@node9/proxy 2.23.2 → 2.24.0

package/dist/cli.js

@@ -60496,11 +60496,15 @@ function injectableJobs(wf, raw, untrustedTrigger) {
   }
   return out;
 }
+var DEAD_SECRET_TAIL_RE = /(?<=(?:\$\{\{|\(|,)\s*)(secrets\.GITHUB_TOKEN|github\.token)(?:\s*\|\|\s*(?:'[^']*'|[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_.]*))+(?=\s*(?:\}\}|\)|,))/gi;
+function dropDeadSecretRefs(text) {
+  return text.replace(DEAD_SECRET_TAIL_RE, "$1");
+}
 function usesPatIn(jobs) {
   for (const j of jobs)
     for (const step of j.steps ?? []) {
-      const gt = str(step.with?.["github_token"]);
-      if (/secrets\./i.test(gt) && !/secrets\.GITHUB_TOKEN/i.test(gt)) return true;
+      const gt = dropDeadSecretRefs(str(step.with?.["github_token"]));
+      if (/secrets\.(?!GITHUB_TOKEN\b)[A-Za-z_]/i.test(gt)) return true;
     }
   return false;
 }
@@ -60533,6 +60537,36 @@ function hasMetaWritePerm(wf, agentJobs) {
 function hasEnvDeny(steps) {
   return steps.some((s) => /"?mode"?\s*:\s*"?deny/i.test(str(s.with?.["settings"])));
 }
+var CLAUDE_CODE_ACTION_RE = /anthropics\/claude-code-action@/i;
+var FULL_OUTPUT_ACTION_RE = /anthropics\/claude-code(-base)?-action@/i;
+function pinnedBelow(uses, min) {
+  const m = /@v?(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)$/.exec(uses.trim());
+  if (!m) return false;
+  const v = [Number(m[1]), Number(m[2]), Number(m[3])];
+  for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) if (v[i] !== min[i]) return v[i] < min[i];
+  return false;
+}
+var FULL_OUTPUT_MIN = [1, 0, 16];
+var ENV_SCRUB_MIN = [1, 0, 77];
+function showsFullOutput(steps) {
+  return steps.some(
+    (s) => FULL_OUTPUT_ACTION_RE.test(s.uses ?? "") && !pinnedBelow(s.uses ?? "", FULL_OUTPUT_MIN) && str(s.with?.["show_full_output"]) === "true"
+  );
+}
+function envScrubOptedOut(pairs, wf) {
+  const wfEnv = wf.env;
+  const KEY = "CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB";
+  return pairs.some(({ job, step }) => {
+    const uses = step.uses ?? "";
+    if (!CLAUDE_CODE_ACTION_RE.test(uses) || pinnedBelow(uses, ENV_SCRUB_MIN)) return false;
+    if (!str(step.with?.["allowed_non_write_users"]).trim()) return false;
+    const holder = [step.env, job.env, wfEnv].find((e) => e != null && KEY in e);
+    if (!holder) return false;
+    const v = str(holder[KEY]).trim();
+    if (!v || /\$\{\{/.test(v)) return false;
+    return !/^(1|true|yes|on)$/i.test(v);
+  });
+}
 function agentActionsPinned(steps) {
   const agent = steps.filter(isAgentStep).filter((s) => s.uses);
   if (agent.length === 0) return false;
@@ -60652,6 +60686,19 @@ function analyzeWorkflow(path80, content) {
     signals.push('allowed_non_write_users: "*" with github_token \u2014 any user can trigger the agent');
   if (elevated) signals.push("elevated permissions (contents/id-token: write)");
   if (pat) signals.push("a static PAT is exposed to the agent (recoverable via injection)");
+  const scopedPairs = allSteps(wf).filter(
+    (p) => isAgentStep(p.step) && (injJobs.length === 0 || injJobs.includes(p.job))
+  );
+  const fullOutput = showsFullOutput(scopedPairs.map((p) => p.step));
+  const scrubOff = envScrubOptedOut(scopedPairs, wf);
+  if (fullOutput)
+    signals.push(
+      "`show_full_output: true` writes every agent command and its output to the Actions log, public on a public repo; GitHub masks known secret values there, but an agent told to encode one first can publish it without any network tool"
+    );
+  if (scrubOff)
+    signals.push(
+      "`CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB` is switched off, so the action no longer scrubs the Anthropic key, cloud credentials and Actions runtime tokens from the agent's shell"
+    );
   if (!gate && reach > 0) signals.push("no effective actor gate");
   const noExplicitPerms = wf.permissions == null && jobList(wf).every((j) => j.permissions == null);
   if (noExplicitPerms && reach > 0 && (broadTools || githubWriteTool))
@@ -60672,7 +60719,7 @@ function analyzeWorkflow(path80, content) {
       'allowed_non_write_users: "*" is set without github_token, so the action keeps its default write gate'
     );
   const title = severity === "critical" || severity === "high" ? "Injectable agent workflow \u2014 untrusted input reaches a tool-using agent with secrets" : severity === "medium" ? "Agent workflow with a risky pattern (partially mitigated)" : "Agent workflow on a privileged trigger \u2014 review the actor gate";
-  return {
+  const finding = {
     check: "CI-2",
     // One verdict per workflow file — the finding IS the file's reachability score.
