@node9/policy-engine 2.51.0 → 2.52.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.d.mts CHANGED
@@ -958,6 +958,10 @@ interface PolicyHostHooks {
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  * holds a `.git` entry. Decides `git -C <dir> add .` (node9Firewall#413).
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  * Absent, or no cwd: the stage-all finding stands. */
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  isGitWorkTreeTop?: (dir: string, cwd: string) => boolean;
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+ /** The running daemon's pid from ~/.node9/daemon.pid, or null. A `kill` of
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+ * that number switches node9 off (commands.node9-disarm). Absent: a numeric
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+ * kill is never read as the daemon. */
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+ daemonPid?: () => number | null;
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  }
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  interface PolicyVerdict {
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  decision: 'allow' | 'review' | 'block';
@@ -1428,6 +1432,10 @@ declare function isRecordOnly(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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  /** Strict and Block all ask about every inline code call, not only the
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  * dangerous ones the inline judge finds. */
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  declare function reviewsEveryInline(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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+ /** Strict and Block all hold a send to an unknown destination while the
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+ * daemon is down, since nobody knows what the session read; Standard records
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+ * it only (node9Firewall#445 follow-up). */
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+ declare function holdsSendsWithoutDaemon(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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  /** Block all: ask before any call no check recognised (the catch-all,
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  * `commands.unknown`) and about a binary of unknown origin. This is what
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  * `strict` meant before the levels. */
@@ -2426,7 +2434,7 @@ declare const LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: number;
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  * and fails CI when the hash drifts without a version bump — forgetting
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  * is loud, not silent.
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  */
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- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v37";
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+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v38";
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  /**
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  * SHA-256 prefix of the detector-source files
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  * (canonical.ts + pii.ts + destructive-regex.ts).
@@ -2437,7 +2445,7 @@ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v37";
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  * files changed, this hash must change too, and you must consciously
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  * decide whether to bump CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION."
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  */
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- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "2c9a0271d9c1dd57";
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+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "2d3dfcccff2c2f65";
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  declare function extractCanonicalFindings(call: ToolCallEntry, ctx: ExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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  declare function extractSessionLevelFindings(calls: ReadonlyArray<SessionToolCall>, ctx: SessionExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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  /**
@@ -2549,5 +2557,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
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  /** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
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  declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
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- export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, ASI, ASI_IDS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, POSTURE_CATEGORY_OWASP, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_REPO_RULES_WITHOUT_RISK, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, agentFileKind, analyzeFsOperation, analyzeGit, analyzeOutbound, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, derivedWrites, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractRegistryOverrides, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitInvocations, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isAsiId, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isPublicRegistryHost, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, packRowOwasp, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, pipelineTexts, positionedArgs, postureCategoryOwasp, previewArgs, redactText, registryHost, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanInstructionWrite, scanRepoRuleOwasp, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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+ export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, ASI, ASI_IDS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, POSTURE_CATEGORY_OWASP, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_REPO_RULES_WITHOUT_RISK, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, agentFileKind, analyzeFsOperation, analyzeGit, analyzeOutbound, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, derivedWrites, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractRegistryOverrides, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitInvocations, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, holdsSendsWithoutDaemon, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isAsiId, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isPublicRegistryHost, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, packRowOwasp, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, pipelineTexts, positionedArgs, postureCategoryOwasp, previewArgs, redactText, registryHost, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanInstructionWrite, scanRepoRuleOwasp, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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  export type { ActionTemplateName, AgentFileKind, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AsiId, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, DerivedWrite, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, GitAnalysis, GitFinding, GitInvocation, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, OutboundAnalysis, OutboundCheckId, OutboundFinding, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, RegistryOverride, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
package/dist/index.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -958,6 +958,10 @@ interface PolicyHostHooks {
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  * holds a `.git` entry. Decides `git -C <dir> add .` (node9Firewall#413).
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  * Absent, or no cwd: the stage-all finding stands. */
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  isGitWorkTreeTop?: (dir: string, cwd: string) => boolean;
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+ /** The running daemon's pid from ~/.node9/daemon.pid, or null. A `kill` of
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+ * that number switches node9 off (commands.node9-disarm). Absent: a numeric
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+ * kill is never read as the daemon. */
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+ daemonPid?: () => number | null;
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  }
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  interface PolicyVerdict {
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  decision: 'allow' | 'review' | 'block';
@@ -1428,6 +1432,10 @@ declare function isRecordOnly(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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  /** Strict and Block all ask about every inline code call, not only the
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  * dangerous ones the inline judge finds. */
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  declare function reviewsEveryInline(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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+ /** Strict and Block all hold a send to an unknown destination while the
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+ * daemon is down, since nobody knows what the session read; Standard records
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+ * it only (node9Firewall#445 follow-up). */
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+ declare function holdsSendsWithoutDaemon(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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  /** Block all: ask before any call no check recognised (the catch-all,
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  * `commands.unknown`) and about a binary of unknown origin. This is what
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  * `strict` meant before the levels. */
@@ -2426,7 +2434,7 @@ declare const LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: number;
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  * and fails CI when the hash drifts without a version bump — forgetting
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  * is loud, not silent.
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  */
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- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v37";
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+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v38";
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  /**
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  * SHA-256 prefix of the detector-source files
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  * (canonical.ts + pii.ts + destructive-regex.ts).
@@ -2437,7 +2445,7 @@ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v37";
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  * files changed, this hash must change too, and you must consciously
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  * decide whether to bump CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION."
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  */
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- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "2c9a0271d9c1dd57";
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+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "2d3dfcccff2c2f65";
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  declare function extractCanonicalFindings(call: ToolCallEntry, ctx: ExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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  declare function extractSessionLevelFindings(calls: ReadonlyArray<SessionToolCall>, ctx: SessionExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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  /**
@@ -2549,5 +2557,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
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  /** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
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  declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
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- export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, ASI, ASI_IDS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, POSTURE_CATEGORY_OWASP, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_REPO_RULES_WITHOUT_RISK, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, agentFileKind, analyzeFsOperation, analyzeGit, analyzeOutbound, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, derivedWrites, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractRegistryOverrides, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitInvocations, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isAsiId, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isPublicRegistryHost, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, packRowOwasp, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, pipelineTexts, positionedArgs, postureCategoryOwasp, previewArgs, redactText, registryHost, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanInstructionWrite, scanRepoRuleOwasp, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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+ export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, ASI, ASI_IDS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, POSTURE_CATEGORY_OWASP, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_REPO_RULES_WITHOUT_RISK, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, agentFileKind, analyzeFsOperation, analyzeGit, analyzeOutbound, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, derivedWrites, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractRegistryOverrides, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitInvocations, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, holdsSendsWithoutDaemon, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isAsiId, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isPublicRegistryHost, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, packRowOwasp, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, pipelineTexts, positionedArgs, postureCategoryOwasp, previewArgs, redactText, registryHost, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanInstructionWrite, scanRepoRuleOwasp, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
2553
2561
  export type { ActionTemplateName, AgentFileKind, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AsiId, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, DerivedWrite, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, GitAnalysis, GitFinding, GitInvocation, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, OutboundAnalysis, OutboundCheckId, OutboundFinding, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, RegistryOverride, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
157
157
  gitInvocations: () => gitInvocations,
158
158
  gitRepoPath: () => gitRepoPath,
159
159
  hashDestination: () => hashDestination,
160
+ holdsSendsWithoutDaemon: () => holdsSendsWithoutDaemon,
160
161
  hostMatches: () => hostMatches,
161
162
  incompleteFileVerdict: () => incompleteFileVerdict,
162
163
  inlineExecDescription: () => inlineExecDescription,
@@ -2384,15 +2385,15 @@ function ssrfExemptMatches(entries, normalized) {
2384
2385
  continue;
2385
2386
  }
2386
2387
  if (!target) continue;
2387
- const base2 = bitsOf(normalizeIpLiteral(entry.slice(0, slash)) ?? "");
2388
+ const base3 = bitsOf(normalizeIpLiteral(entry.slice(0, slash)) ?? "");
2388
2389
  const prefixText = entry.slice(slash + 1);
2389
2390
  const prefix = /^\d+$/.test(prefixText) ? Number(prefixText) : NaN;
2390
- if (!base2 || !Number.isInteger(prefix) || prefix < 0 || // A v4 range never matches a v6 address, and the reverse: the widths
2391
+ if (!base3 || !Number.isInteger(prefix) || prefix < 0 || // A v4 range never matches a v6 address, and the reverse: the widths
2391
2392
  // differ, so `0.0.0.0/0` does not release `::1`.
