@node9/proxy 2.31.3 → 2.32.0

package/dist/index.mjs

@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ import safeRegex3 from "safe-regex2";
 import { createHash as createHash2 } from "crypto";
 import { createHash as createHash22 } from "crypto";
 import mvdanSh3 from "mvdan-sh";
+import mvdanSh4 from "mvdan-sh";
 import crypto from "crypto";
 function isShieldVerdict(v) {
   return v === "allow" || v === "review" || v === "block";
@@ -207,10 +208,10 @@ function compressIpv6(g) {
   if (bestLen < 2) return hex.join(":");
   return hex.slice(0, bestStart).join(":") + "::" + hex.slice(bestStart + bestLen).join(":");
 }
-function normalizeIpLiteral(host) {
+function normalizeIpLiteral(host2) {
   try {
-    if (typeof host !== "string") return null;
-    let s = host.trim();
+    if (typeof host2 !== "string") return null;
+    let s = host2.trim();
     if (!s || s.length > SSRF_MAX_HOST) return null;
     if (s.startsWith("[") && s.endsWith("]")) s = s.slice(1, -1);
     const zone = s.indexOf("%");
@@ -236,11 +237,11 @@ function isStrictGatedTier(tier) {
 function ssrfReason(m, asWritten) {
   return `Blocked: ${asWritten} is ${TIER_REASON[m.tier]}` + (m.normalized && m.normalized !== asWritten ? ` (${m.normalized})` : "") + (m.overridable ? "." : ". This address cannot be allowlisted.");
 }
-function classifySsrf(host) {
+function classifySsrf(host2) {
   try {
-    if (typeof host !== "string" || !host) return null;
-    const lower2 = host.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "");
-    const ip = normalizeIpLiteral(host);
+    if (typeof host2 !== "string" || !host2) return null;
+    const lower2 = host2.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "");
+    const ip = normalizeIpLiteral(host2);
     if (ip === null) {
       return METADATA_HOSTNAMES.has(lower2) ? { tier: "metadata", overridable: false, kind: "hostname" } : null;
     }
@@ -442,6 +443,7 @@ function catalogSettingsFromConfig(settings, policy) {
     injectionScan: policy.injectionScan,
     skillPinning: policy.skillPinning,
     packageCheck: policy.packageCheck,
+    untrustedContent: policy.untrustedContent,
     appliedShields: policy.appliedShields ?? [],
     checks: policy.checks
   };
@@ -949,11 +951,11 @@ function inlineExecStmt(stmt, pipeFed) {
     const firstFlag = args.findIndex((a) => a == null || a.startsWith("-"));
     args = firstFlag >= 0 ? args.slice(firstFlag) : [];
   }
-  let positionals = 0;
+  let positionals2 = 0;
   let selectedProgram = false;
   for (const a of args) {
     if (a == null) {
-      positionals++;
+      positionals2++;
       selectedProgram = true;
       continue;
     }
@@ -964,13 +966,13 @@ function inlineExecStmt(stmt, pipeFed) {
     }
     if (a === "-" && !selectedProgram) return true;
     if (!a.startsWith("-")) {
-      positionals++;
+      positionals2++;
       selectedProgram = true;
     }
   }
   const redirs = stmt.Redirs || cmd.Redirs || [];
   const stdinFed = redirs.some((r) => r && redirStdinOps().has(r.Op));
-  if (positionals === 0 && (stdinFed || pipeFed)) {
+  if (positionals2 === 0 && (stdinFed || pipeFed)) {
     if (!/^(bash|sh|zsh)$/i.test(interp)) return true;
   }
   return false;
@@ -1180,6 +1182,24 @@ function resolveWordLiteral(w) {
   }
   return s;
 }
+function resolveWordPrefix(w) {
+  const walk2 = (parts) => {
+    let s = "";
+    for (const p of parts) {
+      if (p && typeof p === "object" && Array.isArray(p.Parts) && p.Dollar !== void 0) {
+        const inner = walk2(p.Parts);
+        s += inner.prefix;
+        if (inner.dynamic) return { prefix: s, dynamic: true };
+        continue;
+      }
+      const piece = resolvePart(p, false);
+      if (piece === void 0 || piece === null) return { prefix: s, dynamic: true };
+      s += piece;
+    }
+    return { prefix: s, dynamic: false };
+  };
+  return walk2(w?.Parts || []);
+}
 function resolvePart(p, inQuotes) {
   const t = syntax.NodeType(p);
   if (t === "Lit") {
@@ -1227,7 +1247,7 @@ function parseDestHost(token) {
 }
 function destTokensForBinary(binary, args) {
   const valueFlags = VALUE_FLAGS[binary] ?? /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
-  const positionals = [];
+  const positionals2 = [];
   const urlFlagValues = [];
   for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
     const tok = args[i];
@@ -1247,21 +1267,21 @@ function destTokensForBinary(binary, args) {
       if (valueFlags.has(tok)) i++;
       continue;
     }
-    positionals.push(tok);
+    positionals2.push(tok);
   }
   switch (binary) {
     case "curl":
     case "wget":
-      return [...urlFlagValues, ...positionals];
+      return [...urlFlagValues, ...positionals2];
     case "ssh":
-      return positionals.slice(0, 1);
+      return positionals2.slice(0, 1);
     case "scp":
     case "rsync":
-      return positionals.filter((p) => p.includes(":") || p.includes("@"));
+      return positionals2.filter((p) => p.includes(":") || p.includes("@"));
     case "nc":
     case "ncat":
     case "netcat":
-      return positionals.slice(0, 1);
+      return positionals2.slice(0, 1);
     default:
       return [];
   }
@@ -1278,16 +1298,18 @@ function extractShellDestinations(command) {
       if (syntax.NodeType(n) !== "CallExpr") return true;
       const callArgs = n.Args || [];
       if (callArgs.length === 0) return true;
-      const name = (resolveWordLiteral(callArgs[0]) || "").toLowerCase();
+      const words = callArgs.map((a) => resolveWordLiteral(a));
+      const at = unwrapCommandHead(words);
+      const name = (words[at] || "").toLowerCase().split("/").pop() ?? "";
       if (!NET_BINARIES.has(name)) return true;
-      const rest = callArgs.slice(1).map((a) => resolveWordLiteral(a));
+      const rest = words.slice(at + 1);
       for (const raw of destTokensForBinary(name, rest)) {
-        const host = parseDestHost(raw);
-        if (!host) continue;
-        const key = `${name}:${host}`;
+        const host2 = parseDestHost(raw);
+        if (!host2) continue;
+        const key = `${name}:${host2}`;
         if (seen.has(key)) continue;
         seen.add(key);
-        out.push({ host, binary: name, raw });
+        out.push({ host: host2, binary: name, raw });
       }
       return true;
     });
@@ -2047,9 +2069,9 @@ function matchesPattern(text, patterns) {
   const withoutDotSlash = text.replace(/^\.\//, "");
   return isMatch(withoutDotSlash) || isMatch(`./${withoutDotSlash}`);
 }
-function getNestedValue(obj, path20) {
+function getNestedValue(obj, path26) {
   if (!obj || typeof obj !== "object") return null;
-  const segments2 = path20.split(".");
+  const segments2 = path26.split(".");
   for (const seg of segments2) {
     if (FORBIDDEN_PATH_SEGMENTS.has(seg)) return null;
   }
@@ -2376,7 +2398,7 @@ function collectShellFileAccesses(command, context = {}) {
         if (!hasScript) hasScript = true;
         else files.push(token);
       }
-      for (const file of files) add(inplace ? "write" : "read", file, state);
+      for (const file2 of files) add(inplace ? "write" : "read", file2, state);
       return;
     }
     if (FS_READ_TOOLS.has(name) && name !== "dd") {
@@ -2728,6 +2750,17 @@ function collectShellFileAccesses(command, context = {}) {
   if (program) statements(program.Stmts ?? [], initial, 0);
   return out;
 }
+function isAgentInstructionPath(absPath, root) {
+  const r = root.replace(/\/$/, "");
+  if (!(absPath === r || absPath.startsWith(r + "/"))) return false;
+  const rel = absPath.slice(r.length + 1);
+  if (AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES.includes(rel)) return true;
+  return AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS.some((d) => rel === d || rel.startsWith(d + "/"));
+}
+function isInside(root, p) {
+  const r = root.replace(/\/$/, "") || "/";
+  return p === r || p.startsWith(r === "/" ? "/" : r + "/");
+}
 function isPasswordHashPath(p) {
   return PASSWORD_HASH_FILES.includes(p);
 }
@@ -2797,8 +2830,8 @@ function collectFileAccesses(tool, args, context = {}, inspection = {}) {
   }
   return out;
 }
-function within(path20, root) {
-  return path20 === root || path20.startsWith(root === "/" ? "/" : root + "/");
+function within(path26, root) {
+  return path26 === root || path26.startsWith(root === "/" ? "/" : root + "/");
 }
 function hits(access, paths, directories, context) {
   const home = context.homeDirs?.[0] ?? "~";
@@ -3599,7 +3632,7 @@ function pipInstall(words, from, manager, out) {
   if (v >= 0 && lower(words[v]) === "install")
     pushPy(out, manager, operands(words, v + 1, PIP_VALUE_FLAGS));
 }
-function localContexts(file) {
+function localContexts(file2) {
   const contexts = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
   const sample = parseShared("cd . && true");
   if (typeof sample === "symbol") return contexts;
@@ -3627,7 +3660,7 @@ function localContexts(file) {
     contexts.set(cmd.Pos().Offset(), steps);
     return null;
   }
-  if (file.Stmts?.length === 1) visit(file.Stmts[0], []);
+  if (file2.Stmts?.length === 1) visit(file2.Stmts[0], []);
   return contexts;
 }
 function collect(command, out, depth) {
@@ -3765,6 +3798,13 @@ function checkToLegacyPolicy(policy, id, v) {
       return offOr("packageCheck", () => {
         obj("packageCheck").onMalicious = v === "review" ? "review" : "block";
       });
+    case "behavior.untrusted-content":
+      if (v !== "off" && v !== "log" && v !== "review") return false;
+      return offOr("untrustedContent", () => {
+        const uc = obj("untrustedContent");
+        if (v === "log") uc.afterExposure = "log-only";
+        else if (uc.afterExposure !== "ask-every-time") uc.afterExposure = "ask-once";
+      });
     default:
       return false;
   }
@@ -3778,38 +3818,38 @@ function configurableValues(id) {
   if (def.pack || MAP_GOVERNED.has(id)) return def.values;
   return KNOB_GOVERNED[id] ?? [];
 }
-function hostMatches(host, pattern) {
+function hostMatches(host2, pattern) {
   const p = pattern.trim().toLowerCase();
   if (!p) return false;
   if (p === "*") return true;
-  const h = canonicalHost(host);
+  const h = canonicalHost(host2);
   if (p.startsWith("*.")) {
     const suffix = canonicalHost(p.slice(2));
     return h === suffix || h.endsWith("." + suffix);
   }
   return h === canonicalHost(p);
 }
-function matchesAny(host, patterns) {
-  for (const p of patterns ?? []) if (hostMatches(host, p)) return true;
+function matchesAny(host2, patterns) {
+  for (const p of patterns ?? []) if (hostMatches(host2, p)) return true;
   return false;
 }
-function isUniqueLocalV6(host) {
-  const ip = normalizeIpLiteral(host);
+function isUniqueLocalV6(host2) {
+  const ip = normalizeIpLiteral(host2);
   if (!ip || !ip.includes(":")) return false;
   const g = expandIpv6(ip);
   return g !== null && (g[0] & 65024) === 64512;
 }
-function isPrivateHost(host) {
-  const h = host.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "");
+function isPrivateHost(host2) {
+  const h = host2.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "");
   const m = classifySsrf(h);
   if (m) return m.kind === "address" && (m.tier === "private" || m.tier === "unspecified");
   if (h === "localhost") return true;
   if (PRIVATE_HOST_SUFFIXES.some((s) => h.endsWith(s))) return true;
   return isUniqueLocalV6(h);
 }
-function canonicalHost(host) {
-  const ip = normalizeIpLiteral(host);
-  return ip ?? host.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "");
+function canonicalHost(host2) {
+  const ip = normalizeIpLiteral(host2);
+  return ip ?? host2.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "");
 }
 function evaluateEgress(dests, policy) {
   if (!policy.enabled) return null;
@@ -4033,9 +4073,9 @@ function bareToolName(toolName) {
   const parts = toolName.split("__");
   return (parts.length >= 3 ? parts.slice(2).join("__") : toolName).toLowerCase();
 }
-function valuesAt(args, path20) {
+function valuesAt(args, path26) {
   let cursors = [args];
-  for (const rawSegment of path20.split(".")) {
+  for (const rawSegment of path26.split(".")) {
     const isArray = rawSegment.endsWith("[]");
     const key = isArray ? rawSegment.slice(0, -2) : rawSegment;
     const next = [];
@@ -4067,10 +4107,10 @@ function extractToolDestinations(toolName, args) {
     const paths = DESTINATION_ARGS.get(bareToolName(toolName));
     if (!paths) return [];
     const out = [];
-    for (const path20 of paths) {
-      for (const value of valuesAt(args, path20)) {
-        const host = hostOf(value);
-        if (host) out.push({ host, binary: toolName, raw: value });
+    for (const path26 of paths) {
+      for (const value of valuesAt(args, path26)) {
+        const host2 = hostOf(value);
+        if (host2) out.push({ host: host2, binary: toolName, raw: value });
       }
     }
     return out;
@@ -4082,15 +4122,15 @@ function ssrfDestinationFloor(toolName, args, opts = {}) {
   try {
     const paths = DESTINATION_ARGS.get(bareToolName(toolName));
     if (!paths) return null;
-    for (const path20 of paths) {
-      for (const value of valuesAt(args, path20)) {
-        const host = hostOf(value);
-        if (!host) continue;
-        const m = classifySsrf(host);
+    for (const path26 of paths) {
+      for (const value of valuesAt(args, path26)) {
+        const host2 = hostOf(value);
+        if (!host2) continue;
+        const m = classifySsrf(host2);
         if (!m) continue;
         if (isStrictGatedTier(m.tier) && !opts.ssrfStrict) continue;
         if (m.overridable && ssrfExemptMatches(opts.ssrfAllow, m.normalized)) continue;
-        return { ...m, argPath: path20, host, reason: ssrfReason(m, host) };
+        return { ...m, argPath: path26, host: host2, reason: ssrfReason(m, host2) };
       }
     }
     return null;
@@ -4132,16 +4172,16 @@ function* encodedRegions(text, budget) {
       /^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\/([^/?#]*)([^?#]*)(?:\?([^#]*))?(?:#(.*))?$/i
     );
     if (!parts) continue;
-    const host = parts[1].slice(parts[1].lastIndexOf("@") + 1).replace(/:\d+$/, "");
+    const host2 = parts[1].slice(parts[1].lastIndexOf("@") + 1).replace(/:\d+$/, "");
     const regions = [
       parts[1],
-      ...host.split("."),
+      ...host2.split("."),
       ...parts[2].split("/"),
       ...(parts[3] ?? "").split("&"),
       parts[4] ?? ""
     ];
     for (const region of regions) if (region) yield [region, false];
-    const labels = host.split(".");
+    const labels = host2.split(".");
     for (let start = 0; start < labels.length; start++) {
       let joined = labels[start];
       for (let end = start + 1; end < Math.min(labels.length, start + 8); end++) {
@@ -4377,7 +4417,7 @@ function pipeChainVerdict(command, isTrustedHost2, highAction = "review") {
   if (!pipeAnalysis.isPipeline) return null;
   if (pipeAnalysis.risk !== "critical" && pipeAnalysis.risk !== "high") return null;
   const sinks = pipeAnalysis.sinkTargets;
-  const allTrusted = sinks.length > 0 && sinks.every((host) => isTrustedHost2 ? isTrustedHost2(host) : false);
