@node9/proxy 1.62.0 → 1.63.0

package/dist/cli.js

@@ -17451,7 +17451,7 @@ var init_ship = __esm({
 });
 
 // src/policy-snapshot/build.ts
-function buildPolicySnapshot(config, activeShields, overrides, mcpTools = {}, statusEntries = []) {
+function buildPolicySnapshot(config, activeShields, overrides, mcpTools = {}, statusEntries = [], syncHealth) {
   const p = config.policy;
   const statusByKey = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
   for (const s of statusEntries) {
@@ -17510,7 +17510,17 @@ function buildPolicySnapshot(config, activeShields, overrides, mcpTools = {}, st
     dlpEnabled: p.dlp.enabled,
     engineVersion: ENGINE_VERSION,
     // Connected rows first so they win the cap; non-connected SEE rows fill the rest.
-    mcpServers: [...connectedRows, ...extraRows].slice(0, MAX_MCP_SERVERS)
+    mcpServers: [...connectedRows, ...extraRows].slice(0, MAX_MCP_SERVERS),
+    // fleet-ship Step 2: ship the proxy's own sync health so the dashboard can
+    // derive a "sync failing" badge. Only included when the caller passes it.
+    ...syncHealth && {
+      syncHealth: {
+        lastCheckedAt: syncHealth.lastCheckedAt,
+        lastChangedAt: syncHealth.lastChangedAt,
+        lastError: syncHealth.lastError,
+        consecutiveFailures: syncHealth.consecutiveFailures
+      }
+    }
   };
 }
 var MAX_RULES, MAX_EGRESS, MAX_MCP_SERVERS, MAX_MCP_TOOLS;
@@ -18285,7 +18295,10 @@ async function pushPolicySnapshot(creds) {
       // Merged config-vs-connected status. resolveMcpStatus reads process.env to
       // resolve ${VAR} placeholders — so this push reflects THIS process's env
       // (daemon here, user shell in runPolicyPush); see the P2 design's two-env note.
-      resolveMcpStatus()
+      resolveMcpStatus(),
+      // fleet-ship Step 2: ship this machine's sync health so the dashboard can
+      // show "sync failing" badges. readSyncHealth is local (same module, no circular).
+      readSyncHealth()
     );
     await shipPolicySnapshot(body, creds);
   } catch {
@@ -18308,7 +18321,8 @@ async function runPolicyPush() {
       // Merged config-vs-connected status. resolveMcpStatus reads process.env to
       // resolve ${VAR} placeholders — so this push reflects THIS process's env
       // (daemon here, user shell in runPolicyPush); see the P2 design's two-env note.
-      resolveMcpStatus()
+      resolveMcpStatus(),
+      readSyncHealth()
     );
     const sent = await shipPolicySnapshot(body, creds);
     return sent ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, reason: "Push failed (network or server error)" };
@@ -53772,6 +53786,38 @@ function collectTools(steps) {
   }
   return s;
 }
+function toolTokens(blob) {
+  const out = [];
+  let buf = "";
+  let inParen = false;
+  const flush = () => {
+    const t = buf.replace(/[[\]"'`\r\n]/g, "").trim();
+    if (t) out.push(t);
+    buf = "";
+  };
+  for (const ch of blob) {
+    if (ch === "(") inParen = true;
+    else if (ch === ")") inParen = false;
+    if (!inParen && (ch === "," || /\s/.test(ch))) {
+      flush();
+      continue;
+    }
+    buf += ch;
+  }
+  flush();
+  return out;
+}
+function matchedBroadTools(blob) {
+  const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  const out = [];
+  for (const tok of toolTokens(blob)) {
+    if (!BROAD_TOOL_RE.test(`,${tok},`)) continue;
+    if (seen.has(tok)) continue;
+    seen.add(tok);
+    out.push(tok.length > 40 ? tok.slice(0, 40) + "\u2026" : tok);
+  }
+  return out;
+}
 function untrustedHeadCheckout(steps) {
   for (const step of steps) {
     if (!step.uses || !/actions\/checkout/.test(step.uses)) continue;
@@ -53998,7 +54044,12 @@ function analyzeWorkflow(path71, content) {
   if (head === "root") signals.push("checks out the untrusted PR head into the workspace root");
   if (head === "subdir") signals.push("checks out the untrusted PR head into an isolated subdir");
   if (promptUntrusted) signals.push("feeds untrusted PR/issue text to the agent");
-  if (broadTools) signals.push("agent has broad/write-capable tools (Bash/Write/curl/git push)");
+  if (broadTools) {
+    const names = matchedBroadTools(toolsBlob);
+    signals.push(
+      names.length ? `agent has broad/write-capable tools: ${names.map((n) => `\`${n}\``).join(", ")}` : "agent has broad/write-capable tool grants"
+    );
+  }
   if (bypassActive) signals.push('allowed_non_write_users: "*" \u2014 any user can trigger the agent');
   if (elevated) signals.push("elevated permissions (contents/id-token: write)");
   if (pat) signals.push("a static PAT is exposed to the agent (recoverable via injection)");

package/dist/cli.mjs

@@ -17448,7 +17448,7 @@ var init_ship = __esm({
 });
 