2392
- base2.length !== target.length || prefix > base2.length) {
2393
+ base3.length !== target.length || prefix > base3.length) {
2393
2394
  continue;
2394
2395
  }
2395
- if (base2.slice(0, prefix) === target.slice(0, prefix)) return true;
2396
+ if (base3.slice(0, prefix) === target.slice(0, prefix)) return true;
2396
2397
  }
2397
2398
  return false;
2398
2399
  }
@@ -2689,7 +2690,7 @@ var CHECK_TEXT = {
2689
2690
  advice: "Fixed at Review for now."
2690
2691
  },
2691
2692
  "commands.node9-disarm": {
2692
- plain: "The agent runs a node9 command that would switch off a protection: clear a session flag, trust an address, pause the gate, weaken a shield.",
2693
+ plain: "The agent switches node9 off or weakens it: stops or kills the daemon, stops its service, uninstalls node9, changes files in ~/.node9, clears a session flag, trusts an address, pauses the gate, weakens a shield.",
2693
2694
  example: "After reading a web page, the agent runs node9 session-exposure clear --all",
2694
2695
  advice: "Keep Review: these are your commands to run. Block if the agent should never touch node9."
2695
2696
  },
@@ -2742,6 +2743,10 @@ function reviewsEveryAgentFileWrite(mode) {
2742
2743
  const level = levelOf(mode);
2743
2744
  return level === "strict" || level === "block-all";
2744
2745
  }
2746
+ function holdsSendsWithoutDaemon(mode) {
2747
+ const level = levelOf(mode);
2748
+ return level === "strict" || level === "block-all";
2749
+ }
2745
2750
  function isBlockAll(mode) {
2746
2751
  return levelOf(mode) === "block-all";
2747
2752
  }
@@ -3111,7 +3116,7 @@ var PRODUCT_CHECKS = [
3111
3116
  group: "commands",
3112
3117
  owasp: "ASI10",
3113
3118
  title: "node9 disarmed from the shell",
3114
- catches: "a node9 command that clears a session flag, trusts a destination, pauses the gate or weakens a shield, run by the agent",
3119
+ catches: "the agent stopping or killing the node9 daemon, stopping its service, uninstalling node9, changing files in ~/.node9, or running a node9 command that clears a session flag, trusts a destination, pauses the gate or weakens a shield",
3115
3120
  values: ALL,
3116
3121
  defaultValue: "review",
3117
3122
  legacy: ["review-node9-disarm"]
@@ -7935,8 +7940,8 @@ function analyzeFsOperation(command) {
7935
7940
  }
7936
7941
  var stripDotSlash = (p) => p.replace(/^\.\//, "");
7937
7942
  function isSensitiveCleanupName(p) {
7938
- const base2 = p.replace(/^.*[\\/]/, "");
7939
- return /^\.env(\.|$)/i.test(base2) || /(?:^|[\\/])\.(?:ssh|aws|gnupg|git)(?:[\\/]|$)/i.test(p) || /\.(?:pem|key|p12|pfx|crt)$/i.test(base2) || /^\.?(?:netrc|npmrc|pgpass|htpasswd)$/i.test(base2) || /^id_(?:rsa|dsa|ecdsa|ed25519)/i.test(base2) || /credential/i.test(p) || /secret/i.test(base2);
7943
+ const base3 = p.replace(/^.*[\\/]/, "");
7944
+ return /^\.env(\.|$)/i.test(base3) || /(?:^|[\\/])\.(?:ssh|aws|gnupg|git)(?:[\\/]|$)/i.test(p) || /\.(?:pem|key|p12|pfx|crt)$/i.test(base3) || /^\.?(?:netrc|npmrc|pgpass|htpasswd)$/i.test(base3) || /^id_(?:rsa|dsa|ecdsa|ed25519)/i.test(base3) || /credential/i.test(p) || /secret/i.test(base3);
7940
7945
  }
7941
7946
  function isWaivableCleanupTarget(p) {
7942
7947
  if (/^[/~]/.test(p) || /^\$/.test(p)) return false;
@@ -9327,6 +9332,21 @@ function hits(access, paths, directories, context) {
9327
9332
  }
9328
9333
  return false;
9329
9334
  }
9335
+ function hitsNode9Dir(access, dirs, context) {
9336
+ const home = context.homeDirs?.[0] ?? "~";
9337
+ if (access.glob) {
9338
+ const pattern = normalizeFilePath(access.glob, access.cwd ?? context.cwd, home);
9339
+ const magic = pattern.search(/[*?[{]/);
9340
+ const literal = magic < 0 ? pattern : pattern.slice(0, pattern.lastIndexOf("/", magic));
9341
+ return dirs.some((d) => within(literal, d));
9342
+ }
9343
+ const candidates = access.candidates ?? [
9344
+ normalizeFilePath(access.path, access.cwd ?? context.cwd, home)
9345
+ ];
9346
+ return candidates.some(
9347
+ (p) => dirs.some((d) => within(p, d)) || access.recursive === true && dirs.some((d) => within(d, p))
9348
+ );
9349
+ }
9330
9350
  var exempt = (p) => SYSTEM_DIRS_EXEMPT.some((d) => within(p, d));
9331
9351
  function hitsSystemDir(access, context, dirs = SYSTEM_DIRS) {
9332
9352
  const home = context.homeDirs?.[0] ?? "~";
@@ -9369,6 +9389,7 @@ function evaluateProtectedFileAccess(accesses, context, settings) {
9369
9389
  const consider = (result) => {
9370
9390
  if (!best || RANK[result.decision] > RANK[best.decision]) best = result;
9371
9391
  };
9392
+ const node9Dirs = homes.map((home) => `${home.replace(/\/$/, "")}/.node9`);
9372
9393
  for (const access of accesses) {
9373
9394
  const mutation = access.operation !== "read";
9374
9395
  let kind;
@@ -9397,6 +9418,10 @@ function evaluateProtectedFileAccess(accesses, context, settings) {
9397
9418
  "files.system-dirs",
9398
9419
  "review-root-home-read",
9399
9420
  "Reading the root account's home requires approval"
9421
+ ] : mutation && hitsNode9Dir(access, node9Dirs, context) ? [
9422
+ "commands.node9-disarm",
9423
+ "review-node9-disarm",
9424
+ "Changing node9's own files requires approval"
9400
9425
  ] : null;
9401
9426
  } catch {
9402
9427
  consider(incompleteFileVerdict(access.operation));
@@ -12401,9 +12426,9 @@ function validateBelgianNationalNumber(raw) {
12401
12426
  if (!/^\d{11}$/.test(d)) return false;
12402
12427
  const month = Number(d.slice(2, 4)) % 20;
12403
12428
  if (month !== 0 && !plausibleDate(String(month).padStart(2, "0"), d.slice(4, 6))) return false;
12404
- const base2 = Number(d.slice(0, 9));
12429
+ const base3 = Number(d.slice(0, 9));
12405
12430
  const check = Number(d.slice(9, 11));
12406
- return 97 - base2 % 97 === check || 97 - (2e9 + base2) % 97 === check;
12431
+ return 97 - base3 % 97 === check || 97 - (2e9 + base3) % 97 === check;
12407
12432
  }
12408
12433
  function validateCuit(raw) {
12409
12434
  const d = raw.replace(/-/g, "");
@@ -14011,9 +14036,9 @@ var GitWalk = class {