+  const allTrusted = sinks.length > 0 && sinks.every((host2) => isTrustedHost2 ? isTrustedHost2(host2) : false);
   if (pipeAnalysis.risk === "critical") {
     if (allTrusted) {
       return {
@@ -4854,6 +4894,487 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
 function isIgnoredTool(toolName, config) {
   return matchesPattern(toolName, config.policy.ignoredTools);
 }
+function normalizeHost(raw) {
+  let h = raw.trim().toLowerCase();
+  if (h.startsWith("[") && h.endsWith("]")) h = h.slice(1, -1);
+  if (!h || h === "localhost") return null;
+  if (/^[0-9a-f:]+$/.test(h) && h.includes(":")) return h;
+  if (!h.includes(".") || !/^[\p{L}\p{N}.-]+$/u.test(h)) return null;
+  return h;
+}
+function hostOfUrl(value) {
+  const v = value.replace(/[.,;:!?)\]}>'"`]+$/, "");
+  try {
+    const u = new URL(v.toLowerCase().startsWith("www.") ? `http://${v}` : v);
+    return normalizeHost(u.hostname);
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+function addIbans(text, out) {
+  for (const m of text.toUpperCase().matchAll(IBAN_RE)) {
+    const compact = m[0].replace(/[ -]/g, "");
+    if (validateIban(compact)) out.add(`iban:${compact}`);
+    else if (/^[A-Z]{2}\d{2}[A-Z0-9]{11,30}$/.test(compact)) out.add(`account:${compact}`);
+    if (out.size >= MAX_DESTINATIONS) return;
+  }
+}
+function addEmails(text, out) {
+  for (const m of text.matchAll(EMAIL_RE)) {
+    out.add(`email:${m[0].toLowerCase()}`);
+    if (out.size >= MAX_DESTINATIONS) return;
+  }
+}
+function addUrlHosts(text, out) {
+  for (const m of text.matchAll(URL_RE)) {
+    const h = hostOfUrl(m[0]);
+    if (h) out.add(`host:${h}`);
+    if (out.size >= MAX_DESTINATIONS) return;
+  }
+}
+function extractContentDestinations(text) {
+  const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  try {
+    const t = text.length > MAX_SCAN_CHARS ? text.slice(0, MAX_SCAN_CHARS) : text;
+    if (t.includes("@")) addEmails(t, out);
+    if (out.size < MAX_DESTINATIONS) addUrlHosts(t, out);
+    if (out.size < MAX_DESTINATIONS) addIbans(t, out);
+  } catch {
+  }
+  return [...out];
+}
+function extractArgDestinations(args) {
+  const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  try {
+    walk(args, void 0, out, 0);
+  } catch {
+  }
+  return [...out];
+}
+function walk(value, key, out, depth) {
+  if (out.size >= MAX_DESTINATIONS || depth > 12) return;
+  if (typeof value === "string") {
+    const s = value.length > MAX_SCAN_CHARS ? value.slice(0, MAX_SCAN_CHARS) : value;
+    if (s.includes("@")) addEmails(s, out);
+    addUrlHosts(s, out);
+    addIbans(s, out);
+    if (key && RECIPIENT_KEYS.has(key.toLowerCase()) && !/[\s@]/.test(s)) {
+      const h = normalizeHost(
+        s.replace(/^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\//i, "").replace(/^\/\//, "").split(/[/?#]/)[0].replace(/:\d+$/, "")
+      );
+      if (h && (h.includes(":") || /\.\p{L}{2,}$/u.test(h))) out.add(`host:${h}`);
+      const acct = s.replace(/[ .-]/g, "").toUpperCase();
+      if (/^[A-Z]{2}\d{2}[A-Z0-9]{11,30}$/.test(acct) && !validateIban(acct))
+        out.add(`account:${acct}`);
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+    for (const v of value) walk(v, key, out, depth + 1);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (value && typeof value === "object") {
+    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(value))
+      walk(v, k, out, depth + 1);
+  }
+}
+function destinationDomain(dest) {
+  if (!dest.startsWith("email:")) return null;
+  const at = dest.lastIndexOf("@");
+  return at > 0 ? dest.slice(at + 1) : null;
+}
+function destinationKind(dest) {
+  const i = dest.indexOf(":");
+  const k = i > 0 ? dest.slice(0, i) : "";
+  return k === "email" || k === "host" || k === "iban" || k === "account" ? k : null;
+}
+function destinationValue(dest) {
+  const i = dest.indexOf(":");
+  return i > 0 ? dest.slice(i + 1) : dest;
+}
+function isLoopbackHost(host2) {
+  let h = host2.trim().toLowerCase();
+  if (h.startsWith("[") && h.endsWith("]")) h = h.slice(1, -1);
+  return h === "localhost" || h.endsWith(".localhost") || /^127(?:\.\d{1,3}){3}$/.test(h) || h === "::1" || h === "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1" || h === "0.0.0.0";
+}
+function gitRepoPath(url) {
+  const u = url.trim();
+  if (!u) return null;
+  let host2;
+  let p;
+  if (/^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\//i.test(u)) {
+    try {
+      const parsed = new URL(u);
+      host2 = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();
+      p = decodeURIComponent(parsed.pathname);
+    } catch {
+      return null;
+    }
+  } else {
+    const scp = /^(?:[^@/\s]+@)?([A-Za-z0-9.-]+):(?!\/\/)(.+)$/.exec(u);
+    if (!scp || !scp[1].includes(".")) return null;
+    host2 = scp[1].toLowerCase();
+    p = scp[2];
+  }
+  let start = 0;
+  let end = p.length;
+  while (start < end && p[start] === "/") start++;
+  while (end > start && p[end - 1] === "/") end--;
+  const tail = p.slice(start, end).replace(/\.git$/i, "").toLowerCase();
+  if (!host2 || !tail.includes("/")) return null;
+  return `${host2}/${tail}`;
+}
+function isDestructiveToolName(bareTool) {
+  return DESTRUCTIVE_VERB_RE.test(bareTool);
+}
+function host(token) {
+  if (!token) return null;
+  const h = parseDestHost(token);
+  return h ? `host:${h}` : null;
+}
+function ghRepoArg(v, defaultHost) {
+  if (/:\/\/|@/.test(v)) {
+    const r = gitRepoPath(v);
+    if (r) return { host: r.split("/")[0], repo: r };
+  }
+  const parts = v.toLowerCase().replace(/\.git$/, "").split("/").filter(Boolean);
+  if (parts.length === 3) return { host: parts[0], repo: parts.join("/") };
+  if (parts.length === 2) return { host: defaultHost, repo: `${defaultHost}/${parts.join("/")}` };
+  return { host: defaultHost, repo: `${defaultHost}/*` };
+}
+function ghApiRepo(endpoint, ghHost) {
+  if (endpoint === null) return `${ghHost}/*`;
+  const e = endpoint.replace(/^https?:\/\/[^/]+\//i, "").replace(/^\/+/, "");
+  const m = /^repos\/([^/]+)\/([^/?#]+)/i.exec(e);
+  if (!m) return `${ghHost}/*`;
+  if (m[1] === "{owner}" && m[2] === "{repo}") return void 0;
+  return `${ghHost}/${m[1].toLowerCase()}/${m[2].toLowerCase()}`;
+}
+function sendToGitUrl(url, out) {
+  out.sends = true;
+  const h = typeof url === "string" ? host(url) : null;
+  if (!url || !h) {
+    out.unresolved = true;
+    return;
+  }
+  out.destinations.push(h);
+  const r = gitRepoPath(url);
+  if (r) out.repos.push(r);
+}
+function callWords(call) {
+  const raw = call.Args || [];
+  if (raw.length === 0) return null;
+  const words = raw.map((a) => resolveWordLiteral(a));
+  const prefixes = raw.map((a) => resolveWordPrefix(a).prefix);
+  const first = (words[0] || "").toLowerCase().split("/").pop() ?? "";
+  const at = OWN_HEADS.has(first) ? 0 : unwrapCommandHead(words);
+  const head = (words[at] || "").toLowerCase().split("/").pop() ?? "";
+  if (!head) return null;
+  const assigns = call.Assigns || [];
+  const env = [
+    ...assigns.map((a) => String(a?.Name?.Value ?? "")),
+    ...words.slice(0, at).map((w) => w === null ? "" : /^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)=/.exec(w)?.[1] ?? "")
+  ].filter(Boolean);
+  return { head, args: words.slice(at + 1), prefixes: prefixes.slice(at + 1), env };
+}
+function flagValue(args, names) {
+  for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
+    const w = args[i];
+    if (w === null) continue;
+    for (const n of names) {
+      if (w === n && typeof args[i + 1] === "string") return args[i + 1];
+      if (w.startsWith(`${n}=`)) return w.slice(n.length + 1);
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+function positionals(args, valueFlags) {
+  const out = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
+    const w = args[i];
+    if (w === null) {
+      out.push(null);
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (w === "--") {
+      out.push(...args.slice(i + 1));
+      break;
+    }
+    if (w.startsWith("-")) {
+      if (!w.includes("=") && valueFlags.has(w)) i++;
+      continue;
+    }
+    out.push(w);
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+function classifyCall(head, args, prefixes, env, state, out) {
+  const lower2 = args.map((a) => a === null ? null : a.toLowerCase());
+  switch (head) {
+    case "curl":
+    case "wget":
+    case "iwr":
+    case "invoke-webrequest":
+    case "irm":
+    case "invoke-restmethod": {
+      const binary = head === "wget" ? "wget" : "curl";
+      const sendFlags = head === "wget" ? WGET_SEND_FLAGS : head === "curl" ? CURL_SEND_FLAGS : IWR_SEND_FLAGS;
+      let sends = false;
+      for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
+        const w = args[i];
+        if (w === null) continue;
+        const name = (head === "curl" || head === "wget" ? w : w.toLowerCase()).split("=")[0];
+        if (sendFlags.has(name)) sends = true;
+        const next = lower2[i + 1];
+        if ((name === "-X" || name === "--request" || name === "-method") && next) {
+          if (WRITE_METHODS.has(next)) sends = true;
+        }
+        if (/^(?:--request=|-X)(POST|PUT|PATCH|DELETE)$/i.test(w)) sends = true;
+        if (name === "--method" && next && WRITE_METHODS.has(next)) sends = true;
+      }
+      const withPrefixes = args.map(
+        (a, i) => a === null && /^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\//i.test(prefixes[i] ?? "") ? prefixes[i] : a
+      );
+      const dests = destTokensForBinary(binary, withPrefixes).map((t) => host(t)).filter((h) => h !== null);
+      out.fetches = true;
+      out.fetchKinds.push(head);
+      out.fetchDestinations.push(...dests);
+      if (sends) {
+        out.sends = true;
+        out.destinations.push(...dests);
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+    case "scp":
+    case "rsync": {
+      const pos = positionals(args, VALUE_FLAGS[head] ?? /* @__PURE__ */ new Set()).filter(
+        (p) => p !== null
+      );
+      if (pos.length < 2) return;
+      const remote = (p) => /^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\//i.test(p) || /^[^/]*[^/:]:[^/]/.test(p) || p.includes("@");
+      const target = pos[pos.length - 1];
+      const sources = pos.slice(0, -1);
+      if (remote(target)) {
+        out.sends = true;
+        const h = host(target);
+        if (h) out.destinations.push(h);
+      }
+      if (sources.some(remote)) {
+        out.fetches = true;
+        out.fetchKinds.push(head);
+        for (const src of sources.filter(remote)) {
+          const h = host(src);
+          if (h) out.fetchDestinations.push(h);
+        }
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+    case "nc":
+    case "ncat":
+    case "netcat":
+    case "ssh": {
+      out.fetches = true;
+      out.sends = true;
+      out.fetchKinds.push(head);
+      for (const t of destTokensForBinary(head, args)) {
+        const h = host(t);
+        if (h) {
+          out.destinations.push(h);
+          out.fetchDestinations.push(h);
+        }
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+    case "gh": {
+      const pos = positionals(args, GH_HOSTNAME_FLAGS);
+      const group = pos[0] ?? null;
+      const verb = pos[1] ?? null;
+      const hn = flagValue(args, ["--hostname"]);
+      let dest = host(hn ?? "github.com") ?? "host:github.com";
+      const ghHost = dest.slice("host:".length);
+      const envRepo = env.some((n) => n === "GH_REPO" || n === "GH_HOST");
+      if (group === "api") {
+        const method = (flagValue(args, ["-X", "--method"]) ?? "get").toLowerCase();
+        const hasBody = args.some(
+          (w) => w !== null && /^(-f|--raw-field|-F|--field|--input)(=|$)/.test(w)
+        );
+        if (WRITE_METHODS.has(method) || hasBody) {
+          out.sends = true;
+          out.destinations.push(dest);
+          const endpoint = positionals(args, GH_API_VALUE_FLAGS)[1] ?? null;
+          const repo = ghApiRepo(endpoint, ghHost);
+          if (repo !== void 0) out.repos.push(repo);
+          else if (envRepo) out.repos.push(`${ghHost}/*`);
+        } else {
+          out.fetches = true;
+          out.fetchKinds.push("gh api");
+          out.fetchDestinations.push(dest);
+        }
+        return;
+      }
+      if (group === null || verb === null) return;
+      if (GH_WRITE.has(verb)) {
+        out.sends = true;
+        const rIdx = args.findIndex((w) => w === "-R" || w === "--repo");
+        const rEq = args.find((w) => w !== null && /^(-R|--repo)=/.test(w));
+        const rVal = rEq !== void 0 && rEq !== null ? rEq.slice(rEq.indexOf("=") + 1) : rIdx >= 0 ? args[rIdx + 1] : void 0;
+        let repo;
+        if (rIdx >= 0 || rEq !== void 0) {
+          if (typeof rVal === "string") {
+            const named = ghRepoArg(rVal, ghHost);
+            repo = named.repo;
+            if (named.host !== ghHost) dest = `host:${named.host}`;
+          } else repo = `${ghHost}/*`;
+        } else if (group === "gist" || group === "repo" && (verb === "create" || verb === "fork")) {
+          repo = `${ghHost}/*`;
+        } else if (group === "repo" && verb !== "rename") {
+          const operand = positionals(args, GH_REPO_VALUE_FLAGS)[2];
+          if (operand === null) repo = `${ghHost}/*`;
+          else if (operand !== void 0) repo = ghRepoArg(operand, ghHost).repo;
+          else if (envRepo) repo = `${ghHost}/*`;
+        } else if (envRepo) {
+          repo = `${ghHost}/*`;
+        }
+        out.destinations.push(dest);
+        if (repo !== void 0) out.repos.push(repo);
+      } else if (GH_READ.has(verb)) {
+        out.fetches = true;
+        out.fetchKinds.push(`gh ${group}`);
+        out.fetchDestinations.push(dest);
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+    case "git": {
+      const pos = positionals(args, /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["-C", "-c", "--git-dir", "--work-tree"]));
+      const verb = pos[0];
+      if (verb === null || verb === void 0) return;
+      for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
+        if (args[i] !== "-c") continue;
+        const v = args[i + 1];
+        if (v === null || v === void 0) {
+          if (verb === "push") out.unresolved = true;
+          continue;
+        }
+        const m = /^remote\.[^=]+\.(?:push)?url=(.*)$/i.exec(v);
+        if (m) sendToGitUrl(m[1], out);
+      }
+      if (verb === "remote") {
+        const rp = positionals(args, /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["-C", "-c", "--git-dir", "--work-tree", "-t", "-m"]));
+        const sub = rp[1];
+        if (sub === "add" || sub === "set-url") {
+          const url = rp.slice(2).filter((p) => p !== "--push" && p !== "--add")[1];
+          sendToGitUrl(url, out);
+        }
+        return;
+      }
+      if (verb === "config") {
+        const reads = args.some(
+          (w) => w !== null && /^--(get|get-all|get-regexp|unset|unset-all|list|get-urlmatch)$/.test(w)
+        );
+        const k = pos.findIndex((p) => p !== null && /^remote\..+\.(?:push)?url$/i.test(p));
+        if (k >= 0 && k + 1 < pos.length && !reads) sendToGitUrl(pos[k + 1], out);
