+import { zipExtensionDist } from "./lib/extension-dist.js";
+import { isPublicAuthExemptRoute } from "./lib/public-routes.js";
+import { isWebSocketUpgrade, denyUnauthorized, denyDraining } from "./lib/ws-upgrade.js";
+import { isDraining, startDrain } from "./drain.js";
+import { chatTurnRegistry } from "./chat-turn-registry.js";
+import { jobRunRegistry } from "./job-run-registry.js";
+import { replayUpgradeToOwner } from "./lib/fly-replay.js";
+import { startJobCancelPoller } from "./job-control.js";
+import { resolveTrustLocalhost, isLoopbackAddress, parseTrustedProxies, parseTrustedLocalNetworks, isTrustedLocalAddress } from "./lib/localhost-trust.js";
+import { initTelemetry, shutdownTelemetry, createPythonBridge, WebsocketPythonBridge, SwappableBridge, logPythonWorkerStderr } from "@nodetool-ai/runtime";
+import { deriveKey, getMasterKey, initMasterKey } from "@nodetool-ai/security";
+import { setDefaultModelInterfaces } from "@nodetool-ai/runtime";
+import { serverModelInterfaces } from "./websocket-client-session.js";
+import { WorkerManager, attachWorkerActivityHeartbeat, startReaper } from "@nodetool-ai/compute";
+import { getSecret, AccessToken, getWorkerProfile, initDb, initPostgresDb, isAccessToken, McpOauthClient, MCP_OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN_PREFIX, migrateSqliteDb, runSeeds } from "@nodetool-ai/models";
+import { isMcpHttpEnabled, MCP_ENABLE_FLAG } from "./lib/mcp-mount.js";
+import { authenticateMcpAccessToken, mcpBearerChallenge } from "./oauth/gate.js";
+import { registerPythonProviders, relayWorkerDownload } from "./models-api.js";
+import { syncCustomProviderRegistry } from "./custom-providers.js";
+import { runAutomaticStorageCleanup } from "./storage-retention.js";
+import { createGenerationRecoveryWorker } from "./generation-recovery.js";
+/** User id the auth middleware assigns in local (no-account) mode. */
+const LOCAL_USER_ID = "1";
+/** How long an MCP OAuth client nobody ever approved is kept before the
+ * periodic cleanup deletes it. */
+const UNUSED_OAUTH_CLIENT_TTL_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+import { TRPC_MAX_BATCH_SIZE } from "@nodetool-ai/protocol";
 import { handleMcpHttpRequest } from "./mcp-server.js";
 import Fastify from "fastify";
 import fastifyWebSocket from "@fastify/websocket";
 import fastifyCors from "@fastify/cors";
+import fastifyRateLimit from "@fastify/rate-limit";
 import fastifyStatic from "@fastify/static";
-import { encode } from "@msgpack/msgpack";
-import { SupabaseAuthProvider, LocalAuthProvider } from "@nodetool-ai/auth";
+import { packWebSocketMessage } from "./messagepack.js";
+import { SupabaseAuthProvider, LocalAuthProvider, DelegatedTokenProvider, isDelegatedToken, AppSessionTokenProvider, isAppSessionToken } from "@nodetool-ai/auth";
 import { fastifyTRPCPlugin } from "@trpc/server/adapters/fastify";
 import { appRouter } from "./trpc/router.js";
 import { createContextFactory } from "./trpc/context.js";
+import { getHttpRateLimitConfig, rateLimitKey, isRateLimitExempt } from "./lib/http-rate-limit.js";
+import { createTriggerWebhookRoute, startTriggerServices, triggersEnabled } from "./triggers/boot.js";
 import websocketPlugin from "./plugins/websocket.js";
-import healthRoute from "./routes/health.js";
+import healthRoute, { getVersion } from "./routes/health.js";
+import configRoute, { describeMissingAnonKey } from "./routes/config.js";
 import assetsRoutes from "./routes/assets.js";
+import timelineFontRoutes from "./routes/timeline-fonts.js";
+import sdkV1Routes from "./routes/sdk-v1.js";
 import workflowsRoutes from "./routes/workflows.js";
-import jobsRoutes from "./routes/jobs.js";
 import nodesRoutes from "./routes/nodes.js";
 import storageRoutes from "./routes/storage.js";
 import openaiRoutes from "./routes/openai.js";
 import oauthRoutes from "./routes/oauth.js";
+import { oauthAsRoutes } from "./routes/oauth-as.js";
+import { isSdkV1AuthenticationRequired, isSdkV1DiscoveryRequest } from "./sdk/sdk-route-policy.js";
+import { createNodeToolSdkV1CapabilitiesProvider } from "./sdk/sdk-runtime-capabilities-service.js";
+import { createSdkV1ModelDownloadService } from "./sdk/sdk-model-download-service.js";
+import { getSdkV1ModelCatalog, SdkModelCatalogServiceError } from "./sdk/sdk-model-catalog-service.js";
+import { unifiedModel } from "@nodetool-ai/protocol/api-schemas/models.js";
+import { createNodeToolSdkV1PreflightService } from "./sdk/sdk-preflight-service.js";
+import { createSdkV1ExecutionTargetReadiness } from "./sdk/sdk-execution-target-readiness.js";
+import { SdkLiveRunnerRegistry } from "./sdk/sdk-live-runner-registry.js";
+import { createSdkV1Service } from "./sdk/sdk-v1-service.js";
+import { createSdkV1ImplementationBoundary } from "./sdk/sdk-v1-handler-map.js";
+import { createSdkV1TemporaryAssetService } from "./sdk/sdk-temporary-asset-service.js";
+import { getTempAdapter } from "./lib/storage.js";
+import { FrontendRendererRegistry } from "./frontend-renderer-registry.js";
 import workspaceRoutes from "./routes/workspace.js";
+import { initWorkspaceChangeEvents, initWorkspaceStorage } from "./lib/workflow-workspace.js";
 import filesRoutes from "./routes/files.js";
 import collectionsRoutes from "./routes/collections.js";
-import { agentSocketRoute, getAgentRuntime } from "./agent/index.js";
+import applicationsRoutes from "./routes/applications.js";
+import publicAppRoutes from "./routes/public-apps.js";
+import { appDeploymentsEnabled } from "./lib/app-deployment-service.js";
+import accountRoutes from "./routes/account.js";
+import jsScriptsRoutes from "./routes/js-scripts.js";
+import timelineAnimationRoutes from "./routes/timeline-animations.js";
+import timelineAudioBakeRoutes from "./routes/timeline-audio-bake.js";
+import timelineIsolateSubjectRoutes from "./routes/timeline-isolate-subject.js";
+import timelineTrackObjectRoutes from "./routes/timeline-track-object.js";
+import storyboardsRoutes from "./routes/storyboards.js";
+import timelinesRoutes from "./routes/timelines.js";
+import documentsRoutes from "./routes/documents.js";
+import sandboxModulesRoutes from "./routes/sandbox-modules.js";
+import falCreditsRoute from "./routes/fal-credits.js";
+import falPricingRoute from "./routes/fal-pricing.js";
+import falPricingEstimateRoute from "./routes/fal-pricing-estimate.js";
+import kieCreditsRoute from "./routes/kie-credits.js";
+import kiePricingRoute from "./routes/kie-pricing.js";
+import kieWebhookRoute from "./routes/kie-webhook.js";
+import falWebhookRoute from "./routes/fal-webhook.js";
+import atlasCloudWebhookRoute from "./routes/atlascloud-webhook.js";
+import { createIntegrationRoutes } from "./routes/integrations.js";
+import { isNonEmptyString, isString } from "./lib/wire-values.js";
+import { logTrpcRequestError } from "./trpc/error-logging.js";
 // @llamaindex/liteparse bundles a webpack pdf.js whose `isNodeJS` heuristic
 // resolves to false inside Electron utilityProcess (process.type === "utility"),
 // causing it to take browser-only code paths that reference the global `document`
@@ -57,8 +120,13 @@ import { agentSocketRoute, getAgentRuntime } from "./agent/index.js";
 // the heuristic back to Node mode so NodeBinaryDataFactory / fs-based asset
 // loading is selected. No-op outside Electron.
 {
-    const proc = process;
-    if (proc.versions?.electron && proc.type && proc.type !== "browser") {
+    // Electron adds these two to the Node `process`; on plain Node both reads
+    // come back undefined and the check below fails, as it should.
+    const electronVersion = process.versions["electron"];
+    // SAFETY: `type` is Electron's addition to the Node `process`, so it is
+    // declared optional here and reads undefined everywhere else.
