@node9/policy-engine 2.33.0 → 2.33.1

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/dist/index.d.mts CHANGED
@@ -1211,6 +1211,63 @@ declare function isLoopbackHost(host: string): boolean;
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  declare function gitRepoPath(url: string): string | null;
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  declare function isDestructiveToolName(bareTool: string): boolean;
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+ /** The value as the gate compares it: email lower-cased, IBAN and account
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+ * upper-cased without spaces, host lower-cased. */
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+ declare function normalizeDestination(dest: string): string;
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+ /** 'iban:GB82 **** **** 5432', 'account:****5432', 'email:d***@acme.example';
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+ * a host (or anything else) is returned normalised and otherwise unchanged. */
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+ declare function maskDestination(dest: string): string;
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+ /** Whether a destination's kind is masked outside the machine. */
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+ declare function isMaskedKind(dest: string): boolean;
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+ /** SHA-256 (hex) of the normalised destination, kind prefix included. */
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+ declare function hashDestination(dest: string): string;
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+ /** Whether `entry` is a stored masked entry ('<masked>#sha256:<hex>'). */
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+ declare function isHashedEntry(entry: string): boolean;
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+ /** A full destination as it is stored on a trusted list outside the machine:
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+ * a masked kind becomes '<masked>#sha256:<hex>', a host stays as it is. */
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+ declare function trustedEntryOf(dest: string): string;
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+ /** Does a full destination match a stored entry (a hashed one, or a plain
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+ * value as the local list and older managed lists hold)? */
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+ declare function matchesTrustedEntry(dest: string, entry: string): boolean;
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+ /** Does a full destination match any entry of a list? Hashes it once. */
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+ declare function matchesTrustedList(dest: string, entries: readonly string[]): boolean;
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+ /**
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+ * A recipient as a person types it, in the stored destination form: an
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+ * address becomes `email:`, an IBAN `iban:`, a URL or hostname `host:`, and
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+ * `account:<number>` keeps its kind. A value that carries its kind is checked
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+ * against it. Null for anything else (a bare word, two values in one).
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+ */
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+ declare function normalizeRecipient(raw: unknown): string | null;
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+ /**
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+ * One entry of a trusted list outside the machine (the dashboard's workspace
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+ * list, the snapshot's personal list): a host in full; an address, IBAN or
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+ * account as '<masked>#sha256:<hex>'. A value already in that form passes
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+ * with its hash lower-cased; a full value is turned into it. Null when it is
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+ * neither. The backend mirror asserts the same vectors.
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+ */
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+ declare function normalizeTrustedEntry(raw: unknown): string | null;
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+ /** What a person reads for an entry: the masked part, without the hash. */
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+ declare function entryDisplay(entry: string): string;
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+ /**
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+ * IBANs (mod-97), card numbers (exactly what detectPii reports, so not the
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+ * fractional part of a number), account numbers (a whole IBAN-shaped value,
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+ * or a number under an account key) and email addresses inside a text,
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+ * masked the way destinations are. No quote or backslash is introduced or
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+ * removed, so a JSON string stays a JSON string; a card written as a bare
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+ * JSON number does not stay a number, so arguments go through
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+ * maskPersonalValue instead.
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+ */
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+ declare function maskPersonalData(text: string): string;
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+ /**
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+ * maskPersonalData over a JSON-shaped value (tool arguments), leaf by leaf, so
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+ * the result is always a value: a string leaf is masked in its JSON form under
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+ * its own key (the account-key and whole-value rules still see both), an
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+ * object key is masked as text, and a number whose text holds personal data (a
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+ * card passed as a number) becomes the masked string. Anything deeper than 64
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+ * levels is replaced by '[REDACTED]'. Pure, never throws.
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+ */
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+ declare function maskPersonalValue(value: unknown): unknown;
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+
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  interface ShellExposure {
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  /** The command brings outside content in: its output is a source. */
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  fetches: boolean;
@@ -1950,7 +2007,7 @@ declare const LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: number;
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  * and fails CI when the hash drifts without a version bump — forgetting
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  * is loud, not silent.
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  */
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- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v26";
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+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v27";
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  /**
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  * SHA-256 prefix of the detector-source files
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  * (canonical.ts + pii.ts + destructive-regex.ts).
@@ -1961,7 +2018,7 @@ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v26";
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  * files changed, this hash must change too, and you must consciously
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  * decide whether to bump CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION."
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  */
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- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "dec8c65145686360";
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+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "a358f47eacca6e14";
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  declare function extractCanonicalFindings(call: ToolCallEntry, ctx: ExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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  declare function extractSessionLevelFindings(calls: ReadonlyArray<SessionToolCall>, ctx: SessionExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
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  /**
@@ -2070,4 +2127,4 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
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  /** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
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  declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
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2073
- export { AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, type ArgumentInspectionResult, type AuditEntryForClassify, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, type BlastEnvFinding, type BlastFinding, type BlastResult, type BlastSummary, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, type CanaryHit, type CanaryValue, type CanaryView, type CanonicalAgent, type CanonicalFinding, type CanonicalFindingType, type CanonicalSourceType, type CatalogSettings, type CheckDef, type CheckGroup, type CheckSource, type CheckText, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, type Destination, type DestinationKind, type DlpMatch, ENGINE_VERSION, type EgressPolicy, type EgressVerdict, type ExtractContext, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, type FileAccess, type FileAccessContext, type FsOpVerdict, type InjectionConfidence, type InjectionContext, type InjectionMatch, type InspectionInput, type InspectionLayers, KNOB_GOVERNED, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, type LegacyPolicyKnobs, type LoopWindowEvaluation, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, type PackageEcosystem, type PackageInstallRequest, type PiiPattern, type PipeChainAnalysis, type PolicyConfig, type PolicyContext, type PolicyHostHooks, type PolicyVerdict, type PositionedArg, type ProtectedFileVerdict, type ProvenanceLookup, type ProvenanceTrust, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, type ResolvedCheck, type RiskMetadata, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, type ScanFinding, type ScanSignals, type ScanSummary, type ScanView, type ScoreTier, type SessionExtractContext, type SessionToolCall, type Severity, type ShellCommandAnalysis, type ShellDestToken, type ShellDestination, type ShellExposure, type ShellInputResolution, type ShieldDefinition, type ShieldOverrides, type ShieldVerdict, type SmartCondition, type SmartRule, type SsrfFloorOptions, type SsrfMatch, type SsrfTier, type SsrfVerdict, TUNING_FIELDS, type ToolCallEntry, type ToolCallRecord, type ToolInspection, type ToolInspectionEntry, type TuningField, VERDICTS, type Verdict, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isDestructiveToolName, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
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+ export { AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, type ArgumentInspectionResult, type AuditEntryForClassify, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, type BlastEnvFinding, type BlastFinding, type BlastResult, type BlastSummary, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, type CanaryHit, type CanaryValue, type CanaryView, type CanonicalAgent, type CanonicalFinding, type CanonicalFindingType, type CanonicalSourceType, type CatalogSettings, type CheckDef, type CheckGroup, type CheckSource, type CheckText, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, type Destination, type DestinationKind, type DlpMatch, ENGINE_VERSION, type EgressPolicy, type EgressVerdict, type ExtractContext, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, type FileAccess, type FileAccessContext, type FsOpVerdict, type InjectionConfidence, type InjectionContext, type InjectionMatch, type InspectionInput, type InspectionLayers, KNOB_GOVERNED, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, type LegacyPolicyKnobs, type LoopWindowEvaluation, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, type PackageEcosystem, type PackageInstallRequest, type PiiPattern, type PipeChainAnalysis, type PolicyConfig, type PolicyContext, type PolicyHostHooks, type PolicyVerdict, type PositionedArg, type ProtectedFileVerdict, type ProvenanceLookup, type ProvenanceTrust, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, type ResolvedCheck, type RiskMetadata, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, type ScanFinding, type ScanSignals, type ScanSummary, type ScanView, type ScoreTier, type SessionExtractContext, type SessionToolCall, type Severity, type ShellCommandAnalysis, type ShellDestToken, type ShellDestination, type ShellExposure, type ShellInputResolution, type ShieldDefinition, type ShieldOverrides, type ShieldVerdict, type SmartCondition, type SmartRule, type SsrfFloorOptions, type SsrfMatch, type SsrfTier, type SsrfVerdict, TUNING_FIELDS, type ToolCallEntry, type ToolCallRecord, type ToolInspection, type ToolInspectionEntry, type TuningField, VERDICTS, type Verdict, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
package/dist/index.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -1211,6 +1211,63 @@ declare function isLoopbackHost(host: string): boolean;
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  declare function gitRepoPath(url: string): string | null;
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  declare function isDestructiveToolName(bareTool: string): boolean;
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+ /** The value as the gate compares it: email lower-cased, IBAN and account
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+ * upper-cased without spaces, host lower-cased. */
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+ declare function normalizeDestination(dest: string): string;
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+ /** 'iban:GB82 **** **** 5432', 'account:****5432', 'email:d***@acme.example';
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+ * a host (or anything else) is returned normalised and otherwise unchanged. */
1219
+ declare function maskDestination(dest: string): string;
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+ /** Whether a destination's kind is masked outside the machine. */
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+ declare function isMaskedKind(dest: string): boolean;
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+ /** SHA-256 (hex) of the normalised destination, kind prefix included. */
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+ declare function hashDestination(dest: string): string;
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+ /** Whether `entry` is a stored masked entry ('<masked>#sha256:<hex>'). */
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+ declare function isHashedEntry(entry: string): boolean;
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+ /** A full destination as it is stored on a trusted list outside the machine:
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+ * a masked kind becomes '<masked>#sha256:<hex>', a host stays as it is. */
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+ declare function trustedEntryOf(dest: string): string;
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+ /** Does a full destination match a stored entry (a hashed one, or a plain
1230
+ * value as the local list and older managed lists hold)? */
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+ declare function matchesTrustedEntry(dest: string, entry: string): boolean;
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+ /** Does a full destination match any entry of a list? Hashes it once. */
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+ declare function matchesTrustedList(dest: string, entries: readonly string[]): boolean;
1234
+ /**
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+ * A recipient as a person types it, in the stored destination form: an
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+ * address becomes `email:`, an IBAN `iban:`, a URL or hostname `host:`, and
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+ * `account:<number>` keeps its kind. A value that carries its kind is checked
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+ * against it. Null for anything else (a bare word, two values in one).
