@node9/proxy 2.7.0 → 2.7.1

package/dist/cli.js

@@ -243,8 +243,8 @@ function sanitizeConfig(raw) {
     }
   }
   const lines = result.error.issues.map((issue) => {
-    const path73 = issue.path.length > 0 ? issue.path.join(".") : "root";
-    return `  \u2022 ${path73}: ${issue.message}`;
+    const path74 = issue.path.length > 0 ? issue.path.join(".") : "root";
+    return `  \u2022 ${path74}: ${issue.message}`;
   });
   return {
     sanitized,
@@ -624,9 +624,9 @@ function matchesPattern(text, patterns) {
   const withoutDotSlash = text.replace(/^\.\//, "");
   return isMatch(withoutDotSlash) || isMatch(`./${withoutDotSlash}`);
 }
-function getNestedValue(obj, path73) {
+function getNestedValue(obj, path74) {
   if (!obj || typeof obj !== "object") return null;
-  const segments = path73.split(".");
+  const segments = path74.split(".");
   for (const seg of segments) {
     if (FORBIDDEN_PATH_SEGMENTS.has(seg)) return null;
   }
@@ -5423,13 +5423,13 @@ function getConfig(cwd) {
         }
         if (Array.isArray(mc.jailPaths)) {
           for (const jp of mc.jailPaths) {
-            const path73 = typeof jp?.path === "string" ? jp.path.trim() : "";
-            if (!path73) continue;
+            const path74 = typeof jp?.path === "string" ? jp.path.trim() : "";
+            if (!path74) continue;
             const verdict = jp?.verdict === "review" ? "review" : "block";
-            for (const r of pathRules(path73, verdict, "org-managed jail")) {
+            for (const r of pathRules(path74, verdict, "org-managed jail")) {
               mergedPolicy.smartRules.push({ ...r, name: `org:${r.name}` });
             }
-            mergedPolicy.managedJailPaths.push({ path: path73, verdict });
+            mergedPolicy.managedJailPaths.push({ path: path74, verdict });
           }
         }
         if (Array.isArray(mc.trustedHosts)) {
@@ -11401,14 +11401,15 @@ var init_keyed_guard = __esm({
 function normalizeModel(raw) {
   return raw.replace(/-\d{8}$/, "").toLowerCase();
 }
-function readCache() {
+function readCache(opts) {
   try {
     const raw = JSON.parse(import_fs17.default.readFileSync(CACHE_FILE(), "utf-8"));
     if (typeof raw.fetchedAt !== "string" || typeof raw.prices !== "object" || raw.prices === null) {
       return null;
     }
     const ageMs = Date.now() - new Date(raw.fetchedAt).getTime();
-    if (ageMs < 0 || ageMs > TTL_MS) return null;
+    if (!Number.isFinite(ageMs) || ageMs < 0) return null;
+    if (opts.requireFresh && ageMs > TTL_MS) return null;
     return raw.prices;
   } catch {
     return null;
@@ -11474,7 +11475,7 @@ async function fetchLiteLLMPricing() {
 }
 async function ensurePricingLoaded() {
   if (memCache !== null && Date.now() - memCacheAt < TTL_MS) return;
-  const fromDisk = readCache();
+  const fromDisk = readCache({ requireFresh: true });
   if (fromDisk && Object.keys(fromDisk).length > 0) {
     memCache = fromDisk;
     memCacheAt = Date.now();
@@ -11499,7 +11500,7 @@ function pricingFor(model) {
   if (cached !== void 0) return cached;
   if (memCache === null && !diskChecked) {
     diskChecked = true;
-    const disk = readCache();
+    const disk = readCache({ requireFresh: false });
     if (disk && Object.keys(disk).length > 0) {
       memCache = disk;
       memCacheAt = Date.now();
@@ -12506,6 +12507,38 @@ var init_scan_json = __esm({
   }
 });
 
+// src/session-files.ts
+function listSessionFiles(dir, maxDepth = 6) {
+  const out = [];
+  const walk = (d, rel, depth) => {
+    if (depth > maxDepth) return;
+    let entries;
+    try {
+      entries = fs22.readdirSync(d, { withFileTypes: true });
+    } catch {
+      return;
+    }
+    for (const e of entries) {
+      const childRel = rel ? path24.join(rel, e.name) : e.name;
+      if (e.isDirectory()) walk(path24.join(d, e.name), childRel, depth + 1);
+      else if (e.name.endsWith(".jsonl")) out.push(childRel);
+    }
+  };
+  walk(dir, "", 0);
+  return out;
+}
+function sessionIdOf(relPath) {
+  return path24.basename(relPath).replace(/\.jsonl$/, "");
+}
+var fs22, path24;
+var init_session_files = __esm({
+  "src/session-files.ts"() {
+    "use strict";
+    fs22 = __toESM(require("fs"));
+    path24 = __toESM(require("path"));
+  }
+});
+
 // src/cli/render/scan-history.ts
 function defaultHistoryPath() {
   return import_path23.default.join(import_os20.default.homedir(), ".node9", "scan-history.json");
@@ -12869,6 +12902,7 @@ var init_costSync = __esm({
     init_cost_codex();
     init_cost_gemini();
     init_cost_copilot();
+    init_session_files();
     SYNC_INTERVAL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1e3;
     claudeSource = {
       id: "claude",
@@ -12894,7 +12928,7 @@ var init_costSync = __esm({