14011
14036
  const name = n.Name.Value;
14012
14037
  if (n.Append) {
14013
14038
  const prev = this.appended.has(name) ? this.appended.get(name) : resolveWordLiteral(n.Value) === null ? null : void 0;
14014
- const base2 = prev === void 0 ? recordedExpansion(name) : prev;
14039
+ const base3 = prev === void 0 ? recordedExpansion(name) : prev;
14015
14040
  const piece = resolveWordLiteral(n.Value);
14016
- this.appended.set(name, typeof base2 === "string" && piece !== null ? base2 + piece : null);
14041
+ this.appended.set(name, typeof base3 === "string" && piece !== null ? base3 + piece : null);
14017
14042
  this.treeTopVars.delete(name);
14018
14043
  return true;
14019
14044
  }
@@ -15045,9 +15070,9 @@ var INSTRUCTION_NAMES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
15045
15070
  var SETTINGS_RE = /\/(?:\.claude\/settings(?:\.local)?\.json|\.gemini\/settings\.json|\.codex\/hooks\.json|\.cursor\/hooks\.json)$/i;
15046
15071
  function agentFileKind(p) {
15047
15072
  const lower2 = p.toLowerCase();
15048
- const base2 = lower2.slice(lower2.lastIndexOf("/") + 1);
15049
- if (INSTRUCTION_NAMES.has(base2)) return "instructions";
15050
- if (base2 === "copilot-instructions.md" && lower2.endsWith("/.github/" + base2))
15073
+ const base3 = lower2.slice(lower2.lastIndexOf("/") + 1);
15074
+ if (INSTRUCTION_NAMES.has(base3)) return "instructions";
15075
+ if (base3 === "copilot-instructions.md" && lower2.endsWith("/.github/" + base3))
15051
15076
  return "instructions";
15052
15077
  if (/\/\.cursor\/rules(?:\/|$)/.test(lower2)) return "instructions";
15053
15078
  if (/\/\.claude\/projects\/[^/]+\/memory(?:\/|$)/.test(lower2)) return "memory";
@@ -15217,7 +15242,7 @@ function evaluateAgentFileWrite(args, accesses, context, settings, shell, hooks
15217
15242
  skills: "agent skill",
15218
15243
  settings: "agent settings"
15219
15244
  };
15220
- const base2 = `${kindLabel[kind]} written: ${access.path}`;
15245
+ const base3 = `${kindLabel[kind]} written: ${access.path}`;
15221
15246
  if (!signal && !every) {
15222
15247
  return {
15223
15248
  decision: "allow",
@@ -15227,14 +15252,14 @@ function evaluateAgentFileWrite(args, accesses, context, settings, shell, hooks
15227
15252
  path: access.path,
15228
15253
  operation: access.operation,
15229
15254
  kind,
15230
- reason: base2,
15255
+ reason: base3,
15231
15256
  ruleDescription: "The AI writes to a file every later agent session loads as instructions.",
15232
- blockedByLabel: `Node9 Files: ${base2}`,
15257
+ blockedByLabel: `Node9 Files: ${base3}`,
15233
15258
  tier: 2
15234
15259
  };
15235
15260
  }
15236
15261
  const ruleName = signal === "content" ? "review-agent-file-content" : signal === "hooks" ? "review-agent-hooks-change" : "review-agent-file-write";
15237
- const reason = signal ? `${base2} (${detail})` : base2;
15262
+ const reason = signal ? `${base3} (${detail})` : base3;
15238
15263
  const description = signal === "content" ? "The AI writes an instruction into a file every later agent session loads: to hide something from you, to skip approvals or the guard, or to read or send a secret. It would persist past this session; confirm it is yours." : signal === "hooks" ? "The AI changes the hooks in the agent's settings. Hooks are how node9 and your other checks run before each tool call; a change here can disarm them." : "The AI writes to a file every later agent session loads as instructions (CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, memory, agents, commands). Confirm the change is yours.";
15239
15264
  return {
15240
15265
  decision: value === "log" ? "allow" : value,
@@ -17954,6 +17979,175 @@ function scanArgumentSecrets(args) {
17954
17979
  } : null;
17955
17980
  }
17956
17981
 
17982
+ // src/shell/node9-disarm.ts
17983
+ var RULE_NAME2 = "review-node9-disarm";
17984
+ var DESCRIPTION = "The AI wants to stop node9, remove it, or change its own files. These are your commands to run, not the agent's: with the daemon stopped the outside-content and taint checks are off.";
17985
+ var DAEMON_CMDLINES = [
17986
+ "node /usr/lib/node_modules/@node9/proxy/dist/cli.js daemon start",
17987
+ "node9 daemon start"
17988
+ ];
17989
+ var DAEMON_NAMES = ["node", "node9"];
17990
+ var KILLALL_NAMES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["node", "node9", "node.exe", "node9.exe"]);
17991
+ var STOP_SYSTEMCTL = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["stop", "disable", "mask", "kill"]);
17992
+ var STOP_LAUNCHCTL = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["unload", "bootout", "remove", "stop", "kill", "disable"]);
17993
+ var PKILL_VALUE_FLAGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
17994
+ "-u",
17995
+ "-U",
17996
+ "-g",
17997
+ "-G",
17998
+ "-P",
17999
+ "-s",
18000
+ "-t",
18001
+ "-F",
18002
+ "--signal",
18003
+ "--euid",
18004
+ "--uid",
18005
+ "--pgroup",
18006
+ "--group",
18007
+ "--parent",
18008
+ "--session",
18009
+ "--terminal",
18010
+ "--pidfile",
18011
+ "--ns",
18012
+ "--nslist"
18013
+ ]);
18014
+ var NAME_PRESCREEN_RE = /node9|kill|systemctl|launchctl|daemon/i;
18015
+ function patternSelects(pattern, targets) {
18016
+ const pieces = pattern.toLowerCase().split(/[\\^$.*+?()[\]{}|]+/).filter(Boolean);
18017
+ if (pieces.length === 0) return false;
18018
+ return targets.some((t) => pieces.every((p) => t.includes(p)));
18019
+ }
18020
+ function sourceText(bytes, pos, end) {
18021
+ if (typeof pos !== "number" || typeof end !== "number" || pos < 0 || end < pos) return "";
18022
+ return new TextDecoder().decode(bytes.subarray(pos, end));
18023
+ }
18024
+ var base2 = (w) => (w ?? "").split(/[\\/]/).pop()?.toLowerCase() ?? "";
18025
+ function nextOperand(words, from) {
18026
+ for (let i = from; i < words.length; i++) {
18027
+ const w = words[i];
18028
+ if (w !== null && w.startsWith("-")) continue;
18029
+ return i;
18030
+ }
18031
+ return -1;
18032
+ }
18033