+        return;
+      }
+      if (GIT_FETCH.has(verb)) {
+        out.fetches = true;
+        out.fetchKinds.push(`git ${verb}`);
+        for (const p of pos.slice(1)) {
+          const h = p !== null && /:\/\/|@/.test(p) ? host(p) : null;
+          if (h) out.fetchDestinations.push(h);
+        }
+        return;
+      }
+      if (verb === "push") {
+        if (pos.length > 1 && pos[1] === null) {
+          out.sends = true;
+          out.unresolved = true;
+          return;
+        }
+        const target = flagValue(args, ["--repo"]) ?? pos.slice(1).find((p) => p !== null && !p.startsWith("-")) ?? null;
+        if (target !== null && (/:\/\/|@/.test(target) || /^[A-Za-z0-9-]+(\.[A-Za-z0-9-]+)+:/.test(target))) {
+          sendToGitUrl(target, out);
+          return;
+        }
+        if (target !== null && /^[./~]|\//.test(target)) return;
+        out.sends = true;
+        const elsewhere = state.cwdChanged || args.some((w) => w !== null && /^(-C|--git-dir|--work-tree)(=|$)/.test(w)) || env.some((n) => n === "GIT_DIR" || n === "GIT_WORK_TREE" || n === "GIT_CONFIG");
+        if (elsewhere) out.unresolved = true;
+        else out.gitRemotes.push(target ?? "");
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+    default: {
+      const pub = PUBLISH[head];
+      if (!pub) return;
+      const pos = positionals(args, new Set(pub.flag ?? []));
+      const verb = pos[0];
+      if (verb === null || verb === void 0 || !pub.verbs.has(verb)) return;
+      if (head === "yarn" && verb === "npm" && pos[1] !== "publish") return;
+      out.sends = true;
+      const named = pub.flag ? flagValue(args, pub.flag) : null;
+      const h = named ? host(named) : null;
+      if (named && !h) return;
+      if (head === "docker") {
+        const image = pos[1];
+        const first = image?.split("/")[0] ?? "";
+        const reg = first.includes(".") || first.includes(":") ? host(first) : null;
+        out.destinations.push(reg ?? "host:docker.io");
+        return;
+      }
+      out.destinations.push(h ?? `host:${pub.registry}`);
+    }
+  }
+}
+function walkCalls(command, out, depth, state) {
+  const f = parseShared(command);
+  if (typeof f === "symbol" || !f) return;
+  syntax4.Walk(f, (node) => {
+    if (!node) return false;
+    const type = syntax4.NodeType(node);
+    if (type === "DeclClause") {
+      for (const a of node.Args || []) if (a?.Name?.Value) state.env.add(a.Name.Value);
+      return true;
+    }
+    if (type !== "CallExpr") return true;
+    const call = node;
+    if ((call.Args || []).length === 0) {
+      for (const a of call.Assigns || []) if (a?.Name?.Value) state.env.add(a.Name.Value);
+      return true;
+    }
+    const c = callWords(node);
+    if (!c) return true;
+    if (SHELLS2.has(c.head) && depth < MAX_DEPTH3) {
+      const i = c.args.findIndex((w) => w === "-c" || w === "-lc" || w === "-ec");
+      const payload = i >= 0 ? c.args[i + 1] : null;
+      if (typeof payload === "string") walkCalls(payload, out, depth + 1, state);
+      return true;
+    }
+    if (CWD_CHANGERS.has(c.head)) state.cwdChanged = true;
+    classifyCall(c.head, c.args, c.prefixes, [...c.env, ...state.env], state, out);
+    return true;
+  });
+}
+function classifyShellExposure(command) {
+  const out = {
+    ...EMPTY,
+    destinations: [],
+    gitRemotes: [],
+    repos: [],
+    fetchDestinations: [],
+    fetchKinds: []
+  };
+  try {
+    walkCalls(command, out, 0, { cwdChanged: false, env: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set() });
+  } catch {
+    return { ...EMPTY };
+  }
+  out.destinations = [...new Set(out.destinations)];
+  out.fetchDestinations = [...new Set(out.fetchDestinations)];
+  out.gitRemotes = [...new Set(out.gitRemotes)];
+  out.repos = [...new Set(out.repos)];
+  out.fetchKinds = [...new Set(out.fetchKinds)];
+  return out;
+}
 function stripTerminalEscapes(s) {
   return s.replace(TERMINAL_ESCAPE_RE, "");
 }
@@ -5013,8 +5534,8 @@ function matchCanaryArgs(args, values) {
   if (values.length === 0) return null;
   const needles = prepare(values);
   if (needles.length === 0) return null;
-  const walk = (v, depth, fieldPath) => {
-    if (depth > MAX_DEPTH3) return null;
+  const walk2 = (v, depth, fieldPath) => {
+    if (depth > MAX_DEPTH4) return null;
     if (typeof v === "string") {
       const hit = matchPrepared(v, needles);
       if (hit) return { id: hit.v.id, view: hit.view, fieldPath, retired: Boolean(hit.v.retired) };
@@ -5022,31 +5543,31 @@ function matchCanaryArgs(args, values) {
         const trimmed = v.trim();
         if (trimmed.startsWith("{") || trimmed.startsWith("[")) {
           try {
-            return walk(JSON.parse(v), depth + 1, fieldPath);
+            return walk2(JSON.parse(v), depth + 1, fieldPath);
           } catch {
           }
         }
       }
       return null;
     }
-    if (typeof v === "number" && Number.isFinite(v)) return walk(String(v), depth, fieldPath);
+    if (typeof v === "number" && Number.isFinite(v)) return walk2(String(v), depth, fieldPath);
     if (Array.isArray(v)) {
       for (let i = 0; i < v.length; i++) {
-        const h = walk(v[i], depth + 1, `${fieldPath}[${i}]`);
+        const h = walk2(v[i], depth + 1, `${fieldPath}[${i}]`);
         if (h) return h;
       }
       return null;
     }
     if (v && typeof v === "object") {
       for (const [k, child] of Object.entries(v)) {
-        const h = walk(child, depth + 1, fieldPath ? `${fieldPath}.${k}` : k);
+        const h = walk2(child, depth + 1, fieldPath ? `${fieldPath}.${k}` : k);
         if (h) return h;
       }
     }
     return null;
   };
   try {
-    return walk(args, 0, "");
+    return walk2(args, 0, "");
   } catch (e) {
     console.error(
       "[node9 engine] canary args walk failed:",
@@ -5055,7 +5576,7 @@ function matchCanaryArgs(args, values) {
     return null;
   }
 }
-var aws_default, bash_safe_default, docker_default, filesystem_default, github_default, k8s_default, mongodb_default, postgres_default, project_jail_default, redis_default, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, SSRF_MAX_HOST, METADATA_ADDRESSES, STRICT_TIERS, METADATA_HOSTNAMES, v4Octets, TIER_REASON, CHECK_TEXT, VERDICTS, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, ALL, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, PRODUCT_CHECKS, SHIELD_RULE_NAME, SHIELD_RULES_FOLDED_INTO_PRODUCT, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, LEGACY_TO_ID, PROJECT_JAIL_BLOCK_READ, OVERRIDE_PREFIX, LABEL_WRAPPERS, LEGACY_READERS, syntax, sharedParser, MESSAGE_FLAGS, SHELL_INTERPRETERS, DOWNLOAD_CMDS, NORMALIZE_CACHE_MAX, normalizeCache, AST_CACHE_MAX, astCache, PARSE_FAIL, defaultExpansionOps, VARIABLE_READERS, FS_READ_TOOLS, GREP_SHAPE, PATTERN_VERBS, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, GREP_FILE_OPERANDS, READER_VALUE_LETTERS, FILE_OPERAND_FLAGS, SCP_VALUE_FLAGS, TAR_VALUE_LETTERS, ZIP_VALUE_LETTERS, RSYNC_VALUE_LETTERS, RSYNC_SKIP, CP_VALUE_LETTERS, INSTALL_VALUE_LETTERS, COPY_VERBS, TAR_MODE_WORD, COPY_VERB_HEADS, FS_OP_PRESCREEN_RE, HOME_CACHE_ALLOWLIST, SENSITIVE_PATH_RULES, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, SQL_DB_CLIS, SQL_DDL_RE, CHMOD_OPEN_PERM_TOKENS, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, INLINE_INTERPRETER, RUNNER_WRAPPERS, _redirStdinOps, _listOps, WRAPPER_TAKES_TARGET, FIND_EXEC_FLAGS, FS_MUTATION_TOOLS, INTERP_LEADING_TARGET, NET_BINARIES, VALUE_FLAGS, HOME_VARIABLES, assignmentTable, currentStmtOffset, PAYLOAD_BUDGET, payloadBudget, seenPayloads, UNANALYSABLE_NESTING, ASSIGNMENT_HEADS, AND_OP, OR_OP, AND_OR_OPS, FS_OP_CACHE_MAX, fsOpCache, stripDotSlash, REDIR_TRUNCATE_OPS, REDIR_FILE_IN_OPS, REDIR_HEREDOC_OPS, FIND_OPTIONS, COPY_RULE_OF, isReaderWord, positionalAfter, NONE, UNKNOWN, MAX_REGEX_LENGTH, REGEX_CACHE_MAX, regexCache, FORBIDDEN_PATH_SEGMENTS, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, MCP_EXECUTORS, syntax2, MAX_ALTERNATIVES, MAX_DEPTH, MAX_PAYLOAD_DEPTH, unique, clone, base, quoteGlob, asWord, WRITES, READS, DUP_OUT, HERE_STRING, AND, OR, DEFAULT_OPS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, PASSWORD_HASH_FILES, STARTUP_NAMES, LEGACY_SYSTEM_PATH_RE, RANK, BIP39_ENGLISH, BIP39_PUBLIC_VECTORS, indices, lengths, hash, IBAN_LENGTH, B58, B58_INDEX, XPRV_VERSIONS, B62, CRC32_TABLE, GITHUB_TOKEN_RE, B64URL, B64URL_INDEX, CASK_TWO_ZERO_SUFFIX, CASK_FOUR_ZERO_SUFFIX, INVISIBLE_RE, HOMOGLYPHS, HOMOGLYPH_RE, ASSIGNMENT_CONTEXT_RE, DLP_STOPWORDS, REFERENCE_VALUE_RE, IDENTIFIER_VALUE_RE, PATH_VALUE_RE, DOTTED_REFERENCE_RE, EMAIL_VALUE_RE, FIXTURE_NAME_RE, DERIVATIVE_NAME_RE, QUERY_CREDENTIAL_VALUE_RE, OTP_SECRET_RE, ASSIGNED_SECRET_VALUE_RE, ASSIGNED_SECRET_NAME_RE, NAME_KEYWORD_RE, ARN_CONTEXT_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_PATTERNS_GLOBAL, SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, MAX_DEPTH2, MAX_STRING_BYTES, MAX_JSON_PARSE_BYTES, syntax3, NPM_INSTALL_VERBS, NPM_EXEC_VERBS, PNPM_INSTALL_VERBS, YARN_INSTALL_VERBS, BUN_INSTALL_VERBS, DLX_VERBS, NON_REGISTRY_RE, NPM_NAME_RE, EXACT_SEMVER_RE, NPM_VALUE_FLAGS, PNPM_VALUE_FLAGS, YARN_VALUE_FLAGS, BUN_VALUE_FLAGS, PIP_VALUE_FLAGS, UV_VALUE_FLAGS, POETRY_VALUE_FLAGS, PIPENV_VALUE_FLAGS, PIPX_VALUE_FLAGS, PY_SPEC_RE, PY_EXACT_RE, MANAGER_HEADS, SHELLS, MAX_NESTING, SHELL_VALUE_FLAGS, TUNING_FIELDS, MAP_GOVERNED, KNOB_GOVERNED, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, PRIVATE_HOST_SUFFIXES, SOURCE_COMMANDS, SINK_COMMANDS, OBFUSCATORS, SENSITIVE_PATTERNS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, DESTINATION_ARGS, SECRET_VIEW_LIMITS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, VERDICT_RANK, SQL_DML_KEYWORDS, TERMINAL_ESCAPE_RE, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, PII_EMAIL_RE, PII_SSN_RE, PII_PHONE_RE, PII_CC16_RE, PII_CC15_RE, PII_IBAN_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, MAX_PII_SCAN_BYTES, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, MAX_TEXT, MAX_DEPTH3, MAX_JSON_PARSE, URL_DEPTH, B64_DEPTH, MIN_SEGMENT, SEPARATORS, stripSeparators, looksText, CANARY_DECODERS, VIEWS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES;
+var aws_default, bash_safe_default, docker_default, filesystem_default, github_default, k8s_default, mongodb_default, postgres_default, project_jail_default, redis_default, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, SSRF_MAX_HOST, METADATA_ADDRESSES, STRICT_TIERS, METADATA_HOSTNAMES, v4Octets, TIER_REASON, CHECK_TEXT, VERDICTS, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, ALL, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, PRODUCT_CHECKS, SHIELD_RULE_NAME, SHIELD_RULES_FOLDED_INTO_PRODUCT, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, LEGACY_TO_ID, PROJECT_JAIL_BLOCK_READ, OVERRIDE_PREFIX, LABEL_WRAPPERS, LEGACY_READERS, syntax, sharedParser, MESSAGE_FLAGS, SHELL_INTERPRETERS, DOWNLOAD_CMDS, NORMALIZE_CACHE_MAX, normalizeCache, AST_CACHE_MAX, astCache, PARSE_FAIL, defaultExpansionOps, VARIABLE_READERS, FS_READ_TOOLS, GREP_SHAPE, PATTERN_VERBS, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, GREP_FILE_OPERANDS, READER_VALUE_LETTERS, FILE_OPERAND_FLAGS, SCP_VALUE_FLAGS, TAR_VALUE_LETTERS, ZIP_VALUE_LETTERS, RSYNC_VALUE_LETTERS, RSYNC_SKIP, CP_VALUE_LETTERS, INSTALL_VALUE_LETTERS, COPY_VERBS, TAR_MODE_WORD, COPY_VERB_HEADS, FS_OP_PRESCREEN_RE, HOME_CACHE_ALLOWLIST, SENSITIVE_PATH_RULES, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, SQL_DB_CLIS, SQL_DDL_RE, CHMOD_OPEN_PERM_TOKENS, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, INLINE_INTERPRETER, RUNNER_WRAPPERS, _redirStdinOps, _listOps, WRAPPER_TAKES_TARGET, FIND_EXEC_FLAGS, FS_MUTATION_TOOLS, INTERP_LEADING_TARGET, NET_BINARIES, VALUE_FLAGS, HOME_VARIABLES, assignmentTable, currentStmtOffset, PAYLOAD_BUDGET, payloadBudget, seenPayloads, UNANALYSABLE_NESTING, ASSIGNMENT_HEADS, AND_OP, OR_OP, AND_OR_OPS, FS_OP_CACHE_MAX, fsOpCache, stripDotSlash, REDIR_TRUNCATE_OPS, REDIR_FILE_IN_OPS, REDIR_HEREDOC_OPS, FIND_OPTIONS, COPY_RULE_OF, isReaderWord, positionalAfter, NONE, UNKNOWN, MAX_REGEX_LENGTH, REGEX_CACHE_MAX, regexCache, FORBIDDEN_PATH_SEGMENTS, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, MCP_EXECUTORS, syntax2, MAX_ALTERNATIVES, MAX_DEPTH, MAX_PAYLOAD_DEPTH, unique, clone, base, quoteGlob, asWord, WRITES, READS, DUP_OUT, HERE_STRING, AND, OR, DEFAULT_OPS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, PASSWORD_HASH_FILES, STARTUP_NAMES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, LEGACY_SYSTEM_PATH_RE, RANK, BIP39_ENGLISH, BIP39_PUBLIC_VECTORS, indices, lengths, hash, IBAN_LENGTH, B58, B58_INDEX, XPRV_VERSIONS, B62, CRC32_TABLE, GITHUB_TOKEN_RE, B64URL, B64URL_INDEX, CASK_TWO_ZERO_SUFFIX, CASK_FOUR_ZERO_SUFFIX, INVISIBLE_RE, HOMOGLYPHS, HOMOGLYPH_RE, ASSIGNMENT_CONTEXT_RE, DLP_STOPWORDS, REFERENCE_VALUE_RE, IDENTIFIER_VALUE_RE, PATH_VALUE_RE, DOTTED_REFERENCE_RE, EMAIL_VALUE_RE, FIXTURE_NAME_RE, DERIVATIVE_NAME_RE, QUERY_CREDENTIAL_VALUE_RE, OTP_SECRET_RE, ASSIGNED_SECRET_VALUE_RE, ASSIGNED_SECRET_NAME_RE, NAME_KEYWORD_RE, ARN_CONTEXT_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_PATTERNS_GLOBAL, SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, MAX_DEPTH2, MAX_STRING_BYTES, MAX_JSON_PARSE_BYTES, syntax3, NPM_INSTALL_VERBS, NPM_EXEC_VERBS, PNPM_INSTALL_VERBS, YARN_INSTALL_VERBS, BUN_INSTALL_VERBS, DLX_VERBS, NON_REGISTRY_RE, NPM_NAME_RE, EXACT_SEMVER_RE, NPM_VALUE_FLAGS, PNPM_VALUE_FLAGS, YARN_VALUE_FLAGS, BUN_VALUE_FLAGS, PIP_VALUE_FLAGS, UV_VALUE_FLAGS, POETRY_VALUE_FLAGS, PIPENV_VALUE_FLAGS, PIPX_VALUE_FLAGS, PY_SPEC_RE, PY_EXACT_RE, MANAGER_HEADS, SHELLS, MAX_NESTING, SHELL_VALUE_FLAGS, TUNING_FIELDS, MAP_GOVERNED, KNOB_GOVERNED, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, PRIVATE_HOST_SUFFIXES, SOURCE_COMMANDS, SINK_COMMANDS, OBFUSCATORS, SENSITIVE_PATTERNS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, DESTINATION_ARGS, SECRET_VIEW_LIMITS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, VERDICT_RANK, SQL_DML_KEYWORDS, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MAX_SCAN_CHARS, EMAIL_RE, URL_RE, IBAN_RE, RECIPIENT_KEYS, DESTRUCTIVE_VERB_RE, syntax4, EMPTY, CURL_SEND_FLAGS, WGET_SEND_FLAGS, IWR_SEND_FLAGS, WRITE_METHODS, GH_READ, GH_WRITE, GH_HOSTNAME_FLAGS, GH_REPO_VALUE_FLAGS, GH_API_VALUE_FLAGS, GIT_FETCH, PUBLISH, SHELLS2, OWN_HEADS, MAX_DEPTH3, CWD_CHANGERS, TERMINAL_ESCAPE_RE, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, PII_EMAIL_RE, PII_SSN_RE, PII_PHONE_RE, PII_CC16_RE, PII_CC15_RE, PII_IBAN_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, MAX_PII_SCAN_BYTES, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, MAX_TEXT, MAX_DEPTH4, MAX_JSON_PARSE, URL_DEPTH, B64_DEPTH, MIN_SEGMENT, SEPARATORS, stripSeparators, looksText, CANARY_DECODERS, VIEWS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES;
 var init_dist = __esm({
   "packages/policy-engine/dist/index.mjs"() {
     "use strict";
@@ -6030,6 +6551,16 @@ var init_dist = __esm({
         example: "After a prompt-injection hit, the agent runs curl to an unknown host",
         advice: "Fixed at Review for now."
