@node9/policy-engine 2.38.0 → 2.40.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/index.d.mts +44 -3
- package/dist/index.d.ts +44 -3
- package/dist/index.js +139 -21
- package/dist/index.mjs +128 -21
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/index.d.mts
CHANGED
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@@ -393,7 +393,8 @@ interface ResolvedCheck {
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* The value in force for one check, read from today's config shape, and
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* where it came from. A locked check always answers its floor. A pack row is
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* `off` unless its pack is applied. Anything the config does not set is the
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-
*
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* default of the level `settings.mode` names (levels.ts), which for most
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397
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* checks is the catalog default.
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*/
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declare function resolveCheck(settings: CatalogSettings, id: string): ResolvedCheck | undefined;
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/** Every check resolved, in catalog order. */
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@@ -1217,6 +1218,15 @@ declare function checksFromLegacyPolicy(policy: LegacyPolicyKnobs, mode?: string
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* legacy shape cannot carry the value.
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*/
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declare function checkToLegacyPolicy(policy: Obj, id: string, v: Verdict): boolean;
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/**
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* The knob-governed checks a legacy policy block STATES: it sets the field
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1223
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* that picks the check's value. Presence, not value, decides, so a level
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1224
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* (levels.ts) leaves the check alone. A field that turns a check on without
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* choosing between its on values (`dlp.enabled: true` for the weak-credential
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* row, `untrustedContent.enabled: true`) does not pin it: older `node9 init`
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* runs wrote those into every config file.
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*/
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declare function knobStatedChecks(policy: LegacyPolicyKnobs): Set<string>;
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/**
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* Checks whose detector reads the resolved checks map: every value the
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* catalog row offers works. Pack rows (`packs.*`) qualify too.
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@@ -1239,6 +1249,37 @@ declare function configurableValues(id: string): readonly Verdict[];
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/** The ids a config file or a workspace can state today. */
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declare const CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS: readonly string[];
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declare const LEVELS: readonly ["audit", "soft", "standard", "strict", "block-all"];
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type Level = (typeof LEVELS)[number];
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/** Every value `settings.mode` accepts: the five levels plus `observe`, the
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* older name of Audit that the dashboard still stores. */
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declare const MODE_VALUES: readonly ["observe", "audit", "soft", "standard", "strict", "block-all"];
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type ModeValue = (typeof MODE_VALUES)[number];
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declare function isModeValue(v: unknown): v is ModeValue;
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/** The level a mode names. `observe` is Audit; anything unknown or unset is
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* Standard, the default of every install. */
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declare function levelOf(mode: string | undefined): Level;
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/** Audit: nothing is stopped; every check records what it would have done. */
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declare function isRecordOnly(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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/** Strict and Block all ask about every inline code call, not only the
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* dangerous ones the inline judge finds. */
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declare function reviewsEveryInline(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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/** Block all: ask before any call no check recognised (the catch-all,
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* `commands.unknown`) and about a binary of unknown origin. This is what
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* `strict` meant before the levels. */
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declare function isBlockAll(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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/** The value a level gives a check nobody stated, or undefined when the
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* level keeps the catalog default. */
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declare function levelCheckValue(mode: string | undefined, id: string): Verdict | undefined;
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/** Every check a level changes, with its value. */
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declare function levelChecks(mode: string | undefined): Readonly<Record<string, Verdict>>;
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/** The package registry signals (`loading.malicious-package` tuning), which
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* allow only review or off. Soft turns both off; the others keep review. */
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declare function levelPackageSignals(mode: string | undefined): {
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newPackage: 'review' | 'off';
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installScript: 'review' | 'off';
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} | undefined;
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interface PipeChainAnalysis {
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isPipeline: boolean;
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hasSensitiveSource: boolean;
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@@ -2333,5 +2374,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
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/** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
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declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
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-
export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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-
export type { ActionTemplateName, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, LoopWindowEvaluation, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
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export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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export type { ActionTemplateName, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
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package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -393,7 +393,8 @@ interface ResolvedCheck {
|
|
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393
393
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* The value in force for one check, read from today's config shape, and
|
|
394
394
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* where it came from. A locked check always answers its floor. A pack row is
|
|
395
395
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* `off` unless its pack is applied. Anything the config does not set is the
|
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396
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-
*
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396
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+
* default of the level `settings.mode` names (levels.ts), which for most
|
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397
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+
* checks is the catalog default.
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397
398
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*/
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398
399
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declare function resolveCheck(settings: CatalogSettings, id: string): ResolvedCheck | undefined;
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399
400
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/** Every check resolved, in catalog order. */
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@@ -1217,6 +1218,15 @@ declare function checksFromLegacyPolicy(policy: LegacyPolicyKnobs, mode?: string
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1217
1218
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* legacy shape cannot carry the value.
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1218
1219
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*/
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1219
1220
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declare function checkToLegacyPolicy(policy: Obj, id: string, v: Verdict): boolean;
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1221
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+
/**
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1222
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+
* The knob-governed checks a legacy policy block STATES: it sets the field
|
|
1223
|
+
* that picks the check's value. Presence, not value, decides, so a level
|
|
1224
|
+
* (levels.ts) leaves the check alone. A field that turns a check on without
|
|
1225
|
+
* choosing between its on values (`dlp.enabled: true` for the weak-credential
|
|
1226
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+
* row, `untrustedContent.enabled: true`) does not pin it: older `node9 init`
|
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1227
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+
* runs wrote those into every config file.