+ function node9Command(words, h) {
18034
+ const head = base2(words[h]);
18035
+ if (head !== "node9" && head !== "node9.cmd" && words[h] !== "@node9/proxy") return null;
18036
+ const s = nextOperand(words, h + 1);
18037
+ const sub = s < 0 ? "" : (words[s] ?? "").toLowerCase();
18038
+ if (sub === "uninstall") return "node9 uninstall";
18039
+ if (sub !== "daemon") return null;
18040
+ const a = nextOperand(words, s + 1);
18041
+ const action = a < 0 ? "" : (words[a] ?? "").toLowerCase();
18042
+ return action === "stop" || action === "uninstall" ? `node9 daemon ${action}` : null;
18043
+ }
18044
+ var HOME_PID_FILE_RE = /(?:^|[\s"'(=`])(?:~|\$HOME|\$\{HOME\}|\/home\/[^/\s]+|\/Users\/[^/\s]+|\/root)\/\.node9\/daemon\.pid/;
18045
+ function killsDaemon(words, texts, h, daemonPid) {
18046
+ const head = base2(words[h]);
18047
+ const args = words.slice(h + 1);
18048
+ if (head === "kill") {
18049
+ for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
18050
+ const w = args[i];
18051
+ if (w === "-s" || w === "-n") {
18052
+ i++;
18053
+ continue;
18054
+ }
18055
+ if (w !== null && w.startsWith("-")) continue;
18056
+ if (w === null) {
18057
+ if (HOME_PID_FILE_RE.test(texts[h + 1 + i] ?? "")) return "kill of the pid in daemon.pid";
18058
+ continue;
18059
+ }
18060
+ if (daemonPid !== null && w === String(daemonPid)) return `kill ${w} (the node9 daemon)`;
18061
+ }
18062
+ return null;
18063
+ }
18064
+ if (head === "pkill") {
18065
+ let full = false;
18066
+ let pattern = null;
18067
+ for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
18068
+ const w = args[i];
18069
+ if (w === null) continue;
18070
+ if (PKILL_VALUE_FLAGS.has(w)) {
18071
+ i++;
18072
+ continue;
18073
+ }
18074
+ if (w === "--full") full = true;
18075
+ else if (/^-[a-zA-Z]+$/.test(w) && w.includes("f")) full = true;
18076
+ if (w.startsWith("-")) continue;
18077
+ pattern = w;
18078
+ }
18079
+ if (pattern === null) return null;
18080
+ return patternSelects(pattern, full ? DAEMON_CMDLINES : DAEMON_NAMES) ? `pkill ${full ? "-f " : ""}${pattern}` : null;
18081
+ }
18082
+ if (head === "killall") {
18083
+ const regex = args.some((w) => w === "-r" || w === "--regexp");
18084
+ for (const w of args) {
18085
+ if (w === null || w.startsWith("-")) continue;
18086
+ if (regex ? patternSelects(w, DAEMON_NAMES) : KILLALL_NAMES.has(w.toLowerCase()))
18087
+ return `killall ${w}`;
18088
+ }
18089
+ return null;
18090
+ }
18091
+ if (head === "taskkill" || head === "taskkill.exe") {
18092
+ for (let i = 0; i < args.length - 1; i++) {
18093
+ const flag = (args[i] ?? "").toLowerCase();
18094
+ const value = (args[i + 1] ?? "").toLowerCase();
18095
+ if ((flag === "/im" || flag === "-im") && KILLALL_NAMES.has(value))
18096
+ return `taskkill /IM ${value}`;
18097
+ if ((flag === "/pid" || flag === "-pid") && daemonPid !== null && value === String(daemonPid))
18098
+ return `taskkill /PID ${value} (the node9 daemon)`;
18099
+ }
18100
+ }
18101
+ return null;
18102
+ }
18103
+ function stopsService(words, h) {
18104
+ const head = base2(words[h]);
18105
+ const args = words.slice(h + 1).map((w) => (w ?? "").toLowerCase());
18106
+ if (head === "systemctl") {
18107
+ const action = args.find((w) => STOP_SYSTEMCTL.has(w));
18108
+ if (action && args.some((w) => /^node9-daemon(\.service)?$/.test(w)))
18109
+ return `systemctl ${action} node9-daemon`;
18110
+ }
18111
+ if (head === "launchctl") {
18112
+ const action = args.find((w) => STOP_LAUNCHCTL.has(w));
18113
+ if (action && args.some((w) => w.includes("ai.node9.daemon")))
18114
+ return `launchctl ${action} ai.node9.daemon`;
18115
+ }
18116
+ return null;
18117
+ }
18118
+ function analyzeNode9Disarm(command, daemonPid = null, depth = 0) {
18119
+ if (depth > 3 || !NAME_PRESCREEN_RE.test(command.replace(/[\\'"]/g, ""))) return null;
18120
+ let shown = null;
18121
+ const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(command);
18122
+ try {
18123
+ walkCommandScope(command, (node) => {
18124
+ if (shown !== null) return false;
18125
+ const n = node;
18126
+ if (!n || n.kind !== "CallExpr") return true;
18127
+ const words = (n.Args || []).map((a) => resolveWordLiteral(a));
18128
+ if (words.length === 0) return true;
18129
+ const texts = (n.Args || []).map((a) => sourceText(bytes, a.pos, a.end));
18130
+ const h = unwrapCommandHead(words);
18131
+ shown = node9Command(words, h) ?? killsDaemon(words, texts, h, daemonPid) ?? stopsService(words, h);
18132
+ if (shown === null) {
18133
+ const payload = literalShellPayload(words, base2(words[0]));
18134
+ if (payload) {
18135
+ const inner = analyzeNode9Disarm(payload, daemonPid, depth + 1);
18136
+ if (inner) shown = inner.reason.replace(/^node9 switched off by the agent: /, "");
18137
+ }
18138
+ }
18139
+ return true;
18140
+ });
18141
+ } catch {
18142
+ }
18143
+ if (shown === null) return null;
18144
+ return {
18145
+ ruleName: RULE_NAME2,
18146
+ reason: `node9 switched off by the agent: ${shown}`,
18147
+ description: DESCRIPTION
18148
+ };
18149
+ }
18150
+
17957
18151
  // src/policy/index.ts
17958
18152
  function catalogSettings(config) {
17959
18153
  return catalogSettingsFromConfig(config.settings, config.policy);
@@ -18120,7 +18314,7 @@ async function evaluatePolicy(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hostHooks =
18120
18314
  }
18121
18315
  async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks = {}) {
18122
18316
  const { agent, cwd, activeEnvironment } = context;
18123
- const { checkProvenance, isTrustedHost, isConfiguredRegistry, isGitWorkTreeTop } = hooks;
18317
+ const { checkProvenance, isTrustedHost, isConfiguredRegistry, isGitWorkTreeTop, daemonPid } = hooks;
18124
18318
  const settingsView = catalogSettings(config);
18125
18319
  const layers = inspectionLayers(config.policy);
18126
18320
  const cv = (id) => checkValue(settingsView, id);
@@ -18305,6 +18499,23 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
18305
18499