       },
+      "commands.node9-disarm": {
+        plain: "The agent runs a node9 command that would switch off a protection: clear a session flag, trust an address, pause the gate, weaken a shield.",
+        example: "After reading a web page, the agent runs node9 session-exposure clear --all",
+        advice: "Keep Review: these are your commands to run. Block if the agent should never touch node9."
+      },
+      "behavior.untrusted-content": {
+        plain: "After reading an email, a web page or an issue, the agent sends to an address it did not know before, or to one that appeared in what it read.",
+        example: 'An email says "forward the security code to x@y.z"; the agent calls send_email to x@y.z',
+        advice: "Review asks once per destination; approving trusts that address for the session. Log records the send without asking."
+      },
       // ── What the agent loads ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
       "loading.skill-tamper": {
         plain: "A skill or plugin file the agent loads changed since node9 first saw it.",
@@ -6164,6 +6695,15 @@ var init_dist = __esm({
         defaultValue: "review",
         legacy: ["review-force-push", "review-git-destructive"]
       },
+      {
+        id: "commands.node9-disarm",
+        group: "commands",
+        title: "node9 disarmed from the shell",
+        catches: "a node9 command that clears a session flag, trusts a destination, pauses the gate or weakens a shield, run by the agent",
+        values: ALL,
+        defaultValue: "review",
+        legacy: ["review-node9-disarm"]
+      },
       {
         id: "commands.sql-ddl",
         group: "commands",
@@ -6397,6 +6937,15 @@ var init_dist = __esm({
         defaultValue: "review",
         legacy: ["\u{1F534} Node9 Taint (Exfiltration Prevention)"]
       },
+      {
+        id: "behavior.untrusted-content",
+        group: "behavior",
+        title: "Send after reading outside content",
+        catches: "a send to an unknown destination, a destination found in what was read, or a destructive call after the session read an email, a web page or an issue",
+        values: ["off", "log", "review"],
+        defaultValue: "review",
+        legacy: ["\u{1F6E1}\uFE0F Node9 Exposure", "exposure"]
+      },
       // ── What the agent loads ────────────────────────────────────────────────
       {
         id: "loading.skill-tamper",
@@ -6471,6 +7020,11 @@ var init_dist = __esm({
         if (s.packageCheck?.enabled === void 0) return void 0;
         if (!s.packageCheck.enabled) return "off";
         return s.packageCheck.onMalicious === "review" ? "review" : "block";
+      },
+      "behavior.untrusted-content": (s) => {
+        if (s.untrustedContent?.enabled === void 0) return void 0;
+        if (!s.untrustedContent.enabled) return "off";
+        return s.untrustedContent.afterExposure === "log-only" ? "log" : "review";
       }
     };
     ({ syntax } = mvdanSh);
@@ -7418,6 +7972,22 @@ var init_dist = __esm({
     SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS = ["/etc/security", "/etc/pam.d", "/etc/sudoers.d"];
     PASSWORD_HASH_FILES = ["/etc/shadow", "/etc/gshadow"];
     STARTUP_NAMES = [".bashrc", ".zshrc", ".profile", ".bash_profile"];
+    AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES = [
+      ".gitlab-ci.yml",
+      "CLAUDE.md",
+      "AGENTS.md",
+      ".cursorrules",
+      ".mcp.json",
+      ".vscode/settings.json",
+      "package.json"
+    ];
+    AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS = [
+      ".github/workflows",
+      ".claude",
+      ".cursor",
+      ".git/hooks",
+      ".husky"
+    ];
     LEGACY_SYSTEM_PATH_RE = /^(?:[a-zA-Z]:)?\/etc\/(?:passwd|shadow|sudoers)$/;
     RANK = { allow: 0, review: 1, block: 2 };
     BIP39_ENGLISH = `abandon
@@ -10517,7 +11087,25 @@ zoo`.split("\n");
         name: "onlineFallback",
         legacy: ["packageCheck", "onlineFallback"]
       },
-      { checkId: "loading.malicious-package", name: "allow", legacy: ["packageCheck", "allow"] }
+      { checkId: "loading.malicious-package", name: "allow", legacy: ["packageCheck", "allow"] },
+      // fw#318: the verdict carries off / log (log-only) / review; the tuning
+      // carries whether a review asks once per destination or every time, the
+      // frame around outside content, and the organisation's own domains.
+      {
+        checkId: "behavior.untrusted-content",
+        name: "afterExposure",
+        legacy: ["untrustedContent", "afterExposure"]
+      },
+      {
+        checkId: "behavior.untrusted-content",
+        name: "spotlight",
+        legacy: ["untrustedContent", "spotlight"]
+      },
+      {
+        checkId: "behavior.untrusted-content",
+        name: "orgDomains",
+        legacy: ["untrustedContent", "orgDomains"]
+      }
     ];
     MAP_GOVERNED = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
       "files.shell-startup",
@@ -10534,6 +11122,7 @@ zoo`.split("\n");
       "commands.temp-binary",
       "commands.disk-destroy",
       "commands.dangerous-word",
+      "commands.node9-disarm",
       "data.pipe-chain"
     ]);
     KNOB_GOVERNED = {
@@ -10545,7 +11134,8 @@ zoo`.split("\n");
       "behavior.loops": ["off", "block"],
       "behavior.prompt-injection": ["off", "log"],
       "loading.skill-tamper": ["off", "log", "block"],
-      "loading.malicious-package": ["off", "review", "block"]
+      "loading.malicious-package": ["off", "review", "block"],
+      "behavior.untrusted-content": ["off", "log", "review"]
     };
     CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS = CHECKS.filter(
       (c) => configurableValues(c.id).length > 0
@@ -10736,6 +11326,152 @@ zoo`.split("\n");
       block: 2
     };
     SQL_DML_KEYWORDS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["select", "insert", "update", "delete", "merge", "upsert"]);
+    MAX_DESTINATIONS = 200;
+    MAX_SCAN_CHARS = 1e5;
+    EMAIL_RE = /[\p{L}\p{N}._%+-]+@[\p{L}\p{N}](?:[\p{L}\p{N}-]*[\p{L}\p{N}])?(?:\.[\p{L}\p{N}](?:[\p{L}\p{N}-]*[\p{L}\p{N}])?)*\.\p{L}{2,}/gu;
+    URL_RE = /\b(?:[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\/|www\.)[^\s<>"'`){}]+/gi;
+    IBAN_RE = /\b[A-Z]{2}\d{2}(?:[ -]?[A-Z0-9]{4}){2,7}(?:[ -]?[A-Z0-9]{1,4})?\b/g;
+    RECIPIENT_KEYS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+      "to",
+      "cc",
+      "bcc",
+      "recipient",
+      "recipients",
+      "email",
+      "participants",
+      "attendees",
+      "destination",
+      "iban",
+      "account",
+      // Where a request goes, when the value is a bare host or a scheme-less URL.
+      "url",
+      "uri",
+      "host",
+      "hostname",
+      "endpoint",
+      "server",
+      "domain",
+      "address",
+      "webhook",
+      "webhook_url",
+      "callback",
+      "callback_url",
+      "target"
+    ]);
+    DESTRUCTIVE_VERB_RE = /^(?:delete|remove|drop|destroy|purge|wipe|erase|transfer|pay|send_money|withdraw|change_password|update_password|reset_password|set_permission|grant|revoke|share)(?:_|$)/i;
+    ({ syntax: syntax4 } = mvdanSh4);
+    EMPTY = {
+      fetches: false,
+      sends: false,
+      destinations: [],
+      gitRemotes: [],
+      repos: [],
+      unresolved: false,
+      fetchDestinations: [],
+      fetchKinds: []
+    };
+    CURL_SEND_FLAGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+      "-d",
+      "--data",
+      "--data-ascii",
+      "--data-binary",
+      "--data-raw",
+      "--data-urlencode",
+      "-F",
+      "--form",
+      "--form-string",
+      "-T",
+      "--upload-file",
+      "--json"
+    ]);
+    WGET_SEND_FLAGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["--post-data", "--post-file", "--body-data", "--body-file"]);
+    IWR_SEND_FLAGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["-body", "-infile"]);
+    WRITE_METHODS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["post", "put", "patch", "delete"]);
+    GH_READ = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["view", "list", "diff", "checks", "status", "download", "clone"]);
+    GH_WRITE = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+      "create",
+      "comment",
+      "edit",
+      "close",
+      "reopen",
+      "merge",
+      "review",
+      "upload",
+      "delete",
+      "transfer",
+      "pin",
+      "lock",
+      "ready",
+      "set",
+      "sync",
+      "fork"
+    ]);
+    GH_HOSTNAME_FLAGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["--hostname", "-h", "-R", "--repo"]);
+    GH_REPO_VALUE_FLAGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+      "--hostname",
+      "-R",
+      "--repo",
+      "-d",
+      "--description",
+      "-h",
+      "--homepage",
+      "--visibility",
+      "--default-branch",
+      "--add-topic",
+      "--remove-topic",
+      "-p",
+      "--template",
+      "-s",
+      "--source",
+      "-b",
+      "--branch",
+      "-l",
+      "--license",
+      "-g",
+      "--gitignore",
+      "-t",
+      "--team",
+      "-r",
+      "--remote",
+      "--org"
+    ]);
+    GH_API_VALUE_FLAGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+      "--hostname",
+      "-X",
+      "--method",
+      "-f",
+      "--raw-field",
+      "-F",
+      "--field",
+      "-H",
+      "--header",
+      "--input",
+      "-q",
+      "--jq",
+      "-t",
+      "--template",
+      "--cache",
+      "-p",
+      "--preview"
+    ]);
+    GIT_FETCH = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["clone", "fetch", "pull", "ls-remote"]);
+    PUBLISH = {
+      npm: { verbs: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["publish"]), registry: "registry.npmjs.org", flag: ["--registry"] },
+      pnpm: { verbs: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["publish"]), registry: "registry.npmjs.org", flag: ["--registry"] },
+      yarn: {
+        verbs: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["publish", "npm"]),
+        registry: "registry.npmjs.org",
+        flag: ["--registry"]
+      },
+      twine: { verbs: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["upload"]), registry: "upload.pypi.org", flag: ["--repository-url"] },
+      cargo: { verbs: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["publish"]), registry: "crates.io", flag: ["--registry", "--index"] },
+      gem: { verbs: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["push"]), registry: "rubygems.org", flag: ["--host"] },
+      docker: { verbs: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["push"]), registry: "docker.io" }
+    };
+    SHELLS2 = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["sh", "bash", "zsh", "dash", "ksh"]);
+    OWN_HEADS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([...Object.keys(PUBLISH), "git", "gh"]);
+    MAX_DEPTH3 = 3;
+    CWD_CHANGERS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["cd", "pushd", "popd"]);
     TERMINAL_ESCAPE_RE = /\x1b\[[0-9;?]*[A-Za-z]|\x1b\][^\x07\x1b]*(?:\x07|\x1b\\)|\x1b[@-_]|[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e-\x1f\x7f]/g;
     LOOP_MAX_RECORDS = 500;
     PII_EMAIL_RE = /\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\b/;
@@ -10748,7 +11484,7 @@ zoo`.split("\n");
     MAX_PII_SCAN_BYTES = 1e5;
     CANARY_MIN_LENGTH = 16;
     MAX_TEXT = 1e5;
-    MAX_DEPTH3 = 6;
+    MAX_DEPTH4 = 6;
     MAX_JSON_PARSE = 1e4;
     URL_DEPTH = 4;
     B64_DEPTH = 3;
@@ -10860,8 +11596,8 @@ function truncateAuditPreview(text) {
 }
 function appendToLog(logPath, entry) {
   try {
-    const dir = path.dirname(logPath);
-    if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+    const dir2 = path.dirname(logPath);
+    if (!fs.existsSync(dir2)) fs.mkdirSync(dir2, { recursive: true });
     fs.appendFileSync(logPath, JSON.stringify(entry) + "\n");
   } catch {
   }
@@ -11154,6 +11890,13 @@ var ConfigFileSchema = z.object({
       onlineFallback: z.boolean().optional(),
       allow: z.array(z.string()).optional()
     }).optional(),
+    untrustedContent: z.object({
+      enabled: z.boolean().optional(),
+      spotlight: z.boolean().optional(),
+      afterExposure: z.enum(["ask-once", "ask-every-time", "log-only"]).optional(),
+      orgDomains: z.array(z.string()).optional(),
+      roles: z.record(z.string(), z.record(z.string(), z.enum(["source", "action", "read"]))).optional()
+    }).optional(),
     skillPinning: z.object({
       enabled: z.boolean().optional(),
       mode: z.enum(["warn", "block"]).optional(),
@@ -11164,8 +11907,8 @@ var ConfigFileSchema = z.object({
 }).strict();
 function formatIssues(issues) {
   const lines = issues.map((issue) => {
-    const path20 = issue.path.length > 0 ? issue.path.map(String).join(".") : "root";
-    return `  \u2022 ${path20}: ${issue.message}`;
+    const path26 = issue.path.length > 0 ? issue.path.map(String).join(".") : "root";
+    return `  \u2022 ${path26}: ${issue.message}`;
   });
   return `Invalid config:
 ${lines.join("\n")}`;
@@ -11178,9 +11921,9 @@ function prunePaths(root, paths) {
     const yi = y[y.length - 1];
     return typeof xi === "number" && typeof yi === "number" ? yi - xi : 0;
   });
-  for (const path20 of ordered) {
+  for (const path26 of ordered) {
     let cur = root;
-    for (const key of path20.slice(0, -1)) {
+    for (const key of path26.slice(0, -1)) {
       if (cur === null || typeof cur !== "object") {
         cur = void 0;
         break;
@@ -11188,7 +11931,7 @@ function prunePaths(root, paths) {
       cur = cur[key];
     }
     if (cur === null || typeof cur !== "object") continue;
-    const last = path20[path20.length - 1];
+    const last = path26[path26.length - 1];
     if (Array.isArray(cur)) {
       const i = Number(last);
       if (Number.isInteger(i) && i >= 0 && i < cur.length) {
@@ -11224,7 +11967,7 @@ function sanitizeConfig(raw) {
           return issue.keys.map((k) => [...at, k]);
         }
         return [at.slice(0, -level || void 0)];
-      }).filter((path20) => path20.length > 0);
+      }).filter((path26) => path26.length > 0);
       if (paths.length === 0 || !prunePaths(working, paths)) break;
     }
     if (ConfigFileSchema.safeParse(working).success) break;
@@ -11266,8 +12009,8 @@ function loadUserShields() {
     }
     return result;
   }
-  for (const file of entries) {
-    const filePath = path2.join(USER_SHIELDS_DIR, file);
+  for (const file2 of entries) {
+    const filePath = path2.join(USER_SHIELDS_DIR, file2);
     try {
       const raw = JSON.parse(fs2.readFileSync(filePath, "utf-8"));
       const v = validateShieldDefinition(raw);
@@ -11278,7 +12021,7 @@ function loadUserShields() {
       }
       result[v.ok.name] = v.ok;
     } catch (err) {
-      process.stderr.write(`[node9] Failed to load user shield ${file}: ${String(err)}
+      process.stderr.write(`[node9] Failed to load user shield ${file2}: ${String(err)}
 `);
     }
   }
@@ -11549,11 +12292,11 @@ function getCachedHosts() {
   _cache = { hosts, expiry: now + CACHE_TTL_MS, mtime: getFileMtime() };
   return hosts;
 }
-function normalizeHost(raw) {
+function normalizeHost2(raw) {
   return raw.toLowerCase().replace(/^https?:\/\//, "").replace(/\/.*$/, "").replace(/^[^@]+@/, "").replace(/:\d+$/, "");
 }
-function matchesTrustedHost(host, list) {
-  const normalized = normalizeHost(host);
+function matchesTrustedHost(host2, list) {
+  const normalized = normalizeHost2(host2);
   return list.some((raw) => {
     const entryHost = raw.toLowerCase();
     if (entryHost.startsWith("*.")) {
@@ -11563,9 +12306,9 @@ function matchesTrustedHost(host, list) {
     return normalized === entryHost;
   });
 }
-function isTrustedHost(host) {
+function isTrustedHost(host2) {
   return matchesTrustedHost(
-    host,
+    host2,
     getCachedHosts().map((entry) => entry.host)
   );
 }
@@ -11683,6 +12426,10 @@ function v2ToLegacy(raw, options = {}) {
     const [id] = pair.split(".", 1);
     if (CHECK_BY_ID.has(id)) warnings.push(`tuning.${pair}: no such setting`);
   }
+  if (stated["behavior.untrusted-content"] === "log") {
+    const uc = policy.untrustedContent;
+    if (uc) uc.afterExposure = "log-only";
+  }
   const legacy = { version: "1.0" };
   if (Object.keys(settings).length) legacy.settings = settings;
   if (Object.keys(policy).length) legacy.policy = policy;
@@ -11700,9 +12447,9 @@ var DEFAULT_API_URL = "https://api.node9.ai/api/v1/intercept";
 var LOOPBACK = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1", "[::1]", "0.0.0.0"]);
 var HOST_ALLOW_ENV = "NODE9_API_HOST_ALLOW";
 function defaultHostSuffixes() {
-  const host = new URL(DEFAULT_API_URL).hostname.toLowerCase();
-  const parent = host.split(".").slice(1).join(".");
-  return parent.includes(".") ? [host, parent] : [host];
+  const host2 = new URL(DEFAULT_API_URL).hostname.toLowerCase();
+  const parent = host2.split(".").slice(1).join(".");
+  return parent.includes(".") ? [host2, parent] : [host2];
 }
 function allowedSuffixes() {
   const extra = (process.env[HOST_ALLOW_ENV] ?? "").split(",").map(
@@ -11720,11 +12467,11 @@ function validateApiUrl(raw) {
   }
   if (u.username || u.password) return null;
   if (u.protocol !== "https:" && u.protocol !== "http:") return null;
-  const host = u.hostname.toLowerCase();
-  if (LOOPBACK.has(host)) return u;
+  const host2 = u.hostname.toLowerCase();
+  if (LOOPBACK.has(host2)) return u;
   if (u.protocol !== "https:") return null;
   const suffixes = allowedSuffixes();
-  const ok = suffixes.some((s) => host === s || host.endsWith("." + s));
+  const ok = suffixes.some((s) => host2 === s || host2.endsWith("." + s));
   return ok ? u : null;
 }
 function safeApiUrl(raw, onReject) {
@@ -11866,6 +12613,29 @@ var DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
         reason: "SQL DDL destructive statement inside a shell command",
         description: "The AI wants to drop or truncate a database table via the shell. This permanently deletes the table structure or all its data."
