@node9/policy-engine 2.65.7 → 2.65.9
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/index.d.mts +25 -3
- package/dist/index.d.ts +25 -3
- package/dist/index.js +707 -117
- package/dist/index.mjs +704 -117
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/index.d.mts
CHANGED
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@@ -185,6 +185,10 @@ interface FileAccessContext {
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homeDirs?: string[];
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accesses?: FileAccess[];
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}
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+
/** The names, as a regex source without anchors, for the copies that are regexes. */
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declare const PUBLIC_SSH_NAME_SOURCE: string;
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/** Is this path (or glob) public material directly inside a `.ssh` directory? */
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declare function isPublicSshMaterial(p: string): boolean;
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interface DerivedWrite {
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/** The file read, as the command spells it. */
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@@ -514,6 +518,7 @@ declare function resolveCheckMap(settings: CatalogSettings): Record<string, Verd
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type InlineCodeCategory = 'deletes' | 'writes-outside' | 'sends' | 'listens' | 'runs-commands' | 'reads-protected' | 'builds-code' | 'permissions' | 'monitors' | 'amplifies' | 'kills-service';
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declare const SHELL_INTERPRETERS: Set<string>;
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/**
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* The POSIX reading of a command. Kept as the single-string API every existing
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* caller (canonical.ts, the detectors, `explain`) already depends on.
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@@ -1135,6 +1140,16 @@ interface DlpPattern {
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* other capture group (a scheme, a prefix) is NOT the secret, so the field
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* is explicit rather than "group 1 if present". */
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redactGroup?: number;
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/**
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* The capture group that holds the SECRET part of the match, when the match
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* also carries text the writer of the command controls (a scheme word, a
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1146
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* host or cloud name) or a fixed label. The placeholder judgement and the
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1147
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* entropy floor read this group, never the whole match: a heuristic applied
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* to a span the writer controls is a suppression the writer controls
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* (node9Firewall#301). Absent: the whole match is the secret. redactText
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* still replaces the whole match; a validator still receives it.
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*/
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secretGroup?: number;
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/**
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* Only the bounded tool-argument gate (matchArgumentText, reached through
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* inspectArgumentSecrets / scanArgumentSecrets) uses this pattern. The raw
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@@ -1159,6 +1174,13 @@ declare const DLP_PATTERNS: DlpPattern[];
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*/
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declare function matchSensitivePath(resolvedPath: string, originalPath: string, options?: {
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systemAccessHandled?: boolean;
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/**
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* The call only READS the file (`Read`, `Grep`). Public material under
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1179
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* `.ssh` (known_hosts, authorized_keys, *.pub) is then not sensitive
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* (JAIL-16). A write to the same names stays blocked: adding a key to
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* `authorized_keys` is persistence, not a read of something public.
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*/
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readOnly?: boolean;
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}): DlpMatch | null;
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/** Exposed so the proxy's I/O wrapper can build the same fail-closed match. */
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declare function sensitivePathMatch(originalPath: string): DlpMatch;
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@@ -2465,7 +2487,7 @@ declare const LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: number;
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* and fails CI when the hash drifts without a version bump — forgetting
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* is loud, not silent.
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*/
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-
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-
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declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v41";
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/**
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* SHA-256 prefix of the detector-source files
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* (canonical.ts + pii.ts + destructive-regex.ts).
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@@ -2476,7 +2498,7 @@ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v39";
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* files changed, this hash must change too, and you must consciously
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* decide whether to bump CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION."