+    const processType = process.type;
+    if (electronVersion && processType && processType !== "browser") {
         try {
             Object.defineProperty(process, "type", {
                 value: "browser",
@@ -71,6 +139,7 @@ import { agentSocketRoute, getAgentRuntime } from "./agent/index.js";
         }
     }
 }
+loadEnvironment(resolve(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../../.."));
 const log = createLogger("nodetool.websocket.server");
 // Apply log level from NODETOOL_LOG_LEVEL / LOG_LEVEL env vars (the module
 // initialises eagerly, but an explicit call here picks up any env mutations
@@ -78,11 +147,18 @@ const log = createLogger("nodetool.websocket.server");
 configureLogging();
 await initTelemetry();
 const startupT0 = performance.now();
+/**
+ * When this process started. A generation row still `running` from before
+ * this moment belongs to a process that is gone, and the sweep closes it
+ * (docs/media-generation-tracking-design.md § 6.3).
+ */
+const PROCESS_STARTED_AT = new Date().toISOString();
+let stopGenerationReconcileWorker = null;
 function startupMs() {
     return `${(performance.now() - startupT0).toFixed(0)}ms`;
 }
 async function broadcastResourceChange(app, change) {
-    const message = encode({
+    const message = packWebSocketMessage({
         type: "resource_change",
         ...change
     });
@@ -129,21 +205,111 @@ async function notifyPythonBridgeResourceChanges(app, pythonBridge) {
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Database setup
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-const dbPath = getDefaultDbPath();
+function maskDatabaseUrl(url) {
+    try {
+        const parsed = new URL(url);
+        if (parsed.password) {
+            parsed.password = "***";
+        }
+        return parsed.toString();
+    }
+    catch {
+        return "(provided)";
+    }
+}
 try {
-    mkdirSync(dirname(dbPath), { recursive: true });
-    initDb(dbPath);
-    log.info(`Database ready [${startupMs()}]`, { path: dbPath });
-    // Initialize master key from keychain before any secret access.
-    // This must happen before setSecretResolver so that getMasterKey() (sync)
-    // returns the keychain key rather than auto-generating a new one.
+    const postgresDatabaseUrl = getPostgresDatabaseUrl();
+    if (postgresDatabaseUrl) {
+        await initPostgresDb(postgresDatabaseUrl);
+        log.info(`PostgreSQL database ready [${startupMs()}]`, {
+            url: maskDatabaseUrl(postgresDatabaseUrl)
+        });
+    }
+    else {
+        const dbPath = getDefaultDbPath();
+        log.info(`Initializing SQLite database at: ${dbPath}`);
+        mkdirSync(dirname(dbPath), { recursive: true });
+        const appliedMigrations = await migrateSqliteDb(dbPath);
+        if (appliedMigrations.length > 0) {
+            log.info(`SQLite migrations applied [${startupMs()}]`, {
+                count: appliedMigrations.length,
+                versions: appliedMigrations
+            });
+        }
+        initDb(dbPath);
+        log.info(`SQLite database ready [${startupMs()}]`, { path: dbPath });
+    }
+    // Initialize master key from keychain before any secret access. Callers
+    // that need provider credentials bind their own `(key) => getSecret(key,
+    // userId)` closure when invoking provider APIs — there is no shared
+    // global resolver.
     await initMasterKey();
-    setSecretResolver((key, userId) => getSecret(key, userId).then((v) => v ?? undefined));
+    // Bookkeeping for media generations: close the rows a restart orphaned, and
+    // keep refining estimates into billed amounts while the server runs.
+    void sweepInterruptedGenerations(PROCESS_STARTED_AT).catch((err) => {
+        log.warn("Interrupted-generation sweep failed", {
+            error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
+        });
+    });
+    stopGenerationReconcileWorker = startGenerationReconcileWorker({
+        resolveSecret: (key, userId) => getSecret(key, userId)
+    });
+    const runHistoryCleanup = () => {
+        void runAutomaticStorageCleanup(LOCAL_USER_ID)
+            .then((result) => {
+            if (result && result.total > 0) {
+                log.info("Cleaned retained workflow and run history", result);
+            }
+        })
+            .catch((error) => {
+            log.warn("Automatic history cleanup failed", error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error)));
+        });
+        // `/oauth/register` is anonymous and writes a durable row, so the rows it
+        // leaves behind need a sweep of their own: a client nobody ever approved
+        // is dead weight. One with any grant — active or revoked — is kept.
+        void McpOauthClient.gcUnused(UNUSED_OAUTH_CLIENT_TTL_MS)
+            .then((deleted) => {
+            if (deleted > 0) {
+                log.info("Deleted unapproved MCP OAuth clients", { deleted });
+            }
+        })
+            .catch((error) => {
+            log.warn("MCP OAuth client cleanup failed", error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error)));
+        });
+    };
+    runHistoryCleanup();
+    const historyCleanupTimer = setInterval(runHistoryCleanup, 6 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
+    historyCleanupTimer.unref?.();
 }
 catch (err) {
     log.error("Database setup failed", err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)));
     process.exit(1);
 }
+// Persistence for every context this process builds. Each entrance used to
+// wire its own, and the ones that forgot produced runs that could not save an
+// asset — the same workflow ran from the editor and threw over HTTP. A
+// context that wires its own still wins.
+setDefaultModelInterfaces(serverModelInterfaces());
+// Seed built-in workflows — non-fatal; a seed failure should not prevent startup.
+try {
+    await runSeeds();
+    log.info(`Seeds applied [${startupMs()}]`);
+}
+catch (err) {
+    log.warn("Seeds failed (non-fatal)", err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)));
+}
+// User-defined OpenAI-compatible providers for the local user, so a workflow
+// run through a headless entrance reaches them without a settings request
+// first. Each request re-syncs the caller's own catalog.
+try {
+    const ids = await syncCustomProviderRegistry(LOCAL_USER_ID);
+    if (ids.length > 0) {
+        log.info(`Registered custom providers: ${ids.join(", ")}`);
+    }
+}
+catch (err) {
+    log.warn("Custom provider sync failed (non-fatal)", err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)));
+}
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Python pip metadata root detection
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -201,7 +367,7 @@ print(json.dumps(sorted(roots)))
         try {
             const roots = JSON.parse(proc.stdout.trim());
             if (Array.isArray(roots)) {
-                return roots.filter((p) => typeof p === "string" && p.length > 0 && existsSync(p));
+                return roots.filter((p) => isNonEmptyString(p) && existsSync(p));
             }
         }
         catch {
@@ -239,28 +405,135 @@ log.info(`Metadata roots detected [${startupMs()}]`, {
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Node registry
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-const registry = new NodeRegistry();
-registry.loadPythonMetadata({ roots: metadataRoots, maxDepth: 8 });
-log.info(`Python metadata loaded [${startupMs()}]`);
-registerBaseNodes(registry);
-registerElevenLabsNodes(registry);
-registerTransformersJsNodes(registry);
-registerFalNodes(registry);
-registerKieNodes(registry);
-registerReplicateNodes(registry);
-registerTransformersJsProvider();
+const registry = await bootstrapNodeRegistry({
+    metadataRoots,
+    log
+});
 log.info(`Node registry ready [${startupMs()}]`);
+// The Code node reaches the toolbelt and its `@nodetool-ai/sandbox-nodetool/*`
+// imports through the agents package, which it resolves by bare specifier.
+// That specifier resolves in a checkout and nowhere in the bundled backend —
+// esbuild inlines the workspace packages into server.mjs — so hand it the copy
+// this module already holds. Without it, a Code node body in the desktop app
+// and in the Docker image runs with an empty `nodetool.capabilities()`.
+setCodeNodeAgentsModule(agentsModule);
+if (process.env["NODETOOL_ENV"] !== "production") {
+    registerTransformersJsProvider();
+}
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Python bridge
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-const pythonBridge = new PythonStdioBridge({
+const localBridge = createPythonBridge({
     workerArgs: process.env["NODETOOL_WORKER_NAMESPACES"]
         ? ["--namespaces", process.env["NODETOOL_WORKER_NAMESPACES"]]
         : []
 });
+// The ONE stable bridge reference handed to every consumer. It delegates to the
+// local bridge by default; attaching a worker swaps in a dedicated WebSocket
+// bridge to that worker (so ALL Python work — execution AND model management —
+// targets the worker's GPU) and detach swaps back. Because the reference is
+// stable and re-emits its target's events, consumers never re-read it and
+// listeners are wired exactly once.
+const pythonBridge = new SwappableBridge(localBridge);
 let pythonBridgeReady = false;
+// Worker bridge bookkeeping so it can be closed after swapping away. Only the
+// remote WebSocket bridge is tracked here; the local stdio bridge is owned by
+// `localBridge` above and never closed on swap.
+let workerBridge = null;
+const isLocalActive = () => pythonBridge.target === localBridge;
+const getPythonBridgeReady = () => isLocalActive() ? pythonBridgeReady : pythonBridge.isConnected;
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Worker provisioning (GPU workers via @nodetool-ai/compute)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+const workerManager = new WorkerManager();
+/**
+ * Re-point the Python bridge for worker attach/detach by SWAPPING the
+ * SwappableBridge's target (a local stdio bridge cannot be re-pointed in place).
+ *
+ * On attach: build a dedicated WebSocket bridge to the worker, connect it
+ * (discover + status), swap it in as the target — so subsequent execution and
+ * model-management calls run on the worker — then close the previous worker
+ * bridge. Throws (failing the attach) if the worker can't be reached. On detach
+ * (`null`): swap back to the local bridge and dispose the worker bridge.
