@node9/policy-engine 2.35.0 → 2.37.0

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.d.mts CHANGED
@@ -193,6 +193,10 @@ interface SsrfVerdict extends SsrfMatch {
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  host: string;
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  binary: string;
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  reason: string;
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+ /** 'review' for a default-reachable address written in a disguised form
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+ * (`0x7f000001`, `127.1`, `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]`) while the strict tier is
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+ * off; 'block' everywhere else, as before. */
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+ decision: 'block' | 'review';
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  }
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  interface SsrfFloorOptions {
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  /** Exempts OVERRIDABLE tiers only. A tier-1 entry here is ignored (and is
@@ -201,6 +205,10 @@ interface SsrfFloorOptions {
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  /** Opt-in tier 3: loopback and RFC1918. Off by default: a developer talks to
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  * those constantly (72 of 308 destinations on measured real history). */
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  ssrfStrict?: boolean;
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+ /** The egress policy's allowPrivate, when egress is enabled: an operator who
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+ * let private destinations through on purpose is not asked about a
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+ * disguised spelling of one (ssrf-pins V3). */
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+ allowPrivate?: boolean;
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  }
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  /**
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  * Does this exemption list release this address?
@@ -406,6 +414,8 @@ interface FileAccess {
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  cwd?: string;
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  /** A read whose content leaves the machine as a request body or an upload. */
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  upload?: true;
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+ /** A directory listing (`ls`, `tree`, find's start points): the entry names, not a file's content. */
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+ listing?: true;
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  /** Unquoted shell pattern. Quoted metacharacters are escaped in this value. */
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  glob?: string;
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  /** The pattern is find's, not the shell's: `*` also selects dotfiles. */
@@ -493,6 +503,13 @@ interface CopyShape {
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  archive?: 'tar' | 'zip' | 'ar' | '7z';
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  /** flagOperand: the flags (short letter or long name) whose operand is the source. */
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  sourceFlags?: string[];
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+ /**
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+ * flagOperand: the file a flag's operand names, or null when it names none.
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+ * `curl -d @FILE` sends FILE and `curl -d '{"k":1}'` sends text; the flag
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+ * (`-T`, `--data-binary`, resolved from its bundle or abbreviation) and the
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+ * operand as written are passed. Absent, the operand is the file.
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+ */
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+ sourceOperand?: (flag: string, value: string) => string | null;
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  /** GNU `-t DIR` / `--target-directory`: the destination is in a flag. */
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  targetDirFlag?: boolean;
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  /** Flags whose operand is NEVER a source: a short LETTER ('i') or a long name ('--exclude'). */
@@ -574,6 +591,17 @@ interface PositionedArg {
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  * exactly the pre-stage-3 filter, which jail-position.spec.ts pins.
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  */
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  declare function positionedArgs(words: (string | null)[], from?: number, to?: number): PositionedArg[];
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+ /**
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+ * The script files a command runs, as written: the first operand of a shell
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+ * (`bash x.sh`, `sh -e ./x.sh`, `source env.sh`, `. ./lib.sh`) and a head that
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+ * is itself a path (`./deploy.sh`, `/tmp/run.sh`, `scripts/build.sh`). `-c`
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+ * payloads are inline code, not files, and are read by the payload walkers.
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+ * Wrappers (`sudo`, `env`, `timeout`) are seen through. Paths under
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+ * `node_modules` or a `.bin` directory are installed tools, not scripts the
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+ * session wrote, and are left out. Pure: the caller resolves against its cwd
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+ * and decides whether a path is one the session wrote (fw#372 A3).
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+ */
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+ declare function shellScriptOperands(command: string): string[];
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  interface ShellDestination {
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  /** Extracted hostname, lowercased (e.g. "evil.com", "10.0.0.5"). */
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  host: string;
@@ -994,7 +1022,13 @@ declare const DLP_SCAN_LIMITS: {
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  readonly maxDepth: 5;
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  };
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  declare function scanArgs(args: unknown, depth?: number, fieldPath?: string): DlpMatch | null;
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- /** Scan a plain text string (e.g. Claude response prose) for DLP patterns. */
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+ /**
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+ * Scan a plain text string (tool output, Claude response prose) for DLP
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+ * patterns. The text as written first; then its decoded views (base64, hex,
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+ * percent, the bounded set the argument gate reads), so a credential a tool
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+ * returns encoded is still a finding (fw#372 B7). The first-level decoding is
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+ * proportional to the text and nested layers are budgeted, as in the gate.
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+ */
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  declare function scanText(text: string): DlpMatch | null;
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  declare function redactText(text: string): {
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  result: string;
@@ -1399,10 +1433,16 @@ declare function validateOverrides(raw: unknown): {
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  warnings: string[];
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  };
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  /**
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- * The 11 shields shipped with node9. User shields installed at
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+ * The 13 shields shipped with node9. User shields installed at
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  * ~/.node9/shields/*.json are merged on top of these by the host.
