@node9/policy-engine 2.48.1 → 2.49.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/index.d.mts +34 -4
- package/dist/index.d.ts +34 -4
- package/dist/index.js +4910 -4210
- package/dist/index.mjs +4924 -4232
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/index.d.mts
CHANGED
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@@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ interface FileAccess {
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upload?: true;
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/** A directory listing (`ls`, `tree`, find's start points): the entry names, not a file's content. */
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listing?: true;
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/** The source of a copy, move or archive: the credential jail judges these with its copy rules. */
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copy?: true;
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/** Unquoted shell pattern. Quoted metacharacters are escaped in this value. */
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glob?: string;
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/** The pattern is find's, not the shell's: `*` also selects dotfiles. */
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@@ -336,6 +338,32 @@ declare function ssrfFloor(tokens: ReadonlyArray<{
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binary: string;
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}>, opts?: SsrfFloorOptions): SsrfVerdict | null;
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declare const ASI: {
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readonly ASI01: "Agent Goal Hijack";
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readonly ASI02: "Tool Misuse and Exploitation";
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readonly ASI03: "Identity and Privilege Abuse";
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readonly ASI04: "Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities";
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readonly ASI05: "Unexpected Code Execution";
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readonly ASI06: "Memory and Context Poisoning";
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readonly ASI07: "Insecure Inter-Agent Communication";
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readonly ASI08: "Cascading Failures";
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readonly ASI09: "Human-Agent Trust Exploitation";
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readonly ASI10: "Rogue Agents";
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};
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type AsiId = keyof typeof ASI;
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declare const ASI_IDS: readonly AsiId[];
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declare function isAsiId(v: unknown): v is AsiId;
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/** The risk of a pack row, or undefined for a shield this table does not
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* know. The catalog refuses to build a row without a risk, so a new shield
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* cannot ship unmapped. */
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declare function packRowOwasp(id: string, shield: string): AsiId | undefined;
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declare const POSTURE_CATEGORY_OWASP: Readonly<Record<string, AsiId>>;
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declare function postureCategoryOwasp(category: string): AsiId | undefined;
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/** Rule prefixes that carry no risk of their own (listed so a test can tell
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* "unmapped on purpose" from "forgotten"). */
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declare const SCAN_REPO_RULES_WITHOUT_RISK: readonly string[];
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declare function scanRepoRuleOwasp(rule: string): AsiId | undefined;
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/** The one value set every check uses. `log` runs the check and records the
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* finding without stopping the call; it replaces skill pinning's `warn` and
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* the per-check meaning of the global observe mode. */
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@@ -353,6 +381,8 @@ interface CheckDef {
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/** `group.name`, stable forever: audit rows and config files key on it. */
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id: string;
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group: CheckGroup;
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/** The OWASP Agentic Top 10 risk the check guards against (owasp.ts). */
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owasp: AsiId;
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title: string;
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/** One line, shown under the title: what the check catches. */
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catches: string;
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@@ -2388,7 +2418,7 @@ declare const LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: number;
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* and fails CI when the hash drifts without a version bump — forgetting
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* is loud, not silent.
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*/
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-
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-
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declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v36";
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/**
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* SHA-256 prefix of the detector-source files
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* (canonical.ts + pii.ts + destructive-regex.ts).
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@@ -2399,7 +2429,7 @@ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v35";
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* files changed, this hash must change too, and you must consciously
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* decide whether to bump CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION."
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*/
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-
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "
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declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "814655319cb53ff9";
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declare function extractCanonicalFindings(call: ToolCallEntry, ctx: ExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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declare function extractSessionLevelFindings(calls: ReadonlyArray<SessionToolCall>, ctx: SessionExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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/**
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@@ -2511,5 +2541,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
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/** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
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declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
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-
export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, agentFileKind, analyzeFsOperation, analyzeGit, analyzeOutbound, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, derivedWrites, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractRegistryOverrides, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitInvocations, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isPublicRegistryHost, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, pipelineTexts, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, registryHost, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanInstructionWrite, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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-
export type { ActionTemplateName, AgentFileKind, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, DerivedWrite, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, GitAnalysis, GitFinding, GitInvocation, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, OutboundAnalysis, OutboundCheckId, OutboundFinding, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, RegistryOverride, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
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2544
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+
export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, ASI, ASI_IDS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, POSTURE_CATEGORY_OWASP, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_REPO_RULES_WITHOUT_RISK, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, agentFileKind, analyzeFsOperation, analyzeGit, analyzeOutbound, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, derivedWrites, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractRegistryOverrides, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitInvocations, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isAsiId, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isPublicRegistryHost, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, packRowOwasp, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, pipelineTexts, positionedArgs, postureCategoryOwasp, previewArgs, redactText, registryHost, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanInstructionWrite, scanRepoRuleOwasp, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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export type { ActionTemplateName, AgentFileKind, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AsiId, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, DerivedWrite, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, GitAnalysis, GitFinding, GitInvocation, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, OutboundAnalysis, OutboundCheckId, OutboundFinding, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, RegistryOverride, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
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package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ interface FileAccess {
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159
159
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upload?: true;
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160
160
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/** A directory listing (`ls`, `tree`, find's start points): the entry names, not a file's content. */
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161
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listing?: true;
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162
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+
/** The source of a copy, move or archive: the credential jail judges these with its copy rules. */
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copy?: true;
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/** Unquoted shell pattern. Quoted metacharacters are escaped in this value. */
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glob?: string;
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/** The pattern is find's, not the shell's: `*` also selects dotfiles. */
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@@ -336,6 +338,32 @@ declare function ssrfFloor(tokens: ReadonlyArray<{
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binary: string;
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}>, opts?: SsrfFloorOptions): SsrfVerdict | null;
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338
340