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+ */
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+ declare function normalizeRecipient(raw: unknown): string | null;
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+ /**
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+ * One entry of a trusted list outside the machine (the dashboard's workspace
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+ * list, the snapshot's personal list): a host in full; an address, IBAN or
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+ * account as '<masked>#sha256:<hex>'. A value already in that form passes
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+ * with its hash lower-cased; a full value is turned into it. Null when it is
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+ * neither. The backend mirror asserts the same vectors.
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+ */
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+ declare function normalizeTrustedEntry(raw: unknown): string | null;
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+ /** What a person reads for an entry: the masked part, without the hash. */
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+ declare function entryDisplay(entry: string): string;
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+ /**
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+ * IBANs (mod-97), card numbers (exactly what detectPii reports, so not the
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+ * fractional part of a number), account numbers (a whole IBAN-shaped value,
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+ * or a number under an account key) and email addresses inside a text,
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+ * masked the way destinations are. No quote or backslash is introduced or
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+ * removed, so a JSON string stays a JSON string; a card written as a bare
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+ * JSON number does not stay a number, so arguments go through
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+ * maskPersonalValue instead.
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+ */
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+ declare function maskPersonalData(text: string): string;
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+ /**
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+ * maskPersonalData over a JSON-shaped value (tool arguments), leaf by leaf, so
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+ * the result is always a value: a string leaf is masked in its JSON form under
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+ * its own key (the account-key and whole-value rules still see both), an
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+ * object key is masked as text, and a number whose text holds personal data (a
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+ * card passed as a number) becomes the masked string. Anything deeper than 64
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+ * levels is replaced by '[REDACTED]'. Pure, never throws.
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+ */
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+ declare function maskPersonalValue(value: unknown): unknown;
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+
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  interface ShellExposure {
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  /** The command brings outside content in: its output is a source. */
1216
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  fetches: boolean;
@@ -1950,7 +2007,7 @@ declare const LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES: number;
1950
2007
  * and fails CI when the hash drifts without a version bump — forgetting
1951
2008
  * is loud, not silent.
1952
2009
  */
1953
- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v26";
2010
+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v27";
1954
2011
  /**
1955
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  * SHA-256 prefix of the detector-source files
1956
2013
  * (canonical.ts + pii.ts + destructive-regex.ts).
@@ -1961,7 +2018,7 @@ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v26";
1961
2018
  * files changed, this hash must change too, and you must consciously
1962
2019
  * decide whether to bump CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION."
1963
2020
  */
1964
- declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "dec8c65145686360";
2021
+ declare const CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "a358f47eacca6e14";
1965
2022
  declare function extractCanonicalFindings(call: ToolCallEntry, ctx: ExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
1966
2023
  declare function extractSessionLevelFindings(calls: ReadonlyArray<SessionToolCall>, ctx: SessionExtractContext): CanonicalFinding[];
1967
2024
  /**
@@ -2070,4 +2127,4 @@ declare function scanArgumentSecrets(args: unknown): DlpMatch | null;
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  /** Engine version stamped on audit entries for future drift detection. */
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  declare const ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
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2129
 
2073
- export { AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, type ArgumentInspectionResult, type AuditEntryForClassify, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, type BlastEnvFinding, type BlastFinding, type BlastResult, type BlastSummary, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, type CanaryHit, type CanaryValue, type CanaryView, type CanonicalAgent, type CanonicalFinding, type CanonicalFindingType, type CanonicalSourceType, type CatalogSettings, type CheckDef, type CheckGroup, type CheckSource, type CheckText, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, type Destination, type DestinationKind, type DlpMatch, ENGINE_VERSION, type EgressPolicy, type EgressVerdict, type ExtractContext, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, type FileAccess, type FileAccessContext, type FsOpVerdict, type InjectionConfidence, type InjectionContext, type InjectionMatch, type InspectionInput, type InspectionLayers, KNOB_GOVERNED, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, type LegacyPolicyKnobs, type LoopWindowEvaluation, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, type PackageEcosystem, type PackageInstallRequest, type PiiPattern, type PipeChainAnalysis, type PolicyConfig, type PolicyContext, type PolicyHostHooks, type PolicyVerdict, type PositionedArg, type ProtectedFileVerdict, type ProvenanceLookup, type ProvenanceTrust, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, type ResolvedCheck, type RiskMetadata, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, type ScanFinding, type ScanSignals, type ScanSummary, type ScanView, type ScoreTier, type SessionExtractContext, type SessionToolCall, type Severity, type ShellCommandAnalysis, type ShellDestToken, type ShellDestination, type ShellExposure, type ShellInputResolution, type ShieldDefinition, type ShieldOverrides, type ShieldVerdict, type SmartCondition, type SmartRule, type SsrfFloorOptions, type SsrfMatch, type SsrfTier, type SsrfVerdict, TUNING_FIELDS, type ToolCallEntry, type ToolCallRecord, type ToolInspection, type ToolInspectionEntry, type TuningField, VERDICTS, type Verdict, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isDestructiveToolName, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