           }
           let files;
           try {
-            files = import_fs23.default.readdirSync(dirPath).filter((f) => f.endsWith(".jsonl"));
+            files = listSessionFiles(dirPath);
           } catch {
             continue;
           }
@@ -13948,7 +13982,7 @@ function countScanFiles() {
                 const dp = import_path28.default.join(mp, day);
                 try {
                   if (!import_fs26.default.statSync(dp).isDirectory()) continue;
-                  total += import_fs26.default.readdirSync(dp).filter((f) => f.endsWith(".jsonl")).length;
+                  total += listSessionFiles(dp).length;
                 } catch {
                   continue;
                 }
@@ -13981,7 +14015,7 @@ function processClaudeFile(file, projPath, projLabel, ruleSources, startDate, re
   result.filesScanned++;
   result.sessions++;
   onProgress?.(result.filesScanned);
-  const sessionId = file.replace(/\.jsonl$/, "");
+  const sessionId = sessionIdOf(file);
   const session = { sessionId, costUSD: 0, toolCalls: 0 };
   let raw;
   try {
@@ -14207,7 +14241,7 @@ function processClaudeProject(proj, projectsDir, ruleSources, startDate, result,
   );
   let files;
   try {
-    files = import_fs26.default.readdirSync(projPath).filter((f) => f.endsWith(".jsonl") && !f.startsWith("agent-"));
+    files = listSessionFiles(projPath);
   } catch {
     return;
   }
@@ -16228,6 +16262,7 @@ var init_scan = __esm({
     init_protection();
     import_string_width2 = __toESM(require("string-width"));
     init_scan_json();
+    init_session_files();
     init_scan_history();
     toolInspectionMap = DEFAULT_CONFIG.policy.toolInspection;
     CODE_EXTENSIONS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
@@ -18896,28 +18931,28 @@ var init_ship2 = __esm({
 
 // src/machine-id.ts
 function getMachineId(homeDir2 = os34.homedir()) {
-  const file = path37.join(homeDir2, ".node9", "machine-id");
+  const file = path38.join(homeDir2, ".node9", "machine-id");
   try {
-    const existing = fs38.readFileSync(file, "utf-8").trim();
+    const existing = fs39.readFileSync(file, "utf-8").trim();
     if (UUID_RE.test(existing)) return existing;
   } catch {
   }
   const id = crypto5.randomUUID();
   try {
-    fs38.mkdirSync(path37.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
-    fs38.writeFileSync(file, id + "\n", { mode: 384 });
+    fs39.mkdirSync(path38.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
+    fs39.writeFileSync(file, id + "\n", { mode: 384 });
   } catch {
   }
   return id;
 }
-var crypto5, fs38, os34, path37, UUID_RE;
+var crypto5, fs39, os34, path38, UUID_RE;
 var init_machine_id = __esm({
   "src/machine-id.ts"() {
     "use strict";
     crypto5 = __toESM(require("crypto"));
-    fs38 = __toESM(require("fs"));
+    fs39 = __toESM(require("fs"));
     os34 = __toESM(require("os"));
-    path37 = __toESM(require("path"));
+    path38 = __toESM(require("path"));
     UUID_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/;
   }
 });
@@ -23158,14 +23193,14 @@ var require_util = __commonJS({
         }
         const port = url.port != null ? url.port : url.protocol === "https:" ? 443 : 80;
         let origin = url.origin != null ? url.origin : `${url.protocol || ""}//${url.hostname || ""}:${port}`;
-        let path73 = url.path != null ? url.path : `${url.pathname || ""}${url.search || ""}`;
+        let path74 = url.path != null ? url.path : `${url.pathname || ""}${url.search || ""}`;
         if (origin[origin.length - 1] === "/") {
           origin = origin.slice(0, origin.length - 1);
         }
-        if (path73 && path73[0] !== "/") {
-          path73 = `/${path73}`;
+        if (path74 && path74[0] !== "/") {
+          path74 = `/${path74}`;
         }
-        return new URL(`${origin}${path73}`);
+        return new URL(`${origin}${path74}`);
       }
       if (!isHttpOrHttpsPrefixed(url.origin || url.protocol)) {
         throw new InvalidArgumentError("Invalid URL protocol: the URL must start with `http:` or `https:`.");
@@ -23986,9 +24021,9 @@ var require_diagnostics = __commonJS({
         "undici:client:sendHeaders",
         (evt) => {
           const {
-            request: { method, path: path73, origin }
+            request: { method, path: path74, origin }
           } = evt;
-          debugLog("sending request to %s %s%s", method, origin, path73);
+          debugLog("sending request to %s %s%s", method, origin, path74);
         }
       );
     }
@@ -24006,14 +24041,14 @@ var require_diagnostics = __commonJS({
         "undici:request:headers",
         (evt) => {
           const {
-            request: { method, path: path73, origin },
