@node9/policy-engine 2.38.0 → 2.39.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/index.d.mts +44 -3
- package/dist/index.d.ts +44 -3
- package/dist/index.js +132 -19
- package/dist/index.mjs +121 -19
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/index.d.mts
CHANGED
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@@ -393,7 +393,8 @@ interface ResolvedCheck {
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* The value in force for one check, read from today's config shape, and
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* where it came from. A locked check always answers its floor. A pack row is
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* `off` unless its pack is applied. Anything the config does not set is the
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396
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-
*
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* default of the level `settings.mode` names (levels.ts), which for most
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397
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* checks is the catalog default.
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*/
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declare function resolveCheck(settings: CatalogSettings, id: string): ResolvedCheck | undefined;
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/** Every check resolved, in catalog order. */
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@@ -1217,6 +1218,15 @@ declare function checksFromLegacyPolicy(policy: LegacyPolicyKnobs, mode?: string
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* legacy shape cannot carry the value.
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*/
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declare function checkToLegacyPolicy(policy: Obj, id: string, v: Verdict): boolean;
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/**
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* The knob-governed checks a legacy policy block STATES: it sets the field
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1223
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* that picks the check's value. Presence, not value, decides, so a level
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1224
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* (levels.ts) leaves the check alone. A field that turns a check on without
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1225
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* choosing between its on values (`dlp.enabled: true` for the weak-credential
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1226
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* row, `untrustedContent.enabled: true`) does not pin it: older `node9 init`
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* runs wrote those into every config file.
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*/
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declare function knobStatedChecks(policy: LegacyPolicyKnobs): Set<string>;
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/**
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* Checks whose detector reads the resolved checks map: every value the
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* catalog row offers works. Pack rows (`packs.*`) qualify too.
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@@ -1239,6 +1249,37 @@ declare function configurableValues(id: string): readonly Verdict[];
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/** The ids a config file or a workspace can state today. */
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declare const CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS: readonly string[];
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declare const LEVELS: readonly ["audit", "soft", "standard", "strict", "block-all"];
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type Level = (typeof LEVELS)[number];
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/** Every value `settings.mode` accepts: the five levels plus `observe`, the
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* older name of Audit that the dashboard still stores. */
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declare const MODE_VALUES: readonly ["observe", "audit", "soft", "standard", "strict", "block-all"];
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type ModeValue = (typeof MODE_VALUES)[number];
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declare function isModeValue(v: unknown): v is ModeValue;
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/** The level a mode names. `observe` is Audit; anything unknown or unset is
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* Standard, the default of every install. */
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declare function levelOf(mode: string | undefined): Level;
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/** Audit: nothing is stopped; every check records what it would have done. */
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declare function isRecordOnly(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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/** Strict and Block all ask about every inline code call, not only the
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* dangerous ones the inline judge finds. */
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declare function reviewsEveryInline(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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/** Block all: ask before any call no check recognised (the catch-all,
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* `commands.unknown`) and about a binary of unknown origin. This is what
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* `strict` meant before the levels. */
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declare function isBlockAll(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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/** The value a level gives a check nobody stated, or undefined when the
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* level keeps the catalog default. */
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declare function levelCheckValue(mode: string | undefined, id: string): Verdict | undefined;
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/** Every check a level changes, with its value. */
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declare function levelChecks(mode: string | undefined): Readonly<Record<string, Verdict>>;
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/** The package registry signals (`loading.malicious-package` tuning), which
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* allow only review or off. Soft turns both off; the others keep review. */
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declare function levelPackageSignals(mode: string | undefined): {
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newPackage: 'review' | 'off';
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installScript: 'review' | 'off';
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} | undefined;
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interface PipeChainAnalysis {
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isPipeline: boolean;
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hasSensitiveSource: boolean;
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@@ -2333,5 +2374,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
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/** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
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declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
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-
export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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-
export type { ActionTemplateName, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, LoopWindowEvaluation, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
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export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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export type { ActionTemplateName, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
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package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -393,7 +393,8 @@ interface ResolvedCheck {
|
|
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393
393
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* The value in force for one check, read from today's config shape, and
|
|
394
394
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* where it came from. A locked check always answers its floor. A pack row is
|
|
395
395
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* `off` unless its pack is applied. Anything the config does not set is the
|
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396
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-
*
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396
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+
* default of the level `settings.mode` names (levels.ts), which for most
|
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397
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+
* checks is the catalog default.
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397
398
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*/
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398
399
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declare function resolveCheck(settings: CatalogSettings, id: string): ResolvedCheck | undefined;
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399
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/** Every check resolved, in catalog order. */
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@@ -1217,6 +1218,15 @@ declare function checksFromLegacyPolicy(policy: LegacyPolicyKnobs, mode?: string
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1217
1218
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* legacy shape cannot carry the value.
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1218
1219
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*/
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1219
1220
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declare function checkToLegacyPolicy(policy: Obj, id: string, v: Verdict): boolean;
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1221
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+
/**
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1222
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+
* The knob-governed checks a legacy policy block STATES: it sets the field
|
|
1223
|
+
* that picks the check's value. Presence, not value, decides, so a level
|
|
1224
|
+
* (levels.ts) leaves the check alone. A field that turns a check on without
|
|
1225
|
+
* choosing between its on values (`dlp.enabled: true` for the weak-credential
|
|
1226
|
+
* row, `untrustedContent.enabled: true`) does not pin it: older `node9 init`
|
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1227
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+
* runs wrote those into every config file.