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*/
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-
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "
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declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "dbde5e7f06f3738a";
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declare function extractCanonicalFindings(call: ToolCallEntry, ctx: ExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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declare function extractSessionLevelFindings(calls: ReadonlyArray<SessionToolCall>, ctx: SessionExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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/**
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@@ -2588,5 +2610,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
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/** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
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declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
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-
export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, ASI, ASI_IDS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, POSTURE_CATEGORY_OWASP, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_REPO_RULES_WITHOUT_RISK, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, agentFileKind, analyzeFsOperation, analyzeGit, analyzeOutbound, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, boostsHandoffAfterExposure, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, derivedWrites, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractRegistryOverrides, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitInvocations, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, holdsSendsWithoutDaemon, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isAsiId, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isPublicRegistryHost, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isSpawnTool, isStrictGatedTier, isSubagentSpawn, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchArgumentText, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, packRowOwasp, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, pipelineTexts, positionedArgs, postureCategoryOwasp, previewArgs, redactText, registryHost, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanInstructionWrite, scanRepoRuleOwasp, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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+
export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, ASI, ASI_IDS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, POSTURE_CATEGORY_OWASP, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, PUBLIC_SSH_NAME_SOURCE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_REPO_RULES_WITHOUT_RISK, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SHELL_INTERPRETERS, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, agentFileKind, analyzeFsOperation, analyzeGit, analyzeOutbound, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, boostsHandoffAfterExposure, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, derivedWrites, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractRegistryOverrides, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitInvocations, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, holdsSendsWithoutDaemon, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isAsiId, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isPublicRegistryHost, isPublicSshMaterial, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isSpawnTool, isStrictGatedTier, isSubagentSpawn, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchArgumentText, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, packRowOwasp, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, pipelineTexts, positionedArgs, postureCategoryOwasp, previewArgs, redactText, registryHost, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanInstructionWrite, scanRepoRuleOwasp, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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export type { ActionTemplateName, AgentFileKind, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AsiId, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, DerivedWrite, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, GitAnalysis, GitFinding, GitInvocation, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, OutboundAnalysis, OutboundCheckId, OutboundFinding, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, RegistryOverride, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
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package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -185,6 +185,10 @@ interface FileAccessContext {
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185
185
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homeDirs?: string[];
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186
186
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accesses?: FileAccess[];
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187
187
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}
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188
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+
/** The names, as a regex source without anchors, for the copies that are regexes. */
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189
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+
declare const PUBLIC_SSH_NAME_SOURCE: string;
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190
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+
/** Is this path (or glob) public material directly inside a `.ssh` directory? */
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191
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+
declare function isPublicSshMaterial(p: string): boolean;
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192
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189
193
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interface DerivedWrite {
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194
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/** The file read, as the command spells it. */
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@@ -514,6 +518,7 @@ declare function resolveCheckMap(settings: CatalogSettings): Record<string, Verd
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514
518
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515
519
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type InlineCodeCategory = 'deletes' | 'writes-outside' | 'sends' | 'listens' | 'runs-commands' | 'reads-protected' | 'builds-code' | 'permissions' | 'monitors' | 'amplifies' | 'kills-service';
|
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516
520
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521
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+
declare const SHELL_INTERPRETERS: Set<string>;
|
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517
522
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/**
|
|
518
523
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* The POSIX reading of a command. Kept as the single-string API every existing
|
|
519
524
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* caller (canonical.ts, the detectors, `explain`) already depends on.
|
|
@@ -1135,6 +1140,16 @@ interface DlpPattern {
|
|
|
1135
1140
|
* other capture group (a scheme, a prefix) is NOT the secret, so the field
|
|
1136
1141
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* is explicit rather than "group 1 if present". */
|
|
1137
1142
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redactGroup?: number;
|
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1143
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+
/**
|
|
1144
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+
* The capture group that holds the SECRET part of the match, when the match
|
|
1145
|
+
* also carries text the writer of the command controls (a scheme word, a
|
|
1146
|
+
* host or cloud name) or a fixed label. The placeholder judgement and the
|
|
1147
|
+
* entropy floor read this group, never the whole match: a heuristic applied
|
|
1148
|
+
* to a span the writer controls is a suppression the writer controls
|
|
1149
|
+
* (node9Firewall#301). Absent: the whole match is the secret. redactText
|
|
1150
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+
* still replaces the whole match; a validator still receives it.