     rule: "CI-2.injectable-workflow",
@@ -60684,13 +60731,20 @@ function analyzeWorkflow(path80, content) {
     mitigations: mitigations.length ? mitigations : void 0,
     fix: head === "root" && privileged ? "Do not check out the untrusted PR head into the workspace root under a privileged trigger (pull_request_target/workflow_run) \u2014 check out the base ref, or isolate the head in a subdir (--add-dir). Add an actor gate and scope the agent tools." : head === "root" ? "This runs under `pull_request` (fork PRs get a read-only token), so the head checkout is low-risk today \u2014 keep it on `pull_request` (not `pull_request_target`) and keep the actor gate + scoped tools." : "Add/verify an actor gate, scope the agent tools to read-only, and env-deny secrets. See Anthropic\u2019s claude-code-action security doc."
   };
+  const extraFix = [
+    fullOutput ? "Remove `show_full_output: true` (the action documents it for debugging only)." : "",
+    scrubOff ? "Remove the `CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB` opt-out." : ""
+  ].filter(Boolean).join(" ");
+  if (extraFix) finding.fix = `${finding.fix} ${extraFix}`;
+  return finding;
 }
 var AGENT_FUEL_RE = /^(ANTHROPIC_API_KEY|ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN|ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL|CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN|OPENAI_API_KEY|OPENAI_BASE_URL|GEMINI_API_KEY|GOOGLE_API_KEY|GITHUB_TOKEN)$/i;
 var FUEL_INPUT_KEYS = /^(anthropic_api_key|anthropic_auth_token|anthropic_base_url|claude_code_oauth_token|openai_api_key|openai_base_url|gemini_api_key|google_api_key)$/i;
 function fuelSecretNames(agentSteps) {
   const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
   const add = (v) => {
-    for (const m of str(v).matchAll(/secrets\.([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)/gi)) out.add(m[1]);
+    for (const m of dropDeadSecretRefs(str(v)).matchAll(/secrets\.([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)/gi))
+      out.add(m[1]);
   };
   for (const st of agentSteps) {
     for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(st.with ?? {})) if (FUEL_INPUT_KEYS.test(k)) add(v);
@@ -60712,7 +60766,7 @@ function agentReachableSecrets(wf, agentSteps, agentJobs) {
   blobs.push(str(wf.env));
   const fuel = fuelSecretNames(agentSteps);
   const found = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-  for (const b of blobs) {
+  for (const b of blobs.map(dropDeadSecretRefs)) {
     for (const m of b.matchAll(/secrets\.([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)/gi)) {
       const name = m[1];
       if (AGENT_FUEL_RE.test(name) || fuel.has(name)) continue;
@@ -60840,19 +60894,35 @@ function analyzeAgentConfig(path80, content) {
   );
   if (broad.length > 0) {
     const hasBackstop = deny.some((d) => /Bash|Write|Edit/.test(d));
+    const bashBackstop = deny.some((d) => /^Bash\b/.test(d));
+    const bareShell = broad.some((a) => /^Bash$|^Bash\(\s*\*/.test(a));
+    const high = bareShell && !bashBackstop;
+    const signals = [`broad allow(s): ${broad.slice(0, 5).join(", ")}`];
+    if (high)
+      signals.push(
+        "unrestricted `Bash` with no `deny` backstop \u2014 any command an injected instruction names runs without a prompt, for everyone who opens this repo with the agent"
+      );
+    else if (bareShell)
+      signals.push(
+        "a `Bash` deny list narrows the unrestricted `Bash` allow; it blocks only the commands it names"
+      );
+    if (broad.some((a) => /^Bash\(git:/.test(a)))
+      signals.push(
+        "`Bash(git:*)` pre-approves every git command; git can run other programs (`-c core.pager=\u2026`, `!` aliases), so this is broader than it looks"
+      );
+    if (broad.some((a) => /^Write|^Edit$/.test(a)))
+      signals.push("`Write`/`Edit` pre-approve file changes without a prompt");
+    if (!high && !bareShell && !hasBackstop) signals.push("no `deny` entry narrows these grants");
     findings.push({
       check: "CI-1",
       rule: "CI-1.broad-allow",
       // File-level: one finding per config file. Adding a SECOND broad allow makes the
       // same statement about the same file, so it must not read as a new finding.