+ *
+ * `swap()` itself never connects or closes a bridge — lifecycle is owned here:
+ * connect before swapping in, close after swapping away.
+ */
+async function repointPythonBridge(target) {
+    if (target) {
+        const next = new WebsocketPythonBridge({
+            wsUrl: target.wsUrl,
+            workerToken: target.token ?? undefined
+        });
+        try {
+            await next.connect();
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            next.close();
+            throw err;
+        }
+        const previous = workerBridge;
+        workerBridge = next;
+        pythonBridge.swap(next);
+        if (previous)
+            previous.close();
+        log.info("Python bridge re-pointed to attached worker");
+        return;
+    }
+    const previous = workerBridge;
+    workerBridge = null;
+    pythonBridge.swap(localBridge);
+    if (previous)
+        previous.close();
+    log.info("Python bridge re-pointed back to the local worker");
+}
+/** Bound for the readiness probe: TCP/WS handshake + discover RPC. */
+const WORKER_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS = 8000;
+/**
+ * Probe a `running` worker's readiness by opening a transient bridge to its
+ * `{wsUrl, token}` — the same handshake attach performs — then closing it. A
+ * resolved connect (WS open + `discover` answered) means the worker process is
+ * actually serving, not merely that the pod's port is mapped. Never throws:
+ * failures (still booting, unreachable) report `{ healthy: false }`.
+ */
+async function probeWorkerHealth(target) {
+    if (!target.wsUrl) {
+        return { healthy: false, error: "Worker has no WebSocket URL yet" };
+    }
+    const probe = new WebsocketPythonBridge({
+        wsUrl: target.wsUrl,
+        workerToken: target.token ?? undefined,
+        // One-shot probe: no reconnect, bounded handshake.
+        autoRestart: false,
+        startupTimeoutMs: WORKER_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS,
+        reconnectRpcTimeoutMs: WORKER_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS
+    });
+    // A probe must never escalate a socket 'error' into a crash.
+    probe.on("error", () => { });
+    try {
+        await probe.connect();
+        return {
+            healthy: true,
+            protocolVersion: probe.supportsModelManagement() ? 2 : 1
+        };
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        return {
+            healthy: false,
+            error: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
+        };
+    }
+    finally {
+        try {
+            probe.close();
+        }
+        catch {
+            /* best-effort cleanup */
+        }
+    }
+}
 function logPythonBridgeDiagnostics(context) {
-    const loadErrors = pythonBridge.getLoadErrors?.() ?? [];
+    const loadErrors = localBridge.getLoadErrors?.() ?? [];
     if (loadErrors.length === 0)
         return;
     log.warn(`Python bridge ${context} with ${loadErrors.length} load error(s)`);
@@ -273,64 +546,24 @@ function logPythonBridgeDiagnostics(context) {
 }
 pythonBridge.on("stderr", (msg) => {
     for (const line of msg.split("\n")) {
-        if (line.trim())
-            log.debug(`[python-worker] ${line}`);
+        logPythonWorkerStderr(line, log);
     }
 });
+pythonBridge.on("error", (err) => {
+    log.error(`Python bridge protocol error: ${err.message}`);
+    pythonBridgeReady = false;
+});
 pythonBridge.on("exit", (code) => {
     log.warn(`Python worker exited with code ${code}`);
     pythonBridgeReady = false;
 });
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Tool registry
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-const builtinToolClasses = [
-    GoogleSearchTool,
-    GoogleNewsTool,
-    GoogleImagesTool,
-    GoogleGroundedSearchTool,
-    GoogleImageGenerationTool,
-    OpenAIWebSearchTool,
-    OpenAIImageGenerationTool,
-    OpenAITextToSpeechTool,
-    BrowserTool,
-    ScreenshotTool,
-    HttpRequestTool,
-    CalculatorTool,
-    RunCodeTool,
-    StatisticsTool,
-    GeometryTool,
-    ConversionTool,
-    SearchEmailTool,
-    ArchiveEmailTool,
-    AddLabelToEmailTool,
-    DataForSEOSearchTool,
-    DataForSEONewsTool,
-    DataForSEOImagesTool
-];
-// Lazy tool class map — defers instantiation until first access.
-let _toolClassMap = null;
-function getToolClassMap() {
-    if (!_toolClassMap) {
-        _toolClassMap = new Map();
-        for (const cls of builtinToolClasses) {
-            const instance = new cls();
-            _toolClassMap.set(instance.name, cls);
-        }
-        log.info(`Tool class map built (${_toolClassMap.size} tools) [${startupMs()}]`);
-    }
-    return _toolClassMap;
-}
-// Expose as a getter-backed object so existing code using toolClassMap works unchanged.
-const toolClassMap = new Proxy(new Map(), {
-    get(_target, prop, _receiver) {
-        const map = getToolClassMap();
-        const value = map[prop];
-        if (typeof value === "function") {
-            return value.bind(map);
-        }
-        return value;
-    }
+// Keep the attached worker's `last_activity_at` fresh so the cost guard's
+// reaper measures idle time from real bridge traffic, not from creation. The
+// throttling and the best-effort write live in @nodetool-ai/compute so the CLI
+// gets the same behaviour; a local stdio bridge emits no "activity", so this is
+// inert there.
+attachWorkerActivityHeartbeat(pythonBridge, {
+    resolveInstanceId: async () => (await workerManager.getActiveWorker())?.id ?? null
 });
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // TLS configuration
@@ -370,26 +603,45 @@ const port = Number(process.env["PORT"] ?? 7777);
 const isProduction = process.env["NODETOOL_ENV"] === "production";
 // In production, bind to all interfaces unless HOST is explicitly set
 const host = process.env["HOST"] ?? (isProduction ? "0.0.0.0" : "127.0.0.1");
+// The `/mcp` streamable-HTTP mount. Off in production by default: it carries
+// the full agent toolbelt for whichever user it binds, so a deployment opts in
+// with NODETOOL_ENABLE_MCP=1 and authenticates the agent like any other client.
+// The gate is shared with the settings UI, which reports it (see lib/mcp-mount).
+const mcpHttpEnabled = isMcpHttpEnabled();
+// The `WWW-Authenticate` challenge for an unauthenticated or invalid `/mcp`
+// request (docs/mcp-oauth-design.md § "401 challenge") comes from
+// `oauth/gate.ts` — the same gate the AS routes use, so the server never
+// advertises a discovery flow the AS answers with 404. A server where the
+// flow cannot complete answers the plain 401 it always has.
+// Reverse proxies whose X-Forwarded-For header may be trusted to determine the
+// real client IP. Comma-separated IPs/CIDRs (e.g. "127.0.0.1,10.0.0.0/8").
+// When empty, X-Forwarded-For is NOT trusted: req.ip falls back to the socket
+// peer address so clients cannot spoof their origin via headers.
+const trustedProxies = parseTrustedProxies(process.env["NODETOOL_TRUSTED_PROXIES"]);
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Fastify app
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-const app = Fastify({
-    ...(httpsOptions ? { https: httpsOptions } : {}),
-    trustProxy: true,
+const serverOptions = {
+    // Only trust X-Forwarded-For from explicitly configured proxies. With no
+    // proxies configured this is `false`, so req.ip is the unspoofable socket
+    // peer address.
+    trustProxy: trustedProxies.length > 0 ? trustedProxies : false,
     bodyLimit: 100 * 1024 * 1024, // 100 MB
     logger: false,
     // tRPC's httpBatchLink encodes all batched procedure names into a single
     // URL path segment joined with commas (e.g. `/trpc/foo,bar,baz`). Fastify's
-    // default `maxParamLength` of 100 rejects larger batches with a 404 — bump
-    // it so batches up to ~50 procedures route correctly.
+    // default `maxParamLength` of 100 rejects larger batches with a 404, and 2000
+    // was not enough either: one model-picker mount produced a ~2900 char path.
+    // The clients cap a batch at 20 procedures (`maxItems`); this is the backstop.
     routerOptions: {
         ignoreTrailingSlash: true,
-        maxParamLength: 2000
+        maxParamLength: 8000
     },
     genReqId: (req) => {
         return req.headers["x-request-id"] || crypto.randomUUID();
     }
-});
+};
+const app = Fastify(httpsOptions ? { https: httpsOptions, ...serverOptions } : serverOptions);
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Request ID correlation
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -398,6 +650,51 @@ app.addHook("onRequest", async (request) => {
 });
 app.addHook("onSend", async (request, reply) => {
     reply.header("X-Request-Id", request.id);
+    // Baseline security response headers. The web app's CSP lives in a `<meta>`
+    // tag, which browsers ignore for `frame-ancestors` — that directive is only
+    // honoured in a header, so clickjacking protection has to be set here.
