@node9/policy-engine 2.41.3 → 2.43.0

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package/dist/index.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ interface SmartCondition {
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  * Which reading of a `command` field the regex ops test. Absent: the whole
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  * command text. 'access': the command as a file-access rule sees it, without
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  * a script's interpreter line and with the program each command runs cut to
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- * its name (fileAccessView). Set by the jail's path rules (fw#385).
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+ * its name (fileAccessView), and with the code body of a stdin interpreter
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+ * kept (node9Firewall#414). Set by the jail's path rules (fw#385) and the
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+ * project-jail shield's bash rules.
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  */
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  reading?: 'access';
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  }
@@ -129,6 +131,70 @@ interface RiskMetadata {
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  exposureDestinations?: string[];
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  }
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+ declare const SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES: readonly ["/etc/passwd", "/etc/shadow", "/etc/group", "/etc/gshadow", "/etc/sudoers"];
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+ declare const SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS: readonly ["/etc/security", "/etc/pam.d", "/etc/sudoers.d"];
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+ declare const STARTUP_NAMES: readonly [".bashrc", ".zshrc", ".profile", ".bash_profile"];
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+ /**
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+ * Files inside a project that run code or instruct the agent (fw#318 P4,
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+ * design 6). A write there after the session read outside content is held:
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+ * it is how an injected instruction persists past the session. Relative to
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+ * the project root; a directory entry covers everything under it.
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+ */
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+ declare const AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES: readonly [".gitlab-ci.yml", "CLAUDE.md", "AGENTS.md", ".cursorrules", ".mcp.json", ".vscode/settings.json", "package.json"];
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+ declare const AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS: readonly [".github/workflows", ".claude", ".cursor", ".git/hooks", ".husky"];
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+ /** Is `absPath` one of the agent-instruction files of the project at `root`? */
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+ declare function isAgentInstructionPath(absPath: string, root: string): boolean;
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+ /** `isInside(root, p)`: `p` is `root` or below it, lexically. */
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+ declare function isInside(root: string, p: string): boolean;
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+ declare function isPasswordHashPath(p: string): boolean;
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+ /** Compatibility only: old callers do not tell DLP whether they read or write. */
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+ declare function isLegacySystemPath(p: string): boolean;
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+ /** Pure lexical normalization; host physical resolution keeps the original path. */
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+ declare function normalizeFilePath(p: string, cwd?: string, home?: string): string;
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+ interface FileAccess {
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+ operation: 'read' | 'write' | 'remove' | 'create';
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+ path: string;
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+ cwd?: string;
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+ /** A read whose content leaves the machine as a request body or an upload. */
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+ upload?: true;
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+ /** A directory listing (`ls`, `tree`, find's start points): the entry names, not a file's content. */
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+ listing?: true;
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+ /** Unquoted shell pattern. Quoted metacharacters are escaped in this value. */
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+ glob?: string;
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+ /** The pattern is find's, not the shell's: `*` also selects dotfiles. */
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+ dotGlob?: boolean;
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+ followFinal: boolean;
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+ recursive?: boolean;
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+ /** A write that adds to the file (`>>`, `tee -a`): its content stays. */
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+ append?: true;
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+ /** This basename-joined candidate applies only if this operand is a directory. */
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+ directoryTarget?: string;
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+ candidates?: string[];
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+ resolution?: 'resolved' | 'missing' | 'failed' | 'lexical';
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+ }
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+ interface FileAccessContext {
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+ cwd?: string;
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+ homeDirs?: string[];
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+ accesses?: FileAccess[];
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+ }
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+
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+ interface DerivedWrite {
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+ /** The file read, as the command spells it. */
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+ source: string;
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+ /** The file written from it, as the command spells it. */
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+ target: string;
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+ /** The source is gone after the command (`mv`): its record moves rather than copies. */
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+ move: boolean;
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+ }
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+ /** The text of each pipeline of the command: one `cmd | cmd` chain, or one simple command. */
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+ declare function pipelineTexts(command: string): string[];
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+ /**
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+ * The (source, target) pairs of a command: every write of a pipeline is
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+ * derived from every read of the same pipeline. A listing (`ls`) and an
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+ * upload (`curl -F file=@K`) are not sources: nothing is written from them.
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+ */
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+ declare function derivedWrites(command: string, context?: FileAccessContext): DerivedWrite[];
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+
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  type ToolInspectionEntry = string | {
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  kind: 'shell';
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  field: string;
@@ -410,51 +476,6 @@ declare function checkValue(settings: CatalogSettings, id: string): Verdict;
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  * stores this on its config so every reader sees the same answers. */
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  declare function resolveCheckMap(settings: CatalogSettings): Record<string, Verdict>;
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- declare const SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES: readonly ["/etc/passwd", "/etc/shadow", "/etc/group", "/etc/gshadow", "/etc/sudoers"];
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- declare const SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS: readonly ["/etc/security", "/etc/pam.d", "/etc/sudoers.d"];
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- declare const STARTUP_NAMES: readonly [".bashrc", ".zshrc", ".profile", ".bash_profile"];
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- /**
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- * Files inside a project that run code or instruct the agent (fw#318 P4,
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- * design 6). A write there after the session read outside content is held:
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- * it is how an injected instruction persists past the session. Relative to
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- * the project root; a directory entry covers everything under it.