+            request: { method, path: path74, origin },
             response: { statusCode }
           } = evt;
           debugLog(
             "received response to %s %s%s - HTTP %d",
             method,
             origin,
-            path73,
+            path74,
             statusCode
           );
         }
@@ -24022,23 +24057,23 @@ var require_diagnostics = __commonJS({
         "undici:request:trailers",
         (evt) => {
           const {
-            request: { method, path: path73, origin }
+            request: { method, path: path74, origin }
           } = evt;
-          debugLog("trailers received from %s %s%s", method, origin, path73);
+          debugLog("trailers received from %s %s%s", method, origin, path74);
         }
       );
       diagnosticsChannel.subscribe(
         "undici:request:error",
         (evt) => {
           const {
-            request: { method, path: path73, origin },
+            request: { method, path: path74, origin },
             error
           } = evt;
           debugLog(
             "request to %s %s%s errored - %s",
             method,
             origin,
-            path73,
+            path74,
             error.message
           );
         }
@@ -24141,7 +24176,7 @@ var require_request = __commonJS({
     var kHandler = /* @__PURE__ */ Symbol("handler");
     var Request = class {
       constructor(origin, {
-        path: path73,
+        path: path74,
         method,
         body,
         headers,
@@ -24158,11 +24193,11 @@ var require_request = __commonJS({
         maxRedirections,
         typeOfService
       }, handler) {
-        if (typeof path73 !== "string") {
+        if (typeof path74 !== "string") {
           throw new InvalidArgumentError("path must be a string");
-        } else if (path73[0] !== "/" && !(path73.startsWith("http://") || path73.startsWith("https://")) && method !== "CONNECT") {
+        } else if (path74[0] !== "/" && !(path74.startsWith("http://") || path74.startsWith("https://")) && method !== "CONNECT") {
           throw new InvalidArgumentError("path must be an absolute URL or start with a slash");
-        } else if (invalidPathRegex.test(path73)) {
+        } else if (invalidPathRegex.test(path74)) {
           throw new InvalidArgumentError("invalid request path");
         }
         if (typeof method !== "string") {
@@ -24237,7 +24272,7 @@ var require_request = __commonJS({
         this.completed = false;
         this.aborted = false;
         this.upgrade = upgrade || null;
-        this.path = query ? serializePathWithQuery(path73, query) : path73;
+        this.path = query ? serializePathWithQuery(path74, query) : path74;
         this.origin = origin;
         this.protocol = getProtocolFromUrlString(origin);
         this.idempotent = idempotent == null ? method === "HEAD" || method === "GET" : idempotent;
@@ -29276,7 +29311,7 @@ var require_client_h1 = __commonJS({
       return method !== "GET" && method !== "HEAD" && method !== "OPTIONS" && method !== "TRACE" && method !== "CONNECT";
     }
     function writeH1(client, request2) {
-      const { method, path: path73, host, upgrade, blocking, reset } = request2;
+      const { method, path: path74, host, upgrade, blocking, reset } = request2;
       let { body, headers, contentLength } = request2;
       const expectsPayload = method === "PUT" || method === "POST" || method === "PATCH" || method === "QUERY" || method === "PROPFIND" || method === "PROPPATCH";
       if (util.isFormDataLike(body)) {
@@ -29345,7 +29380,7 @@ var require_client_h1 = __commonJS({
       if (socket.setTypeOfService) {
         socket.setTypeOfService(request2.typeOfService);
       }
-      let header = `${method} ${path73} HTTP/1.1\r
+      let header = `${method} ${path74} HTTP/1.1\r
 `;
       if (typeof host === "string") {
         header += `host: ${host}\r
@@ -29998,7 +30033,7 @@ var require_client_h2 = __commonJS({
     function writeH2(client, request2) {
       const requestTimeout = request2.bodyTimeout ?? client[kBodyTimeout];
       const session = client[kHTTP2Session];
-      const { method, path: path73, host, upgrade, expectContinue, signal, protocol, headers: reqHeaders } = request2;
+      const { method, path: path74, host, upgrade, expectContinue, signal, protocol, headers: reqHeaders } = request2;
       let { body } = request2;
       if (upgrade != null && upgrade !== "websocket") {
         util.errorRequest(client, request2, new InvalidArgumentError(`Custom upgrade "${upgrade}" not supported over HTTP/2`));
@@ -30066,7 +30101,7 @@ var require_client_h2 = __commonJS({
           }
           headers[HTTP2_HEADER_METHOD] = "CONNECT";
           headers[HTTP2_HEADER_PROTOCOL] = "websocket";