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1228
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+
*/
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1229
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+
declare function knobStatedChecks(policy: LegacyPolicyKnobs): Set<string>;
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1220
1230
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/**
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1221
1231
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* Checks whose detector reads the resolved checks map: every value the
|
|
1222
1232
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* catalog row offers works. Pack rows (`packs.*`) qualify too.
|
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@@ -1239,6 +1249,37 @@ declare function configurableValues(id: string): readonly Verdict[];
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1239
1249
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/** The ids a config file or a workspace can state today. */
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1240
1250
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declare const CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS: readonly string[];
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+
declare const LEVELS: readonly ["audit", "soft", "standard", "strict", "block-all"];
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1253
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type Level = (typeof LEVELS)[number];
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1254
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+
/** Every value `settings.mode` accepts: the five levels plus `observe`, the
|
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1255
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+
* older name of Audit that the dashboard still stores. */
|
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1256
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+
declare const MODE_VALUES: readonly ["observe", "audit", "soft", "standard", "strict", "block-all"];
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1257
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type ModeValue = (typeof MODE_VALUES)[number];
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1258
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declare function isModeValue(v: unknown): v is ModeValue;
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1259
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+
/** The level a mode names. `observe` is Audit; anything unknown or unset is
|
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1260
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+
* Standard, the default of every install. */
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1261
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+
declare function levelOf(mode: string | undefined): Level;
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1262
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+
/** Audit: nothing is stopped; every check records what it would have done. */
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1263
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+
declare function isRecordOnly(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
|
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1264
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+
/** Strict and Block all ask about every inline code call, not only the
|
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1265
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+
* dangerous ones the inline judge finds. */
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1266
|
+
declare function reviewsEveryInline(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
|
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1267
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+
/** Block all: ask before any call no check recognised (the catch-all,
|
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1268
|
+
* `commands.unknown`) and about a binary of unknown origin. This is what
|
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1269
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+
* `strict` meant before the levels. */
|
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1270
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+
declare function isBlockAll(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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1271
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+
/** The value a level gives a check nobody stated, or undefined when the
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1272
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+
* level keeps the catalog default. */
|
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1273
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+
declare function levelCheckValue(mode: string | undefined, id: string): Verdict | undefined;
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1274
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+
/** Every check a level changes, with its value. */
|
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1275
|
+
declare function levelChecks(mode: string | undefined): Readonly<Record<string, Verdict>>;
|
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1276
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+
/** The package registry signals (`loading.malicious-package` tuning), which
|
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1277
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+
* allow only review or off. Soft turns both off; the others keep review. */
|
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1278
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+
declare function levelPackageSignals(mode: string | undefined): {
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1279
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+
newPackage: 'review' | 'off';
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1280
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+
installScript: 'review' | 'off';
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1281
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+
} | undefined;
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1282
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+
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1242
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interface PipeChainAnalysis {
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1243
1284
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isPipeline: boolean;
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1244
1285
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hasSensitiveSource: boolean;
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@@ -2333,5 +2374,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
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2333
2374
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/** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
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2334
2375
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declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
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2335
2376
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2336
|
-
export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
|
|
2337
|
-
export type { ActionTemplateName, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, LoopWindowEvaluation, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
|
|
2377
|
+
export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
|
|
2378
|
+
export type { ActionTemplateName, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
|
package/dist/index.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -65,12 +65,14 @@ __export(src_exports, {
|
|
|
65
65
|
FS_READ_TOOLS: () => FS_READ_TOOLS,
|
|
66
66
|
GENERAL_ACTION_RULES: () => GENERAL_ACTION_RULES,
|
|
67
67
|
KNOB_GOVERNED: () => KNOB_GOVERNED,
|
|
68
|
+
LEVELS: () => LEVELS,
|
|
68
69
|
LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: () => LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES,
|
|
69
70
|
LOOP_MAX_RECORDS: () => LOOP_MAX_RECORDS,
|
|
70
71
|
LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE: () => LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE,
|
|
71
72
|
MAP_GOVERNED: () => MAP_GOVERNED,
|
|
72
73
|
MAX_BLAST_PATH: () => MAX_BLAST_PATH,
|
|
73
74
|
MAX_DESTINATIONS: () => MAX_DESTINATIONS,
|
|
75
|
+
MODE_VALUES: () => MODE_VALUES,
|
|
74
76
|
NET_BINARIES: () => NET_BINARIES,
|
|
75
77
|
PATTERN_VERB_NAMES: () => PATTERN_VERB_NAMES,
|
|
76
78
|
PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE: () => PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE,
|
|
@@ -155,6 +157,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
|
|
|
155
157
|
inspectionLayers: () => inspectionLayers,
|
|
156
158
|
isAgentInstructionPath: () => isAgentInstructionPath,
|
|
157
159
|
isBashTool: () => isBashTool,
|
|
160
|
+
isBlockAll: () => isBlockAll,
|
|
158
161
|
isDestructiveToolName: () => isDestructiveToolName,
|
|
159
162
|
isHashedEntry: () => isHashedEntry,
|
|
160
163
|
isIgnoredTool: () => isIgnoredTool,
|
|
@@ -164,13 +167,20 @@ __export(src_exports, {
|
|
|
164
167
|
isLockedCheck: () => isLockedCheck,
|
|
165
168
|
isLoopbackHost: () => isLoopbackHost,
|
|
166
169
|
isMaskedKind: () => isMaskedKind,
|
|
170
|
+
isModeValue: () => isModeValue,
|
|
167
171
|
isPasswordHashPath: () => isPasswordHashPath,
|
|
168
172
|
isPrivateHost: () => isPrivateHost,
|
|
169
173
|
isProtectedHomePath: () => isProtectedHomePath,
|
|
174
|
+
isRecordOnly: () => isRecordOnly,
|
|
170
175
|
isShellShapedTool: () => isShellShapedTool,
|
|
171
176
|
isShieldVerdict: () => isShieldVerdict,
|
|
172
177
|
isStrictGatedTier: () => isStrictGatedTier,
|
|
173
178
|
isVerdict: () => isVerdict,
|
|
179
|
+
knobStatedChecks: () => knobStatedChecks,
|
|
180
|
+
levelCheckValue: () => levelCheckValue,
|
|
181
|
+
levelChecks: () => levelChecks,
|
|
182
|
+
levelOf: () => levelOf,
|
|
183
|
+
levelPackageSignals: () => levelPackageSignals,
|
|
174
184
|
maskDestination: () => maskDestination,
|
|
175
185
|
maskPersonalData: () => maskPersonalData,
|
|
176
186
|
maskPersonalValue: () => maskPersonalValue,
|
|
@@ -201,6 +211,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
|
|
|
201
211
|
resolveCheckMap: () => resolveCheckMap,
|
|
202
212
|
resolvePinned: () => resolvePinned,
|
|
203
213
|
resolveShellInput: () => resolveShellInput,
|
|
214
|
+
reviewsEveryInline: () => reviewsEveryInline,
|
|
204
215
|
ruleServerMatches: () => ruleServerMatches,
|
|
205
216
|
safeMessage: () => safeMessage,
|
|
206
217
|
sampleCopyCommand: () => sampleCopyCommand,
|
|
@@ -2286,7 +2297,7 @@ var CHECK_TEXT = {
|
|
|
2286
2297
|
"actions.money": {
|
|
2287
2298
|
plain: "The agent moves money (a refund, a payout, a transfer, a charge) through an app node9 has no protection for, such as an internal billing server.",
|
|
2288
2299
|
example: "refund_order on a server called acme-billing",
|
|
2289
|
-
advice: "
|
|
2300
|
+
advice: "Standard records these and Strict asks. Set Review to be asked before every money move at any level. When the app is Stripe or PayPal, turn on its own protection instead: it covers the CLI, the API and scripts too, and a call from it no longer comes here."