 // src/policy-snapshot/build.ts
-function buildPolicySnapshot(config, activeShields, overrides, mcpTools = {}, statusEntries = []) {
+function buildPolicySnapshot(config, activeShields, overrides, mcpTools = {}, statusEntries = [], syncHealth) {
   const p = config.policy;
   const statusByKey = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
   for (const s of statusEntries) {
@@ -17507,7 +17507,17 @@ function buildPolicySnapshot(config, activeShields, overrides, mcpTools = {}, st
     dlpEnabled: p.dlp.enabled,
     engineVersion: ENGINE_VERSION,
     // Connected rows first so they win the cap; non-connected SEE rows fill the rest.
-    mcpServers: [...connectedRows, ...extraRows].slice(0, MAX_MCP_SERVERS)
+    mcpServers: [...connectedRows, ...extraRows].slice(0, MAX_MCP_SERVERS),
+    // fleet-ship Step 2: ship the proxy's own sync health so the dashboard can
+    // derive a "sync failing" badge. Only included when the caller passes it.
+    ...syncHealth && {
+      syncHealth: {
+        lastCheckedAt: syncHealth.lastCheckedAt,
+        lastChangedAt: syncHealth.lastChangedAt,
+        lastError: syncHealth.lastError,
+        consecutiveFailures: syncHealth.consecutiveFailures
+      }
+    }
   };
 }
 var MAX_RULES, MAX_EGRESS, MAX_MCP_SERVERS, MAX_MCP_TOOLS;
@@ -18283,7 +18293,10 @@ async function pushPolicySnapshot(creds) {
       // Merged config-vs-connected status. resolveMcpStatus reads process.env to
       // resolve ${VAR} placeholders — so this push reflects THIS process's env
       // (daemon here, user shell in runPolicyPush); see the P2 design's two-env note.
-      resolveMcpStatus()
+      resolveMcpStatus(),
+      // fleet-ship Step 2: ship this machine's sync health so the dashboard can
+      // show "sync failing" badges. readSyncHealth is local (same module, no circular).
+      readSyncHealth()
     );
     await shipPolicySnapshot(body, creds);
   } catch {
@@ -18306,7 +18319,8 @@ async function runPolicyPush() {
       // Merged config-vs-connected status. resolveMcpStatus reads process.env to
       // resolve ${VAR} placeholders — so this push reflects THIS process's env
       // (daemon here, user shell in runPolicyPush); see the P2 design's two-env note.
-      resolveMcpStatus()
+      resolveMcpStatus(),
+      readSyncHealth()
     );
     const sent = await shipPolicySnapshot(body, creds);
     return sent ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, reason: "Push failed (network or server error)" };
@@ -53765,6 +53779,38 @@ function collectTools(steps) {
   }
   return s;
 }
+function toolTokens(blob) {
+  const out = [];
+  let buf = "";
+  let inParen = false;
+  const flush = () => {
+    const t = buf.replace(/[[\]"'`\r\n]/g, "").trim();
+    if (t) out.push(t);
+    buf = "";
+  };
+  for (const ch of blob) {
+    if (ch === "(") inParen = true;
+    else if (ch === ")") inParen = false;
+    if (!inParen && (ch === "," || /\s/.test(ch))) {
+      flush();
+      continue;
+    }
+    buf += ch;
+  }
+  flush();
+  return out;
+}
+function matchedBroadTools(blob) {
+  const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  const out = [];
+  for (const tok of toolTokens(blob)) {
+    if (!BROAD_TOOL_RE.test(`,${tok},`)) continue;
+    if (seen.has(tok)) continue;
+    seen.add(tok);
+    out.push(tok.length > 40 ? tok.slice(0, 40) + "\u2026" : tok);
+  }
+  return out;
+}
 function untrustedHeadCheckout(steps) {
   for (const step of steps) {
     if (!step.uses || !/actions\/checkout/.test(step.uses)) continue;
@@ -53991,7 +54037,12 @@ function analyzeWorkflow(path71, content) {
   if (head === "root") signals.push("checks out the untrusted PR head into the workspace root");
   if (head === "subdir") signals.push("checks out the untrusted PR head into an isolated subdir");
   if (promptUntrusted) signals.push("feeds untrusted PR/issue text to the agent");
-  if (broadTools) signals.push("agent has broad/write-capable tools (Bash/Write/curl/git push)");
+  if (broadTools) {
+    const names = matchedBroadTools(toolsBlob);
+    signals.push(
+      names.length ? `agent has broad/write-capable tools: ${names.map((n) => `\`${n}\``).join(", ")}` : "agent has broad/write-capable tool grants"
+    );
+  }
   if (bypassActive) signals.push('allowed_non_write_users: "*" \u2014 any user can trigger the agent');
   if (elevated) signals.push("elevated permissions (contents/id-token: write)");
   if (pat) signals.push("a static PAT is exposed to the agent (recoverable via injection)");

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@node9/proxy",
-  "version": "1.62.0",
+  "version": "1.63.0",
   "description": "The Sudo Command for AI Agents. Execution Security for Claude Code, Codex, Gemini, Cursor, Opencode, Pi, and any MCP server.",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",
   "module": "./dist/index.mjs",