       },
+      // ── node9 itself ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+      // The agent runs as the user, so a `node9 ...` command from Bash can
+      // clear the session's taint or exposure, trust a destination or pause
+      // the gate. Those are the user's own commands; from the agent they are
+      // a review (fw#318 review finding 1).
+      {
+        name: "review-node9-disarm",
+        tool: "bash",
+        conditions: [
+          {
+            field: "command",
+            op: "matches",
+            // Single spaces on purpose: a nested `\\s+` inside the alternation
+            // fails the engine's ReDoS check and the rule would be dropped.
+            value: "(^|&&|\\|\\||;)\\s*(npx )?node9 (session-(exposure|taint) clear|trust (add|recipient add)|pause|shield (disable|set)|egress allow|approver set)\\b",
+            flags: "i"
+          }
+        ],
+        conditionMode: "all",
+        verdict: "review",
+        reason: "node9 self-weakening command run by the agent",
+        description: "The AI wants to run a node9 command that clears a session flag, trusts a destination, pauses the gate or weakens a shield. These are your commands to run, not the agent's."
+      },
       // ── Git safety ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
       {
         name: "review-force-push",
@@ -11967,6 +12737,13 @@ var DEFAULT_CONFIG = {
       allow: []
     },
     skillPinning: { enabled: false, mode: "warn", roots: [] },
+    untrustedContent: {
+      enabled: true,
+      spotlight: true,
+      afterExposure: "ask-once",
+      orgDomains: [],
+      roles: {}
+    },
     trustedHosts: [],
     trustedHostsManaged: false,
     appPermissions: {},
@@ -12191,6 +12968,11 @@ function getConfig(cwd) {
       ...DEFAULT_CONFIG.policy.skillPinning,
       roots: [...DEFAULT_CONFIG.policy.skillPinning.roots]
     },
+    untrustedContent: {
+      ...DEFAULT_CONFIG.policy.untrustedContent,
+      orgDomains: [...DEFAULT_CONFIG.policy.untrustedContent.orgDomains],
+      roles: {}
+    },
     // Left empty on purpose: the local file is read fresh at policy-eval time
     // (getCachedHosts via isTrustedHost), NOT snapshotted into the frozen config
     // here. A managed list fills this below and flips trustedHostsManaged.
@@ -12350,6 +13132,9 @@ function getConfig(cwd) {
         }
       }
     }
+    if (p.untrustedContent && typeof p.untrustedContent === "object") {
+      applyUntrustedContent(mergedPolicy.untrustedContent, p.untrustedContent, false, isProject);
+    }
     const envs = source.environments || {};
     for (const [envName, envConfig] of Object.entries(envs)) {
       if (envConfig && typeof envConfig === "object") {
@@ -12549,6 +13334,9 @@ function getConfig(cwd) {
             allow: Array.isArray(pc.allow) ? pc.allow.filter((a) => typeof a === "string" && a.length > 0) : cur.allow
           };
         }
+        if (mc.untrustedContent && typeof mc.untrustedContent === "object") {
+          applyUntrustedContent(mergedPolicy.untrustedContent, mc.untrustedContent, true);
+        }
         if (mc.loopDetection && typeof mc.loopDetection === "object") {
           const l = mc.loopDetection;
           const cur = mergedPolicy.loopDetection;
@@ -12569,18 +13357,18 @@ function getConfig(cwd) {
         }
         if (Array.isArray(mc.jailPaths)) {
           for (const jp of mc.jailPaths) {
-            const path20 = typeof jp?.path === "string" ? jp.path.trim() : "";
-            if (!path20) continue;
+            const path26 = typeof jp?.path === "string" ? jp.path.trim() : "";
+            if (!path26) continue;
             const verdict = jp?.verdict === "review" ? "review" : "block";
-            for (const r of pathRules(path20, verdict, "org-managed jail")) {
+            for (const r of pathRules(path26, verdict, "org-managed jail")) {
               mergedPolicy.smartRules.push({ ...r, name: `org:${r.name}` });
             }
-            mergedPolicy.managedJailPaths.push({ path: path20, verdict });
+            mergedPolicy.managedJailPaths.push({ path: path26, verdict });
           }
         }
         if (Array.isArray(mc.trustedHosts)) {
           mergedPolicy.trustedHostsManaged = true;
-          mergedPolicy.trustedHosts = mc.trustedHosts.filter((h) => typeof h === "string").map((h) => normalizeHost(h));
+          mergedPolicy.trustedHosts = mc.trustedHosts.filter((h) => typeof h === "string").map((h) => normalizeHost2(h));
         }
         if (mc.appPermissions && typeof mc.appPermissions === "object" && !Array.isArray(mc.appPermissions)) {
           const coerced = {};
@@ -12598,7 +13386,7 @@ function getConfig(cwd) {
           );
         }
         const on = (v) => !!v && typeof v === "object" && v.enabled === true;
-        cloudMandatesEnforcement = cloudMandatesAppPerm || Array.isArray(mc.jailPaths) && mc.jailPaths.some((jp) => typeof jp?.path === "string" && jp.path.trim() !== "") || on(mc.egress) || on(mc.dlp) || on(mc.injectionScan) || on(mc.skillPinning) || on(mc.loopDetection) || !!mc.commandChecks && typeof mc.commandChecks === "object" && Object.values(mc.commandChecks).some(
+        cloudMandatesEnforcement = cloudMandatesAppPerm || Array.isArray(mc.jailPaths) && mc.jailPaths.some((jp) => typeof jp?.path === "string" && jp.path.trim() !== "") || on(mc.egress) || on(mc.dlp) || on(mc.injectionScan) || on(mc.untrustedContent) || on(mc.skillPinning) || on(mc.loopDetection) || !!mc.commandChecks && typeof mc.commandChecks === "object" && Object.values(mc.commandChecks).some(
           (v) => typeof v === "string" && v !== "off"
         );
       }
@@ -12834,6 +13622,37 @@ ${error.replace("Invalid config:\n", "")}
   }
   return sanitized;
 }
+function applyUntrustedContent(cur, raw, replaceLists = false, isProject = false) {
+  if (!raw || typeof raw !== "object") return;
+  const uc = raw;
+  const AFTER_RANK = { "log-only": 0, "ask-once": 1, "ask-every-time": 2 };
+  if (typeof uc.enabled === "boolean" && !(isProject && uc.enabled === false))
+    cur.enabled = uc.enabled;
+  if (typeof uc.spotlight === "boolean" && !(isProject && uc.spotlight === false))
+    cur.spotlight = uc.spotlight;
+  if ((uc.afterExposure === "ask-once" || uc.afterExposure === "ask-every-time" || uc.afterExposure === "log-only") && !(isProject && AFTER_RANK[uc.afterExposure] < AFTER_RANK[cur.afterExposure]))
+    cur.afterExposure = uc.afterExposure;
+  if (Array.isArray(uc.orgDomains) && !isProject) {
+    const domains = uc.orgDomains.filter((d) => typeof d === "string").map((d) => d.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/^@/, "")).filter((d) => /^[a-z0-9.-]+\.[a-z]{2,}$/.test(d));
+    if (replaceLists) cur.orgDomains = domains;
+    else for (const d of domains) if (!cur.orgDomains.includes(d)) cur.orgDomains.push(d);
+  }
+  if (uc.roles && typeof uc.roles === "object" && !Array.isArray(uc.roles)) {
+    const next = replaceLists ? {} : cur.roles;
+    for (const [server, tools] of Object.entries(uc.roles)) {
+      if (!tools || typeof tools !== "object" || Array.isArray(tools)) continue;
+      const m = { ...next[server] ?? {} };
+      for (const [tool, role] of Object.entries(tools)) {
+        if (role === "source" || role === "action" || role === "read") {
+          if (isProject && role !== "action") continue;
+          m[tool] = role;
+        }
+      }
+      if (Object.keys(m).length > 0) next[server] = m;
+    }
+    cur.roles = next;
+  }
+}
 
 // src/utils/regex.ts
 init_dist();
@@ -12994,9 +13813,9 @@ var SUSPECT_PREFIXES = ["/tmp", "/var/tmp", "/dev/shm"];
 function findInPath(cmd) {
   if (path7.posix.isAbsolute(cmd)) return cmd;
   const pathEnv = process.env.PATH ?? "";
-  for (const dir of pathEnv.split(path7.delimiter)) {
-    if (!dir) continue;
-    const full = path7.join(dir, cmd);
+  for (const dir2 of pathEnv.split(path7.delimiter)) {
+    if (!dir2) continue;
+    const full = path7.join(dir2, cmd);
     try {
       fs7.accessSync(full, fs7.constants.X_OK);
       return full;
@@ -13097,7 +13916,7 @@ async function evaluatePolicy2(toolName, args, agent, cwd, opts) {
       // config; changes arrive via cloud sync). Unmanaged → the local file via
       // getCachedHosts (5s TTL + mtime), so a `node9 trust add/remove` still
       // reaches a long-lived in-process authorizer (the gateway) within seconds.