|
|
2290
2301
|
},
|
|
2291
2302
|
"actions.access": {
|
|
2292
2303
|
plain: "The agent changes a password, a key, a role or who belongs to a team, through an app node9 has no protection for.",
|
|
@@ -2464,6 +2475,82 @@ var CHECK_TEXT = {
|
|
|
2464
2475
|
}
|
|
2465
2476
|
};
|
|
2466
2477
|
|
|
2478
|
+
// src/levels.ts
|
|
2479
|
+
var LEVELS = ["audit", "soft", "standard", "strict", "block-all"];
|
|
2480
|
+
var MODE_VALUES = ["observe", ...LEVELS];
|
|
2481
|
+
function isModeValue(v) {
|
|
2482
|
+
return typeof v === "string" && MODE_VALUES.includes(v);
|
|
2483
|
+
}
|
|
2484
|
+
function levelOf(mode) {
|
|
2485
|
+
if (mode === "observe") return "audit";
|
|
2486
|
+
return LEVELS.includes(mode ?? "") ? mode : "standard";
|
|
2487
|
+
}
|
|
2488
|
+
function isRecordOnly(mode) {
|
|
2489
|
+
return levelOf(mode) === "audit";
|
|
2490
|
+
}
|
|
2491
|
+
function reviewsEveryInline(mode) {
|
|
2492
|
+
const level = levelOf(mode);
|
|
2493
|
+
return level === "strict" || level === "block-all";
|
|
2494
|
+
}
|
|
2495
|
+
function isBlockAll(mode) {
|
|
2496
|
+
return levelOf(mode) === "block-all";
|
|
2497
|
+
}
|
|
2498
|
+
var SOFT = {
|
|
2499
|
+
"commands.inline-exec": "log",
|
|
2500
|
+
"commands.eval-dynamic": "log",
|
|
2501
|
+
"commands.rm": "log",
|
|
2502
|
+
"commands.chmod": "log",
|
|
2503
|
+
"commands.sudo": "log",
|
|
2504
|
+
"commands.git-destructive": "log",
|
|
2505
|
+
"commands.sql-ddl": "log",
|
|
2506
|
+
"commands.sql-no-where": "log",
|
|
2507
|
+
"commands.temp-binary": "log",
|
|
2508
|
+
"commands.disk-destroy": "log",
|
|
2509
|
+
"commands.dangerous-word": "log",
|
|
2510
|
+
"files.system-dirs": "log",
|
|
2511
|
+
"files.shell-startup": "log",
|
|
2512
|
+
"files.password-hashes": "log",
|
|
2513
|
+
"data.pipe-chain": "log",
|
|
2514
|
+
"behavior.untrusted-content": "log"
|
|
2515
|
+
};
|
|
2516
|
+
var STRICT = {
|
|
2517
|
+
"commands.sql-ddl": "block",
|
|
2518
|
+
"commands.disk-destroy": "block",
|
|
2519
|
+
"commands.node9-disarm": "block",
|
|
2520
|
+
"files.system-dirs": "block",
|
|
2521
|
+
"files.shell-startup": "block",
|
|
2522
|
+
"files.password-hashes": "block",
|
|
2523
|
+
"data.secrets-weak": "block",
|
|
2524
|
+
"data.pipe-chain": "block",
|
|
2525
|
+
"network.unknown-host": "review",
|
|
2526
|
+
"network.internal-addresses": "block",
|
|
2527
|
+
"behavior.prompt-injection": "log",
|
|
2528
|
+
"loading.skill-tamper": "block",
|
|
2529
|
+
// Standard records money moves (catalog default log); Strict asks.
|
|
2530
|
+
"actions.money": "review"
|
|
2531
|
+
};
|
|
2532
|
+
var BLOCK_ALL = {
|
|
2533
|
+
...STRICT,
|
|
2534
|
+
"commands.unknown": "review",
|
|
2535
|
+
"commands.temp-binary": "block"
|
|
2536
|
+
};
|
|
2537
|
+
var LEVEL_CHECKS = {
|
|
2538
|
+
audit: {},
|
|
2539
|
+
soft: SOFT,
|
|
2540
|
+
standard: {},
|
|
2541
|
+
strict: STRICT,
|
|
2542
|
+
"block-all": BLOCK_ALL
|
|
2543
|
+
};
|
|
2544
|
+
function levelCheckValue(mode, id) {
|
|
2545
|
+
return LEVEL_CHECKS[levelOf(mode)][id];
|
|
2546
|
+
}
|
|
2547
|
+
function levelChecks(mode) {
|
|
2548
|
+
return LEVEL_CHECKS[levelOf(mode)];
|
|
2549
|
+
}
|
|
2550
|
+
function levelPackageSignals(mode) {
|
|
2551
|
+
return levelOf(mode) === "soft" ? { newPackage: "off", installScript: "off" } : void 0;
|
|
2552
|
+
}
|
|
2553
|
+
|
|
2467
2554
|
// src/catalog.ts
|
|
2468
2555
|
var VERDICTS = ["off", "log", "review", "block"];
|
|
2469
2556
|
var CHECK_VERDICT_RANK = { off: 0, log: 1, review: 2, block: 3 };
|
|
@@ -2893,7 +2980,10 @@ var PRODUCT_CHECKS = [
|
|
|
2893
2980
|
title: "Money moves",
|
|
2894
2981
|
catches: "a refund, payout, transfer, charge or withdrawal through an app with no protection of its own",
|
|
2895
2982
|
values: ALL,
|
|
2896
|
-
|
|
2983
|
+
// Founder decision 2026-10-25: a transfer the user asked for is ordinary
|
|
2984
|
+
// work. Standard records it; Strict asks (levels.ts); a user who wants to
|
|
2985
|
+
// be asked states review.