  else if (v && !pendingAstReview) pendingAstReview = v;
18306
18500
  }
18307
18501
  }
18502
+ if (cv("commands.node9-disarm") !== "off") {
18503
+ const finding = analyzeNode9Disarm(bashCommand, daemonPid?.() ?? null);
18504
+ if (finding) {
18505
+ const v = applyCheckValue(cv("commands.node9-disarm"), {
18506
+ decision: "review",
18507
+ blockedByLabel: `Node9 (AST): ${finding.ruleName}`,
18508
+ reason: finding.reason,
18509
+ tier: 2,
18510
+ ruleName: finding.ruleName,
18511
+ ruleDescription: finding.description,
18512
+ checkId: "commands.node9-disarm"
18513
+ });
18514
+ if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
18515
+ else if (v?.decision === "block") return v;
18516
+ else if (v && !pendingAstReview) pendingAstReview = v;
18517
+ }
18518
+ }
18308
18519
  }
18309
18520
  if (config.policy.smartRules.length > 0) {
18310
18521
  const rmCleanupWaiver = bashCommand !== null && isRmCreatedInCommandCleanup(bashCommand);
@@ -18896,8 +19107,8 @@ function hasRoutingNumber(text) {
18896
19107
  return false;
18897
19108
  }
18898
19109
  var PII_IBAN_RE = /\b[A-Z]{2}\d{2}(?:[A-Z0-9]|[ -][A-Z0-9]){11,30}\b/;
18899
- function* validCardRuns(text, base2, exemptFractions = true) {
18900
- const re = new RegExp(base2.source, "g");
19110
+ function* validCardRuns(text, base3, exemptFractions = true) {
19111
+ const re = new RegExp(base3.source, "g");
18901
19112
  let m;
18902
19113
  while ((m = re.exec(text)) !== null) {
18903
19114
  const digits = m[0].replace(/\D/g, "");
@@ -18910,17 +19121,17 @@ function* validCardRuns(text, base2, exemptFractions = true) {
18910
19121
  }
18911
19122
  }
18912
19123
  function hasValidCard(text) {
18913
- for (const base2 of CARD_PATTERNS) {
18914
- if (!validCardRuns(text, base2).next().done) return true;
19124
+ for (const base3 of CARD_PATTERNS) {
19125
+ if (!validCardRuns(text, base3).next().done) return true;
18915
19126
  }
18916
19127
  return false;
18917
19128
  }
18918
19129
  function replaceValidCards(text, replace, { exemptFractions = true } = {}) {
18919
19130
  let out = text;
18920
- for (const base2 of CARD_PATTERNS) {
19131
+ for (const base3 of CARD_PATTERNS) {
18921
19132
  let res = "";
18922
19133
  let last = 0;
18923
- for (const run of validCardRuns(out, base2, exemptFractions)) {
19134
+ for (const run of validCardRuns(out, base3, exemptFractions)) {
18924
19135
  res += out.slice(last, run.index) + replace(run.digits);
18925
19136
  last = run.index + run.length;
18926
19137
  }
@@ -19209,9 +19420,9 @@ function maskLeaf(value, key, depth) {
19209
19420
  const used = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
19210
19421
  return Object.fromEntries(
19211
19422
  Object.entries(value).map(([k, v]) => {
19212
- const base2 = maskPersonalData(k);
19213
- let name = base2;
19214
- for (let n = 2; used.has(name); n++) name = `${base2}#${n}`;
19423
+ const base3 = maskPersonalData(k);
19424
+ let name = base3;
19425
+ for (let n = 2; used.has(name); n++) name = `${base3}#${n}`;
19215
19426
  used.add(name);
19216
19427
  return [name, maskLeaf(v, k, depth + 1)];
19217
19428
  })
@@ -20259,8 +20470,8 @@ function matchCanaryArgs(args, values) {
20259
20470
 
20260
20471
  // src/scan/canonical.ts
20261
20472
  var LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES = 100 * 1024;
20262
- var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v37";
20263
- var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "2c9a0271d9c1dd57";
20473
+ var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v38";
20474
+ var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "2d3dfcccff2c2f65";
20264
20475
  var DEDUPE_PREVIEW_LEN = 120;
20265
20476
  function extractCanonicalFindings(call, ctx) {
20266
20477
  const out = [];
@@ -20841,6 +21052,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
20841
21052
  gitInvocations,
20842
21053
  gitRepoPath,
20843
21054
  hashDestination,
21055
+ holdsSendsWithoutDaemon,
20844
21056
  hostMatches,
20845
21057
  incompleteFileVerdict,
20846
21058
  inlineExecDescription,
package/dist/index.mjs CHANGED
@@ -2122,15 +2122,15 @@ function ssrfExemptMatches(entries, normalized) {
2122
2122
  continue;
2123
2123
  }
2124
2124
  if (!target) continue;
2125
- const base2 = bitsOf(normalizeIpLiteral(entry.slice(0, slash)) ?? "");
2125
+ const base3 = bitsOf(normalizeIpLiteral(entry.slice(0, slash)) ?? "");
2126
2126
  const prefixText = entry.slice(slash + 1);
2127
2127
  const prefix = /^\d+$/.test(prefixText) ? Number(prefixText) : NaN;
2128
- if (!base2 || !Number.isInteger(prefix) || prefix < 0 || // A v4 range never matches a v6 address, and the reverse: the widths
2128
+ if (!base3 || !Number.isInteger(prefix) || prefix < 0 || // A v4 range never matches a v6 address, and the reverse: the widths
2129
2129
  // differ, so `0.0.0.0/0` does not release `::1`.
2130
- base2.length !== target.length || prefix > base2.length) {
2130
+ base3.length !== target.length || prefix > base3.length) {
2131
2131
  continue;
2132
2132
  }
2133
- if (base2.slice(0, prefix) === target.slice(0, prefix)) return true;
2133
+ if (base3.slice(0, prefix) === target.slice(0, prefix)) return true;
2134
2134
  }
2135
2135
  return false;
2136
2136
  }
@@ -2427,7 +2427,7 @@ var CHECK_TEXT = {
2427
2427
  advice: "Fixed at Review for now."
2428
2428
  },
2429
2429
  "commands.node9-disarm": {
2430
- plain: "The agent runs a node9 command that would switch off a protection: clear a session flag, trust an address, pause the gate, weaken a shield.",
2430
+ plain: "The agent switches node9 off or weakens it: stops or kills the daemon, stops its service, uninstalls node9, changes files in ~/.node9, clears a session flag, trusts an address, pauses the gate, weakens a shield.",
2431
2431
  example: "After reading a web page, the agent runs node9 session-exposure clear --all",
2432
2432
  advice: "Keep Review: these are your commands to run. Block if the agent should never touch node9."