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1228
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+
*/
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1229
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+
declare function knobStatedChecks(policy: LegacyPolicyKnobs): Set<string>;
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1220
1230
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/**
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1221
1231
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* Checks whose detector reads the resolved checks map: every value the
|
|
1222
1232
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* catalog row offers works. Pack rows (`packs.*`) qualify too.
|
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@@ -1239,6 +1249,37 @@ declare function configurableValues(id: string): readonly Verdict[];
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1239
1249
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/** The ids a config file or a workspace can state today. */
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1240
1250
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declare const CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS: readonly string[];
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1241
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+
declare const LEVELS: readonly ["audit", "soft", "standard", "strict", "block-all"];
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1253
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type Level = (typeof LEVELS)[number];
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1254
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+
/** Every value `settings.mode` accepts: the five levels plus `observe`, the
|
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1255
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+
* older name of Audit that the dashboard still stores. */
|
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1256
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+
declare const MODE_VALUES: readonly ["observe", "audit", "soft", "standard", "strict", "block-all"];
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1257
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type ModeValue = (typeof MODE_VALUES)[number];
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1258
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declare function isModeValue(v: unknown): v is ModeValue;
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1259
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+
/** The level a mode names. `observe` is Audit; anything unknown or unset is
|
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1260
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+
* Standard, the default of every install. */
|
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1261
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+
declare function levelOf(mode: string | undefined): Level;
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1262
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+
/** Audit: nothing is stopped; every check records what it would have done. */
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1263
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+
declare function isRecordOnly(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
|
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1264
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+
/** Strict and Block all ask about every inline code call, not only the
|
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1265
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+
* dangerous ones the inline judge finds. */
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1266
|
+
declare function reviewsEveryInline(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
|
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1267
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+
/** Block all: ask before any call no check recognised (the catch-all,
|
|
1268
|
+
* `commands.unknown`) and about a binary of unknown origin. This is what
|
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1269
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+
* `strict` meant before the levels. */
|
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1270
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+
declare function isBlockAll(mode: string | undefined): boolean;
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1271
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+
/** The value a level gives a check nobody stated, or undefined when the
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1272
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+
* level keeps the catalog default. */
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1273
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+
declare function levelCheckValue(mode: string | undefined, id: string): Verdict | undefined;
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1274
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+
/** Every check a level changes, with its value. */
|