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  */
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  declare const BUILTIN_SHIELDS: Record<string, ShieldDefinition>;
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+ /**
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+ * The category shields for dangerous actions on MCP apps (node9Firewall#385):
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+ * enabled from the Apps page for the apps a user connects, not recommended by
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+ * a repository or history scan, which has nothing to say about them.
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+ */
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+ declare const ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string>;
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  interface ToolCallRecord {
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  /** tool name */
@@ -1846,13 +1886,15 @@ declare const SENSITIVE_PATH_RE: RegExp;
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  */
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  declare const FILE_TOOLS: Set<string>;
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- type PiiPattern = 'Email' | 'SSN' | 'Phone' | 'Credit Card' | 'IBAN';
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+ type PiiPattern = 'Email' | 'SSN' | 'Phone' | 'Credit Card' | 'IBAN' | 'Bank Routing Number' | 'National ID';
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  /**
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  * Detect PII patterns in a string. Returns a deduplicated list — one entry
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  * per distinct pattern type, never multiple "Email" findings from one input.
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  */
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  declare function detectPii(text: string): PiiPattern[];
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  declare const REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS: readonly PiiPattern[];
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+ /** Every string leaf of a tool call's arguments, joined by newlines, bounded. */
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+ declare function argumentLeavesText(args: unknown, limit?: number): string;
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  /**
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  * Realtime adapter for detectPii: walks a tool-args value leaf by leaf and
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  * returns only the high-signal PII patterns found. Used by the authorize path
@@ -2021,7 +2063,7 @@ declare const LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: number;
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  * and fails CI when the hash drifts without a version bump — forgetting
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  * is loud, not silent.
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  */
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- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v28";
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+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v29";
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  /**
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  * SHA-256 prefix of the detector-source files
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  * (canonical.ts + pii.ts + destructive-regex.ts).
@@ -2032,7 +2074,7 @@ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v28";
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  * files changed, this hash must change too, and you must consciously
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  * decide whether to bump CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION."
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  */
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- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "11df698796585cbe";
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+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "3b936dab47d27942";
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  declare function extractCanonicalFindings(call: ToolCallEntry, ctx: ExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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  declare function extractSessionLevelFindings(calls: ReadonlyArray<SessionToolCall>, ctx: SessionExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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  /**
@@ -2093,6 +2135,8 @@ interface DestinationHit extends SsrfMatch {
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  argPath: string;
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  host: string;
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  reason: string;
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+ /** 'review' for a disguised spelling of a default-reachable address. */
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+ decision: 'block' | 'review';
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  }
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  /**
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  * Judge a non-shell tool call. Returns the first protected destination, or
@@ -2102,6 +2146,7 @@ interface DestinationHit extends SsrfMatch {
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  declare function ssrfDestinationFloor(toolName: string, args: unknown, opts?: {
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  ssrfStrict?: boolean;
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  ssrfAllow?: readonly string[];
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+ allowPrivate?: boolean;
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  }): DestinationHit | null;
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  declare const ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS: {
@@ -2141,5 +2186,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
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  /** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
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  declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
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- export { AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, KNOB_GOVERNED, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
2189
+ export { ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, KNOB_GOVERNED, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
2145
2190
  export type { ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, LoopWindowEvaluation, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };
package/dist/index.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -193,6 +193,10 @@ interface SsrfVerdict extends SsrfMatch {
193
193
  host: string;
194
194
  binary: string;
195
195
  reason: string;
196
+ /** 'review' for a default-reachable address written in a disguised form
197
+ * (`0x7f000001`, `127.1`, `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]`) while the strict tier is
198
+ * off; 'block' everywhere else, as before. */
199
+ decision: 'block' | 'review';
196
200
  }
197
201
  interface SsrfFloorOptions {
198
202
  /** Exempts OVERRIDABLE tiers only. A tier-1 entry here is ignored (and is
@@ -201,6 +205,10 @@ interface SsrfFloorOptions {
201
205
  /** Opt-in tier 3: loopback and RFC1918. Off by default: a developer talks to
202
206
  * those constantly (72 of 308 destinations on measured real history). */
203
207
  ssrfStrict?: boolean;
208
+ /** The egress policy's allowPrivate, when egress is enabled: an operator who
209
+ * let private destinations through on purpose is not asked about a
210
+ * disguised spelling of one (ssrf-pins V3). */
211
+ allowPrivate?: boolean;
204
212
  }
205
213
  /**
206
214
  * Does this exemption list release this address?
