@node9/proxy 2.23.1 → 2.23.3

package/dist/cli.js

@@ -60475,6 +60475,11 @@ function jobActorGate(job, wf, raw) {
   return ifsAreGated(ifs, labelTypeConfigured(wf, raw)) || /assignee\.login\s*==|event\.assignee\b/i.test(ifs) || PERMISSION_OUTPUT_GATE_RE.test(ifs) || // [2] job-scoped permission-check-output gate
   hasStepMembershipGate(job);
 }
+function bypassArmed(steps) {
+  return steps.some(
+    (s) => str(s.with?.["allowed_non_write_users"]) === "*" && (!!str(s.with?.["github_token"]) || !!str(s.env?.["OVERRIDE_GITHUB_TOKEN"]))
+  );
+}
 function hasImplicitActorGate(agentSteps, bypassActive) {
   if (bypassActive) return false;
   return agentSteps.some((s) => /anthropics\/claude-code-action@/i.test(s.uses ?? ""));
@@ -60484,18 +60489,22 @@ function injectableJobs(wf, raw, untrustedTrigger) {
   for (const job of jobList(wf)) {
     const a = (job.steps ?? []).filter(isAgentStep);
     if (!a.length) continue;
-    const jobStar = str(a.map((s) => s.with?.["allowed_non_write_users"]).find(Boolean)) === "*";
+    const jobStar = bypassArmed(a);
     if (jobActorGate(job, wf, raw) || hasImplicitActorGate(a, jobStar && untrustedTrigger))
       continue;
     out.push(job);
   }
   return out;
 }
+var DEAD_SECRET_TAIL_RE = /(?<=(?:\$\{\{|\(|,)\s*)(secrets\.GITHUB_TOKEN|github\.token)(?:\s*\|\|\s*(?:'[^']*'|[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_.]*))+(?=\s*(?:\}\}|\)|,))/gi;
+function dropDeadSecretRefs(text) {
+  return text.replace(DEAD_SECRET_TAIL_RE, "$1");
+}
 function usesPatIn(jobs) {
   for (const j of jobs)
     for (const step of j.steps ?? []) {
-      const gt = str(step.with?.["github_token"]);
-      if (/secrets\./i.test(gt) && !/secrets\.GITHUB_TOKEN/i.test(gt)) return true;
+      const gt = dropDeadSecretRefs(str(step.with?.["github_token"]));
+      if (/secrets\.(?!GITHUB_TOKEN\b)[A-Za-z_]/i.test(gt)) return true;
     }
   return false;
 }
@@ -60564,7 +60573,8 @@ function analyzeWorkflow(path80, content) {
     privileged
   } = triggerReach(wf, raw);
   const nonWrite = str(agentSteps.map((s) => s.with?.["allowed_non_write_users"]).find(Boolean));
-  const nonWriteStar = nonWrite === "*";
+  const nonWriteStar = bypassArmed(agentSteps);
+  const starWithoutToken = nonWrite === "*" && !nonWriteStar;
   const nonWriteList = !!nonWrite && nonWrite !== "*";
   const untrustedTrigger = forkInput || reusable;
   const bypassActive = nonWriteStar && untrustedTrigger;
@@ -60642,7 +60652,8 @@ function analyzeWorkflow(path80, content) {
       names.length ? `agent has broad/write-capable tools: ${names.map((n) => `\`${n}\``).join(", ")}` : "agent has broad/write-capable tool grants"
     );
   }
-  if (bypassActive) signals.push('allowed_non_write_users: "*" \u2014 any user can trigger the agent');
+  if (bypassActive)
+    signals.push('allowed_non_write_users: "*" with github_token \u2014 any user can trigger the agent');
   if (elevated) signals.push("elevated permissions (contents/id-token: write)");
   if (pat) signals.push("a static PAT is exposed to the agent (recoverable via injection)");
   if (!gate && reach > 0) signals.push("no effective actor gate");
@@ -60660,6 +60671,10 @@ function analyzeWorkflow(path80, content) {
   if (envDeny) mitigations.push("secrets env-denied from the agent subprocess");
   if (pinned) mitigations.push("agent action pinned to a commit SHA");
   if (nonWriteList) mitigations.push('non-write users scoped to a list, not "*"');
+  if (starWithoutToken)
+    mitigations.push(
+      'allowed_non_write_users: "*" is set without github_token, so the action keeps its default write gate'
+    );
   const title = severity === "critical" || severity === "high" ? "Injectable agent workflow \u2014 untrusted input reaches a tool-using agent with secrets" : severity === "medium" ? "Agent workflow with a risky pattern (partially mitigated)" : "Agent workflow on a privileged trigger \u2014 review the actor gate";
   return {
     check: "CI-2",
@@ -60679,7 +60694,8 @@ var FUEL_INPUT_KEYS = /^(anthropic_api_key|anthropic_auth_token|anthropic_base_u
 function fuelSecretNames(agentSteps) {