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1275
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+
declare function levelChecks(mode: string | undefined): Readonly<Record<string, Verdict>>;
|
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1276
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+
/** The package registry signals (`loading.malicious-package` tuning), which
|
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1277
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+
* allow only review or off. Soft turns both off; the others keep review. */
|
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1278
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+
declare function levelPackageSignals(mode: string | undefined): {
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1279
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+
newPackage: 'review' | 'off';
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1280
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+
installScript: 'review' | 'off';
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1281
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+
} | undefined;
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1282
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+
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1242
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interface PipeChainAnalysis {
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1243
1284
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isPipeline: boolean;
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1244
1285
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hasSensitiveSource: boolean;
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@@ -2333,5 +2374,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
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2333
2374
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/** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
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2334
2375
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declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
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2335
2376
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2336
|
-
export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
|
|
2337
|
-
export type { ActionTemplateName, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, LoopWindowEvaluation, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
|
|
2377
|
+
export { ACTION_CHECKS, ACTION_TEMPLATES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, APP_SERVER_GLOB, APP_SHIELD_NAMES, APP_SHIELD_SPECS, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, GENERAL_ACTION_RULES, KNOB_GOVERNED, LEVELS, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, MODE_VALUES, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, REPLACED_SHIELDS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileAccessView, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inlineExecDescription, inlineExecReason, inlineExecReview, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isBlockAll, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isModeValue, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isRecordOnly, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, knobStatedChecks, levelCheckValue, levelChecks, levelOf, levelPackageSignals, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, mcpServerFromToolName, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, reviewsEveryInline, ruleServerMatches, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, suggestFromApprovals, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, unwrapRuleLabel, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
|
|
2378
|
+
export type { ActionTemplateName, ApprovalRow, ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InlineExecReview, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, Level, LoopWindowEvaluation, ModeValue, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, SuggestOptions, Suggestion, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
|
package/dist/index.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -65,12 +65,14 @@ __export(src_exports, {
|
|
|
65
65
|
FS_READ_TOOLS: () => FS_READ_TOOLS,
|
|
66
66
|
GENERAL_ACTION_RULES: () => GENERAL_ACTION_RULES,
|
|
67
67
|
KNOB_GOVERNED: () => KNOB_GOVERNED,
|
|
68
|
+
LEVELS: () => LEVELS,
|
|
68
69
|
LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: () => LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES,
|
|
69
70
|
LOOP_MAX_RECORDS: () => LOOP_MAX_RECORDS,
|
|
70
71
|
LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE: () => LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE,
|
|
71
72
|
MAP_GOVERNED: () => MAP_GOVERNED,
|
|
72
73
|
MAX_BLAST_PATH: () => MAX_BLAST_PATH,
|
|
73
74
|
MAX_DESTINATIONS: () => MAX_DESTINATIONS,
|
|
75
|
+
MODE_VALUES: () => MODE_VALUES,
|
|
74
76
|
NET_BINARIES: () => NET_BINARIES,
|
|
75
77
|
PATTERN_VERB_NAMES: () => PATTERN_VERB_NAMES,
|
|
76
78
|
PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE: () => PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE,
|
|