|
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1151
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+
*/
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1152
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+
secretGroup?: number;
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1138
1153
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/**
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|
1139
1154
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* Only the bounded tool-argument gate (matchArgumentText, reached through
|
|
1140
1155
|
* inspectArgumentSecrets / scanArgumentSecrets) uses this pattern. The raw
|
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@@ -1159,6 +1174,13 @@ declare const DLP_PATTERNS: DlpPattern[];
|
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|
1159
1174
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*/
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1160
1175
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declare function matchSensitivePath(resolvedPath: string, originalPath: string, options?: {
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1161
1176
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systemAccessHandled?: boolean;
|
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1177
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+
/**
|
|
1178
|
+
* The call only READS the file (`Read`, `Grep`). Public material under
|
|
1179
|
+
* `.ssh` (known_hosts, authorized_keys, *.pub) is then not sensitive
|
|
1180
|
+
* (JAIL-16). A write to the same names stays blocked: adding a key to
|
|
1181
|
+
* `authorized_keys` is persistence, not a read of something public.
|
|
1182
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+
*/
|
|
1183
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+
readOnly?: boolean;
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1162
1184
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}): DlpMatch | null;
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|
1163
1185
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/** Exposed so the proxy's I/O wrapper can build the same fail-closed match. */
|
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1164
1186
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declare function sensitivePathMatch(originalPath: string): DlpMatch;
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@@ -2465,7 +2487,7 @@ declare const LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: number;
|
|
|
2465
2487
|
* and fails CI when the hash drifts without a version bump — forgetting
|
|
2466
2488
|
* is loud, not silent.
|
|
2467
2489
|
*/
|
|
2468
|
-
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-
|
|
2490
|
+
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v41";
|
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2469
2491
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/**
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|
2470
2492
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* SHA-256 prefix of the detector-source files
|
|
2471
2493
|
* (canonical.ts + pii.ts + destructive-regex.ts).
|
|
@@ -2476,7 +2498,7 @@ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v39";
|
|
|
2476
2498
|
* files changed, this hash must change too, and you must consciously
|
|
2477
2499
|
* decide whether to bump CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION."
|
|
2478
2500
|
*/
|
|
2479
|
-
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "
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2501
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+
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "dbde5e7f06f3738a";
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2480
2502
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declare function extractCanonicalFindings(call: ToolCallEntry, ctx: ExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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2481
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declare function extractSessionLevelFindings(calls: ReadonlyArray<SessionToolCall>, ctx: SessionExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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2482
2504
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/**
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@@ -2588,5 +2610,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
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2588
2610
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/** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
|
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2589
2611
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declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
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2590
2612
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|
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2591
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-
export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, ASI, ASI_IDS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, POSTURE_CATEGORY_OWASP, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_REPO_RULES_WITHOUT_RISK, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, agentFileKind, analyzeFsOperation, analyzeGit, analyzeOutbound, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, boostsHandoffAfterExposure, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, derivedWrites, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractRegistryOverrides, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitInvocations, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, holdsSendsWithoutDaemon, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isAsiId, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isPublicRegistryHost, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isSpawnTool, isStrictGatedTier, isSubagentSpawn, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchArgumentText, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, packRowOwasp, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, pipelineTexts, positionedArgs, postureCategoryOwasp, previewArgs, redactText, registryHost, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanInstructionWrite, scanRepoRuleOwasp, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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2613
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export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, ASI, ASI_IDS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, POSTURE_CATEGORY_OWASP, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, PUBLIC_SSH_NAME_SOURCE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_REPO_RULES_WITHOUT_RISK, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SHELL_INTERPRETERS, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, agentFileKind, analyzeFsOperation, analyzeGit, analyzeOutbound, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, boostsHandoffAfterExposure, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, derivedWrites, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractRegistryOverrides, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitInvocations, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, holdsSendsWithoutDaemon, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isAsiId, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isPublicRegistryHost, isPublicSshMaterial, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isSpawnTool, isStrictGatedTier, isSubagentSpawn, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchArgumentText, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, packRowOwasp, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, pipelineTexts, positionedArgs, postureCategoryOwasp, previewArgs, redactText, registryHost, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanInstructionWrite, scanRepoRuleOwasp, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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2592
2614
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export type { ActionTemplateName, AgentFileKind, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AsiId, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, DerivedWrite, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, GitAnalysis, GitFinding, GitInvocation, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, OutboundAnalysis, OutboundCheckId, OutboundFinding, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, RegistryOverride, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
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