2130
+ export { AGENT_INSTRUCTION_DIRS, AGENT_INSTRUCTION_FILES, ARGUMENT_SCAN_LIMITS, AST_FS_REGEX_RULES, type ArgumentInspectionResult, type AuditEntryForClassify, BASH_TOOL_NAMES, BUILTIN_DANGEROUS_WORDS, BUILTIN_SHIELDS, type BlastEnvFinding, type BlastFinding, type BlastResult, type BlastSummary, CANARY_MIN_LENGTH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH, CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION, CHECKS, CHECK_BY_ID, CHECK_GROUPS, CHECK_TEXT, CHECK_VERDICT_RANK, COMMAND_WRAPPERS, CONFIGURABLE_CHECK_IDS, COPY_VERBS, COST_PER_LOOP_ITER_USD, type CanaryHit, type CanaryValue, type CanaryView, type CanonicalAgent, type CanonicalFinding, type CanonicalFindingType, type CanonicalSourceType, type CatalogSettings, type CheckDef, type CheckGroup, type CheckSource, type CheckText, DEFAULT_EGRESS_ALLOWLIST, DESTINATION_ARGS, DESTRUCTIVE_OP_RE, DLP_PATTERNS, DLP_SCAN_LIMITS, type Destination, type DestinationKind, type DlpMatch, ENGINE_VERSION, type EgressPolicy, type EgressVerdict, type ExtractContext, FILE_TOOLS, FLAGS_WITH_VALUES, FS_READ_TOOLS, type FileAccess, type FileAccessContext, type FsOpVerdict, type InjectionConfidence, type InjectionContext, type InjectionMatch, type InspectionInput, type InspectionLayers, KNOB_GOVERNED, LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES, LOOP_MAX_RECORDS, LOOP_THRESHOLD_FOR_WASTE, type LegacyPolicyKnobs, type LoopWindowEvaluation, MAP_GOVERNED, MAX_BLAST_PATH, MAX_DESTINATIONS, NET_BINARIES, PATTERN_VERB_NAMES, PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION_RE, type PackageEcosystem, type PackageInstallRequest, type PiiPattern, type PipeChainAnalysis, type PolicyConfig, type PolicyContext, type PolicyHostHooks, type PolicyVerdict, type PositionedArg, type ProtectedFileVerdict, type ProvenanceLookup, type ProvenanceTrust, REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS, type ResolvedCheck, type RiskMetadata, SCAN_SIGNAL_WEIGHTS, SENSITIVE_PATH_RE, SENSITIVE_PATH_REGEXES, SSRF_MAX_HOST, STARTUP_NAMES, SYSTEM_AUTH_DIRS, SYSTEM_AUTH_FILES, type ScanFinding, type ScanSignals, type ScanSummary, type ScanView, type ScoreTier, type SessionExtractContext, type SessionToolCall, type Severity, type ShellCommandAnalysis, type ShellDestToken, type ShellDestination, type ShellExposure, type ShellInputResolution, type ShieldDefinition, type ShieldOverrides, type ShieldVerdict, type SmartCondition, type SmartRule, type SsrfFloorOptions, type SsrfMatch, type SsrfTier, type SsrfVerdict, TUNING_FIELDS, type ToolCallEntry, type ToolCallRecord, type ToolInspection, type ToolInspectionEntry, type TuningField, VERDICTS, type Verdict, analyzeFsOperation, analyzePipeChain, analyzeShellCommand, catalogSettingsFromConfig, checkDangerousSql, checkIdForCheckedBy, checkIdForRule, checkToLegacyPolicy, checkValue, checksFromLegacyPolicy, classifyAuditEntry, classifyRuleSeverity, classifyScanSignal, classifyShellExposure, classifySsrf, collectFileAccesses, computeAgentDeviceScore, computeArgsHash, computeBlendedSecurityScore, computeScanScore, computeSecurityScore, configurableValues, decodeEmbeddedBase64, decodeEmbeddedHex, dedupeCanonicalFindings, destinationDomain, destinationKind, destinationValue, detectArgsPii, detectDangerousEval, detectDangerousShellExec, detectInlineExec, detectPii, entryDisplay, evaluateEgress, evaluateLoopWindow, evaluatePolicy, evaluateProtectedFileAccess, evaluateSmartConditions, extractAllSshHosts, extractArgDestinations, extractCanonicalFindings, extractContentDestinations, extractNetworkTargets, extractPackageInstalls, extractPositionalArgs, extractSessionLevelFindings, extractShellDestTokens, extractShellDestinations, extractToolDestinations, fileOperandFlagsOf, fileToolOperation, foldHomoglyphs, getCheck, getCompiledRegex, getNestedValue, gitRepoPath, hashDestination, hostMatches, incompleteFileVerdict, inspectArgumentSecrets, inspectionEntry, inspectionLayers, isAgentInstructionPath, isBashTool, isDestructiveToolName, isHashedEntry, isIgnoredTool, isInside, isKnobGoverned, isLegacySystemPath, isLockedCheck, isLoopbackHost, isMaskedKind, isPasswordHashPath, isPrivateHost, isProtectedHomePath, isShellShapedTool, isShieldVerdict, isStrictGatedTier, isVerdict, maskDestination, maskPersonalData, maskPersonalValue, matchCanary, matchCanaryArgs, matchSensitivePath, matchesPattern, matchesTrustedEntry, matchesTrustedList, narrativeRuleLabel, normalizeCommandForPolicy, normalizeDestination, normalizeFilePath, normalizeForScan, normalizeIpLiteral, normalizePyPiName, normalizeRecipient, normalizeTrustedEntry, parseAllSshHostsFromCommand, parseDestHost, patternShapeOf, positionedArgs, previewArgs, redactText, resolveAllChecks, resolveCheck, resolveCheckMap, resolvePinned, resolveShellInput, safeMessage, sampleCopyCommand, scanArgs, scanArgumentSecrets, scanInjection, scanText, scanViews, sensitivePathMatch, shellRuleArgs, ssrfCheckId, ssrfDestinationFloor, ssrfExemptMatches, ssrfFloor, ssrfReason, stripControlChars, stripInvisible, stripTerminalEscapes, summarizeBlast, summarizeScan, toScanFinding, toolMatchesRule, truncateBlastPath, trustedEntryOf, tuningFromLegacyPolicy, tuningToLegacyPolicy, unwrapCommandHead, validateOverrides, validateRegex, validateShieldDefinition };
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
111
111
  detectDangerousShellExec: () => detectDangerousShellExec,
112
112
  detectInlineExec: () => detectInlineExec,
113
113
  detectPii: () => detectPii,
114
+ entryDisplay: () => entryDisplay,
114
115
  evaluateEgress: () => evaluateEgress,
115
116
  evaluateLoopWindow: () => evaluateLoopWindow,
116
117
  evaluatePolicy: () => evaluatePolicy,
@@ -134,6 +135,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
134
135
  getCompiledRegex: () => getCompiledRegex,
135
136
  getNestedValue: () => getNestedValue,
136
137
  gitRepoPath: () => gitRepoPath,
138
+ hashDestination: () => hashDestination,
137
139
  hostMatches: () => hostMatches,
138
140
  incompleteFileVerdict: () => incompleteFileVerdict,
139
141
  inspectArgumentSecrets: () => inspectArgumentSecrets,
@@ -142,12 +144,14 @@ __export(src_exports, {
142
144
  isAgentInstructionPath: () => isAgentInstructionPath,
143
145
  isBashTool: () => isBashTool,
144
146
  isDestructiveToolName: () => isDestructiveToolName,
147
+ isHashedEntry: () => isHashedEntry,
145
148
  isIgnoredTool: () => isIgnoredTool,
146
149
  isInside: () => isInside,
147
150
  isKnobGoverned: () => isKnobGoverned,
148
151
  isLegacySystemPath: () => isLegacySystemPath,
149
152
  isLockedCheck: () => isLockedCheck,
150
153
  isLoopbackHost: () => isLoopbackHost,
154
+ isMaskedKind: () => isMaskedKind,
151
155
  isPasswordHashPath: () => isPasswordHashPath,
152
156
  isPrivateHost: () => isPrivateHost,
153
157
  isProtectedHomePath: () => isProtectedHomePath,
@@ -155,16 +159,24 @@ __export(src_exports, {
155
159
  isShieldVerdict: () => isShieldVerdict,
156
160
  isStrictGatedTier: () => isStrictGatedTier,
157
161
  isVerdict: () => isVerdict,
162
+ maskDestination: () => maskDestination,
163
+ maskPersonalData: () => maskPersonalData,
164
+ maskPersonalValue: () => maskPersonalValue,
158
165
  matchCanary: () => matchCanary,
159
166
  matchCanaryArgs: () => matchCanaryArgs,