@@ -155,6 +157,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
|
|
|
155
157
|
inspectionLayers: () => inspectionLayers,
|
|
156
158
|
isAgentInstructionPath: () => isAgentInstructionPath,
|
|
157
159
|
isBashTool: () => isBashTool,
|
|
160
|
+
isBlockAll: () => isBlockAll,
|
|
158
161
|
isDestructiveToolName: () => isDestructiveToolName,
|
|
159
162
|
isHashedEntry: () => isHashedEntry,
|
|
160
163
|
isIgnoredTool: () => isIgnoredTool,
|
|
@@ -164,13 +167,20 @@ __export(src_exports, {
|
|
|
164
167
|
isLockedCheck: () => isLockedCheck,
|
|
165
168
|
isLoopbackHost: () => isLoopbackHost,
|
|
166
169
|
isMaskedKind: () => isMaskedKind,
|
|
170
|
+
isModeValue: () => isModeValue,
|
|
167
171
|
isPasswordHashPath: () => isPasswordHashPath,
|
|
168
172
|
isPrivateHost: () => isPrivateHost,
|
|
169
173
|
isProtectedHomePath: () => isProtectedHomePath,
|
|
174
|
+
isRecordOnly: () => isRecordOnly,
|
|
170
175
|
isShellShapedTool: () => isShellShapedTool,
|
|
171
176
|
isShieldVerdict: () => isShieldVerdict,
|
|
172
177
|
isStrictGatedTier: () => isStrictGatedTier,
|
|
173
178
|
isVerdict: () => isVerdict,
|
|
179
|
+
knobStatedChecks: () => knobStatedChecks,
|
|
180
|
+
levelCheckValue: () => levelCheckValue,
|
|
181
|
+
levelChecks: () => levelChecks,
|
|
182
|
+
levelOf: () => levelOf,
|
|
183
|
+
levelPackageSignals: () => levelPackageSignals,
|
|
174
184
|
maskDestination: () => maskDestination,
|
|
175
185
|
maskPersonalData: () => maskPersonalData,
|
|
176
186
|
maskPersonalValue: () => maskPersonalValue,
|
|
@@ -201,6 +211,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
|
|
|
201
211
|
resolveCheckMap: () => resolveCheckMap,
|
|
202
212
|
resolvePinned: () => resolvePinned,
|
|
203
213
|
resolveShellInput: () => resolveShellInput,
|
|
214
|
+
reviewsEveryInline: () => reviewsEveryInline,
|
|
204
215
|
ruleServerMatches: () => ruleServerMatches,
|
|
205
216
|
safeMessage: () => safeMessage,
|
|
206
217
|
sampleCopyCommand: () => sampleCopyCommand,
|
|
@@ -2464,6 +2475,80 @@ var CHECK_TEXT = {
|
|
|
2464
2475
|
}
|
|
2465
2476
|
};
|
|
2466
2477
|
|
|
2478
|
+
// src/levels.ts
|
|
2479
|
+
var LEVELS = ["audit", "soft", "standard", "strict", "block-all"];
|
|
2480
|
+
var MODE_VALUES = ["observe", ...LEVELS];
|
|
2481
|
+
function isModeValue(v) {
|
|
2482
|
+
return typeof v === "string" && MODE_VALUES.includes(v);
|
|
2483
|
+
}
|
|
2484
|
+
function levelOf(mode) {
|
|
2485
|
+
if (mode === "observe") return "audit";
|
|
2486
|
+
return LEVELS.includes(mode ?? "") ? mode : "standard";
|
|
2487
|
+
}
|
|
2488
|
+
function isRecordOnly(mode) {
|
|
2489
|
+
return levelOf(mode) === "audit";
|
|
2490
|
+
}
|
|
2491
|
+
function reviewsEveryInline(mode) {
|
|
2492
|
+
const level = levelOf(mode);
|
|
2493
|
+
return level === "strict" || level === "block-all";
|
|
2494
|
+
}
|
|
2495
|
+
function isBlockAll(mode) {
|
|
2496
|
+
return levelOf(mode) === "block-all";
|
|
2497
|
+
}
|
|
2498
|
+
var SOFT = {
|
|
2499
|
+
"commands.inline-exec": "log",
|
|
2500
|
+
"commands.eval-dynamic": "log",
|
|
2501
|
+
"commands.rm": "log",
|
|
2502
|
+
"commands.chmod": "log",
|
|
2503
|
+
"commands.sudo": "log",
|
|
2504
|
+
"commands.git-destructive": "log",
|
|
2505
|
+
"commands.sql-ddl": "log",
|
|
2506
|
+
"commands.sql-no-where": "log",
|
|
2507
|
+
"commands.temp-binary": "log",
|
|
2508
|
+
"commands.disk-destroy": "log",
|
|
2509
|
+
"commands.dangerous-word": "log",
|
|
2510
|
+
"files.system-dirs": "log",
|
|
2511
|
+
"files.shell-startup": "log",
|
|
2512
|
+
"files.password-hashes": "log",
|
|
2513
|
+
"data.pipe-chain": "log",
|
|
2514
|
+
"behavior.untrusted-content": "log"
|
|
2515
|
+
};
|
|
2516
|
+
var STRICT = {
|
|
2517
|
+
"commands.sql-ddl": "block",
|
|
2518
|
+
"commands.disk-destroy": "block",
|
|
2519
|
+
"commands.node9-disarm": "block",
|
|
2520
|
+
"files.system-dirs": "block",
|
|
2521
|
+
"files.shell-startup": "block",
|
|
2522
|
+
"files.password-hashes": "block",
|
|
2523
|
+
"data.secrets-weak": "block",
|
|
2524
|
+
"data.pipe-chain": "block",
|
|
2525
|
+
"network.unknown-host": "review",
|
|
2526
|
+
"network.internal-addresses": "block",
|
|
2527
|
+
"behavior.prompt-injection": "log",
|
|
2528
|
+
"loading.skill-tamper": "block"
|
|
2529
|
+
};
|
|
2530
|
+
var BLOCK_ALL = {
|
|
2531
|
+
...STRICT,
|
|
2532
|
+
"commands.unknown": "review",
|
|
2533
|
+
"commands.temp-binary": "block"
|
|
2534
|
+
};
|
|
2535
|
+
var LEVEL_CHECKS = {
|
|
2536
|
+
audit: {},
|
|
2537
|
+
soft: SOFT,
|
|
2538
|
+
standard: {},
|
|
2539
|
+
strict: STRICT,
|
|
2540
|
+
"block-all": BLOCK_ALL
|
|
2541
|
+
};
|
|
2542
|
+
function levelCheckValue(mode, id) {
|
|
2543
|
+
return LEVEL_CHECKS[levelOf(mode)][id];
|
|
2544
|
+
}
|
|
2545
|
+
function levelChecks(mode) {
|
|
2546
|
+
return LEVEL_CHECKS[levelOf(mode)];
|
|
2547
|
+
}
|
|
2548
|
+
function levelPackageSignals(mode) {
|
|
2549
|
+
return levelOf(mode) === "soft" ? { newPackage: "off", installScript: "off" } : void 0;
|
|
2550
|
+
}
|
|
2551
|
+
|
|
2467
2552
|
// src/catalog.ts
|
|
2468
2553
|
var VERDICTS = ["off", "log", "review", "block"];
|
|
2469
2554
|
var CHECK_VERDICT_RANK = { off: 0, log: 1, review: 2, block: 3 };
|
|
@@ -3070,7 +3155,7 @@ var LEGACY_READERS = {
|
|
|
3070
3155
|