2433
2433
  },
@@ -2480,6 +2480,10 @@ function reviewsEveryAgentFileWrite(mode) {
2480
2480
  const level = levelOf(mode);
2481
2481
  return level === "strict" || level === "block-all";
2482
2482
  }
2483
+ function holdsSendsWithoutDaemon(mode) {
2484
+ const level = levelOf(mode);
2485
+ return level === "strict" || level === "block-all";
2486
+ }
2483
2487
  function isBlockAll(mode) {
2484
2488
  return levelOf(mode) === "block-all";
2485
2489
  }
@@ -2849,7 +2853,7 @@ var PRODUCT_CHECKS = [
2849
2853
  group: "commands",
2850
2854
  owasp: "ASI10",
2851
2855
  title: "node9 disarmed from the shell",
2852
- catches: "a node9 command that clears a session flag, trusts a destination, pauses the gate or weakens a shield, run by the agent",
2856
+ catches: "the agent stopping or killing the node9 daemon, stopping its service, uninstalling node9, changing files in ~/.node9, or running a node9 command that clears a session flag, trusts a destination, pauses the gate or weakens a shield",
2853
2857
  values: ALL,
2854
2858
  defaultValue: "review",
2855
2859
  legacy: ["review-node9-disarm"]
@@ -7673,8 +7677,8 @@ function analyzeFsOperation(command) {
7673
7677
  }
7674
7678
  var stripDotSlash = (p) => p.replace(/^\.\//, "");
7675
7679
  function isSensitiveCleanupName(p) {
7676
- const base2 = p.replace(/^.*[\\/]/, "");
7677
- return /^\.env(\.|$)/i.test(base2) || /(?:^|[\\/])\.(?:ssh|aws|gnupg|git)(?:[\\/]|$)/i.test(p) || /\.(?:pem|key|p12|pfx|crt)$/i.test(base2) || /^\.?(?:netrc|npmrc|pgpass|htpasswd)$/i.test(base2) || /^id_(?:rsa|dsa|ecdsa|ed25519)/i.test(base2) || /credential/i.test(p) || /secret/i.test(base2);
7680
+ const base3 = p.replace(/^.*[\\/]/, "");
7681
+ return /^\.env(\.|$)/i.test(base3) || /(?:^|[\\/])\.(?:ssh|aws|gnupg|git)(?:[\\/]|$)/i.test(p) || /\.(?:pem|key|p12|pfx|crt)$/i.test(base3) || /^\.?(?:netrc|npmrc|pgpass|htpasswd)$/i.test(base3) || /^id_(?:rsa|dsa|ecdsa|ed25519)/i.test(base3) || /credential/i.test(p) || /secret/i.test(base3);
7678
7682
  }
7679
7683
  function isWaivableCleanupTarget(p) {
7680
7684
  if (/^[/~]/.test(p) || /^\$/.test(p)) return false;
@@ -9065,6 +9069,21 @@ function hits(access, paths, directories, context) {
9065
9069
  }
9066
9070
  return false;
9067
9071
  }
9072
+ function hitsNode9Dir(access, dirs, context) {
9073
+ const home = context.homeDirs?.[0] ?? "~";
9074
+ if (access.glob) {
9075
+ const pattern = normalizeFilePath(access.glob, access.cwd ?? context.cwd, home);
9076
+ const magic = pattern.search(/[*?[{]/);
9077
+ const literal = magic < 0 ? pattern : pattern.slice(0, pattern.lastIndexOf("/", magic));
9078
+ return dirs.some((d) => within(literal, d));
9079
+ }
9080
+ const candidates = access.candidates ?? [
9081
+ normalizeFilePath(access.path, access.cwd ?? context.cwd, home)
9082
+ ];
9083
+ return candidates.some(
9084
+ (p) => dirs.some((d) => within(p, d)) || access.recursive === true && dirs.some((d) => within(d, p))
9085
+ );
9086
+ }
9068
9087
  var exempt = (p) => SYSTEM_DIRS_EXEMPT.some((d) => within(p, d));
9069
9088
  function hitsSystemDir(access, context, dirs = SYSTEM_DIRS) {
9070
9089
  const home = context.homeDirs?.[0] ?? "~";
@@ -9107,6 +9126,7 @@ function evaluateProtectedFileAccess(accesses, context, settings) {
9107
9126
  const consider = (result) => {
9108
9127
  if (!best || RANK[result.decision] > RANK[best.decision]) best = result;
9109
9128
  };
9129
+ const node9Dirs = homes.map((home) => `${home.replace(/\/$/, "")}/.node9`);
9110
9130
  for (const access of accesses) {
9111
9131
  const mutation = access.operation !== "read";
9112
9132
  let kind;
@@ -9135,6 +9155,10 @@ function evaluateProtectedFileAccess(accesses, context, settings) {
9135
9155
  "files.system-dirs",
9136
9156
  "review-root-home-read",
9137
9157
  "Reading the root account's home requires approval"
9158
+ ] : mutation && hitsNode9Dir(access, node9Dirs, context) ? [
9159
+ "commands.node9-disarm",
9160
+ "review-node9-disarm",
9161
+ "Changing node9's own files requires approval"
9138
9162
  ] : null;
9139
9163
  } catch {
9140
9164
  consider(incompleteFileVerdict(access.operation));
@@ -12139,9 +12163,9 @@ function validateBelgianNationalNumber(raw) {
12139
12163
  if (!/^\d{11}$/.test(d)) return false;
12140
12164
  const month = Number(d.slice(2, 4)) % 20;
12141
12165
  if (month !== 0 && !plausibleDate(String(month).padStart(2, "0"), d.slice(4, 6))) return false;
12142
- const base2 = Number(d.slice(0, 9));
12166
+ const base3 = Number(d.slice(0, 9));
12143
12167
  const check = Number(d.slice(9, 11));
12144
- return 97 - base2 % 97 === check || 97 - (2e9 + base2) % 97 === check;
12168
+ return 97 - base3 % 97 === check || 97 - (2e9 + base3) % 97 === check;
12145
12169
  }
12146
12170
  function validateCuit(raw) {
12147
12171
  const d = raw.replace(/-/g, "");
@@ -13749,9 +13773,9 @@ var GitWalk = class {
13749
13773
  const name = n.Name.Value;
13750
13774
  if (n.Append) {
13751
13775
  const prev = this.appended.has(name) ? this.appended.get(name) : resolveWordLiteral(n.Value) === null ? null : void 0;
13752
- const base2 = prev === void 0 ? recordedExpansion(name) : prev;
13776
+ const base3 = prev === void 0 ? recordedExpansion(name) : prev;
13753
13777
  const piece = resolveWordLiteral(n.Value);
13754
- this.appended.set(name, typeof base2 === "string" && piece !== null ? base2 + piece : null);
13778
+ this.appended.set(name, typeof base3 === "string" && piece !== null ? base3 + piece : null);
13755
13779
  this.treeTopVars.delete(name);
13756
13780
  return true;
13757
13781
  }
@@ -14783,9 +14807,9 @@ var INSTRUCTION_NAMES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
14783
14807
  var SETTINGS_RE = /\/(?:\.claude\/settings(?:\.local)?\.json|\.gemini\/settings\.json|\.codex\/hooks\.json|\.cursor\/hooks\.json)$/i;
14784
14808
  function agentFileKind(p) {
14785
14809
  const lower2 = p.toLowerCase();
14786
- const base2 = lower2.slice(lower2.lastIndexOf("/") + 1);
14787
- if (INSTRUCTION_NAMES.has(base2)) return "instructions";
14788
- if (base2 === "copilot-instructions.md" && lower2.endsWith("/.github/" + base2))
14810
+ const base3 = lower2.slice(lower2.lastIndexOf("/") + 1);
14811
+ if (INSTRUCTION_NAMES.has(base3)) return "instructions";
14812
+ if (base3 === "copilot-instructions.md" && lower2.endsWith("/.github/" + base3))
14789
14813
  return "instructions";
14790
14814
  if (/\/\.cursor\/rules(?:\/|$)/.test(lower2)) return "instructions";
14791
14815
  if (/\/\.claude\/projects\/[^/]+\/memory(?:\/|$)/.test(lower2)) return "memory";
@@ -14955,7 +14979,7 @@ function evaluateAgentFileWrite(args, accesses, context, settings, shell, hooks
14955
14979
  skills: "agent skill",
14956
14980
  settings: "agent settings"
14957
14981
  };
14958
- const base2 = `${kindLabel[kind]} written: ${access.path}`;
14982
+ const base3 = `${kindLabel[kind]} written: ${access.path}`;
14959
14983
  if (!signal && !every) {
14960
14984
  return {
14961
14985
  decision: "allow",
@@ -14965,14 +14989,14 @@ function evaluateAgentFileWrite(args, accesses, context, settings, shell, hooks