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- */
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- declare const AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES: readonly [".gitlab-ci.yml", "CLAUDE.md", "AGENTS.md", ".cursorrules", ".mcp.json", ".vscode/settings.json", "package.json"];
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- declare const AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS: readonly [".github/workflows", ".claude", ".cursor", ".git/hooks", ".husky"];
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- /** Is `absPath` one of the agent-instruction files of the project at `root`? */
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- declare function isAgentInstructionPath(absPath: string, root: string): boolean;
426
- /** `isInside(root, p)`: `p` is `root` or below it, lexically. */
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- declare function isInside(root: string, p: string): boolean;
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- declare function isPasswordHashPath(p: string): boolean;
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- /** Compatibility only: old callers do not tell DLP whether they read or write. */
430
- declare function isLegacySystemPath(p: string): boolean;
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- /** Pure lexical normalization; host physical resolution keeps the original path. */
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- declare function normalizeFilePath(p: string, cwd?: string, home?: string): string;
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- interface FileAccess {
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- operation: 'read' | 'write' | 'remove' | 'create';
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- path: string;
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- cwd?: string;
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- /** A read whose content leaves the machine as a request body or an upload. */
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- upload?: true;
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- /** A directory listing (`ls`, `tree`, find's start points): the entry names, not a file's content. */
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- listing?: true;
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- /** Unquoted shell pattern. Quoted metacharacters are escaped in this value. */
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- glob?: string;
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- /** The pattern is find's, not the shell's: `*` also selects dotfiles. */
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- dotGlob?: boolean;
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- followFinal: boolean;
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- recursive?: boolean;
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- /** This basename-joined candidate applies only if this operand is a directory. */
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- directoryTarget?: string;
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- candidates?: string[];
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- resolution?: 'resolved' | 'missing' | 'failed' | 'lexical';
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- }
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- interface FileAccessContext {
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- cwd?: string;
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- homeDirs?: string[];
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- accesses?: FileAccess[];
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- }
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-
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  type InlineCodeCategory = 'deletes' | 'writes-outside' | 'sends' | 'listens' | 'runs-commands' | 'reads-protected' | 'builds-code' | 'permissions' | 'monitors' | 'amplifies';
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  /**
@@ -888,6 +909,13 @@ interface PolicyHostHooks {
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  checkProvenance?: (binary: string, cwd?: string) => ProvenanceLookup;
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  /** Returns true if the host is on the user's trusted-hosts allowlist. */
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  isTrustedHost?: (host: string) => boolean;
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+ /** The agent settings file at `absPath` as it is on disk now (a regular
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+ * file within the host's size cap), or null (node9Firewall#413 part 4). */
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+ readAgentSettings?: (absPath: string) => string | null;
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+ /** True when the user's own npm, yarn, bun, pip or uv configuration names
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+ * this registry host (node9Firewall#415 item 4). Absent: only the public
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+ * registries and the machine itself count as configured. */
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+ isConfiguredRegistry?: (host: string, cwd?: string) => boolean;
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  }
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  interface PolicyVerdict {
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  decision: 'allow' | 'review' | 'block';
@@ -948,11 +976,12 @@ declare function resolvePinned(matches: SmartRule[]): SmartRule | undefined;
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  * Returns a reason string if dangerous, null if safe.
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  */
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  declare function checkDangerousSql(sql: string): string | null;
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- declare function evaluatePolicy(config: PolicyConfig, toolName: string, args?: unknown, context?: PolicyContext, hooks?: PolicyHostHooks): Promise<PolicyVerdict>;
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+ declare function evaluatePolicy(config: PolicyConfig, toolName: string, args?: unknown, context?: PolicyContext, hostHooks?: PolicyHostHooks): Promise<PolicyVerdict>;
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  /** Returns true when toolName matches the config's ignoredTools list. */
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  declare function isIgnoredTool(toolName: string, config: PolicyConfig): boolean;
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  type ProtectedFileVerdict = PolicyVerdict & {
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+ ruleName: string;
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  path: string;
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  operation: FileAccess['operation'];
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  };
@@ -1106,6 +1135,88 @@ declare function redactText(text: string): {
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  found: string[];
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  };
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+ type AgentFileKind = 'instructions' | 'memory' | 'agents' | 'commands' | 'skills' | 'settings';
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+ /** The kind of agent file a normalized path is, or null. */
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+ declare function agentFileKind(p: string): AgentFileKind | null;
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Scan text about to be written into an agent instruction or memory file.