+    //
+    // `/api/storage/*` is exempt: those bytes are designed to be embedded from
+    // other origins (MCP App iframes, the Electron renderer, external preview
+    // clients — see storage-api.ts), and the endpoint deliberately serves
+    // unknown extensions as `application/octet-stream` for `<img>`/`<video>` to
+    // sniff. Both `nosniff` and the frame headers would break that contract.
+    const path = request.url.split("?")[0] ?? "/";
+    if (!path.startsWith("/api/storage/")) {
+        reply.header("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff");
+        reply.header("X-Frame-Options", "SAMEORIGIN");
+        reply.header("Content-Security-Policy", "frame-ancestors 'self'");
+    }
+    reply.header("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-cross-origin");
+});
+// CORS must be registered before hooks that can short-circuit. Auth failures
+// and rate-limit responses still need ACAO for first-party web deployments.
+await app.register(fastifyCors, { origin: corsOriginDelegate });
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Per-IP HTTP rate limiting
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Registered before the auth hook so floods are rejected with 429 before any
+// token verification work. Localhost is exempt; tune via NODETOOL_RATE_LIMIT_*.
+const httpRateLimit = getHttpRateLimitConfig();
+// Always register so every request path (including the auth hook) shares one
+// limiter. When disabled via env, use a cap large enough to be inert in
+// practice while keeping CodeQL/static setup able to see the plugin.
+const httpRateLimitMax = httpRateLimit.enabled
+    ? httpRateLimit.max
+    : Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER;
+await app.register(fastifyRateLimit, {
+    global: true,
+    max: httpRateLimitMax,
+    timeWindow: httpRateLimit.timeWindow,
+    keyGenerator: (req) => rateLimitKey(req, httpRateLimit.trustProxy),
+    allowList: (req) => isRateLimitExempt(rateLimitKey(req, httpRateLimit.trustProxy))
+});
+log.info(httpRateLimit.enabled
+    ? "Per-IP HTTP rate limiting enabled"
+    : "Per-IP HTTP rate limiting disabled (limiter registered with no practical cap)", {
+    max: httpRateLimitMax,
+    timeWindowMs: httpRateLimit.timeWindow,
+    trustProxy: httpRateLimit.trustProxy
 });
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Auth
@@ -412,63 +709,252 @@ const supabaseProvider = supabaseMode
     })
     : null;
 const localProvider = supabaseProvider ? null : new LocalAuthProvider();
+// A server that enforces auth but never got an anon key serves a healthy
+// /health and a well-formed /api/config while no user can log in. Say so at
+// boot, where an operator reading the deploy log will see it.
+const missingAnonKey = describeMissingAnonKey();
+if (missingAnonKey) {
+    log.error(missingAnonKey);
+}
+// Auth is enforced whenever a remote identity provider is configured.
+const enforceAuth = supabaseMode;
+// Whether loopback connections may bypass auth as user "1". Explicit
+// NODETOOL_TRUST_LOCALHOST wins; otherwise this defaults off when auth is
+// enforced (so reverse-proxied/containerized deployments — where the proxy
+// connects from loopback — don't silently disable auth) and on for local dev.
+const trustLocalhost = resolveTrustLocalhost({
+    envValue: process.env["NODETOOL_TRUST_LOCALHOST"],
+    enforceAuth
+});
+if (enforceAuth && trustLocalhost) {
+    log.warn("NODETOOL_TRUST_LOCALHOST is enabled while auth is enforced: any " +
+        "connection from loopback (including a reverse proxy) bypasses " +
+        "authentication. Unset it unless the proxy is fully trusted.");
+}
+// Source networks trusted to run as the local user "1" without a token. Needed
+// for containerized self-hosting: Docker NATs a published-port connection to
+// the bridge gateway (e.g. 172.17.0.1), so it never arrives from loopback and
+// the isLoopbackAddress bypass can't fire. Honored ONLY in Local mode — when
+// auth is enforced a CIDR must never bypass a real login, so the list is empty.
+const trustLocalNetworks = enforceAuth
+    ? []
+    : parseTrustedLocalNetworks(process.env["NODETOOL_TRUST_LOCAL_NETWORKS"]);
+if (enforceAuth && process.env["NODETOOL_TRUST_LOCAL_NETWORKS"]) {
+    log.warn("NODETOOL_TRUST_LOCAL_NETWORKS is set while auth is enforced (Supabase " +
+        "mode); it is ignored so every request must present a valid token.");
+}
+else if (trustLocalNetworks.length > 0) {
+    log.warn(`Local mode: trusting connections from ${trustLocalNetworks.join(", ")} ` +
+        'as user "1" without authentication. Only expose this instance to ' +
+        "networks you trust.");
+}
+// Messaging integrations (Telegram, later Discord). The service token is what
+// enables the surface: without it there are no integration routes and no
+// delegated tokens to verify.
+const integrationServiceToken = process.env["NODETOOL_INTEGRATION_TOKEN"];
+const integrationsEnabled = Boolean(integrationServiceToken && integrationServiceToken.length >= 16);
+if (integrationServiceToken && !integrationsEnabled) {
+    log.warn("NODETOOL_INTEGRATION_TOKEN is shorter than 16 characters and was " +
+        "ignored; the /api/integrations routes are not registered.");
+}
+// Delegated tokens are signed with a key derived from the master key, so
+// rotating the master key revokes every outstanding one. Derived lazily: a
+// server that never mints one never reads the key.
+let cachedDelegatedKey = null;
+const delegatedSigningKey = () => (cachedDelegatedKey ??= deriveKey(getMasterKey(), "nodetool-delegated-token"));
+const delegatedProvider = integrationsEnabled
+    ? new DelegatedTokenProvider(delegatedSigningKey)
+    : null;
+// A deployed mini app's run sessions are signed with their own key, derived
+// from the same master key under a different label. Rotating the master key
+// invalidates every outstanding session; a distinct label keeps a session
+// token from ever verifying as a delegated one, or the reverse.
+let cachedAppSessionKey = null;
+const appSessionSigningKey = () => (cachedAppSessionKey ??= deriveKey(getMasterKey(), "nodetool-app-session"));
+// Public app deployments exist only in production; outside it the routes are
+// still registered and every handler refuses, so the surface is decided by one
+// predicate at request time rather than by boot order.
+const appSessionProvider = new AppSessionTokenProvider(appSessionSigningKey);
 app.decorateRequest("userId", null);
+app.decorateRequest("authToken", null);
+app.decorateRequest("appSession", null);
+// Global @fastify/rate-limit (registered above) runs before this hook on every
+// request, including public auth exemptions handled by isPublicAuthExemptRoute.
+// CodeQL js/missing-rate-limiting does not attribute a global Fastify plugin to
+// a hook handler, so it would read this as unlimited. It ships in
+// security-extended, which our default-setup code scanning does not run, so it
+// never fires here. Nothing excludes it either: default setup reads no config
+// file, so suppressing an alert means dismissing it in the Security UI.
 app.addHook("onRequest", async (req, reply) => {
     // Let CORS preflight through — the @fastify/cors plugin handles OPTIONS responses
     if (req.method === "OPTIONS")
         return;
-    // Public routes — no auth required
+    // Public routes — no auth required (still rate-limited globally above).
     const pathname = req.url.split("?")[0];
-    if (pathname === "/health" ||
-        pathname === "/ready" ||
-        pathname.startsWith("/api/oauth/") ||
-        pathname === "/api/assets/packages" ||
-        pathname.startsWith("/api/assets/packages/") ||
-        pathname === "/api/nodes/metadata") {
+    if (isPublicAuthExemptRoute(pathname, req.method) ||
+        (isSdkV1DiscoveryRequest(pathname, req.method) &&
+            !isSdkV1AuthenticationRequired(process.env, enforceAuth))) {
         return;
     }
     // Static frontend assets don't require auth (served by fastifyStatic)
+    // `GET /mcp` is the MCP SSE stream, not a static asset — it must go through
+    // auth so the mount can bind the session's user.
     if (hasStaticApp &&
         req.method === "GET" &&
         !pathname.startsWith("/api") &&
         !pathname.startsWith("/ws") &&
         !pathname.startsWith("/v1") &&
-        !pathname.startsWith("/trpc")) {
+        !pathname.startsWith("/trpc") &&
+        !pathname.startsWith("/mcp")) {
+        return;
+    }
+    // req.ip reflects X-Forwarded-For only when the request arrived through a
+    // configured trusted proxy (see NODETOOL_TRUSTED_PROXIES); otherwise it is
+    // the unspoofable socket peer address.
+    const clientIp = req.ip;
+    // Loopback connections bypass auth as user "1" only when explicitly trusted.
+    // Behind a reverse proxy/container/SSH tunnel the proxy itself connects from
+    // loopback, so this is gated by NODETOOL_TRUST_LOCALHOST (off by default when
+    // auth is enforced). Docker's bridge NAT means the peer is the gateway rather
+    // than loopback, so NODETOOL_TRUST_LOCAL_NETWORKS additionally trusts that
+    // source range (Local mode only).