14965
14989
  path: access.path,
14966
14990
  operation: access.operation,
14967
14991
  kind,
14968
- reason: base2,
14992
+ reason: base3,
14969
14993
  ruleDescription: "The AI writes to a file every later agent session loads as instructions.",
14970
- blockedByLabel: `Node9 Files: ${base2}`,
14994
+ blockedByLabel: `Node9 Files: ${base3}`,
14971
14995
  tier: 2
14972
14996
  };
14973
14997
  }
14974
14998
  const ruleName = signal === "content" ? "review-agent-file-content" : signal === "hooks" ? "review-agent-hooks-change" : "review-agent-file-write";
14975
- const reason = signal ? `${base2} (${detail})` : base2;
14999
+ const reason = signal ? `${base3} (${detail})` : base3;
14976
15000
  const description = signal === "content" ? "The AI writes an instruction into a file every later agent session loads: to hide something from you, to skip approvals or the guard, or to read or send a secret. It would persist past this session; confirm it is yours." : signal === "hooks" ? "The AI changes the hooks in the agent's settings. Hooks are how node9 and your other checks run before each tool call; a change here can disarm them." : "The AI writes to a file every later agent session loads as instructions (CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, memory, agents, commands). Confirm the change is yours.";
14977
15001
  return {
14978
15002
  decision: value === "log" ? "allow" : value,
@@ -17692,6 +17716,175 @@ function scanArgumentSecrets(args) {
17692
17716
  } : null;
17693
17717
  }
17694
17718
 
17719
+ // src/shell/node9-disarm.ts
17720
+ var RULE_NAME2 = "review-node9-disarm";
17721
+ var DESCRIPTION = "The AI wants to stop node9, remove it, or change its own files. These are your commands to run, not the agent's: with the daemon stopped the outside-content and taint checks are off.";
17722
+ var DAEMON_CMDLINES = [
17723
+ "node /usr/lib/node_modules/@node9/proxy/dist/cli.js daemon start",
17724
+ "node9 daemon start"
17725
+ ];
17726
+ var DAEMON_NAMES = ["node", "node9"];
17727
+ var KILLALL_NAMES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["node", "node9", "node.exe", "node9.exe"]);
17728
+ var STOP_SYSTEMCTL = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["stop", "disable", "mask", "kill"]);
17729
+ var STOP_LAUNCHCTL = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["unload", "bootout", "remove", "stop", "kill", "disable"]);
17730
+ var PKILL_VALUE_FLAGS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
17731
+ "-u",
17732
+ "-U",
17733
+ "-g",
17734
+ "-G",
17735
+ "-P",
17736
+ "-s",
17737
+ "-t",
17738
+ "-F",
17739
+ "--signal",
17740
+ "--euid",
17741
+ "--uid",
17742
+ "--pgroup",
17743
+ "--group",
17744
+ "--parent",
17745
+ "--session",
17746
+ "--terminal",
17747
+ "--pidfile",
17748
+ "--ns",
17749
+ "--nslist"
17750
+ ]);
17751
+ var NAME_PRESCREEN_RE = /node9|kill|systemctl|launchctl|daemon/i;
17752
+ function patternSelects(pattern, targets) {
17753
+ const pieces = pattern.toLowerCase().split(/[\\^$.*+?()[\]{}|]+/).filter(Boolean);
17754
+ if (pieces.length === 0) return false;
17755
+ return targets.some((t) => pieces.every((p) => t.includes(p)));
17756
+ }
17757
+ function sourceText(bytes, pos, end) {
17758
+ if (typeof pos !== "number" || typeof end !== "number" || pos < 0 || end < pos) return "";
17759
+ return new TextDecoder().decode(bytes.subarray(pos, end));
17760
+ }
17761
+ var base2 = (w) => (w ?? "").split(/[\\/]/).pop()?.toLowerCase() ?? "";
17762
+ function nextOperand(words, from) {
17763
+ for (let i = from; i < words.length; i++) {
17764
+ const w = words[i];
17765
+ if (w !== null && w.startsWith("-")) continue;
17766
+ return i;
17767
+ }
17768
+ return -1;
17769
+ }
17770
+ function node9Command(words, h) {
17771
+ const head = base2(words[h]);
17772
+ if (head !== "node9" && head !== "node9.cmd" && words[h] !== "@node9/proxy") return null;
17773
+ const s = nextOperand(words, h + 1);
17774
+ const sub = s < 0 ? "" : (words[s] ?? "").toLowerCase();
17775
+ if (sub === "uninstall") return "node9 uninstall";
17776
+ if (sub !== "daemon") return null;
17777
+ const a = nextOperand(words, s + 1);
17778
+ const action = a < 0 ? "" : (words[a] ?? "").toLowerCase();
17779
+ return action === "stop" || action === "uninstall" ? `node9 daemon ${action}` : null;
17780
+ }
17781
+ var HOME_PID_FILE_RE = /(?:^|[\s"'(=`])(?:~|\$HOME|\$\{HOME\}|\/home\/[^/\s]+|\/Users\/[^/\s]+|\/root)\/\.node9\/daemon\.pid/;
17782
+ function killsDaemon(words, texts, h, daemonPid) {
17783
+ const head = base2(words[h]);
17784
+ const args = words.slice(h + 1);
17785
+ if (head === "kill") {
17786
+ for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
17787
+ const w = args[i];
17788
+ if (w === "-s" || w === "-n") {
17789
+ i++;
17790
+ continue;
17791
+ }
17792
+ if (w !== null && w.startsWith("-")) continue;
17793
+ if (w === null) {
17794
+ if (HOME_PID_FILE_RE.test(texts[h + 1 + i] ?? "")) return "kill of the pid in daemon.pid";
17795
+ continue;
17796
+ }
17797
+ if (daemonPid !== null && w === String(daemonPid)) return `kill ${w} (the node9 daemon)`;
17798
+ }
17799
+ return null;
17800
+ }
17801
+ if (head === "pkill") {
17802
+ let full = false;
17803
+ let pattern = null;
17804
+ for (let i = 0; i < args.length; i++) {
17805
+ const w = args[i];
17806
+ if (w === null) continue;
17807
+ if (PKILL_VALUE_FLAGS.has(w)) {
17808
+ i++;
17809
+ continue;
17810
+ }
17811
+ if (w === "--full") full = true;
17812
+ else if (/^-[a-zA-Z]+$/.test(w) && w.includes("f")) full = true;
17813
+ if (w.startsWith("-")) continue;
17814
+ pattern = w;
17815
+ }
17816
+ if (pattern === null) return null;
17817
+ return patternSelects(pattern, full ? DAEMON_CMDLINES : DAEMON_NAMES) ? `pkill ${full ? "-f " : ""}${pattern}` : null;
17818
+ }
17819
+ if (head === "killall") {
17820
+ const regex = args.some((w) => w === "-r" || w === "--regexp");
17821
+ for (const w of args) {
17822
+ if (w === null || w.startsWith("-")) continue;
17823
+ if (regex ? patternSelects(w, DAEMON_NAMES) : KILLALL_NAMES.has(w.toLowerCase()))
17824
+ return `killall ${w}`;
17825
+ }
17826
+ return null;
17827
+ }
17828
+ if (head === "taskkill" || head === "taskkill.exe") {
17829
+ for (let i = 0; i < args.length - 1; i++) {
17830
+ const flag = (args[i] ?? "").toLowerCase();
17831
+ const value = (args[i + 1] ?? "").toLowerCase();
17832
+ if ((flag === "/im" || flag === "-im") && KILLALL_NAMES.has(value))
17833
+ return `taskkill /IM ${value}`;
17834
+ if ((flag === "/pid" || flag === "-pid") && daemonPid !== null && value === String(daemonPid))
17835
+ return `taskkill /PID ${value} (the node9 daemon)`;
17836
+ }
17837
+ }
17838
+ return null;
17839
+ }
17840
+ function stopsService(words, h) {
17841
+ const head = base2(words[h]);
17842
+ const args = words.slice(h + 1).map((w) => (w ?? "").toLowerCase());
17843
+ if (head === "systemctl") {
17844
+ const action = args.find((w) => STOP_SYSTEMCTL.has(w));
17845
+ if (action && args.some((w) => /^node9-daemon(\.service)?$/.test(w)))
17846