-          headers[HTTP2_HEADER_PATH] = path73;
+          headers[HTTP2_HEADER_PATH] = path74;
           if (protocol === "ws:" || protocol === "wss:") {
             headers[HTTP2_HEADER_SCHEME] = protocol === "ws:" ? "http" : "https";
           } else {
@@ -30107,7 +30142,7 @@ var require_client_h2 = __commonJS({
         stream.setTimeout(requestTimeout);
         return true;
       }
-      headers[HTTP2_HEADER_PATH] = path73;
+      headers[HTTP2_HEADER_PATH] = path74;
       headers[HTTP2_HEADER_SCHEME] = protocol === "http:" ? "http" : "https";
       const expectsPayload = method === "PUT" || method === "POST" || method === "PATCH";
       if (body && typeof body.read === "function") {
@@ -32409,10 +32444,10 @@ var require_proxy_agent = __commonJS({
         };
         const {
           origin,
-          path: path73 = "/",
+          path: path74 = "/",
           headers = {}
         } = opts;
-        opts.path = origin + path73;
+        opts.path = origin + path74;
         if (!("host" in headers) && !("Host" in headers)) {
           const { host } = new URL(origin);
           headers.host = host;
@@ -34475,20 +34510,20 @@ var require_mock_utils = __commonJS({
       }
       return normalizedQp;
     }
-    function safeUrl(path73) {
-      if (typeof path73 !== "string") {
-        return path73;
+    function safeUrl(path74) {
+      if (typeof path74 !== "string") {
+        return path74;
       }
-      const pathSegments = path73.split("?", 3);
+      const pathSegments = path74.split("?", 3);
       if (pathSegments.length !== 2) {
-        return path73;
+        return path74;
       }
       const qp = new URLSearchParams(pathSegments.pop());
       qp.sort();
       return [...pathSegments, qp.toString()].join("?");
     }
-    function matchKey(mockDispatch2, { path: path73, method, body, headers }) {
-      const pathMatch = matchValue(mockDispatch2.path, path73);
+    function matchKey(mockDispatch2, { path: path74, method, body, headers }) {
+      const pathMatch = matchValue(mockDispatch2.path, path74);
       const methodMatch = matchValue(mockDispatch2.method, method);
       const bodyMatch = typeof mockDispatch2.body !== "undefined" ? matchValue(mockDispatch2.body, body) : true;
       const headersMatch = matchHeaders(mockDispatch2, headers);
@@ -34513,8 +34548,8 @@ var require_mock_utils = __commonJS({
       const basePath = key.query ? serializePathWithQuery(key.path, key.query) : key.path;
       const resolvedPath = typeof basePath === "string" ? safeUrl(basePath) : basePath;
       const resolvedPathWithoutTrailingSlash = removeTrailingSlash(resolvedPath);
-      let matchedMockDispatches = mockDispatches.filter(({ consumed }) => !consumed).filter(({ path: path73, ignoreTrailingSlash }) => {
-        return ignoreTrailingSlash ? matchValue(removeTrailingSlash(safeUrl(path73)), resolvedPathWithoutTrailingSlash) : matchValue(safeUrl(path73), resolvedPath);
+      let matchedMockDispatches = mockDispatches.filter(({ consumed }) => !consumed).filter(({ path: path74, ignoreTrailingSlash }) => {
+        return ignoreTrailingSlash ? matchValue(removeTrailingSlash(safeUrl(path74)), resolvedPathWithoutTrailingSlash) : matchValue(safeUrl(path74), resolvedPath);
       });
       if (matchedMockDispatches.length === 0) {
         throw new MockNotMatchedError(`Mock dispatch not matched for path '${resolvedPath}'`);
@@ -34553,19 +34588,19 @@ var require_mock_utils = __commonJS({
         mockDispatches.splice(index, 1);
       }
     }
-    function removeTrailingSlash(path73) {
-      while (path73.endsWith("/")) {
-        path73 = path73.slice(0, -1);
+    function removeTrailingSlash(path74) {
+      while (path74.endsWith("/")) {
+        path74 = path74.slice(0, -1);
       }
-      if (path73.length === 0) {
-        path73 = "/";
+      if (path74.length === 0) {
+        path74 = "/";
       }
-      return path73;
+      return path74;
     }
     function buildKey(opts) {
-      const { path: path73, method, body, headers, query } = opts;
+      const { path: path74, method, body, headers, query } = opts;
       return {
-        path: path73,
+        path: path74,
         method,
         body,
         headers,
@@ -35255,10 +35290,10 @@ var require_pending_interceptors_formatter = __commonJS({
       }
       format(pendingInterceptors) {
         const withPrettyHeaders = pendingInterceptors.map(
-          ({ method, path: path73, data: { statusCode }, persist, times, timesInvoked, origin }) => ({
+          ({ method, path: path74, data: { statusCode }, persist, times, timesInvoked, origin }) => ({
             Method: method,
             Origin: origin,