160
167
  matchSensitivePath: () => matchSensitivePath2,
161
168
  matchesPattern: () => matchesPattern,
169
+ matchesTrustedEntry: () => matchesTrustedEntry,
170
+ matchesTrustedList: () => matchesTrustedList,
162
171
  narrativeRuleLabel: () => narrativeRuleLabel,
163
172
  normalizeCommandForPolicy: () => normalizeCommandForPolicy,
173
+ normalizeDestination: () => normalizeDestination,
164
174
  normalizeFilePath: () => normalizeFilePath,
165
175
  normalizeForScan: () => normalizeForScan,
166
176
  normalizeIpLiteral: () => normalizeIpLiteral,
167
177
  normalizePyPiName: () => normalizePyPiName,
178
+ normalizeRecipient: () => normalizeRecipient,
179
+ normalizeTrustedEntry: () => normalizeTrustedEntry,
168
180
  parseAllSshHostsFromCommand: () => parseAllSshHostsFromCommand,
169
181
  parseDestHost: () => parseDestHost,
170
182
  patternShapeOf: () => patternShapeOf,
@@ -198,6 +210,7 @@ __export(src_exports, {
198
210
  toScanFinding: () => toScanFinding,
199
211
  toolMatchesRule: () => toolMatchesRule,
200
212
  truncateBlastPath: () => truncateBlastPath,
213
+ trustedEntryOf: () => trustedEntryOf,
201
214
  tuningFromLegacyPolicy: () => tuningFromLegacyPolicy,
202
215
  tuningToLegacyPolicy: () => tuningToLegacyPolicy,
203
216
  unwrapCommandHead: () => unwrapCommandHead,
@@ -11531,6 +11544,264 @@ function isDestructiveToolName(bareTool) {
11531
11544
  return DESTRUCTIVE_VERB_RE.test(bareTool);
11532
11545
  }
11533
11546
 
11547
+ // src/exposure/mask.ts
11548
+ var import_crypto2 = require("crypto");
11549
+
11550
+ // src/scan/pii.ts
11551
+ var PII_EMAIL_RE = /\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\b/;
11552
+ var PII_SSN_RE = /\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b/;
11553
+ var PII_PHONE_RE = /\b(?:\+?1[-.\s]?)?\(?\d{3}\)?[-.\s]\d{3}[-.\s]\d{4}\b/;
11554
+ var PII_CC16_RE = /\b(?:4\d{3}|5[1-5]\d{2}|6\d{3})[-\s]?\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}\b/;
11555
+ var PII_CC15_RE = /\b3[47]\d{2}[-\s]?\d{6}[-\s]?\d{5}\b/;
11556
+ var PII_IBAN_RE = /\b[A-Z]{2}\d{2}(?:[A-Z0-9]|[ -][A-Z0-9]){11,30}\b/;
11557
+ function* validCardRuns(text, base2) {
11558
+ const re = new RegExp(base2.source, "g");
11559
+ let m;
11560
+ while ((m = re.exec(text)) !== null) {
11561
+ const digits = m[0].replace(/\D/g, "");
11562
+ if (!isDecimalFraction(text, m.index, digits.length === m[0].length) && validateLuhn(digits)) {
11563
+ yield { index: m.index, length: m[0].length, digits };
11564
+ } else {
11565
+ re.lastIndex = m.index + 1;
11566
+ }
11567
+ }
11568
+ }
11569
+ function hasValidCard(text) {
11570
+ for (const base2 of [PII_CC16_RE, PII_CC15_RE]) {
11571
+ if (!validCardRuns(text, base2).next().done) return true;
11572
+ }
11573
+ return false;
11574
+ }
11575
+ function replaceValidCards(text, replace) {
11576
+ let out = text;
11577
+ for (const base2 of [PII_CC16_RE, PII_CC15_RE]) {
11578
+ let res = "";
11579
+ let last = 0;
11580
+ for (const run of validCardRuns(out, base2)) {
11581
+ res += out.slice(last, run.index) + replace(run.digits);
11582
+ last = run.index + run.length;
11583
+ }
11584
+ out = res + out.slice(last);
11585
+ }
11586
+ return out;
11587
+ }
11588
+ var NUMBER_LEAD_RE = /[\s:=;([{"'+-]/;
11589
+ function isDecimalFraction(text, index, unseparated) {
11590
+ if (!unseparated) return false;
11591
+ const sep = text[index - 1];
11592
+ const a = text[index - 2];
11593
+ if (sep === ".") {
11594
+ if (a !== void 0 && a >= "0" && a <= "9") return true;
11595
+ return a === void 0 || NUMBER_LEAD_RE.test(a);
11596
+ }
11597
+ if (sep === "," && a === "0") {
11598
+ const b = text[index - 3];
11599
+ return b === void 0 || NUMBER_LEAD_RE.test(b);
11600
+ }
11601
+ return false;
11602
+ }
11603
+ function hasValidIban(text) {
11604
+ const re = new RegExp(PII_IBAN_RE.source, "g");
11605
+ let m;
11606
+ while ((m = re.exec(text)) !== null) {
11607
+ if (validateIban(m[0])) return true;
11608
+ re.lastIndex = m.index + 1;
11609
+ }
11610
+ return false;
11611
+ }
11612
+ function detectPii(text) {
11613
+ const found = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
11614
+ if (/@/.test(text) && PII_EMAIL_RE.test(text)) found.add("Email");
11615
+ if (/-/.test(text) && PII_SSN_RE.test(text)) found.add("SSN");
11616
+ if (PII_PHONE_RE.test(text)) found.add("Phone");
11617
+ if (hasValidCard(text)) found.add("Credit Card");
11618
+ if (hasValidIban(text)) found.add("IBAN");
11619
+ return [...found];
11620
+ }
11621
+ var REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS = ["SSN", "Credit Card", "IBAN"];
11622
+ var MAX_PII_SCAN_BYTES = 1e5;
11623
+ function* stringLeaves(v, depth = 0) {
11624
+ if (depth > 6) return;
11625
+ if (typeof v === "string") {
11626
+ if (v.length > 0) yield v;
11627
+ return;
11628
+ }
11629
+ if (typeof v === "number") {
11630
+ if (Number.isFinite(v)) yield String(v);
11631
+ return;
11632
+ }
11633
+ if (!v || typeof v !== "object") return;
11634
+ if (Array.isArray(v)) {
11635
+ for (const x of v) yield* stringLeaves(x, depth + 1);
11636
+ return;
11637
+ }
11638
+ for (const x of Object.values(v)) yield* stringLeaves(x, depth + 1);
11639
+ }
11640
+ function detectArgsPii(args) {
11641
+ if (args === null || args === void 0) return [];
11642
+ const found = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
11643
+ let budget = MAX_PII_SCAN_BYTES;
11644
+ try {
11645
+ for (const leaf of stringLeaves(args)) {
11646
+ if (budget <= 0) break;
11647
+ const t = leaf.length > budget ? leaf.slice(0, budget) : leaf;
11648
+ budget -= t.length;
11649
+ for (const p of detectPii(t)) {
11650
+ if (REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS.includes(p)) found.add(p);
11651
+ }
11652
+ }
11653
+ } catch {
11654
+ return [];
11655
+ }
11656
+ return [...found];
11657
+ }
11658
+
11659
+ // src/exposure/mask.ts
11660
+ var MASKED_KINDS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["email", "iban", "account"]);
11661
+ var ENTRY_RE = /^(email|iban|account):([^#\s]{1,200}(?: [^#\s]{1,40}){0,4})#sha256:([0-9a-f]{64})$/;
11662
+ function split(dest) {
11663
+ const i = dest.indexOf(":");
11664
+ if (i <= 0) return null;
11665
+ return { kind: dest.slice(0, i).toLowerCase(), value: dest.slice(i + 1) };
11666
+ }
11667
+ function normalizeDestination(dest) {
11668
+ const p = split(dest.trim());
11669
+ if (!p) return dest.trim();
11670
+ if (p.kind === "iban" || p.kind === "account")
11671
+ return `${p.kind}:${p.value.replace(/\s+/g, "").toUpperCase()}`;
11672
+ return `${p.kind}:${p.value.toLowerCase()}`;
11673
+ }
11674
+ function maskEmailValue(address) {
11675
+ const at = address.lastIndexOf("@");
11676
+ if (at <= 0) return "***";
11677
+ return `${address[0]}***@${address.slice(at + 1)}`;
11678
+ }
11679
+ function maskDestination(dest) {
11680
+ const n = normalizeDestination(dest);
11681
+ const p = split(n);
11682
+ if (!p || !MASKED_KINDS.has(p.kind)) return n;
11683
+ if (p.kind === "iban") return `iban:${p.value.slice(0, 4)} **** **** ${p.value.slice(-4)}`;
11684
+ if (p.kind === "account") return `account:****${p.value.slice(-4)}`;
11685
+ return `email:${maskEmailValue(p.value)}`;
11686
+ }
11687
+ function isMaskedKind(dest) {
11688
+ const p = split(dest);
11689
+ return !!p && MASKED_KINDS.has(p.kind);
11690
+ }
11691
+ function hashDestination(dest) {
11692
+ return (0, import_crypto2.createHash)("sha256").update(normalizeDestination(dest), "utf8").digest("hex");
11693
+ }
11694
