@node9/policy-engine 2.41.3 → 2.42.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/index.d.mts +70 -6
- package/dist/index.d.ts +70 -6
- package/dist/index.js +1434 -30
- package/dist/index.mjs +1430 -30
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/index.d.mts
CHANGED
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@@ -444,6 +444,8 @@ interface FileAccess {
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dotGlob?: boolean;
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followFinal: boolean;
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recursive?: boolean;
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/** A write that adds to the file (`>>`, `tee -a`): its content stays. */
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append?: true;
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/** This basename-joined candidate applies only if this operand is a directory. */
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directoryTarget?: string;
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candidates?: string[];
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@@ -888,6 +890,9 @@ interface PolicyHostHooks {
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checkProvenance?: (binary: string, cwd?: string) => ProvenanceLookup;
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/** Returns true if the host is on the user's trusted-hosts allowlist. */
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isTrustedHost?: (host: string) => boolean;
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/** The agent settings file at `absPath` as it is on disk now (a regular
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* file within the host's size cap), or null (node9Firewall#413 part 4). */
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readAgentSettings?: (absPath: string) => string | null;
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}
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interface PolicyVerdict {
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decision: 'allow' | 'review' | 'block';
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@@ -948,11 +953,12 @@ declare function resolvePinned(matches: SmartRule[]): SmartRule | undefined;
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* Returns a reason string if dangerous, null if safe.
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*/
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declare function checkDangerousSql(sql: string): string | null;
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-
declare function evaluatePolicy(config: PolicyConfig, toolName: string, args?: unknown, context?: PolicyContext,
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declare function evaluatePolicy(config: PolicyConfig, toolName: string, args?: unknown, context?: PolicyContext, hostHooks?: PolicyHostHooks): Promise<PolicyVerdict>;
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/** Returns true when toolName matches the config's ignoredTools list. */
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declare function isIgnoredTool(toolName: string, config: PolicyConfig): boolean;
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type ProtectedFileVerdict = PolicyVerdict & {
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ruleName: string;
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path: string;
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operation: FileAccess['operation'];
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};
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@@ -1106,6 +1112,53 @@ declare function redactText(text: string): {
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found: string[];
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};
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type AgentFileKind = 'instructions' | 'memory' | 'agents' | 'commands' | 'skills' | 'settings';
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/** The kind of agent file a normalized path is, or null. */
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declare function agentFileKind(p: string): AgentFileKind | null;
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/**
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* Scan text about to be written into an agent instruction or memory file.
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* The three signals above, plus the override, fake-role and destination
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* signals of scanInjection; any one is a finding. Read on every view
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* (normalised, base64 and hex decoded), as the output scanner does.
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*/
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declare function scanInstructionWrite(text: string): InjectionMatch | null;
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type GitCheckId = 'commands.git-destructive' | 'commands.git-hooks-bypass' | 'commands.git-stage-all';
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interface GitFinding {
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checkId: GitCheckId;
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/** The rule name the audit log and the catalog's legacy table know. */
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ruleName: 'review-force-push' | 'review-git-destructive' | 'review-git-hooks-bypass' | 'review-git-stage-all';
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reason: string;
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description: string;
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/** The invocation as resolved, for the reason and the explain trace. */
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shown: string;
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}
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interface GitAnalysis {
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/** False when mvdan-sh could not parse the command: nothing was judged. */
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parsed: boolean;
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findings: GitFinding[];
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}
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/** One git invocation after resolution. */
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interface GitInvocation {
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/** The subcommand, or null when it could not be read (a dynamic word). */
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sub: string | null;
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/** The words after the subcommand; null marks a dynamic word. */
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args: (string | null)[];
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/** `-c key=value` pairs given before the subcommand, lowercased keys. */
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config: Map<string, string>;
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/** Assignments applied to this call (`HUSKY=0 git …`, `env K=V git …`). */
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env: Map<string, string | null>;
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/** How the call was written, for the reason. */
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shown: string;
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}
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/**
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* Every git finding in a shell command. Cached by the raw text; pure.