@@ -406,6 +414,8 @@ interface FileAccess {
406
414
  cwd?: string;
407
415
  /** A read whose content leaves the machine as a request body or an upload. */
408
416
  upload?: true;
417
+ /** A directory listing (`ls`, `tree`, find's start points): the entry names, not a file's content. */
418
+ listing?: true;
409
419
  /** Unquoted shell pattern. Quoted metacharacters are escaped in this value. */
410
420
  glob?: string;
411
421
  /** The pattern is find's, not the shell's: `*` also selects dotfiles. */
@@ -493,6 +503,13 @@ interface CopyShape {
493
503
  archive?: 'tar' | 'zip' | 'ar' | '7z';
494
504
  /** flagOperand: the flags (short letter or long name) whose operand is the source. */
495
505
  sourceFlags?: string[];
506
+ /**
507
+ * flagOperand: the file a flag's operand names, or null when it names none.
508
+ * `curl -d @FILE` sends FILE and `curl -d '{"k":1}'` sends text; the flag
509
+ * (`-T`, `--data-binary`, resolved from its bundle or abbreviation) and the
510
+ * operand as written are passed. Absent, the operand is the file.
511
+ */
512
+ sourceOperand?: (flag: string, value: string) => string | null;
496
513
  /** GNU `-t DIR` / `--target-directory`: the destination is in a flag. */
497
514
  targetDirFlag?: boolean;
498
515
  /** Flags whose operand is NEVER a source: a short LETTER ('i') or a long name ('--exclude'). */
@@ -574,6 +591,17 @@ interface PositionedArg {
574
591
  * exactly the pre-stage-3 filter, which jail-position.spec.ts pins.
575
592
  */
576
593
  declare function positionedArgs(words: (string | null)[], from?: number, to?: number): PositionedArg[];
594
+ /**
595
+ * The script files a command runs, as written: the first operand of a shell
596
+ * (`bash x.sh`, `sh -e ./x.sh`, `source env.sh`, `. ./lib.sh`) and a head that
597
+ * is itself a path (`./deploy.sh`, `/tmp/run.sh`, `scripts/build.sh`). `-c`
598
+ * payloads are inline code, not files, and are read by the payload walkers.
599
+ * Wrappers (`sudo`, `env`, `timeout`) are seen through. Paths under
600
+ * `node_modules` or a `.bin` directory are installed tools, not scripts the
601
+ * session wrote, and are left out. Pure: the caller resolves against its cwd
602
+ * and decides whether a path is one the session wrote (fw#372 A3).
603
+ */
604
+ declare function shellScriptOperands(command: string): string[];
577
605
  interface ShellDestination {
578
606
  /** Extracted hostname, lowercased (e.g. "evil.com", "10.0.0.5"). */
579
607
  host: string;
@@ -994,7 +1022,13 @@ declare const DLP_SCAN_LIMITS: {
994
1022
  readonly maxDepth: 5;
995
1023
  };
996
1024
  declare function scanArgs(args: unknown, depth?: number, fieldPath?: string): DlpMatch | null;
997
- /** Scan a plain text string (e.g. Claude response prose) for DLP patterns. */
1025
+ /**
1026
+ * Scan a plain text string (tool output, Claude response prose) for DLP
1027
+ * patterns. The text as written first; then its decoded views (base64, hex,
1028
+ * percent, the bounded set the argument gate reads), so a credential a tool
1029
+ * returns encoded is still a finding (fw#372 B7). The first-level decoding is
1030
+ * proportional to the text and nested layers are budgeted, as in the gate.
1031
+ */
998
1032
  declare function scanText(text: string): DlpMatch | null;
999
1033
  declare function redactText(text: string): {
1000
1034
  result: string;
@@ -1399,10 +1433,16 @@ declare function validateOverrides(raw: unknown): {
1399
1433
  warnings: string[];
1400
1434
  };
1401
1435
  /**
1402
- * The 11 shields shipped with node9. User shields installed at
1436
+ * The 13 shields shipped with node9. User shields installed at
1403
1437
  * ~/.node9/shields/*.json are merged on top of these by the host.
1404
1438
  */
1405
1439
  declare const BUILTIN_SHIELDS: Record<string, ShieldDefinition>;
1440
+ /**
1441
+ * The category shields for dangerous actions on MCP apps (node9Firewall#385):
1442
+ * enabled from the Apps page for the apps a user connects, not recommended by
1443
+ * a repository or history scan, which has nothing to say about them.
1444
+ */
1445
+ declare const ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string>;
1406
1446
 
1407
1447
  interface ToolCallRecord {
1408
1448
  /** tool name */
@@ -1846,13 +1886,15 @@ declare const SENSITIVE_PATH_RE: RegExp;
1846
1886
  */
1847
1887
  declare const FILE_TOOLS: Set<string>;
1848
1888
 
1849
- type PiiPattern = 'Email' | 'SSN' | 'Phone' | 'Credit Card' | 'IBAN';
1889
+ type PiiPattern = 'Email' | 'SSN' | 'Phone' | 'Credit Card' | 'IBAN' | 'Bank Routing Number' | 'National ID';
1850
1890
  /**
1851
1891
  * Detect PII patterns in a string. Returns a deduplicated list — one entry
1852
1892
  * per distinct pattern type, never multiple "Email" findings from one input.