+ function isHashedEntry(entry) {
11695
+ return ENTRY_RE.test(entry);
11696
+ }
11697
+ function trustedEntryOf(dest) {
11698
+ const n = normalizeDestination(dest);
11699
+ if (!isMaskedKind(n)) return n;
11700
+ return `${maskDestination(n)}#sha256:${hashDestination(n)}`;
11701
+ }
11702
+ function matchesTrustedEntry(dest, entry) {
11703
+ const m = ENTRY_RE.exec(entry);
11704
+ if (m) return hashDestination(dest) === m[3];
11705
+ return normalizeDestination(dest) === normalizeDestination(entry);
11706
+ }
11707
+ function matchesTrustedList(dest, entries) {
11708
+ if (entries.length === 0) return false;
11709
+ const plain = normalizeDestination(dest);
11710
+ let hash2;
11711
+ for (const entry of entries) {
11712
+ const m = ENTRY_RE.exec(entry);
11713
+ if (m) {
11714
+ hash2 ??= hashDestination(dest);
11715
+ if (hash2 === m[3]) return true;
11716
+ } else if (plain === normalizeDestination(entry)) return true;
11717
+ }
11718
+ return false;
11719
+ }
11720
+ function normalizeRecipient(raw) {
11721
+ if (typeof raw !== "string") return null;
11722
+ const v = raw.trim();
11723
+ if (!v || v.length > 512) return null;
11724
+ const acct = /^account:([A-Za-z0-9 ]{8,40})$/i.exec(v);
11725
+ if (acct) {
11726
+ const n = acct[1].replace(/\s+/g, "").toUpperCase();
11727
+ return n.length >= 8 && n.length <= 34 ? `account:${n}` : null;
11728
+ }
11729
+ if (/^(email|host|iban):/i.test(v)) {
11730
+ const i = v.indexOf(":");
11731
+ const kind = v.slice(0, i).toLowerCase();
11732
+ const inner = normalizeRecipient(v.slice(i + 1));
11733
+ return inner && inner.startsWith(`${kind}:`) ? inner : null;
11734
+ }
11735
+ const found = extractArgDestinations({ to: v });
11736
+ return found.length === 1 ? found[0] : null;
11737
+ }
11738
+ function normalizeTrustedEntry(raw) {
11739
+ if (typeof raw !== "string") return null;
11740
+ const v = raw.trim().replace(/#sha256:([0-9A-Fa-f]{64})$/, (_m, h) => `#sha256:${h.toLowerCase()}`);
11741
+ if (v.includes("#")) return isHashedEntry(v) ? v : null;
11742
+ const full = normalizeRecipient(v);
11743
+ return full === null ? null : trustedEntryOf(full);
11744
+ }
11745
+ function entryDisplay(entry) {
11746
+ const i = entry.indexOf("#sha256:");
11747
+ return i > 0 ? entry.slice(0, i) : entry;
11748
+ }
11749
+ var IBAN_TEXT_RE = /\b[A-Z]{2}\d{2}(?:[ -]?[A-Z0-9]{4}){2,7}(?:[ -]?[A-Z0-9]{1,4})?\b/gi;
11750
+ var EMAIL_TEXT_RE = /[\p{L}\p{N}._%+-]+@[\p{L}\p{N}](?:[\p{L}\p{N}-]*[\p{L}\p{N}])?(?:\.[\p{L}\p{N}](?:[\p{L}\p{N}-]*[\p{L}\p{N}])?)*\.\p{L}{2,}/gu;
11751
+ var ACCOUNT_KEY_RE = /("(?:iban|account|account_number|accountNumber)"\s*:\s*")([A-Za-z0-9 .-]{6,40})(")/g;
11752
+ var ACCOUNT_VALUE_RE = /"([A-Z]{2}\d{2}[A-Z0-9]{11,30})"/g;
11753
+ function maskPersonalData(text) {
11754
+ if (!text) return text;
11755
+ try {
11756
+ let out = text;
11757
+ out = out.replace(IBAN_TEXT_RE, (m) => {
11758
+ const v = m.replace(/[ -]/g, "").toUpperCase();
11759
+ return validateIban(v) ? `${v.slice(0, 4)} **** **** ${v.slice(-4)}` : m;
11760
+ });
11761
+ out = replaceValidCards(out, (digits) => `**** **** **** ${digits.slice(-4)}`);
11762
+ out = out.replace(
11763
+ ACCOUNT_VALUE_RE,
11764
+ (m, v) => IBAN_LENGTH[v.slice(0, 2).toUpperCase()] === v.length ? `"****${v.slice(-4)}"` : m
11765
+ );
11766
+ out = out.replace(ACCOUNT_KEY_RE, (m, a, v, b) => {
11767
+ const compact = v.replace(/[ .-]/g, "");
11768
+ const digits = compact.replace(/\D/g, "").length;
11769
+ return digits >= 6 && digits * 2 >= compact.length ? `${a}****${compact.slice(-4)}${b}` : m;
11770
+ });
11771
+ if (out.includes("@")) out = out.replace(EMAIL_TEXT_RE, (m) => maskEmailValue(m));
11772
+ return out;
11773
+ } catch {
11774
+ return text;
11775
+ }
11776
+ }
11777
+ var MAX_MASK_DEPTH = 64;
11778
+ function maskPersonalValue(value) {
11779
+ return maskLeaf(value, "", 0);
11780
+ }
11781
+ function maskLeaf(value, key, depth) {
11782
+ if (depth > MAX_MASK_DEPTH) return "[REDACTED]";
11783
+ if (typeof value === "string") {
11784
+ try {
11785
+ const json = `{${JSON.stringify(key)}:${JSON.stringify(value)}}`;
11786
+ return Object.values(JSON.parse(maskPersonalData(json)))[0];
11787
+ } catch {
11788
+ return "[REDACTED]";
11789
+ }
11790
+ }
11791
+ if (typeof value === "number") {
11792
+ const text = String(value);
11793
+ const masked = maskPersonalData(text);
11794
+ return masked === text ? value : masked;
11795
+ }
11796
+ if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map((v) => maskLeaf(v, key, depth + 1));
11797
+ if (value && typeof value === "object") {
11798
+ return Object.fromEntries(
11799
+ Object.entries(value).map(([k, v]) => [maskPersonalData(k), maskLeaf(v, k, depth + 1)])
11800
+ );
11801
+ }
11802
+ return value;
11803
+ }
11804
+
11534
11805
  // src/exposure/shell.ts
11535
11806
  var import_mvdan_sh4 = __toESM(require("mvdan-sh"));
11536
11807
  var { syntax: syntax4 } = import_mvdan_sh4.default;
@@ -12011,11 +12282,11 @@ function safeMessage(value, max = 300) {
12011
12282
  }
12012
12283
 
12013
12284
  // src/loop/index.ts
12014
- var import_crypto2 = __toESM(require("crypto"));
12285
+ var import_crypto3 = __toESM(require("crypto"));
12015
12286
  var LOOP_MAX_RECORDS = 500;
12016
12287
  function computeArgsHash(args) {
12017
12288
  const str = JSON.stringify(args ?? "");
12018
- return import_crypto2.default.createHash("sha256").update(str).digest("hex").slice(0, 16);
12289
+ return import_crypto3.default.createHash("sha256").update(str).digest("hex").slice(0, 16);
12019
12290
  }
12020
12291
  function evaluateLoopWindow(records, tool, args, threshold, windowMs, now) {
12021
12292
  const hash2 = computeArgsHash(args);
@@ -12310,88 +12581,6 @@ var FILE_TOOLS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
12310
12581
  "list_files"
12311
12582
  ]);
12312
12583
 
12313
- // src/scan/pii.ts
12314
- var PII_EMAIL_RE = /\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\b/;
12315
- var PII_SSN_RE = /\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b/;
12316
- var PII_PHONE_RE = /\b(?:\+?1[-.\s]?)?\(?\d{3}\)?[-.\s]\d{3}[-.\s]\d{4}\b/;
12317
- var PII_CC16_RE = /\b(?:4\d{3}|5[1-5]\d{2}|6\d{3})[-\s]?\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}\b/;
12318
- var PII_CC15_RE = /\b3[47]\d{2}[-\s]?\d{6}[-\s]?\d{5}\b/;
12319
- var PII_IBAN_RE = /\b[A-Z]{2}\d{2}(?:[A-Z0-9]|[ -][A-Z0-9]){11,30}\b/;
12320
- function hasValidCard(text) {
12321
- for (const base2 of [PII_CC16_RE, PII_CC15_RE]) {
12322
- const re = new RegExp(base2.source, "g");
12323
- let m;
12324
- while ((m = re.exec(text)) !== null) {
12325
- const digits = m[0].replace(/\D/g, "");
12326
- if (!isDecimalFraction(text, m.index, digits.length === m[0].length)) {
12327
- if (validateLuhn(digits)) return true;
12328
- }
12329
- re.lastIndex = m.index + 1;
12330
- }
12331
- }
12332
- return false;
12333
- }
12334
- function isDecimalFraction(text, index, unseparated) {
12335
- if (!unseparated || text[index - 1] !== ".") return false;
12336
- const before = text.charCodeAt(index - 2);
12337
- return before >= 48 && before <= 57;
12338
- }
12339
- function hasValidIban(text) {
12340
- const re = new RegExp(PII_IBAN_RE.source, "g");
12341
- let m;
12342
- while ((m = re.exec(text)) !== null) {
12343
- if (validateIban(m[0])) return true;
12344
- re.lastIndex = m.index + 1;
12345
- }
12346
- return false;
12347
- }
12348
- function detectPii(text) {
12349
- const found = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