       dimension: "toolRules",
-      severity: hasBackstop ? "medium" : "high",
-      title: hasBackstop ? "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools" : "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools with no deny backstop",
+      severity: high ? "high" : "medium",
+      title: high ? "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools with no deny backstop" : "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools",
       file: path80,
-      signals: [
-        `broad allow(s): ${broad.slice(0, 5).join(", ")}`,
-        hasBackstop ? "a `deny` list backstops the broad allow" : "no `deny` entry covers Bash/Write/Edit \u2014 every contributor is pre-authorized for catastrophic tools"
-      ],
+      signals,
       fix: "Scope the allow-list to specific read-only subcommands (e.g. `Bash(gh pr view:*)`); avoid bare `Bash`/`git:`/`Write`, or add a `deny` backstop."
     });
   }

package/dist/cli.mjs

@@ -60485,11 +60485,15 @@ function injectableJobs(wf, raw, untrustedTrigger) {
   }
   return out;
 }
+var DEAD_SECRET_TAIL_RE = /(?<=(?:\$\{\{|\(|,)\s*)(secrets\.GITHUB_TOKEN|github\.token)(?:\s*\|\|\s*(?:'[^']*'|[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_.]*))+(?=\s*(?:\}\}|\)|,))/gi;
+function dropDeadSecretRefs(text) {
+  return text.replace(DEAD_SECRET_TAIL_RE, "$1");
+}
 function usesPatIn(jobs) {
   for (const j of jobs)
     for (const step of j.steps ?? []) {
-      const gt = str(step.with?.["github_token"]);
-      if (/secrets\./i.test(gt) && !/secrets\.GITHUB_TOKEN/i.test(gt)) return true;
+      const gt = dropDeadSecretRefs(str(step.with?.["github_token"]));
+      if (/secrets\.(?!GITHUB_TOKEN\b)[A-Za-z_]/i.test(gt)) return true;
     }
   return false;
 }
@@ -60522,6 +60526,36 @@ function hasMetaWritePerm(wf, agentJobs) {
 function hasEnvDeny(steps) {
   return steps.some((s) => /"?mode"?\s*:\s*"?deny/i.test(str(s.with?.["settings"])));
 }
+var CLAUDE_CODE_ACTION_RE = /anthropics\/claude-code-action@/i;
+var FULL_OUTPUT_ACTION_RE = /anthropics\/claude-code(-base)?-action@/i;
+function pinnedBelow(uses, min) {
+  const m = /@v?(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)$/.exec(uses.trim());
+  if (!m) return false;
+  const v = [Number(m[1]), Number(m[2]), Number(m[3])];
+  for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) if (v[i] !== min[i]) return v[i] < min[i];
+  return false;
+}
+var FULL_OUTPUT_MIN = [1, 0, 16];
+var ENV_SCRUB_MIN = [1, 0, 77];
+function showsFullOutput(steps) {
+  return steps.some(
+    (s) => FULL_OUTPUT_ACTION_RE.test(s.uses ?? "") && !pinnedBelow(s.uses ?? "", FULL_OUTPUT_MIN) && str(s.with?.["show_full_output"]) === "true"
+  );
+}
+function envScrubOptedOut(pairs, wf) {
+  const wfEnv = wf.env;
+  const KEY = "CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB";
+  return pairs.some(({ job, step }) => {
+    const uses = step.uses ?? "";
+    if (!CLAUDE_CODE_ACTION_RE.test(uses) || pinnedBelow(uses, ENV_SCRUB_MIN)) return false;
+    if (!str(step.with?.["allowed_non_write_users"]).trim()) return false;
+    const holder = [step.env, job.env, wfEnv].find((e) => e != null && KEY in e);