+    if ((trustLocalhost && isLoopbackAddress(clientIp)) ||
+        isTrustedLocalAddress(clientIp, trustLocalNetworks)) {
+        req.userId = "1";
         return;
     }
     // Extract token from the appropriate source
-    const isWs = req.headers["upgrade"]?.toLowerCase() === "websocket";
+    const isWs = isWebSocketUpgrade(req);
     const searchParams = new URLSearchParams(req.url.split("?")[1] ?? "");
     const provider = supabaseProvider ?? localProvider;
     const token = isWs
         ? provider.extractTokenFromWs(req.headers, searchParams)
         : provider.extractTokenFromHeaders(req.headers);
+    // MCP OAuth access tokens (`nta_`) authorize `/mcp` ONLY — the audience
+    // binding is structural, not claim-parsing (docs/mcp-oauth-design.md §
+    // "Token model and storage"). A valid token whose stored `resource` no
+    // longer matches this deployment's canonical `/mcp` URI (the server was
+    // rehosted since it was minted) or that is presented outside `/mcp` is
+    // denied with `invalid_token`, never silently ignored — falling through to
+    // the `ntk_`/session checks below would let an audience-scoped credential
+    // be probed against the rest of the API.
+    if (token && token.startsWith(MCP_OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN_PREFIX)) {
+        const decision = await authenticateMcpAccessToken(token, req.url.split("?")[0] ?? "/");
+        if (decision.ok) {
+            req.userId = decision.userId;
+            req.authToken = token;
+            return;
+        }
+        denyUnauthorized(req, reply, { error: "invalid_token" }, decision.challenge);
+        return;
+    }
+    // Access tokens (`ntk_`) are the credential a person mints in the app and
+    // pastes into an MCP client's config. They authenticate in every auth mode,
+    // including local: a self-hoster exposing /mcp beyond loopback should be
+    // able to hand out a revocable per-agent token rather than widen
+    // NODETOOL_TRUST_LOCAL_NETWORKS. A token that fails here falls through, so
+    // an expired or revoked one is refused by the mode's own rules.
+    if (token && isAccessToken(token)) {
+        const accessToken = await AccessToken.verify(token);
+        if (accessToken) {
+            req.userId = accessToken.user_id;
+            req.authToken = token;
+            void accessToken.touch().catch(() => {
+                // last_used_at is a convenience for the revoke UI; a failed write
+                // must not fail the request it was recording.
+            });
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+    // A deployed mini app's session token (`nda_`) authenticates a visitor who
+    // has the app's hidden URL. It carries the owner's user id *and* the one
+    // application it may act on, and its whole point is that it reaches nothing
+    // else — so the confinement is applied right here, at the door, rather than
+    // trusted to every handler downstream. `/ws` is the only path it opens: the
+    // run transport, and exactly that path — `/ws/download` and `/ws/extension`
+    // are model downloads and the browser-extension bridge, neither of which a
+    // visitor to somebody's app has any business opening. The public app routes
+    // need no token at all (they are auth-exempt above), and every other path —
+    // tRPC, the REST library, assets, settings — is refused, because the
+    // owner's account is not what the visitor was given a link to.
+    //
+    // A failed verification does *not* fall through to the providers below. An
+    // expired or tampered app session must be refused as itself; letting it
+    // reach the session check would turn a confined credential into a probe
+    // against the rest of the API.
+    if (token && isAppSessionToken(token)) {
+        const session = await appSessionProvider.verifyToken(token);
+        if (session.ok &&
+            session.applicationId &&
+            session.userId &&
+            appDeploymentsEnabled() &&
+            pathname === "/ws") {
+            req.userId = session.userId;
+            req.authToken = token;
+            req.appSession = {
+                applicationId: session.applicationId,
+                version: session.applicationVersion ?? 0
+            };
+            return;
+        }
+        denyUnauthorized(req, reply, { error: "Unauthorized" });
+        return;
+    }
+    // Delegated tokens (a messaging bridge acting as the linked user) are
+    // checked only when they announce themselves by prefix. Anything else —
+    // including a delegated token that is expired or tampered with — falls
+    // through to the configured provider, which rejects it.
+    if (delegatedProvider && token && isDelegatedToken(token)) {
+        const delegated = await delegatedProvider.verifyToken(token);
+        if (delegated.ok) {
+            req.userId = delegated.userId ?? null;
+            req.authToken = token;
+            return;
+        }
+    }
+    // /mcp gets a WWW-Authenticate challenge on every unauthenticated/invalid
+    // denial below it — but only when the OAuth flow can actually complete
+    // (see mcpBearerChallenge). Every other path is unaffected.
+    const challenge = pathname.startsWith("/mcp")
+        ? mcpBearerChallenge()
+        : undefined;
     if (supabaseMode) {
         if (!token) {
-            reply.status(401).send({ error: "Unauthorized" });
+            denyUnauthorized(req, reply, { error: "Unauthorized" }, challenge);
             return;
         }
         const result = await supabaseProvider.verifyToken(token);
         if (!result.ok) {
-            reply.status(401).send({ error: result.error ?? "Unauthorized" });
+            denyUnauthorized(req, reply, { error: result.error ?? "Unauthorized" }, challenge);
             return;
         }
         req.userId = result.userId ?? null;
+        req.authToken = token;
         return;
     }
-    // Dev mode: localhost only
-    // Use req.socket.remoteAddress rather than req.ip because trustProxy: true
-    // makes req.ip reflect x-forwarded-for (spoofable).
-    const remoteAddr = req.socket.remoteAddress ?? "";
-    const isLocalhost = remoteAddr === "127.0.0.1" || remoteAddr === "::1";
-    if (!isLocalhost) {
-        reply.status(401).send({ error: "Remote access requires authentication" });
+    denyUnauthorized(req, reply, { error: "Remote access requires authentication" }, challenge);
+});
+// Multi-instance only: a handshake asking to resume a run that another machine
+// owns is answered with a fly-replay instruction instead of being accepted
+// here, so the client reconnects onto the process holding the run's session.
+// Registered after the auth hook because it scopes the lookup to req.userId.
+// Inert (one env read, no DB) without NODETOOL_INSTANCE_ID / FLY_MACHINE_ID.
+app.addHook("onRequest", async (req, reply) => {
+    await replayUpgradeToOwner(req, reply);
+});
+// A machine that is draining takes no new sockets: the handshake is answered
+// with 503 rather than accepted, so the client's reconnect backoff carries it
+// to a machine that is staying. Its /health is already failing, so the proxy
+// normally routes elsewhere before this is reached; this covers the window
+// between the drain starting and the next health check.
+app.addHook("onRequest", async (req, reply) => {
+    if (!isDraining() || !isWebSocketUpgrade(req))
         return;
-    }
-    req.userId = "1";
+    const path = req.url.split("?")[0] ?? "";
+    if (path !== "/ws" && !path.startsWith("/ws/"))
+        return;
+    denyDraining(req, reply);
 });
-// CORS
-await app.register(fastifyCors, { origin: true });
 // WebSocket support
 await app.register(fastifyWebSocket);
 // Parse all request bodies as raw Buffer — the Web API handlers do their own parsing
@@ -491,6 +977,7 @@ app.addContentTypeParser("*", { parseAs: "buffer" }, (_req, body, done) => {
 const _serverDir = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
 const _envExamplesDir = process.env["NODETOOL_BASE_EXAMPLES_DIR"];
 const _bundledExamplesDir = resolve(_serverDir, "examples", "nodetool-base");
+const _bundledAssetsDir = resolve(_serverDir, "assets", "nodetool-base");
 const _monoExamplesDir = resolve(_serverDir, "..", "..", "..", "packages", "base-nodes", "nodetool", "examples", "nodetool-base");
 const _examplesDirCandidates = [
     _envExamplesDir && existsSync(_envExamplesDir) ? _envExamplesDir : null,
@@ -507,9 +994,161 @@ else {
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // API options for HTTP route handlers
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-const apiOptions = { metadataRoots, registry };
+const sdkLiveRunnerRegistry = new SdkLiveRunnerRegistry();
+const frontendRendererRegistry = new FrontendRendererRegistry();
+const resolveExecutionTarget = createSdkV1ExecutionTargetReadiness({
+    getActiveWorker: () => workerManager.getActiveWorker()
+});
+function listRegistryRecommendedModels() {
+    const models = [];
+    for (const metadata of registry.listMetadata()) {
+        for (const candidate of metadata.recommended_models ?? []) {
+            const parsed = unifiedModel.safeParse(candidate);
+            if (parsed.success) {
+                models.push({
+                    ...parsed.data,
+                    provider: parsed.data.provider == null ? undefined : parsed.data.provider
+                });
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return models;
+}
+const sdkModelDownloadService = createSdkV1ModelDownloadService({
+    startWorkerDownload: (userId, request, operationId, onProgress) => relayWorkerDownload({
+        send: (data) => onProgress(JSON.parse(data))
+    }, pythonBridge, workerManager, {
+        command: "start_download",
+        repo_id: request.repo_id,
+        path: request.path ?? null,
+        allow_patterns: request.allow_patterns ?? null,
+        ignore_patterns: request.ignore_patterns ?? null,
+        model_type: request.model_type,
+        scope: "worker"
+    }, operationId, userId),
+    cancelWorkerDownload: (operationId) => pythonBridge.cancelModelDownload(operationId)
+});
+const apiOptions = {
+    metadataRoots,
+    registry,
+    getPythonBridgeReady,
+    sdkV1Boundary: createSdkV1ImplementationBoundary(createSdkV1Service({
+        getCapabilities: createNodeToolSdkV1CapabilitiesProvider({
+            nodetoolVersion: getVersion(),
+            registry,
+            pythonBridge: () => (getPythonBridgeReady() ? "ready" : "starting"),
+            profiles: {
+                discovery: "available",
+                execution: "available",
+                preflight: "available",
+                model_catalog: "available",
+                model_download: "available",
+                temporary_asset_upload: "available"
+            },
+            authModes: enforceAuth ? ["bearer"] : ["trusted_local"],
+            assetUriSchemes: ["asset"],
+            limits: {
+                maxRpcBatch: 100,
+                // The initial SDK profile deliberately prefers asset references for
+                // media instead of promising an inline payload size.