|
|
2986
|
+
defaultValue: "log",
|
|
2897
2987
|
legacy: generalActionRuleNames("finance")
|
|
2898
2988
|
},
|
|
2899
2989
|
{
|
|
@@ -3070,7 +3160,7 @@ var LEGACY_READERS = {
|
|
|
3070
3160
|
"commands.rm": (s) => knob(s.commandChecks?.rmAdvisory),
|
|
3071
3161
|
"commands.chmod": (s) => knob(s.commandChecks?.chmod),
|
|
3072
3162
|
"commands.sql-ddl": (s) => knob(s.commandChecks?.sqlDdl),
|
|
3073
|
-
"commands.unknown": (s) => s.mode === void 0 ? void 0 : s.mode
|
|
3163
|
+
"commands.unknown": (s) => s.mode === void 0 ? void 0 : isBlockAll(s.mode) ? "review" : "off",
|
|
3074
3164
|
"data.secrets": (s) => enabledOr(s.dlp?.enabled, "block"),
|
|
3075
3165
|
"data.secrets-weak": (s) => {
|
|
3076
3166
|
if (s.dlp?.enabled === false) return "off";
|
|
@@ -3109,19 +3199,21 @@ function resolveCheck(settings, id) {
|
|
|
3109
3199
|
if (!def) return void 0;
|
|
3110
3200
|
if (isLockedCheck(def)) return { id, value: "block", source: "locked" };
|
|
3111
3201
|
const floor = def.floor ? CHECK_VERDICT_RANK[def.floor] : 0;
|
|
3202
|
+
const levelDefault = levelCheckValue(settings.mode, id) ?? def.defaultValue;
|
|
3203
|
+
const sourceOf = (value2) => value2 === levelDefault ? "default" : "configured";
|
|
3112
3204
|
const explicit = settings.checks?.[id];
|
|
3113
3205
|
if (isVerdict(explicit)) {
|
|
3114
3206
|
const value2 = CHECK_VERDICT_RANK[explicit] < floor ? def.floor : explicit;
|
|
3115
|
-
return { id, value: value2, source: value2
|
|
3207
|
+
return { id, value: value2, source: sourceOf(value2) };
|
|
3116
3208
|
}
|
|
3117
3209
|
if (def.pack) {
|
|
3118
3210
|
const on = settings.appliedShields?.includes(def.pack) ?? false;
|
|
3119
3211
|
return { id, value: on ? def.defaultValue : "off", source: "default" };
|
|
3120
3212
|
}
|
|
3121
3213
|
const read = LEGACY_READERS[id]?.(settings);
|
|
3122
|
-
if (read === void 0) return { id, value:
|
|
3214
|
+
if (read === void 0) return { id, value: levelDefault, source: "default" };
|
|
3123
3215
|
const value = CHECK_VERDICT_RANK[read] < floor ? def.floor : read;
|
|
3124
|
-
return { id, value, source: value
|
|
3216
|
+
return { id, value, source: sourceOf(value) };
|
|
3125
3217
|
}
|
|
3126
3218
|
function resolveAllChecks(settings) {
|
|
3127
3219
|
return CHECKS.map((c) => resolveCheck(settings, c.id));
|
|
@@ -12916,7 +13008,7 @@ function checksFromLegacyPolicy(policy, mode) {
|
|
|
12916
13008
|
if (uc?.enabled === false) out["behavior.untrusted-content"] = "off";
|
|
12917
13009
|
else if (uc?.enabled === true)
|
|
12918
13010
|
out["behavior.untrusted-content"] = uc.afterExposure === "log-only" ? "log" : "review";
|
|
12919
|
-
if (mode
|
|
13011
|
+
if (isBlockAll(mode)) out["commands.unknown"] = "review";
|
|
12920
13012
|
return out;
|
|
12921
13013
|
}
|
|
12922
13014
|
function checkToLegacyPolicy(policy, id, v) {
|
|
@@ -13008,6 +13100,25 @@ function checkToLegacyPolicy(policy, id, v) {
|
|
|
13008
13100
|
return false;
|
|
13009
13101
|
}
|
|
13010
13102
|
}
|
|
13103
|
+
function knobStatedChecks(policy) {
|
|
13104
|
+
const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
|
|
13105
|
+
const has = (o, key) => !!o && typeof o === "object" && o[key] !== void 0;
|
|
13106
|
+
const { dlp, egress, loopDetection, injectionScan, skillPinning, packageCheck } = policy;
|
|
13107
|
+
const uc = policy.untrustedContent;
|
|
13108
|
+
if (has(dlp, "enabled")) out.add("data.secrets");
|
|
13109
|
+
if (has(dlp, "reviewAction") || dlp?.enabled === false) out.add("data.secrets-weak");
|
|
13110
|
+
if (has(dlp, "pii")) out.add("data.pii");
|
|
13111
|
+
if (has(egress, "enabled") || has(egress, "mode")) out.add("network.unknown-host");
|
|
13112
|
+
if (has(egress, "ssrfStrict")) out.add("network.internal-addresses");
|
|
13113
|
+
if (has(loopDetection, "enabled")) out.add("behavior.loops");
|
|
13114
|
+
if (has(injectionScan, "enabled")) out.add("behavior.prompt-injection");
|
|
13115
|
+
if (has(skillPinning, "enabled") || has(skillPinning, "mode")) out.add("loading.skill-tamper");
|
|
13116
|
+
if (has(packageCheck, "enabled") || has(packageCheck, "onMalicious"))
|
|
13117
|
+
out.add("loading.malicious-package");
|
|
13118
|
+
if (uc && typeof uc === "object" && (uc.enabled === false || has(uc, "afterExposure")))
|
|
13119
|
+
out.add("behavior.untrusted-content");
|
|
13120
|
+
return out;
|
|
13121
|
+
}
|
|
13011
13122
|
var MAP_GOVERNED = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
|
|
13012
13123
|
"files.shell-startup",
|
|
13013
13124
|
"files.password-hashes",
|
|
@@ -14074,7 +14185,7 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
|
|
|
14074
14185
|
if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
|
|
14075
14186
|
else if (v) candidates.push(v);
|
|
14076
14187
|
};
|
|
14077