-            Path: path73,
+            Path: path74,
             "Status code": statusCode,
             Persistent: persist ? PERSISTENT : NOT_PERSISTENT,
             Invocations: timesInvoked,
@@ -35340,9 +35375,9 @@ var require_mock_agent = __commonJS({
         const acceptNonStandardSearchParameters = this[kMockAgentAcceptsNonStandardSearchParameters];
         const dispatchOpts = { ...opts };
         if (acceptNonStandardSearchParameters && dispatchOpts.path) {
-          const [path73, searchParams] = dispatchOpts.path.split("?");
+          const [path74, searchParams] = dispatchOpts.path.split("?");
           const normalizedSearchParams = normalizeSearchParams(searchParams, acceptNonStandardSearchParameters);
-          dispatchOpts.path = `${path73}?${normalizedSearchParams}`;
+          dispatchOpts.path = `${path74}?${normalizedSearchParams}`;
         }
         return this[kAgent].dispatch(dispatchOpts, handler);
       }
@@ -35743,12 +35778,12 @@ var require_snapshot_recorder = __commonJS({
        * @return {Promise<void>} - Resolves when snapshots are loaded
        */
       async loadSnapshots(filePath) {
-        const path73 = filePath || this.#snapshotPath;
-        if (!path73) {
+        const path74 = filePath || this.#snapshotPath;
+        if (!path74) {
           throw new InvalidArgumentError("Snapshot path is required");
         }
         try {
-          const data = await readFile(resolve2(path73), "utf8");
+          const data = await readFile(resolve2(path74), "utf8");
           const parsed = JSON.parse(data);
           if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {
             this.#snapshots.clear();
@@ -35762,7 +35797,7 @@ var require_snapshot_recorder = __commonJS({
           if (error.code === "ENOENT") {
             this.#snapshots.clear();
           } else {
-            throw new UndiciError(`Failed to load snapshots from ${path73}`, { cause: error });
+            throw new UndiciError(`Failed to load snapshots from ${path74}`, { cause: error });
           }
         }
       }
@@ -35773,11 +35808,11 @@ var require_snapshot_recorder = __commonJS({
        * @returns {Promise<void>} - Resolves when snapshots are saved
        */
       async saveSnapshots(filePath) {
-        const path73 = filePath || this.#snapshotPath;
-        if (!path73) {
+        const path74 = filePath || this.#snapshotPath;
+        if (!path74) {
           throw new InvalidArgumentError("Snapshot path is required");
         }
-        const resolvedPath = resolve2(path73);
+        const resolvedPath = resolve2(path74);
         await mkdir(dirname3(resolvedPath), { recursive: true });
         const data = Array.from(this.#snapshots.entries()).map(([hash, snapshot]) => ({
           hash,
@@ -36402,15 +36437,15 @@ var require_redirect_handler = __commonJS({
           return;
         }
         const { origin, pathname, search } = util.parseURL(new URL(this.location, this.opts.origin && new URL(this.opts.path, this.opts.origin)));
-        const path73 = search ? `${pathname}${search}` : pathname;
-        const redirectUrlString = `${origin}${path73}`;
+        const path74 = search ? `${pathname}${search}` : pathname;
+        const redirectUrlString = `${origin}${path74}`;
         for (const historyUrl of this.history) {
           if (historyUrl.toString() === redirectUrlString) {
             throw new InvalidArgumentError(`Redirect loop detected. Cannot redirect to ${origin}. This typically happens when using a Client or Pool with cross-origin redirects. Use an Agent for cross-origin redirects.`);
           }
         }
         this.opts.headers = cleanRequestHeaders(this.opts.headers, statusCode === 303, this.opts.origin !== origin);
-        this.opts.path = path73;
+        this.opts.path = path74;
         this.opts.origin = origin;
         this.opts.query = null;
       }
@@ -42617,11 +42652,11 @@ var require_fetch = __commonJS({
       function dispatch({ body }) {
         const url = requestCurrentURL(request2);
         const agent = fetchParams.controller.dispatcher;
-        const path73 = url.pathname + url.search;
+        const path74 = url.pathname + url.search;
         const hasTrailingQuestionMark = url.search.length === 0 && url.href[url.href.length - url.hash.length - 1] === "?";
         return new Promise((resolve2, reject) => agent.dispatch(
           {
-            path: hasTrailingQuestionMark ? `${path73}?` : path73,
+            path: hasTrailingQuestionMark ? `${path74}?` : path74,
             origin: url.origin,
             method: request2.method,
             body: agent.isMockActive ? request2.body && (request2.body.source || request2.body.stream) : body,