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*/
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declare function analyzeGit(command: string): GitAnalysis;
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/** The git invocations a command makes, resolved. Exposed for the explain trace and tests. */
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declare function gitInvocations(command: string): GitInvocation[];
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/**
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* The OSV ecosystem name, verbatim: it is the index directory, the bucket path
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* of the OSV archive and the `ecosystem` of the online query at once. `VSCode`
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@@ -2117,7 +2170,7 @@ declare function matchCanary(text: string, values: readonly CanaryValue[]): Cana
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* so escaped values are seen (B23), like scanArgs. */
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declare function matchCanaryArgs(args: unknown, values: readonly CanaryValue[]): CanaryHit | null;
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-
type CanonicalFindingType = 'smart-rule' | 'ast-fs-op' | 'dlp' | 'pii' | 'canary' | 'sensitive-file-read' | 'privilege-escalation' | 'destructive-op' | 'pipe-to-shell' | 'eval-of-remote' | 'loop' | 'long-output-redacted';
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type CanonicalFindingType = 'smart-rule' | 'ast-fs-op' | 'file-access' | 'dlp' | 'pii' | 'canary' | 'sensitive-file-read' | 'privilege-escalation' | 'destructive-op' | 'pipe-to-shell' | 'eval-of-remote' | 'loop' | 'long-output-redacted';
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type CanonicalAgent = 'claude' | 'gemini' | 'codex' | 'shell';
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type CanonicalSourceType = 'default' | 'shield' | 'user' | 'engine';
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interface CanonicalFinding {
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@@ -2150,6 +2203,9 @@ interface CanonicalFinding {
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sourceType: CanonicalSourceType;
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/** Optional shield/source label for UI. */
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shieldLabel?: string;
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/** The catalog check the gate names for the same call (`files.system-dirs`,
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* `commands.git-hooks-bypass`, ...). Set on 'file-access' findings. */
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checkId?: string;
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/** When this exact (post-dedupe) finding was first / last seen. */
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firstSeenAt: string;
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lastSeenAt: string;
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@@ -2203,6 +2259,14 @@ interface ExtractContext {
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kind?: string;
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path?: string;
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}>;
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/** The session's working directory, absolute, when the transcript carries
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* one. A relative file_path resolves against it for the file checks. */
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cwd?: string;
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/** The user's home directory (first) as the gate's FileAccessContext has it. */
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homeDirs?: string[];
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/** Catalog settings for the file checks. Absent means the defaults (the
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* Standard level), which keeps extractor output machine-independent. */
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catalogSettings?: CatalogSettings;
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}
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interface SessionExtractContext {
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sessionId: string;
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@@ -2251,7 +2315,7 @@ declare const LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: number;
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* and fails CI when the hash drifts without a version bump — forgetting
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* is loud, not silent.
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*/
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declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-
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declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v32";
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/**
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* SHA-256 prefix of the detector-source files
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* (canonical.ts + pii.ts + destructive-regex.ts).
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@@ -2262,7 +2326,7 @@ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v31";
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* files changed, this hash must change too, and you must consciously
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* decide whether to bump CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION."
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*/
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declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "
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declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "bf14326b92bf1718";
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declare function extractCanonicalFindings(call: ToolCallEntry, ctx: ExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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declare function extractSessionLevelFindings(calls: ReadonlyArray<SessionToolCall>, ctx: SessionExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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/**
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@@ -2374,5 +2438,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
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/** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
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declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
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-
export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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export type { ActionTemplateName, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
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export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, agentFileKind, analyzeFsOperation, analyzeGit, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitInvocations, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanInstructionWrite, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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export type { ActionTemplateName, AgentFileKind, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, GitAnalysis, GitFinding, GitInvocation, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
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package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -444,6 +444,8 @@ interface FileAccess {
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dotGlob?: boolean;
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followFinal: boolean;
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recursive?: boolean;
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/** A write that adds to the file (`>>`, `tee -a`): its content stays. */
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append?: true;
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/** This basename-joined candidate applies only if this operand is a directory. */
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directoryTarget?: string;
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candidates?: string[];
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@@ -888,6 +890,9 @@ interface PolicyHostHooks {
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checkProvenance?: (binary: string, cwd?: string) => ProvenanceLookup;
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/** Returns true if the host is on the user's trusted-hosts allowlist. */
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isTrustedHost?: (host: string) => boolean;
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+
/** The agent settings file at `absPath` as it is on disk now (a regular
|
|
894
|
+
* file within the host's size cap), or null (node9Firewall#413 part 4). */
|
|
895
|
+
readAgentSettings?: (absPath: string) => string | null;
|
|
891
896
|
}
|
|
892
897
|
interface PolicyVerdict {
|
|
893
898
|
decision: 'allow' | 'review' | 'block';
|
|
@@ -948,11 +953,12 @@ declare function resolvePinned(matches: SmartRule[]): SmartRule | undefined;
|
|
|
948
953
|
* Returns a reason string if dangerous, null if safe.