|
-
const inline = config.settings.mode
|
|
14188
|
+
const inline = reviewsEveryInline(config.settings.mode) ? detectInlineExec(shellCommand) ? void 0 : null : inlineExecReview(shellCommand);
|
|
14078
14189
|
if (inline !== null) {
|
|
14079
14190
|
consider("commands.inline-exec", {
|
|
14080
14191
|
decision: "review",
|
|
@@ -14134,21 +14245,17 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
|
|
|
14134
14245
|
if (firstToken && firstToken.startsWith("/") && checkProvenance) {
|
|
14135
14246
|
const prov = checkProvenance(firstToken, cwd);
|
|
14136
14247
|
if (prov.trustLevel === "suspect") {
|
|
14137
|
-
const
|
|
14138
|
-
|
|
14139
|
-
|
|
14140
|
-
{
|
|
14141
|
-
|
|
14142
|
-
|
|
14143
|
-
|
|
14144
|
-
tier: 3,
|
|
14145
|
-
checkId: "commands.temp-binary"
|
|
14146
|
-
}
|
|
14147
|
-
);
|
|
14248
|
+
const v = applyCheckValue(cv("commands.temp-binary"), {
|
|
14249
|
+
decision: "review",
|
|
14250
|
+
blockedByLabel: "Node9: Suspect Binary",
|
|
14251
|
+
reason: `Binary "${firstToken}" resolved to ${prov.resolvedPath} \u2014 ${prov.reason}`,
|
|
14252
|
+
tier: 3,
|
|
14253
|
+
checkId: "commands.temp-binary"
|
|
14254
|
+
});
|
|
14148
14255
|
if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
|
|
14149
14256
|
else if (v) return v;
|
|
14150
14257
|
}
|
|
14151
|
-
if (prov.trustLevel === "unknown" && config.settings.mode
|
|
14258
|
+
if (prov.trustLevel === "unknown" && isBlockAll(config.settings.mode)) {
|
|
14152
14259
|
return {
|
|
14153
14260
|
decision: "review",
|
|
14154
14261
|
blockedByLabel: "Node9: Unknown Binary (strict mode)",
|
|
@@ -14239,7 +14346,7 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
|
|
|
14239
14346
|
if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
|
|
14240
14347
|
else if (v) return v;
|
|
14241
14348
|
}
|
|
14242
|
-
if (config.settings.mode
|
|
14349
|
+
if (isBlockAll(config.settings.mode)) {
|
|
14243
14350
|
if (activeEnvironment?.requireApproval === false) return allowed();
|
|
14244
14351
|
return {
|
|
14245
14352
|
decision: "review",
|
|
@@ -16241,12 +16348,14 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
|
|
|
16241
16348
|
FS_READ_TOOLS,
|
|
16242
16349
|
GENERAL_ACTION_RULES,
|
|
16243
16350
|
KNOB_GOVERNED,
|
|
16351
|
+
LEVELS,
|
|
16244
16352
|
LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES,
|
|
16245
16353
|
LOOP_MAX_RECORDS,
|
|
16246
16354
|
LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE,
|
|
16247
16355
|
MAP_GOVERNED,
|
|
16248
16356
|
MAX_BLAST_PATH,
|
|
16249
16357
|
MAX_DESTINATIONS,
|
|
16358
|
+
MODE_VALUES,
|
|
16250
16359
|
NET_BINARIES,
|
|
16251
16360
|
PATTERN_VERB_NAMES,
|
|
16252
16361
|
PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE,
|
|
@@ -16331,6 +16440,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
|
|
|
16331
16440
|
inspectionLayers,
|
|
16332
16441
|
isAgentInstructionPath,
|
|
16333
16442
|
isBashTool,
|
|
16443
|
+
isBlockAll,
|
|
16334
16444
|
isDestructiveToolName,
|
|
16335
16445
|
isHashedEntry,
|
|
16336
16446
|
isIgnoredTool,
|
|
@@ -16340,13 +16450,20 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
|
|
|
16340
16450
|
isLockedCheck,
|
|
16341
16451
|
isLoopbackHost,
|
|
16342
16452
|
isMaskedKind,
|
|
16453
|
+
isModeValue,
|
|
16343
16454
|
isPasswordHashPath,
|
|
16344
16455
|
isPrivateHost,
|
|
16345
16456
|
isProtectedHomePath,
|
|
16457
|
+
isRecordOnly,
|
|
16346
16458
|
isShellShapedTool,
|
|
16347
16459
|
isShieldVerdict,
|
|
16348
16460
|
isStrictGatedTier,
|
|
16349
16461
|
isVerdict,
|
|
16462
|
+
knobStatedChecks,
|
|
16463
|
+
levelCheckValue,
|
|
16464
|
+
levelChecks,
|
|
16465
|
+
levelOf,
|
|
16466
|
+
levelPackageSignals,
|
|
16350
16467
|
maskDestination,
|
|
16351
16468
|
maskPersonalData,
|
|
16352
16469
|
maskPersonalValue,
|
|
@@ -16377,6 +16494,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
|
|
|
16377
16494
|
resolveCheckMap,
|
|
16378
16495
|
resolvePinned,
|
|
16379
16496
|
resolveShellInput,
|
|
16497
|
+
reviewsEveryInline,
|
|
16380
16498
|
ruleServerMatches,
|
|
16381
16499
|
safeMessage,
|
|
16382
16500
|
sampleCopyCommand,
|
package/dist/index.mjs
CHANGED
|
@@ -2047,7 +2047,7 @@ var CHECK_TEXT = {
|
|
|
2047
2047
|
"actions.money": {
|
|
2048
2048
|
plain: "The agent moves money (a refund, a payout, a transfer, a charge) through an app node9 has no protection for, such as an internal billing server.",
|
|
2049
2049
|
example: "refund_order on a server called acme-billing",
|
|
2050
|
-
advice: "
|
|
2050
|
+
advice: "Standard records these and Strict asks. Set Review to be asked before every money move at any level. When the app is Stripe or PayPal, turn on its own protection instead: it covers the CLI, the API and scripts too, and a call from it no longer comes here."