   const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
   const add = (v) => {
-    for (const m of str(v).matchAll(/secrets\.([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)/gi)) out.add(m[1]);
+    for (const m of dropDeadSecretRefs(str(v)).matchAll(/secrets\.([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)/gi))
+      out.add(m[1]);
   };
   for (const st of agentSteps) {
     for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(st.with ?? {})) if (FUEL_INPUT_KEYS.test(k)) add(v);
@@ -60701,7 +60717,7 @@ function agentReachableSecrets(wf, agentSteps, agentJobs) {
   blobs.push(str(wf.env));
   const fuel = fuelSecretNames(agentSteps);
   const found = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-  for (const b of blobs) {
+  for (const b of blobs.map(dropDeadSecretRefs)) {
     for (const m of b.matchAll(/secrets\.([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)/gi)) {
       const name = m[1];
       if (AGENT_FUEL_RE.test(name) || fuel.has(name)) continue;
@@ -60719,8 +60735,7 @@ function evalAgentJob(job, wf, raw, untrustedTrigger, reusable) {
   if (jobAgentSteps.length === 0) return null;
   const secrets = agentReachableSecrets(wf, jobAgentSteps, [job]);
   if (secrets.length === 0) return null;
-  const nonWriteStar = str(jobAgentSteps.map((s) => s.with?.["allowed_non_write_users"]).find(Boolean)) === "*";
-  const bypassActive = nonWriteStar && untrustedTrigger;
+  const bypassActive = bypassArmed(jobAgentSteps) && untrustedTrigger;
   const head = untrustedHeadCheckout(jobSteps);
   const reach = Math.max(
     head === "root" ? 3 : head === "subdir" ? 1 : 0,
@@ -60830,19 +60845,35 @@ function analyzeAgentConfig(path80, content) {
   );
   if (broad.length > 0) {
     const hasBackstop = deny.some((d) => /Bash|Write|Edit/.test(d));
+    const bashBackstop = deny.some((d) => /^Bash\b/.test(d));
+    const bareShell = broad.some((a) => /^Bash$|^Bash\(\s*\*/.test(a));
+    const high = bareShell && !bashBackstop;
+    const signals = [`broad allow(s): ${broad.slice(0, 5).join(", ")}`];
+    if (high)
+      signals.push(
+        "unrestricted `Bash` with no `deny` backstop \u2014 any command an injected instruction names runs without a prompt, for everyone who opens this repo with the agent"
+      );
+    else if (bareShell)
+      signals.push(
+        "a `Bash` deny list narrows the unrestricted `Bash` allow; it blocks only the commands it names"
+      );
+    if (broad.some((a) => /^Bash\(git:/.test(a)))
+      signals.push(
+        "`Bash(git:*)` pre-approves every git command; git can run other programs (`-c core.pager=\u2026`, `!` aliases), so this is broader than it looks"
+      );
+    if (broad.some((a) => /^Write|^Edit$/.test(a)))
+      signals.push("`Write`/`Edit` pre-approve file changes without a prompt");
+    if (!high && !bareShell && !hasBackstop) signals.push("no `deny` entry narrows these grants");
     findings.push({
       check: "CI-1",
       rule: "CI-1.broad-allow",
       // File-level: one finding per config file. Adding a SECOND broad allow makes the
       // same statement about the same file, so it must not read as a new finding.
       dimension: "toolRules",
-      severity: hasBackstop ? "medium" : "high",
-      title: hasBackstop ? "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools" : "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools with no deny backstop",
+      severity: high ? "high" : "medium",
+      title: high ? "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools with no deny backstop" : "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools",
       file: path80,
-      signals: [
-        `broad allow(s): ${broad.slice(0, 5).join(", ")}`,
-        hasBackstop ? "a `deny` list backstops the broad allow" : "no `deny` entry covers Bash/Write/Edit \u2014 every contributor is pre-authorized for catastrophic tools"
-      ],
+      signals,
       fix: "Scope the allow-list to specific read-only subcommands (e.g. `Bash(gh pr view:*)`); avoid bare `Bash`/`git:`/`Write`, or add a `deny` backstop."