-      isTrustedHost: config.policy.trustedHostsManaged ? (host) => matchesTrustedHost(host, config.policy.trustedHosts) : isTrustedHost
+      isTrustedHost: config.policy.trustedHostsManaged ? (host2) => matchesTrustedHost(host2, config.policy.trustedHosts) : isTrustedHost
     }
   );
 }
@@ -13115,8 +13934,8 @@ import fs8 from "fs";
 import path8 from "path";
 import { randomUUID } from "crypto";
 function atomicWriteSync(filePath, data, options) {
-  const dir = path8.dirname(filePath);
-  if (!fs8.existsSync(dir)) fs8.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+  const dir2 = path8.dirname(filePath);
+  if (!fs8.existsSync(dir2)) fs8.mkdirSync(dir2, { recursive: true });
   const tmpPath = `${filePath}.${randomUUID()}.tmp`;
   try {
     fs8.writeFileSync(tmpPath, data, options);
@@ -13215,9 +14034,9 @@ function writeTrustSession(toolName, durationMs, args) {
 }
 function getPersistentDecision(toolName) {
   try {
-    const file = path9.join(os7.homedir(), ".node9", "decisions.json");
-    if (!fs9.existsSync(file)) return null;
-    const decisions = JSON.parse(fs9.readFileSync(file, "utf-8"));
+    const file2 = path9.join(os7.homedir(), ".node9", "decisions.json");
+    if (!fs9.existsSync(file2)) return null;
+    const decisions = JSON.parse(fs9.readFileSync(file2, "utf-8"));
     const d = decisions[toolName];
     if (d === "allow" || d === "deny") return d;
   } catch {
@@ -13327,7 +14146,7 @@ async function daemonHasInteractiveApprover(timeoutMs = 400) {
     return false;
   }
 }
-async function registerDaemonEntry(toolName, args, meta, riskMetadata, activityId, cwd, recoveryCommand, skipBackgroundAuth, viewOnly, localSmartRuleMatched, socketActivitySent) {
+async function registerDaemonEntry(toolName, args, meta, riskMetadata, activityId, cwd, recoveryCommand, skipBackgroundAuth, viewOnly, localSmartRuleMatched, socketActivitySent, sessionId) {
   const base2 = `http://${DAEMON_HOST}:${DAEMON_PORT}`;
   const ctrl = new AbortController();
   const timer = setTimeout(() => ctrl.abort(), 5e3);
@@ -13352,7 +14171,8 @@ async function registerDaemonEntry(toolName, args, meta, riskMetadata, activityI
         ...recoveryCommand && { recoveryCommand },
         ...skipBackgroundAuth && { skipBackgroundAuth: true },
         ...viewOnly && { viewOnly: true },
-        ...localSmartRuleMatched && { localSmartRuleMatched: true }
+        ...localSmartRuleMatched && { localSmartRuleMatched: true },
+        ...sessionId && { sessionId }
       }),
       signal: ctrl.signal
     });
@@ -13451,7 +14271,7 @@ async function checkSessionTaint(sessionId) {
   try {
     const res = await fetch(`${base2}/session-taint/check`, {
       method: "POST",
-      headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+      headers: exposureHeaders(),
       body: JSON.stringify({ sessionId }),
       signal: AbortSignal.timeout(2e3)
     });
@@ -13460,6 +14280,42 @@ async function checkSessionTaint(sessionId) {
     return { tainted: false, daemonUnavailable: true };
   }
 }
+function exposureHeaders() {
+  return {
+    "Content-Type": "application/json",
+    "X-Node9-Internal": getInternalToken() ?? ""
+  };
+}
+async function exposurePost(route, body, timeoutMs) {
+  const base2 = `http://${DAEMON_HOST}:${DAEMON_PORT}`;
+  const res = await fetch(`${base2}${route}`, {
+    method: "POST",
+    headers: exposureHeaders(),
+    body: JSON.stringify(body),
+    signal: AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs)
+  });
+  if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`session-exposure ${route}: HTTP ${res.status}`);
+  return res.json();
+}
+async function checkSessionExposure(sessionId) {
+  if (!sessionId || !isDaemonRunning()) return { exposed: false };
+  try {
+    return await exposurePost(
+      "/session-exposure/check",
+      { sessionId },
+      2e3
+    );
+  } catch {
+    return { exposed: false, daemonUnavailable: true };
+  }
+}
+async function approveSessionExposure(sessionId, keys) {
+  if (!sessionId || keys.length === 0 || !isDaemonRunning()) return;
+  try {
+    await exposurePost("/session-exposure/approve", { sessionId, keys }, 1e3);
+  } catch {
+  }
+}
 async function resolveViaDaemon(id, decision, internalToken, source) {
   const base2 = `http://${DAEMON_HOST}:${DAEMON_PORT}`;
   await fetch(`${base2}/resolve/${id}`, {
@@ -13472,6 +14328,7 @@ async function resolveViaDaemon(id, decision, internalToken, source) {
 
 // src/auth/orchestrator.ts
 import { randomUUID as randomUUID2 } from "crypto";
+import os18 from "os";
 
 // src/ui/native.ts
 import { spawn } from "child_process";
@@ -13591,6 +14448,7 @@ function resolveNativeDecision(opts) {
   const { code, output, elapsedMs, locked } = opts;
   if (locked) return "deny";
   const tooFast = elapsedMs < MIN_INTERACTION_MS;
+  if (output.includes("Allow & trust")) return tooFast ? "deny" : "trust_recipients";
   if (output.includes("Always Allow")) return tooFast ? "deny" : "always_allow";
   if (code === 0) return tooFast ? "deny" : "allow";
   return "deny";
@@ -13613,12 +14471,12 @@ function formatArgs(args, matchedField, matchedWord) {
   if (typeof parsed === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed)) {
     const obj = parsed;
     if (obj.old_string !== void 0 && obj.new_string !== void 0) {
-      const file = obj.file_path ? path12.basename(String(obj.file_path)) : "file";
+      const file2 = obj.file_path ? path12.basename(String(obj.file_path)) : "file";
       const oldPreview = smartTruncate(String(obj.old_string), 120);
       const newPreview = extractContext(String(obj.new_string), matchedWord).snippet;
       return {
         intent: "EDIT",
-        message: `\u{1F4DD} EDITING: ${file}
+        message: `\u{1F4DD} EDITING: ${file2}
 \u{1F4C2} PATH: ${obj.file_path}
 
 --- REPLACING ---
@@ -13676,7 +14534,7 @@ ${smartTruncate(str, 500)}`
 function escapePango(text) {
   return text.replace(/&/g, "&amp;").replace(/</g, "&lt;").replace(/>/g, "&gt;");
 }
-function buildPlainMessage(toolName, formattedArgs, agent, explainableLabel, locked, allowCount = 1, ruleDescription) {
+function buildPlainMessage(toolName, formattedArgs, agent, explainableLabel, locked, allowCount = 1, ruleDescription, exposure = false) {
   const lines = [];
   if (locked) lines.push("\u26A0\uFE0F  LOCKED BY ADMIN POLICY\n");
   const safeAgent = safeMessage(agent ?? "AI Agent", 80);
@@ -13685,17 +14543,19 @@ function buildPlainMessage(toolName, formattedArgs, agent, explainableLabel, loc
   if (ruleDescription) lines.push(`\u2139  ${ruleDescription}`);
   lines.push("");
   lines.push(formattedArgs);
-  if (allowCount >= 3) {
+  if (allowCount >= 3 && !exposure) {
     lines.push("");
     lines.push(`\u{1F4A1} Approved ${allowCount - 1}\xD7 before \u2014 "Always Allow" creates a permanent rule`);
   }
   if (!locked) {
     lines.push("");
-    lines.push('\u21B5 Enter = Allow \u21B5   |   \u238B Esc = Block \u238B   |   "Always Allow" = never ask again');
+    lines.push(
+      exposure ? '\u21B5 Enter = Allow once   |   \u238B Esc = Block   |   "Allow & trust" = this address is fine from now on' : '\u21B5 Enter = Allow \u21B5   |   \u238B Esc = Block \u238B   |   "Always Allow" = never ask again'
+    );
   }
   return lines.join("\n");
 }
-function buildPangoMessage(toolName, formattedArgs, agent, explainableLabel, locked, allowCount = 1, ruleDescription) {
+function buildPangoMessage(toolName, formattedArgs, agent, explainableLabel, locked, allowCount = 1, ruleDescription, exposure = false) {
   const lines = [];
   if (locked) {
     lines.push('<span foreground="red" weight="bold">\u26A0\uFE0F  LOCKED BY ADMIN POLICY</span>');
@@ -13708,7 +14568,7 @@ function buildPangoMessage(toolName, formattedArgs, agent, explainableLabel, loc
   if (ruleDescription) lines.push(`<i>\u2139  ${escapePango(ruleDescription)}</i>`);
   lines.push("");
   lines.push(`<tt>${escapePango(formattedArgs)}</tt>`);
-  if (allowCount >= 3) {
+  if (allowCount >= 3 && !exposure) {
     lines.push("");
     lines.push(
       `<span foreground="#f0c040">\u{1F4A1} Approved ${allowCount - 1}\xD7 before \u2014 "Always Allow" creates a permanent rule</span>`
@@ -13717,13 +14577,14 @@ function buildPangoMessage(toolName, formattedArgs, agent, explainableLabel, loc
   if (!locked) {
     lines.push("");
     lines.push(
-      '<small>\u21B5 Enter = <b>Allow \u21B5</b>   |   \u238B Esc = <b>Block \u238B</b>   |   "Always Allow" = never ask again</small>'
+      exposure ? '<small>\u21B5 Enter = <b>Allow once</b>   |   \u238B Esc = <b>Block</b>   |   "Allow &amp; trust" = this address is fine from now on</small>' : '<small>\u21B5 Enter = <b>Allow \u21B5</b>   |   \u238B Esc = <b>Block \u238B</b>   |   "Always Allow" = never ask again</small>'
     );
   }
   return lines.join("\n");
 }
-async function askNativePopup(toolName, args, agent, explainableLabel, locked = false, signal, matchedField, matchedWord, allowCount = 1, ruleDescription) {
+async function askNativePopup(toolName, args, agent, explainableLabel, locked = false, signal, matchedField, matchedWord, allowCount = 1, ruleDescription, exposureDestinations = []) {
   if (isTestEnv()) return "deny";
+  const thirdButton = exposureDestinations.length > 0 ? "Allow & trust" : "Always Allow";
   const { message: formattedArgs, intent } = formatArgs(args, matchedField, matchedWord);
   const intentLabel = intent === "EDIT" ? "Code Edit" : "Action Approval";
   const title = locked ? `\u26A1 Node9 \u2014 Locked` : `\u{1F6E1}\uFE0F Node9 \u2014 ${intentLabel}`;
@@ -13734,7 +14595,8 @@ async function askNativePopup(toolName, args, agent, explainableLabel, locked =
     explainableLabel,
     locked,
     allowCount,
-    ruleDescription
+    ruleDescription,
+    exposureDestinations.length > 0
   );
   return new Promise((resolve) => {
     let childProcess = null;
@@ -13754,7 +14616,7 @@ async function askNativePopup(toolName, args, agent, explainableLabel, locked =
     }
     try {
       if (process.platform === "darwin") {
-        const buttons = locked ? `buttons {"Waiting\u2026"} default button "Waiting\u2026"` : `buttons {"Block \u238B", "Always Allow", "Allow \u21B5"} default button "Allow \u21B5" cancel button "Block \u238B"`;
+        const buttons = locked ? `buttons {"Waiting\u2026"} default button "Waiting\u2026"` : `buttons {"Block \u238B", "${thirdButton}", "Allow \u21B5"} default button "Allow \u21B5" cancel button "Block \u238B"`;
         const script = `on run argv
 tell application "System Events"
 activate
@@ -13770,7 +14632,8 @@ end run`;
           explainableLabel,
           locked,
           allowCount,
-          ruleDescription
+          ruleDescription,
+          exposureDestinations.length > 0
         );
         const argsList = [
           locked ? "--info" : "--question",
@@ -13785,7 +14648,7 @@ end run`;
         ];
         if (!locked) {
           argsList.push("--cancel-label", "Block  \u238B");
-          argsList.push("--extra-button", "Always Allow");
+          argsList.push("--extra-button", thirdButton);
         }
         childProcess = spawn("zenity", argsList);
       } else if (process.platform === "win32") {
@@ -13894,31 +14757,452 @@ function canaryValues() {
 init_dist();
 init_dist();
 init_audit();
+init_dist();
 
-// src/auth/cloud.ts
-init_audit();
+// src/exposure/known-hosts.ts
 import fs14 from "fs";
-import os11 from "os";
+import path16 from "path";
+
+// src/utils/git-remotes.ts
+init_dist();
+import fs13 from "fs";
 import path15 from "path";
+function readSmallFile(p, max) {
+  let fd;
+  try {
+    fd = fs13.openSync(p, fs13.constants.O_RDONLY | (fs13.constants.O_NOFOLLOW ?? 0));
+    const st = fs13.fstatSync(fd);
+    if (!st.isFile() || st.size > max) return null;
+    const buf = Buffer.alloc(st.size);
+    const n = fs13.readSync(fd, buf, 0, st.size, 0);
+    return buf.subarray(0, n).toString("utf8");
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  } finally {
+    if (fd !== void 0) fs13.closeSync(fd);
+  }
+}
+function gitRemoteHost(url) {
+  const u = url.trim();
+  if (!u) return null;
+  if (/^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\//i.test(u)) {
+    try {
+      const h = new URL(u).hostname.toLowerCase();
+      return h || null;
+    } catch {
+      return null;
+    }
+  }
+  const scp = /^(?:[^@/\s]+@)?([A-Za-z0-9.-]+):(?!\/\/)/.exec(u);
+  if (scp && scp[1].includes(".")) return scp[1].toLowerCase();
+  return null;
+}
+function findGitConfig(dir2, walkUp = true) {
+  let cur = path15.resolve(dir2);
+  for (let i = 0; i < (walkUp ? 64 : 1); i++) {
+    const dotGit = path15.join(cur, ".git");
+    const direct = readSmallFile(path15.join(dotGit, "config"), 1e6);
+    if (direct !== null) return direct;
+    const pointer = readSmallFile(dotGit, 4096);
+    const m = pointer && /^gitdir:\s*(.+?)\s*$/m.exec(pointer);
+    if (m) {
+      let gitDir = path15.resolve(cur, m[1]);
+      const common = readSmallFile(path15.join(gitDir, "commondir"), 4096);
+      if (common !== null) gitDir = path15.resolve(gitDir, common.trim());
+      return readSmallFile(path15.join(gitDir, "config"), 1e6);
+    }
+    const parent = path15.dirname(cur);
+    if (parent === cur) return null;
+    cur = parent;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+var cache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+function readGitRemotes(dir2, opts = {}) {
+  if (!dir2) return [];
+  const walkUp = opts.walkUp !== false;
+  const key = `${walkUp ? "up" : "at"}:${path15.resolve(dir2)}`;
+  const hit = cache.get(key);
+  if (hit) return hit;
+  const out = [];
+  try {
+    const cfg = findGitConfig(path15.resolve(dir2), walkUp);
+    if (cfg !== null) {
+      let current = null;
+      for (const line of cfg.split(/\r?\n/)) {
+        const sec = /^\s*\[\s*([^\]\s]+)(?:\s+"([^"]*)")?\s*\]/.exec(line);
+        if (sec) {
+          current = sec[1].toLowerCase() === "remote" && sec[2] ? { name: sec[2], urls: [], hosts: [], repos: [] } : null;
+          if (current) out.push(current);
+          continue;
+        }
+        const url = current && /^\s*(?:push)?url\s*=\s*(.+?)\s*$/i.exec(line);
+        if (url && current) {
+          current.urls.push(url[1]);
+          const h = gitRemoteHost(url[1]);
+          if (h && !current.hosts.includes(`host:${h}`)) current.hosts.push(`host:${h}`);
+          const repo = gitRepoPath(url[1]);
+          if (repo && !current.repos.includes(repo)) current.repos.push(repo);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  } catch {
+  }
+  cache.set(key, out);
+  return out;
+}
+
+// src/exposure/known-hosts.ts
+var ECOSYSTEMS = [
+  ["package.json", "host:registry.npmjs.org"],
+  ["pyproject.toml", "host:upload.pypi.org"],
+  ["setup.py", "host:upload.pypi.org"],
+  ["Cargo.toml", "host:crates.io"],
+  ["Gemfile", "host:rubygems.org"]
+];
+var cache2 = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+function manifestRoot(dir2) {
+  let cur = path16.resolve(dir2);
+  for (let i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+    for (const [m] of ECOSYSTEMS) {
+      try {
+        if (fs14.existsSync(path16.join(cur, m))) return cur;
+      } catch {
+      }
+    }
+    const parent = path16.dirname(cur);
+    if (parent === cur) return null;
+    cur = parent;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+function knownProjectHosts(dir2) {
+  const empty = { hosts: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(), repos: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(), remotes: /* @__PURE__ */ new Map() };
+  if (!dir2) return empty;
+  const key = path16.resolve(dir2);
+  const hit = cache2.get(key);
+  if (hit) return hit;
+  const out = { hosts: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(), repos: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(), remotes: /* @__PURE__ */ new Map() };
+  try {
+    for (const r of readGitRemotes(key)) {
+      out.remotes.set(r.name, r.hosts);
+      for (const h of r.hosts) out.hosts.add(h);
+      for (const repo of r.repos) out.repos.add(repo);
+    }
+    const root = manifestRoot(key);
+    if (root !== null) {
+      for (const [m, registry] of ECOSYSTEMS) {
+        if (fs14.existsSync(path16.join(root, m))) out.hosts.add(registry);
+      }
+      try {
+        if (fs14.readdirSync(root).some((f) => f.endsWith(".gemspec")))
+          out.hosts.add("host:rubygems.org");
+      } catch {
+      }
+    }
+  } catch {
+  }
+  cache2.set(key, out);
+  return out;
+}
+
+// src/exposure/writes.ts
+init_dist();
+import fs15 from "fs";
+import os11 from "os";
+import path17 from "path";
+var WRITE_OPS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["write", "create", "remove"]);
+var LIFECYCLE_RE = /"(scripts|preinstall|install|postinstall|prepare|prepublish|prepublishOnly|prepack|postpack|publish|postpublish)"\s*:/;
+function writtenContent(args) {
+  if (!args || typeof args !== "object" || Array.isArray(args)) return [];
+  const a = args;
+  const out = [];
+  for (const k of ["content", "new_string", "new_str", "file_text", "contents"]) {
+    if (typeof a[k] === "string") out.push(a[k]);
+  }
+  if (Array.isArray(a.edits)) {
+    for (const e of a.edits) {
+      if (e && typeof e === "object" && typeof e.new_string === "string")
+        out.push(e.new_string);
+    }
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+function packageScriptsTouched(args, absPath, shellCommand) {
+  if (shellCommand !== null) return true;
+  const a = args ?? {};
+  const texts = [
+    ...writtenContent(args),
+    ...typeof a.old_string === "string" ? [a.old_string] : [],
+    ...Array.isArray(a.edits) ? a.edits.map((e) => String(e?.old_string ?? "")) : []
+  ];
+  if (typeof a.content === "string") {
+    try {
+      const next = JSON.parse(a.content);
+      const prev = JSON.parse(fs15.readFileSync(absPath, "utf8"));
+      return JSON.stringify(next.scripts ?? null) !== JSON.stringify(prev.scripts ?? null);
+    } catch {
+      return LIFECYCLE_RE.test(a.content);
+    }
+  }
+  return texts.some((t) => LIFECYCLE_RE.test(t));
+}
+function judgeWritesAfterExposure(opts) {
+  const holds = [];
+  const home = opts.home ?? os11.homedir();
+  const tmp = normalizeFilePath(os11.tmpdir());
+  const root = opts.cwd ? normalizeFilePath(opts.cwd, "", home) : null;
+  const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  for (const access of opts.accesses) {
+    if (!WRITE_OPS.has(access.operation)) continue;
+    const p = access.candidates?.[0] ?? normalizeFilePath(access.path, access.cwd ?? opts.cwd ?? "", home);
+    if (seen.has(p)) continue;
+    seen.add(p);
+    if (p === "/dev" || p.startsWith("/dev/")) continue;
+    if (root !== null && isInside(root, p)) {
+      if (isAgentInstructionPath(p, root) && (path17.basename(p) !== "package.json" || packageScriptsTouched(opts.args, p, opts.shellCommand)))
+        holds.push({ path: p, why: "agent-instruction" });
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (isInside(tmp, p) && !(root !== null && isInside(tmp, root))) continue;
+    holds.push({ path: p, why: "outside-project" });
+  }
+  const texts = opts.shellCommand !== null ? [opts.shellCommand] : writtenContent(opts.args);
+  if (texts.length > 0 && opts.inContent.size > 0) {
+    for (const d of extractContentDestinations(texts.join("\n"))) {
+      if (opts.inContent.has(d) && !opts.isKnown(d)) {
+        const target = [...seen][0] ?? "";
+        if (!holds.some((h) => h.why === "content-destination" && h.destination === d))
+          holds.push({ path: target, why: "content-destination", destination: d });
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return holds;
+}
+
+// src/exposure/marker.ts
+import crypto3 from "crypto";
+import fs16 from "fs";
+import os12 from "os";
+import path18 from "path";
+
+// src/daemon/exposure-store.ts
+var SESSION_EXPOSURE_TTL_MS = 4 * 60 * 60 * 1e3;
+
+// src/exposure/marker.ts
+function dir() {
+  return path18.join(os12.homedir(), ".node9", "exposure-sessions");
+}
+function file(sessionId) {
+  const id = crypto3.createHash("sha256").update(sessionId).digest("hex").slice(0, 32);
+  return path18.join(dir(), id);
+}
+function maybeSessionExposed(sessionId) {
+  if (!sessionId) return false;
+  try {
+    const st = fs16.statSync(file(sessionId));
+    return Date.now() - st.mtimeMs < SESSION_EXPOSURE_TTL_MS;
+  } catch (e) {
+    return e.code !== "ENOENT";
+  }
+}
+
+// src/exposure/roles.ts
+import fs18 from "fs";
+
+// src/daemon/mcp-tools.ts
+import fs17 from "fs";
+import path19 from "path";
+import os13 from "os";
+function getMcpToolsFile() {
+  return path19.join(os13.homedir(), ".node9", "mcp-tools.json");
+}
+function readMcpToolsConfig() {
+  try {
+    const file2 = getMcpToolsFile();
+    if (!fs17.existsSync(file2)) return {};
+    const raw = fs17.readFileSync(file2, "utf-8");
+    return JSON.parse(raw);
+  } catch {
+    return {};
+  }
+}
+
+// src/exposure/roles.ts
+var EXPOSURE_LABEL = "\u{1F6E1}\uFE0F Node9 Exposure";
+var AGENT_INTERNAL_PREFIXES = ["ccd_", "visualize"];
+function foldServerName(name) {
+  return name.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9_-]/g, "_").toLowerCase();
+}
+var inventoryCache = null;
+var inventoryStamp = null;
+function inventoryFileStamp() {
+  try {
+    const st = fs18.statSync(getMcpToolsFile());
+    return `${st.mtimeMs}:${st.size}`;
+  } catch {
+    return "";
+  }
+}
+function resolveToolAnnotations(server, tool) {
+  const stamp = inventoryFileStamp();
+  if (inventoryCache === null || stamp !== inventoryStamp) {
+    inventoryStamp = stamp;
+    inventoryCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+    try {
+      const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+      for (const cfg of Object.values(readMcpToolsConfig())) {
+        if (!cfg?.name) continue;
+        const key = foldServerName(cfg.name);
+        seen.set(key, (seen.get(key) ?? 0) + 1);
+        const tools = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+        for (const t of cfg.tools ?? []) tools.set(t.name, t.annotations ?? null);
+        inventoryCache.set(key, tools);
+      }
+      for (const [key, n] of seen) if (n > 1) inventoryCache.delete(key);
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
+  return inventoryCache.get(foldServerName(server))?.get(tool) ?? null;
+}
+var BUILTIN_SOURCES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+  "webfetch",
+  "websearch",
+  "web_fetch",
+  "web_search",
+  "fetch",
+  "navigate",
+  "browser_batch",
+  "get_page_text",
+  "read_page",
+  "find",
+  "read_console_messages",
+  "read_network_requests",
+  // Claude Code reads MCP resources through two built-ins, not through the
+  // server's own tools: an email read as a resource is still an email.
+  "readmcpresourcetool",
+  "listmcpresourcestool"
+]);
+var MCP_RE = /^mcp__([^_](?:[^_]|_(?!_))*?)__(.+)$/i;
+function splitMcpToolName(toolName) {
+  const m = toolName.match(MCP_RE);
+  return m ? { server: m[1], bare: m[2] } : null;
+}
+function toolRole(toolName, policy) {
+  const mcp = splitMcpToolName(toolName);
+  const bare = (mcp ? mcp.bare : toolName).toLowerCase();
+  if (mcp) {
+    const configured = policy.roles[mcp.server]?.[mcp.bare] ?? policy.roles[mcp.server]?.[bare];
+    if (configured === "source") return { source: true, action: false };
+    if (configured === "action") return { source: false, action: true };
+    if (configured === "read") return { source: false, action: false };
+    const serverLower = mcp.server.toLowerCase();
+    if (AGENT_INTERNAL_PREFIXES.some((p) => serverLower.startsWith(p)))
+      return { source: false, action: false };
+    if (BUILTIN_SOURCES.has(bare)) return { source: true, action: false };
+    const ann = resolveToolAnnotations(mcp.server, mcp.bare);
+    return { source: true, action: true, destructive: ann?.destructiveHint === true };
+  }
+  return { source: BUILTIN_SOURCES.has(bare), action: false };
+}
+function sourceWord(toolName) {
+  const mcp = splitMcpToolName(toolName);
+  const bare = (mcp ? mcp.bare : toolName).toLowerCase();
+  const server = (mcp?.server ?? "").toLowerCase();
+  if (/mail|message|inbox|thread/.test(bare) || /mail|slack|teams|chat/.test(server))
+    return "email";
+  if (/issue|ticket|pull|pr\b|comment/.test(bare) || /github|gitlab|jira|linear/.test(server))
+    return "issue";
+  if (BUILTIN_SOURCES.has(bare) || /browser|web|http|search/.test(server)) return "web page";
+  return "tool result";
+}
+
+// src/auth/trusted-recipients.ts
+init_dist();
+import fs19 from "fs";
+import path20 from "path";
+import os14 from "os";
+function getTrustedRecipientsPath() {
+  return path20.join(os14.homedir(), ".node9", "trusted-recipients.json");
+}
+function readTrustedRecipients() {
+  try {
+    const raw = fs19.readFileSync(getTrustedRecipientsPath(), "utf8");
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+    return Array.isArray(parsed.entries) ? parsed.entries.filter((e) => e && typeof e.value === "string") : [];
+  } catch {
+    return [];
+  }
+}
+function writeTrustedRecipients(entries) {
+  const filePath = getTrustedRecipientsPath();
+  fs19.mkdirSync(path20.dirname(filePath), { recursive: true });
+  const tmp = filePath + ".node9-tmp";
+  fs19.writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify({ entries }, null, 2), { mode: 384 });
+  fs19.renameSync(tmp, filePath);
+}
+function normalizeRecipient(raw) {
+  const v = raw.trim();
+  if (!v) return null;
+  if (/^(email|host|iban):/i.test(v)) {
+    const i = v.indexOf(":");
+    const kind = v.slice(0, i).toLowerCase();
+    const inner = normalizeRecipient(v.slice(i + 1));
+    return inner && inner.startsWith(`${kind}:`) ? inner : null;
+  }
+  const found = extractArgDestinations({ to: v });
+  return found.length === 1 ? found[0] : null;
+}
+function addTrustedRecipient(raw, addedBy = "user") {
+  const value = normalizeRecipient(raw);
+  if (!value) return null;
+  const entries = readTrustedRecipients();
+  if (!entries.some((e) => e.value === value)) {
+    entries.push({ value, addedAt: Date.now(), addedBy });
+    writeTrustedRecipients(entries);
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+var cache3 = null;
+function mtimeOf() {
+  try {
+    return fs19.statSync(getTrustedRecipientsPath()).mtimeMs;
+  } catch {
+    return 0;
+  }
+}
+function isTrustedRecipient(value) {
+  const mtime = mtimeOf();
+  if (!cache3 || cache3.mtime !== mtime) {
+    cache3 = { mtime, values: new Set(readTrustedRecipients().map((e) => e.value)) };
+  }
+  return cache3.values.has(value);
+}
+
+// src/auth/cloud.ts
+init_audit();
+import fs21 from "fs";
+import os15 from "os";
+import path21 from "path";
 
 // src/utils/read-capped.ts
-import fs13 from "fs";
-function readCapped(file, maxBytes) {
+import fs20 from "fs";
+function readCapped(file2, maxBytes) {
   if (maxBytes < 0) return null;
   let fd;
   try {
-    fd = fs13.openSync(file, "r");
+    fd = fs20.openSync(file2, "r");
   } catch {
     return null;
   }
   try {
-    const st = fs13.fstatSync(fd);
+    const st = fs20.fstatSync(fd);
     if (!st.isFile()) return null;
     const want = Math.min(st.size, maxBytes + 1);
     const buf = Buffer.alloc(want);
     let read = 0;
     while (read < want) {
-      const n = fs13.readSync(fd, buf, read, want - read, read);
+      const n = fs20.readSync(fd, buf, read, want - read, read);
       if (n <= 0) break;
       read += n;
     }
@@ -13930,13 +15214,13 @@ function readCapped(file, maxBytes) {
     return null;
   } finally {
     try {
-      fs13.closeSync(fd);
+      fs20.closeSync(fd);
     } catch {
     }
   }
 }
-function readCappedText(file, maxBytes) {
-  const r = readCapped(file, maxBytes);
+function readCappedText(file2, maxBytes) {
+  const r = readCapped(file2, maxBytes);
   return r ? { text: r.bytes.toString("utf8"), truncated: r.truncated } : null;
 }
 
@@ -13948,7 +15232,7 @@ async function initNode9SaaS(toolName, args, creds, meta, riskMetadata, agentPol
   let ciContext;
   if (process.env.CI) {
     try {
-      const ciContextPath = path15.join(os11.homedir(), ".node9", "ci-context.json");
+      const ciContextPath = path21.join(os15.homedir(), ".node9", "ci-context.json");
       const ci = readCappedText(ciContextPath, 1e4);
       if (!ci) throw new Error("ci-context.json unreadable");
       if (ci.truncated) throw new Error("ci-context.json exceeds 10 KB");
@@ -13985,11 +15269,17 @@ async function initNode9SaaS(toolName, args, creds, meta, riskMetadata, agentPol
         context: {
           agent: meta?.agent,
           mcpServer: meta?.mcpServer,
-          hostname: os11.hostname(),
+          hostname: os15.hostname(),
           cwd: process.cwd(),
-          platform: os11.platform()
+          platform: os15.platform()
+        },
+        // Local-only fields (fw#318 exposureDestinations) stay off the wire:
+        // the SaaS validates riskMetadata strictly and would drop it whole.
+        ...riskMetadata && {
+          riskMetadata: Object.fromEntries(
+            Object.entries(riskMetadata).filter(([, v]) => !Array.isArray(v))
+          )
         },
-        ...riskMetadata && { riskMetadata },
         ...ciContext && { ciContext },
         ...agentPolicy && { policy: agentPolicy },
         ...forceReview && { forceReview: true }
@@ -14051,14 +15341,14 @@ async function resolveNode9SaaS(requestId, creds, approved, decidedBy) {
     });
     clearTimeout(timer);
     if (!res.ok) {
-      fs14.appendFileSync(
+      fs21.appendFileSync(
         HOOK_DEBUG_LOG,
         `[resolve-cloud] PATCH ${safeMessage(resolveUrl, 200)} \u2192 HTTP ${res.status}
 `
       );
     }
   } catch (err) {
-    fs14.appendFileSync(
+    fs21.appendFileSync(
       HOOK_DEBUG_LOG,
       `[resolve-cloud] PATCH failed for ${safeMessage(requestId, 64)}: ${safeMessage(err)}
 `
@@ -14069,16 +15359,16 @@ async function resolveNode9SaaS(requestId, creds, approved, decidedBy) {
 // src/loop-detector.ts
 init_dist();
 init_dist();
-import fs15 from "fs";
-import path16 from "path";
-import os12 from "os";
+import fs22 from "fs";
+import path22 from "path";
+import os16 from "os";
 function loopStateFile() {
-  return path16.join(os12.homedir(), ".node9", "loop-state.json");
+  return path22.join(os16.homedir(), ".node9", "loop-state.json");
 }
 function readState() {
   try {
-    if (!fs15.existsSync(loopStateFile())) return [];
-    const raw = fs15.readFileSync(loopStateFile(), "utf-8");
+    if (!fs22.existsSync(loopStateFile())) return [];
+    const raw = fs22.readFileSync(loopStateFile(), "utf-8");
     const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
     if (!Array.isArray(parsed)) return [];
     return parsed;
@@ -14087,11 +15377,11 @@ function readState() {
   }
 }
 function writeState(records) {
-  const dir = path16.dirname(loopStateFile());
-  if (!fs15.existsSync(dir)) fs15.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
-  const tmpPath = `${loopStateFile()}.${os12.hostname()}.${process.pid}.tmp`;
-  fs15.writeFileSync(tmpPath, JSON.stringify(records));
-  fs15.renameSync(tmpPath, loopStateFile());
+  const dir2 = path22.dirname(loopStateFile());
+  if (!fs22.existsSync(dir2)) fs22.mkdirSync(dir2, { recursive: true });
+  const tmpPath = `${loopStateFile()}.${os16.hostname()}.${process.pid}.tmp`;
+  fs22.writeFileSync(tmpPath, JSON.stringify(records));
+  fs22.renameSync(tmpPath, loopStateFile());
 }
 function recordAndCheck(tool, args, threshold = 3, windowMs = 12e4) {
   try {
@@ -14106,20 +15396,20 @@ function recordAndCheck(tool, args, threshold = 3, windowMs = 12e4) {
 // src/supply-chain/check.ts
 init_dist();
 import picomatch2 from "picomatch";
-import path19 from "path";
+import path25 from "path";
 
 // src/supply-chain/osv-index.ts
 init_dist();
-import fs16 from "fs";
-import os13 from "os";
-import path17 from "path";
+import fs23 from "fs";
+import os17 from "os";
+import path23 from "path";
 import { createHash as createHash3 } from "crypto";
 var INDEX_FRESH_MS = 72 * 60 * 60 * 1e3;
 function osvRoot() {
-  return path17.join(os13.homedir(), ".node9", "osv");
+  return path23.join(os17.homedir(), ".node9", "osv");
 }
 function ecoDir(eco) {
-  return path17.join(osvRoot(), eco);
+  return path23.join(osvRoot(), eco);
 }
 function indexKey(eco, name) {
   return eco === "PyPI" ? normalizePyPiName(name) : name.toLowerCase();
@@ -14128,11 +15418,11 @@ function shardOf(key) {
   return createHash3("sha1").update(key).digest("hex").slice(0, 2);
 }
 function shardPath(eco, shard) {
-  return path17.join(ecoDir(eco), "shards", `${shard}.json`);
+  return path23.join(ecoDir(eco), "shards", `${shard}.json`);
 }
 function readMeta(eco) {
   try {
-    const m = JSON.parse(fs16.readFileSync(path17.join(ecoDir(eco), "meta.json"), "utf8"));
+    const m = JSON.parse(fs23.readFileSync(path23.join(ecoDir(eco), "meta.json"), "utf8"));
     if (typeof m?.syncedAt !== "string" || typeof m?.lastModifiedMs !== "number") return null;
     return m;
   } catch {
@@ -14141,7 +15431,7 @@ function readMeta(eco) {
 }
 function readShard(eco, shard) {
   try {
-    const s = JSON.parse(fs16.readFileSync(shardPath(eco, shard), "utf8"));
+    const s = JSON.parse(fs23.readFileSync(shardPath(eco, shard), "utf8"));
     return s && typeof s === "object" && !Array.isArray(s) ? s : {};
   } catch {
     return {};
@@ -14338,19 +15628,19 @@ async function registryInfo(eco, name, version, freshWindowMs, raw) {
 }
 
 // src/supply-chain/local-resolve.ts
-import fs17 from "fs";
-import path18 from "path";
+import fs24 from "fs";
+import path24 from "path";
 var MAX_LEVELS = 32;
 var LOCAL_FIRST_MANAGERS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["npx", "bunx", "npm exec"]);
 function resolveInstalled(name, cwd) {
-  if (!cwd || !path18.isAbsolute(cwd)) return null;
+  if (!cwd || !path24.isAbsolute(cwd)) return null;
   if (!/^(?:@[^/\\]+\/)?[^/\\]+$/.test(name)) return null;
-  let dir = path18.resolve(cwd);
+  let dir2 = path24.resolve(cwd);
   for (let i = 0; i < MAX_LEVELS; i++) {
-    const pkgDir = path18.join(dir, "node_modules", ...name.split("/"));
-    const manifest = path18.join(pkgDir, "package.json");
+    const pkgDir = path24.join(dir2, "node_modules", ...name.split("/"));
+    const manifest = path24.join(pkgDir, "package.json");
     try {
-      const raw = fs17.readFileSync(manifest, "utf8");
+      const raw = fs24.readFileSync(manifest, "utf8");
       const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
       if (typeof parsed.version === "string" && parsed.version.length > 0) {
         return { version: parsed.version, dir: pkgDir };
@@ -14358,9 +15648,9 @@ function resolveInstalled(name, cwd) {
       return null;
     } catch {
     }
-    const parent = path18.dirname(dir);
-    if (parent === dir) break;
-    dir = parent;
+    const parent = path24.dirname(dir2);
+    if (parent === dir2) break;
+    dir2 = parent;
   }
   return null;
 }
@@ -14455,7 +15745,7 @@ function checkInstalled(p, version, misses) {
 }
 async function checkOne(p, cfg, misses, networkCapped, cwd) {
   if (p.ecosystem === "npm" && LOCAL_FIRST_MANAGERS.has(p.manager) && p.localCwd !== null && (p.raw === p.name || p.version)) {
-    const localCwd = cwd && path19.isAbsolute(cwd) ? (p.localCwd ?? []).reduce((dir, step) => path19.resolve(dir, step), cwd) : void 0;
+    const localCwd = cwd && path25.isAbsolute(cwd) ? (p.localCwd ?? []).reduce((dir2, step) => path25.resolve(dir2, step), cwd) : void 0;
     const installed = resolveInstalled(p.name, localCwd);
     if (installed && (!p.version || p.version === installed.version))
       return checkInstalled(p, installed.version, misses);
@@ -14590,6 +15880,9 @@ function isWriteTool(toolName) {
   const t = toolName.toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z_]/g, "_");
   return WRITE_TOOLS.has(t);
 }
+function isMcpToolName(toolName) {
+  return /^mcp__[^_](?:[^_]|_(?!_))*?__/i.test(toolName);
+}
 function extractFilePaths(toolName, args, shellCommand) {
   const paths = [];
   if (!args || typeof args !== "object" || Array.isArray(args)) return paths;
@@ -14823,13 +16116,165 @@ async function _authorizeHeadlessCore(toolName, args, metaArg, options) {
       }
     }
   }
-  if (!taintWarning && meta?.sessionId && (networkShell || isWriteTool(toolName) || options?.sessionTaintGated === true)) {
+  const mcpHookTool = options?.sessionTaintGated === void 0 && isMcpToolName(toolName);
+  let daemonSaysExposed;
+  if (!taintWarning && meta?.sessionId && (networkShell || isWriteTool(toolName) || options?.sessionTaintGated === true || mcpHookTool)) {
     const sessionTaint = await checkSessionTaint(meta.sessionId);
+    if (typeof sessionTaint.exposed === "boolean") daemonSaysExposed = sessionTaint.exposed;