1853
1893
  */
1854
1894
  declare function detectPii(text: string): PiiPattern[];
1855
1895
  declare const REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS: readonly PiiPattern[];
1896
+ /** Every string leaf of a tool call's arguments, joined by newlines, bounded. */
1897
+ declare function argumentLeavesText(args: unknown, limit?: number): string;
1856
1898
  /**
1857
1899
  * Realtime adapter for detectPii: walks a tool-args value leaf by leaf and
1858
1900
  * returns only the high-signal PII patterns found. Used by the authorize path
@@ -2021,7 +2063,7 @@ declare const LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: number;
2021
2063
  * and fails CI when the hash drifts without a version bump — forgetting
2022
2064
  * is loud, not silent.
2023
2065
  */
2024
- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v28";
2066
+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v29";
2025
2067
  /**
2026
2068
  * SHA-256 prefix of the detector-source files
2027
2069
  * (canonical.ts + pii.ts + destructive-regex.ts).
@@ -2032,7 +2074,7 @@ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v28";
2032
2074
  * files changed, this hash must change too, and you must consciously
2033
2075
  * decide whether to bump CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION."
2034
2076
  */
2035
- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "11df698796585cbe";
2077
+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "3b936dab47d27942";
2036
2078
  declare function extractCanonicalFindings(call: ToolCallEntry, ctx: ExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
2037
2079
  declare function extractSessionLevelFindings(calls: ReadonlyArray<SessionToolCall>, ctx: SessionExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
2038
2080
  /**
@@ -2093,6 +2135,8 @@ interface DestinationHit extends SsrfMatch {
2093
2135
  argPath: string;
2094
2136
  host: string;
2095
2137
  reason: string;
2138
+ /** 'review' for a disguised spelling of a default-reachable address. */
2139
+ decision: 'block' | 'review';
2096
2140
  }
2097
2141
  /**
2098
2142
  * Judge a non-shell tool call. Returns the first protected destination, or
@@ -2102,6 +2146,7 @@ interface DestinationHit extends SsrfMatch {
2102
2146
  declare function ssrfDestinationFloor(toolName: string, args: unknown, opts?: {
2103
2147
  ssrfStrict?: boolean;
2104
2148
  ssrfAllow?: readonly string[];
2149
+ allowPrivate?: boolean;
2105
2150
  }): DestinationHit | null;
2106
2151
 
2107
2152
  declare const ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS: {
@@ -2141,5 +2186,5 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
2141
2186
  /** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
2142
2187
  declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
2143
2188
 
2144
- export { AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, KNOB_GOVERNED, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
2189
+ export { ACTION_SHIELD_NAMES, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, ENGINE_VERSION, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, KNOB_GOVERNED, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, TUNING_FIELDS, VERDICTS, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, argumentLeavesText, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, shellScriptOperands, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
2145
2190
  export type { ArgumentInspectionResult, AuditEntryForClassify, BlastEnvFinding, BlastFinding, BlastResult, BlastSummary, CanaryHit, CanaryValue, CanaryView, CanonicalAgent, CanonicalFinding, CanonicalFindingType, CanonicalSourceType, CatalogSettings, CheckDef, CheckGroup, CheckSource, CheckText, Destination, DestinationKind, DlpMatch, EgressPolicy, EgressVerdict, ExtractContext, FileAccess, FileAccessContext, FsOpVerdict, InjectionConfidence, InjectionContext, InjectionMatch, InspectionInput, InspectionLayers, LegacyPolicyKnobs, LoopWindowEvaluation, PackageEcosystem, PackageInstallRequest, PiiPattern, PipeChainAnalysis, PolicyConfig, PolicyContext, PolicyHostHooks, PolicyVerdict, PositionedArg, ProtectedFileVerdict, ProvenanceLookup, ProvenanceTrust, ResolvedCheck, RiskMetadata, ScanFinding, ScanSignals, ScanSummary, ScanView, ScoreTier, SessionExtractContext, SessionToolCall, Severity, ShellCommandAnalysis, ShellDestToken, ShellDestination, ShellExposure, ShellInputResolution, ShieldDefinition, ShieldOverrides, ShieldVerdict, SmartCondition, SmartRule, SsrfFloorOptions, SsrfMatch, SsrfTier, SsrfVerdict, ToolCallEntry, ToolCallRecord, ToolInspection, ToolInspectionEntry, TuningField, Verdict };