|
|
2051
2051
|
},
|
|
2052
2052
|
"actions.access": {
|
|
2053
2053
|
plain: "The agent changes a password, a key, a role or who belongs to a team, through an app node9 has no protection for.",
|
|
@@ -2225,6 +2225,82 @@ var CHECK_TEXT = {
|
|
|
2225
2225
|
}
|
|
2226
2226
|
};
|
|
2227
2227
|
|
|
2228
|
+
// src/levels.ts
|
|
2229
|
+
var LEVELS = ["audit", "soft", "standard", "strict", "block-all"];
|
|
2230
|
+
var MODE_VALUES = ["observe", ...LEVELS];
|
|
2231
|
+
function isModeValue(v) {
|
|
2232
|
+
return typeof v === "string" && MODE_VALUES.includes(v);
|
|
2233
|
+
}
|
|
2234
|
+
function levelOf(mode) {
|
|
2235
|
+
if (mode === "observe") return "audit";
|
|
2236
|
+
return LEVELS.includes(mode ?? "") ? mode : "standard";
|
|
2237
|
+
}
|
|
2238
|
+
function isRecordOnly(mode) {
|
|
2239
|
+
return levelOf(mode) === "audit";
|
|
2240
|
+
}
|
|
2241
|
+
function reviewsEveryInline(mode) {
|
|
2242
|
+
const level = levelOf(mode);
|
|
2243
|
+
return level === "strict" || level === "block-all";
|
|
2244
|
+
}
|
|
2245
|
+
function isBlockAll(mode) {
|
|
2246
|
+
return levelOf(mode) === "block-all";
|
|
2247
|
+
}
|
|
2248
|
+
var SOFT = {
|
|
2249
|
+
"commands.inline-exec": "log",
|
|
2250
|
+
"commands.eval-dynamic": "log",
|
|
2251
|
+
"commands.rm": "log",
|
|
2252
|
+
"commands.chmod": "log",
|
|
2253
|
+
"commands.sudo": "log",
|
|
2254
|
+
"commands.git-destructive": "log",
|
|
2255
|
+
"commands.sql-ddl": "log",
|
|
2256
|
+
"commands.sql-no-where": "log",
|
|
2257
|
+
"commands.temp-binary": "log",
|
|
2258
|
+
"commands.disk-destroy": "log",
|
|
2259
|
+
"commands.dangerous-word": "log",
|
|
2260
|
+
"files.system-dirs": "log",
|
|
2261
|
+
"files.shell-startup": "log",
|
|
2262
|
+
"files.password-hashes": "log",
|
|
2263
|
+
"data.pipe-chain": "log",
|
|
2264
|
+
"behavior.untrusted-content": "log"
|
|
2265
|
+
};
|
|
2266
|
+
var STRICT = {
|
|
2267
|
+
"commands.sql-ddl": "block",
|
|
2268
|
+
"commands.disk-destroy": "block",
|
|
2269
|
+
"commands.node9-disarm": "block",
|
|
2270
|
+
"files.system-dirs": "block",
|
|
2271
|
+
"files.shell-startup": "block",
|
|
2272
|
+
"files.password-hashes": "block",
|
|
2273
|
+
"data.secrets-weak": "block",
|
|
2274
|
+
"data.pipe-chain": "block",
|
|
2275
|
+
"network.unknown-host": "review",
|
|
2276
|
+
"network.internal-addresses": "block",
|
|
2277
|
+
"behavior.prompt-injection": "log",
|
|
2278
|
+
"loading.skill-tamper": "block",
|
|
2279
|
+
// Standard records money moves (catalog default log); Strict asks.
|
|
2280
|
+
"actions.money": "review"
|
|
2281
|
+
};
|
|
2282
|
+
var BLOCK_ALL = {
|
|
2283
|
+
...STRICT,
|
|
2284
|
+
"commands.unknown": "review",
|
|
2285
|
+
"commands.temp-binary": "block"
|
|
2286
|
+
};
|
|
2287
|
+
var LEVEL_CHECKS = {
|
|
2288
|
+
audit: {},
|
|
2289
|
+
soft: SOFT,
|
|
2290
|
+
standard: {},
|
|
2291
|
+
strict: STRICT,
|
|
2292
|
+
"block-all": BLOCK_ALL
|
|
2293
|
+
};
|
|
2294
|
+
function levelCheckValue(mode, id) {
|
|
2295
|
+
return LEVEL_CHECKS[levelOf(mode)][id];
|
|
2296
|
+
}
|
|
2297
|
+
function levelChecks(mode) {
|
|
2298
|
+
return LEVEL_CHECKS[levelOf(mode)];
|
|
2299
|
+
}
|
|
2300
|
+
function levelPackageSignals(mode) {
|
|
2301
|
+
return levelOf(mode) === "soft" ? { newPackage: "off", installScript: "off" } : void 0;
|
|
2302
|
+
}
|
|
2303
|
+
|
|
2228
2304
|
// src/catalog.ts
|
|
2229
2305
|
var VERDICTS = ["off", "log", "review", "block"];
|
|
2230
2306
|
var CHECK_VERDICT_RANK = { off: 0, log: 1, review: 2, block: 3 };
|
|
@@ -2654,7 +2730,10 @@ var PRODUCT_CHECKS = [
|
|
|
2654
2730
|
title: "Money moves",
|
|
2655
2731
|
catches: "a refund, payout, transfer, charge or withdrawal through an app with no protection of its own",
|
|
2656
2732
|
values: ALL,
|
|
2657
|
-
|
|
2733
|
+
// Founder decision 2026-10-25: a transfer the user asked for is ordinary
|
|
2734
|
+
// work. Standard records it; Strict asks (levels.ts); a user who wants to
|
|
2735
|
+
// be asked states review.