+                maxInlineBytes: 0,
+                maxQueuedJobs: 0,
+                maxJobEventReplay: 0,
+                requestTimeoutSeconds: 30
+            }
+        }),
+        preflightService: createNodeToolSdkV1PreflightService({
+            registry,
+            getPythonBridgeReady,
+            getExecutionTargetReadiness: ({ request, principal }) => {
+                const target = request.execution_target;
+                if (target?.kind === "runner") {
+                    const ready = sdkLiveRunnerRegistry.has(target.runner_id, principal.userId);
+                    return {
+                        id: target.runner_id,
+                        name: "Live runner",
+                        ready,
+                        message: ready ? null : "Selected live runner is not available."
+                    };
+                }
+                return resolveExecutionTarget(target);
+            },
+            getExecutionCapacitySnapshot: ({ request, principal }) => {
+                const target = request.execution_target;
+                if (target?.kind !== "runner") {
+                    throw new Error("Execution capacity requires a selected live runner.");
+                }
+                return sdkLiveRunnerRegistry.getCapacity({
+                    runnerId: target.runner_id,
+                    userId: principal.userId,
+                    workflowId: request.workflow_id,
+                    concurrent: target.concurrent
+                });
+            }
+        }),
+        modelCatalogService: {
+            list: (args) => getSdkV1ModelCatalog({
+                ...args,
+                recommendedModels: listRegistryRecommendedModels(),
+                getWorkerModels: async () => {
+                    const activeWorker = await workerManager?.getActiveWorker();
+                    if (!activeWorker) {
+                        throw new SdkModelCatalogServiceError("No worker is attached to this server.");
+                    }
+                    if (!pythonBridge.supportsModelManagement()) {
+                        throw new SdkModelCatalogServiceError("The attached worker does not support model management.");
+                    }
+                    const models = [];
+                    for (const candidate of await pythonBridge.listCachedModels()) {
+                        const parsed = unifiedModel.safeParse(candidate);
+                        if (parsed.success)
+                            models.push(parsed.data);
+                    }
+                    return models;
+                }
+            })
+        },
+        modelDownloadService: sdkModelDownloadService,
+        temporaryAssetService: createSdkV1TemporaryAssetService({
+            getStorage: getTempAdapter
+        })
+    }))
+};
 if (_resolvedExamplesDir) {
     apiOptions.examplesDir = _resolvedExamplesDir;
+    if (existsSync(_bundledAssetsDir)) {
+        apiOptions.examplesAssetsFallbackDir = _bundledAssetsDir;
+    }
+}
+// Constant package assets (`package://<pkg>/<file>`) are served read-only at
+// `/api/assets/packages/<pkg>/<file>` from `<root>/<pkg>/<file>`. The bundled
+// root sits next to server.mjs (no Python needed); the monorepo root is used
+// in dev/dist runs.
+const _bundledPackageAssetsRoot = resolve(_serverDir, "assets");
+const _monoPackageAssetsRoot = resolve(_serverDir, "..", "..", "..", "packages", "base-nodes", "nodetool", "assets");
+// The bundled typefaces (D8). Two layouts, checked rather than assumed: the
+// packaged backend stages them beside `server.mjs`, a checkout keeps them in
+// the timeline package's own `fonts/` directory. `registerBundledFonts` in
+// `@nodetool-ai/timeline/fonts/node` resolves the same two for the Node
+// rasterizers; this is the copy the HTTP route serves to the browser from.
+const _bundledFontsDir = [
+    resolve(_serverDir, "fonts"),
+    resolve(_serverDir, "..", "..", "..", "packages", "timeline", "fonts")
+].find((dir) => existsSync(dir));
+if (_bundledFontsDir) {
+    apiOptions.bundledFontsDir = _bundledFontsDir;
+}
+const _packageAssetsRoots = [
+    existsSync(_bundledPackageAssetsRoot) ? _bundledPackageAssetsRoot : null,
+    existsSync(_monoPackageAssetsRoot) ? _monoPackageAssetsRoot : null
+].filter((d) => Boolean(d));
+if (_packageAssetsRoots.length > 0) {
+    apiOptions.packageAssetsRoots = _packageAssetsRoots;
+    // Let in-process workflow execution resolve `package://` refs straight from
+    // disk instead of guessing the loopback port for an HTTP round-trip.
+    if (!process.env["NODETOOL_PACKAGE_ASSETS_DIR"]) {
+        process.env["NODETOOL_PACKAGE_ASSETS_DIR"] = _packageAssetsRoots[0];
+    }
 }
 const staticFolder = process.env["STATIC_FOLDER"];
 const hasStaticApp = Boolean(staticFolder && existsSync(staticFolder));
@@ -520,31 +1159,42 @@ const createContext = createContextFactory({
     registry,
     apiOptions,
     pythonBridge,
-    getPythonBridgeReady: () => pythonBridgeReady
+    getPythonBridgeReady,
+    workerManager,
+    repointPythonBridge,
+    probeWorkerHealth
 });
 await app.register(fastifyTRPCPlugin, {
     prefix: "/trpc",
     trpcOptions: {
         router: appRouter,
         createContext,
-        onError({ path, error }) {
-            log.error(`tRPC error on ${path}`, error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error)));
-            // Surface inner ZodError details (output validation failures) so callers
-            // can diagnose the offending fields instead of seeing only "Output
-            // validation failed".
-            const cause = error.cause;
-            if (cause && typeof cause === "object" && "issues" in cause) {
-                log.error(`tRPC error cause on ${path}: ${JSON.stringify(cause.issues)}`);
-            }
+        // The web client forces all batches to POST (httpBatchLink
+        // `methodOverride: "POST"`) so long batched inputs ride in the body instead
+        // of the URL, which reverse proxies reject once the query string grows too
+        // large (see web/src/trpc/client.ts and issues #3979/#3981). Without this
+        // flag the server rejects POST-to-query with 405, leaving panels empty.
+        allowMethodOverride: true,
+        maxBatchSize: TRPC_MAX_BATCH_SIZE,
+        onError({ path, error, req }) {
+            logTrpcRequestError(log, {
+                path,
+                error,
+                requestId: req.id
+            });
         }
     }
 });
 await app.register(websocketPlugin, {
     registry,
     pythonBridge,
-    getPythonBridgeReady: () => pythonBridgeReady,
+    apiOptions,
+    sdkLiveRunnerRegistry,
+    frontendRendererRegistry,
+    workerManager,
+    getPythonBridgeReady,
     ensurePythonBridge: async () => {
-        if (pythonBridgeReady)
+        if (getPythonBridgeReady())
             return;
         log.info(`Lazily starting Python bridge [${startupMs()}]`);
         try {
@@ -554,31 +1204,18 @@ await app.register(websocketPlugin, {
             log.warn(`Python bridge lazy start failed [${startupMs()}]`, err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)));
             throw err;
         }
+        // A worker bridge is connected eagerly on attach; readiness then derives
+        // from its live connection state. Only the local bridge does the one-time
+        // node-metadata registration below.