"commands.rm": (s) => knob(s.commandChecks?.rmAdvisory),
|
|
3071
3156
|
"commands.chmod": (s) => knob(s.commandChecks?.chmod),
|
|
3072
3157
|
"commands.sql-ddl": (s) => knob(s.commandChecks?.sqlDdl),
|
|
3073
|
-
"commands.unknown": (s) => s.mode === void 0 ? void 0 : s.mode
|
|
3158
|
+
"commands.unknown": (s) => s.mode === void 0 ? void 0 : isBlockAll(s.mode) ? "review" : "off",
|
|
3074
3159
|
"data.secrets": (s) => enabledOr(s.dlp?.enabled, "block"),
|
|
3075
3160
|
"data.secrets-weak": (s) => {
|
|
3076
3161
|
if (s.dlp?.enabled === false) return "off";
|
|
@@ -3109,19 +3194,21 @@ function resolveCheck(settings, id) {
|
|
|
3109
3194
|
if (!def) return void 0;
|
|
3110
3195
|
if (isLockedCheck(def)) return { id, value: "block", source: "locked" };
|
|
3111
3196
|
const floor = def.floor ? CHECK_VERDICT_RANK[def.floor] : 0;
|
|
3197
|
+
const levelDefault = levelCheckValue(settings.mode, id) ?? def.defaultValue;
|
|
3198
|
+
const sourceOf = (value2) => value2 === levelDefault ? "default" : "configured";
|
|
3112
3199
|
const explicit = settings.checks?.[id];
|
|
3113
3200
|
if (isVerdict(explicit)) {
|
|
3114
3201
|
const value2 = CHECK_VERDICT_RANK[explicit] < floor ? def.floor : explicit;
|
|
3115
|
-
return { id, value: value2, source: value2
|
|
3202
|
+
return { id, value: value2, source: sourceOf(value2) };
|
|
3116
3203
|
}
|
|
3117
3204
|
if (def.pack) {
|
|
3118
3205
|
const on = settings.appliedShields?.includes(def.pack) ?? false;
|
|
3119
3206
|
return { id, value: on ? def.defaultValue : "off", source: "default" };
|
|
3120
3207
|
}
|
|
3121
3208
|
const read = LEGACY_READERS[id]?.(settings);
|
|
3122
|
-
if (read === void 0) return { id, value:
|
|
3209
|
+
if (read === void 0) return { id, value: levelDefault, source: "default" };
|
|
3123
3210
|
const value = CHECK_VERDICT_RANK[read] < floor ? def.floor : read;
|
|
3124
|
-
return { id, value, source: value
|
|
3211
|
+
return { id, value, source: sourceOf(value) };
|
|
3125
3212
|
}
|
|
3126
3213
|
function resolveAllChecks(settings) {
|
|
3127
3214
|
return CHECKS.map((c) => resolveCheck(settings, c.id));
|
|
@@ -12916,7 +13003,7 @@ function checksFromLegacyPolicy(policy, mode) {
|
|
|
12916
13003
|
if (uc?.enabled === false) out["behavior.untrusted-content"] = "off";
|
|
12917
13004
|
else if (uc?.enabled === true)
|
|
12918
13005
|
out["behavior.untrusted-content"] = uc.afterExposure === "log-only" ? "log" : "review";
|
|
12919
|
-
if (mode
|
|
13006
|
+
if (isBlockAll(mode)) out["commands.unknown"] = "review";
|
|
12920
13007
|
return out;
|
|
12921
13008
|
}
|
|
12922
13009
|
function checkToLegacyPolicy(policy, id, v) {
|
|
@@ -13008,6 +13095,25 @@ function checkToLegacyPolicy(policy, id, v) {
|
|
|
13008
13095
|
return false;
|
|
13009
13096
|
}
|
|
13010
13097
|
}
|
|
13098
|
+
function knobStatedChecks(policy) {
|
|
13099
|
+
const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
|
|
13100
|
+
const has = (o, key) => !!o && typeof o === "object" && o[key] !== void 0;
|
|
13101
|
+
const { dlp, egress, loopDetection, injectionScan, skillPinning, packageCheck } = policy;
|
|
13102
|
+
const uc = policy.untrustedContent;
|
|
13103
|
+
if (has(dlp, "enabled")) out.add("data.secrets");
|
|
13104
|
+
if (has(dlp, "reviewAction") || dlp?.enabled === false) out.add("data.secrets-weak");
|
|
13105
|
+
if (has(dlp, "pii")) out.add("data.pii");
|
|
13106
|
+
if (has(egress, "enabled") || has(egress, "mode")) out.add("network.unknown-host");
|
|
13107
|
+
if (has(egress, "ssrfStrict")) out.add("network.internal-addresses");
|
|
13108
|
+
if (has(loopDetection, "enabled")) out.add("behavior.loops");
|
|
13109
|
+
if (has(injectionScan, "enabled")) out.add("behavior.prompt-injection");
|
|
13110
|
+
if (has(skillPinning, "enabled") || has(skillPinning, "mode")) out.add("loading.skill-tamper");
|
|
13111
|
+
if (has(packageCheck, "enabled") || has(packageCheck, "onMalicious"))
|
|
13112
|
+
out.add("loading.malicious-package");
|
|
13113
|
+
if (uc && typeof uc === "object" && (uc.enabled === false || has(uc, "afterExposure")))
|
|
13114
|
+
out.add("behavior.untrusted-content");
|
|
13115
|
+
return out;
|
|
13116
|
+
}
|
|
13011
13117
|
var MAP_GOVERNED = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
|
|
13012
13118
|
"files.shell-startup",
|
|
13013
13119
|
"files.password-hashes",
|
|
@@ -14074,7 +14180,7 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
|
|
|
14074
14180
|
if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
|
|
14075
14181
|
else if (v) candidates.push(v);
|
|
14076
14182
|
};
|
|
14077
|
-
const inline = config.settings.mode
|
|
14183
|
+
const inline = reviewsEveryInline(config.settings.mode) ? detectInlineExec(shellCommand) ? void 0 : null : inlineExecReview(shellCommand);
|
|
14078
14184
|
if (inline !== null) {
|
|
14079
14185
|
consider("commands.inline-exec", {
|
|
14080
14186
|
decision: "review",
|
|
@@ -14134,21 +14240,17 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
|
|
|
14134
14240
|
if (firstToken && firstToken.startsWith("/") && checkProvenance) {
|
|
14135
14241
|
const prov = checkProvenance(firstToken, cwd);
|
|
14136
14242
|
if (prov.trustLevel === "suspect") {
|
|
14137
|
-
const
|
|
14138
|
-
|
|
14139
|
-
|
|
14140
|
-
{
|
|
14141
|