|
|
2736
|
+
defaultValue: "log",
|
|
2658
2737
|
legacy: generalActionRuleNames("finance")
|
|
2659
2738
|
},
|
|
2660
2739
|
{
|
|
@@ -2831,7 +2910,7 @@ var LEGACY_READERS = {
|
|
|
2831
2910
|
"commands.rm": (s) => knob(s.commandChecks?.rmAdvisory),
|
|
2832
2911
|
"commands.chmod": (s) => knob(s.commandChecks?.chmod),
|
|
2833
2912
|
"commands.sql-ddl": (s) => knob(s.commandChecks?.sqlDdl),
|
|
2834
|
-
"commands.unknown": (s) => s.mode === void 0 ? void 0 : s.mode
|
|
2913
|
+
"commands.unknown": (s) => s.mode === void 0 ? void 0 : isBlockAll(s.mode) ? "review" : "off",
|
|
2835
2914
|
"data.secrets": (s) => enabledOr(s.dlp?.enabled, "block"),
|
|
2836
2915
|
"data.secrets-weak": (s) => {
|
|
2837
2916
|
if (s.dlp?.enabled === false) return "off";
|
|
@@ -2870,19 +2949,21 @@ function resolveCheck(settings, id) {
|
|
|
2870
2949
|
if (!def) return void 0;
|
|
2871
2950
|
if (isLockedCheck(def)) return { id, value: "block", source: "locked" };
|
|
2872
2951
|
const floor = def.floor ? CHECK_VERDICT_RANK[def.floor] : 0;
|
|
2952
|
+
const levelDefault = levelCheckValue(settings.mode, id) ?? def.defaultValue;
|
|
2953
|
+
const sourceOf = (value2) => value2 === levelDefault ? "default" : "configured";
|
|
2873
2954
|
const explicit = settings.checks?.[id];
|
|
2874
2955
|
if (isVerdict(explicit)) {
|
|
2875
2956
|
const value2 = CHECK_VERDICT_RANK[explicit] < floor ? def.floor : explicit;
|
|
2876
|
-
return { id, value: value2, source: value2
|
|
2957
|
+
return { id, value: value2, source: sourceOf(value2) };
|
|
2877
2958
|
}
|
|
2878
2959
|
if (def.pack) {
|
|
2879
2960
|
const on = settings.appliedShields?.includes(def.pack) ?? false;
|
|
2880
2961
|
return { id, value: on ? def.defaultValue : "off", source: "default" };
|
|
2881
2962
|
}
|
|
2882
2963
|
const read = LEGACY_READERS[id]?.(settings);
|
|
2883
|
-
if (read === void 0) return { id, value:
|
|
2964
|
+
if (read === void 0) return { id, value: levelDefault, source: "default" };
|
|
2884
2965
|
const value = CHECK_VERDICT_RANK[read] < floor ? def.floor : read;
|
|
2885
|
-
return { id, value, source: value
|
|
2966
|
+
return { id, value, source: sourceOf(value) };
|
|
2886
2967
|
}
|
|
2887
2968
|
function resolveAllChecks(settings) {
|
|
2888
2969
|
return CHECKS.map((c) => resolveCheck(settings, c.id));
|
|
@@ -12677,7 +12758,7 @@ function checksFromLegacyPolicy(policy, mode) {
|
|
|
12677
12758
|
if (uc?.enabled === false) out["behavior.untrusted-content"] = "off";
|
|
12678
12759
|
else if (uc?.enabled === true)
|
|
12679
12760
|
out["behavior.untrusted-content"] = uc.afterExposure === "log-only" ? "log" : "review";
|
|
12680
|
-
if (mode
|
|
12761
|
+
if (isBlockAll(mode)) out["commands.unknown"] = "review";
|
|
12681
12762
|
return out;
|
|
12682
12763
|
}
|
|
12683
12764
|
function checkToLegacyPolicy(policy, id, v) {
|
|
@@ -12769,6 +12850,25 @@ function checkToLegacyPolicy(policy, id, v) {
|
|
|
12769
12850
|
return false;
|
|
12770
12851
|
}
|
|
12771
12852
|
}
|
|
12853
|
+
function knobStatedChecks(policy) {
|
|
12854
|
+
const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
|
|
12855
|
+
const has = (o, key) => !!o && typeof o === "object" && o[key] !== void 0;
|
|
12856
|
+
const { dlp, egress, loopDetection, injectionScan, skillPinning, packageCheck } = policy;
|
|
12857
|
+
const uc = policy.untrustedContent;
|
|
12858
|
+
if (has(dlp, "enabled")) out.add("data.secrets");
|
|
12859
|
+
if (has(dlp, "reviewAction") || dlp?.enabled === false) out.add("data.secrets-weak");
|
|
12860
|
+
if (has(dlp, "pii")) out.add("data.pii");
|
|
12861
|
+
if (has(egress, "enabled") || has(egress, "mode")) out.add("network.unknown-host");
|
|
12862
|
+
if (has(egress, "ssrfStrict")) out.add("network.internal-addresses");
|
|
12863
|
+
if (has(loopDetection, "enabled")) out.add("behavior.loops");
|
|
12864
|
+
if (has(injectionScan, "enabled")) out.add("behavior.prompt-injection");
|
|
12865
|
+
if (has(skillPinning, "enabled") || has(skillPinning, "mode")) out.add("loading.skill-tamper");
|
|
12866
|
+
if (has(packageCheck, "enabled") || has(packageCheck, "onMalicious"))
|
|
12867
|
+
out.add("loading.malicious-package");
|
|
12868
|
+
if (uc && typeof uc === "object" && (uc.enabled === false || has(uc, "afterExposure")))
|
|
12869
|
+
out.add("behavior.untrusted-content");
|
|
12870
|
+
return out;
|
|
12871
|
+
}
|
|
12772
12872
|
var MAP_GOVERNED = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
|
|
12773
12873
|
"files.shell-startup",
|
|
12774
12874
|
"files.password-hashes",
|
|
@@ -13835,7 +13935,7 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