+        if (!isLocalActive()) {
+            log.info(`Worker Python bridge connected [${startupMs()}]`);
+            return;
+        }
         pythonBridgeReady = true;
         log.info(`Python bridge lazy start completed [${startupMs()}]`);
         const meta = pythonBridge.getNodeMetadata();
-        // Register Python bridge nodes — skip those already loaded from JSON metadata
-        let bridgeOnly = 0;
-        for (const nodeMeta of meta) {
-            if (!nodeMeta.node_type)
-                continue;
-            if (registry.getMetadata(nodeMeta.node_type))
-                continue;
-            bridgeOnly++;
-            registry.loadMetadata(nodeMeta.node_type, {
-                ...nodeMeta,
-                namespace: nodeMeta.node_type.split(".").slice(0, -1).join("."),
-                layout: "default",
-                recommended_models: [],
-                basic_fields: [],
-                required_settings: nodeMeta.required_settings ?? [],
-                is_dynamic: nodeMeta.is_dynamic ?? false,
-                is_streaming_output: nodeMeta.is_streaming_output ?? false,
-                expose_as_tool: false,
-                supports_dynamic_outputs: false
-            });
-        }
-        log.info(`Python bridge connected [${startupMs()}] — ${meta.length} Python nodes (${bridgeOnly} bridge-only, ${meta.length - bridgeOnly} from JSON)`);
+        const mergeResult = mergePythonBridgeMetadata(registry, meta);
+        log.info(`Python bridge connected [${startupMs()}] — ${mergeResult.total} Python nodes (${mergeResult.bridgeOnly} bridge-only, ${mergeResult.alreadyKnown} already registered)`);
         pythonBridge
             .getWorkerStatus?.()
             ?.then((status) => {
@@ -599,26 +1236,82 @@ await app.register(websocketPlugin, {
         notifyPythonBridgeResourceChanges(app, pythonBridge).catch((err) => {
             log.warn("Failed to notify Python bridge resource changes", err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)));
         });
-    },
-    toolClassMap
+    }
 });
+// One poller for the whole process, not one per connection: it re-reads this
+// instance's own running runs so a cancel written on another instance lands
+// here. The registry it consults is process-wide.
+const stopJobCancelPoller = startJobCancelPoller();
 await app.register(healthRoute);
+await app.register(configRoute);
 // All HTTP API routes receive apiOptions
 const routeOpts = { apiOptions };
+await app.register(sdkV1Routes, routeOpts);
 await app.register(assetsRoutes, routeOpts);
+await app.register(timelineFontRoutes, routeOpts);
 await app.register(workflowsRoutes, routeOpts);
-await app.register(jobsRoutes, routeOpts);
 await app.register(nodesRoutes, routeOpts);
 await app.register(storageRoutes, routeOpts);
 await app.register(openaiRoutes, routeOpts);
 await app.register(oauthRoutes, routeOpts);
+// MCP OAuth 2.1 AS + well-known discovery routes (docs/mcp-oauth-design.md).
+// Self-contained: registers its own content-type parsers on its own
+// encapsulated context, so it is unaffected by the raw-buffer parser the
+// outer app installs above. 404s every route on its own when the flow is
+// unconfigured or NODETOOL_DISABLE_MCP_OAUTH=1 — nothing to gate here.
+await app.register(oauthAsRoutes);
 await app.register(workspaceRoutes, routeOpts);
+// A cloud deployment keeps workspaces in the asset bucket rather than on the
+// machine's disk, which it would lose on every replacement. No-op locally.
+initWorkspaceStorage();
+// The Workspace Explorer has no other way to hear about a file a run wrote:
+// workspace files are not database rows.
+initWorkspaceChangeEvents();
 await app.register(filesRoutes, routeOpts);
 await app.register(collectionsRoutes, routeOpts);
-// MCP endpoints are only available in local/dev mode — not in production.
-// The configuration endpoints moved to the tRPC `mcpConfig` router; the
-// `/mcp` proxy below is a bare MCP over-HTTP transport and stays on REST.
-if (!isProduction) {
+await app.register(applicationsRoutes, routeOpts);
+await app.register(publicAppRoutes, { appSessionSigningKey });
+await app.register(jsScriptsRoutes, routeOpts);
+await app.register(timelineAnimationRoutes, routeOpts);
+await app.register(timelineAudioBakeRoutes, routeOpts);
+await app.register(timelineIsolateSubjectRoutes, routeOpts);
+await app.register(timelineTrackObjectRoutes, routeOpts);
+await app.register(storyboardsRoutes, routeOpts);
+await app.register(timelinesRoutes, routeOpts);
+// PDF/DOCX text extraction for script and screenplay imports. Stores
+// nothing and needs no apiOptions.
+await app.register(documentsRoutes);
+// Art. 20 export and Art. 17 erasure. The subject is always the caller:
+// no admin path, no subject id anywhere in the URL or body.
+await app.register(accountRoutes, routeOpts);
+await app.register(sandboxModulesRoutes);
+await app.register(falCreditsRoute);
+await app.register(falPricingRoute);
+await app.register(falPricingEstimateRoute);
+await app.register(kieCreditsRoute);
+await app.register(kiePricingRoute);
+await app.register(kieWebhookRoute);
+// fal callbacks authenticate with signed headers and commit to the durable
+// generation inbox before the route acknowledges them.
+await app.register(falWebhookRoute);
+// AtlasCloud callbacks authenticate with an Ed25519 signature over the raw
+// body and hand the finished prediction to the run waiting on it.
+await app.register(atlasCloudWebhookRoute);
+// Messaging-integration identity routes (`/api/integrations/:provider/*`).
+// The plugin registers nothing unless NODETOOL_INTEGRATION_TOKEN is set, so a
+// server without it answers 404 on every one of these paths.
+await app.register(createIntegrationRoutes({ signingKey: delegatedSigningKey, enforceAuth }));
+// Trigger webhook ingestion (`POST /api/webhooks/:token`). Registered here
+// because Fastify routes must exist before `app.listen`; the plugin reaches the
+// wakeup service and dispatcher started below through module accessors.
+if (triggersEnabled()) {
+    await app.register(createTriggerWebhookRoute());
+}
+// The `/mcp` mount is a bare MCP over-HTTP transport (the configuration
+// endpoints moved to the tRPC `mcpConfig` router, which stays local-only). In
+// production it registers only with NODETOOL_ENABLE_MCP=1, and it binds the
+// user the auth hook resolved rather than the local single user.
+if (mcpHttpEnabled) {
     app.all("/mcp", async (req, reply) => {
         const protocol = httpsOptions ? "https" : "http";
         const url = `${protocol}://${req.headers.host ?? `127.0.0.1:${port}`}${req.url}`;
@@ -629,7 +1322,7 @@ if (!isProduction) {
                     headers.append(key, item);
                 }
             }
-            else if (typeof value === "string") {
+            else if (value != null) {
                 headers.set(key, value);
             }
         }
@@ -637,7 +1330,7 @@ if (!isProduction) {
             ? undefined
             : Buffer.isBuffer(req.body)
                 ? req.body
-                : typeof req.body === "string"
+                : isString(req.body)
                     ? req.body
                     : req.body == null
                         ? Buffer.alloc(0)
@@ -645,10 +1338,30 @@ if (!isProduction) {
         const request = new Request(url, {
             method: req.method,
             headers,
-            body: requestBody,
-            duplex: "half"
+            body: Buffer.isBuffer(requestBody)
+                ? new Uint8Array(requestBody)
+                : requestBody,
+            // `duplex` is required by Node's fetch when streaming bodies but is
+            // missing from some `@types/node`/`undici-types` versions of RequestInit.
+            ...{ duplex: "half" }
+        });
+        // The scope is the user the auth hook resolved for this request. With no
+        // user, no scope is passed and mcp-server.ts answers 401 at initialize
+        // instead of handing out an anonymous full-access session.
+        const response = await handleMcpHttpRequest(request, {
+            metadataRoots,
+            registry,
+            examplesDir: apiOptions.examplesDir,
+            frontendRendererRegistry,
+            allowLocalFilePaths: !isProduction && isLoopbackAddress(req.ip),
+            agentToolsScope: req.userId
+                ? {
+                    userId: req.userId,
+                    source: isProduction ? "http-session" : "local-dev-http"
+                }
+                : undefined,
+            unauthorizedChallenge: mcpBearerChallenge()
         });
-        const response = await handleMcpHttpRequest(request, { metadataRoots });
         if (!response) {
             reply.status(404).send({ error: "Not found" });
             return;
@@ -661,7 +1374,9 @@ if (!isProduction) {
         reply.send(payload);
     });
 }
-await app.register(agentSocketRoute);
+else {
+    log.info(`MCP over HTTP (/mcp) disabled in production; set ${MCP_ENABLE_FLAG}=1 to enable`);
+}
 log.info(`Routes registered [${startupMs()}]`);
 if (hasStaticApp && staticFolder) {
     log.info("Serving static app", { root: staticFolder });
@@ -676,6 +1391,20 @@ if (hasStaticApp && staticFolder) {
         return reply.sendFile("index.html");
     });
 }
+// Download the built Chrome extension as a zip, for the install helper UI.
+app.get("/api/extension/download", async (_req, reply) => {
+    try {
+        const zip = await zipExtensionDist();
+        return reply
+            .header("Content-Type", "application/zip")
+            .header("Content-Disposition", 'attachment; filename="nodetool-chrome-extension.zip"')
+            .send(zip);
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        log.warn(`Extension download failed: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);
+        return reply.status(404).send({ detail: "Extension build not found" });
+    }
+});
 // Log all 404s so we can identify missing routes
 app.setNotFoundHandler((req, reply) => {
     const pathname = req.url.split("?")[0] ?? "/";
@@ -685,8 +1414,14 @@ app.setNotFoundHandler((req, reply) => {
         !pathname.startsWith("/health") &&
         !pathname.startsWith("/ws") &&
         !pathname.startsWith("/v1") &&
-        !pathname.startsWith("/oauth") &&
+        !pathname.startsWith("/.well-known/") &&
+        // /oauth/consent is the one /oauth path that IS the SPA — the MCP OAuth
+        // consent page (docs/mcp-oauth-design.md). Every other /oauth/* path is
+        // an AS API route (authorize/token/register/revoke), and unmatched
+        // requests there must 404 rather than get served index.html.