-
|
|
14142
|
-
|
|
14143
|
-
|
|
14144
|
-
tier: 3,
|
|
14145
|
-
checkId: "commands.temp-binary"
|
|
14146
|
-
}
|
|
14147
|
-
);
|
|
14243
|
+
const v = applyCheckValue(cv("commands.temp-binary"), {
|
|
14244
|
+
decision: "review",
|
|
14245
|
+
blockedByLabel: "Node9: Suspect Binary",
|
|
14246
|
+
reason: `Binary "${firstToken}" resolved to ${prov.resolvedPath} \u2014 ${prov.reason}`,
|
|
14247
|
+
tier: 3,
|
|
14248
|
+
checkId: "commands.temp-binary"
|
|
14249
|
+
});
|
|
14148
14250
|
if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
|
|
14149
14251
|
else if (v) return v;
|
|
14150
14252
|
}
|
|
14151
|
-
if (prov.trustLevel === "unknown" && config.settings.mode
|
|
14253
|
+
if (prov.trustLevel === "unknown" && isBlockAll(config.settings.mode)) {
|
|
14152
14254
|
return {
|
|
14153
14255
|
decision: "review",
|
|
14154
14256
|
blockedByLabel: "Node9: Unknown Binary (strict mode)",
|
|
@@ -14239,7 +14341,7 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
|
|
|
14239
14341
|
if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
|
|
14240
14342
|
else if (v) return v;
|
|
14241
14343
|
}
|
|
14242
|
-
if (config.settings.mode
|
|
14344
|
+
if (isBlockAll(config.settings.mode)) {
|
|
14243
14345
|
if (activeEnvironment?.requireApproval === false) return allowed();
|
|
14244
14346
|
return {
|
|
14245
14347
|
decision: "review",
|
|
@@ -16241,12 +16343,14 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
|
|
|
16241
16343
|
FS_READ_TOOLS,
|
|
16242
16344
|
GENERAL_ACTION_RULES,
|
|
16243
16345
|
KNOB_GOVERNED,
|
|
16346
|
+
LEVELS,
|
|
16244
16347
|
LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES,
|
|
16245
16348
|
LOOP_MAX_RECORDS,
|
|
16246
16349
|
LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE,
|
|
16247
16350
|
MAP_GOVERNED,
|
|
16248
16351
|
MAX_BLAST_PATH,
|
|
16249
16352
|
MAX_DESTINATIONS,
|
|
16353
|
+
MODE_VALUES,
|
|
16250
16354
|
NET_BINARIES,
|
|
16251
16355
|
PATTERN_VERB_NAMES,
|
|
16252
16356
|
PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE,
|
|
@@ -16331,6 +16435,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
|
|
|
16331
16435
|
inspectionLayers,
|
|
16332
16436
|
isAgentInstructionPath,
|
|
16333
16437
|
isBashTool,
|
|
16438
|
+
isBlockAll,
|
|
16334
16439
|
isDestructiveToolName,
|
|
16335
16440
|
isHashedEntry,
|
|
16336
16441
|
isIgnoredTool,
|
|
@@ -16340,13 +16445,20 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
|
|
|
16340
16445
|
isLockedCheck,
|
|
16341
16446
|
isLoopbackHost,
|
|
16342
16447
|
isMaskedKind,
|
|
16448
|
+
isModeValue,
|
|
16343
16449
|
isPasswordHashPath,
|
|
16344
16450
|
isPrivateHost,
|
|
16345
16451
|
isProtectedHomePath,
|
|
16452
|
+
isRecordOnly,
|
|
16346
16453
|
isShellShapedTool,
|
|
16347
16454
|
isShieldVerdict,
|
|
16348
16455
|
isStrictGatedTier,
|
|
16349
16456
|
isVerdict,
|
|
16457
|
+
knobStatedChecks,
|
|
16458
|
+
levelCheckValue,
|
|
16459
|
+
levelChecks,
|
|
16460
|
+
levelOf,
|
|
16461
|
+
levelPackageSignals,
|
|
16350
16462
|
maskDestination,
|
|
16351
16463
|
maskPersonalData,
|
|
16352
16464
|
maskPersonalValue,
|
|
@@ -16377,6 +16489,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
|
|
|
16377
16489
|
resolveCheckMap,
|
|
16378
16490
|
resolvePinned,
|
|
16379
16491
|
resolveShellInput,
|
|
16492
|
+
reviewsEveryInline,
|
|
16380
16493
|
ruleServerMatches,
|
|
16381
16494
|
safeMessage,
|
|
16382
16495
|
sampleCopyCommand,
|
package/dist/index.mjs
CHANGED
|
@@ -2225,6 +2225,80 @@ var CHECK_TEXT = {
|
|
|
2225
2225
|
}
|
|
2226
2226
|
};
|
|
2227
2227
|
|
|
2228
|
+
// src/levels.ts
|
|
2229
|
+
var LEVELS = ["audit", "soft", "standard", "strict", "block-all"];
|
|
2230
|
+
var MODE_VALUES = ["observe", ...LEVELS];
|
|
2231
|
+
function isModeValue(v) {
|
|
2232
|
+
return typeof v === "string" && MODE_VALUES.includes(v);
|
|
2233
|
+
}
|
|
2234
|
+
function levelOf(mode) {
|
|
2235
|
+
if (mode === "observe") return "audit";
|
|
2236
|
+
return LEVELS.includes(mode ?? "") ? mode : "standard";
|
|
2237
|
+
}
|
|
2238
|
+
function isRecordOnly(mode) {
|
|
2239
|
+
return levelOf(mode) === "audit";
|
|
2240
|
+
}
|
|
2241
|
+
function reviewsEveryInline(mode) {
|
|
2242
|
+
const level = levelOf(mode);
|
|
2243
|
+
return level === "strict" || level === "block-all";
|
|
2244
|
+
}
|
|
2245
|
+
function isBlockAll(mode) {
|
|
2246
|
+
return levelOf(mode) === "block-all";
|
|
2247
|
+
}
|
|
2248
|
+
var SOFT = {
|
|
2249
|
+
"commands.inline-exec": "log",
|
|
2250
|
+
"commands.eval-dynamic": "log",
|
|
2251
|
+
"commands.rm": "log",
|
|
2252
|
+
"commands.chmod": "log",
|
|
2253
|
+
"commands.sudo": "log",
|
|
2254
|
+
"commands.git-destructive": "log",
|
|
2255
|
+
"commands.sql-ddl": "log",
|
|
2256
|
+
"commands.sql-no-where": "log",
|
|
2257
|
+
"commands.temp-binary": "log",
|
|
2258
|
+
"commands.disk-destroy": "log",
|
|
2259
|
+
"commands.dangerous-word": "log",
|
|
2260
|
+
"files.system-dirs": "log",
|
|
2261
|
+
"files.shell-startup": "log",
|
|
2262
|
+
"files.password-hashes": "log",
|
|
2263
|
+
"data.pipe-chain": "log",
|
|
2264
|
+
"behavior.untrusted-content": "log"
|
|
2265
|
+
};
|
|
2266
|
+
var STRICT = {
|
|
2267
|
+
"commands.sql-ddl": "block",
|
|
2268
|
+
"commands.disk-destroy": "block",
|
|
2269