|
|
|
13835
13935
|
if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
|
|
13836
13936
|
else if (v) candidates.push(v);
|
|
13837
13937
|
};
|
|
13838
|
-
const inline = config.settings.mode
|
|
13938
|
+
const inline = reviewsEveryInline(config.settings.mode) ? detectInlineExec(shellCommand) ? void 0 : null : inlineExecReview(shellCommand);
|
|
13839
13939
|
if (inline !== null) {
|
|
13840
13940
|
consider("commands.inline-exec", {
|
|
13841
13941
|
decision: "review",
|
|
@@ -13895,21 +13995,17 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
|
|
|
13895
13995
|
if (firstToken && firstToken.startsWith("/") && checkProvenance) {
|
|
13896
13996
|
const prov = checkProvenance(firstToken, cwd);
|
|
13897
13997
|
if (prov.trustLevel === "suspect") {
|
|
13898
|
-
const
|
|
13899
|
-
|
|
13900
|
-
|
|
13901
|
-
{
|
|
13902
|
-
|
|
13903
|
-
|
|
13904
|
-
|
|
13905
|
-
tier: 3,
|
|
13906
|
-
checkId: "commands.temp-binary"
|
|
13907
|
-
}
|
|
13908
|
-
);
|
|
13998
|
+
const v = applyCheckValue(cv("commands.temp-binary"), {
|
|
13999
|
+
decision: "review",
|
|
14000
|
+
blockedByLabel: "Node9: Suspect Binary",
|
|
14001
|
+
reason: `Binary "${firstToken}" resolved to ${prov.resolvedPath} \u2014 ${prov.reason}`,
|
|
14002
|
+
tier: 3,
|
|
14003
|
+
checkId: "commands.temp-binary"
|
|
14004
|
+
});
|
|
13909
14005
|
if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
|
|
13910
14006
|
else if (v) return v;
|
|
13911
14007
|
}
|
|
13912
|
-
if (prov.trustLevel === "unknown" && config.settings.mode
|
|
14008
|
+
if (prov.trustLevel === "unknown" && isBlockAll(config.settings.mode)) {
|
|
13913
14009
|
return {
|
|
13914
14010
|
decision: "review",
|
|
13915
14011
|
blockedByLabel: "Node9: Unknown Binary (strict mode)",
|
|
@@ -14000,7 +14096,7 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
|
|
|
14000
14096
|
if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
|
|
14001
14097
|
else if (v) return v;
|
|
14002
14098
|
}
|
|
14003
|
-
if (config.settings.mode
|
|
14099
|
+
if (isBlockAll(config.settings.mode)) {
|
|
14004
14100
|
if (activeEnvironment?.requireApproval === false) return allowed();
|
|
14005
14101
|
return {
|
|
14006
14102
|
decision: "review",
|
|
@@ -16001,12 +16097,14 @@ export {
|
|
|
16001
16097
|
FS_READ_TOOLS,
|
|
16002
16098
|
GENERAL_ACTION_RULES,
|
|
16003
16099
|
KNOB_GOVERNED,
|
|
16100
|
+
LEVELS,
|
|
16004
16101
|
LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES,
|
|
16005
16102
|
LOOP_MAX_RECORDS,
|
|
16006
16103
|
LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE,
|
|
16007
16104
|
MAP_GOVERNED,
|
|
16008
16105
|
MAX_BLAST_PATH,
|
|
16009
16106
|
MAX_DESTINATIONS,
|
|
16107
|
+
MODE_VALUES,
|
|
16010
16108
|
NET_BINARIES,
|
|
16011
16109
|
PATTERN_VERB_NAMES,
|
|
16012
16110
|
PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE,
|
|
@@ -16091,6 +16189,7 @@ export {
|
|
|
16091
16189
|
inspectionLayers,
|
|
16092
16190
|
isAgentInstructionPath,
|
|
16093
16191
|
isBashTool,
|
|
16192
|
+
isBlockAll,
|
|
16094
16193
|
isDestructiveToolName,
|
|
16095
16194
|
isHashedEntry,
|
|
16096
16195
|
isIgnoredTool,
|
|
@@ -16100,13 +16199,20 @@ export {
|
|
|
16100
16199
|
isLockedCheck,
|
|
16101
16200
|
isLoopbackHost,
|
|
16102
16201
|
isMaskedKind,
|
|
16202
|
+
isModeValue,
|
|
16103
16203
|
isPasswordHashPath,
|
|
16104
16204
|
isPrivateHost,
|
|
16105
16205
|
isProtectedHomePath,
|
|
16206
|
+
isRecordOnly,
|
|
16106
16207
|
isShellShapedTool,
|
|
16107
16208
|
isShieldVerdict,
|
|
16108
16209
|
isStrictGatedTier,
|
|
16109
16210
|
isVerdict,
|
|
16211
|
+
knobStatedChecks,
|
|
16212
|
+
levelCheckValue,
|
|
16213
|
+
levelChecks,
|
|
16214
|
+
levelOf,
|
|
16215
|
+
levelPackageSignals,
|
|
16110
16216
|
maskDestination,
|
|
16111
16217
|
maskPersonalData,
|
|
16112
16218
|
maskPersonalValue,
|
|
@@ -16137,6 +16243,7 @@ export {
|
|
|
16137
16243
|
resolveCheckMap,
|
|
16138
16244
|
resolvePinned,
|
|
16139
16245
|
resolveShellInput,
|
|
16246
|
+
reviewsEveryInline,
|
|
16140
16247
|
ruleServerMatches,
|
|
16141
16248
|
safeMessage,
|
|
16142
16249
|
sampleCopyCommand,
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@node9/policy-engine",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "2.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "2.40.0",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Shared policy evaluation engine for node9 — DLP, smart rules, AST shell parsing, shields, loop detection. Pure functions, no I/O. Used by both node9-proxy and the node9 SaaS firewall.",
|
|
5
5
|
"license": "Apache-2.0",
|
|
6
6
|
"homepage": "https://node9.ai",
|