12350
- if (/@/.test(text) && PII_EMAIL_RE.test(text)) found.add("Email");
12351
- if (/-/.test(text) && PII_SSN_RE.test(text)) found.add("SSN");
12352
- if (PII_PHONE_RE.test(text)) found.add("Phone");
12353
- if (hasValidCard(text)) found.add("Credit Card");
12354
- if (hasValidIban(text)) found.add("IBAN");
12355
- return [...found];
12356
- }
12357
- var REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS = ["SSN", "Credit Card", "IBAN"];
12358
- var MAX_PII_SCAN_BYTES = 1e5;
12359
- function* stringLeaves(v, depth = 0) {
12360
- if (depth > 6) return;
12361
- if (typeof v === "string") {
12362
- if (v.length > 0) yield v;
12363
- return;
12364
- }
12365
- if (typeof v === "number") {
12366
- if (Number.isFinite(v)) yield String(v);
12367
- return;
12368
- }
12369
- if (!v || typeof v !== "object") return;
12370
- if (Array.isArray(v)) {
12371
- for (const x of v) yield* stringLeaves(x, depth + 1);
12372
- return;
12373
- }
12374
- for (const x of Object.values(v)) yield* stringLeaves(x, depth + 1);
12375
- }
12376
- function detectArgsPii(args) {
12377
- if (args === null || args === void 0) return [];
12378
- const found = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
12379
- let budget = MAX_PII_SCAN_BYTES;
12380
- try {
12381
- for (const leaf of stringLeaves(args)) {
12382
- if (budget <= 0) break;
12383
- const t = leaf.length > budget ? leaf.slice(0, budget) : leaf;
12384
- budget -= t.length;
12385
- for (const p of detectPii(t)) {
12386
- if (REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS.includes(p)) found.add(p);
12387
- }
12388
- }
12389
- } catch {
12390
- return [];
12391
- }
12392
- return [...found];
12393
- }
12394
-
12395
12584
  // src/dlp/canary.ts
12396
12585
  var CANARY_MIN_LENGTH = 16;
12397
12586
  var MAX_TEXT = 1e5;
@@ -12563,8 +12752,8 @@ function matchCanaryArgs(args, values) {
12563
12752
 
12564
12753
  // src/scan/canonical.ts
12565
12754
  var LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES = 100 * 1024;
12566
- var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v26";
12567
- var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "dec8c65145686360";
12755
+ var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v27";
12756
+ var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "a358f47eacca6e14";
12568
12757
  var DEDUPE_PREVIEW_LEN = 120;
12569
12758
  function extractCanonicalFindings(call, ctx) {
12570
12759
  const out = [];
@@ -13016,6 +13205,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
13016
13205
  detectDangerousShellExec,
13017
13206
  detectInlineExec,
13018
13207
  detectPii,
13208
+ entryDisplay,
13019
13209
  evaluateEgress,
13020
13210
  evaluateLoopWindow,
13021
13211
  evaluatePolicy,
@@ -13039,6 +13229,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
13039
13229
  getCompiledRegex,
13040
13230
  getNestedValue,
13041
13231
  gitRepoPath,
13232
+ hashDestination,
13042
13233
  hostMatches,
13043
13234
  incompleteFileVerdict,
13044
13235
  inspectArgumentSecrets,
@@ -13047,12 +13238,14 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
13047
13238
  isAgentInstructionPath,
13048
13239
  isBashTool,
13049
13240
  isDestructiveToolName,
13241
+ isHashedEntry,
13050
13242
  isIgnoredTool,
13051
13243
  isInside,
13052
13244
  isKnobGoverned,
13053
13245
  isLegacySystemPath,
13054
13246
  isLockedCheck,
13055
13247
  isLoopbackHost,
13248
+ isMaskedKind,
13056
13249
  isPasswordHashPath,
13057
13250
  isPrivateHost,
13058
13251
  isProtectedHomePath,
@@ -13060,16 +13253,24 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
13060
13253
  isShieldVerdict,
13061
13254
  isStrictGatedTier,
13062
13255
  isVerdict,
13256
+ maskDestination,
13257
+ maskPersonalData,
13258
+ maskPersonalValue,
13063
13259
  matchCanary,
13064
13260
  matchCanaryArgs,
13065
13261
  matchSensitivePath,
13066
13262
  matchesPattern,
13263
+ matchesTrustedEntry,
13264
+ matchesTrustedList,
13067
13265
  narrativeRuleLabel,
13068
13266
  normalizeCommandForPolicy,
13267
+ normalizeDestination,
13069
13268
  normalizeFilePath,
13070
13269
  normalizeForScan,
13071
13270
  normalizeIpLiteral,
13072
13271
  normalizePyPiName,
13272
+ normalizeRecipient,
13273
+ normalizeTrustedEntry,
13073
13274
  parseAllSshHostsFromCommand,
13074
13275
  parseDestHost,
13075
13276
  patternShapeOf,
@@ -13103,6 +13304,7 @@ var ENGINE_VERSION = "1.4.0";
13103
13304
  toScanFinding,
13104
13305
  toolMatchesRule,
13105
13306
  truncateBlastPath,
13307
+ trustedEntryOf,
13106
13308
  tuningFromLegacyPolicy,
13107
13309
  tuningToLegacyPolicy,
13108
13310
  unwrapCommandHead,
package/dist/index.mjs CHANGED
@@ -11322,6 +11322,264 @@ function isDestructiveToolName(bareTool) {
11322
11322
  return DESTRUCTIVE_VERB_RE.test(bareTool);
11323
11323
  }
11324
11324
 
11325
+ // src/exposure/mask.ts
11326
+ import { createHash as createHash3 } from "crypto";
11327
+
11328
+ // src/scan/pii.ts
11329
+ var PII_EMAIL_RE = /\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\b/;
11330
+ var PII_SSN_RE = /\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b/;
11331
+ var PII_PHONE_RE = /\b(?:\+?1[-.\s]?)?\(?\d{3}\)?[-.\s]\d{3}[-.\s]\d{4}\b/;
11332
+ var PII_CC16_RE = /\b(?:4\d{3}|5[1-5]\d{2}|6\d{3})[-\s]?\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}\b/;
11333
+ var PII_CC15_RE = /\b3[47]\d{2}[-\s]?\d{6}[-\s]?\d{5}\b/;
11334
+ var PII_IBAN_RE = /\b[A-Z]{2}\d{2}(?:[A-Z0-9]|[ -][A-Z0-9]){11,30}\b/;
11335
+ function* validCardRuns(text, base2) {
11336
+ const re = new RegExp(base2.source, "g");
11337
+ let m;
11338
+ while ((m = re.exec(text)) !== null) {
11339
+ const digits = m[0].replace(/\D/g, "");
11340
+ if (!isDecimalFraction(text, m.index, digits.length === m[0].length) && validateLuhn(digits)) {
11341
+ yield { index: m.index, length: m[0].length, digits };
11342
+ } else {
11343
+ re.lastIndex = m.index + 1;
11344
+ }
11345
+ }
11346
+ }
11347
+ function hasValidCard(text) {
11348
+ for (const base2 of [PII_CC16_RE, PII_CC15_RE]) {
11349
+ if (!validCardRuns(text, base2).next().done) return true;
11350
+ }
11351
+ return false;
11352
+ }
11353
+ function replaceValidCards(text, replace) {
11354
+ let out = text;
11355
+ for (const base2 of [PII_CC16_RE, PII_CC15_RE]) {
11356
+ let res = "";
11357
+ let last = 0;
11358
+ for (const run of validCardRuns(out, base2)) {
11359
+ res += out.slice(last, run.index) + replace(run.digits);
11360
+ last = run.index + run.length;
11361
+ }
11362
+ out = res + out.slice(last);
11363
+ }
11364
+ return out;
11365
+ }
11366
+ var NUMBER_LEAD_RE = /[\s:=;([{"'+-]/;
11367
+ function isDecimalFraction(text, index, unseparated) {
11368
+ if (!unseparated) return false;
11369
+ const sep = text[index - 1];
11370
+ const a = text[index - 2];
11371
+ if (sep === ".") {
11372
+ if (a !== void 0 && a >= "0" && a <= "9") return true;
11373
+ return a === void 0 || NUMBER_LEAD_RE.test(a);
11374
+ }
11375
+ if (sep === "," && a === "0") {
11376
+ const b = text[index - 3];
11377
+ return b === void 0 || NUMBER_LEAD_RE.test(b);
11378
+ }
11379
+ return false;
11380
+ }
11381
+ function hasValidIban(text) {
11382
+ const re = new RegExp(PII_IBAN_RE.source, "g");
11383
+ let m;
11384
+ while ((m = re.exec(text)) !== null) {
11385
+ if (validateIban(m[0])) return true;
11386
+ re.lastIndex = m.index + 1;
11387
+ }
11388
+ return false;
11389
+ }
11390
+ function detectPii(text) {
11391