     });
   }

package/dist/cli.mjs

@@ -60464,6 +60464,11 @@ function jobActorGate(job, wf, raw) {
   return ifsAreGated(ifs, labelTypeConfigured(wf, raw)) || /assignee\.login\s*==|event\.assignee\b/i.test(ifs) || PERMISSION_OUTPUT_GATE_RE.test(ifs) || // [2] job-scoped permission-check-output gate
   hasStepMembershipGate(job);
 }
+function bypassArmed(steps) {
+  return steps.some(
+    (s) => str(s.with?.["allowed_non_write_users"]) === "*" && (!!str(s.with?.["github_token"]) || !!str(s.env?.["OVERRIDE_GITHUB_TOKEN"]))
+  );
+}
 function hasImplicitActorGate(agentSteps, bypassActive) {
   if (bypassActive) return false;
   return agentSteps.some((s) => /anthropics\/claude-code-action@/i.test(s.uses ?? ""));
@@ -60473,18 +60478,22 @@ function injectableJobs(wf, raw, untrustedTrigger) {
   for (const job of jobList(wf)) {
     const a = (job.steps ?? []).filter(isAgentStep);
     if (!a.length) continue;
-    const jobStar = str(a.map((s) => s.with?.["allowed_non_write_users"]).find(Boolean)) === "*";
+    const jobStar = bypassArmed(a);
     if (jobActorGate(job, wf, raw) || hasImplicitActorGate(a, jobStar && untrustedTrigger))
       continue;
     out.push(job);
   }
   return out;
 }
+var DEAD_SECRET_TAIL_RE = /(?<=(?:\$\{\{|\(|,)\s*)(secrets\.GITHUB_TOKEN|github\.token)(?:\s*\|\|\s*(?:'[^']*'|[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_.]*))+(?=\s*(?:\}\}|\)|,))/gi;
+function dropDeadSecretRefs(text) {
+  return text.replace(DEAD_SECRET_TAIL_RE, "$1");
+}
 function usesPatIn(jobs) {
   for (const j of jobs)
     for (const step of j.steps ?? []) {
-      const gt = str(step.with?.["github_token"]);
-      if (/secrets\./i.test(gt) && !/secrets\.GITHUB_TOKEN/i.test(gt)) return true;
+      const gt = dropDeadSecretRefs(str(step.with?.["github_token"]));
+      if (/secrets\.(?!GITHUB_TOKEN\b)[A-Za-z_]/i.test(gt)) return true;
     }
   return false;
 }
@@ -60553,7 +60562,8 @@ function analyzeWorkflow(path80, content) {
     privileged
   } = triggerReach(wf, raw);
   const nonWrite = str(agentSteps.map((s) => s.with?.["allowed_non_write_users"]).find(Boolean));
-  const nonWriteStar = nonWrite === "*";
+  const nonWriteStar = bypassArmed(agentSteps);
+  const starWithoutToken = nonWrite === "*" && !nonWriteStar;
   const nonWriteList = !!nonWrite && nonWrite !== "*";
   const untrustedTrigger = forkInput || reusable;
   const bypassActive = nonWriteStar && untrustedTrigger;
@@ -60631,7 +60641,8 @@ function analyzeWorkflow(path80, content) {
       names.length ? `agent has broad/write-capable tools: ${names.map((n) => `\`${n}\``).join(", ")}` : "agent has broad/write-capable tool grants"
     );
   }
-  if (bypassActive) signals.push('allowed_non_write_users: "*" \u2014 any user can trigger the agent');
+  if (bypassActive)
+    signals.push('allowed_non_write_users: "*" with github_token \u2014 any user can trigger the agent');
   if (elevated) signals.push("elevated permissions (contents/id-token: write)");
   if (pat) signals.push("a static PAT is exposed to the agent (recoverable via injection)");
   if (!gate && reach > 0) signals.push("no effective actor gate");
@@ -60649,6 +60660,10 @@ function analyzeWorkflow(path80, content) {
   if (envDeny) mitigations.push("secrets env-denied from the agent subprocess");
   if (pinned) mitigations.push("agent action pinned to a commit SHA");
   if (nonWriteList) mitigations.push('non-write users scoped to a list, not "*"');
+  if (starWithoutToken)
+    mitigations.push(
+      'allowed_non_write_users: "*" is set without github_token, so the action keeps its default write gate'
+    );
   const title = severity === "critical" || severity === "high" ? "Injectable agent workflow \u2014 untrusted input reaches a tool-using agent with secrets" : severity === "medium" ? "Agent workflow with a risky pattern (partially mitigated)" : "Agent workflow on a privileged trigger \u2014 review the actor gate";
   return {
     check: "CI-2",
@@ -60668,7 +60683,8 @@ var FUEL_INPUT_KEYS = /^(anthropic_api_key|anthropic_auth_token|anthropic_base_u
 function fuelSecretNames(agentSteps) {
   const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
   const add = (v) => {
-    for (const m of str(v).matchAll(/secrets\.([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)/gi)) out.add(m[1]);