@@ -43552,9 +43587,9 @@ var require_util4 = __commonJS({
         }
       }
     }
-    function validateCookiePath(path73) {
-      for (let i = 0; i < path73.length; ++i) {
-        const code = path73.charCodeAt(i);
+    function validateCookiePath(path74) {
+      for (let i = 0; i < path74.length; ++i) {
+        const code = path74.charCodeAt(i);
         if (code < 32 || // exclude CTLs (0-31)
         code === 127 || // DEL
         code === 59) {
@@ -46724,11 +46759,11 @@ var require_undici = __commonJS({
           if (typeof opts.path !== "string") {
             throw new InvalidArgumentError("invalid opts.path");
           }
-          let path73 = opts.path;
+          let path74 = opts.path;
           if (!opts.path.startsWith("/")) {
-            path73 = `/${path73}`;
+            path74 = `/${path74}`;
           }
-          url = new URL(util.parseOrigin(url).origin + path73);
+          url = new URL(util.parseOrigin(url).origin + path74);
         } else {
           if (!opts) {
             opts = typeof url === "object" ? url : {};
@@ -48716,9 +48751,9 @@ async function runDeviceLogin(opts = {}) {
 }
 
 // src/cli/commands/logout.ts
-var fs48 = __toESM(require("fs"));
+var fs49 = __toESM(require("fs"));
 var os44 = __toESM(require("os"));
-var path46 = __toESM(require("path"));
+var path47 = __toESM(require("path"));
 var import_chalk12 = __toESM(require("chalk"));
 async function revokeSelf(creds) {
   const url = creds.apiUrl.replace(/\/$/, "") + "/machines/self/disconnect";
@@ -48736,10 +48771,10 @@ function registerLogoutCommand(program2) {
     "Disconnect this machine from the cloud (revokes its key; local enforcement keeps running)"
   ).action(async () => {
     const profile = process.env.NODE9_PROFILE || "default";
-    const credPath = path46.join(os44.homedir(), ".node9", "credentials.json");
+    const credPath = path47.join(os44.homedir(), ".node9", "credentials.json");
     let all = {};
     try {
-      all = JSON.parse(fs48.readFileSync(credPath, "utf-8"));
+      all = JSON.parse(fs49.readFileSync(credPath, "utf-8"));
     } catch {
     }
     const entry = all[profile];
@@ -48769,11 +48804,11 @@ function registerLogoutCommand(program2) {
     delete all[profile];
     if (Object.keys(all).length === 0) {
       try {
-        fs48.unlinkSync(credPath);
+        fs49.unlinkSync(credPath);
       } catch {
       }
     } else {
-      fs48.writeFileSync(credPath, JSON.stringify(all, null, 2), { mode: 384 });
+      fs49.writeFileSync(credPath, JSON.stringify(all, null, 2), { mode: 384 });
     }
     console.log(import_chalk12.default.green("\u2713 Local: credentials removed."));
     console.log(
@@ -50911,6 +50946,7 @@ init_costSync();
 init_litellm();
 init_cost_codex();
 init_decision();
+init_session_files();
 var TEST_COMMAND_RE3 = /(?:^|\s)(npm\s+(?:run\s+)?test|npx\s+(?:vitest|jest|mocha)|yarn\s+(?:run\s+)?test|pnpm\s+(?:run\s+)?test|vitest|jest|mocha|pytest|py\.test|cargo\s+test|go\s+test|bundle\s+exec\s+rspec|rspec|phpunit|dotnet\s+test)\b/i;
 function buildTestTimestamps(allEntries) {
   const testTs = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
@@ -51050,7 +51086,7 @@ function processClaudeCostProject(proj, projectsDir, start, end, acc) {
   try {
     const stat = import_fs55.default.statSync(projPath);
     if (!stat.isDirectory()) return;
-    files = import_fs55.default.readdirSync(projPath).filter((f) => f.endsWith(".jsonl") && !f.startsWith("agent-"));
+    files = listSessionFiles(projPath);
   } catch {
     return;
   }
@@ -55519,7 +55555,7 @@ function severityFromScore(score) {
   if (score >= 1) return "advisory";
   return null;
 }
-function analyzeWorkflow(path73, content) {
+function analyzeWorkflow(path74, content) {
   let raw;
   try {
     raw = (0, import_yaml.parse)(content) ?? {};
@@ -55645,7 +55681,7 @@ function analyzeWorkflow(path73, content) {
     dimension: "workflows",
     severity,
     title,
-    file: path73,
+    file: path74,
     signals,
     mitigations: mitigations.length ? mitigations : void 0,
     fix: head === "root" && privileged ? "Do not check out the untrusted PR head into the workspace root under a privileged trigger (pull_request_target/workflow_run) \u2014 check out the base ref, or isolate the head in a subdir (--add-dir). Add an actor gate and scope the agent tools." : head === "root" ? "This runs under `pull_request` (fork PRs get a read-only token), so the head checkout is low-risk today \u2014 keep it on `pull_request` (not `pull_request_target`) and keep the actor gate + scoped tools." : "Add/verify an actor gate, scope the agent tools to read-only, and env-deny secrets. See Anthropic\u2019s claude-code-action security doc."