|
+
"commands.node9-disarm": "block",
|
|
2270
|
+
"files.system-dirs": "block",
|
|
2271
|
+
"files.shell-startup": "block",
|
|
2272
|
+
"files.password-hashes": "block",
|
|
2273
|
+
"data.secrets-weak": "block",
|
|
2274
|
+
"data.pipe-chain": "block",
|
|
2275
|
+
"network.unknown-host": "review",
|
|
2276
|
+
"network.internal-addresses": "block",
|
|
2277
|
+
"behavior.prompt-injection": "log",
|
|
2278
|
+
"loading.skill-tamper": "block"
|
|
2279
|
+
};
|
|
2280
|
+
var BLOCK_ALL = {
|
|
2281
|
+
...STRICT,
|
|
2282
|
+
"commands.unknown": "review",
|
|
2283
|
+
"commands.temp-binary": "block"
|
|
2284
|
+
};
|
|
2285
|
+
var LEVEL_CHECKS = {
|
|
2286
|
+
audit: {},
|
|
2287
|
+
soft: SOFT,
|
|
2288
|
+
standard: {},
|
|
2289
|
+
strict: STRICT,
|
|
2290
|
+
"block-all": BLOCK_ALL
|
|
2291
|
+
};
|
|
2292
|
+
function levelCheckValue(mode, id) {
|
|
2293
|
+
return LEVEL_CHECKS[levelOf(mode)][id];
|
|
2294
|
+
}
|
|
2295
|
+
function levelChecks(mode) {
|
|
2296
|
+
return LEVEL_CHECKS[levelOf(mode)];
|
|
2297
|
+
}
|
|
2298
|
+
function levelPackageSignals(mode) {
|
|
2299
|
+
return levelOf(mode) === "soft" ? { newPackage: "off", installScript: "off" } : void 0;
|
|
2300
|
+
}
|
|
2301
|
+
|
|
2228
2302
|
// src/catalog.ts
|
|
2229
2303
|
var VERDICTS = ["off", "log", "review", "block"];
|
|
2230
2304
|
var CHECK_VERDICT_RANK = { off: 0, log: 1, review: 2, block: 3 };
|
|
@@ -2831,7 +2905,7 @@ var LEGACY_READERS = {
|
|
|
2831
2905
|
"commands.rm": (s) => knob(s.commandChecks?.rmAdvisory),
|
|
2832
2906
|
"commands.chmod": (s) => knob(s.commandChecks?.chmod),
|
|
2833
2907
|
"commands.sql-ddl": (s) => knob(s.commandChecks?.sqlDdl),
|
|
2834
|
-
"commands.unknown": (s) => s.mode === void 0 ? void 0 : s.mode
|
|
2908
|
+
"commands.unknown": (s) => s.mode === void 0 ? void 0 : isBlockAll(s.mode) ? "review" : "off",
|
|
2835
2909
|
"data.secrets": (s) => enabledOr(s.dlp?.enabled, "block"),
|
|
2836
2910
|
"data.secrets-weak": (s) => {
|
|
2837
2911
|
if (s.dlp?.enabled === false) return "off";
|
|
@@ -2870,19 +2944,21 @@ function resolveCheck(settings, id) {
|
|
|
2870
2944
|
if (!def) return void 0;
|
|
2871
2945
|
if (isLockedCheck(def)) return { id, value: "block", source: "locked" };
|
|
2872
2946
|
const floor = def.floor ? CHECK_VERDICT_RANK[def.floor] : 0;
|
|
2947
|
+
const levelDefault = levelCheckValue(settings.mode, id) ?? def.defaultValue;
|
|
2948
|
+
const sourceOf = (value2) => value2 === levelDefault ? "default" : "configured";
|
|
2873
2949
|
const explicit = settings.checks?.[id];
|
|
2874
2950
|
if (isVerdict(explicit)) {
|
|
2875
2951
|
const value2 = CHECK_VERDICT_RANK[explicit] < floor ? def.floor : explicit;
|
|
2876
|
-
return { id, value: value2, source: value2
|
|
2952
|
+
return { id, value: value2, source: sourceOf(value2) };
|
|
2877
2953
|
}
|
|
2878
2954
|
if (def.pack) {
|
|
2879
2955
|
const on = settings.appliedShields?.includes(def.pack) ?? false;
|
|
2880
2956
|
return { id, value: on ? def.defaultValue : "off", source: "default" };
|
|
2881
2957
|
}
|
|
2882
2958
|
const read = LEGACY_READERS[id]?.(settings);
|
|
2883
|
-
if (read === void 0) return { id, value:
|
|
2959
|
+
if (read === void 0) return { id, value: levelDefault, source: "default" };
|
|
2884
2960
|
const value = CHECK_VERDICT_RANK[read] < floor ? def.floor : read;
|
|
2885
|
-
return { id, value, source: value
|
|
2961
|
+
return { id, value, source: sourceOf(value) };
|
|
2886
2962
|
}
|
|
2887
2963
|
function resolveAllChecks(settings) {
|
|
2888
2964
|
return CHECKS.map((c) => resolveCheck(settings, c.id));
|
|
@@ -12677,7 +12753,7 @@ function checksFromLegacyPolicy(policy, mode) {
|
|
|
12677
12753
|
if (uc?.enabled === false) out["behavior.untrusted-content"] = "off";
|
|
12678
12754
|
else if (uc?.enabled === true)
|
|
12679
12755
|
out["behavior.untrusted-content"] = uc.afterExposure === "log-only" ? "log" : "review";
|
|
12680
|
-
if (mode
|
|
12756
|
+
if (isBlockAll(mode)) out["commands.unknown"] = "review";
|
|
12681
12757
|
return out;
|
|
12682
12758
|
}
|
|
12683
12759
|
function checkToLegacyPolicy(policy, id, v) {
|
|
@@ -12769,6 +12845,25 @@ function checkToLegacyPolicy(policy, id, v) {
|
|
|
12769
12845
|
return false;
|
|
12770
12846
|
}
|
|
12771
12847
|
}
|
|
12848
|
+
function knobStatedChecks(policy) {
|
|
12849
|
+
const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
|
|
12850
|
+
const has = (o, key) => !!o && typeof o === "object" && o[key] !== void 0;
|
|
12851
|
+
const { dlp, egress, loopDetection, injectionScan, skillPinning, packageCheck } = policy;
|
|
12852
|
+
const uc = policy.untrustedContent;
|
|
12853
|
+
if (has(dlp, "enabled")) out.add("data.secrets");
|
|
12854
|
+
if (has(dlp, "reviewAction") || dlp?.enabled === false) out.add("data.secrets-weak");
|
|
12855
|
+
if (has(dlp, "pii")) out.add("data.pii");
|
|
12856
|
+
if (has(egress, "enabled") || has(egress, "mode")) out.add("network.unknown-host");
|
|
12857
|
+
if (has(egress, "ssrfStrict")) out.add("network.internal-addresses");
|
|
12858
|
+
if (has(loopDetection, "enabled")) out.add("behavior.loops");
|
|
12859
|
+
if (has(injectionScan, "enabled")) out.add("behavior.prompt-injection");
|
|
12860
|
+