+ return `systemctl ${action} node9-daemon`;
17847
+ }
17848
+ if (head === "launchctl") {
17849
+ const action = args.find((w) => STOP_LAUNCHCTL.has(w));
17850
+ if (action && args.some((w) => w.includes("ai.node9.daemon")))
17851
+ return `launchctl ${action} ai.node9.daemon`;
17852
+ }
17853
+ return null;
17854
+ }
17855
+ function analyzeNode9Disarm(command, daemonPid = null, depth = 0) {
17856
+ if (depth > 3 || !NAME_PRESCREEN_RE.test(command.replace(/[\\'"]/g, ""))) return null;
17857
+ let shown = null;
17858
+ const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(command);
17859
+ try {
17860
+ walkCommandScope(command, (node) => {
17861
+ if (shown !== null) return false;
17862
+ const n = node;
17863
+ if (!n || n.kind !== "CallExpr") return true;
17864
+ const words = (n.Args || []).map((a) => resolveWordLiteral(a));
17865
+ if (words.length === 0) return true;
17866
+ const texts = (n.Args || []).map((a) => sourceText(bytes, a.pos, a.end));
17867
+ const h = unwrapCommandHead(words);
17868
+ shown = node9Command(words, h) ?? killsDaemon(words, texts, h, daemonPid) ?? stopsService(words, h);
17869
+ if (shown === null) {
17870
+ const payload = literalShellPayload(words, base2(words[0]));
17871
+ if (payload) {
17872
+ const inner = analyzeNode9Disarm(payload, daemonPid, depth + 1);
17873
+ if (inner) shown = inner.reason.replace(/^node9 switched off by the agent: /, "");
17874
+ }
17875
+ }
17876
+ return true;
17877
+ });
17878
+ } catch {
17879
+ }
17880
+ if (shown === null) return null;
17881
+ return {
17882
+ ruleName: RULE_NAME2,
17883
+ reason: `node9 switched off by the agent: ${shown}`,
17884
+ description: DESCRIPTION
17885
+ };
17886
+ }
17887
+
17695
17888
  // src/policy/index.ts
17696
17889
  function catalogSettings(config) {
17697
17890
  return catalogSettingsFromConfig(config.settings, config.policy);
@@ -17858,7 +18051,7 @@ async function evaluatePolicy(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hostHooks =
17858
18051
  }
17859
18052
  async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks = {}) {
17860
18053
  const { agent, cwd, activeEnvironment } = context;
17861
- const { checkProvenance, isTrustedHost, isConfiguredRegistry, isGitWorkTreeTop } = hooks;
18054
+ const { checkProvenance, isTrustedHost, isConfiguredRegistry, isGitWorkTreeTop, daemonPid } = hooks;
17862
18055
  const settingsView = catalogSettings(config);
17863
18056
  const layers = inspectionLayers(config.policy);
17864
18057
  const cv = (id) => checkValue(settingsView, id);
@@ -18043,6 +18236,23 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
18043
18236
  else if (v && !pendingAstReview) pendingAstReview = v;
18044
18237
  }
18045
18238
  }
18239
+ if (cv("commands.node9-disarm") !== "off") {
18240
+ const finding = analyzeNode9Disarm(bashCommand, daemonPid?.() ?? null);
18241
+ if (finding) {
18242
+ const v = applyCheckValue(cv("commands.node9-disarm"), {
18243
+ decision: "review",
18244
+ blockedByLabel: `Node9 (AST): ${finding.ruleName}`,
18245
+ reason: finding.reason,
18246
+ tier: 2,
18247
+ ruleName: finding.ruleName,
18248
+ ruleDescription: finding.description,
18249
+ checkId: "commands.node9-disarm"
18250
+ });
18251
+ if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
18252
+ else if (v?.decision === "block") return v;
18253
+ else if (v && !pendingAstReview) pendingAstReview = v;
18254
+ }
18255
+ }
18046
18256
  }
18047
18257
  if (config.policy.smartRules.length > 0) {
18048
18258
  const rmCleanupWaiver = bashCommand !== null && isRmCreatedInCommandCleanup(bashCommand);
@@ -18634,8 +18844,8 @@ function hasRoutingNumber(text) {
18634
18844
  return false;
18635
18845
  }
18636
18846
  var PII_IBAN_RE = /\b[A-Z]{2}\d{2}(?:[A-Z0-9]|[ -][A-Z0-9]){11,30}\b/;
18637
- function* validCardRuns(text, base2, exemptFractions = true) {
18638
- const re = new RegExp(base2.source, "g");
18847
+ function* validCardRuns(text, base3, exemptFractions = true) {
18848
+ const re = new RegExp(base3.source, "g");
18639
18849
  let m;
18640
18850
  while ((m = re.exec(text)) !== null) {
18641
18851
  const digits = m[0].replace(/\D/g, "");
@@ -18648,17 +18858,17 @@ function* validCardRuns(text, base2, exemptFractions = true) {
18648
18858
  }
18649
18859
  }
18650
18860
  function hasValidCard(text) {
18651
- for (const base2 of CARD_PATTERNS) {
18652
- if (!validCardRuns(text, base2).next().done) return true;
18861
+ for (const base3 of CARD_PATTERNS) {
18862
+ if (!validCardRuns(text, base3).next().done) return true;
18653
18863
  }
18654
18864
  return false;
18655
18865
  }
18656
18866
  function replaceValidCards(text, replace, { exemptFractions = true } = {}) {
18657
18867
  let out = text;
18658
- for (const base2 of CARD_PATTERNS) {
18868
+ for (const base3 of CARD_PATTERNS) {
18659
18869
  let res = "";
18660
18870
  let last = 0;
18661
- for (const run of validCardRuns(out, base2, exemptFractions)) {
18871
+ for (const run of validCardRuns(out, base3, exemptFractions)) {
18662
18872
  res += out.slice(last, run.index) + replace(run.digits);
18663
18873
  last = run.index + run.length;
18664
18874
  }
@@ -18947,9 +19157,9 @@ function maskLeaf(value, key, depth) {
18947
19157
  const used = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
18948
19158
  return Object.fromEntries(
18949
19159
  Object.entries(value).map(([k, v]) => {
18950
- const base2 = maskPersonalData(k);
18951
- let name = base2;
18952
- for (let n = 2; used.has(name); n++) name = `${base2}#${n}`;
19160
+ const base3 = maskPersonalData(k);
19161
+ let name = base3;
19162
+ for (let n = 2; used.has(name); n++) name = `${base3}#${n}`;
18953
19163
  used.add(name);
18954
19164
  return [name, maskLeaf(v, k, depth + 1)];
18955
19165
  })
@@ -19997,8 +20207,8 @@ function matchCanaryArgs(args, values) {
19997
20207
 
19998
20208
  // src/scan/canonical.ts
19999
20209
  var LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES = 100 * 1024;
20000
- var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v37";
20001
- var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "2c9a0271d9c1dd57";
20210
+ var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v38";
20211
+ var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "2d3dfcccff2c2f65";
20002
20212
  var DEDUPE_PREVIEW_LEN = 120;
20003
20213
  function extractCanonicalFindings(call, ctx) {
20004
20214
  const out = [];
@@ -20578,6 +20788,7 @@ export {
20578
20788
  gitInvocations,
20579
20789
  gitRepoPath,
20580
20790
  hashDestination,
20791
+ holdsSendsWithoutDaemon,
20581
20792
  hostMatches,
20582
20793
  incompleteFileVerdict,
20583
20794
  inlineExecDescription,
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@node9/policy-engine",
3
- "version": "2.51.0",
3
+ "version": "2.52.0",
4
4
  "description": "Shared policy evaluation engine for node9 — DLP, smart rules, AST shell parsing, shields, loop detection. Pure functions, no I/O. Used by both node9-proxy and the node9 SaaS firewall.",
5
5
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
6
6
  "homepage": "https://node9.ai",