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341
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+
declare const ASI: {
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342
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readonly ASI01: "Agent Goal Hijack";
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343
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+
readonly ASI02: "Tool Misuse and Exploitation";
|
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344
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+
readonly ASI03: "Identity and Privilege Abuse";
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345
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+
readonly ASI04: "Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities";
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346
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readonly ASI05: "Unexpected Code Execution";
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347
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readonly ASI06: "Memory and Context Poisoning";
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348
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+
readonly ASI07: "Insecure Inter-Agent Communication";
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349
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+
readonly ASI08: "Cascading Failures";
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350
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+
readonly ASI09: "Human-Agent Trust Exploitation";
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351
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+
readonly ASI10: "Rogue Agents";
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352
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};
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type AsiId = keyof typeof ASI;
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declare const ASI_IDS: readonly AsiId[];
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declare function isAsiId(v: unknown): v is AsiId;
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356
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/** The risk of a pack row, or undefined for a shield this table does not
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357
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+
* know. The catalog refuses to build a row without a risk, so a new shield
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358
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+
* cannot ship unmapped. */
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359
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+
declare function packRowOwasp(id: string, shield: string): AsiId | undefined;
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360
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+
declare const POSTURE_CATEGORY_OWASP: Readonly<Record<string, AsiId>>;
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361
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+
declare function postureCategoryOwasp(category: string): AsiId | undefined;
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362
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+
/** Rule prefixes that carry no risk of their own (listed so a test can tell
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363
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+
* "unmapped on purpose" from "forgotten"). */
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364
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+
declare const SCAN_REPO_RULES_WITHOUT_RISK: readonly string[];
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365
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+
declare function scanRepoRuleOwasp(rule: string): AsiId | undefined;
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366
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+
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339
367
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/** The one value set every check uses. `log` runs the check and records the
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340
368
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* finding without stopping the call; it replaces skill pinning's `warn` and
|
|
341
369
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* the per-check meaning of the global observe mode. */
|
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@@ -353,6 +381,8 @@ interface CheckDef {
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353
381
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/** `group.name`, stable forever: audit rows and config files key on it. */
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354
382
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id: string;
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355
383
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group: CheckGroup;
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384
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+
/** The OWASP Agentic Top 10 risk the check guards against (owasp.ts). */
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385
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owasp: AsiId;
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title: string;
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357
387
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/** One line, shown under the title: what the check catches. */
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358
388
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catches: string;
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@@ -2388,7 +2418,7 @@ declare const LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: number;
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2388
2418
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* and fails CI when the hash drifts without a version bump — forgetting
|
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2389
2419
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* is loud, not silent.
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2390
2420
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*/
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2391
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-
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-
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2421
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+
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v36";
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2422
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/**
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2393
2423
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* SHA-256 prefix of the detector-source files
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|
2394
2424
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* (canonical.ts + pii.ts + destructive-regex.ts).
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@@ -2399,7 +2429,7 @@ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v35";
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2399
2429
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* files changed, this hash must change too, and you must consciously
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2400
2430
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* decide whether to bump CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION."
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2401
2431
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*/
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2402
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-
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "
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declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "814655319cb53ff9";
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2403
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declare function extractCanonicalFindings(call: ToolCallEntry, ctx: ExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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declare function extractSessionLevelFindings(calls: ReadonlyArray<SessionToolCall>, ctx: SessionExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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/**
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@@ -2511,5 +2541,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
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2511
2541
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/** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
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2512
2542
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declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
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2513
2543
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2514
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-
export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, agentFileKind, analyzeFsOperation, analyzeGit, analyzeOutbound, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, derivedWrites, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractRegistryOverrides, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitInvocations, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isPublicRegistryHost, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, pipelineTexts, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, registryHost, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanInstructionWrite, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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2515
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export type { ActionTemplateName, AgentFileKind, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, DerivedWrite, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, GitAnalysis, GitFinding, GitInvocation, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, OutboundAnalysis, OutboundCheckId, OutboundFinding, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, RegistryOverride, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
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2544
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+
export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, ASI, ASI_IDS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, POSTURE_CATEGORY_OWASP, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_REPO_RULES_WITHOUT_RISK, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, agentFileKind, analyzeFsOperation, analyzeGit, analyzeOutbound, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, derivedWrites, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractRegistryOverrides, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitInvocations, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isAsiId, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isPublicRegistryHost, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, packRowOwasp, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, pipelineTexts, positionedArgs, postureCategoryOwasp, previewArgs, redactText, registryHost, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanInstructionWrite, scanRepoRuleOwasp, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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2545
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+
export type { ActionTemplateName, AgentFileKind, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AsiId, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, DerivedWrite, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, GitAnalysis, GitFinding, GitInvocation, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, OutboundAnalysis, OutboundCheckId, OutboundFinding, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, RegistryOverride, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
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