|
|
949
954
|
*/
|
|
950
955
|
declare function checkDangerousSql(sql: string): string | null;
|
|
951
|
-
declare function evaluatePolicy(config: PolicyConfig, toolName: string, args?: unknown, context?: PolicyContext,
|
|
956
|
+
declare function evaluatePolicy(config: PolicyConfig, toolName: string, args?: unknown, context?: PolicyContext, hostHooks?: PolicyHostHooks): Promise<PolicyVerdict>;
|
|
952
957
|
/** Returns true when toolName matches the config's ignoredTools list. */
|
|
953
958
|
declare function isIgnoredTool(toolName: string, config: PolicyConfig): boolean;
|
|
954
959
|
|
|
955
960
|
type ProtectedFileVerdict = PolicyVerdict & {
|
|
961
|
+
ruleName: string;
|
|
956
962
|
path: string;
|
|
957
963
|
operation: FileAccess['operation'];
|
|
958
964
|
};
|
|
@@ -1106,6 +1112,53 @@ declare function redactText(text: string): {
|
|
|
1106
1112
|
found: string[];
|
|
1107
1113
|
};
|
|
1108
1114
|
|
|
1115
|
+
type AgentFileKind = 'instructions' | 'memory' | 'agents' | 'commands' | 'skills' | 'settings';
|
|
1116
|
+
/** The kind of agent file a normalized path is, or null. */
|
|
1117
|
+
declare function agentFileKind(p: string): AgentFileKind | null;
|
|
1118
|
+
|
|
1119
|
+
/**
|
|
1120
|
+
* Scan text about to be written into an agent instruction or memory file.
|
|
1121
|
+
* The three signals above, plus the override, fake-role and destination
|
|
1122
|
+
* signals of scanInjection; any one is a finding. Read on every view
|
|
1123
|
+
* (normalised, base64 and hex decoded), as the output scanner does.
|
|
1124
|
+
*/
|
|
1125
|
+
declare function scanInstructionWrite(text: string): InjectionMatch | null;
|
|
1126
|
+
|
|
1127
|
+
type GitCheckId = 'commands.git-destructive' | 'commands.git-hooks-bypass' | 'commands.git-stage-all';
|
|
1128
|
+
interface GitFinding {
|
|
1129
|
+
checkId: GitCheckId;
|
|
1130
|
+
/** The rule name the audit log and the catalog's legacy table know. */
|
|
1131
|
+
ruleName: 'review-force-push' | 'review-git-destructive' | 'review-git-hooks-bypass' | 'review-git-stage-all';
|
|
1132
|
+
reason: string;
|
|
1133
|
+
description: string;
|
|
1134
|
+
/** The invocation as resolved, for the reason and the explain trace. */
|
|
1135
|
+
shown: string;
|
|
1136
|
+
}
|
|
1137
|
+
interface GitAnalysis {
|
|
1138
|
+
/** False when mvdan-sh could not parse the command: nothing was judged. */
|
|
1139
|
+
parsed: boolean;
|
|
1140
|
+
findings: GitFinding[];
|
|
1141
|
+
}
|
|
1142
|
+
/** One git invocation after resolution. */
|
|
1143
|
+
interface GitInvocation {
|
|
1144
|
+
/** The subcommand, or null when it could not be read (a dynamic word). */
|
|
1145
|
+
sub: string | null;
|
|
1146
|
+
/** The words after the subcommand; null marks a dynamic word. */
|
|
1147
|
+
args: (string | null)[];
|
|
1148
|
+
/** `-c key=value` pairs given before the subcommand, lowercased keys. */
|
|
1149
|
+
config: Map<string, string>;
|
|
1150
|
+
/** Assignments applied to this call (`HUSKY=0 git …`, `env K=V git …`). */
|
|
1151
|
+
env: Map<string, string | null>;
|
|
1152
|
+
/** How the call was written, for the reason. */
|
|
1153
|
+
shown: string;
|
|
1154
|
+
}
|
|
1155
|
+
/**
|
|
1156
|
+
* Every git finding in a shell command. Cached by the raw text; pure.