+ const found = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
11392
+ if (/@/.test(text) && PII_EMAIL_RE.test(text)) found.add("Email");
11393
+ if (/-/.test(text) && PII_SSN_RE.test(text)) found.add("SSN");
11394
+ if (PII_PHONE_RE.test(text)) found.add("Phone");
11395
+ if (hasValidCard(text)) found.add("Credit Card");
11396
+ if (hasValidIban(text)) found.add("IBAN");
11397
+ return [...found];
11398
+ }
11399
+ var REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS = ["SSN", "Credit Card", "IBAN"];
11400
+ var MAX_PII_SCAN_BYTES = 1e5;
11401
+ function* stringLeaves(v, depth = 0) {
11402
+ if (depth > 6) return;
11403
+ if (typeof v === "string") {
11404
+ if (v.length > 0) yield v;
11405
+ return;
11406
+ }
11407
+ if (typeof v === "number") {
11408
+ if (Number.isFinite(v)) yield String(v);
11409
+ return;
11410
+ }
11411
+ if (!v || typeof v !== "object") return;
11412
+ if (Array.isArray(v)) {
11413
+ for (const x of v) yield* stringLeaves(x, depth + 1);
11414
+ return;
11415
+ }
11416
+ for (const x of Object.values(v)) yield* stringLeaves(x, depth + 1);
11417
+ }
11418
+ function detectArgsPii(args) {
11419
+ if (args === null || args === void 0) return [];
11420
+ const found = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
11421
+ let budget = MAX_PII_SCAN_BYTES;
11422
+ try {
11423
+ for (const leaf of stringLeaves(args)) {
11424
+ if (budget <= 0) break;
11425
+ const t = leaf.length > budget ? leaf.slice(0, budget) : leaf;
11426
+ budget -= t.length;
11427
+ for (const p of detectPii(t)) {
11428
+ if (REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS.includes(p)) found.add(p);
11429
+ }
11430
+ }
11431
+ } catch {
11432
+ return [];
11433
+ }
11434
+ return [...found];
11435
+ }
11436
+
11437
+ // src/exposure/mask.ts
11438
+ var MASKED_KINDS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["email", "iban", "account"]);
11439
+ var ENTRY_RE = /^(email|iban|account):([^#\s]{1,200}(?: [^#\s]{1,40}){0,4})#sha256:([0-9a-f]{64})$/;
11440
+ function split(dest) {
11441
+ const i = dest.indexOf(":");
11442
+ if (i <= 0) return null;
11443
+ return { kind: dest.slice(0, i).toLowerCase(), value: dest.slice(i + 1) };
11444
+ }
11445
+ function normalizeDestination(dest) {
11446
+ const p = split(dest.trim());
11447
+ if (!p) return dest.trim();
11448
+ if (p.kind === "iban" || p.kind === "account")
11449
+ return `${p.kind}:${p.value.replace(/\s+/g, "").toUpperCase()}`;
11450
+ return `${p.kind}:${p.value.toLowerCase()}`;
11451
+ }
11452
+ function maskEmailValue(address) {
11453
+ const at = address.lastIndexOf("@");
11454
+ if (at <= 0) return "***";
11455
+ return `${address[0]}***@${address.slice(at + 1)}`;
11456
+ }
11457
+ function maskDestination(dest) {
11458
+ const n = normalizeDestination(dest);
11459
+ const p = split(n);
11460
+ if (!p || !MASKED_KINDS.has(p.kind)) return n;
11461
+ if (p.kind === "iban") return `iban:${p.value.slice(0, 4)} **** **** ${p.value.slice(-4)}`;
11462
+ if (p.kind === "account") return `account:****${p.value.slice(-4)}`;
11463
+ return `email:${maskEmailValue(p.value)}`;
11464
+ }
11465
+ function isMaskedKind(dest) {
11466
+ const p = split(dest);
11467
+ return !!p && MASKED_KINDS.has(p.kind);
11468
+ }
11469
+ function hashDestination(dest) {
11470
+ return createHash3("sha256").update(normalizeDestination(dest), "utf8").digest("hex");
11471
+ }
11472
+ function isHashedEntry(entry) {
11473
+ return ENTRY_RE.test(entry);
11474
+ }
11475
+ function trustedEntryOf(dest) {
11476
+ const n = normalizeDestination(dest);
11477
+ if (!isMaskedKind(n)) return n;
11478
+ return `${maskDestination(n)}#sha256:${hashDestination(n)}`;
11479
+ }
11480
+ function matchesTrustedEntry(dest, entry) {
11481
+ const m = ENTRY_RE.exec(entry);
11482
+ if (m) return hashDestination(dest) === m[3];
11483
+ return normalizeDestination(dest) === normalizeDestination(entry);
11484
+ }
11485
+ function matchesTrustedList(dest, entries) {
11486
+ if (entries.length === 0) return false;
11487
+ const plain = normalizeDestination(dest);
11488
+ let hash2;
11489
+ for (const entry of entries) {
11490
+ const m = ENTRY_RE.exec(entry);
11491
+ if (m) {
11492
+ hash2 ??= hashDestination(dest);
11493
+ if (hash2 === m[3]) return true;
11494
+ } else if (plain === normalizeDestination(entry)) return true;
11495
+ }
11496
+ return false;
11497
+ }
11498
+ function normalizeRecipient(raw) {
11499
+ if (typeof raw !== "string") return null;
11500
+ const v = raw.trim();
11501
+ if (!v || v.length > 512) return null;
11502
+ const acct = /^account:([A-Za-z0-9 ]{8,40})$/i.exec(v);
11503
+ if (acct) {
11504
+ const n = acct[1].replace(/\s+/g, "").toUpperCase();
11505
+ return n.length >= 8 && n.length <= 34 ? `account:${n}` : null;
11506
+ }
11507
+ if (/^(email|host|iban):/i.test(v)) {
11508
+ const i = v.indexOf(":");
11509
+ const kind = v.slice(0, i).toLowerCase();
11510
+ const inner = normalizeRecipient(v.slice(i + 1));
11511
+ return inner && inner.startsWith(`${kind}:`) ? inner : null;
11512
+ }
11513
+ const found = extractArgDestinations({ to: v });
11514
+ return found.length === 1 ? found[0] : null;
11515
+ }
11516
+ function normalizeTrustedEntry(raw) {
11517
+ if (typeof raw !== "string") return null;
11518
+ const v = raw.trim().replace(/#sha256:([0-9A-Fa-f]{64})$/, (_m, h) => `#sha256:${h.toLowerCase()}`);
11519
+ if (v.includes("#")) return isHashedEntry(v) ? v : null;
11520
+ const full = normalizeRecipient(v);
11521
+ return full === null ? null : trustedEntryOf(full);
11522
+ }
11523
+ function entryDisplay(entry) {
11524
+ const i = entry.indexOf("#sha256:");
11525
+ return i > 0 ? entry.slice(0, i) : entry;
11526
+ }
11527
+ var IBAN_TEXT_RE = /\b[A-Z]{2}\d{2}(?:[ -]?[A-Z0-9]{4}){2,7}(?:[ -]?[A-Z0-9]{1,4})?\b/gi;
11528
+ var EMAIL_TEXT_RE = /[\p{L}\p{N}._%+-]+@[\p{L}\p{N}](?:[\p{L}\p{N}-]*[\p{L}\p{N}])?(?:\.[\p{L}\p{N}](?:[\p{L}\p{N}-]*[\p{L}\p{N}])?)*\.\p{L}{2,}/gu;
11529
+ var ACCOUNT_KEY_RE = /("(?:iban|account|account_number|accountNumber)"\s*:\s*")([A-Za-z0-9 .-]{6,40})(")/g;
11530
+ var ACCOUNT_VALUE_RE = /"([A-Z]{2}\d{2}[A-Z0-9]{11,30})"/g;
11531
+ function maskPersonalData(text) {
11532
+ if (!text) return text;
11533
+ try {
11534
+ let out = text;
11535
+ out = out.replace(IBAN_TEXT_RE, (m) => {
11536
+ const v = m.replace(/[ -]/g, "").toUpperCase();
11537
+ return validateIban(v) ? `${v.slice(0, 4)} **** **** ${v.slice(-4)}` : m;
11538
+ });
11539
+ out = replaceValidCards(out, (digits) => `**** **** **** ${digits.slice(-4)}`);
11540
+ out = out.replace(
11541
+ ACCOUNT_VALUE_RE,
11542
+ (m, v) => IBAN_LENGTH[v.slice(0, 2).toUpperCase()] === v.length ? `"****${v.slice(-4)}"` : m
11543
+ );
11544
+ out = out.replace(ACCOUNT_KEY_RE, (m, a, v, b) => {
11545
+ const compact = v.replace(/[ .-]/g, "");
11546
+ const digits = compact.replace(/\D/g, "").length;
11547
+ return digits >= 6 && digits * 2 >= compact.length ? `${a}****${compact.slice(-4)}${b}` : m;
11548
+ });
11549
+ if (out.includes("@")) out = out.replace(EMAIL_TEXT_RE, (m) => maskEmailValue(m));
11550
+ return out;
11551
+ } catch {
11552
+ return text;
11553
+ }
11554
+ }
11555
+ var MAX_MASK_DEPTH = 64;
11556
+ function maskPersonalValue(value) {
11557
+ return maskLeaf(value, "", 0);
11558
+ }
11559
+ function maskLeaf(value, key, depth) {
11560
+ if (depth > MAX_MASK_DEPTH) return "[REDACTED]";
11561
+ if (typeof value === "string") {
11562
+ try {
11563
+ const json = `{${JSON.stringify(key)}:${JSON.stringify(value)}}`;