@@ -55721,7 +55757,7 @@ function evalAgentJob(job, wf, raw, untrustedTrigger, reusable) {
   if (reusable && !loadedGun && SEVERITY_RANK2[severity] > SEVERITY_RANK2.medium) severity = "medium";
   return { severity, secrets, injectable, canReadEnv };
 }
-function analyzeWorkflowSecrets(path73, content) {
+function analyzeWorkflowSecrets(path74, content) {
   let raw;
   try {
     raw = (0, import_yaml.parse)(content) ?? {};
@@ -55741,7 +55777,7 @@ function analyzeWorkflowSecrets(path73, content) {
     dimension: "data",
     severity: worst.severity,
     title: worst.severity === "advisory" ? "Secrets reachable by the agent \u2014 hardening" : "Exfiltratable secrets reachable by an injectable agent",
-    file: path73,
+    file: path74,
     signals: [
       `agent can reach: ${worst.secrets.map((s) => s.name).join(", ")}`,
       worst.injectable ? "the agent is externally triggerable (untrusted trigger, no gate)" : "gated / not externally triggerable \u2014 latent risk only",
@@ -55768,7 +55804,7 @@ function hookCommands(hooks) {
   }
   return out;
 }
-function analyzeAgentConfig(path73, content) {
+function analyzeAgentConfig(path74, content) {
   let cfg;
   try {
     cfg = JSON.parse(content);
@@ -55787,7 +55823,7 @@ function analyzeAgentConfig(path73, content) {
       dimension: "toolRules",
       severity: high ? "high" : "medium",
       title: high ? "Agent hook runs UNPINNED/remote third-party code on every action" : "Agent hook runs third-party code in the agent hot path",
-      file: path73,
+      file: path74,
       signals: [
         `hook command: \`${cmd.slice(0, 120)}\``,
         remoteExec ? "fetch-and-run (curl|wget / pipe-to-shell) \u2014 unpinnable remote code execution on every contributor" : unpinned ? "unpinned \u2014 a compromised/yanked package = code execution on every contributor" : "pinned, but still a standing supply-chain dependency in the agent hot path"
@@ -55807,7 +55843,7 @@ function analyzeAgentConfig(path73, content) {
       dimension: "toolRules",
       severity: hasBackstop ? "medium" : "high",
       title: hasBackstop ? "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools" : "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools with no deny backstop",
-      file: path73,
+      file: path74,
       signals: [
         `broad allow(s): ${broad.slice(0, 5).join(", ")}`,
         hasBackstop ? "a `deny` list backstops the broad allow" : "no `deny` entry covers Bash/Write/Edit \u2014 every contributor is pre-authorized for catastrophic tools"
@@ -55820,16 +55856,16 @@ function analyzeAgentConfig(path73, content) {
 
 // src/ci-check/mcp.ts
 init_dist();
-function analyzeMcp(path73, content) {
+function analyzeMcp(path74, content) {
   let cfg;
   try {
     cfg = JSON.parse(content);
   } catch {
     return [];
   }
-  return analyzeMcpServers(cfg.mcpServers ?? {}, path73);
+  return analyzeMcpServers(cfg.mcpServers ?? {}, path74);
 }
-function analyzeMcpServers(servers, path73) {
+function analyzeMcpServers(servers, path74) {
   const findings = [];
   for (const [name, srv] of Object.entries(servers ?? {})) {
     if (!srv || srv.disabled) continue;
@@ -55840,7 +55876,7 @@ function analyzeMcpServers(servers, path73) {
         dimension: "mcp",
         severity: "medium",
         title: `MCP server "${name}" runs an unpinned executable`,
-        file: path73,
+        file: path74,
         signals: [`\`${argv.slice(0, 120)}\` \u2014 unversioned/@latest npx`],
         fix: "Pin the MCP server package to an exact version so a PR (or a registry compromise) can\u2019t swap the toolchain."