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+ * The three signals above, plus the override, fake-role and destination
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+ * signals of scanInjection; any one is a finding. Read on every view
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+ * (normalised, base64 and hex decoded), as the output scanner does.
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+ */
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+ declare function scanInstructionWrite(text: string): InjectionMatch | null;
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+
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+ type GitCheckId = 'commands.git-destructive' | 'commands.git-hooks-bypass' | 'commands.git-stage-all';
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+ interface GitFinding {
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+ checkId: GitCheckId;
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+ /** The rule name the audit log and the catalog's legacy table know. */
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+ ruleName: 'review-force-push' | 'review-git-destructive' | 'review-git-hooks-bypass' | 'review-git-stage-all';
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+ reason: string;
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+ description: string;
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+ /** The invocation as resolved, for the reason and the explain trace. */
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+ shown: string;
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+ }
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+ interface GitAnalysis {
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+ /** False when mvdan-sh could not parse the command: nothing was judged. */
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+ parsed: boolean;
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+ findings: GitFinding[];
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+ }
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+ /** One git invocation after resolution. */
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+ interface GitInvocation {
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+ /** The subcommand, or null when it could not be read (a dynamic word). */
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+ sub: string | null;
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+ /** The words after the subcommand; null marks a dynamic word. */
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+ args: (string | null)[];
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+ /** `-c key=value` pairs given before the subcommand, lowercased keys. */
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+ config: Map<string, string>;
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+ /** Assignments applied to this call (`HUSKY=0 git …`, `env K=V git …`). */
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+ env: Map<string, string | null>;
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+ /** How the call was written, for the reason. */
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+ shown: string;
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * Every git finding in a shell command. Cached by the raw text; pure.
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+ */
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+ declare function analyzeGit(command: string): GitAnalysis;
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+ /** The git invocations a command makes, resolved. Exposed for the explain trace and tests. */
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+ declare function gitInvocations(command: string): GitInvocation[];
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+
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+ type OutboundCheckId = 'commands.reverse-shell' | 'data.env-exfil';
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+ interface OutboundFinding {
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+ checkId: OutboundCheckId;
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+ /** The rule name the audit log and the catalog's legacy table know. */
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+ ruleName: 'block-reverse-shell' | 'review-env-exfil';
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+ reason: string;
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+ description: string;
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+ /** data.env-exfil only: the hosts the environment is sent to, or null when
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+ * one sender's destination cannot be read (a dynamic or dotless host, a
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+ * sender whose destination argument is unknown). A trusted-host exemption
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+ * needs every one of them. */
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+ destinations?: string[] | null;
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+ }
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+ interface OutboundAnalysis {
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+ /** False when mvdan-sh could not parse the command: nothing was judged. */
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+ parsed: boolean;
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+ findings: OutboundFinding[];
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+ }
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+ declare function analyzeOutbound(command: string): OutboundAnalysis;
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+
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+ interface RegistryOverride {
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+ /** The front-end: npm, pnpm, yarn, bun, npx, pip, uv, pipx, pipenv. */
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+ manager: string;
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+ /** The flag or variable that named it, for the reason. */
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+ via: string;
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+ /** The URL as written. */
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+ url: string;
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+ /** Its host, lowercased, without the port. */
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+ host: string;
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+ }
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+ declare function isPublicRegistryHost(host: string): boolean;
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+ /** The host of an http(s) URL, or null. A `name=url` uv index keeps its URL. */
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+ declare function registryHost(value: string): string | null;
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+ declare function extractRegistryOverrides(command: string): RegistryOverride[];
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+
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  /**
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  * The OSV ecosystem name, verbatim: it is the index directory, the bucket path
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  * of the OSV archive and the `ecosystem` of the online query at once. `VSCode`
@@ -1598,7 +1709,7 @@ declare function validateOverrides(raw: unknown): {
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  */
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  declare const BUILTIN_SHIELDS: Record<string, ShieldDefinition>;
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1601
- type ActionTemplateName = 'finance' | 'identity' | 'publishing';
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+ type ActionTemplateName = 'finance' | 'identity' | 'publishing' | 'settings' | 'branches';
1602
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  declare const ACTION_TEMPLATES: Readonly<Record<ActionTemplateName, readonly SmartRule[]>>;
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  /** The general check each template feeds, and the word its rules carry. */
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  declare const ACTION_CHECKS: Readonly<Record<ActionTemplateName, {
@@ -2079,7 +2190,7 @@ type PiiPattern = 'Email' | 'SSN' | 'Phone' | 'Credit Card' | 'IBAN' | 'Bank Rou
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  * Detect PII patterns in a string. Returns a deduplicated list — one entry
2080
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  * per distinct pattern type, never multiple "Email" findings from one input.