+    for (const m of dropDeadSecretRefs(str(v)).matchAll(/secrets\.([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)/gi))
+      out.add(m[1]);
   };
   for (const st of agentSteps) {
     for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(st.with ?? {})) if (FUEL_INPUT_KEYS.test(k)) add(v);
@@ -60690,7 +60706,7 @@ function agentReachableSecrets(wf, agentSteps, agentJobs) {
   blobs.push(str(wf.env));
   const fuel = fuelSecretNames(agentSteps);
   const found = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-  for (const b of blobs) {
+  for (const b of blobs.map(dropDeadSecretRefs)) {
     for (const m of b.matchAll(/secrets\.([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)/gi)) {
       const name = m[1];
       if (AGENT_FUEL_RE.test(name) || fuel.has(name)) continue;
@@ -60708,8 +60724,7 @@ function evalAgentJob(job, wf, raw, untrustedTrigger, reusable) {
   if (jobAgentSteps.length === 0) return null;
   const secrets = agentReachableSecrets(wf, jobAgentSteps, [job]);
   if (secrets.length === 0) return null;
-  const nonWriteStar = str(jobAgentSteps.map((s) => s.with?.["allowed_non_write_users"]).find(Boolean)) === "*";
-  const bypassActive = nonWriteStar && untrustedTrigger;
+  const bypassActive = bypassArmed(jobAgentSteps) && untrustedTrigger;
   const head = untrustedHeadCheckout(jobSteps);
   const reach = Math.max(
     head === "root" ? 3 : head === "subdir" ? 1 : 0,
@@ -60819,19 +60834,35 @@ function analyzeAgentConfig(path80, content) {
   );
   if (broad.length > 0) {
     const hasBackstop = deny.some((d) => /Bash|Write|Edit/.test(d));
+    const bashBackstop = deny.some((d) => /^Bash\b/.test(d));
+    const bareShell = broad.some((a) => /^Bash$|^Bash\(\s*\*/.test(a));
+    const high = bareShell && !bashBackstop;
+    const signals = [`broad allow(s): ${broad.slice(0, 5).join(", ")}`];
+    if (high)
+      signals.push(
+        "unrestricted `Bash` with no `deny` backstop \u2014 any command an injected instruction names runs without a prompt, for everyone who opens this repo with the agent"
+      );
+    else if (bareShell)
+      signals.push(
+        "a `Bash` deny list narrows the unrestricted `Bash` allow; it blocks only the commands it names"
+      );
+    if (broad.some((a) => /^Bash\(git:/.test(a)))
+      signals.push(
+        "`Bash(git:*)` pre-approves every git command; git can run other programs (`-c core.pager=\u2026`, `!` aliases), so this is broader than it looks"
+      );
+    if (broad.some((a) => /^Write|^Edit$/.test(a)))
+      signals.push("`Write`/`Edit` pre-approve file changes without a prompt");
+    if (!high && !bareShell && !hasBackstop) signals.push("no `deny` entry narrows these grants");
     findings.push({
       check: "CI-1",
       rule: "CI-1.broad-allow",
       // File-level: one finding per config file. Adding a SECOND broad allow makes the
       // same statement about the same file, so it must not read as a new finding.
       dimension: "toolRules",
-      severity: hasBackstop ? "medium" : "high",
-      title: hasBackstop ? "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools" : "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools with no deny backstop",
+      severity: high ? "high" : "medium",
+      title: high ? "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools with no deny backstop" : "Committed agent config pre-authorizes broad tools",
       file: path80,
-      signals: [
-        `broad allow(s): ${broad.slice(0, 5).join(", ")}`,
-        hasBackstop ? "a `deny` list backstops the broad allow" : "no `deny` entry covers Bash/Write/Edit \u2014 every contributor is pre-authorized for catastrophic tools"
-      ],
+      signals,
       fix: "Scope the allow-list to specific read-only subcommands (e.g. `Bash(gh pr view:*)`); avoid bare `Bash`/`git:`/`Write`, or add a `deny` backstop."
     });
   }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@node9/proxy",
-  "version": "2.23.1",
+  "version": "2.23.3",
   "description": "IAM for your AI agents. Set what Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor and any MCP server are allowed to do, review risky actions before they run, and keep every action on the record.",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",
   "module": "./dist/index.mjs",