+        (pathname === "/oauth/consent" || !pathname.startsWith("/oauth")) &&
         !pathname.startsWith("/trpc") &&
+        !pathname.startsWith("/mcp") &&
         !pathname.includes(".")) {
         return reply.sendFile("index.html");
     }
@@ -730,18 +1465,111 @@ app.listen({ port, host }, (err) => {
     log.info(`WebSocket endpoint: ${tlsEnabled ? "wss" : "ws"}://${host}:${port}/ws`);
 });
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Triggers — durable wakeup service, dispatcher, and ingestion adapters
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+//
+// Starting the dispatcher also drains the boot backlog: every unprocessed
+// `trigger_inputs` row a previous process life stored is dispatched now. Set
+// NODETOOL_DISABLE_TRIGGERS=1 to opt this process out.
+const triggerServices = startTriggerServices({ registry });
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Worker cost guard — reconcile orphaned GPU pods on boot, then reap on a loop
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+const WORKER_REAPER_INTERVAL_MS = 60_000;
+workerManager
+    .reconcile()
+    .then((summary) => {
+    if (summary.liveCount > 0 || summary.orphans.length > 0) {
+        log.info(`Worker reconcile: ${summary.liveCount} live, ` +
+            `${summary.orphans.length} orphaned, ~$${summary.estimatedCostUsd.toFixed(2)}`);
+    }
+})
+    .catch((reconcileErr) => {
+    log.warn("Worker reconcile failed at startup", reconcileErr instanceof Error
+        ? reconcileErr
+        : new Error(String(reconcileErr)));
+});
+const stopReaper = startReaper({
+    manager: workerManager,
+    getProfile: (name) => getWorkerProfile(name),
+    now: () => Date.now()
+}, WORKER_REAPER_INTERVAL_MS);
+const generationRecoveryWorker = createGenerationRecoveryWorker();
+const generationRecoveryTimer = setInterval(() => {
+    void generationRecoveryWorker.runOnce().catch((error) => {
+        log.warn("Durable generation recovery failed", error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error)));
+    });
+}, 30_000);
+generationRecoveryTimer.unref?.();
+void generationRecoveryWorker.runOnce().catch((error) => {
+    log.warn("Durable generation recovery failed at startup", error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error)));
+});
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Graceful shutdown — ensure child processes (Python worker, etc.) are killed
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+/**
+ * How long SIGTERM waits for aborted turns and runs to settle. Under Fly's
+ * 300 s cap between the signal and the kill; the drain the deploy script runs
+ * first is what actually waits for a long turn, so this is the fallback for a
+ * restart nobody drained.
+ */
+function shutdownGraceMs() {
+    const raw = process.env["NODETOOL_SHUTDOWN_GRACE_MS"];
+    if (!raw)
+        return 240_000;
+    const parsed = Number.parseInt(raw, 10);
+    return Number.isFinite(parsed) && parsed >= 0 ? parsed : 240_000;
+}
+let shuttingDown = false;
 async function shutdown(signal) {
+    // The wait below can last minutes; a second signal in that window must not
+    // run the teardown a second time on top of the first.
+    if (shuttingDown) {
+        log.info(`${signal} received again — shutdown already in progress`);
+        return;
+    }
+    shuttingDown = true;
     log.info(`${signal} received — shutting down`);
+    // Take no new work first, so nothing starts during the wait below.
+    startDrain();
+    const abortedTurns = chatTurnRegistry.abortAll("shutdown");
+    const cancelledJobs = jobRunRegistry.cancelAll();
+    if (abortedTurns > 0 || cancelledJobs > 0) {
+        log.info("Aborting in-flight work", {
+            turns: abortedTurns,
+            jobs: cancelledJobs
+        });
+    }
+    const grace = shutdownGraceMs();
+    const [turnsDrained, jobsDrained] = await Promise.all([
+        chatTurnRegistry.drained(grace),
+        jobRunRegistry.drained(grace)
+    ]);
+    if (!turnsDrained || !jobsDrained) {
+        // The turn's own `finally` writes the stand-in tool-result rows, so a
+        // turn still running here is one whose transcript stays incomplete.
+        log.warn("Shutdown grace expired with work still running", {
+            graceMs: grace,
+            turns: chatTurnRegistry.runningCount(),
+            jobs: jobRunRegistry.runningCount()
+        });
+    }
+    // Spans are batched, so without this every span the last turns produced dies
+    // with the process.
+    await shutdownTelemetry();
     log.info("Closing Python bridge");
+    stopReaper();
+    clearInterval(generationRecoveryTimer);
+    stopJobCancelPoller();
+    stopGenerationReconcileWorker?.();
     try {
-        getAgentRuntime().closeAllSessions();
+        await triggerServices.stop();
     }
-    catch {
-        // best-effort cleanup
+    catch (err) {
+        log.warn("Trigger services failed to stop cleanly", err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err)));
     }
-    pythonBridge.close();
+    localBridge.close();
+    workerBridge?.close();
     try {
         await app.close();
     }
@@ -752,12 +1580,20 @@ async function shutdown(signal) {
 }
 process.on("SIGINT", () => void shutdown("SIGINT"));
 process.on("SIGTERM", () => void shutdown("SIGTERM"));
+// The deploy's drain signal: stop taking work and let the turns in flight
+// finish, without a deadline. `scripts/fly-rolling-deploy.sh` sends it, waits
+// for /health to report no turns and no jobs, and only then replaces the
+// machine — which is what keeps a 30-minute turn off Fly's 300 s SIGTERM cap.
+process.on("SIGUSR2", () => {
+    log.info("SIGUSR2 received — draining");
+    startDrain();
+});
 // On Windows, Ctrl+C in some terminals fires SIGBREAK instead of SIGINT
 if (process.platform === "win32") {
     process.on("SIGBREAK", () => void shutdown("SIGBREAK"));
 }
-// Start Python bridge eagerly if Python is installed.
-if (pythonBridge.hasPython()) {
+// Start Python bridge eagerly if a worker is available.
+if (pythonBridge.isAvailable()) {
     log.info(`Starting Python bridge eagerly [${startupMs()}]`);
     pythonBridge
         .ensureConnected()
@@ -765,27 +1601,8 @@ if (pythonBridge.hasPython()) {
         pythonBridgeReady = true;
         log.info(`Python bridge eager start completed [${startupMs()}]`);
         const meta = pythonBridge.getNodeMetadata();
-        let bridgeOnly = 0;
-        for (const nodeMeta of meta) {
-            if (!nodeMeta.node_type)
-                continue;
-            if (registry.getMetadata(nodeMeta.node_type))
-                continue;
-            bridgeOnly++;
-            registry.loadMetadata(nodeMeta.node_type, {
-                ...nodeMeta,
-                namespace: nodeMeta.node_type.split(".").slice(0, -1).join("."),
-                layout: "default",
-                recommended_models: [],
-                basic_fields: [],
-                required_settings: nodeMeta.required_settings ?? [],
-                is_dynamic: nodeMeta.is_dynamic ?? false,
-                is_streaming_output: nodeMeta.is_streaming_output ?? false,
-                expose_as_tool: false,
-                supports_dynamic_outputs: false
-            });
-        }
-        log.info(`Python bridge connected [${startupMs()}] — ${meta.length} Python nodes (${bridgeOnly} bridge-only, ${meta.length - bridgeOnly} from JSON)`);
+        const mergeResult = mergePythonBridgeMetadata(registry, meta);
+        log.info(`Python bridge connected [${startupMs()}] — ${mergeResult.total} Python nodes (${mergeResult.bridgeOnly} bridge-only, ${mergeResult.alreadyKnown} already registered)`);
         pythonBridge
             .getWorkerStatus?.()
             ?.then((status) => {
@@ -812,8 +1629,9 @@ if (pythonBridge.hasPython()) {
     });
 }
 else {
-    log.info(isProduction
-        ? "Python bridge disabled in production — Python nodes will not be available"
+    const pythonAllowedInProduction = process.env["NODETOOL_ALLOW_PYTHON_BRIDGE_IN_PRODUCTION"] === "1";
+    log.info(isProduction && !pythonAllowedInProduction
+        ? "Python bridge disabled in production — Python nodes will not be available; set NODETOOL_ALLOW_PYTHON_BRIDGE_IN_PRODUCTION=1 to enable (the image ships no Python worker: install nodetool-core and point NODETOOL_PYTHON at that interpreter)"
         : "Python not found — Python nodes will not be available");
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=server.js.map