       });
@@ -55854,7 +55890,7 @@ function analyzeMcpServers(servers, path73) {
           dimension: "mcp",
           severity: "high",
           title: `MCP server "${name}" has an inline credential`,
-          file: path73,
+          file: path74,
           signals: [
             `env.${k} matches ${hit.patternName} \u2014 agent-reachable secret committed to the repo`
           ],
@@ -55868,7 +55904,7 @@ function analyzeMcpServers(servers, path73) {
 
 // src/ci-check/codex.ts
 var import_smol_toml5 = require("smol-toml");
-function analyzeCodexConfig(path73, content) {
+function analyzeCodexConfig(path74, content) {
   let cfg;
   try {
     cfg = (0, import_smol_toml5.parse)(content);
@@ -55876,7 +55912,7 @@ function analyzeCodexConfig(path73, content) {
     return [];
   }
   const findings = [];
-  findings.push(...analyzeMcpServers(cfg.mcp_servers ?? {}, path73));
+  findings.push(...analyzeMcpServers(cfg.mcp_servers ?? {}, path74));
   const sandbox = typeof cfg.sandbox_mode === "string" ? cfg.sandbox_mode : "";
   const approval = typeof cfg.approval_policy === "string" ? cfg.approval_policy : "";
   const fullAccess = /danger-full-access/i.test(sandbox);
@@ -55891,7 +55927,7 @@ function analyzeCodexConfig(path73, content) {
       dimension: "toolRules",
       severity: fullAccess ? "high" : "medium",
       title: fullAccess ? "Codex config grants a full-access sandbox" : "Codex config never requires approval",
-      file: path73,
+      file: path74,
       signals,
       fix: 'Commit a least-privilege Codex config: prefer `sandbox_mode = "read-only"` (or `"workspace-write"`) and `approval_policy = "on-request"`/`"on-failure"`. A repo-committed config applies to every contributor who runs Codex here.'
     });
@@ -55947,10 +55983,10 @@ function decodeSuspiciousBase64(text) {
   }
   return out;
 }
-function mk(severity, title, signals, fix, path73) {
-  return { check: "CI-6", dimension: "instructions", severity, title, file: path73, signals, fix };
+function mk(severity, title, signals, fix, path74) {
+  return { check: "CI-6", dimension: "instructions", severity, title, file: path74, signals, fix };
 }
-function analyzeInstructionFile(path73, content) {
+function analyzeInstructionFile(path74, content) {
   const findings = [];
   const decoded = decodeSuspiciousBase64(content);
   if (TAG_CHARS.test(content))
@@ -55962,7 +55998,7 @@ function analyzeInstructionFile(path73, content) {
           "contains Unicode tag characters (U+E0000\u2013E007F) \u2014 an invisible instruction-smuggling channel with no legitimate use in text"
         ],
         "Remove the tag characters. Instruction files must be plain, reviewable text.",
-        path73
+        path74
       )
     );
   if (BIDI_OVERRIDE.test(content))
@@ -55974,7 +56010,7 @@ function analyzeInstructionFile(path73, content) {
           "contains a bidi override (U+202D/U+202E) \u2014 a Trojan-Source technique that visually reorders text so a human reads something different from what the agent parses"
         ],
         "Remove the bidi override characters.",
-        path73
+        path74
       )
     );
   else if (BIDI_EMBED_ISOLATE.test(content))
@@ -55986,7 +56022,7 @@ function analyzeInstructionFile(path73, content) {
           "contains bidi embed/isolate characters (U+202A\u2013202C / U+2066\u20132069) \u2014 legitimate in right-to-left text, but confirm they are not being used to hide or reorder instructions"
         ],
         "Confirm the bidi marks are legitimate RTL formatting; remove otherwise.",
-        path73
+        path74
       )
     );
   const zw = suspiciousZeroWidth(content);
@@ -56000,7 +56036,7 @@ function analyzeInstructionFile(path73, content) {
           revealed ? "a zero-width character conceals a prompt-override directive that only appears once the hidden characters are stripped" : "a zero-width character splits a visible Latin word \u2014 a concealment technique (hides text from human review while the agent reads it as contiguous)"
         ],
         "Remove the zero-width characters. Instruction files must be plain, reviewable text.",
-        path73
+        path74
       )
     );
   }
@@ -56016,7 +56052,7 @@ function analyzeInstructionFile(path73, content) {
           `contains a prompt-override / role-impersonation directive (\`${m[0].slice(0, 60).trim()}\`)${ovEnc ? " \u2014 concealed in a base64 blob" : ""}`
         ],
         "Remove the override text. An instruction file should not tell the agent to ignore its own rules.",
-        path73
+        path74
       )
     );
   }
@@ -56028,7 +56064,7 @@ function analyzeInstructionFile(path73, content) {
         "Instruction directs the agent to fetch and run remote code",
         [`\`${fo[0].slice(0, 70).trim()}\` \u2014 fetch-and-obey, outside an install/setup section`],
         "Do not instruct the agent to pipe remote content into a shell; pin and vendor scripts instead.",
-        path73
+        path74
       )
     );
   }
@@ -56040,7 +56076,7 @@ function analyzeInstructionFile(path73, content) {
         "Instruction points the agent at credential material",
         [`references \`${sp[0].slice(0, 50).trim()}\` \u2014 directs the agent toward secrets`],
         "Do not reference credential files or paths in agent instructions.",
-        path73
+        path74
       )
     );
   }
@@ -56052,7 +56088,7 @@ function analyzeInstructionFile(path73, content) {
         "Instruction directs the agent to send data to an external endpoint",
         [`\`${ex[0].slice(0, 70).trim()}\` \u2014 possible exfiltration directive`],
         "Remove external post/upload directives from agent instructions.",
-        path73
+        path74
       )
     );
   }