|
|
1157
|
+
*/
|
|
1158
|
+
declare function analyzeGit(command: string): GitAnalysis;
|
|
1159
|
+
/** The git invocations a command makes, resolved. Exposed for the explain trace and tests. */
|
|
1160
|
+
declare function gitInvocations(command: string): GitInvocation[];
|
|
1161
|
+
|
|
1109
1162
|
/**
|
|
1110
1163
|
* The OSV ecosystem name, verbatim: it is the index directory, the bucket path
|
|
1111
1164
|
* of the OSV archive and the `ecosystem` of the online query at once. `VSCode`
|
|
@@ -2117,7 +2170,7 @@ declare function matchCanary(text: string, values: readonly CanaryValue[]): Cana
|
|
|
2117
2170
|
* so escaped values are seen (B23), like scanArgs. */
|
|
2118
2171
|
declare function matchCanaryArgs(args: unknown, values: readonly CanaryValue[]): CanaryHit | null;
|
|
2119
2172
|
|
|
2120
|
-
type CanonicalFindingType = 'smart-rule' | 'ast-fs-op' | 'dlp' | 'pii' | 'canary' | 'sensitive-file-read' | 'privilege-escalation' | 'destructive-op' | 'pipe-to-shell' | 'eval-of-remote' | 'loop' | 'long-output-redacted';
|
|
2173
|
+
type CanonicalFindingType = 'smart-rule' | 'ast-fs-op' | 'file-access' | 'dlp' | 'pii' | 'canary' | 'sensitive-file-read' | 'privilege-escalation' | 'destructive-op' | 'pipe-to-shell' | 'eval-of-remote' | 'loop' | 'long-output-redacted';
|
|
2121
2174
|
type CanonicalAgent = 'claude' | 'gemini' | 'codex' | 'shell';
|
|
2122
2175
|
type CanonicalSourceType = 'default' | 'shield' | 'user' | 'engine';
|
|
2123
2176
|
interface CanonicalFinding {
|
|
@@ -2150,6 +2203,9 @@ interface CanonicalFinding {
|
|
|
2150
2203
|
sourceType: CanonicalSourceType;
|
|
2151
2204
|
/** Optional shield/source label for UI. */
|
|
2152
2205
|
shieldLabel?: string;
|
|
2206
|
+
/** The catalog check the gate names for the same call (`files.system-dirs`,
|
|
2207
|
+
* `commands.git-hooks-bypass`, ...). Set on 'file-access' findings. */
|
|
2208
|
+
checkId?: string;
|
|
2153
2209
|
/** When this exact (post-dedupe) finding was first / last seen. */
|
|
2154
2210
|
firstSeenAt: string;
|
|
2155
2211
|
lastSeenAt: string;
|
|
@@ -2203,6 +2259,14 @@ interface ExtractContext {
|
|
|
2203
2259
|
kind?: string;
|
|
2204
2260
|
path?: string;
|
|
2205
2261
|
}>;
|
|
2262
|
+
/** The session's working directory, absolute, when the transcript carries
|
|
2263
|
+
* one. A relative file_path resolves against it for the file checks. */
|
|
2264
|
+
cwd?: string;
|
|
2265
|
+
/** The user's home directory (first) as the gate's FileAccessContext has it. */
|
|
2266
|
+
homeDirs?: string[];
|
|
2267
|
+
/** Catalog settings for the file checks. Absent means the defaults (the
|
|
2268
|
+
* Standard level), which keeps extractor output machine-independent. */
|
|
2269
|
+
catalogSettings?: CatalogSettings;
|
|
2206
2270
|
}
|
|
2207
2271
|
interface SessionExtractContext {
|
|
2208
2272
|
sessionId: string;
|
|
@@ -2251,7 +2315,7 @@ declare const LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: number;
|
|
|
2251
2315
|
* and fails CI when the hash drifts without a version bump — forgetting
|
|
2252
2316
|
* is loud, not silent.
|
|
2253
2317
|
*/
|
|
2254
|
-
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-
|
|
2318
|
+
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v32";
|
|
2255
2319
|
/**
|
|
2256
2320
|
* SHA-256 prefix of the detector-source files
|
|
2257
2321
|
* (canonical.ts + pii.ts + destructive-regex.ts).
|
|
@@ -2262,7 +2326,7 @@ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v31";
|
|
|
2262
2326
|
* files changed, this hash must change too, and you must consciously
|
|
2263
2327
|
* decide whether to bump CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION."
|
|
2264
2328
|
*/
|
|
2265
|
-
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "
|
|
2329
|
+
declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "bf14326b92bf1718";
|
|
2266
2330
|
declare function extractCanonicalFindings(call: ToolCallEntry, ctx: ExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
|
|
2267
2331
|
declare function extractSessionLevelFindings(calls: ReadonlyArray<SessionToolCall>, ctx: SessionExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
|
|
2268
2332
|
/**
|
|
@@ -2374,5 +2438,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
|
|
|
2374
2438
|
/** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
|
|
2375
2439
|
declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
|
|
2376
2440
|
|
|
2377
|
-
export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
|
|
2378
|
-
export type { ActionTemplateName, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
|
|
2441
|
+
export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, agentFileKind, analyzeFsOperation, analyzeGit, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitInvocations, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanInstructionWrite, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
|
|
2442
|
+
export type { ActionTemplateName, AgentFileKind, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, GitAnalysis, GitFinding, GitInvocation, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
|