+    if (!holder) return false;
+    const v = str(holder[KEY]).trim();
+    if (!v || /\$\{\{/.test(v)) return false;
+    return !/^(1|true|yes|on)$/i.test(v);
+  });
+}
 function agentActionsPinned(steps) {
   const agent = steps.filter(isAgentStep).filter((s) => s.uses);
   if (agent.length === 0) return false;
@@ -60641,6 +60675,19 @@ function analyzeWorkflow(path80, content) {
     signals.push('allowed_non_write_users: "*" with github_token \u2014 any user can trigger the agent');
   if (elevated) signals.push("elevated permissions (contents/id-token: write)");
   if (pat) signals.push("a static PAT is exposed to the agent (recoverable via injection)");
+  const scopedPairs = allSteps(wf).filter(
+    (p) => isAgentStep(p.step) && (injJobs.length === 0 || injJobs.includes(p.job))
+  );
+  const fullOutput = showsFullOutput(scopedPairs.map((p) => p.step));
+  const scrubOff = envScrubOptedOut(scopedPairs, wf);
+  if (fullOutput)
+    signals.push(
+      "`show_full_output: true` writes every agent command and its output to the Actions log, public on a public repo; GitHub masks known secret values there, but an agent told to encode one first can publish it without any network tool"
+    );
+  if (scrubOff)
+    signals.push(
+      "`CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB` is switched off, so the action no longer scrubs the Anthropic key, cloud credentials and Actions runtime tokens from the agent's shell"
+    );
   if (!gate && reach > 0) signals.push("no effective actor gate");
   const noExplicitPerms = wf.permissions == null && jobList(wf).every((j) => j.permissions == null);
   if (noExplicitPerms && reach > 0 && (broadTools || githubWriteTool))
@@ -60661,7 +60708,7 @@ function analyzeWorkflow(path80, content) {
       'allowed_non_write_users: "*" is set without github_token, so the action keeps its default write gate'
     );
   const title = severity === "critical" || severity === "high" ? "Injectable agent workflow \u2014 untrusted input reaches a tool-using agent with secrets" : severity === "medium" ? "Agent workflow with a risky pattern (partially mitigated)" : "Agent workflow on a privileged trigger \u2014 review the actor gate";
-  return {
+  const finding = {
     check: "CI-2",
     // One verdict per workflow file — the finding IS the file's reachability score.
     rule: "CI-2.injectable-workflow",
@@ -60673,13 +60720,20 @@ function analyzeWorkflow(path80, content) {
     mitigations: mitigations.length ? mitigations : void 0,
     fix: head === "root" && privileged ? "Do not check out the untrusted PR head into the workspace root under a privileged trigger (pull_request_target/workflow_run) \u2014 check out the base ref, or isolate the head in a subdir (--add-dir). Add an actor gate and scope the agent tools." : head === "root" ? "This runs under `pull_request` (fork PRs get a read-only token), so the head checkout is low-risk today \u2014 keep it on `pull_request` (not `pull_request_target`) and keep the actor gate + scoped tools." : "Add/verify an actor gate, scope the agent tools to read-only, and env-deny secrets. See Anthropic\u2019s claude-code-action security doc."
   };
+  const extraFix = [
+    fullOutput ? "Remove `show_full_output: true` (the action documents it for debugging only)." : "",
+    scrubOff ? "Remove the `CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB` opt-out." : ""
+  ].filter(Boolean).join(" ");
+  if (extraFix) finding.fix = `${finding.fix} ${extraFix}`;
+  return finding;
 }
 var AGENT_FUEL_RE = /^(ANTHROPIC_API_KEY|ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN|ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL|CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN|OPENAI_API_KEY|OPENAI_BASE_URL|GEMINI_API_KEY|GOOGLE_API_KEY|GITHUB_TOKEN)$/i;
 var FUEL_INPUT_KEYS = /^(anthropic_api_key|anthropic_auth_token|anthropic_base_url|claude_code_oauth_token|openai_api_key|openai_base_url|gemini_api_key|google_api_key)$/i;
 function fuelSecretNames(agentSteps) {
   const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
   const add = (v) => {
-    for (const m of str(v).matchAll(/secrets\.([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)/gi)) out.add(m[1]);
+    for (const m of dropDeadSecretRefs(str(v)).matchAll(/secrets\.([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)/gi))
+      out.add(m[1]);
   };
   for (const st of agentSteps) {
     for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(st.with ?? {})) if (FUEL_INPUT_KEYS.test(k)) add(v);
@@ -60701,7 +60755,7 @@ function agentReachableSecrets(wf, agentSteps, agentJobs) {
   blobs.push(str(wf.env));
   const fuel = fuelSecretNames(agentSteps);
   const found = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-  for (const b of blobs) {
+  for (const b of blobs.map(dropDeadSecretRefs)) {
     for (const m of b.matchAll(/secrets\.([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)/gi)) {
       const name = m[1];
       if (AGENT_FUEL_RE.test(name) || fuel.has(name)) continue;
@@ -60829,19 +60883,35 @@ function analyzeAgentConfig(path80, content) {
   );
   if (broad.length > 0) {
     const hasBackstop = deny.some((d) => /Bash|Write|Edit/.test(d));
+    const bashBackstop = deny.some((d) => /^Bash\b/.test(d));
+    const bareShell = broad.some((a) => /^Bash$|^Bash\(\s*\*/.test(a));
+    const high = bareShell && !bashBackstop;
+    const signals = [`broad allow(s): ${broad.slice(0, 5).join(", ")}`];
+    if (high)
+      signals.push(
+        "unrestricted `Bash` with no `deny` backstop \u2014 any command an injected instruction names runs without a prompt, for everyone who opens this repo with the agent"
+      );
+    else if (bareShell)
+      signals.push(
+        "a `Bash` deny list narrows the unrestricted `Bash` allow; it blocks only the commands it names"
+      );
+    if (broad.some((a) => /^Bash\(git:/.test(a)))
+      signals.push(
+        "`Bash(git:*)` pre-approves every git command; git can run other programs (`-c core.pager=\u2026`, `!` aliases), so this is broader than it looks"
+      );
+    if (broad.some((a) => /^Write|^Edit$/.test(a)))
+      signals.push("`Write`/`Edit` pre-approve file changes without a prompt");
+    if (!high && !bareShell && !hasBackstop) signals.push("no `deny` entry narrows these grants");
     findings.push({
       check: "CI-1",
       rule: "CI-1.broad-allow",
       // File-level: one finding per config file. Adding a SECOND broad allow makes the
       // same statement about the same file, so it must not read as a new finding.
       dimension: "toolRules",
-      severity: hasBackstop ? "medium" : "high",
-      title: hasBackstop ? "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools" : "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools with no deny backstop",
+      severity: high ? "high" : "medium",
+      title: high ? "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools with no deny backstop" : "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools",
       file: path80,
-      signals: [
-        `broad allow(s): ${broad.slice(0, 5).join(", ")}`,
-        hasBackstop ? "a `deny` list backstops the broad allow" : "no `deny` entry covers Bash/Write/Edit \u2014 every contributor is pre-authorized for catastrophic tools"
-      ],
+      signals,
       fix: "Scope the allow-list to specific read-only subcommands (e.g. `Bash(gh pr view:*)`); avoid bare `Bash`/`git:`/`Write`, or add a `deny` backstop."
     });
   }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@node9/proxy",
-  "version": "2.23.2",
+  "version": "2.24.0",
   "description": "IAM for your AI agents. Set what Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor and any MCP server are allowed to do, review risky actions before they run, and keep every action on the record.",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",
   "module": "./dist/index.mjs",