if (has(skillPinning, "enabled") || has(skillPinning, "mode")) out.add("loading.skill-tamper");
|
|
12861
|
+
if (has(packageCheck, "enabled") || has(packageCheck, "onMalicious"))
|
|
12862
|
+
out.add("loading.malicious-package");
|
|
12863
|
+
if (uc && typeof uc === "object" && (uc.enabled === false || has(uc, "afterExposure")))
|
|
12864
|
+
out.add("behavior.untrusted-content");
|
|
12865
|
+
return out;
|
|
12866
|
+
}
|
|
12772
12867
|
var MAP_GOVERNED = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
|
|
12773
12868
|
"files.shell-startup",
|
|
12774
12869
|
"files.password-hashes",
|
|
@@ -13835,7 +13930,7 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
|
|
|
13835
13930
|
if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
|
|
13836
13931
|
else if (v) candidates.push(v);
|
|
13837
13932
|
};
|
|
13838
|
-
const inline = config.settings.mode
|
|
13933
|
+
const inline = reviewsEveryInline(config.settings.mode) ? detectInlineExec(shellCommand) ? void 0 : null : inlineExecReview(shellCommand);
|
|
13839
13934
|
if (inline !== null) {
|
|
13840
13935
|
consider("commands.inline-exec", {
|
|
13841
13936
|
decision: "review",
|
|
@@ -13895,21 +13990,17 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
|
|
|
13895
13990
|
if (firstToken && firstToken.startsWith("/") && checkProvenance) {
|
|
13896
13991
|
const prov = checkProvenance(firstToken, cwd);
|
|
13897
13992
|
if (prov.trustLevel === "suspect") {
|
|
13898
|
-
const
|
|
13899
|
-
|
|
13900
|
-
|
|
13901
|
-
{
|
|
13902
|
-
|
|
13903
|
-
|
|
13904
|
-
|
|
13905
|
-
tier: 3,
|
|
13906
|
-
checkId: "commands.temp-binary"
|
|
13907
|
-
}
|
|
13908
|
-
);
|
|
13993
|
+
const v = applyCheckValue(cv("commands.temp-binary"), {
|
|
13994
|
+
decision: "review",
|
|
13995
|
+
blockedByLabel: "Node9: Suspect Binary",
|
|
13996
|
+
reason: `Binary "${firstToken}" resolved to ${prov.resolvedPath} \u2014 ${prov.reason}`,
|
|
13997
|
+
tier: 3,
|
|
13998
|
+
checkId: "commands.temp-binary"
|
|
13999
|
+
});
|
|
13909
14000
|
if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
|
|
13910
14001
|
else if (v) return v;
|
|
13911
14002
|
}
|
|
13912
|
-
if (prov.trustLevel === "unknown" && config.settings.mode
|
|
14003
|
+
if (prov.trustLevel === "unknown" && isBlockAll(config.settings.mode)) {
|
|
13913
14004
|
return {
|
|
13914
14005
|
decision: "review",
|
|
13915
14006
|
blockedByLabel: "Node9: Unknown Binary (strict mode)",
|
|
@@ -14000,7 +14091,7 @@ async function evaluatePolicyCore(config, toolName, args, context = {}, hooks =
|
|
|
14000
14091
|
if (v?.logged) noteLogged(v);
|
|
14001
14092
|
else if (v) return v;
|
|
14002
14093
|
}
|
|
14003
|
-
if (config.settings.mode
|
|
14094
|
+
if (isBlockAll(config.settings.mode)) {
|
|
14004
14095
|
if (activeEnvironment?.requireApproval === false) return allowed();
|
|
14005
14096
|
return {
|
|
14006
14097
|
decision: "review",
|
|
@@ -16001,12 +16092,14 @@ export {
|
|
|
16001
16092
|
FS_READ_TOOLS,
|
|
16002
16093
|
GENERAL_ACTION_RULES,
|
|
16003
16094
|
KNOB_GOVERNED,
|
|
16095
|
+
LEVELS,
|
|
16004
16096
|
LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES,
|
|
16005
16097
|
LOOP_MAX_RECORDS,
|
|
16006
16098
|
LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE,
|
|
16007
16099
|
MAP_GOVERNED,
|
|
16008
16100
|
MAX_BLAST_PATH,
|
|
16009
16101
|
MAX_DESTINATIONS,
|
|
16102
|
+
MODE_VALUES,
|
|
16010
16103
|
NET_BINARIES,
|
|
16011
16104
|
PATTERN_VERB_NAMES,
|
|
16012
16105
|
PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE,
|
|
@@ -16091,6 +16184,7 @@ export {
|
|
|
16091
16184
|
inspectionLayers,
|
|
16092
16185
|
isAgentInstructionPath,
|
|
16093
16186
|
isBashTool,
|
|
16187
|
+
isBlockAll,
|
|
16094
16188
|
isDestructiveToolName,
|
|
16095
16189
|
isHashedEntry,
|
|
16096
16190
|
isIgnoredTool,
|
|
@@ -16100,13 +16194,20 @@ export {
|
|
|
16100
16194
|
isLockedCheck,
|
|
16101
16195
|
isLoopbackHost,
|
|
16102
16196
|
isMaskedKind,
|
|
16197
|
+
isModeValue,
|
|
16103
16198
|
isPasswordHashPath,
|
|
16104
16199
|
isPrivateHost,
|
|
16105
16200
|
isProtectedHomePath,
|
|
16201
|
+
isRecordOnly,
|
|
16106
16202
|
isShellShapedTool,
|
|
16107
16203
|
isShieldVerdict,
|
|
16108
16204
|
isStrictGatedTier,
|
|
16109
16205
|
isVerdict,
|
|
16206
|
+
knobStatedChecks,
|
|
16207
|
+
levelCheckValue,
|
|
16208
|
+
levelChecks,
|
|
16209
|
+
levelOf,
|
|
16210
|
+
levelPackageSignals,
|
|
16110
16211
|
maskDestination,
|
|
16111
16212
|
maskPersonalData,
|
|
16112
16213
|
maskPersonalValue,
|
|
@@ -16137,6 +16238,7 @@ export {
|
|
|
16137
16238
|
resolveCheckMap,
|
|
16138
16239
|
resolvePinned,
|
|
16139
16240
|
resolveShellInput,
|
|
16241
|
+
reviewsEveryInline,
|
|
16140
16242
|
ruleServerMatches,
|
|
16141
16243
|
safeMessage,
|
|
16142
16244
|
sampleCopyCommand,
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@node9/policy-engine",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "2.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "2.39.0",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Shared policy evaluation engine for node9 — DLP, smart rules, AST shell parsing, shields, loop detection. Pure functions, no I/O. Used by both node9-proxy and the node9 SaaS firewall.",
|
|
5
5
|
"license": "Apache-2.0",
|
|
6
6
|
"homepage": "https://node9.ai",
|