     if (sessionTaint.tainted && sessionTaint.record) {
-      const kind = isWriteTool(toolName) ? "write" : networkShell ? "network" : "state-changing";
+      const kind = isWriteTool(toolName) ? "write" : networkShell ? "network" : mcpHookTool ? "MCP" : "state-changing";
       taintWarning = `\u26A0\uFE0F node9 flagged this session \u2014 earlier tool output contained ${sessionTaint.record.source}. Approve this ${kind} action before it proceeds.`;
     }
   }
+  let exposureReview = null;
+  let exposureKeys = [];
+  let exposureDestinations = [];
+  const ucPolicy = config.policy.untrustedContent;
+  if (ucPolicy?.enabled && !taintWarning && meta?.sessionId && !isManual) {
+    const role = toolRole(toolName, ucPolicy);
+    const acts = role.action || options?.sessionTaintGated === true;
+    const shellExp = shellInput.kind === "shell" ? classifyShellExposure(shellInput.command) : null;
+    const bareName = splitMcpToolName(toolName)?.bare;
+    const mcpFileWrite = bareName !== void 0 && fileToolOperation(bareName, args) === "write";
+    const writes = (mcpFileWrite ? prepareFileAccesses(bareName, args, options?.cwd, config.policy.toolInspection).accesses : fileAccess.accesses).filter((a) => ["write", "create", "remove"].includes(a.operation));
+    const sendsSomething = acts && !mcpFileWrite || !!shellExp?.sends;
+    const mayBeExposed = daemonSaysExposed ?? (maybeSessionExposed(meta.sessionId) || writes.length > 0 && judgeWritesAfterExposure({
+      accesses: writes,
+      args,
+      shellCommand: shellInput.kind === "shell" ? shellInput.command : null,
+      cwd: options?.cwd,
+      inContent: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(),
+      isKnown: () => true
+    }).length > 0);
+    const judged = sendsSomething || (!!shellExp?.fetches || writes.length > 0) && mayBeExposed;
+    if (judged) {
+      const exposure = await checkSessionExposure(meta.sessionId);
+      if (exposure.exposed && exposure.record) {
+        const rec = exposure.record;
+        const dests = new Set(
+          acts && !shellExp && !mcpFileWrite ? extractArgDestinations(args) : []
+        );
+        const fetchOnly = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+        const projectHosts = shellExp ? knownProjectHosts(options?.cwd) : null;
+        let unknownRemote = false;
+        if (shellExp) {
+          if (shellExp.sends) {
+            for (const d of shellExp.destinations) dests.add(d);
+            for (const name of shellExp.gitRemotes) {
+              const remotes = projectHosts.remotes;
+              const hosts = name === "" ? remotes.get("origin") ?? [...remotes.values()].flat() : remotes.get(name);
+              if (hosts) for (const h of hosts) dests.add(h);
+              else if (projectHosts.remotes.size > 0) unknownRemote = true;
+            }
+          }
+          if (shellExp.fetches) {
+            for (const h of shellExp.fetchDestinations) if (!dests.has(h)) fetchOnly.add(h);
+          }
+        }
+        const inContent = new Set(rec.destinations);
+        const mentioned = new Set(rec.userMentioned);
+        const approved = new Set(rec.approved);
+        const held = [];
+        const logged = [];
+        const writeProjectHosts = projectHosts ?? knownProjectHosts(options?.cwd);
+        const isKnown = (d) => {
+          const domain = destinationDomain(d);
+          const value = destinationValue(d);
+          return domain !== null && ucPolicy.orgDomains.includes(domain) || mentioned.has(d) || isTrustedRecipient(d) || destinationKind(d) === "host" && (isLoopbackHost(value) || isTrustedHost(value) || config.policy.trustedHostsManaged && matchesTrustedHost(value, config.policy.trustedHosts) || config.policy.egress.allow.some((pat) => hostMatches(value, pat)) || writeProjectHosts.hosts.has(d));
+        };
+        const approvedOnce = (key) => ucPolicy.afterExposure === "ask-once" && approved.has(key);
+        const repos = (shellExp?.sends ? shellExp.repos : []).filter(
+          (r) => writeProjectHosts.hosts.has(`host:${r.split("/")[0]}`)
+        );
+        const repoHosts = new Set(repos.map((r) => `host:${r.split("/")[0]}`));
+        for (const r of repos) {
+          if (writeProjectHosts.repos.has(r) || approvedOnce(`${toolName}|repo:${r}`))
+            logged.push(`repo:${r}`);
+          else held.push({ dest: "", why: "repository", repo: r });
+        }
+        for (const d of dests) {
+          if (repoHosts.has(d)) continue;
+          if (approvedOnce(`${toolName}|${d}`) || isKnown(d)) logged.push(d);
+          else if (inContent.has(d)) held.push({ dest: d, why: "appeared in what was read" });
+          else held.push({ dest: d, why: "not known to this session" });
+        }
+        for (const d of fetchOnly) {
+          if (approvedOnce(`${toolName}|${d}`) || isKnown(d) || !inContent.has(d)) logged.push(d);
+          else held.push({ dest: d, why: "appeared in what was read" });
+        }
+        if (shellExp?.sends && (shellExp.unresolved || unknownRemote || shellExp.destinations.length === 0 && shellExp.gitRemotes.length === 0) && !approvedOnce(`${toolName}|unresolved`)) {
+          held.push({ dest: "", why: "unresolved" });
+        }
+        const bare = splitMcpToolName(toolName)?.bare ?? toolName;
+        if (dests.size === 0 && acts && !mcpFileWrite && (role.destructive === true || isDestructiveToolName(bare))) {
+          held.push({ dest: "", why: "destructive" });
+        }
+        const writeHolds = writes.length > 0 ? judgeWritesAfterExposure({
+          accesses: writes,
+          args,
+          shellCommand: shellInput.kind === "shell" ? shellInput.command : null,
+          cwd: options?.cwd,
+          inContent,
+          isKnown
+        }).filter((h) => {
+          const key = `${toolName}|${h.why === "content-destination" ? h.destination : `path:${h.path}`}`;
+          if (ucPolicy.afterExposure === "ask-once" && approved.has(key)) {
+            logged.push(key);
+            return false;
+          }
+          return true;
+        }) : [];
+        const last = rec.sources[rec.sources.length - 1];
+        const readWord = last ? last.word ?? sourceWord(last.tool) : "content";
+        const when = last ? new Date(last.at).toTimeString().slice(0, 5) : "";
+        const read = last ? `${/^[aeiou]/i.test(readWord) ? "an" : "a"} ${readWord}` + (last.server ? ` through ${last.server}` : "") + (when ? ` at ${when}` : "") : "outside content";
+        if ((held.length > 0 || writeHolds.length > 0) && ucPolicy.afterExposure !== "log-only") {
+          const noun = (d) => {
+            const k = destinationKind(d);
+            return k === "email" ? "an address" : k === "host" ? "a host" : "an account";
+          };
+          const parts = held.map(
+            (h) => h.dest ? `sends to ${destinationValue(h.dest)}, ${h.why === "appeared in what was read" ? `${noun(h.dest)} that appeared in that ${last ? readWord : "content"}` : `${noun(h.dest)} this session did not know`}` : h.why === "repository" ? h.repo.endsWith("/*") ? `sends to a repository on ${h.repo.slice(0, -2)} it does not name (a gist, a new repository or an API call)` : `sends to ${h.repo}, a repository that is not one of this project's remotes` : h.why === "unresolved" ? "sends to a destination this session cannot see (built at run time, or a remote of another repository)" : `is ${bare}, a destructive call, with no known destination`
+          );
+          const home = os18.homedir();
+          const short = (p) => p.startsWith(home + "/") ? "~" + p.slice(home.length) : p;
+          for (const w of writeHolds) {
+            parts.push(
+              w.why === "outside-project" ? `writes outside the project, to ${short(w.path)}` : w.why === "agent-instruction" ? `writes to ${short(w.path)}, a file that runs code or instructs the agent` : `writes content carrying ${destinationValue(w.destination ?? "")}, ${noun(w.destination ?? "host:x")} that appeared in that ${readWord}`
+            );
+          }
+          exposureReview = `\u{1F6E1}\uFE0F Node9: this session read ${read}. This call ${parts.join("; and ")}.`;
+          exposureKeys = [
+            ...held.filter((h) => h.dest || h.why === "unresolved" || h.why === "repository").map(
+              (h) => h.why === "repository" ? `${toolName}|repo:${h.repo}` : `${toolName}|${h.dest || "unresolved"}`
+            ),
+            ...writeHolds.map(
+              (w) => `${toolName}|${w.why === "content-destination" ? w.destination : `path:${w.path}`}`
+            )
+          ];
+          exposureDestinations = held.filter((h) => h.dest).map((h) => h.dest).slice(0, 10);
+          if (exposureDestinations.length > 0 && options?.deferReview) {
+            exposureReview += ` To trust ${exposureDestinations.length === 1 ? "this address" : "these addresses"} for good, the user runs: ` + exposureDestinations.map((d) => `node9 trust recipient add ${destinationValue(d)}`).join("; ") + ".";
+          }
+        } else if (held.length > 0 || writeHolds.length > 0 || logged.length > 0) {
+          appendToLog(HOOK_DEBUG_LOG, {
+            ts: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
+            event: "exposure-logged",
+            tool: toolName,
+            held: held.length + writeHolds.length,
+            known: logged.length,
+            sessionId: meta.sessionId
+          });
+        }
+      } else if (exposure.daemonUnavailable) {
+        appendToLog(HOOK_DEBUG_LOG, {
+          ts: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
+          event: "exposure-unavailable",
+          tool: toolName
+        });
+      }
+    }
+  }
   const canaryVals = safeCanaryValues();
   if (canaryVals.length > 0) {
     const canaryHit = matchCanaryArgs(args, canaryVals);
@@ -15070,7 +16515,7 @@ async function _authorizeHeadlessCore(toolName, args, metaArg, options) {
   }
   let appPermReview = null;
   let appPermReviewTool = null;
-  const callSpecificReview = () => fileReview || shellReview || dlpReviewFlagged || !!appPermReview || !!taintWarning || !!packageReview;
+  const callSpecificReview = () => fileReview || shellReview || dlpReviewFlagged || !!appPermReview || !!taintWarning || !!exposureReview || !!packageReview;
   const standingTrustApplies = () => !callSpecificReview() && !hardBlockDowngraded;
   const reviewDemanded = () => callSpecificReview() || localSmartRuleMatched === true || options?.localSmartRuleMatched === true;
   if (meta?.serverKey) {
@@ -15315,6 +16760,12 @@ async function _authorizeHeadlessCore(toolName, args, metaArg, options) {
       appPermReview ? `${taintWarning}
 ${appPermReview}` : taintWarning
     );
+  } else if (exposureReview) {
+    explainableLabel = EXPOSURE_LABEL;
+    riskMetadata = computeRiskMetadata(args, 6, explainableLabel, void 0, void 0, "exposure");
+    riskMetadata.ruleDescription = (appPermReview ? `${exposureReview}
+${appPermReview}` : exposureReview).slice(0, 1024);
+    if (exposureDestinations.length > 0) riskMetadata.exposureDestinations = exposureDestinations;
   } else if (appPermReview) {
     if (dlpReviewFlagged) {
       explainableLabel = "\u{1F6A8} Node9 DLP (Credential Review) + \u{1F512} App Permission (Review)";
@@ -15357,7 +16808,8 @@ ${packageReview}`;
       // The prompt must say WHY: the taint sentence beats the bare label so
       // the dev sees the actual risk context inline. (No appPermReview term:
       // deferReview and serverKey never co-occur in production — see above.)
-      reason: taintWarning || packageReview || explainableLabel || "Node9 flagged this action for review.",
+      reason: taintWarning || packageReview || exposureReview || explainableLabel || "Node9 flagged this action for review.",
+      ...exposureReview && exposureKeys.length > 0 ? { exposureKeys } : {},
       ruleDescription: policyRuleDescription,
       blockedByLabel: explainableLabel
     };
@@ -15451,10 +16903,14 @@ ${packageReview}`;
           // auto-allows. This process (the long-running gateway — appPermReview
           // only ever happens here) stays alive to run its own racers, so the
           // daemon just holds the card and waits for the human decision.
-          appPermReview ? true : void 0,
+          // fw#318 P1.1: the same for every call-specific review (exposure,
+          // session taint, DLP, file review): the re-run carries no session id
+          // and cannot see these reasons, so it must never answer the card.
+          appPermReview || callSpecificReview() ? true : void 0,
           void 0,
           localSmartRuleMatched || options?.localSmartRuleMatched,
-          options?.socketActivitySent
+          options?.socketActivitySent,
+          meta?.sessionId
         );
         daemonEntryId = entry.id;
         daemonAllowCount = entry.allowCount;
@@ -15495,8 +16951,15 @@ ${packageReview}`;
           policyMatchedField,
           policyMatchedWord,
           daemonAllowCount,
-          riskMetadata?.ruleDescription
+          riskMetadata?.ruleDescription,
+          exposureDestinations
         );
+        if (decision === "trust_recipients") {
+          if (config.policySource !== "workspace") {
+            for (const d of exposureDestinations) addTrustedRecipient(d, "approval");
+          }
+          return { approved: true, checkedBy: "daemon", decisionSource: "native" };
+        }
         if (decision === "always_allow") {
           if (standingTrustApplies()) {
             writeTrustSession(toolName, 36e5, args);
@@ -15597,6 +17060,9 @@ REASON: Action blocked because no approval channels are available. (Native/Brows
       });
     }
   });
+  if (finalResult.approved && exposureKeys.length > 0 && meta?.sessionId && ucPolicy?.afterExposure === "ask-once") {
+    await approveSessionExposure(meta.sessionId, exposureKeys);
+  }
   if (cloudRequestId && creds && finalResult.checkedBy !== "cloud") {
     await resolveNode9SaaS(
       cloudRequestId,