11564
+ return Object.values(JSON.parse(maskPersonalData(json)))[0];
11565
+ } catch {
11566
+ return "[REDACTED]";
11567
+ }
11568
+ }
11569
+ if (typeof value === "number") {
11570
+ const text = String(value);
11571
+ const masked = maskPersonalData(text);
11572
+ return masked === text ? value : masked;
11573
+ }
11574
+ if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map((v) => maskLeaf(v, key, depth + 1));
11575
+ if (value && typeof value === "object") {
11576
+ return Object.fromEntries(
11577
+ Object.entries(value).map(([k, v]) => [maskPersonalData(k), maskLeaf(v, k, depth + 1)])
11578
+ );
11579
+ }
11580
+ return value;
11581
+ }
11582
+
11325
11583
  // src/exposure/shell.ts
11326
11584
  import mvdanSh4 from "mvdan-sh";
11327
11585
  var { syntax: syntax4 } = mvdanSh4;
@@ -12101,88 +12359,6 @@ var FILE_TOOLS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
12101
12359
  "list_files"
12102
12360
  ]);
12103
12361
 
12104
- // src/scan/pii.ts
12105
- var PII_EMAIL_RE = /\b[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Za-z0-9.-]+\.[A-Za-z]{2,}\b/;
12106
- var PII_SSN_RE = /\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b/;
12107
- var PII_PHONE_RE = /\b(?:\+?1[-.\s]?)?\(?\d{3}\)?[-.\s]\d{3}[-.\s]\d{4}\b/;
12108
- var PII_CC16_RE = /\b(?:4\d{3}|5[1-5]\d{2}|6\d{3})[-\s]?\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}[-\s]?\d{4}\b/;
12109
- var PII_CC15_RE = /\b3[47]\d{2}[-\s]?\d{6}[-\s]?\d{5}\b/;
12110
- var PII_IBAN_RE = /\b[A-Z]{2}\d{2}(?:[A-Z0-9]|[ -][A-Z0-9]){11,30}\b/;
12111
- function hasValidCard(text) {
12112
- for (const base2 of [PII_CC16_RE, PII_CC15_RE]) {
12113
- const re = new RegExp(base2.source, "g");
12114
- let m;
12115
- while ((m = re.exec(text)) !== null) {
12116
- const digits = m[0].replace(/\D/g, "");
12117
- if (!isDecimalFraction(text, m.index, digits.length === m[0].length)) {
12118
- if (validateLuhn(digits)) return true;
12119
- }
12120
- re.lastIndex = m.index + 1;
12121
- }
12122
- }
12123
- return false;
12124
- }
12125
- function isDecimalFraction(text, index, unseparated) {
12126
- if (!unseparated || text[index - 1] !== ".") return false;
12127
- const before = text.charCodeAt(index - 2);
12128
- return before >= 48 && before <= 57;
12129
- }
12130
- function hasValidIban(text) {
12131
- const re = new RegExp(PII_IBAN_RE.source, "g");
12132
- let m;
12133
- while ((m = re.exec(text)) !== null) {
12134
- if (validateIban(m[0])) return true;
12135
- re.lastIndex = m.index + 1;
12136
- }
12137
- return false;
12138
- }
12139
- function detectPii(text) {
12140
- const found = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
12141
- if (/@/.test(text) && PII_EMAIL_RE.test(text)) found.add("Email");
12142
- if (/-/.test(text) && PII_SSN_RE.test(text)) found.add("SSN");
12143
- if (PII_PHONE_RE.test(text)) found.add("Phone");
12144
- if (hasValidCard(text)) found.add("Credit Card");
12145
- if (hasValidIban(text)) found.add("IBAN");
12146
- return [...found];
12147
- }
12148
- var REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS = ["SSN", "Credit Card", "IBAN"];
12149
- var MAX_PII_SCAN_BYTES = 1e5;
12150
- function* stringLeaves(v, depth = 0) {
12151
- if (depth > 6) return;
12152
- if (typeof v === "string") {
12153
- if (v.length > 0) yield v;
12154
- return;
12155
- }
12156
- if (typeof v === "number") {
12157
- if (Number.isFinite(v)) yield String(v);
12158
- return;
12159
- }
12160
- if (!v || typeof v !== "object") return;
12161
- if (Array.isArray(v)) {
12162
- for (const x of v) yield* stringLeaves(x, depth + 1);
12163
- return;
12164
- }
12165
- for (const x of Object.values(v)) yield* stringLeaves(x, depth + 1);
12166
- }
12167
- function detectArgsPii(args) {
12168
- if (args === null || args === void 0) return [];
12169
- const found = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
12170
- let budget = MAX_PII_SCAN_BYTES;
12171
- try {
12172
- for (const leaf of stringLeaves(args)) {
12173
- if (budget <= 0) break;
12174
- const t = leaf.length > budget ? leaf.slice(0, budget) : leaf;
12175
- budget -= t.length;
12176
- for (const p of detectPii(t)) {
12177
- if (REALTIME_PII_PATTERNS.includes(p)) found.add(p);
12178
- }
12179
- }
12180
- } catch {
12181
- return [];
12182
- }
12183
- return [...found];
12184
- }
12185
-
12186
12362
  // src/dlp/canary.ts
12187
12363
  var CANARY_MIN_LENGTH = 16;
12188
12364
  var MAX_TEXT = 1e5;
@@ -12354,8 +12530,8 @@ function matchCanaryArgs(args, values) {
12354
12530
 
12355
12531
  // src/scan/canonical.ts
12356
12532
  var LONG_OUTPUT_THRESHOLD_BYTES = 100 * 1024;
12357
- var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v26";
12358
- var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "dec8c65145686360";
12533
+ var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_VERSION = "canonical-v27";
12534
+ var CANONICAL_EXTRACTOR_HASH = "a358f47eacca6e14";
12359
12535
  var DEDUPE_PREVIEW_LEN = 120;
12360
12536
  function extractCanonicalFindings(call, ctx) {
12361
12537
  const out = [];
@@ -12806,6 +12982,7 @@ export {
12806
12982
  detectDangerousShellExec,
12807
12983
  detectInlineExec,
12808
12984
  detectPii,
12985
+ entryDisplay,
12809
12986
  evaluateEgress,
12810
12987
  evaluateLoopWindow,
12811
12988
  evaluatePolicy,
@@ -12829,6 +13006,7 @@ export {
12829
13006
  getCompiledRegex,
12830
13007
  getNestedValue,
12831
13008
  gitRepoPath,
13009
+ hashDestination,
12832
13010
  hostMatches,
12833
13011
  incompleteFileVerdict,
12834
13012
  inspectArgumentSecrets,
@@ -12837,12 +13015,14 @@ export {
12837
13015
  isAgentInstructionPath,
12838
13016
  isBashTool,
12839
13017
  isDestructiveToolName,
13018
+ isHashedEntry,
12840
13019
  isIgnoredTool,
12841
13020
  isInside,
12842
13021
  isKnobGoverned,
12843
13022
  isLegacySystemPath,
12844
13023
  isLockedCheck,
12845
13024
  isLoopbackHost,
13025
+ isMaskedKind,
12846
13026
  isPasswordHashPath,
12847
13027
  isPrivateHost,
12848
13028
  isProtectedHomePath,
@@ -12850,16 +13030,24 @@ export {
12850
13030
  isShieldVerdict,
12851
13031
  isStrictGatedTier,
12852
13032
  isVerdict,
13033
+ maskDestination,
13034
+ maskPersonalData,
13035
+ maskPersonalValue,
12853
13036
  matchCanary,
12854
13037
  matchCanaryArgs,
12855
13038
  matchSensitivePath2 as matchSensitivePath,
12856
13039
  matchesPattern,
13040
+ matchesTrustedEntry,
13041
+ matchesTrustedList,
12857
13042
  narrativeRuleLabel,
12858
13043
  normalizeCommandForPolicy,
13044
+ normalizeDestination,
12859
13045
  normalizeFilePath,
12860
13046
  normalizeForScan,
12861
13047
  normalizeIpLiteral,
12862
13048
  normalizePyPiName,
13049
+ normalizeRecipient,
13050
+ normalizeTrustedEntry,
12863
13051
  parseAllSshHostsFromCommand,
12864
13052
  parseDestHost,
12865
13053
  patternShapeOf,
@@ -12893,6 +13081,7 @@ export {
12893
13081
  toScanFinding,
12894
13082
  toolMatchesRule,
12895
13083
  truncateBlastPath,
13084
+ trustedEntryOf,
12896
13085
  tuningFromLegacyPolicy,
12897
13086
  tuningToLegacyPolicy,
12898
13087
  unwrapCommandHead,
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@node9/policy-engine",
3
- "version": "2.33.0",
3
+ "version": "2.33.1",
4
4
  "description": "Shared policy evaluation engine for node9 — DLP, smart rules, AST shell parsing, shields, loop detection. Pure functions, no I/O. Used by both node9-proxy and the node9 SaaS firewall.",
5
5
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
6
6
  "homepage": "https://node9.ai",