2081
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  */
2082
- declare function detectPii(text: string): PiiPattern[];
2193
+ declare function detectPii(text: string, labelContext?: string): PiiPattern[];
2083
2194
  declare const REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS: readonly PiiPattern[];
2084
2195
  /** Every string leaf of a tool call's arguments, joined by newlines, bounded. */
2085
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  declare function argumentLeavesText(args: unknown, limit?: number): string;
@@ -2117,7 +2228,7 @@ declare function matchCanary(text: string, values: readonly CanaryValue[]): Cana
2117
2228
  * so escaped values are seen (B23), like scanArgs. */
2118
2229
  declare function matchCanaryArgs(args: unknown, values: readonly CanaryValue[]): CanaryHit | null;
2119
2230
 
2120
- type CanonicalFindingType = 'smart-rule' | 'ast-fs-op' | 'dlp' | 'pii' | 'canary' | 'sensitive-file-read' | 'privilege-escalation' | 'destructive-op' | 'pipe-to-shell' | 'eval-of-remote' | 'loop' | 'long-output-redacted';
2231
+ type CanonicalFindingType = 'smart-rule' | 'ast-fs-op' | 'file-access' | 'dlp' | 'pii' | 'canary' | 'sensitive-file-read' | 'privilege-escalation' | 'destructive-op' | 'pipe-to-shell' | 'eval-of-remote' | 'loop' | 'long-output-redacted';
2121
2232
  type CanonicalAgent = 'claude' | 'gemini' | 'codex' | 'shell';
2122
2233
  type CanonicalSourceType = 'default' | 'shield' | 'user' | 'engine';
2123
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  interface CanonicalFinding {
@@ -2150,6 +2261,9 @@ interface CanonicalFinding {
2150
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  sourceType: CanonicalSourceType;
2151
2262
  /** Optional shield/source label for UI. */
2152
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  shieldLabel?: string;
2264
+ /** The catalog check the gate names for the same call (`files.system-dirs`,
2265
+ * `commands.git-hooks-bypass`, ...). Set on 'file-access' findings. */
2266
+ checkId?: string;
2153
2267
  /** When this exact (post-dedupe) finding was first / last seen. */
2154
2268
  firstSeenAt: string;
2155
2269
  lastSeenAt: string;
@@ -2203,6 +2317,14 @@ interface ExtractContext {
2203
2317
  kind?: string;
2204
2318
  path?: string;
2205
2319
  }>;
2320
+ /** The session's working directory, absolute, when the transcript carries
2321
+ * one. A relative file_path resolves against it for the file checks. */
2322
+ cwd?: string;
2323
+ /** The user's home directory (first) as the gate's FileAccessContext has it. */
2324
+ homeDirs?: string[];
2325
+ /** Catalog settings for the file checks. Absent means the defaults (the
2326
+ * Standard level), which keeps extractor output machine-independent. */
2327
+ catalogSettings?: CatalogSettings;
2206
2328
  }
2207
2329
  interface SessionExtractContext {
2208
2330
  sessionId: string;
@@ -2251,7 +2373,7 @@ declare const LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: number;
2251
2373
  * and fails CI when the hash drifts without a version bump — forgetting
2252
2374
  * is loud, not silent.
2253
2375
  */
2254
- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v31";
2376
+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v34";
2255
2377
  /**
2256
2378
  * SHA-256 prefix of the detector-source files
2257
2379
  * (canonical.ts + pii.ts + destructive-regex.ts).
@@ -2262,7 +2384,7 @@ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v31";
2262
2384
  * files changed, this hash must change too, and you must consciously
2263
2385
  * decide whether to bump CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION."
2264
2386
  */
2265
- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "60048df5a64eb7c0";
2387
+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "45158fa38836036f";
2266
2388
  declare function extractCanonicalFindings(call: ToolCallEntry, ctx: ExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
2267
2389
  declare function extractSessionLevelFindings(calls: ReadonlyArray<SessionToolCall>, ctx: SessionExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
2268
2390
  /**
@@ -2374,5 +2496,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
2374
2496
  /** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
2375
2497
  declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
2376
2498
 
2377
- export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
2378
- export type { ActionTemplateName, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
2499
+ export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, agentFileKind, analyzeFsOperation, analyzeGit, analyzeOutbound, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, derivedWrites, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractRegistryOverrides, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitInvocations, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isPublicRegistryHost, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, pipelineTexts, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, registryHost, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanInstructionWrite, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
2500
+ export type { ActionTemplateName, AgentFileKind, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, DerivedWrite, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, GitAnalysis, GitFinding, GitInvocation, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, OutboundAnalysis, OutboundCheckId, OutboundFinding, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, RegistryOverride, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };